FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001200060002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 12, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
N?
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR
1953-57
CIA/RR 148
12 September 1958
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEICH AND REPORTS
RETURN TO WKS & REttalt CENTER
IAIMEATELY AFTER USE
Innux-a
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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.ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR
1953-57
CIA/RR 148
(ORR Project 41.1764A)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Introduction 4
II. Legal Developments Affecting Forced Labor 5
A. Changes in Legal Procedures 5
B. Changes in Criminal Laws 7
C. Amnesties 8
III. Changes in the Administration of Forced Labor . 9
A. Situation at the Beginning of 1953 9
B. 1953-55 10
C. 1956-57 11
IV. Changes in the Treatment of Prisoners 12
A. Living Conditions 13
B. Working Conditions 14
C. Other Conditions 15
V. Changes in the Numbertof Camps and Prisoners 16
A. Camps 16
B. Prisoners 19
VI: Other Evidence of a Major Change in Forced Labor
Policy. 22
A. Release of Foreign Prisoners 22
B. Effects of the Amnesties 24
C. Decline in the Utilization of Forced Labor in
Individual Industries - .25
D. Recruitment of Free Workers and Rehabilitation
of Former Forced Labor Centers 27
VII. Major Factors Contributing to the Change in Forced
Labor Policy 29
A. Economic Considerations 29
B. Political Considerations 33
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Appendix A.
Appendix B.
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Appendixes
Location of Forced Labor Camps in the USSR, .
1953-57
Strikes and Other Disturbances in Forced
Labor Camps in the USSR 1953-55
Page
35
45
Tables
1. Distribution of Places Associated with Forced Labor
Camps in the USSR) by Economic Region, 1953-57 . . .
2. Distribution of Places Associated with Forced Labor
Camps in the USSR, by Year of Latest Identification,
1953-57
3. Estimates of the Prison Population in the USSR, by
Category, 1952-56
Illustrations
Figure 1. Administrative Structure for Forced Labor in
the USSR, March 1953 (Chart)
Figure 2. Administrative Structure for Forced Labor in
the USSR) December 1957 (Chart)
Figure 3. Location of Forced Labor Camps in the USSR,
1953-57 (map)
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(ORB Project 41.1764A)
FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR*
1953-57
Summary and Conclusions
Since the beginning of the Communist regime the USSR has used forced
labor as an instrument of political and social control. Its use has been
given legal sanction in Soviet penal codes and ideological sanction in
the tenets of Communist doctrine. It has been employed in varying degrees
at different periods in Soviet history to further changing policy objec-
tives, both political and economic.
At the beginning of 1953, forced labor occupied an important place
in the Soviet system, a place far different from that of prison labor
in Western countries. Several million prisoners were confined in camps
scattered throughout the USSR, with large camp clusters located in Cen-
tral Siberia, the Far North, and the Far East. The prisoners were em-
ployed in a variety of enterprises, hut mainly in construction and ex-
tractive activities, and their labor contributed significantly to the
economy. The forced labor system was administered in a highly centralized
manner by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which not only con-
trolled the prison labor force but also managed the most important eco-
nomic enterprises employing such workers.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 inaugurated a series of events
which have profoundly affected all aspects of the system of forced labor
in the USSR. Important changes? have been made in legal procedures,
which, if enforced, will make it considerably more difficult to send
people to forced labor camps than was possible with the arbitrary methods
permissible in the past. The most important of these changes was the
abolition of the MVD's Special Conference, an extrajudicial body
authorized to impose sentences by administrative action, and the sub-
sequent review of all such sentences. In addition, special courts which
tried certain kinds of cases investigated by the MVD were abolished, as
were courts that had jurisdiction over cases involving employees of the
transport system. The right to try civilians (except for espionage) was
taken away from the military courts. Nearly all cases involving civilians
are now under the jurisdiction of the regular kray, oblast, and republic
courts, whose powers have been strengthened by the transfer of some
functions formerly given to the Ministry of Justice. In addition, the ?
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of ORB as of 1 July 1958.
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Procurator General, USSR, and his counterparts on the regional and local
levels have been vested with increased powers to enforce judicial ad-
herence to established law and legal protedures. In addition to these
reforms in judicial procedure, a number of changes have been made in the
content of Soviet criminal law which reduce the number of offenses pun-
ishable by imprisonment and which lessen the severity of the penal sen-
tences prescribed for other offenses. The basic penal codes also are
currently being revised.
The administratiOn of the camp system has undergone a radical trans-
formation since 1953, and the treatment of the prisoners has improved
substantially. Within a few months after Stalin's death, the MVD was
divested of all of its extensive entrepreneurial activities based on
the use of forced labor and of all responsibility for administering the
far-flung system of corrective labor camps. The economic functions were
assumed by the appropriate economic ministries, and the camps were taken
over by the Ministry of Justice. In 1954 the camps were returned to the
control of the MVD and its Main Administration of Capps (GULAG), along
with some lumbering and agricultural enterprises. Beginning in April
1956, however, MVD control over the camp system was weakened through a
series of reorganizations which resulted in a broad administrative de-
centralization of the police and the prison system. With respect to
forced labor, it was decided to place all of the camps -- including
even the large camp complexes formerly administered directly from Mos-
cow -- under the direct control of newly created Administrations of
Internal Affairs subordinate to oblast and kray Executive Committees.
The Administrations themselves were made dually subordinate -- to these
committees and to the Ministries of Internal Affairs in the republics.
it was decided some time in 1956 to 50X1
convert all corrective labor camps to corrective labor "colonies," where
the principal emphasis would be on rehabilitating the prisoners and
returning them speedily to civilian life rather than on exploiting
prison labor for economic purposes. Under the new system, prison labor
allegedly will no longer be hired out to civilian enterprises; rather,
the prisoners will be employed in.prison workshops. The extent to
which the planned conversion is being carried out is not known. Pris-
oners were still being employed by civilian enterprises in Magadanskaya
Oblast in early 1957. 50X1
The number of persons in corrective labor camps has declined sharply
since 1953, perhaps by as much as two-thirds
Several million prisoners were freed as a result of six separa50X1
amnesties issued during 1953-57, through the repatriation of foreign
prisoners and through a systematic review of individual cases. Although
definitive estimates are not possible, the available evidence suggests
that the prison population probably was less than 5 million at the
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beginning of 1953 and that by the end of 1957 it had dropped to less
than 2 million and may even have been as low as 1 million. This evi-
dence also indicates that most previous estimates of the size of the
prison population were too high.
Along with the freeing of prisoners, large numbers of camps have
been closed or converted to civilian use, including the large camp com-
plex at Noril'sk. Forced labor still existed in 1956 in the places that
have long been forced labor centers -- Vorkuta, Karaganda, Irkutsk,
Magadan, and Khabarovsk -- but both the number of individual camp sites
and the number of inmates had. declined greatly. These former centers
are currently being "rehabilitated" through the large-scale influx of
free workers, and major housing construction programs are being under-
taken.
Prison labor has virtually disappeared from the gold-mining industry
in the Far East, where it had long been almost the only source of man-
power. A substantial decline in the use of forced labor for mining
nickel, coal, tin, tungsten, and copper also has taken place, as evi-
denced by camp liquidations, arrival of recruited free workers at enter-
prises formerly employing forced labor, and changes in camp administra-
tion. The last vestige of MVD activity in the timber industry was re-
moved in 1956, indicating that little or no prison labor is employed
there. The amount of prison labor now employed in railroad construction
appears to be negligible. Free labor is now being used on the kind of
large-scale development projects, such as the hydroelectric power proj-
ect at Bratsk, that would have employed prison labor in the past.
The change in Soviet policies with respect to forced labor results
from a number of factors, both economic and political. About 1952-53,
Soviet administrators evidently became convinced that economic progress
in a modern industrial state must depend on the provision of incentives
rather than on the use of coercion and that therefore the huge prison
labor force was a serious drag on over-all productivity. The adminis-
trative costs of the camp system were high, and the net output per pris-
oner must have been very low. Moreover, by 1953, after about 25 years
of the use of forced labor on a massive scale, a large part of the task
of developing the habitable frontier had been accomplished, and most of
the catastrophic destruction resulting from World War II had been re-
paired. The demographic consequences of the forced labor system also
were becoming apparent. The disability and mortality rates in the camps
were extremely high, and the isolation of large numbers of males neces-
sarily had an adverse effect on the birthrate. Finally, the strikes and
general unrest that spread through the prison camps during 1953 added to
the administrative difficulties and economic costs of the system.
Whatever the economic imperatives against the use of forced labor,
the transformation of the camp system could not have been accomplished
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without the relative political stability which has characterized the
post-Stalin period. There has been no serious threat to the status of
the, collective leadership or to the Soviet economic and political sys-
tem. By the end of 1957 the Soviet prison system was approaching the
status of such systems in Western countries -- that is, imprisonment was
being used as a method of punishment for criminal acts rather than pri-
marily as an instrument for political repression and economic exploita-
tion. As long as there is continued political stability, the gradual
conversion of the infamous forced labor system to a normal penal system
may be expected to continue.
I. Introduction.
Since the beginning of the Communist regime the USSR has used forced
labor as an instrument of political and social control. Its use is
given legal sanction in Soviet penal codes and philosophical sanction
in the tenets of Communism. Although it can be argued that all labor
in a Communist society is forced labor, the term as used in this report
may be considered synonymous with prison labor; it refers generally to
all prisoners, regardless of nationality and regardless of the type of
prison -- whether camp or colony -- in which they are confined.
Forced labor has been employed in varying degrees at different
periods in Soviet history to further changing policy objectives, both
economic and political. At the beginning of 1953 the institution of
forced labor occupied an important place in the Soviet system, a place
far different from that of prison labor in Western countries. Several
million prisoners were confined in camps scattered throughout the USSR,
with large camp clusters located in Central Siberia, the Far North, and
the Far East. The prisoners were employed in a variety of enterprises,
and their labor made a significant contribution to the economy. The
forced labor system was administered in a highly centralized manner by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which not only controlled the
prison labor force but also managed the most important economic enter-
prises employing such workers. During 1953-57 the system underwent a
radical transformation. The present report was undertaken to assess
the nature of this transformation, to explore its rationale, and to
determine its current status and probable future course. The report
is based on an exhaustive analysis of several thousand pertinent docu-
ments. Although specific source citations have been made in many
instances, most of the conclusions concerning the various changes in
the system represent composite judgments based on an analysis of the
material as a whole.
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II. Legal Developments Affecting Forced Labor.
The use of forced ("corrective") labor as a means of punishment has
long been an inherent part of the Soviet legal system. The criminal
and penal codes of the various union republics provide for three types
of punishments involving forced labor -- corrective labor without de-
privation of liberty, exile with corrective labor, and deprivation of
liberty with corrective labor. The latter form, entailing confinement
and work under guard in camps and colonies scattered throughout the
USSR, undoubtedly has been the most significant, with respect both to
numbers involved and to economic consequences and is the form with
which this report is concerned. Under the various penal codes, per-
sons may be sentenced to corrective labor for ordinary criminal offenses,
such as murder, robbery, rape, and embezzlement, and for so-called
"political" offenses, such as "counterrevolutionary crimes" and "crimes
against the established order which are especially dangerous to the
Soviet Union" (for example, sections 58 and 59 of the criminal code of
the RSFSR). Sentences to corrective labor may range from a few months
to as long as 25 years.
The death of Stalin in March 1953 inaugurated a series of events in
the field of law and legal procedure which have had profound effects on
the use of forced labor as a punitive device. As part of a cohcerted
campaign to "improve socialist legality," important changes have been
made in legal procedures, which, if enforced, will make it considerably
more difficult to send large numbers of persons to forced labor camps
than was possible with the arbitrary methods permissible in the past.
Legislative changes have reduced the number and kinds of offenses punish-
able by sentence to corrective labor institutions. Finally, a series
of amnesties has greatly reduced the population of the labor camps.
A. Changes in Legal Procedures.
As of March 1953, persons could be sentenced to corrective labor
either through regular judicial procedures or through administrative
action of the state police. 1/* Under the usual judicial procedure the
accused was charged with violation of a specific statute, was given a
court trial with the right to legal counsel, and was sentenced by a
judge or panel of judges. Cases involving ordinary criminal offenses
against persons or property were handled by the local peoples courts,
and cases involving certain kinds of counterrevolutionary crimes and
crimes against the state were tried by territorial and regional courts.
