NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300860003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 19, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
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Near East and
South Asia Review
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
3?5
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles Syria: Inner Circle Infighting
Political infighting within President Assad's inner circle has
intensified in recent months in the wake of Syria's mounting
domestic and international problems. Assad's declining health and
heavy workload may be forcing him to increasingly delegate
authority, and this is certain to intensify rivalries and jealousies in
the inner circle
'cy Troubles
The regime of President Assad has entered a period of severe
political stress brought on by a series of policy crises and marked by
Assad's apparent inability to cope with them. This has resulted in
mixed political signals, especially in Lebanon and in the use of
terrorism, that will erode Syrian influence.
The return of the Palestinians to South Lebanon reinforces the de
facto partition of Lebanon and further weakens the authority of the
central government. The failure of the Syrian-backed Shia Amal
militia is an important setback for Damascus's Lebanon policy and
almost certainly will undercut Syrian prestige
Islamic fundamentalists are capturing more support in West Bank
universities and refugee camps by offering a stark alternative to
Palestinians who have grown weary of the secular political parties'
competition and skeptical of their effectiveness.
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NESA NESAR 86-028
l9 December 1986
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Tourism and tourist-related industries in Israel-an integral part
of the national economy-have slumped in 1986 because of the
decline in the number of visiting Americans. Econometric analysis
indicates that the specter of international terrorism, along with
fluctuations in real exchange rates, are the primary causes of the
decline.
Iran: Khoiniha-The Maverick Radica~
For the last seven years Mohammad Asgar Khoiniha, the spiritual
mentor of the US-hostage takers, has been a maverick in the radical
faction of the Iranian clergy. His willingness to engage in unpleasant
judicial chores as Iran's prosecutor general and his value as a radical
symbol ensure Khomeini's favor and will prevent his removal.
Kuwait's Islamic fundamentalists have become more assertive and
have made significant inroads into Kuwaiti politics and society. The
government continues to implement measures designed to control
the spread of fundamentalism, but these measures could incite
antiregime activity over time.
The deployment of North Yemen's first Soviet-supplied SA-3
surface-to-air missiles to the Marib area reflects Sanaa's heightened
concern over the vulnerability of its oilfields to South Yemeni air
attack. North Yemeni reliance on Soviet military expertise will
increase as it deploys more of its SA-3s.
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Sudan's Vulnerability to Ethiopian Air Incursions
Sudan's air defense continues to be ineffective against Ethiopian
aircraft incursions. These violations of Sudan's airspace are
politically embarrassing for Prime Minister Sadiq, who has publicly
pledged to strengthen the Sudanese armed forces.
The second annual summit meeting of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation produced modest progress toward the
organization's goal of increased partnership. The member states
agreed to further discussion on terrorism and narcotics and provided
an opportunity for the leaders to conduct private talks on sensitive
issues.
Prospects for Pakistan: Political Officers' Assessment
Pakistan's civilian government is anemic and beset by internal
problems, but the opposition is also hurting, in the view of US
diplomats and Embassy local employees at the recent Political
Officers' Conference in Pakistan. Deteriorating public order and
sectarian violence were identified as potential problems for the
government
Political parties in Punjab feature highly personal leadership, poor
organization, and a multiplicity of factions. The effective lifespan of
political parties has tended to be short, but, as politics has become
more ideologically polarized, the Islamic parties and the Pakistan
People's Party appear to be taking root.
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To weaken resistance activity in and around Qandahar city the
Soviets have placed intense pressure on insurgent supply routes to
the area, but through adaptations in tactics and the overall increase
in the availability of supplies to all insurgents, the insurgents in
Qandahar maintained an effective presence in 1986
Panjsher Valley Commander Masood's capture of the Afghan army
garrison at Farkhar on 21 August was a major step in the insurgent
leader's campaign to increase the tempo of the war in northern
Afghanistan and marked the first successful offensive deployment of
Masood's multiethnic, specially trained central units.
South India
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Some articles are preliminary views oj'a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views o a sin le anal st ? these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Syria: Inner Circle Infighting
Political infighting within President Hafiz Assad's
inner circle has intensified in recent months in the
wake of Syria's mounting international and domestic
problems. Syrian Air Force Intelligence Chief
Muhammad Kht~li in particular has been the focus of
criticism by rivals in the inner circle, most notably
Military Intelligence Chief Ali Duba, for his role in
the failed El Al? bombing attempt in London last
April. This criticism is motivated probably less by the
damage done to Syria's reputation than to the
perception of Duba and others that Khuli's growing
power and influence with the President threaten to
eclipse their own
In the past Assad's intolerance of open conflict within
his inner circle and his unwillingness to take decisive
action in mediating disputes have channeled
infighting into subtle intrigues. We believe Assad's
declining health and heavy workload may be forcing
him to increasingly delegate authority, and this is
certain to intensify rivalries and jealousies within the
inner circle. Senior Alawites who have
enthusiastically supported Assad's policies may be less
tolerant of policies originating with lesser figures.
Members of the inner circle, who we believe were
architects of such policy and intelligence
miscalculations in the past year as the stillborn
tripartite accord in Lebanon and Syria's involvement
in international terrorism, have relied on Assad to
fend off attacks by rivals within the regime.
The Inner Circle: A Delicate Balance
Assad's longevity in office and his success in
maintaining a firm grip on power in Syria are a
testament to his skill in assigning loyal cronies and
kinsmen to key security, intelligence, and military
positions within his ruling apparatus. Although inner
circle members accrue a good deal of power and
influence through their positions, their individual
indebtedness to the President and antagonistic
relationships with each other make corporate
opposition to Assad's authority unlikely.
Assad has kept a tight rein on members of his inner
circle by decentralizing responsibility. Undelineated
and overlapping roles within the inner circle afford
the President the luxury of shifting power among its
members without displacing them from their posts.
Since the ouster of Naji Jamil as head of the National
Security Bureau and the shaking up of that
organization in 1978, no individual or agency has had
sole responsibility for security and intelligence affairs.
Likewise, power in the military is shared by a handful
of Alawite generals, who, while nominally under the
Minister of Defense, a Sunni figurehead, enjoy a
direct link to the President.
Assad Still Balancing
Assad has not been intimidated by powerful members
in his inner circle and continues to maintain a balance
of power and responsibility among them while not
shying away from disciplinary action when necessary.
Despite the ascendancy of Muhammad Khuli, Assad
has slowly transferred responsibility for his personal
protection from Khuli's Air Force Intelligence to
Adnan Makhluf's expanded Republican Guard. In
the past year Assad has supported Army Chief of
Staff Hikmat Shahabi's brief suspension of the
powerful head of the Special Forces Ali Haydar, and,
has himself in recent months taken disciplinary action
against air defense officers close to Ali Duba. Assad
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NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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The following are the most prominent members of
Assad s inner circle, distinguished by their close
personal relationship to the President, their sensitive
role in the regime's security, and their ability to
speak authoritatively for the President without his
close supervision.
Director oJ.Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Ali
Duba. Ali Duba is an Alawite and a longtime Ba`thist
and military o,~cer who played a key role in bringing
Assad to power in 1970. Nominally under the
Minister of Defense, Duba actually reports directly to
Assad and has served as a special envoylor Assad in
sensitive negotiations. Duba's principal responsibility
is to maintain internal security by monitoring
internal dissidents. In recent years his intelligence
network has been expanded to include Lebanon,
where his deputy, Ghazi Kan'an, is a powerful figure.
Chief of Air Force Intelligence Maj. Gen.
Muhammad Khuli. Khuli's association with Assad
goes back to the 1960s when both men were Air Force
o,~icers. Since Air Force Intelligence became
independent of Military Intelligence, Khuli has taken
orders directly from the President. Khuli's
responsibilities include the personal security of the
President as well as domestic security and foreign
intelligence operations. Khuli, an Alawite from
Assad's hometown, has served as a personal
representative for the President in talks with Syria's
key regional allies and as a key link to various
terrorist groups like Abu Nidal and the Armenian
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.
Special Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Ali Haydar.
Haydar is a career military man and has held a
prominent position among the Alawite o,~icer elite
since Assad came to power. The predominantly
Alawite Special Forces has been used as a spearhead
against potentially dangerous political unrest in
Syria and is currently a major part of Syria's
security force in Lebanon.
Commander of the 3rd Armored Division Maj. Gen.
Shq/iq Fayyad. Fayyad is a prominent figure in
Alawite military circles and has ties to the Assad
family through blood and marriage. The 3rd
Armored Division has long been considered the best
fighting unit in the Army. The home baselor
Fayyad s division is north of Damascus at Qutyfah,
where it serves as a strategic reserve for national
defense in times of war and is also used to quell civil
unrest.
Chief of Republican Guard Brig. Gen. Adnan
MakhlrEf: As the head of the Presidential Guard,
Makhluf is the last line of defense for the President
in the event of a coup attempt. Assad recently
demonstrated his support for his kinsman Makhluf
by promoting him to the rank of general and adding
three regiments to the Guard, bringing it up to
division strength. Assad also assigned his son Basil,
who is rumored to be his personal choice as his
successor, to serve under Makhluf
Vice President for Foreign `airs Abd al-Halim
Khaddam. Khaddam came to power with Assad in
1970 and became the President's first Foreign
Minister and a rare Sunni within Assad s inner circle.
Khaddam's depth of understanding of Assad's
complex and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy
objectives has made him indispensable to the
President as an adviser, spokesman, and sounding
board.
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also appears determined to carry through an
antismuggling campaign that is certain to cut off a
major source of income to most members of his inner
circle.
A key element of inner circle solidarity-the
collective opposition to Rif`at Assad-has been
diminished by the absence of the President's brother
from the Syrian political scene over the past year.
Although Rif`at's political fortunes are uncertain, his
self-imposed exile and the disbanding of his Defense
Companies have created a power vacuum that
individual members of the inner circle hope to fill
discreetly. As a consequence, their suspicions and
distrust of Rif at have been, in part, transferred to
each other. Moreover, Assad probably hopes that
leaving open the prospect of Rif at's return will
continue to keep his inner circle off balance.
Duba and Kbuli: Clasb of the Titans
The current round of infighting has centered around
Assad's two most powerful intelligence chiefs-
Muhammad Khuli and Ali Duba.
The notoriety Khuli has received from revelations of
the Syrian Air Force Intelligence's role in the London
Heathrow attempted bombing does not appear to have
affected his standing with Assad, but it has given
ammunition to his political rivals. Khuli has carried
out sensitive visits to Iran and Saudi Arabia since
April, indicating he is still well regarded by Assad.
Although Assad has probably held off punishing
Khuli for fear that it would be an admission of guilt,
the order for the mission probably came directly from
Assad, at least in general outline, and, therefore
Khuli's position probabl is secure.
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Laying Down the Law
While Assad may be delegating more authority and
autonomy to inner circle members, he has been quick
to check excesses and criticize poor performance:
Assad appears confident of the unflagging loyalty of
his inner circle and is not likely to make dramatic
personnel changes that could disrupt the status quo.
The President will go a long way in forgiving
transgressions of Khuli, Duba, and the others who
form a bulwark against regime opponents. Assad does
not appear menaced by interelite intrigues. He
probably believes that encouraging them minimizes
the opportunities for collective challenges to his
valance.
authority. Assad's position is firm enough, in our
view, that he can, in extremis, remove any of his
lieutenants-even Khuli or Duba-as he ousted Jamil
in 1978 and exiled Rif`at. Nonetheless, should Assad
delegate more authority to individuals in his inner
ircle or his health decline seriously, it will become
ncreasingly difficult for him to maintain this delicate
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Syria: Assad's Mounting
Foreign Policy Troubles
The regime of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad has
entered a period of severe political stress brought on
by a series of domestic and foreign policy crises and
marked by Assad's apparent inability to cope with
their multitude and complexity. The current lethargy
in Damascus has resulted in mixed political signals,
especially in Lebanon and in the use of terrorism,
that, if left unchecked, will erode Syrian credibility
and regional influence. Although Assad still is in
control, there are tentative signs that the
decisionmaking process may be in transition and that
the President's ability to affect the outcome of
regional events is diminishing.
Since 1982, Assad's regional influence has been at an
all-time high as a result of dramatic victories in
undermining US and Israeli policies in Lebanon,
blocking initiatives on the peace process, and
improving Syria's strategic position against Israel.
These successes appear to have encouraged greater
adventurism in Syrian policies, particularly in
Lebanon and regarding the use of terrorism. Serious
miscalculations on both counts, however, have
resulted in serious policy failures, loss of credibility,
and political embarrassment.
Trouble at the Top
Rivalries among the President's closest advisers have
intensified in recent months, and Assad's temporizing
may reflect growing dissension within the regime.
Although Assad is notorious for his
micromanagement, there are indications that he is
delegating more authority than previously.
Squabbling among his advisers would have a crippling
effect on implementing key policies and force Assad
to make choices among those on whom he depends for
the survival of his regime.
The errant nature of recent Syrian policies may also
reflect strains brought on by Assad's declining health.
Although we do not believe his physical deterioration
has impaired his judgment, his morale is being sapped
by his country's serious economic decline, major
incidents of internal subversion, and a severely
damaged international image resulting from
revelations of Damascus's direct involvement in acts
of international terrorism. Assad, nonetheless, has
demonstrated remarkable resilience during his 16
years in power, and he may yet overcome mounting
odds against his continuing to direct regional events.
Lebanon Policy in Disarray
A series of miscalculations and half measures in
Lebanon illustrate the downturn in Syrian fortunes.
Damascus's problems began last January when, after
months of tortuous negotiations, Syrian efforts to
hammer out a framework for factional reconciliation
fell apart following a Christian revolt against the
scheme. Since the collapse of the so-called tripartite
accord, Damascus has been stymied in its efforts
either to cajole or threaten Lebanese Christians into
cooperating with the plan.
A number of car bombs in Christian East Beirut,
presumably the work of Syria's Lebanese allies, were
met with reciprocal bombings in Muslim West Beirut.
Syrian officials believe that some of the devastating
bombings in northern Syria and in Damascus last
spring and summer may also have been the work of
hardline Lebanese Christians signaling their distaste
for Syrian plans in Lebanon. Assad's dissatisfaction
with the stalemate in Lebanon led him to end Vice
President Khaddam's monopoly on the account and to
increase the roles of Foreign Minister Shara and
Brig. Gen. Ghazi Kan`an, Assad's intelligence chief
for Lebanon. Since then, policies in Lebanon have
become even more confused as those responsible cast
about for a solution and for clearcut authority to
implement it.
The dearth of Syrian options in Lebanon was
dramatically revealed last September when Damascus
backed what amounted to a coup attempt by pro-
Syrian Christian forces against the East Beirut
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NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December / 986
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Christian establishment. Elie Hubayqa, the ousted
and discredited Lebanese Forces militia leader who
was the only Christian signatory to the tripartite
agreement, led an incursion into East Beirut that was
quickly and decisively routed by his former Lebanese
Forces colleagues. Syrian forces in Lebanon did little
or nothing to support the coup once it ran into trouble
after playing a key role in putting Hubayqa up to the
attack. Eight months after Hubayga's leadership and
politics had been rejected by the majority of Lebanese
Christians-who literally ran him out of the Christian
enclave-Damascus has not come up with a better
alternative.
The failed coup attempt compounded the damage to
Syrian credibility that had resulted earlier from the
collapse of the tripartite agreement. Nonetheless,
rumors continue to circulate that the Syrians are
considering letting Hubayqa have another shot at
East Beirut. The only thing that seems certain is that
the absence of consensus on Lebanon will stifle both
the formulation of strong initiatives and, as in the case
of Hubayga's machinations, successful follow-through
when a course of action is attempted.
The Shia-Palestinian-Iran Triangle
Damascus never could fully concentrate on efforts to
overcome Lebanese Christian intransigence or
nurture the reconciliation process because a more
serious threat to Syrian interests was emerging as
greater numbers of Palestinian fighters loyal to Yasir
Arafat began returning to Beirut. In July Syria began
implementing measures in the Muslim sectors of
Beirut, ostensibly to restore calm to the Lebanese
capital, but in fact designed to inhibit PLO activities.
Despite the insertion of Syrian Special Forces into
Beirut to give backbone to the security plan,
Damascus has been losing ground in its efforts to
contain the PLO.
Syria's chosen instrument to confront the
Palestinians, the mainline Lebanese Shia Amal
militia, has proved to be as inept in defeating the
Palestinians as it was during its earlier engagement in
the 1985 version of the camps war. The PLO not only
has held its own in Beirut but also has achieved a
major buildup in the south, where it is engaged in a
bid to break out of the camps around Sidon and carve
out an enclave with its Lebanese Sunni allies.
Despite Syrian determination to undermine the PLO
in Lebanon, Damascus has not been prepared to give
Amal the kind of support it needs to stand up to the
Palestinians, especially in view of growing ties
between the PLO and Amal's Shia rival, the radical
Iranian-backed Hizballah organization. After their
experiences in the late 1970s, Syrian leaders are not
prepared to commit large numbers of troops to the
Lebanese quagmire, recognizing that the effort would
not guarantee a favorable outcome. Moreover, it
could spark an Israeli response against Syrian forces
in Lebanon or in Syria itself, where their defenses
would be significantly weakened because of extensive
involvement in Lebanon.
Syria also has been unsuccessful in undercutting the
activities of the Shia fundamentalists, who over the
last year have become the most dynamic political
force in Lebanon. Damascus opposes Hizballah's goal
of transforming Lebanon into an Iranian-style Islamic
republic. Nonetheless, the value of Syria's alliance
with Tehran continues to override concern about
Hizballah's expanding influence. Despite growing
strains between Damascus and Tehran, Assad is
unlikely to move against Iran's allies in Lebanon so
long as he believes the alliance with Tehran is useful.
For the time being, Damascus is checkmated in
Lebanon. Syria's adversaries-the Maronites, the
PLO, and the Hizballah-have been more effective
than Syria's allies in directing events there. Assad's
hiatus in decisionmaking on Lebanon could reflect his
traditional caution in searching for new ways to cope
with complex problems. It may also indicate that the
President has vacillated too long and that the
problems confronting him in Lebanon now
outdistance his considerable abilities to deal with
them.
Terrorism: Syria Aims for the Big Leagues
Syria, long a major practitioner and patron of
international terrorism in the Middle East, was
implicated this year in two attempts to bomb El Al
airliners in Europe, one at Heathrow Airport on
17 April (where the evidence is strongest) and another
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on 26 June in Madrid. The attacks probably reflect
Assad's evolving strategy of stepping up pressure on
Israel in an effort to achieve psychological as well as
strategic balance. Nonetheless, the El Al attempts
suggest a recklessness that has not been characteristic
of Syrian terrorism.
The Assad regime uses or supports terrorism as one of
several coercive instruments to advance Syrian goals.
When diplomacy fails, Assad uses assassination and
intimidation to raise the cost to other states of
pursuing policies inimical to Syrian interests, to keep
opponents off balance, and to extract financial
support. Generally, however, the Syrians have been
more disciplined in their methods and less arbitrary in
their selection of targets.
Syrian involvement in terrorism had undergone a
fundamental shift in recent years as it moved away
from direct involvement in terrorist acts in favor of
using surrogate groups that enabled Damascus to
conceal its hand. Attempts to use Syrian personnel
resulted in significant embarrassment to the regime
through bungled operations and public exposure of
Damascus's direct participation. In February 1981,
for example, a failed attempt to assassinate the
Jordanian Prime Minister resulted in the televised
confessions of the would-be assassins-members of
the elite Defense Companies then under the command
of Assad's brother Rif`at.
The El Al attacks-and the successful bombing of the
German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin last
March-represent a return to Syria's previous
operating methods. The planners of the London
operation probably believed the spectacular nature of
the act was worth the risks.
Although international scrutiny of Syria's role in
terrorism intensified following the Heathrow incident,
the Madrid attempt was not aborted. This raises
questions about Assad's intentions or the level of
control he exercises over his extensive intelligence
apparatus. The El Al incidents demonstrate Syrian
willingness to risk direct involvement in terrorist
spectaculars designed to maximize casualties and
suggest that Syria may have altered its guidelines for
the use of terror. The decision to go forward with the
Madrid plot despite the flap caused by the Heathrow
attempt, moreover, indicates that Damascus
apparently believes it can escape serious retaliation or,
more ominously, that it is prepared to absorb Israeli
punishment to pursue an aggressive terrorist
campaign.
Assad is concerned about the damage to Syria's
international image that has resulted from its
involvement in terrorism. He is devoting considerable
energy to damage limitation and is especially eager to
maintain contacts with the United States.
Nonetheless, we do not believe that Damascus will
sever its ties to groups engaged in terrorism or make
serious efforts to undermine their operational
capabilities. Damascus has used its influence to
encourage these groups to lower their profiles, at least
temporarily.
Despite persuasive evidence of Syrian guilt in a
number of recent terrorist incidents, Assad apparently
has decided to stonewall on the terrorism issue. At
least for the near term, he cannot move against those
within his regime who are closely connected with
terrorism. To do so would be tantamount to either
admitting guilt or acknowledging lack of control over
his subordinates.