The military courts were assigned original jurisdiction in cases of
espionage, treason, terrorism, diversionary actiVities, and similar
crimes. Finally, certain crimes against the state for which the MVD
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was the investigative agency were tried by special tribunals organized
within the system of territorial courts.
Sentences to corrective labor could also be imposed by admin-
istrative action of the state police through the Special Conference of
the MVD. This body, usually called OSSO (Osoboye Soveshchaniye), was
created in 1934 and vested with authority to sentence to corrective
labor camps for periods of 5 years or less any person "recognized as
constituting a danger to society." Such action was taken by secret
administrative procedure, the accused having no right of counsel or
of appeal. This body was the chief legal instrument for carrying out
the political purges of the Stalin era and apparently was also used
extensively during the postwar period to sentence prisoners of war to
terms of corrective labor by charging them with violation of some Soviet
law. Almost never were the prisoners of war present at the proceedings,
which seem usually to have taken place in Moscow. Judging from state-
ments made by these ex-prisoners of war, the Conference imposed sentences
of 10 years or more, despite the statutory restriction limiting its
authority to sentences of 5 years or less.
A number of changes have taken place since 1953 in the methods
used to convict and sentence persons in the USSR. Probably the most
significant of these changes is the abolition of the Special Conference
of the MVD in September 1953 and the subsequent review of the cases of
all prisoners who had been sentenced by the tribunal. 2/ Although the
demise of the Conference seems to have been generally known among prison
camp inmates, it was not officially announced until 1956. Other extra-
judicial organs and procedures have also been abolished. In a decree of
19 April 1956 the Supreme Soviet stripped the MVD of its authority to
investigate and present certain kinds of cases involving terroristic
acts and abolished the special courts which formerly had tried such
cases. 3/ A subsequent decree issued in July 1956 removed the right of
military courts to try cases involving civilians, except cases of es-
pionage. The special courts which tried cases involving employees
of the rail and water transport system also have been abolished. V The
effect of these actions is to place all criminal casee involving civilians
(except espionage cases) under the jurisdiction of the regular kray,
oblast, and republic courts, whose powers have been strengthened by
these actions and by the assumption of some of the functions of the
recently dissolved Ministry of Justice in the USSR and of the Ministries
of Justice in the various republics.
To insure that the courts and the militia adhere to the prin-
ciples of the new "socialist legality," the Procurator General, USSR,
and his counterparts on the regional and local levels have been vested
with wider. authority to see to it that the legal acts of judicial and
administrative organs are in accord with law and established legal
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procedure. 2/ Soviet legal experts are currently drafting the "Princi-
ples of Criminal Trial Procedure in the USSR and the Union Republics,"
to be embodied in a law and submitted to the Supreme Soviet for action. 2/
Among these principles are the following: citizens may be convicted and
sentenced only by the courts, all citizens are equal before the law,
peoples assessors (jurymen) must participate in the hearing of cases in
all courts of original jurisdiction, judges must be independent and sub-
ordinate only to law, trials must be public, and defendants must be
allowed legal counsel. If principles such as these are adhered to in
practice, the character of Soviet justice will be quite different from
what it has been in recent decades, when persons could be sent to prison
without trial or the right to counsel and to appeal.
B. Changes in Criminal Laws.
In addition to reforms in judicial procedure, a number of changes
also have been made in the content of Soviet criminal law during the past
several years. The effect of these changes is to reduce the number of
offenses subject to criminal punishment and to lessen the severity of
penal sentences prescribed for other offenses. Thus, in a series of
decrees issued by the Supreme Soviet in 1955-56, criminal penalties were
eliminated for failure of kolkhoz members to work the required number of
27
workdays 8 /
; for absenteeism, tardiness, and unauthorized quitting by
workers ; for the illegal sale, exchange, or release of surplus equip-
ment by enterprise managers 12/; for unauthorized travel on freight
?:7 /
trains 11 ; and for avoiding mobilization for seasonal agricultural
work. 12 The severity of punishment for various "economic" crimes,
such as petty theft, has also been lessened, along with the abolition
of criminal arrest for violation of work discipline by employees of the
transport systems. 131 Likewise, the enactment of new measures providing
relatively light punishments for breach of the peace ("petty hooliganism")
makes it easier for the courts to avoid sentencing such persons under
other statutes to corrective labor camps for protracted periods, as had
been done in the past, when there were no specific laws dealing with
petty offenses. Finally, there seems to be general agreement that the
new criminal codes of the various republics, now in process of prepara-
tion, will remove some of the more onerous provisions of the laws gov-
erning political crimes, specifically those provisions relating to the
guilt assigned to relatives of persons convicted of political crimes and
military desertion. 1W Likewise, it appears that the sentencing tri-
bunals no longer will be permitted to apply the so-called doctrine of
analogy, which had been used in the past to sentence persons for acts
not specifically prohibited by law by means of a finding that such acts
were analogous to others that were explicitly proscribed.
Although the trend toward liberalization of criminal legislation
and legal procedure seems, at the moment, to be firmly established, two
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republics have recently passed "antiparasite" laws which are counter to
this trend. These laws, similar to those also being discussed in the
other republics, provide for 2 to 5 years' exile with compulsory labor
for any able-bodied person who is not gainfully employed in approved state.
enterprises or cooperatives. 12/ Sentences to exile may be imposed by '
the majority vote of citizens present at "general meetings" in villages
or other appropriate units, subject to confirmation by the executive
committee of the rayon or city soviet concerned. Thus not only do these
new laws prescribe harsh penalities for what would seem to be an innocuous
offense but also they permit the use of extralegal procedures to impose
such penalties. A decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 5 October 1956
imposes similar penalties on'gypsies who refuse to work, 1../ but this
decree, in contrast to the "antiparasite" laws of the republics, pro-
vides that sentences to exile may be imposed only by court action. In
view of the continuance of work on revision of the penal codes and of
the liberal tone of recent discussions of legal matters, however, it
seems probable that the actions taken against gypsies and parasites rep-
resent efforts to deal with a specific social problem rather than a
reversal of policy. ,
C. Amnesties.
Along with the various actions taken since 1953 to liberalize
criminal legislation and improve legal procedures, the USSR has issued
a number of amnesties under which large numbers of persons have been
freed from labor camps.* Six of these amnesties have been published
officially, as follows:
1. An edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated
27 March 1953 provided for a sweeping amnesty of all prisoners sentenced
to terms of 5 years or less. fl/ In addition, the decree freed all
pregnant women, women with children under 10 years of age, youths under
18, all men over 55 and women over 50, and the incurably ill.
2. An edict of 14 July 1954 provided for the release of
prisoners who had completed two-thirds of their sentences if they had
good conduct and work records,1?1/ and individual camp commanders were
authorized to ease the sentences of others with similar records.
3. A decree of 17 September 1955 permitted the immediate
release of persons sentenced up to 10 years for collaborating with the
Germans during World War II, and sentences of 10 years or more for such
crimes were halved. 12/ The decree also released, regardless of length
of sentence, those persons who were imprisoned for serving in the German
army and police or in "special German units."
* See pp. 24-25, below.
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4. In an edict of 25 September 1956 the provisions of the
amnesty of 17 September 1955 were extended to members of the Soviet
armed forces who had been imprisoned for having surrendered to the Ger-
man army during World War II. 22/
5. An edict of 13 December 1956 freed all Japanese citizens
held in Soviet prisons. gi/
6. Under a decree of 1 November 1957, amnesty was granted
to prisoners serving terms of 3 years or less, to juvenile offenders
aged 16 or under, to men over 60 and women over 55, and to women who
were pregnant or had children under 8 years of age. 22/ The sentences
of other prisoners were cut in half. Political prisoners; those con-
victed of serious crimes such as murder or banditry, repeat offenders,
and various other categories of prisoners were excepted from the amnesty.
According to statements of persons freed from Soviet prison
camps, several unpublished amnesties were issued in 1954 and 1955 in?,!
addition to the published amnesties already noted. These edicts al-. '
legedly freed persons who had been sentenced for crimes committed be-
fore their 18th birthday, prisoners considered physically unable to
work, and individuals imprisoned on religious grounds. 23/ Ex-prisoners
report the issuance in 1956 of decrees which 50X1
provided for the establishment of special commissions with authority
to review the cases of all political prisoners and to grant pardons or
commute sentences.2!-11 In this connection a "Rehabilitation Commission
of the Supreme Soviet' was reviewing the cases of prisoners in 1956.
III. Changes in the Administration of Forced Labor.
A. Situation at the Beginning of 1953.
? At the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, all forced labor in
the USSR was administered and controlled by the MVD. This Ministry em-
ployed its large prison labor force in a variety of economic undertakings
which were carried out by subordinate main administrations (glavki) or-
ganized along industrial lines. Among these .main administrations were
the following: Main Administration for Construction of the Far North
(Dalistroy), Main Administration of Mining and. Metallurgical Enterprises,
Main Administration of Special Nonferrous Metallurgy, Main Administration
of the Mica Industry, Main Administration of the Asbestos Industry, Main
Administration of Industrial Construction, Main Administration of High-
ways, Main Administration of Road Construction, Main Administration of
Railroad Construction, and Main Administration of the Timber Industry.
The labor for most of these ecqnomic activities was supplied by GULAG,
which administered directly or indirectly all of the forced labor caMps.
Several other main administrations existed within the MVD for the pur-
pose of supplying the camps and projects with material and equipment.
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GULAG, with headquarters in Moscow, administered a number of
large camp complexes (such as the Karlag camps in Karagandinskaya Oblast),
which were subordinated directly to GULAG because of their size or the
importance of their activities. 252 Other large complexes, such as the
Vorkuta camps, were subordinated directly to one of the MVD economic main
administrations, although administered through GULAG. In addition, GULAG
was responsible for the camps and colonies directly subordinate to GULAG
counterparts in the republics, oblasts, and krays. The accompanying
chart, Figure 1,* shows the probable administrative setup of the forced
labor system in March 1953.
Most of the centrally administered camp complexes, termed "ad-
ministrations," were divided into "sections," each having charge of a
number of individual camps (lagpunkty) within its territorial jurisdic-
tion. The administrations, sections, and individual camps had a common
organizational pattern, each having departments for production, accounting,
finance, supplies, prisoner registration and distribution, guard and
regime, and medical-sanitation. EaCh also had a so-called "third sec-
tion," which was responsible for the security investigation of all pris-
oners and camp personnel and was directly subordinate to the Ministry
of State Security (MOB). The camps and colonies administered by the
GULAG counterparts in the republics, oblasts, and krays followed the
organizational pattern of the federal camps, although these camps and
colonies usually were not grouped into administrations and sections.
B. 1953-55.
Within a few months after Stalin's death in March 1953 the MVD
was divested of all its extensive entrepreneurial activities based on the
use of forced labor and of all respbnsibility for administering the far-
flung system of camps and colonies. The Main Administration of Camps,
its local counterparts, and all its camps and colonies were transferred
to the Ministry of Justice. The various industrial administrations and
their subordinate units were transferred to appropriate economic min-
istries (principally the Ministry of the Coal Industry, the Ministry of
the Metallurgical Industry, the Ministry of the Construction Materials
Industry, the Ministry of Land Transportation, and the Ministry of the
Timber and Paper Industry). The transfer of GULAG to the Ministry of
Justice proved to be unsatisfactory, and it was returned to the MVD
early in 1954.
* Following p. 10.
** The transfer of GULAG to the Ministry of Justice reportedly resulted
in great administrative confusion. The Ministry, only about one-fifth
the size of GULAG, did not have the personnel resources to manage the
camps, with the result that only 28 percent of GULAG's plan for 1953 was
fulfilled. The transfer is alleged to have cost the USSR 25 million to
30 million rubles. a&
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Figure 1
Administrative Structure for Forced Labor
in the USSR
March 1953
MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF CAMPS
MVD
ECONOMIC
ADMINISTRATIONS
Far Northern Construction
Timber, Mining, and
Metallurgical Enterprises
Nonferrous Metallurgy
? Asbestos Industry
Mica Industry.