Outlook
The problems confronting Assad-and his choices for
resolving them-are getting tougher. His expertise
continues to be as a spoiler capable of blocking
initiatives he opposes. A recent example would be the
Syrian role in pressing Tehran to make public US
arms shipments to Iran. We believe Syria played a
key behind-the-scenes role-probably in cooperation
with some Iranian factions-in publication of the
story in the pro-Syrian Lebanese paper al-Shira on
3 November.
Assad apparently saw the revelation as a means to
embarrass Washington at a time when the United
States was attempting to rally international opinion
against Syria for its role in international terrorism.
The move backfired to some extent, however, as
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Damascus has been embarrassed by the Israeli role in
the arms transfer-an aspect of Iran's dealings it
apparently had been unaware of at the time of the
revelation. Nonetheless, Assad will try to minimize
the strains the arms deal is adding to the already tense
relationship between Damascus and Tehran and will
continue to take advantage of US discomfiture over
the issue.
In many respects, Damascus's foreign policy has
become a victim of its own success. Its ability to direct
events through negative action established its regional
preeminence in the Levant. The nature and
complexity of the problems besetting Syria are
changing, however, and need constructive initiatives if
they are to be resolved or at least contained. Assad-
and his potential successors-have not yet
demonstrated their mastery of this approach.
Consequently, Syria's primacy is largely the result of
one man's leadership style, not an institutionalized
policy process that could be utilized by his successors.
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The Palestinians have withstood Amal's latest round
of attacks and, despite a tentative cease-fire, are bent
on establishing a permanent enclave in South
Lebanon. The return of the Palestinians in strength
reinforces the de facto partition of Lebanon and
further weakens the authority of the central
government. The failure of the Syrian-backed
Lebanese Shia Amal militia to halt the Palestinian
expansion is an important setback for Damascus's
Lebanon policy and almost certainly will undercut
Syrian prestige.
The situation in the south continues to favor the
Palestinians, who have the upper hand in the strategic
town of Maghdushah, making it more difficult for
Amal or Syria to move men and materiel to the south
from Beirut. In the camps of West Beirut, the
Palestinians are holding their own despite intense
shelling by Amal. Underground shelters and tunnels
have protected the Palestinians in the camps. To root
them out Amal would be forced into costly close
infantry fighting, something that neith
Syrian sponsor have much stomach for.
Political Impact on Lebanese Groups
This latest round of the two-year-old camps war
reveals the growing irrelevancy of the central
government, the salience of sectarian divisions, and
the reinjection of the Palestinians as a factor in
Lebanese politics. The government in Beirut has been
unable to prevent pro-Syrian Shia elements of the
Lebanese Army from joining Amal in the fighting.
The Shia 6th Brigade along with elements of other
Army brigades shelled the Shatila and Burj
al-Barajinah camps in West Beirut and took art in
the fighting near Sidon.
The Christian Lebanese Forces militia is apparently
Forces militia sees this policy as a way to take Syrian
pressure off the Christians and to weaken Syria and
Amal in Lebanon
Since the camps war began in the summer of 1985,
Shia Amal leader Nabih Barri's authority has been
unraveling. In the south, for example, key Amal
military commanders like Daud Daud have balked at
Barri's orders, and mal
fighters near Sidon are far more responsive to local
leaders than to Barri. As the Palestinians gained
ground, Shias from the Army, Amal, and the
Hizballah came together in a common resistance-
underscoring the importance of confessional
allegiances and illustrating the Shias' fear of renewed
Palestinian strength in the south.
Lebanon's Sunnis have looked to the PLO as their
prime military force since the start of the civil war.
The Sunnis' position has been revitalized by the
PLO's return to Lebanon, although pro-Syrian Sunnis
like Prime Minister Karami are uncomfortable with
Arafat.
Palestinian Goals in the South
Since the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the evacuation
of Palestinian fighters, the PLO has been slowly
reinfiltrating into Lebanon. Arafat's initial motivation
after 1982 was to regain close proximity to Israel in
hopes of conducting cross-border operations and to
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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protect Palestinians within the camps. Most returning
fighters were first rearmed and placed in refugee
camps in Beirut. Amal's attempts since 1985 to
disarm these Palestinians forced Arafat to redirect his
efforts toward building up the PLO's strength in
southern Lebanon by infiltrating fighters from
Cyprus and elsewhere through ports near Sidon and
Tyre.
In the most recent fighting, Arafat has again
demonstrated his capacity to survive aSyrian-backed
military onslaught and has scored a political and
military victory. Arafat is likely to point to the
Palestinian presence in the south as proof that his
wing of the PLO is still a force to be reckoned with in
Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli peace process. As
they grow stronger, Palestinian guerrillas will launch
more frequent attacks on Israeli and Army of South
Lebanon troops.
The PLO's strength, however, is likely to remain
largely defensive. Arafat does not have-and is
unlikely to obtain-the arms and manpower necessary
to recreate the state-within-a-state the PLO ruled in
South Lebanon before 1982. Moreover, Arafat's
guarded statements on PLO intentions in Lebanon
suggest that he wants to avoid involving the PLO in
local conflicts so as not to risk losing ground recovered
since 1982. He appears acutely aware that the PLO
cannot suffer another forced evacuation from
Lebanon at a time when its
among seven Arab countries.
The View From Damascus
Syria remains the preeminent foreign power in
Lebanon, despite Amal's failure to contain the
Palestinians, and it is unlikely to be dislodged from
this position any time soon. Several of Damascus's
interests in Lebanon, however, have been
compromised by a string of events ranging from the
January 1986 repudiation of the tripartite accord to
the recent consolidation of the Palestinian position in
South Lebanon. Despite occasional cease-fires, Syria
will continue to urge Amal to keep pressure on the
Palestinian camps and to have radical Palestinian
groups end military cooperation with Arafat's forces
or risk losing bases in Syria and the Bekaa Valley.
Damascus is unlikely to commit its own troops to
South Lebanon.
Israel's Stake
Israel's interests in the south converge with those of
Amal and Syria. The Israelis, too, are determined to
keep the Palestinians from reestablishing a military
infrastructure in southern Lebanon, and Amal's
military operations against the camps further this
goal. The Israelis clearly hope that Amal eventually
will emerge victorious over the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, Tel Aviv recognizes that protracted and
inconclusive battles between the various factions in
Lebanon serve Israel's interests. Such battles sap the
PLO's military strength and resources while at the
same time embarrass Syrian efforts to negotiate
cease-fires and divert Syria's attention from its
confrontation with Israel.
Israel is concerned that Amal's demonstrated
weakness in the recent fighting will erode its prestige
in the south and further reduce the already remote 25X1
prospects of security guarantees for Israel's northern
border. Tel Aviv has long viewed Amal as the only
militia capable of entering some type of Syrian-
approved security arrangement in the south that
would allow Israeli troops to withdraw completely
from the security zone. Further weakening of Amal
coupled with the resurgence of the PLO and
Hizballah would eventually force the Israelis into
more frequent, forceful military interventions in
southern Lebanon, an option they have cons icuousl
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Outlook
The anarchy of southern Lebanon, the disarray of the
government in Beirut, and the involvement of Syria,
Israel, and the Palestinians ensure that the area will
remain explosively unstable. Although the latest
cease-fire appears to have calmed the situation, the
possibility of renewed fighting-and escalation-is
unabated.
If a Palestinian stronghold does emerge in the south,
it probably will remain merely that-a primarily
military enclave rather than a political entity. As a
consequence, the Palestinians will rely on local
Lebanese militias, such as Mustafa Sa`ad's Popular
Nasirite Organization, for political legitimacy and
support.
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JCI:I CL
West Bank: Growing
Fundamentalist Strength
Islamic fundamentalists are capturing more support
in West Bank universities and refugee camps by
offering a stark alternative to Palestinians who have
grown weary of the secular political parties'
competition and skeptical of their effectiveness.
Dissatisfaction with their standard of living and the
prospect of increased restrictions under hardline
Israeli leadership may cause West Bankers to look for
solace in traditional religious practices. As the
fundamentalist groups grow stronger, various political
organizations are likely to vie for Islamic support to
broaden their political appeal. Moreover, the recent
Islamic Jihad attack on Israeli soldiers near the
Western Wall in Jerusalem shows that organized
Palestinian groups may exploit growing
fundamentalist fervor to carry out violence on the
West Bank.
Background
Islamic fundamentalist groups gained momentum and
strength at the end of the 1970s as a consequence of
the Iranian revolution. The US Consulate General in
Jerusalem reports that fundamentalism is making
slow but steady progress throughout Palestinian
society on the West Bank and Gaza strip-accounting
for about 15 percent of the Muslim population. A
controversial poll published recently in a Palestinian
newpaper showed that Ayatollah Khomeini trailed
Jordan's King Hussein in popularity by only one
point-71 percent chose PLO Chairman Arafat as
their preferred leader, 3 percent chose King Hussein,
and 2 percent Khomeini, with a 4-percent margin for
error. The poll, however, was widely criticized for its
glaring methodological problems.
Although fundamentalism's influence can be seen in
all age groups, its greatest impact has been among
Palestinian youth. University students increasingly
view Islamic piety as a means of expressing their
opposition to the Israeli occupation and their
adherence to Palestinian nationalist goals. The
Consulate General reports a marked increase in the
number of students wearing traditional Islamic garb.
The fundamentalist Islamic groups in the West Bank
can be divided into two groups, those with views
similar to the Muslim Brotherhood-advocating the
establishment of a state based on Islamic law and
therefore antinationalist-and those that are
religious-nationalist and support current national
frameworks, including Palestinian nationalism.
the following groups
have recently game greater po itical strength:
? Muslim Brotherhood. The strongest and most
powerful West Bank fundamentalist group whose
stronghold is Nablus and Hebron.
0 the Brotherhood has had considerable
success in establishing its self-reliance,
effectiveness, and independence from the Jordanian
Wagf, or Islamic trust, which owns property and
uses its income to advance Islamic concerns, such as
public prayer, education, and social assistance. The
Brotherhood's spiritual leader in Jerusalem is
Shaykh Sulayman.
? Islamic Liberation Party (ILPJ. Although of modest
size, this group's influence is growing rapidly in
West Bank secondary schools,
OThe ILP is based in Hebron and is led by
Shaykh Qanaybi, who preaches spiritual liberation
and establishment of an Islamic government. A
splinter group in Jerusalem is led by Ahmad Khatib,
who has gathered support by changing party
doctrine to permit armed struggle against Israel
from inside the occupied territories.
? Practitioners ojthe Koran. This group is a loosely
organized coalition of smaller, conservative religious
groups whose central belief is the divine power of
prayer with an element of mysticism. The group
favors an Islamic government but is sympathetic to
PLO policies,
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-018
19 December l 986
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? Sufis. These Muslims pursue activities of a mystical
nature as prescribed by several preachers and
dervishes, mostly in the villages around Hebron.
They are strongly influenced by Egyptian Sufis and
have no particular political leanings.
The power in traditional West Bank Islamic
institutions is concentrated, at least formally, in the
hands of one man, Shaykh Saad Eddin al-Alami, who
is the Mufti of Jerusalem, Chairman of the Supreme
Islamic Council, Chairman of the Board of the Waqf,
and Chief Justice of the Islamic courts, among other
things. Consulate General sources complain of his
ubiquitousness and charge that the Mufti's relative
weakness-and the lack of other strong leaders in
positions to oversee the vast network of Muslim
institutions-leave the system open to manipulation
by ad hoc activist leaders.
Efforts To Manipulate Fundamentalist Sentiment
A variety of political groupings appear to be vying for
fundamentalist support to broaden their appeal.
the main goal of the pro-
Hashemite Jordanian-Palestinian Grouping is to gain
support of fundamentalists to strengthen its political
base on the West Bank. The grouping believes the
fundamentalists are a natural political ally in
countering PLO influence. The grouping hopes to
convince the fundamentalists to play a leading role in
any future government or entity in a West Bank
confederation with Jordan.
Palestinian nationalist groups, such as the Arafat-led
PLO, also have tried in the past to win fundamentalist
support primarily to counter secular leftist bodies,
including the Communists, the Democratic and
Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, and
pro-Syrian Fatah dissidents. This tactical alliance
may be ending, however, and Islamic groups may
begin to challenge all secular Palestinian parties,
particularly for control of student governments at
West Bank universities.
Nevertheless, Fatah in at least one incident has
successfully channeled fundamentalist fervor into acts
of violence against Israelis. On 15 October two
assailants hurled grenades at Israeli soldiers and their
families near the Western Wall in Jerusalem, killing
one and injuring 69. Israeli authorities subsequently
arrested three suspects who claimed to be members of
Islamic Jihad. the suspects were
fundamentalists recruited by Fatah's Force 17 who, in
return for their cooperation, were allowed to
distribute fundamentalist literature at the site of the
attack.
Muslim leaders, moreover, may be incensed by the
heavyhanded Israeli response to recent violence on the
West Bank. At least three Palestinians were killed in
early December by Israeli troops trying to disperse
violent demonstrations at Arab universities and
refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza strip.
blamed religious extremists in part for
inciting the recent violence and claimed there had
been a significant increase in the activities of young
people who sympathize with Hizballah goals in
Lebanon.
Outlook
Religious groups in the past have apparently not
sought to vent their frustrations through attacks on
Israelis. For that reason, the Israeli Government has
not moved against the fundamentalists because it
believes they serve Israeli interests by fracturing the
Palestinian national movement. As recent events
illustrate, however, fundamentalists may be more
willing to fight back, and this may lead to greater
Israeli restrictions on their activities.
We believe, however, that Islamic fundamentalist
groups will continue to play a more important role in
intra-Palestinian rivalries than in anti-Israeli violence
in the near term. Moreover, most West Bank
Palestinians are Sunni Muslims and generally are not
inspired by fundamentalist Shia fervor.
As long as pro- and anti-Arafat groups continue to
wrangle inconclusively, and particularly if the peace
process remains stalemated, the fundamentalists'
prospects for making inroads among West Bank
Palestinians will grow. Islamic fundamentalists are
likely to attract more converts, and this will lead to
greater opportunities for political influence. So long as
the Israeli occupation lasts, many West Bankers are
likely to turn to Islamic bodies as the few truly
Palestinian-controlled institutions in the area.
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OCl"fCl
Israel: Tourism, Terrorism,
and Exchange Rates
Tourism and tourist-related industries in Israel-an
integral part of the national economy-have slumped
in 1986 because of a decline in the number of visiting
Americans. Econometric analysis indicates that the
specter of international terrorism, along with
fluctuations in real exchange rates, are the primary
causes of the decline. To turn things around, the
government must find ways to reduce the cost of
tourism to American visitors by following a more
consistent exchange rate policy and by encouraging
lower construction costs and greater competition
among hotels and restaurants. Moreover, with the
scope of tourism to Israel greatly influenced by
security factors, additional steps are needed to show
potential tourists that Israel is a safe destination.
Tourism's Economic Value
Israel is the location of some of the world's most
famous historical sites. Although the absolute number
of yearly visitors to Israel's sites is lower than in other
countries dependent on the tourist trade-such as
Greece, Italy, and Spain-the relative scope of
tourism in Israel is impressive given the country's
small size. Income from foreign tourism traditionally
amounts to about 3 to 4 percent of Israel's gross
national product.
Foreign currency income from tourism totaled about
$1.1 billion in 1985-a 5.8-percent increase from the
1984 level-while an additional $242 million was
derived from airfares. These earnings are particularly
important because of Israel's chronic need for
increased foreign exchange earnings.
In Israel each export dollar brought in diminishes in
value according to the amount of materials imported
to provide the service. In the case of tourism,
materials include transportation equipment such as
tour buses, food products unavailable in Israel, and
other imported products specifically geared to
tourists. Tourism's value-added percentage is
estimated at 70 percent, which means that for each
dollar brought in through tourism, Israel can retain
To explainRuctuations in Israeli tourism levels, we
developed an econometric analysis to incorporate
jactors that help to determine tourist Rows.
Generally, natural catastrophes, tourism/political
unrest, real exchange rates, and the structure oj'a
country s tourist market-where the tourists are
.from play major roles.
To work terrorism into the analysis, a variable
covering terrorist attacks was incorporated. Two
different values were then assigned to the terrorism
variable depending on whether a terrorist attack
occurred each month. The findings suggest that
tourists are sensitive to terrorism, especially those
incidents receiving widespread media coverage.
Tourists, like other consumers, also respond to
relative prices. Our analysis incorporated real
exchange rates-which are calculated by multiplying
the nominal or everyday market exchange rate 6y the
country s consumer price ratios. As expected, when
changes in real exchange rates indicated that tourism
was a good buy, tourism levels increased.
70 cents after paying out 30 cents for import costs.
This makes tourism one of the nation's most
profitable export industries. In dollar terms, the added
value for 1985 was estimated at $840 million, about
15 percent of the total added value of Israeli exports.
The overall number of visitors to Israel in 1985 was
slightly over 1.4 million, an increase of about 200,000
from 1984. Close to 1.2 million arrived by plane,
while the rest came either by land from Arab
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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Israel: Total Cruise Passenger Arrivals
Arrivals
(thousands)
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A
1986
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countries or by sea on cruise ships. Nearly 60 percent
of these tourists came from Western Europe-mostly
from France, West Germany, and the United
Kingdom. About 30 percent were from the United
States-the largest single source of tourists to
Israel-with the remaining 10 percent from the rest
of the world.
After the especially successful 1985 tourist season,
tourism industry personnel were convinced that their
long-term goal of attracting 2 million tourists
annually would be achieved by 1988. With that in
mind, facilities were built to accommodate an
expected mass influx of visitors. New construction
was started to add 3,200 hotel rooms to the already
existing 30,600 rooms. The decline in tourism in 1986,
however, has forced a halt to these projects. Except on
certain religious holidays, many hotels stand half
empty.
Tourism's Other Benefits
The benefits that accrue to Israel from foreign
tourism go far beyond economic gains. First of all, an
enjoyable visit improves Israel's image in the eyes of
foreign tourists. Surveys undertaken before 1986 have
consistently revealed that 80 to 90 percent of the
tourists questioned were satisfied with their visit and
that their overall impression of Israel was positive.
Thus, tourism represents an invaluable tool for the
improvement of Israel's international image. Second,
Jewish tourism contributes to a strengthening of ties
between Israel and overseas Jewry. Third, tourism
contributes to the development of regions such as
Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba-a haven for European
tourists-and the Dead Sea area, where tourism is the
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Rsal
Exchangge
Rate Indexa
140
Real
Exchangge
Rate Indsx
b ~ a
l~
/~ I\
,
I~ / ~ I ~
~ ~ ~ I
~~ ~ ~
'
r
~,
Total
Tourist
Arrivals
(thousands)
140
Ij I
I ~ I ~
l / I I 90
II
1983 1984 1985
Real Shekel/Dollar
Exchange Rate and Total Tourism
I
Tourlst I I
Arrivals v I I
(thousands) I
,~ ~-'
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Secret
primary source of income and employment. These
additional benefits, along with the economic rewards,
will become harder to realize if terrorism continues to
exact such a damaging toll.
The Terrorism Link
Major terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle
East over the last year have left searing marks on
Israel's tourism industry. The hijacking of a TWA
airliner in June 1985, the seizing of the Italian luxury
liner Achille Lauro in October 1985, the attacks on
airports in Rome and Vienna in December 1985, the
attack on an Istanbul synagogue in September 1986,
and the grenade attack in mid-October 1986 near the
Western Wall in Jerusalem-a particularly popular
area for tourists~ach generated flurries of telexes
from US travel agencies to Israeli hotels and tour
offices canceling scheduled visits.
Hotel industry officials predict the overall decline in
visitors could reach 30 percent by the end of this year,
mainly because of reduced US tourist arrivals. During
and immediately following major terrorist incidents,
Israeli tour operators typically estimate a cancellation
rate as high as 70 percent. The number of American
tourists coming to Israel dropped by 47 percent in the
first eight months of 1986 when compared to the same
period in 1985.
Cruise ship tourism appears to have been particularly
hard hit by the Achille Lauro seizure. During the first
eight months of this year, total cruise ship arrivals
were down over 48 percent from the same period in
1985. The most severe drop-a 64-percent decline in
the first quarter of 1986 as compared to the same
period in 1985-was in the number of American
tourists coming to Israel via cruise ships.
The Exchange Rate Effect
Exchange rate policies, encompassing formal or
informal pegs to the US dollar, have a lesser but still
important impact on tourism, according to our
econometric analysis. When a country like Israel
becomes expensive relative to its competitors, a prime
and growing source of foreign exchange earnings
could be diverted or destroyed as tourists travel to
more affordable areas. With respect to the shekel's
performance vis-a-vis the US dollar, the pattern of
real exchange rate movements indicates that from
about July 1984 until July 1985, Israel was a
relatively good buy for American tourists as the
dollar's value increased in shekel terms by about 25
percent. This advantageous real exchange rate
appears to have helped offset tourist concerns about
terrorism.
Since July 1985, however, exchange rate changes
have been unfavorable, with the shekel appreciating
by about 18 percent with respect to the US dollar.