Highways
Industrial Construction
Railroad Construction
Road Construction
Federal Camps and
Camp Complexes
24981 9-58
SERVICE
ADMINISTRATIONS
Material and Technical Supply
Prison
Mining-Technical Inspectorate
Administrations of Camps
and Colonies
(MVD) in Republics, Obfasts,
and Krays
Camps and Colonies
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C. 1956-57.
Beginning in April 1956, the power of the MVD was further cur-
tailed by a series of reorganizations which resulted in a broad decen-
tralization of control over the police and the forced labor system. The
first of these reorganizations was the merger of the oblast and kray
administrations of police with the oblast and kray administrations of the
MVD. The next step was to transform the merged administrations into
Administrations of Internal Affairs (UVD) and to subordinate them directly
to the Executive Committees of the oblast and kray soviets of workers'
deputies. E/ The effect of these moves was to make the local units of
internal affairs dually responsible to the Ministry of Internal Affairs
in the republics and in Moscow and to the Executive Committees of the
?
local governments. Also, it seems likely that the guarding of camps and
the convoying of prisoners, formerly functions of the MVD, are performed
now by the regular police.
As a i-esult of these reorganizations, the Administrations of
Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies at the oblast and the kray level,
formerly subordinate directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
appropriate republic and indirectly to the MVD in Moscow, were placed as
departments under the control of the newly created Administrations of
Internal Affairs of the Executive Committees at the oblast and the kray
level. At about the same time, it was decided to transfer control of
all camps and colonies to these local administrations, including even the
large camp complexes formerly administered directly by GULAG in Moscow.
The rationale for this decision stems in part from a desire to decentra-
lize the prison system in line with a general move to increase the powers
of local government units in legal and economic affairs and in part also
from the need for adjusting the administrative structure for forced labor
to conform to the drastic decline in the number of camp inmates.* The
accompanying chart, Figure 2,** shows the presumed administrative setup
for forced labor as of the end of 1957.
In May 1956 an MVD official in Moscow reported to a visiting
delegation of French Socialists that the Soviet government had decided
to abolish all forced labor camps within 18 months. 28/
it had been decided to convert all
corrective labor camps to corrective labor "colonies," 29/ where the
principal emphasis would be on rehabilitating the prisoners and return-
ing them speedily to civilian life rather than on exploiting prisoner
labor for economic purposes. Apparently this program is being imple-
mented slowly, for as late as 10 December 1957 the press reported a sen-
tence to a corrective labor "camp." 30/
? * See pp. 21-22, below.
** Following p. 12.
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In another action the MVD of the USSR and the Councils of Min-
isters of the republics were assigned responsibility for maintaining
"strict order" in corrective labor establishments, and special con-
trol commissions of the oblast and kray soviets were formed with broad
responsibilities for exercising "public control" over the administra-
tion of prisons and colonies. 21/ The regulations establishing these
commissions specify that they are to insure the observance of "socialist
legality" and "proper maintenance" in prisons and see to it that the
prisoners are given "re-education" while in prison and that they get
jobs when they are released. Prison officials must submit all documents
demanded by these commissions and must follow their recommendations;
disputed questions are to be considered by the Executive Committee of
the local soviet. 22/ These commissions presumably are to supplement
the supervision exercised by the Department for Supervision over Places
of Deprivation of Freedom of the Office of the Procurator, USSR.
In addition to the concrete steps taken to reorganize the MVD
and the forced labor system, there was considerable discussion in the
press and in the legal journals in 1956-57 on a variety of legal, ad-
ministrative, and philosophical problems concerning the use of "correc-
tive labor" as a forth of punishment. 2L/ These subjects had not been
discussed in the press since at least the early 1930's. The articles
severely criticize the past legal and administrative practices with
respect to forced labor, a frequent charge being that those responsible
for prisoners emphasized the "economic" aspects of the system of cor-
rective labor to the almost total neglect of the "re-educational" as-
pects. One author notes that no books on corrective labor law, have
been published) nor had any scholarly Work been done in this field since
the 1930's, despite the fact that corrective labor was the most common
form of punishment in the USSR. 22/ Another article reports the pro-
ceedings of the first conference on corrective labor law in 25 years. 2W
IV. Changes in the Treatment of Prisoners.*
Although some amelioration in the lot of the inmates of forced labor
camps became noticeable as early as 1950-51, the changes that have taken
place since the death of Stalin have been spectacular. Encompassing
almost every aspect of prison life, these changes clearly have been
directed toward the gradual conversion of the Soviet forced labor sys-
tem into a prison system aimed at incarceration and rehabilitation of
ordinary criminals rather than a system geared to the silencing of
political opposition and to the development of remote geographic areas
with prison labor.
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Figure 2
Administrative Structure for
Forced Labor in the USSR
December 1957
MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
CORRECTIVE LABOR COLONIES
MVD, USSR
Administrations of Corrective Labor
Colonies, MVD, in the Republics
Executive Committees of
Oblast and Kray Soviets
of Workers' Deputies
24982 9-58
Departments of Corrective
Labor Colonies, MVD,
in ()blasts and Krays
Corrective Labor
Colonies
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A. Living Conditions.
Although living conditions varied widely, depending largely on
the camp location and the nature of its activities, the typical inmate
of a forced labor camp in the pre-Stalin period was housed in an over-
crowded wooden barracks accommodating from 60 to 200 persons. Prisoners
slept on wooden shelves or in bunks and were supplied with blankets.
Although prisoners report improvements in the supply of bedding and in
the fuel allocated for heating the barracks, the principal improvement
in housing conditions for the prisoners was the great reduction in the
number of persons per building resulting from the decline in the number
of prisoners. With respect to housing for prisoners, the conversion of
corrective labor camps to "colonies" announced in 1956 apparently was a
change in name only, as no new prisons are to be constructed, according
to a Soviet spokesman.
Male and female prisoners were consistently housed in separate
camps throughout the period under consideration. Policies with respect
to the segregation of other prisoner groups varied widely from camp to
camp, even in the same year, and no clear pattern of changes emerges for
the post-Stalin period. In general, separate camps were maintained for
German prisoners of war and for Germans who were sentenced under Soviet
criminal laws, but this practice was not carried out in areas of the Far
North (for example, Vorkuta) or in Central and Eastern Siberia. Other
nationalities usually were not segregated in any way, except that begin-
ning in 1954 an effort was made to assemble various nationality groups
in separate camps in order to facilitate their repatriation. In general,
both political and criminal prisoners were put in the same camp, although
SOM2 attempt apparently was made after 1953 to place these categories in
separate campe.
The amount of food allotted to camp inmates supposedly was pre-
scribed by MVD regulations, but in practice the size of the food ration
appears to have been one of the greatest variables in the life of the
prisoner, and wide differences in policy seem to have existed between
one camp and another even in the same year. An examination of several
thousand reports from ex-prisoners indicates that by the end of 1955
the average prisoner was getting considerably more food than he got in
1950-51, perhaps as much as a third more. A gradual improvement in food
rations became apparent in 1951-52, and by the end of 1953 the self-
defeating practice of relating the size of the food ration to the per-
centage of fulfillment of work norms had been abandoned. Beginning in
1953, food stocks available in prison canteens became plentiful, and
prisoners were able to augment their food rations by purchasing food
with their wages. In Vorkuta, for example, two basic rations were es-
tablished in 1953, one for underground miners and another for all other
prisoners, and in September 1955 the basic army 50X1
food ration was adopted for all prisoners. 38/ In general, prisoners
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who were in forced labor camps in 1955-56 state that the food allotment
was adequate, although of poor quality and of limited variety.
B. Working Conditions.
Under the Soviet prison system, all able-bodied prisoners have
always been required to work in productive undertakings. Mining, lum-
bering, and construction have been the major economic activities using
prison labor. Before 1953, large numbers of the prisoners were employed
in MVD-controlled enterprises, but many prisoners also were contracted
out to work in enterprises controlled by other economic ministries. With
the transfer of MVD economic activities to other ministries during 1953-55,
the contracting out of prisoner labor became almost universal. It is
claimed, however, that when the conversion of corrective labor camps to
the new "colonies" (started in 1956) has been completed, prisoners will
work on projects run by the colony itself and the contracting of prison
labor to other enterprises will be banned. ?T2/ It will take some time
to implement this policy, and it seems highly probable that ordinary
enterprises will continue to rent prisoner labor for some time, at least
in labor-short areas long accustomed to the use of prison labor, such as
Magadanskaya Oblast and Vorkuta.
The lot of the prisoner-worker improved considerably during
1953-57. Although the nature, the date, and the pace of the reforms
varied greatly among the camps, the most substantial changes occurred
during 1953-54. Before 1953 it was common for prisoners to work as
many as 12 hours per day and 7 days per week./12/ Ex-prisoners report
that, beginning in 1953, the prisoners were generally given 1 day off
each'week and that in most camps the workday was reduced to 10 hours
in 1953, to 9 hours in 1954, and to 8 hours in 1955. Ill/
under the new system of corrective labor colonies
the prisoners will work the same number of hours as free workers (46,
hours per week at present).LE/
Beginning in 1950-51, prisoners in some camps began to receive
wages for their work, and by the end of 1953 this practice had been
extended to all camps.* Prisoners were paid for their work on the basis
of wage rates and norms applicable to free workers, except that forced
laborers were not paid the special bonuses for work in remote areas and
for length of service. Prisoners report gross monthly earnings ranging
up to 1,800 rubles. Only a small part of these earnings was paid to
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the prisoner, the rest being kept by the state. The maximum amount
which a prisoner was allowed to be paid in cash was fixed at 150 or
200 rubles in 1953, depending on the kind of work, and this ceiling
was raised to 300 rubles in 1955.
The camp administration made regular monthly deductions from
the prisoners' wages for subsistence and other purposes. During
1953755 this deduction was fixed at 260 rubles for native Russian
prisoners and at 456 rubles for foreign prisoners of war, who were
told that, of this amount, 200 rubles were deducted for "reparations."1.1.1/
Deductions were also made for income taxes and even for state loan sub-
scriptions, according to some reports. All sums earned by the Prisoner
in excess of these deductions and the allowable cash payment to him
were supposed to be placed in a special "release fund" to be paid to
him upon completion of his term of imprisonment. It appears, however,
that few released prisoners received more than a few hundred rubles.
In 1950-51 the system of zachet under which the prisoner was
able to redUce his term of imprisonment by overfuffilling his work
norm, was introduced in a few camps and was liberalized and extended
throughout the camp system during 1953-54. A typical schedule, one
in effect in a camp in Magadanskaya Oblast in 1955, provided that the
term of imprisonment would be reduced by 2 days for each month in
which the prisoner overfulfilled his work norm by 25 percent or more
and by 1 day for each month in which the norm was overfulfilled by
10 to 25 percent./IL/
under the new system started 50X1
in 1956, a prisoner confined in a corrective labor colony will not be
compelled to work. The working prisoner, however, will receive occu-
pational training and will be paid the same wages as free workers doing
comparable jobs, less 30 percent for his subsistence and medical care,
and, in addition, 1 day of work will equal 3 days' detention. 112/
These incentives undoubtedly will be sufficient to induce the prisoners
to work rather than to remain idle.
C. Other Conditions.
In addition to matters relating to ,food, housing, and working
conditions, a number of reforms were made during 1953-55 in the general
policies with respect to the treatment of prisoners. Among these re-
forms were the following: doors to the prisoners' barracks were no
longer locked at night, and bars were removed from the windows; prisoners
with good work and conduct records were permitted to write letters and
receive mail at frequent intervals, to receive visitors, and to be given
leave and overnight passes to visit nearby towns; prisoners with good
records were allowed to go to and from work without a guard (bezkonvoy);
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and prisoners were given the right to appeal for the review of their
sentences and to file formal complaints of ill treatment with camp
authorities. Ex-prisoners also report that the prisoners were accorded
much more humane treatment by camp guards And administrative officials,
particularly after the downfall of Beriya in June 1953. Not all of
these improvements were introduced at the same time, nor were they
applied uniformly in all camps. By the end of 1955, however, these
reforms, along with improved living and working conditions, the payment
of wages, and the system of zachet, seem to have been effected in all
of the important camp complexes, such as those near Vorkuta, Inta, Kara-
ganda, Noril'sk, and Magadan. These relatively enlightened methods of
handling prisoners are in effect in the new "colonies" which replaced
the old forced labor camps starting in 1956. 50X1 I
prisoners may receive unlimited amounts of mail 50X1 !
and packages, their relatives may visit them for 30 minutes each day,
married prisoners are allowed periodically to spend several days with
their wives in special lodgings provided within the prison compound,
and working prisoners are covered by provisions of the Soviet labor code
in the same way as free workers. Is When the conversion from camps
to colonies is completed, most prisoners supposedly will be incarcerated
in institutions of this kind, but some prisons with a more severe regime
are to be provided for repeat offenders, persons convicted of political
and other major crimes, and incorrigible prisoners transferred from the
work colonies for disciplinary offenses.
V. Changes in the Number of Camps and Prisoners.
An overwhelming body of evidence points to a fundamental and drastic
change in the number of forced labor camps and in the prison population
in the USSR since 1953. Large numbers of camps have been closed; whole
camp complexes have been abandoned; and several million prisoners have
been freed through amnesties, repatriations, individual pardons, and a
change in policy toward some categories of prisoners. Although an
attempt will be made to quantify the decrease in the numbers of camps
and-prisoners, these numerical estimates cannot be considered definitive,
because of the nature of the data on which they necessarily must be
based. Nevertheless, these estimates, together with the large amount
of nonquantitative information, not only provide convincing evidence
of the probable size of the forced labor contingent at present and the
magnitude of the change that has occurred since 1953 but also indicate
that most past estimates of the forced labor population. have been much
too high.
A. Camps.
The number of forced labor camps
of 1953 is not known.
in existence at the beginning
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Because information
necessarily is based on reports from ex-prisoners who have been repa-
triated to their native countries or who have defected, the data were
limited to those places in which such persons were confined or about
which they were told by fellow prisoners. For the most part, such per-
sons tended to be imprisoned in one or another of the large camp com-
plexes that were centrally administered by GULAG in Moscow. Hence the
list of place names would not include many of the camps and colonies
directly under the control of the MVD organizations in the republics,
oblasts, and krays.
In order to obtain some idea of the geography and site of the
camp system in the years since 1952, an exhaustive survey was made of
all available material, including several thousand reports from former
prisoners and others who had personal knowledge of the camps during
1953-57. This survey is believed to be a complete examination of such
available materials. In all, 321 places were identified as having been
the location of one or more forced labor camps at some time during the
period surveyed. Tables 1 and 2** show the distribution of these places
by economic regionxxx and bY year of latest identification; the places
are listed in Appendix A and located on the map, Figure
3.XXXX
Although it cannot be contended that this list is complete, it
probably covers all of the camp center's that were centrally administered
and most of those directly subordinate to the republic, oblast, and kray
** Tables 1 and 2 follow on p. 18.
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Table 1
Distribution of Places Associated with Forced Labor Camps
In the USSR, by Economic Region W
1953-57
Economic Region
Number of Places
17
II
5
18
IV
9
V
5
VI
7
VII
29
VIII
35
IX
lo
29
XI
59
XII
98
Total
3a.
a These places are listed in Appendix A
Table 2
Distribution of Places Associated. with Forced. Labor Camps
in the USSR, by Year of Latest Identification W
1953-57
Year
Number of Places
1953
71
1954
8o
1955
105
1956
56
1957
9
Total
a. These places are listed in Appendix A
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, .
\ '
..7
MOWED
42 45 73
85 98 AO 111
150 189 101
it.f
1\ 14.?
\ -4to I t / '----. /
? '?T, \ -A
1,01/400.
so
112
281. ?8 2" 7:2S1
207/1751
ta a ? 08. ? 132 le2?
? \ :31?1:5
12?T\I:s/
158 254 35 318
k181
no' AP
vtid?
Ts?
4
0.0
To
100
UOLOCATI-D
(Primo:our WO
04
LOCATION OF FORCED LABOR CAMPS
IN THE USSR, 1953-57
Not See Wert A In idenfirotion al location
isisto,s
? 10:0
120
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MVD organizations. It does not include the locations of the numerous
smaller camps and colonies administered by about 150 local MVD units
in Central Siberia and Western USSR. A few of the places listed and
Identified in 1953 and 1954 (particularly in Western USSR) may have
been the locations of prisoner-of-war camps only rather than of forced
labor camps housing both native and foreign prisoners, although forced
labor camps and prisoner-of-war camps were commonly located side by
side.
Available information indicates that in 1956 forced labor camps
still existed in the places that have long been forced labor centers --
Vorkuta, Karaganda, Irkutsk, Noril'sk, Magadan, and Khabarovsk -- but.
both the number of camps and the number of prisoners were greatly re-
duced. The scanty information available for 1957 pertains to transit
or repatriation camps, such as Bikovo in Moskovskaya Oblast, and to a
few camps in the Far East.
Ex-prisoners and other observers have reported the dissolution
of a considerable number of individual camps. Of a total of 125 in-
dividual camps in which a selected group of German returnees were in-
terned at some time during 1953-56, almost one-third -- 41 -- were
reported to have been closed during the period.* In addition,, reports
made by 20 returnees of various nationalities indicate the closing of
4o individual camps. information 50X1
concerning the closing of camps: all camps in Vorkuta except two were
closed or converted to free settlements by the end of 1955 Ii92; 80 to
85 percent of the camps in the Kolyma area had been closed by the end
of 1955 22/; most camp billets in Noril'sk and Khabarovsk were being
converted to civilian use in 1956 21; a number of camps in the Zayarsk
area were disbanded during 1954-55 22/: most camps in the Abez area
were handed over to the Red Army during 1955 23/; numerous abandoned
camps were observed in the area between Vorkuta and Potma Li; and a
large number of abandoned camps were observed by a Western visitor in
Sverdlovsk in the summer of 1956. Finally, Ithe 50X1
camp complex at Noril'sk was dissolved by the end of 1956 and la 5uxi
number of individual camps in Magadanskaya Oblast and Yakutskaya ASSR
were closed during 1956-57.
B. Prisoners.
Estimates of the number of forced laborers in the USSR in
various past years have ranged from a conservative 2 million to 3 mil-
lion to such extreme figures as 25 million to 40 million. Great dif-
ferences exist even in estimates made for approximately the same time
period.
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estimated the prisoner population at 13.5 million and 3.5
million for 1940 and 1941, respectively. 52/ The plethora and extreme
range of such estimates and the lack of.adequate data on which to
determine their reliability led the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor
in 1953 to decline to assess "however roughly, the number of persons
sentenced to corrective labor in camps, in colonies, or in exile." 5.?./
50X1
The most recent major attempt to determine the forced labor popu-
lation in the USSR 50X1
estimated 50X1,
the number of prisoners in the prewar period (about 1941) at 10 million,
plus or minus 20 percent, and at 12 million, plus or minus 10 percent,
in the postwar period (about 1950). 21/ These magnitudes were obtained
for each period by assembling all available reports from ex-prisoners
who had given the number of prisoners at various forced labor sites,
computing an estimate of the average number of prisoners per place and
multiplying this average by the estimated total number of places asso-
ciated with forced labor camps. Because of the nature of the data (ob-
servation reports from ex-prisoners) and the methodology used, and in
light of information received since 1953, 50X1
the estimate of 12 million prisoners as of about 1950 appears much too
high. As at least 4 out of every 5 prisoners were males in the produc-
tive age group (15 to 59), moreover, a prisoner population of such a
magnitude would mean that nearly one-fifth of all adult males were
imprisoned. So disastrous would be the demographic and economic con-
sequences of such a situation that its existence seems highly im-
plausible. I 50X1
QUA I
the number of prisoners released under 50X1
the terms of the 1953 amnesty "must have run into millions." 2/
During the past several years the USSR has released more sta-
tistics concerning the distribution of its labor force by work cate-
gories, and, in addition, Soviet officials have made various statements
which afford some clues as to size and trends in prisoner population.
On the basis of these clues and an analysis of Soviet population and
labor statistics, it has been possible to develop an estimate of the
total number of forced laborers (including prisoners of foreign nation-
ality) for 1952-56, with a breakdown of these totals into.the number
employed on MVD-administered projects or not Working and the number
contracted out to various economic ministries. These estimates are
shown in Table 3.*
According to the estimates shown in Table 3, the forced labor
total dropped from 4.8 million in 1952 to 2.2 million in 1956. These
* Table 3 follows on p. 21.
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Table 3
Estimates of the Prison Population in the USSR
by Category
1952-56
Millions
Number of Prisoners
Number Working on MVD Number Contracted Out
Year Projects or Not Working 21 to Economic Ministries 12/ Total 2/
1952
1.8
3.0
U.S
1953
1.6
3.0
4.6
1954
1.0
2.5
3.5
1955
0.8
2.2
3.0
1956
0.5
1.7
2.2
a. These estimates were derived as residuals and are consistent with
official Soviet statistics and with other estimates which are believed
to have high reliability.
b. These estimates represent the difference between total prison popu-
lation and the number of prisoners employed on MVD projects or not
working.
c. These estimates were developed for use in estimating gross national
product (GNP) in the USSR. The figures (annual averages) represent
ORR's best judgment of the probable maximum size of the prison popu-
lation for the indicated years. They are the quantitative expression of
a mass of both quantitative and qualitative information concerning
size of the trends in camp pot ulation during the period. )
the
50X1
figures are to be regarded as maximums, representing the largest totals
that would seem to be consistent with Soviet statistics and with other
evidence concerning the forced labor situation during the period. In
view of the continuing release and repatriation of prisoners and the new
amnesty, the total for 1957 undoubtedly declined further. In the absence
of major purges or amnesties, the total will probably become stabilized
at about the 1957 level, which would represent about 0.5 percent of the
total population.*
Besides these estimates of prison population "maximums," it is
possible to set some figures which should probably be regarded as prison
* In 1955, only about 0.1 percent of the population Of the US was in
prisons.
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population "minimums." The Soviet Deputy Procurator General, P.I. Kud-
riatsev, intimated that about 3 mil- 50X1
lion persons had been under detention in the USSR in March 1953, almost
half of whom were political prisoners, but that at that time (May 1957)
only about 800,000 or 900,000 persons were imprisoned, of whom about
18,000 were political prisoners. Kudriatsev also stated that the
number of prisoners had been reduced by 70 percent since the death of
Stalin, that 52 percent of those detained at that time were released as
a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953, that more than half of those
then (presumably in May 1957) serving sentences had been sentenced after
March 1953, and that the number of prisoners then was less than in the
1920's and less than one-third of the number in prerevolutionary Rus-
sia. al These are the first figures ever released by Soviet officials
concerning the prison population and, in light of current agitation
among Soviet jurists for the release of crime statistics, suggest that
the USSR may be preparing to issue official statistics concerning crime
rates and the criminal population.
According to the estimates in Table 3, the number of prisoners
employed directly on MVD projects or not working decreased sharply be-
tween 1953 and 1956, a reflection of the fact that the MVD was gradually
shorn of all of its economic functions during the period. By the end
of 1956 the MVD no longer had direct production responsibilities, and
most of the working prisoners were contracted out to other ministries,
principally the metallurgical, construction, and timber industries'.
When the announced conversion of camps to colonies is completed, how-
ever, prisoners will no longer be contracted out to civilian enterprises,
according to Soviet statements. .62/
VI. Other Evidence of a Major Change in Forced Labor Policy.
A large body of evidence concerning labor developments in the USSR
since 1953 can be marshaled to support the reasonableness of the numeri-
cal estimates of prison population and trends previously presented. This
body of evidence concerns (1) the release and repatriation of foreign
prisoners and the effects of amnesties; (2) evidence of the drastically
decreased use of forced labor in specific industries; and (3) the use
of free labor on large-scale developmental projects and the "rehabilita-
tion" of such notorious forced labor centers as Magadan, Noril'sk, and
Karaganda. Although no one part of this body of evidence is definitive,
taken as a whole it makes possible a confident judgment that the USSR
has decided to disband the notorious camp system, at least for the pres-
ent, and that this decision is being implemented as rapidly as possible.