This has made tourism to Israel relatively more
expensive for US visitors. Predictably, the currently
less advantageous exchange rate appears to have
contributed to the major decline in US visitors.
Outlook
With terrorism exacting such a heavy toll on tourism,
1986 will probably end up a disappointing year for
Israel's tourism industry. The tourism industry's poor
performance comes at an especially bad time for the
Israeli economy, which is already grappling with
economic austerity.
Despite terrorism's deleterious effects, Israel can
improve its prospects for increased tourism in several
ways:
? Hold the line on construction costs for hotels and
related services. Currently, Israel is at a cost
disadvantage with competing countries on the
Mediterranean coast such as Spain. Working to
overcome this cost disadvantage will go a long way
toward reducing the relative cost of tourism to
Israel.
? Increase competition within Israel among hotels and
restaurants, thereby creating lower prices for
travelers. This could be accomplished by
encouraging restaurant chains to offer meals for
tourists at special prices. Furthermore, additional
government controls could be imposed on prices for
services used almost exclusively by tourists.
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Reai Shekel/Dollar Exchange Rate
and US Tourism
US
Tourist
Arrival
Index b
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M
w
a January 1985=100
b January 1985=100; seasonally adjusted data
with January 1985 tourism of 32,552 visitors
Legend
tourtsm index
exchan~c a rate_
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? Improve the public image and reputation of EI Al,
Israel's official airline, as a safe carrier for tourists.
? Explore ways to extend the average stay of tourists
in Israel and to encourage more off-season tourism.
In addition, successful promotional efforts to
encourage greater tourism from nearby countries
such as Egypt could offset declines in US tourism.
A more consistent exchange rate policy also would
help encourage tourists to visit Israel. In the past,
exchange rates have been adjusted to try to offset the
effects of hyperinflation on the competitiveness of
Israeli export goods. These adjustments, however,
were piecemeal at best and sporadic in their
application.
Large devaluations in exchange rates are no longer
necessary because of the progress made in controlling
Israel's runaway inflation. Some economic policy
makers, including Bank of Israel Governor Michael
Bruno, insist that no further devaluations are planned
in the near term. A return to steadier exchange
rates-if maintained for an extended period-would
help those contemplating a visit to Israel to better
gauge their planned expenses and might offset some
of their concerns about terrorism.
21 Secret
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Iran: Khoiniha-
The Maverick Radical
For the last seven years Mohammad Asgar Khoiniha,
the spiritual mentor of the US hostage-takers, has
been a maverick in the radical faction of the Iranian
clergy. Mercurial and violent, he has used a series of
political positions to espouse and advance the radical
line. Currently, as Iran's prosecutor general, he is
attempting to make the judiciary an instrument of
radical reform. Khoiniha's inflexibility sometimes has
led to disagreements with other radicals, but his
willingness to engage in unpleasant judicial chores
and his value as a symbol of the radicals ensure
Khomeini's favor and will prevent his removal.
Background
Khoiniha became involved in radical politics soon
after epublic in
1979. Khoiniha's
rise to a position o m uence was ai e by Ayatollah
Khomeini's son Ahmad, whom he met after the
revolution while prayer leader of a mosque near
Tehran. Khoiniha took advantage of the US Embassy
seizure to enhance his role in the radical movement.
He was a key figure behind the takeover and served as
an adviser to the student hostage-takers,
He appeared in the Iranian pies as
an a vocate o spy trials and the severing of ties
between the United States and Iran
Following the resolution of the hostage crisis,
Ayatollah Khomeini appointed Khoiniha as his
personal representative to the hajj, a position he held
through 1984. In this role he advocated export of the
revolution to the Gulf states and fomented anti-Saudi
demonstrations in Mecca.
Over the past several years Khoiniha has called for
the nationalization of industry, the distribution of
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of Western cultural influence from Iran. Khoiniha has
devoted much of his attention to the latter effort, and
his dogmatic adherence to this issue has at times
estranged him from other radicals
Khoiniha found a new forum for his radical
philosophy in 1985 when Ayatollah Khomeini
appointed him prosecutor general.
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Current Power
Khoiniha has used his current position to make the
judiciary an instrument of radical reform. According
to the Iranian press, he believes Iran's internal
difficulties are rooted in the failure of certain Iranians
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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An important target of Khoiniha's wrath is former
officials of the Shah's regime. In his view, these
officials profited by slandering Islam and colluding
with foreigners, activities they would repeat if given
the chance.
He also has attacked those he believes are subservient
to Western interests. Khoiniha includes in this group
those individuals who oppose his radical reforms,
those who support a negotiated settlement with Iraq,
and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's
supporters. According to the Iranian press, members
of the latter group hold Khoiniha responsible for the
disruption of their meetings by Hizballah gangs
Khoiniha has differed from other radicals over the
return of exiles. Prime Minister Musavi has called for
the return of exiles and assured them that their
property will be respected. Khoiniha, however, has
told the exiles to stay in the West, as they are
"contaminated" and would pose a threat to the
revolution. Through his office, he has continued his
efforts to seize their property as a means of
discouraging their return.
Outlook
Khoiniha appears intent on building a power base
within the judiciary.
will continue to rely on his personal connections and
his willingness to espouse the radical line to maintain
his position within the government. If his actions
hamper the policies of more powerful radicals, or if
the radicals should lose in a power struggle, Khoiniha
would not last.
We believe Khoiniha will continue to obstruct efforts
by pragmatic elements to improve relations with the
West. He will also continue to use the judiciary and
the media to prevent the return of exiles. But, as he
lacks a firm power base among the clerics, he will not
play a decisive role in the struggle over Khomeini's
succession.
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Kuwait: Islamic Fundamentalist
Currents Flowing Steadily
Kuwait's Islamic fundamentalists have become more
assertive and have made significant inroads into
Kuwaiti politics and society. Sectarianism in
Kuwait-sharpened by the Iran-Iraq war and by
gains made by the fundamentalist movement
throughout the Arab world-is worrying Kuwait's
ruling family. The government continues to
implement measures designed to control the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism. The Amir's decisions to
dissolve the National Assembly and increase press
censorship earlier this year were intended partly to
warn fundamentalists that they were demanding too
Gaining Political Respectability
Traditional Islamic religious associations in Kuwait
continue to flourish and to attract greater numbers of
sympathizers. Fundamentalists are found throughout
all levels of Kuwaiti society, including wealthy
businessmen and government officials. Most
adherents are young, relatively well educated, and
have studied in the West. Many received their
fundamentalist indoctrination in Kuwait's public
schools where religious instruction is mandatory and
dominated by fundamentalists. Although most
fundamentalists-Sunni and Shia alike-support the
ruling family, some groups advocate an Islamic form
of government and have been associated with
antiregime activity, including terrorism.
Fundamentalism, however, has not yet become a mass
movement in opposition to the government
Islamic fundamentalism in Kuwait has been
gradually transformed from a social to a political
phenomenon over the past five years. Kuwait's small
fundamentalist groups-both Sunni and Shia-
gained significant political stature as a result of
gerrymandering in the 1981 election and won 10 of
the 50 seats in the National Assembly. When an
election was held again in 1985, the fundamentalists
gained five more seats. Sunnis-who constitute a
majority of the Kuwaiti population and hold
important committee assignments in the Assembly-
Fundamentalists on Campus
Islamic fundamentalism is at the heart of student
politics in Kuwait. Fundamentalist groups operate
through the Union of Kuwaiti Students at the
University of Kuwait and among Kuwaiti students
abroad. Founded in 1969 and organized as a
miniparliament, the union acts as the students'
liaison with the university administration. ~~ 25X1
Over the years the union has become a political
forum through which special interest groups
disseminate their ideas. Cultivated by national
political groupings, the union mirrors Kuwait's
political spectrum and receives .financial and moral
support from a variety of special interest groups in
Kuwait. As in the case of the National Assembly, the
union has become highly politicized and less
concerned with its purported role-the improvement
of higher education.
Fundamentalist groups dominate the union. The
largest group-al-I'atilaf (Coalition)-operates
virtually as an arm of the Social Reform Society and
won about 37 percent oJthe votes in the most recent
student election. The Coalition has sought to relate
the principles of Islam and Islamic ideology to each
position it takes on a wide variety of issues raised in
the context of student politics. Shias represent about
20 percent of the membership, and their group is 25X1
closely gf.~liated with the Islamic Cultural Society.
Those c~rliated with the Islamic Revival Society
claim about 16 percent of the union's supporters.
Fundamentalist activity on Kuwaiti campuses has
been limited mostly to nonviolent activities such as
meetings and the distribution of leq/lets. Last April,
however, fundamentalists organized aone-day
university strike to protest regulations they believed
to be ant(fundamentalist.
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NESA NESAR 86-028
l9 December 1986
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have gained more political clout in that body than the
Shias. Although Shias are tolerated in the Assembly,
they have held on to only three seats through several
elections and do not serve on any committees, largely
because of ineffective organization, internal divisions,
and government gerrymandering in favor of Sunnis.
Having secured a foothold in the Assembly, the
fundamentalists have begun pressing the ruling Al
Sabah family to follow more conservative policies and
to take a more Islamic outlook. Harsh fundamentalist
rhetoric has been embarrassing to the government on
such issues as women's suffrage and the rights of non-
Muslims. The government has also come under fire
for attempting to revamp Kuwait's educational
system to incorporate more Western values. To
complicate matters, the government has had to deal
with sectarian differences over such issues as aid to
Iraq and Syria
The ruling family has accommodated the
fundamentalists on a number of issues, and Kuwaiti
laws and social practice are more restrictive than in
past years. Kuwait's leaders share many of the
conservative social values of the fundamentalists and
have a long tradition of governing by consultation and
accommodation. The ruling family has been discreet
in displaying its wealth and has avoided the
extravagance of other Arab ruling families. The Al
Sabah maintain good relations with Sunni and Shia
leaders and have tried to respond to their views. To
satisfy some of their demands, the government has
banned public dancing and the sale of pork and
alcoholic beverages. In July 1985 the government
allowed religious leaders to issue a latwa (ruling)
opposing women's suffrage.
These concessions failed to satisfy the
fundamentalists, however, and they have continued to
make more demands than the government believes it
can satisfy without alienating other sectors of the
population. Kuwait's influential merchant families,
the Bedouin community, and Arab nationalists have
opposed the drift toward social and religious
fundamentalism. To appease these groups, the
government has allowed the press to criticize Sunni
fundamentalist efforts to segregate the sexes in
The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP)-a worldwide
organization of fundamentalist Muslims-has an
active following in Kuwait.
Kuwait, and about 500 regional delegates attended.
Their activities included visiting various mosques
and delivering daily lectures. It does not appear that
the SICP is engaged in significant subversive activity
in Kuwait, but its strong fundamentalist orientation
could bring it into cordlict with the Kuwaiti
Government
The extent of SICP involvement with other Islamic
fundamentalist groups in Kuwait is not clear. SICP
leaders at a cortlerence in Kuwait last year called for
members to join other fundamentalist groups. The
SICP has tried to appeal to the Shia community in
Bahrain, and we suspect that similar contacts have
been attempted with Kuwaiti Shias. These overtures
are likely tofail, however, as these groups probably
view the SICP as alien and too noticeable by local
security services.
Kuwaiti schools and change the country's
Constitution to make sharia (Islamic law) the sole
basis of civil law.
The government's enforcement of some
antifundamentalist measures suggests that its
tolerance for the Islamic trend is limited. In 1985 the
regime issued a law banning public prayer outside of
mosques. Last January the government closed 80
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Dr. Abdallah al-Nafisi, a 41 year-old professor
turned politician, will exploit any theme as long as it
is anathema to the Al Sabah. He was a leader in
Kuwait's Arab Nationalist Movement when it was
popular in the late 1960s and rode the growing tide of
Islamic fundamentalism into the National Assembly
in 1985. In the Assembly, Nafisi has advocated
greater government attention to Islamic principles but
has frequently joined secular nationalists in
attacking the royal family and their close ties to the
United States. He contradicted his fundamentalist
constituency last year by supporting female suffrage.
To increase his popular appeal, Nafisi has
consistently called for a broader political process and
greater freedom of expression in Kuwait.
Nafisi's high profile activism has earned him little
reward and much trouble over the years. He lost his
chairmanship of the Political Science Department at
Kuwait University in 1978 after writing a book
critical of the royal family. Shortly after, he
attempted an unauthorized pilgrimage to Mecca and
was detained by Saudi o.,~icials. To avoid further
problems with the Kuwaiti Government, Nafisi lived
in sel,/=imposed exile in the United Arab Emirates
from 1979 until his reinstatement at Kuwait
University in 1981.
Koranic teaching centers, according to the Iranian
press. In connection with the newly imposed press
censorship, the Kuwaiti Government announced it is
working on a law that will prevent the publication of
items that touch on any aspect of Islam. Rumors are
circulating that the Kuwaiti Government has purged
Shias from government positions and applied strict
security measures to the Shia community partly to
warn against increased fundamentalist activity.~~ 25X1
Sunni Fundamentalist Groups
Sunni fundamentalists are the most vocal element in
Kuwaiti politics and society. Their political base is
divided between the Social Reform Society and the
Islamic Revival Society (the Salafiyyin). Before the
dissolution of the National Assembly last July, these
groups probably held six seats. Led by Abdallah
al-Nafisi, their political agenda includes making
Islamic law the basis of all constitutional law,
enforcing zakat (the alms tax), limiting naturalization
to Muslims only, and opposing female suffrage. They
do not, however, advocate the repressive social
strictures racticed in nei hboring Saudi Arabia.
The Social Reform Society has more political clout,
financial resources, and membership than other Sunni
fundamentalist groups in Kuwait. According to the
US Embassy, the society has about 1,000 members,
all of whom are Kuwaiti nationals. Many more,
however, including expatriates, participate in
activities that include seminars, conferences of
Islamic scholars, youth and sports programs, charity
programs, and the publication of its magazine
al-Mujtamah. A 12-member board manages the 25X1
society's $800,000 budget, which is funded by
voluntary contributions and an annual government
subsidy of $80,000. Reflecting its considerable
resources, the society operates in an impressive
modern building complex in Kuwait that includes a
large mosque and a snorts field for its youth program.
The Social Reform Society is in effect a front for the 25X1
Muslim Brotherhood, which was outlawed by the
Kuwaiti Government in 1959. When the ban on
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religious organizations was lifted in 1963, the
resurrected Muslim Brotherhood was renamed the
Social Reform Society, and Kuwaitis replaced its
Egyptian founders as the organization's leaders.
According to Embassy reporting, Egypt's Muslim
Brethren maintain some influence and have close
personal contacts in the society.
The Salafiyyin, a more radical Sunni movement, is
much smaller and has no front organization or
publication of its own. According to the US Embassy,
it advocates an ultraconservative view of Islam and
operates out of mosques run by sympathetic prayer
leaders. The US Embassy reports that the Salafiyyin
have been accused of using brainwashing techniques
to indoctrinate adolescents, even against their parents'
wishes
Shia Activity
The Islamic Cultural Society is the major Shia
fundamentalist organization. In contrast to its Sunni
counterpart, the Islamic Cultural Society is reputed to
be a small, apolitical organization that caters to the
country's conservative and staid Shia merchant
families, whose interests tend to parallel those of the
regime. The government closely monitors its activities
for political content but largely ignores its
proselytizing. The US Embassy reports that Shia
clerics and religious institutions have been given more
autonomy by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs than
The impact of the Iranian revolution on Kuwait's Shia
community has been mixed.
the size and influence of pro-
Khomeini Shia elements have diminished over the
past several years. Iranian threats and attempts to
intimidate Kuwait through airstrikes and attacks on
Kuwaiti ships have caused many fundamentalists to
view Iran more as an enemy than as a model.
Although many Shias continue to be spiritually
inspired by the teachings of Khomeini, they have been
disillusioned with what they perceive to be a
burgeoning bureaucracy bogged down in its own
redtape and peppered with corrupt leaders
The continuation oft e war
with its effect on business travel and family
relationships has slowly convinced many Shias that a
change in the leadership in Tehran is necessary. The
deportation of 15,000 to 20,000 Shias from Kuwait in
1985, apparently for security reasons, has been a
factor in reducing threats from the potentially
militant segment of the population.
For some Shias, however, a successful Islamic
government in Iran is proof that an Islamic republic is
feasible. The US Embassy reports that pro-Khomeini
Shias are dispersed among shadowy, clandestine
groups without identifiable leaders or organizational
structure. Tehran has channeled some support to
these groups over the years. Anti-Sabah leaflets
printed in Iran and calling for an Islamic republic in
Kuwait have found their way to Kuwait. Some Shias
their Sunni counterparts
Kuwait's large Shia population~ver 30 percent of
the native population-is a sensitive point for the
ruling family, and Kuwaiti security takes seriously the
possibility of Iranian-inspired subversion. The
presence of Iranian and Arab Shias who have
developed contacts with radical Shias in Lebanon and
exiles in Iran poses the principal domestic terrorist
threat in Kuwait. Radical Shia elements have been
associated with the rash of terrorist incidents that
have occurred in Kuwait since 1983. The Al Sabah
family, however, has done better than most Gulf
ruling families in integrating Shias into society, giving
them an economic stake in the country and allowing
them a limited political voice.
have received terrorist training in Tehran.
Outlook
Although Kuwaiti fundamentalists have been
silenced, fundamentalist currents are unlikely to
subside in Kuwait. The Amir's decision to suspend
Kuwait's democratic institutions could incite
antiregime activity over time. Now cut out of
Kuwait's political decision making process, Shia and
Sunni fundamentalists, particularly the young
firebrands, could be more inclined to undertake
antiregime activities to make their views known.
Moreover, the fundamentalists are unlikely to be
placated by the Amir's use of the traditional
diwaniyyas (informal gatherings) to defuse domestic
grievances.
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The Al Sabah, whose legitimacy rests on political
rather than religious grounds, feel increasingly
threatened by the spread of fundamentalism. In part
this stems from their lack of strong allies in the
religious establishment; none are religious leaders and
none hold prominent positions in Islamic circles.
Despite their pious image and efforts at
accommodation, their perceived materialism, political
liberalism, and personal ties to the West will spur
criticism in the fundamentalist community.
Kuwait's proximity to Iran and its large Iranian and
Palestinian populations will continue to make the
country a target of Islamic militants. Although Shias
as well as Sunnis have rallied around the ruling family
on the issue of terrorism, particularly that sponsored
by Iran, circumstances such as religious repression or
further economic decline could rejuvenate interest in
violent activity directed against the Al Sabah regime.
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NORTH YEMENI FORCES
AT MARIB
SAUDI ARABIA
NORTH YEMEN
SOUTH YEMEN
SR2
MRRIB ~ SR2
Secret 30
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to Marib
The deployment of North Yemen's first Soviet-
supplied SA-3 surface-to-air missiles to the Marib
area reflects Sanaa's heightened concern over the
vulnerability of its oilfields to South Yemeni air
attack. The SA-3 system will require Soviet military
advisers to operate and offers Moscow intelligence
collection opportunities in the Marib area. North
Yemeni reliance on Soviet military expertise is likely
to increase as it deploys more of its SA-3s.
includes three SA-3 missile launchers each ca able of
firing four missiles before reloading
~ area to make the first site operational and six
more launchers sufficient to set up two more sites.
The SA-3 deployments to Marib should significantly
bolster defenses of the oilfields against South Yemeni
air attack. The decision to deploy the SA-3 system to
The SA-3 missile is intended to counter fast, low-
flying fighter-bombers and complements the SA-2,
which is better suited for higher altitude air threats.
area as we as t e equiva ent o tree u y
equipped Army brigades. North Yemeni forces enjoy
a decisive numerical advantage over South Yemeni or
Saudi forces in the triborder area.
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probably has increased with the acquisition of the
SA-3. 25X1
President Salih recently has looked to Arab states to
diversify his sources of military support for the SA-3
program.
program.
early December, presumably to support the SA-3
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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Outlook
The deployment of the SA-3 missile to Marib will
improve North Yemen's ability to protect its oilfields
against air attack but will also allow the Soviets
increased access to the Marib area. To operate the
SA-3 system effectively, North Yemen will require
close Soviet supervision, maintenance, and logistic
support. At the same time, President Salih will try to
limit Soviet attempts to collect intelligence on the
progress of Marib oil operations and the activities of
South Yemeni military exiles operating in this area.
Salih's reliance on Soviet military expertise for his air
defense forces is likely to increase despite his attempts
to acquire non-Soviet training and advisers for his
SA-3 program. North Yemen will require additional
Soviet air defense advisers as it prepares to deploy
SA-3 missiles around Sanaa. North Yemen's efforts
to secure substantial training, logistic, and
maintenance support for its SA-3s from other Arab or
Asian states with Soviet equipment-such as Egypt or
India-will be limited by North Yemen's inability to
pay for the assistance.