A. Release of Foreign Prisoners.
Following World War II a large but unknown number of foreign
nationals became prisoners of war in the USSR. These prisoners came
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from virtually every country of Europe, the Middle East, and the Far
East, and estimates of their total have ranged from a few hundred
thousand to several million ?_3./ It has also been estimated that
"anything up to 10 percent" of all prisoners in about 1950 were foreign
nationals. gi/ As noted previously, beginning about 1950, large num-
bers of these prisoners of war (particularly Germans) were tried under
Soviet criminal laws and sentenced to terms of corrective labor, usually
of 5 to 10 years, for various crimes against the state. Although sub-
stantial numbers of prisoners of war had been released before the
death of Stalin, the USSR has been pursuing since 1953 a systematic
policy of freeing foreign nationals from the prison camps. Numerous
returned prisoners report evidence of this policy; some state that the
policy was decided upon in 1952, and others give the year as 1954.
According to these returnees, a concerted effort was made beginning
in 1953-54 to collect prisoners of a given nationality in special camps
preparatory to repatriation, a process which took many months in most
cases and even several years in some instances.
Prisoners of foreign nationality were freed as a result of the
general amnesties declared during 1953-55 and certain special amnesties.
The total number released is unknown. In 1953, all Japanese "war crimi-
nals" and, allegedly, 9,000 Germans were released. 451 In late 1955
and early 1956, 9,652 German prisoners were repatriated as a result of
an agreement reached between West Germany and the USSR in October 1955. 462
The Soviet Red Cross denied that any German prisoners of war remained
in the USSR in. 1957. All remaining Japanese prisoners allegedly
have been freed as a result of the special amnesty for such persons
issued in December 1956. gl/ During 1953-56 the USSR released numerous
Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles, Spaniards, Iranians, and other foreign
prisoners of many nationalities. With respect to Poland in particular,
a large-scale repatriation campaign was conducted during 1955-57, and
as of February 1957 about 55,800 Polish nationals were returned to Poland,
all but a few thousand of whom came from the USSR. .,92 How many of
these were former prisoners is not known, but the Polish press reported
that the majority of the 3,468 repatriates who returned in October 1956
had been in Soviet prisons.. /2/
With the exception of the Hungarians deported to the USSR fol-
lowing the Hungarian rebellion in October 1956, all pertinent reports
received in the past several years indicate a rapid decline in the num-
bers of foreign nationals held in Soviet prisons. The reasons why the
USSR should wish to get rid of these foreign prisoners are eminently
clear from a review of the several thousand reports available from re-
turnees. The foreigners created serious disciplinary problems. They
were the nucleus of dissidence when thrown with native prisoners; they
frequently refused to work. Moreover, by 1953 the task of rebuilding
war-damaged areas had been largely completed, as had several large
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construction projects which used prison labor. Many ex-prisoners report
very high disability rates and long sojourns in camps where the prisoners
did not work. The mass of reports from repatriated prisoners shows
clearly that, by and large, the foreign nationals detained in the camps
during 1953-56 must have been an economic liability.
B. Effects of the Amnesties.
The major amnesties affording release to prisoners were those of
March 1953 and September 1955, although the two amnesties issued in 1954
also had significant effects. Both the 1953 and the 1955 amnesties were
hailed in the press as having resulted in the release of "millions" of
prisoners. The evidence indicates that such estimates were grossly
exaggerated, stemming as they did from excessively high estimates of
total prisoner strength. This body of evidence shows also that the
implementation of each of the amnesties was spread over a number of
months. With respect to each amnesty, the practice seems to have been
to release quickly those prisoners whose cases. clearly fell within the
scope of the amnesty and then to review all questionable cases over a
period of many months. Beginning in late 1953 and extending into 1956,
special commissions from the Ministry of Justice visited individual
camps and reviewed dossiers. The use of this procedure ?or implementing
the amnesties makes it impossible to delineate their separate effects
with any degree of assurance.
In 1957 the Soviet Deputy Procurator stated that the 1953 amnesty,
which affected criminal and not political prisoners, resulted in the
release of 52 percent of all those detained at the time. /1/ This state-
ment may refer only to the relative proportion of criminal prisoners re-
leased and to the total ultimately released under this amnesty; if so,
the statement may well be correct.
numbers of the criminals released in 1953 shortly committed
and were re-imprisoned.
9,900
Noril'sk and Dudinka. /2/
60,000 to 80,000 prisoners
large
new crimes
Prisoners were
released
from the camps at
half of the
in the Kraslag camp complex were freed. /V
substantial declines in individual 50X1
from the amnesty, 50X1
such as many of those in Vorkuta, 50X1
50X1.
50X11
50X11
sox.'
50X1,
camp populations resulting
report few releases.
The sums spent to carry out provisions of the 1953 amnesty must
have run into hundreds of millions of rubles, judging from the available
fragmentary information. In addition, production undoubtedly was ad-
versely affected in many instances. Strenuous efforts were made to in-
duce amnestied workers to take jobs in the areas of their release. A
decree of the Soviet Council of Ministers authorized lump-sum grants
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ranging from 150 to 1,000 rubles, depending on the area and activity,
to persons who signed work contracts of 1 to 3 years;- in addition,
they could be granted loans of 1,000 to 2,000, or 3,000 rubles, de-
pending on the length of the contract, to be repaid within 1 year;
workers who signed 2-year contracts received money to bring their
families to the area; and, finally those signing 3-year contracts for
work in the Far North became entitled to the special financial privi-
leges accorded free workers in these areas. These inducements were
only partly successful, and persons whose
release under the amnesty was delayed until the second half of 1953
were forcibly settled in the camp areas. 7j1/
Those released in the amnesties of 1954 were mainly invalids
and juveniles. These amnesties reportedly resulted in closing of all
of the invalid camps in many areas, and the virtual removal of juveniles
and the aged from the camps. Releases under the 1953 amnesty apparently
also were still taking place in 1954. Also in 1954, large numbers of
those who had served two-thirds of their sentences were permitted a
semifree status by being allowed to live in barracks outside the camp
and to go to work without convoy. 22/
The amnesty of September 1955, which affected those arrested
for collaboration with the enemy during World War II, allegedly freed
half of all prisoners. IL/
Finally, there is evidence that the reductions in forced labor
osulation continued in 1956 on a considerable scale. For example,
in Yerevan, Armenia, in the summer of 1956
,000 prisoners freed from Siberia returned to the city. /V
most political prisoners had been released by the
end of 1956. Finally, some time in 1956 a special commission was set
up by the Supreme Soviet to examine the cases of individuals sentenced
to corrective labor camps. This so-called Rehabilitation Commission
appears to have been quite active during 1956.
C. Decline in the Utilization of Forced Labor in Individual
Industries.
50X1
5rwl
50X1
50X1
50X1
In the past, prison labor in the USSR has been employed primar-
ily in the mining and timber industries and on large-scale construction
projects, such as railroads, canals, and industrial installations. Be-
fore 1953, when the. MVD had maximum control over the use of prison la-
bor, its contribution to total output in these economic activities was
important, especially in certain geographic areas. Thus data in the
captured 1941 state plan show that the MVD was to produce 2.8 percent of
total coal tonnage, but the proportions were to be 82.5 in Khabarovskiy
Kray, 100 percent in Komi ASSR, and 35.6 percent in Chitinskaya Oblast. ILV
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The MVD was to be responsible for 13.7 percent of industrial timber
output; corresponding percentages were 34.0 for Khabarovskiy Kray,
51.7 for Komi ASSR, and 41.5 for MUrmanskaya Oblast. The share of the
MVD in total capital construction was planned at 18.2 percent, or 6,850
million rubles. Although comparable data are not available for sub-
sequent years, the entrepreneurial role of the MVD probably was not much
different at the beginning of 1953 from what it was in 1941. The
amnesties and the changes in forced labor administration, which began
almost immediately after Stalin's death, have radically altered the role
of the MVD in economic affairs and have resulted in the disappearance
of forced labor as a major source of manpower, even in those areas of
the Far North that had been built up by prisoners.
According to available evidence, forced labor has virtually dis-
appeared from the gold-mining industry in the Soviet Far East. Begin-
ning in 1954, various gold-mining trusts began to experience difficulty
in obtaining forced labor from the MVD and by the end of 1956 these
trusts apparently no longer were using prison labor. Throughout 1956
the gold trusts conducted extensive recruiting campaigns in order to
replace released forced laborers. A number of camps located near gold
mines were closed in 1956, including some which supplied labor for the
Kolyma gold fields under the jurisdiction of Dal'stroy. Finally, the
activities of various gold-mining enterprises recently have been de-
scribed in the press in much the same way as are the activities of other
Soviet enterprises. 227 This fact is significant in view of the long
silence in the Soviet press on all matters pertaining to the .gold in-
dustry, whose exploitation of forced labor has long been known.
A substantial decline in the use of forced labor for mining
nickel, cobalt, coal, tin, tungsten, and copper also has taken place.
Evidence of this decline is shown by liquidations of forced labor
camps, arrival of recruited free workers at enterprises formerly em-
ploying forced labor, and changes in camp administration. One of the
most complete pieces of substantiating evidence concerns the liquida-
tion of the camp complex at Noril'sk. This complex, supplying labor
for the mining of nickel, cobalt, copper, and coal in the Noril'sk
area, was one of the large camp systems directly subordinated to GULAG
in Moscow. Reports indicate that during 1956 prisoners were shipped
out of the area, barracks were converted to civilian use, and the entire
complex was scheduled for liquidation by the end of the year. Extensive
efforts were made to obtain free workers through organized recruitment
and a special "public appeal"; a Komsomol official at Noril'sk stated
that 20,000 workers arrived there during 1956, and at least 11,900 per-
sons recruited from among demobilized soldiers and through the "public
appeal" arrived during the first half of 1956. L/
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A similar fate has befallen the Main Administration of North-
eastern Correctional Labor Camps (USVITL), the large camp complex that
formerly supplied labor to Dal'stroy mining and construction enter-
prises. The total number of prisoners in Magadanskaya Oblast and
in Yakutskaya ASSR in 1957 is estimated at about 20,000 to 30,000.*
During 1957, as part of the over-all reorganization of economic
management in the USSR, Dal'stroy was liquidated and its subordinate
'mining administrations were transferred to the Sovnarkhozy of Magadan-
skaya Oblast and Yakutskaya ASSR, and USVITL was broken up and subor-
dinated to the Internal Affairs Administrations of these same political
subdivisions. Also, as noted previously, Dal'stroy lost large numbers
of workers because of the amnesties and engaged in extensive recruiting
activities during 1955-56 to replace the lost prison labor.
In 1956 the last vestige of MVD activity in the timber industry
apparently was removed. Evidence taken from the trade journal of the
Ministry of the Timber Industry indicates that the Chief Directorate for
Special Timber became subordinate to the Ministry in 1956. 81/ This
Administration formerly had been subordinate to the MVD and had con-
trolled a number of camps engaged in logging and timber processing. The
trade journal also listed 13 of these camps as trusts subordinate to the
Ministry.? These facts suggest that forced labor is no longer being used
in these timber enterprises.
During World War II and throughout the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1946-50), large numbers of forced laborers (including army troops)
were employed in railroad construction. During the Fifth Five Year Plan
(1951-55) the use of forced labor gradually decreased, and its composi-
tion changed, so that by the end of the period most nonfree labor used
in railroad construction consisted of troops. It is estimated that
nonfree labor laid 49 percent of total railroad track during 1946-50
and 29 percent during 1951-55, and the proportion is expected to be
negligible during 1956-60. 82/
D. Recruitment of Free Workers and Rehabilitation of Former Forced
Labor Centers.
Beginning in 1955 and proceeding with mounting intensity during
1956 and 1957, the USSR conducted extensive recruiting campaigns to ob-
tain free workers for mines, factories, and construction in the Far
North and the Fax East and in other areas such as the Donbas, where
large-scale construction and developmental projects were being carried
on. An important part of this recruitment was undertaken directly to
replace forced laborers freed under the various amnesties. The reports
* During the period 1948-50, there probably were between 75,000 and
100,000 prisoners in Yakutskaya ASSR and the territory that is now
Magadanskaya Oblast.