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Sudan's Vulnerability to
Ethiopian Air Incursions
Sudan's air defense continues to be ineffective against
Ethiopian aircraft incursions. Ethiopia engages in
cross-border operations to support the rebel Sudanese
People's Liberation Army (SPCA) in the south and to
strike Eritrean insurgents fighting against Addis
Ababa from positions along the Sudan-Ethiopia
Ethiopian violations of Sudan's airspace are politically
embarrassing for Prime Minister Sadiq, who has
publicly pledged to strengthen the Sudanese armed
forces. Sadiq will continue to seek military assistance
and equipment from foreign donors to bolster Sudan's
air defenses in his efforts to keep the military
satisfied. Foreign military procurements, however, are
unlikely to be sufficient to redress Sudan's air defense
an additional precaution, Ethiopian markings have
been removed from many aircraft to provide for a
degree of deniability in the event an aircraft is
downed.
Ethiopia is likely to continue to make helicopter
sorties into southern Sudan to support SPCA
operations there.
deficiencies.
In the absence of an effective air defense, Ethiopian
aircraft violations of Sudanese airspace will continue
and contribute to Sadiq's resolve to pursue alternative
means of retaliation against Addis Ababa. His most
readily available options are to continue to allow
Eritrean insurgents to operate against Ethiopia from
bases in Sudan and to press militarily in southern
Sudan against the Ethiopian-backed SPCA
Ethiopian Aircraft Operations Against Eritrean
Insurgents
Sudan's airspace along its border with Ethiopia is also
penetrated periodically by Addis Ababa's aircraft
flying missions against Eritrean insurgents operating
from Sudanese territory. For example,
Ethiopian Support Flights for the SPCA
Ethiopian helicopter flights support SPCA operations
in southern Sudan. The helicopters carry primarily
small arms and ammunition, including light
machineeuns and mortars,
Food apparently is also delivered to the
y t ese flights.
Ethiopian pilots fly only in those areas firmly in
SPCA control to reduce their vulnerability to
Sudanese ground-based air defenses.
no Ethiopian
e icopter has been fired upon in southern Sudan-
which may attest to the effectiveness of this tactic. As
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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In addition, periodic Ethiopian aircraft violations of
Sudanese airspace are probably for reconnaissance of
Sudanese military activity along the border.~~
Sudanese Response to Ethiopian Aircraft Incursions
Sudanese air defenses are incapable of effectively
deterring or defending against Ethiopian aircraft
operations in Sudanese airspace
Sudan lacks the air defense assets required to counter
intruding Ethiopian aircraft.
Ethiopian aircraft incursions are heightening the
frustration of the military over its inability to perform
Sadiq is
likely to feel increased pressure from the military to
upgrade Sudan's air defenses as part of his pledge to
modernize the armed forces.
The Air Defense Force, in conjunction with the Air
Force, is charged with defending Sudanese airspace
and territory against hostile air attack. Thelorce,
headquartered in Port Sudan, consists of three
brigades-an air defense artillery and an SA-2
brigade based on Port Sudan, and an air defense and
artillery brigade based near Khartoum. The Air
Defense Force, therefore, can provide only limited
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radars, moreover, probabl cannot erjorm to
The Air Defense Force also controls about 30
radars-late-1950, Soviet-manufactured models-
jor early warning and target acquisition. Most of the 25X1
radars, however, are inoperative because of
inadequate maintenance and spare parts. Operational
The Air Force, headquartered in Khartoum,
primarily relies on 12 MIG-21 s jor air defense
missions, although probably only jour ojthese 25X1
aircraft are operational because ojinadequate
maintenance and spare parts. The Air Force's ability
to perjorm air defense missions islurther limited by
jactors such as low pilot proficiency because of
insufficient training, inadequate logistics, and
inadequate communications between the Air Force
and the Air Defense Force. 25X1
Sadiq Looks for Help
Sadiq will continue to look to foreign donors for the
military assistance and a ui ment needed
Sudan's air defenses.
~ Sudan has had difficulty keeping its 12
MIG-21 aircraft-Khartoum's primary interceptor-
operational partly because of a lack of spare parts.
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Sadiq has turned to Saudi Arabia for tactical aircraft.
Although Sadiq's justification or
this request was to aid the military in its dry season
offensive against the SPLA, the armed forces could
seek to exploit the F-5's interceptor capability against
Ethiopian aircraft.
Sadiq probably asked the Soviet Union for military
assistance, including air defense equipment, durin
Prospects for Increased Air Defense Capability
The near-term prospects for Sadiq to procure
sufficient military assistance and equipment from
foreign donors to significantly bolster Sudan's air
defenses are poor. The acquisition of additional
fighter aircraft alone, for example, is not likely to
significantly enhance Sudanese capability to engage
Ethiopian fighter aircraft because of the inferiority of
Sudanese pilots and inadequate ground-based radar
acquisition and control capability required to vector
aircraft to their targets. Moreover, additional fighter
aircraft will increasingly burden the country's already
inadequate maintenance and logistic infrastructure.
fly over only those areas controlled by the SPLA. This
tactic probably will also preclude effective
employment of portable air defense systems such as
SA-7 missiles, since in most instances the military
lacks the requisite access on the ground.
Foreign donors are unlikely to provide sufficient
military assistance and equipment to financially
strapped Khartoum to redress major air defense
deficiencies resulting from shortages of maintenance,
logistics, and training. Without correction of these
problems, the armed forces will be unable to optimally
employ newly acquired weapon systems.
In the absence of an effective air defense deterrent,
Ethiopian aircraft operations in Sudanese airspace
will almost certainly continue. These aircraft
incursions will constitute a political irritant, both
domestically and internationally, to Prime Minister
Sadiq. Recognition that no near-term solution to
correct Sudan's air defense inadequacy is available is
likely to encourage Sadiq's pursuit of alternative
means of retaliation against Ethiopia. Sadiq probably
views continued tacit support of Eritrean insurgents
and military operations in southern Sudan against the
Ethiopian-backed SPLA as the most readily available
retaliatory options. Should Sadiq pursue these
avenues, he is likely to fuel Ethiopian incentives to
increase support for Sudan's southern insurgency.
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Additional ground-based air defense weapons such as
antiaircraft guns may strengthen the defense of fixed
installations such as bridges, dams, and airstrips, but
Ethiopian aircraft are likely to avoid flying over these
sites. These weapons, moreover, are unlikely to
significantly increase the armed forces' capability to
interdict Ethiopian helicopters, which are careful to
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South Asian Nations: Inching
Toward Cooperation
The second annual summit meeting of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) in Bangalore, India, on 17-19 November
produced modest progress toward the organization's
goal of increased partnership. The member states-
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan, and the Maldives-agreed to joint
declarations and further discussion on touchy issues
such as terrorism and narcotics. The SAARC summit
meeting also provided an opportunity for the leaders
of the individual states to conduct private talks on
sensitive bilateral issues that produced several new
efforts to relax regional tensions. The self-interest of
each state, however, will work against significant
movement on controversial regional issues.
SAARC's First Year
SAARC was formally launched in December 1985 at
a summit meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Throughout
1986 officials from the SAARC member states met to
prepare for the second summit meeting in Bangalore.
General declarations and recommendations were
issued on ways SAARC members could better
cooperate on issues, such as terrorism and narcotics,
but no major substantive agreements were reached:
? A SAARC economic ministerial meeting was held
in Islamabad in April.
? A SAARC study group on terrorism met in Dhaka
in June.
? The SAARC Foreign Ministers' Conference was
held in Dhaka last August.
? A study group on drug traffickin and dru abuse
met in September, also in Dhaka
This low-key approach to cooperation has apparently
paid off in a lessening of distrust among the SAARC
member states.
All the SAARC member states 25X1
agreed to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
becoming the next chairman of SAARC at the
Bangalore meeting. He will serve until the next
summit meeting, scheduled for late 1987 in
Kathmandu.
Results of the Bangalore Summit
The SAARC summit meeting produced the
"Bangalore Declaration," which stressed general
agreement on substantive regional concerns.~~ 25X1
Terrorism. All seven member states agreed to
condemn "all methods and practices of terrorism" as
criminal and decided to reconvene the study group, 25X1
headed by India, at a date to be determined. The
members also recognized the importance of UN
Resolution 2625, which requires all states to abstain
from organizing, instigating, assisting, or
participating in terrorist acts. A US Embassy source
in Dhaka said that the member states deliberately
avoided defining terrorism in order to skirt
contentious issues such as the Sikh agitation in India
and the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka
Narcotics. The SAARC countries formally agreed to
add narcotics to the "core issues" addressed by the
organization. The Bangalore Declaration urged
greater cooperation and information sharing in
halting illegal narcotics trafficking and reducing drug
abuse in the member states. The declaration also
pledged to set up a technical committee, chaired by
Pakistan, that will meet next year to draw up more 25X1
specific recommendations, according to the US
Embassy in Islamabad
and a return to economic "multilateralism" through a
resumption of the North-South dialogue. The
state rounded out the Bangalore Declaration by
calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty
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declaration specifically advocated enlarged
concessional economic assistance from donor nations,
"amelioration" of official debts, trade liberalization,
commodity price stabilization, increased technology
transfer, and special treatment for the least developed
SAARC countries
Administrative Issues. In a separate Memorandum of
Understanding, the SAARC countries agreed on
several unresolved administrative issues. All seven
states agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in
Kathmandu, Nepal, with a target inauguration date
of 16 January 1987, according to the US Embassy in
Nepal. The first secretary general, Abdul Ahsan, is
from Bangladesh and will serve for two years. There
will also be four directors general~ne each from
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Bhutan and
the Maldives will not be represented in the Secretariat
because they cannot afford to pay the salaries,
according to the US Embassy in Kathmandu. Finally,
the SAARC heads of state approved a formula for
funding that assigns most of the burden to India (32
percent) and Pakistan (24 percent)
Bilateral and Trilateral Talks
The South Asian heads of state took the opportunity
provided by the summit meeting to hold private
bilateral talks and achieved modest progress on
nuclear bomb, according to the US Embassy in New
Delhi. Gandhi publicly said he was "utterly
unconvinced" by Junejo's denials that Pakistan was
building a bomb and also criticized Junejo's proposal
at the summit meeting that SAARC states send
observers to monitor each other's military exercises.
India-Sri Lanka. In a series of meetings, Gandhi and
Sri Lankan President Jayewardene appeared to make
progress on reviving the stalled Sri Lankan peace
talks. The US Embassy in New Delhi reports that
Gandhi and Jayewardene came up with a plan to
redraw provincial boundaries in Tamil-dominated
areas of Sri Lanka and to coax the insurgents back to
the negotiating table. The major Tamil insurgent
group, however, has rejected all of Colombo's peace
proposals
Water Sharing. India, Bangladesh, and Nepal
discussed ways to better apportion the waters of the
Ganges River that runs through all three countries.
Bangladeshi officials told US diplomats that Dhaka
was glad that Gandhi agreed to include Nepal in the
talks, since New Delhi had previously insisted that the
Ganges water issue should be s ilaterall
between India and Bangladesh.
sensitive issues.