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submitted by ex-prisoners frequently refer to the arrival of large
numbers of free workers during 1955 and 1956 in Vorkuta, Magadan,
Noril'sk, Karaganda, and other forced labor centers. The press and
radio refer to the presence of young recruits at mining and construc-
tion sites that used prison labor in the past -- for example, the
Komsolets, Udarnik, and Timoshenko placer mines in Magadanskaya
Oblast. L33/ There has also been extensive advertising for workers to
go to construction projects formerly using prison labor -- for example,
the Noril'sk Combine, the Krasnoyarsk Construction Trust, the Kansk
Construction Trust, the Yenisey and Lena Gold Trusts, and the Pechorles
Combine. .g.)j The radio refers to the arrival of 20,000 "young patriots"
in Noril'sk during 1955-56, 4252 6,500 "new workers" in Magadan during
1956, L/ and 13,000 "young construction workers" in Irkutskaya Oblast
during 1956. L7/
In addition to the drives to recruit free workers for economic
activities formerly carried on with prison labor, extensive efforts were
also made to keep the ex-prisoners from leaving the labor-short areas of
the Far North and Far East. The financial inducements offered to per-
sons signing long-term work contracts have been noted previously.* In
some forced labor centers such as Vorkuta, prisoners who were released
after the expiration of two-thirds of their sentences were required to
remain in the area until the end of their original term. With respect
to the status of other released prisoners, the evidence is conflicting.
On balance, however, the facts seem to be that different policies were
pursued in various places and at different times. Criminal prisoners
released in the 1953 amnesty apparently were permitted to return home
at first, but freed persons later were required to remain in the area
for a fixed period. Political prisoners, for the most part, apparently
either were forcibly resettled in the camp areas or were allowed to
choose among several areas. There are also reports that freed prisoners
who returned to their homes were unable to find work and had to return
to the camp area.
There is also extensive evidence that free labor is now being
used for the kind of large-scale construction and resource development
projects that in the past would have used prisoners. Thus the huge
hydroelectric power project at Bratsk is being built with free labor. .821/
Many thousands of young people have been recruited for the enormous task
of developing new coal mines in the Donbas 413.9/ and in Karaganda. 0
Free labor is being used to build or expand the Omsk oil refinery, the
Dzhezkazgan copper smelting plant, the Pavlodar aluminum plant, the
Karaganda metallurgical plant, and numerous others. 9.1j Finally, the .
diamond fields in Yakutskaya ASSR are being exploited with free labor. 22./
* See pp. 24-25, above.
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Further evidence suggesting that the USSR is gradually dis-
mantling its erstwhile huge prison camp system is afforded by the nu-
merous references in the central and local press to conditions in areas
once the centers of large forced labor populations. The attempt evi-
dently is being mane to remove the stigma attached to these areas by
virtue of their long association with forced labor. This policy is in
striking contrast to the situation which prevailed until recently, when
the remote areas and the economic activities associated with them were
almost never mentioned. Some of the places that have been the subjects
of discussion recently in the press are Vorkuta, Noril'sk,'Magadan,
Tayshet, and Karaganda. 92/ A recent article discusses the developments
in the northern areas of the USSR in general, including all of the
former major centers of forced labor. 2h/ Another article gives a
glowing description of conditions in the gold fields of Yakutskaya
ASSR. 25/ Other evidence of the rehabilitation of the notorious "lands
of the prisoners" is afforded by the numerous references to the influx
of population into these cities during 1954-57 and to the existence of
large-scale housing construction programs there. For example, returned
prisoners report that a large housing construction program was being
carried on in Karaganda in 1954-55, that civilian cities began to spring
up in the Tayshet area during 1954-56, and that the populations of Rud-
nik and Pervomaiskiy rose sharply during the same period. L/ The press
reports that 160,000 square meters of housing were constructed during
1956 in Vorkuta 9// and refers to major housing projects in such former
prison centers as Noril'sk, Magadan, Sverdlovsk, and Dzhezkazgan. 98/
In August 1956 the Chairman of the Novosibirsk City Soviet told US re-
porters that the prison camp system was being abandoned in that area, 92/
the site of a huge new water development project.
VII. Major Factors Contributing to the Change in Forced Labor Policy.
The radical change since 1952 in Soviet policies with respect to
forced labor must be explained in terms of a number of factors, both
economic and political. No single factor would have been sufficient
to bring about the changes. They are in essence the result of the com-
bination of pressing economic and demographic considerations militating
against the efficiency of a mass forced labor system and of a political
climate which, in the minds of the Soviet leaders, would permit the con-
version to a more normal prison system without the loss of political
control over the people.
A. Economic Considerations.
Although the net value of a system of mass forced labor to the
USSR cannot be appraised solely in economic terms, the evidence strongly
suggests that about 1952-53 it became evident to Soviet administrators
that a modern industrial economy can best be operated with incentives
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rather than coercion and that the huge prison labor force was a drag on
over-all productivity. Also, strategic considerations made this an
opportune time to appraise the efficacy of the forced labor system
purely in economic terms. By 1953, after about 25 years of the use of
forced labor on a massive scale, a large part of the task of developing
the frontier had been accomplished. Prison labor, for example, had
built the White Sea - Baltic Canal and the Volga-Don Canal and the North
Pechora and the Baykal-Amur Magistral' (BAM) railroads; forced labor had
opened and developed such remote areas as Magadan, Noril'sk, Ukhta,
Vorkuta, the Kola Peninsula, Karagandinskaya Oblast, the northern part
of Sverdlovskaya Oblast, and the northern Urals. In addition, most of
the catastrophic destruction resulting from World War II had been re-
paired, mainly by prisoners of war. Whether or not these developmental
projects could have been completed, or accomplished more cheaply, with
free labor is an unanswerable -- and irrelevant -- question.
In any event, it is evident that the Soviet leaders have come
to regard the forced labor system as an economic liability, and there
is ample evidence to support such a position. In the first place, the
administrative costs of the system were high. The prisoners lived and
worked under guard. Although the ratio of guards to prisoners varied
with circumstances, the preponderance of information indicates that the
ratios usually fell within the range of 1 to 6 and 1 to 12. An MVD
. official stated in 1957, however, that the ratio was 1 to 20. 100/ When
the latter ratio (which should be regarded as a minimum) is applied to
the estimated total of 4.8 million prisoners in 1952,* an estimate of
240,000 persons employed to guard the prisoners is obtained. A com-
parable estimate of 85,000 may be made for 1956. Almost all of these
persons were males in the prime productive age groups and thus represent
the diversion of a significant segment of manpower form civilian em-
ployment.
In addition to these direct manpower costs of policing the
prison labor force, there were other costs peculiar to the use of
prison labor. Prison laborers worked under guard, even when hired
out to civilian enterprises, and construction projects employing such
labor had to be surrounded by high wooden fences and equipped with
guard towers. Ex-prisoners report that there was an "appalling" in-
difference among the prisoners toward the materials and equipment with
which they worked and that sabotage of machinery, notably in mines,
was an almost daily occurrence. 10i/ Others report that the prisoners
deliberately pursued "go slow" policies, had a highly negative attitude
toward doing what was forced on them, and showed no initiative what-
ever. 102/ Moreover, there was little or no on-the-job training, and
* See Table 3,.p. 21, above.
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the skills that a prisoner may have acquired before his arrest were
seldom used.* Prisoners hired out to civilian enterprises devised a
variety of ingenious methods for obtaining high earnings with as little
effort as possible, to the serious detriment of the quality of the
work. 122?/
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the USSR
should wish to weigh the relative productivity of forced and free labor.
An MVD official stated in May 1957, "It has been proved that the camps
were not profitable from an economic point of view. The ministries did
not like to make contracts with the camps because the costs were too
high." 122/ There is also evidence that the existence of large pools
of prison labor encouraged administrators to undertake developmental
projects that were economically unsound some of which were dropped
before completion, with attendant waste of materials and investment
funds. l_C?/ The availability of large numbers of unskilled workers in
the northern and eastern regions also undoubtedly deterred the mechani-
zation of mines and construction projects in these areas. The press
recently have reported many instances of the progress
of mechanization and increased labor productivity in mines and other
enterprises known to have used prison labor in the past. 12//
the 1957 gold-extraction plan for Naga-
danskaya Oblast had been completed 3 months ahead of schedule with a
4-percent increase in output and a substantial reduction in production
costs. 12.E.I/ The manager of the gold trust at Yakutsk stated that labor
productivity in the trust increased 17 percent in 1955 and that, in
1956, gold mines in the Aldan Rayon as a whole reduced production costs
by 16 percent. 122/ Similar claims of success have been made for the
timber industry in the Far East. 112/
Another important factor in an assessment of the over7all value
of mass forced labor is the sociological and demographic consequence of
the system. The disability and mortality rates in the camps were very
high. According to numerous ex-prisoners reports, the percentage of
prisoners unable to work because of illness or injury ranged from 10 to
40 percent in the various camps. In addition, there were special camps
for invalids in each of the large camp complexes and administrations,
some of them having as many as 1,200 inmates. These sick and disabled
prisoners made no economic contribution and had to be maintained at
state expense. Although medical facilities were generally available,
they were grossly inadequate. The mortality rates in the camps con-
sequently were higher than the death rate for the population as a
* The USSR made good use, however, of the skills of prisoners who were
scientists. They were allowed to work freely in certain laboratories
and were even permitted to travel and to have their sentences reduced
for good conduct. 123/
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whole during the same period, which was probably slightly more than
1 percent. la/ Although the extremely high mortality rates in the
camps probably declined considerably after 1950 as a result of improved
living and working conditions, the abnormal death rates and high inci-
dence of disability among the prisoners continued to represent a sig-
nificant economic and demographic loss, which must have been apparent
to Soviet administrators. In 1954 a directive reportedly was issued to
all camp commanders requiring them to take steps to reduce prisoner
mortality rates. 112/
The high death rates among camp inmates, most of whom were males,
and the removal of millions of males from normal civilian and family
life during a part of their prime years undoubtedly had critical effects
on the birthrate in the USSR. Faced with a sharply declining birthrate
and imminent decreases in the annual increments to the labor force,
Soviet leaders apparently concluded that the situation could be corrected
only through large-scale release of prisoners, which has occurred, and
through abandonment of the mass isolation of men, except hardened crimi-
nals and persons clearly dangerous to the preservation of the Soviet
state. As already shown, serious attempts are being made to transform
the former prison areas -- Vorkuta, Noril'sk, and Magadan -- into or-
dinary cities, so that even though the released prisoners may be forced
to remain in these areas, they will have the opportunity to live and
work as civilians and to rear families.
Other factors which undoubtedly contributed to the transforma-
tion of the forced labor system are the rash of large-scale strikes and
the general unrest which seems to have permeated the prison camps since
1953. Although scattered instances of rebellion during the years before
1953 have been reported, a veritable rash of strikes and other disturb-
ances occurred during 1953-55. . The most famous of these was the strike
at Vorkuta in July 1953, which lasted more than a month and resulted in
an investigation from Moscow.* These incidents of serious unrest in the
prison camps must have had significant adverse effects on productivity
and must have caused serious concern to MVD officials. 50X1
following the strikes, measures were taken to reduce the 50X1
possibility of large-scale revolts. a special edict 50X1
issued in 1953 or 1954 limited the number of prisoners in each camp to
800 and provided for a greater physical separation of camps, and politi-
cal prisoners were not to remain in one camp for more than 6 months
and other prisoners for more than 1 year. 112/ If this directive was
carried out, it must have increased greatly the economic loss involved
in the constant transfer of prisoners from camp to camp, a persistent
feature of the forced labor system.
* The locations, dates, and the nature of the disturbances in the labor
camps, as reported by ex-prisoners, are shown in Appendix B.
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B. Political Considerations.
Although there are indications that, even before 1953, Soviet
policymakers were becoming aware of the economic liabilities inherent
in the forced labor system, the dominant political event which trig-
gered the transformation of the system was the death of Stalin in March
1953. This event, along with the subsequent removal of Beriya, pro-
vided an opportunity for the more liberal elements in the CoMmunist
Party leadership to initiate and implement a series of measures in the
domestic field which have radically altered the life of the ordinary
Soviet citizen. At least for the moment, the use of terror as an in-
strument of control has been virtually abandoned, and throughout the
Soviet system incentives have replaced coercion as the means of securing
adherence of the people to the goals of the state. Such a shift in
methods of control made imperative the disbanding of the system of mass
forced labor which had been inherited from the old regime. The collec-
tive leadership has recognized this imperative, and the events of the
past 5 years -- the amnesties, the release of prisoners, the lightening
of criminal penalties, the closing of camps, the changes in camp admini-
stration, and the dissolution of the MVD's economic empire -- bear wit-
ness to this recognition. By the end of 1957 the Soviet prison system
was approaching the status of such systems in Western countries -- that
is, imprisonment was being used as a method of punishment for criminFil
acts rather than as an instrument for political repression, the objec-
tives of imprisonment being to administer punishment and rehabilitate
the prisoner. The economic exploitation of prison labor is no longer a
dominant factor influencing penal policy. Although persons are still
being sentenced to "corrective labor," the logic of a centrally managed
economy -- and good penal practice -- requires that able-bodied prisoners
should be employed productively.
Finally, whatever the economic imperatives against the use of
mass forced labor, the transformation of the camp system in the USSR
could not have been accomplished without a high degree of political
stability. Such stability has characterized the post-Stalin period.
There has been no serious threat to the status of the collective leader-
ship, no attempt to change the planned character of the economic system,
and, in short, no serious threat to the existence of the Soviet state.
Consequently, the Soviet leadership has been sufficiently secure to
permit the carrying out of the sweeping transformation of the prison
system which has taken place in the past 5 years. As long as there is
such political stability, the policy of a gradual conversion of the in-
famous forced labor system to a normal penal system may be expected to
continue.
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APPENDIX A
LOCATION OF FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR*
1953-57
Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates**1
Date of Latest
Identification
Abez
1
66?3o,
N - 61040'
1955
Akmolinsk
2
5101o,
N - 71030'
1953
Aktas
3
480o2,
N - 66021'
1954
Aldan
4
58037,
N - 125024'
1954
Aleksandrovsk
5
5o054,
N - 142010'
1956
Aleksandrovskoye
6
51045,
N - 113045'
1956
Aleskito Perevoz
7
68?33'
N - 146?12'
1955
Ambarchik
8
69?45'
N - 162000'
1955
Anadyr'
9
64?45,
1955
Andzebinskaya
lo
56011,
: : 1021:
1956
Anga
11
53058,
N - 106012'
1955
Angarsk
12
58005,
N - 93?10'
1954
Arkag ala
13
63?o7'
N - 146?49'
E.
1955
Arkhangel'sk
14
6403o,
N - 41?00'
1953
Asbest
15
57?05'
N - 61?25'
1955
Astrakhan
16
46014,
N - 48?30'
1955
Ayuta
17
47043,
N - 40?04'
1954
Baku
18
40?20'
N - 50?00'
1953
Balkhash
19
46?49'
N - 75?00'
1954
Balykley
20
52?22,
N - 42?36'
1956
Barashevo
21
54031,
N - 42?52'
1955
Batygay
22
67011,
N - 133012'
1955
Belniki
23
53?55'
N- 73022'
1955
Belov
24
44?41,
N - 4o?o8,
1955
Beregovaya
25
42?46,
N - 133?05'
1954
Berelyakh
26
62047,
N - 148?07'
1956
Bezymyanka
27
490551
- 43?14'
1953
Bira
28
49?031
N - 132?28'
1955
Birobidzhan
29
48?50'
N - 133?00'
1953
** Alternate coordinates are given when nearby localities have iden-
tical place names and it is impossible to determine which locality has
the camp. No coordinates are given if the place name can not be iden-
tified in a standard gazetteer.
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Location
Blagoveschenskoye
Bodaybo
Bol'she-Bykovo
Bondyug
Borovichi.
Bratsk
Bryanka
Bryansk
Budukan
Burgalchan
Burma
Burustakh
Busochan
Butygyehag
Caneyon (Phonetic)
Chita
Chka1ov Ostrov
Chu.
Chuguyevo
Chuna
Churba Nun
Chulym
Chuyevo
Darnitsa
Debin
Degtyarsk
Dekastri
Dayankyr
Derzhinskiy
Dnepropetrovsk
Dolino
Dolinsk
Dolinskoye
Dorozhnya
Dub insk
Dubrovka
Dudinka
Dzemgi
Dzhegala
Dzhezkazgan Kingi
Dzhugdzhur
S-E-C-R-E-T ,
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
30 46?45' N - 142?31' E 1955
31 57051' N 114012' E 1954
32 50051' N 38?23' E 1957
33 60?30' N - 55?55' E 1955
34 58?15' N 34?02' E 1954
35 56?05' N - 101?48' E 1957
36 1954
37 53?15 N - 34?20' E 1953
38 49?01' N 132?13' E 1955
39 61?06' N - 142?36' E 1954
40 48?55' N 72050' E 1954
41 64?27' N - 144?44' E 1953
42 1953
43 61030' N - 149?11' E 1956
44 62?40' N
45 52003' N
46 53?24' N
47 43?36' N
48 44?15' N
49 57047' N
50 49036' N
51 55008' N
54?34' N
52 48?02' N
53 50026' N
54 62021' N
55 56043' N
56 51?30' N
57 63?50' N
58 55?40' N
59 48?27' N
60 51028' N
61 47?25' N
62 49?42' N
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
- 151?43'
- 113?30'
_ 141?12'
_ 73?42'
_ 133?50'
? 94?37'
ggz):
_ 78.20,
39?57'
1954
1953
1955
1954
1953
1953
1956
1953
1953
- 30039' E 1954
- 150046' E 1953
- 60005' E 1955
- 140?47' E 1953
- 145?33' E 1953
- 37045' E 1956
- 34959' E 1953
- 80050' E 1955
- 142?50' E 1956
- 72050' E 1954
1954
1953
48?57' N - 29?45' E 1955
69?25' N - 86010' E 1954
51020' N - 137000' E 1954
1955
47051' N - 67014' E 1954
47?40' N - 58?45' E 1956
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Ege Khaya
Egvekinot
Ekibastuz
Elgen
Elgen-Ugol'
Forchaysk
71
72
73
74
75
76
67024' N - 134?15' E
65?10' N - 179015' W
51040' N - 75022' E
62048' N - 150044' E
62?54' N - 1510461 E
1956
1956
1955
1953
1953
1956
Golenki
77
440o3 N 131046' E
1953
Gori
78
41?58' N 44007' E
1953
Gubakha
79
58052' N - 57?36' E
1955
Gukovo
80
48003' N - 39?56' E
1954
Gundorovskaya
81
48021' N - 4o0oli E
1954
GvardeYsk
82
54?39' N 21?05' E
1954
Igarka
83
67?30' N 86?35' E
1953
Il'inskiy
84
480oo, N 142?15' E
1956
Ilintag
85
1954
Indigirskiy
86
64037' N 144?26' E
1953
Inta
87
660o0, N 60055' E
1955
Irkutsk
88
52?10' N - 104010' E
1956
Iul'tin
89
67?50' N - 178?45' W
1957
Ivanovka
90
44?00' N - 132?30' E
50030' N - 128028' E
1953
Ivanovo
91
57003' N - 40050' E
1955
Ivdel'
92
60045' N - 60030' E
1954
Izvarino
93
48019' N - 39?52' E
1954
Izvestkovaya
94
49?00' N - 131?30' E
1953
Kadakchan
95
1955
Kadiyevka
96
48?30' N - 38?45' E
1954
Kadzhar
97
40?36' N - 48028' E
39?12' N - 46026' E
1954
Kaiki
98
1955
Kalinina
99
1954
Kamensk
100
52?59' N - 32?28' E
1955
Kamenskoye
101
62?40' N - 165010' E
1953
Kansk
102
56?13' N - 95?40' E
1954
Karabas Gora
103
44030' N - 72020' E
1955
Karabash
104
54?42' N - 52?34' E
1954
Karafuto (So. Sakhalin)
105
51?00' N - 143?00' E
1955
Karaganda
106
49?50' N - 73?10' E
1957
Kayskoye
107
57?21' N - 44041, E
1955
Kemerovo
108
55?20' N - 86005' E
1955
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Khabarovsk
109
48?20' N - 135?10' E
1956
Khandyga
110
62032' N - 135035' E
1955
Khenikenzhinskiy
111
1956
Kholodnyy
112
1953
Khorol'
113
44025' N - 132?04' E
1953
Khrompik
114
56?54' N - 59055, E
1955
Kiev
115
50010' N - 30045' E
1954
Kingar
116
47?47' N - 67?46' E
1954
Kitoy
117
52?33' N - 103049' E
1955
Kizel
118
59?00' N - 57?40' E
1955
Klyuchi
119
58003' N - 52?27' E
1955
Knyazhpogost
120
62?38' N - 50050' E
1957
Kokuzek
121
49?40' N - 73?10' E
1954
Komsomol'sk
122
50033' N - 136059' E
1955
Kopeysk
123
55?00' N - 61?35' E
1953
Korsakov
124
46040, N - 143?45' E
1955
Kospash
125
59030' N - 57000' E
1955
Koton
126
49045' N - 142045' E
1955
Krasnaya Rechka
127
46042' N - 134000' E
48?23' N - 135004' E
1954
Krasnodon
128
48017' N - 39048' E
48?19' N - 39034' E
1954
Krasnomayskiy
129
57037, N - 34?27' E
1955
Krasnopolye
130
50047' N - 35?15' E
1954
Krasnoturinsk
131
59?50' N - 60015' E
1955
Krasnoyarsk
132
56?02' N - 92?48' E
1955
Kryazh
133
57033, N - 58?09' E
1955
Kuchino
134
54?28' N - 40046, E
1955
55059' N - 35009' E
Kuogastakh
135
70055' N - 135?40' E
1954
Kurgannaya
136
44?54 N - 40?35' E
1953
Kushunnai
137
48000, N - 142?15' E
1956
Kyzyl-Kiya
138
41039' N - 69?22' E
1953
Lachanka
139
59?50' N - 150?10' E
1955
Lazo
140
45022' N - 133?39' E
1954
Lebedinyy
141
56?02' N - 125?27' E
1953
58?29' N - 125?31' E
Lydiyevka
142
47058' N - 37041' E
1953
Magadan
143
59?34' N - 150?48' E
1956
Makar'ovo
\
144
52?16' N - 43?20' E
52?30' N - 43030' E
1954
Maksimovka
145
49032' N - 25045' E
1954
Mariinsk
146
56?15' N - 87050' E
1955
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Marshalskiy
147
64?28, N - 142?03' E
1955
Matrosovo
148
61?39' N - 147?51' E
1954
Mikhalevo
149
52?07' N - 1040281 E
1954
Mikhaylovka
150
48?02' N - 135?29' E
1954
Mikheroska
151
47?14' N - 39053, E
1954
Minsk
152
53?45' N - 26?25' E
1953
Miyuki
153
47?11' N - 142045' E
1956
Molotov
154
58000' N - 56?15' E
1954
Molotovsk
155
64?34, N - 39050' E
1954
Mbrdovo
156
52?05' N - 40046' E
55?42' N - 45006' E
1956
Moscow
157
55?56' N - 37?58' E
1955
Mbzhaysh
158
55?30' N - 36?00' E
1955
Mimika
159
1956
mylki
160
1955
Nadezhdinskoye
161
48016, N - 133?14' E
1953
Naibuchi
162
47020' N - 142?34' E
1956
Nakhodka
163
42?50' N - 132050' E
1954
Nera
164
64014, N 130016' E
1955
Nerchinsk
165
51?58' N - 116?35' E
1953
Nerenzha
166
58?12' N 125?17' E
1953
Nikolayevsk-Na-Amure
167
53?15' N - 140?45' E
1955
Nizhnaya Poyma
168
56?11' N - 96039' E
1955
Nizhne Isetskiy
169
56046, N - 60?42' E
1955
Nizhniy Kuranakh
170
58046, N 125032' E
1953
Nizhniy Tagil
171
57054, N - 60000' E
1955
Noril'sk
172
69?20' N - 88?06' E
1956
Novaya Zemlya (Island)
173
72?00' N - 54?00' E
1955
Novocherkassk
174
47024' N - 39042' E
? 1955
Novosibirsk
175
55?02' N - 82053' E
1955
Novo Troitsk
176
51?10' N 58015' E
? 1953
Novy Voroshilov
177
1955
Novyy Port
178
67?42' N 72?55' E
1953
Nyrob
179
60043' N - 56?44' E
1953
Okha
18o
53?34' N 142056' E
1955.
Olonki
181
52?54' N 103?45' E
1955
Omsk
182
55?00' N - 73?24' E
1954
Orotukan
183
62016, N - 151?42' E
1955
Orsk
184
51?10' N - 58?30' E
1954
Ossora
185
59015' N 163000, E
1953
Oymyakon
186
63?28' N - 142049' E
1955
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Location
Map Key
Number Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Parichi '
187
52?48' N - 29?26' E
1953
Pechora
188
65?25' N - 57?02' E
1953
Pernaty
189
1955
Pervomaysk
190
48?04' N - 30?52' E
1953
Pervomayskiy
191
51?30' N - 55910' E
1955
Pervoural'sk
192
56045' N - 60000' E
1956
Petropavlovsk
193
5)4052t .N - 69006' E
1954
Petropavlovsk
Kamchatskiy
194
53?01' N - 158?39' E
1955
Pevek
195
69?42' N - 170?17' E
1957
Pokateyevka
196
1955
Polovinka
197
58?50' N - 57?50' E
1955
Poronaysk
198
49?15' N - 143?00' E
1956
Postal'
199
46005' N - 300051 E
1955
Potma
200
53032' N - 44?05' E
1956
Pretschachtnaya
201
67?30' N - 64045' E
1954
Prokhladnyy
202
48?30' N - 82?46' E
1955
Provodanka -
203
47?59' N - 37057' E
1954
Pyatiletka
204
62?18' N - 151027' E
1953
Razvedchik
205
62?21' N - 151014' E
1957
Razvet'ye
206
52019' N - 35?20' E
1956
Reshety
207
54?13' N - 80014 E
1956
Revda
208
56?45' N - 60000' E
1956
Rostov
209
57?12' N - 39?25' E
1953
Rostov-Na-Donu
210
47?14' N - 39?42' E
1954
Rudnik
211
53?32' V - 119?18' E
1954
Rutchenkovo
212
47?57' N - 37?44' E
1953
Sakaehama
213
47030' N - 142050' E
1956
Samarkand
214
39?40' N - 67?00' E
1953
Saran
215
49030' N - 73?301 E
1954
Selyamka
216
59?35' N - 56055' E
1953
Sesvetsky
217
wow N _ 560301 E
1956
Severnoye
218
55?21' N - 165?57' E
1956
Seymchan
24.9
62?53' N - 152?26' E
1954
Shakhty
220
47?46' N - 40?12' E
1955
Shcherbakov
221
58?03' N = 38?50' E
1955
Shestakova
222
62?40' N - 164?32' E
1955
Shikuka
223
49015' N - 143?10' E
1954
Shirokiy
224
50?55' N - 129?00' E
1955
Sim
225
55000' N - 57045' E
1955
Slyudyanka
226
51038' N - 103?40' E
1955
Solikamsk
227
59?40' N - 56?45' E
1955
-4o-
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Sosnovka
228
54?15' N - 109?30' E
55?00' N - 117030' E
1953
Sos'va
229
59015' N - 61?50' E
1953
Sovetskaya Gavan
230
48?58' N - 140018' E
1954
Spassk-Darniy
231
44?37' N - 132?48' E
1953
Spasskiy
232
48?28' N 7 85018' E
54?04' N - 77?02' E
1954
Spasskiy Zavod
233
49?32' N - 73017' E
1955
Spornyy
234
62?21' N - 151006' E
1955
Sredne Beloye
235
50?41' N - 128?02' E
1955
Stalinabad
236
38030' N - 68?55' E
1955
Stalingrad
237
48?30' N - 44?45' E
1956
Stalino
238
48?00' N - 37?55' E
1955
Stalinsk
239
53?44' N - 87?10' E
1955
Stan UtinV,
240
59050' N - 151000' E
1954
Staro Mikhaylovka
241
47?58' N - 37?35' E
1954
Sukhobezvodnoye
242
57?03' N - 44?55' E
1956
Susman
243
62?47' N - 148?10' E
1956
Suzdal
244
56?25' N - 40?26' E
1954
Sverdlovsk
245
56?45' N - 60?20' E
1955
Svodbodnyy
246
48?14' N - 134042' E
51?24' N - 128008' E
1955
Takhia Tash
247
42?17' N - 59?45' E
1953
Talagi
248
64?34' N - 40?32' E
1956
Talitsa
249
57000' N - 63?45' E
1956
Tambov
250
52?43' N - 41027' E
1953
Tashkent
251
41?10' N - 69?00' E
1953
Taskan
252
62?59' N - 150020' E
1953
Tavda
253
58?00' N - 64025' E
1953
Tayshet
254
55057' N - 98?02' E
1957
Temir-Tau
255
50005' N - 72?56' E
1954
Temnikov
256
54?38' N - 43?12' E
1955.
Tiflis
257
41045' N - 45000 E
1953
Timoshenko
258
61033' N - 147?55' E
1954
Tomaxi
259
47?45' N - 142?00"E
1954
?Tomarikishi
260
49?00' N - 142?58' E
1956
Toro
261
49015' N - 142010' E
1956
Toyohara
262
47?00' N - 142?45' E
1956
Truskovets-Zdroy
263
49?16' N - 23?30' E
1955
Tsimmermanovka
264
510211 N - 139?16' E
1953
Tula
265
54?12' N - 37?36' E
1956
Tumnin
266
49018' N - 140023' E
1954
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Turinsk-
Tymovskoye
Tyrkhanda
Uglegorsk
267
268
269
270
58000' N - 63?45' E
50045' N - 142?40' E
57?48' N - 127054' E
49?00' N - 142000, E
1956
1953
1953
1956
Ugolinyy
271
63?00' N 179?24' E
1954
Ukhta
272
63?34' N - 53?42' E
1955
Ukta
273
70055' N - 145035' E
1953
Ulan Ude
274
51?50' N - 107?37' E
1954
Umet
275
52?34' N 42?58' E
1954
Unzha
276
58?01' N - 44?01' E
1953
Uralo Klyuchi
277
56004' N - 97?25' E
1955
Usa
278
65?25' N - 51?11' E
1955
Usha
279
54?25' N - 26036' E
1955
Usol'ye-Sibirskoye
280
52?45' N - 103?38' E
1954
Ust'drinka
281
47?20' N - 142?34' E
1956
Ust' Kamenogorsk
282
49?58' N 82?40' E
1955
Ust' Kut
283
560461 N - 105?40' E
1954
Ust' Nera
284
6404o' N - 143?05' E
1953
Ust' Omchuk
285
61009' N - 149?38' E
1956
Ust' Utinaya
286
62?34' N 151?28' E
1954
Ust Vikhorevka
287
56?48' N - 101926' E
1956
Ust' Vym
288
62015' N - 50025' E
1954
Utinaya
289
62?31' N 151028' E
1954
Vakeushev
290
1956
Vakhruthev
291
49000' N - 142?58' E
1956
Vanino
292
49002' N - 140016' E?
1955
Vasilyevskiy
293
50030' N - 117050' E
1953
Verkhniy Kuranakh
294
58030, N - 125?00' E
1953
Verkhniy Stvor
295
58?00' N - 56?50' E
1956
Verkhotur'ye
296
58045' N - 610oo, E
1953
Verkhoyansk
297
67035' N - 133?30' E
1955
Veslyana
298
63?01' N - 50?51' E
1954
Vikhorevka
299
56?08' N - 101020' E
1956
Vladimir
300
56?10' N - 400251 E
1955
Vladivostok
301
43?08' N - 131054' E
1955
Volkovo
302
57048' N - 63?02' E
1955
Vorkuta
303
67?30' N - 640oo, E
1956
Voroshilov
304
43?47' N - 131054, E
1955
Voroshilovgrad
305
48034' N - 39?20' E
1954
Yagodnyy
306
62?33' N - 149?40' E
1956
Yakutsk
307
62?05' N - 129?50' E
1957
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Location
Map Key
Number
Coordinates
Date of Latest
Identification
Yavas
308
54?25' N - 42?51' E
1956
Yaya
309
56?12' N - 86024' E
1953
Yekatetinoslavskoye
310
53?13' N - 77?49' E
1954
Yerevan
311
40?11' N - 44?30'
1954
Yoshkar Ola
312
56?40' N - 47?55' E
1955
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
313
47?00' N - 142?45' E
1956
Za1iv Kresta
314
66000' N - 179015' w
1955
Zaporozh'ye
315
47?49' N - 35?11' E
1953
Zayarsk
316
55?45' N - 102?30' E
1955
Zheleznodorozhny
317
62?35' N - 50052' E
1954
Zhiga1ovo
318
54?48' N - 105008' E
1954
Zhigulevsk
319
53?25' N - 49?29' E
1955
Zubova Polyana
320
54?05' N - 42?50' E
1955
Zyryznka
321
65050' N - 150950' E
1956
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/12 :
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?
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
STRIKES AND OTHER DISTURBANCES IN FORCED LABOR CAMPS
IN THE USSR
1953-55
Year
Location
Type of Disturbance
Cause of Disturbance
1953
Kingir
Riot
Bad working and living con-
ditions. 114/
1953
Kraslag Complex
Riot
General dissatisfaction. 115/
1953
Lazo
Riot
Aftermath of a prisoner's un-
successful plot to escape.
1953
Norillsk
Hunger strike
Dissatisfaction with food
rations. 11
1953
Omsk
Hunger strike
Demand for release from penal
barracks. 118/
1953
Tayshet
Hunger strike
Promises of better food and
working conditions not ful-
filled. 119/
1953
Vorkuta
Strike
Prisoners who were transferred
from Karaganda to Vorkuta
found conditions much worse. 120/
1954
Bratsk
Strike
Nonfulfillment of promises for
preterm release of prisoners. 121/
1954
Dzhezkazgan
Sympathy strike
Response to the strike at
Kingir. 122./
1954
Inta
Strike
Strike allegedly instigated by
MVD to determine which potential
German repatriates were strongly
anti-Communist. IQ/
1954
Karaganda
Strike
Unrest over application of
Amnesty Decree of 1953.
Bad working and living con-
ditions. 124/
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Year
Location
Type of Disturbance
1954
Karaganda
Riot
1954
Kingir
Strike
1954
Kingir
Riot
1954
Revda.
Strike
1954
Rudnik
Sympathy strike
1954
Tayshet
Strike
1954
Bratsk
Strike
1954
Tayshet
Riot
1954
Tayshet
Strike
1954
Vorkuta
Riot
1955
Khabarovsk
Strike
1955
Komsomollsk
Strike
1955
Muyka
Riot
1955
Kingir
Riot
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Cause of Disturbance
Young Communists transferred
from towns to the new lands
program area were dissatisfied
with conditions, complained,
and were interned in forced
labor camps. Youths then
organized strike. 125/
Bad treatment by guards. 126/
Discontent resulting from the
mixing of political and
criminal prisoners. Promises
not fulfilled. 127/
Nonfulfillment of promises to
free prisoners. 128/
Aesponse to strike at
Kingir. 129/
Insufficient clothing for low
temperatures. 132/
High work norms. 131/
Refusal of German prisoners to
work on German holiday. 12/
Refusal of nuns to Work. 133/
Bad working and living con-
ditions. laL/
Dissatisfaction. 1.35.1
Refusal of new medical offi-
cers to supply narcotics to
prisoners who were drug
addicts. lag/
Bad treatment by guards. Lay
Unfair work norms. 138/
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Year Location Type of Disturbance Cause of Disturbance
1955 Mirnoye Riot . General dissatisfaction. 132/
1955 Vorkuta Riot Demand of political prisoners
for removal of criminal
prisoners. 140/
1955 Timsher Strike Bad working and living con-
ditions. 141/
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