India-Pakistan. Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and
Mohammad Khan Junejo held private conversations
that produced agreements that may ease currently
tense bilateral relations. At the end of the summit
meeting, the two countries announced that high-level
officials from their respective Interior Ministries
would meet in Pakistan in December to discuss border
problems including illegal border crossings, alleged
Pakistani support to militant Sikhs, drug trafficking,
and smuggling. Indian Foreign Secretary
Venkateswaran is to travel to Islamabad at a later
date to resume stalled talks on normalization of
bilateral relations.
Prospects for SAARC
The Bangalore summit meeting reaffirmed the basic
viability of SAARC as a vehicle for South Asian
cooperation. US diplomatic reporting indicates that
most SAARC countries viewed the meeting as a
modest success, both in its progress toward
multilateral cooperation and in its use as a forum for
bilateral talks. India appears relieved that the smaller
SAARC states did not use the meeting to "gang up"
on New Delhi, while the smaller states are probably
pleased that India is not trying to dominate the
organization.
The two leaders, however, made no progress on easing
Islamabad's concerns about large Indian military
exercises near the Pakistani border or dealing with
New Delhi's charges that Pakistan is developing a
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Despite this optimism, SAARC remains a fragile
organization that could be easily disrupted by the
injection of intractable political issues. Cooperation
on neutral administrative issues may unrealistically
increase expectations about progress on more
substantive matters. The agreement to discuss
terrorism, for example, risks renewed Indian and
Pakistani charges of meddling in each other's internal
affairs. Future SAARC progress will probably be
confined to noncontroversial issues, although the
organization will continue to be valuable as a venue
for private bilateral discussions among the member
states.
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Prospects for Pakistan:
Political Officers' Assessment
Pakistan's civilian government is anemic and beset by
internal problems, but the opposition is also hurting,
in the view of US diplomats and Embassy local
employees at the recent Political Officers' Conference
in Pakistan.' Deteriorating public order and sectarian
violence between Sunnis and Shias were the two
problems identified by the participants as posing
potential problems for the current government. Little
has changed in the Afghan conflict despite the
increase in the level of fighting. There are few
favorable prospects for either the Afghan resistance
alliance or the Geneva peace talks, but Islamabad
continues to enjoy considerable support for its
Afghanistan policy. The conferees saw no signs
indicating an improvement in Indo-Pakistani
relations.
The Current Government
One speaker at the conference said that Pakistanis
regard Prime Minister Junejo as a man who lacks the
intelligence and the charisma required of a leader, but
they are willing to give him more time. President Zia
has handed over the day-to-day running of the
government to Junejo while continuing to cultivate
members of the National Assembly and to keep open
lines of communication with many opposition figures,
probably to maximize his leverage over Junejo. Zia
and the Pir of Pagaro-the spiritual head of the
ruling Pakistan Muslim League and Junejo's
mentor-clearly despise each other.
exists only in its offices and that, unless something is
done in the coming months to develop public support,
there is a distinct possibility that the League will
vanish as a viable political party when Junejo leaves
office.
One participant observed that the one thing that
might hasten the demise of the government could be
the deterioration in public order. He said that the
military is rapidly becoming disenchanted with the
lawlessness, sabotage, ethnic violence, and corruption
that appear to have spread since the lifting of martial
law. The consensus at the conference was that, while
the Army would not hesitate to move if disorder
spread, the situation would have to worsen
considerably before the Army would intervene. The
key factors arguing against imminent reimposition of
martial law are the dispirited state of the opposition
and the lack of a pressing external threat.
The Political Opposition
Most of the conference participants agreed that the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy-a
coalition of opposition parties dominated by Benazir
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP-appears
incapable of mounting a credible challenge to the
government for perhaps another year. In tacit
admission of its weakness, the movement has
announced that it will avoid agitation over the coming
months and is adopting a strategy of peaceful public
meetings.
The Pakistan Muslim League is not much better
organized than its opponents who are in disarray. At
the district level, most members of the National
Assembly and the provincial assemblies are spending
more time attacking each other than in organizing the
party. One speaker claimed that the Muslim League
Benazir Bhutto was disappointed in the lackluster
public support-most of it confined to Sind
Province-she received in the wake of her arrest on 14
August. Since then, the chief of the PPP in Sind quit
his post, and many PPP members in Punjab are
making no secret of their unhappiness with provincial
party chief Jahangir Badar. Punjab is Pakistan's most
important province, and Benazir must demonstrate
substantial support there if she is to have any chance
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of unseating the government. Some participants
contended that the position of the PPP has not
deteriorated in Sind'and in the North-West Frontier
Province as much as it has in Punjab and that, if
anything, the August confrontation increased support
for Benazir in rural Sind and did little to affect her
standing in the North-West Frontier.
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi-former chief of the Sind
PPP-is trying to take advantage of the disarray in
the PPP by establishing his own National People's
Party. One participant said that for Jatoi to succeed,
he needs Mustapha Khar, a former member of the
PPP and governor of Punjab Province in the mid-
1970s. Khar is feared and respected throughout
Punjab
President Zia is recruiting Jatoi as a
possible replacement for Prime Minister Junejo. One
of the indications of such a maneuver would be Jatoi's
running in a parliamentary byelection. The
Constitution requires that the Prime Minister be a
member of the National Assembly, a qualification
Jatoi currently lacks.
Most participants believe that the newly formed
Awami National Party is the same wine in new
bottles and that it appears to be even more pro-Soviet
and more anti-American than the parties that formed
it. The party platform advocates a reduced US
presence in Pakistan, increased provincial autonomy,
immediate party-based national elections, expulsion
of Afghan insurgents and refugees from Pakistani
territory, and a secular, democratic government
rather than Islamization. For tribal rather than
ideological reasons, the head of the party, Wali Khan,
is a powerful figure in some areas of the North-West
Frontier. Outside that province, his brand of
radicalism has little support.
Sectarianism
The participants agreed that, over the past year or so,
the Sunni majority has become less tolerant of the
Shia minority. Much of the blame for the September
anti-Shia riots in Lahore can be laid at the doorstep of
Sunni extremists, including one cleric who gave an
extremely provocative sermon just two days before
Shia religious processions. A key test of the new
civilian government will be proposed legislation that
would make Sunni interpretations of Islamic law the
law of the land. Shias oppose the bill because they
believe it will lead to Sunni domination. One
participant said that the bill itself would not lead to
major changes and would be just "another one of
those laws." The participants agreed that, if the
government cannot forge a compromise acceptable to
the Shias by recognizing Shia interpretations of
Islamic law, a further deterioration in sectarian
relations is likely.
Regionalism
A deep feeling of alienation from the current
government exists among much of the population of
rural Sind Province, in part because of the apparent
inability of the provincial government to come to grips
with the bandit problem. How the Army acts in
suppressing banditry will determine whether
alienation increases. Accounts of Army behavior
conflict; some point to excessive use of force.
One participant remarked that influential Punjabis
are beginning to realize that there is deep-seated
resentment toward Punjab, particularly in Sind, and
they are beginning to consider the consequences. This
observer noted. that one reason Jatoi has some support
from Punjabis is because his party is seen as broad
enough to unite Sindhis and Punjabis.
The conference consensus was that, although
alienation from the central government exists in the
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, it is less
virulent than in Sind. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan has taken much of the steam out of the
separatist movements that exist in the North-West
Frontier and Baluchistan. Moreover, both provinces
have done fairly well in recent years. Massive grants
from the federal government-a model many
participants believed could be usefully applied to
Sind-have helped in Baluchistan, and Pathans from
the North-West Frontier have done well in the
military and the bureaucracy and in competition for
jobs in the oil-producing Gulf states and Karachi.
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Foreign A8'airs
There was a general consensus that, as a national
issue, Afghanistan is overshadowed by domestic issues
and concern about India. Because of the Afghan
resistance alliance's uncertain nature, Pakistan is
reluctant to encourage it to play a more prominent
role. Islamabad may also be keeping its options open
should a political settlement or a slackening of
outside-especially US-support on Afghanistan
require it to change its policy. The Geneva peace talks
show few hopeful signs, although all parties appear
willing to see them limp along. The cost of the
Afghanistan conflict is growing in the North-West
Frontier, where increasing sabotage has renewed talk
about restricting refugees to camps. Air and artillery
incursions from Afghanistan are again occurring at a
high rate and present a continuing threat to Pakistan.
The conferees found few signs of hope for Indo-
Pakistani relations. Pakistan is dejected and
frustrated with what it believes is India's
unwillingness to respond to its initiatives on border
security, terrorism, drugs, nuclear nonproliferation,
and trade. India seems preoccupied with domestic
political issues and is keeping Pakistan in the public
eye as at least a partial explanation for India's
problems. One participant noted that, because Indian
Prime Minister Gandhi was naively overoptimistic
about his ability to make foreign policy gains, he has
been frustrated by his failure to do so. Despite the
rhetoric about the Pakistani threat, a conferee noted
that India is more concerned by the greater challenges
posed by China and by the possibilities of Soviet-
Chinese rapprochement that India can do little about.
The participants agreed that neither India nor
Pakistan is in a position domestically to make the
political concessions the other side demands as a
precondition for substantive progress on
normalization of relations.z
' The conference took place before the South Asian regional summit
meeting at Bangalore during which Prime Ministers Junejo and
Gandhi agreed to bilateral meetings to discuss border issues,
leading to a visit to Islamabad by the Indian Foreign Secretary.
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Pakistan: A Primer on Punjabi
Political Parties'
Political parties in Punjab, with the exception of the
Jama'at-i-Islami, feature highly personal leadership,
poor organization, and a multiplicity of factions. To
date, the effective lifespan of political parties has
tended to be short. But, as politics has become more
ideologically polarized, the Islamic parties and the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) appear to be
establishing more permanence. The PPP seems to be
the most popular, but its strength is sapped by splinter
groups.
Pakistan People's Party
Founded at Lahore in November 1967, the Pakistan
People's Party, in our view, is the most popular party
in Punjab. Very much a mass movement party at its
height in 1968-70, the party is a coalition of interest
groups.
The unprecedented outpouring for Benazir Bhutto
when she returned to Pakistan through Lahore in
April 1986 demonstrated the hold the PPP retains
over the urban and rural poor in Punjab, a
constituency that only social change will break down.
Whatever its shortcomings, the PPP was the first
party to represent their interests and take seriously
their capacity to effect political change.
Nevertheless, the party's structure has been twisted
and torn by poor organization, factional struggles, and
the disruption of major events, and over time,
important faction leaders have left. Although we
doubt that any of the departed faction leaders have
taken with them a major bloc of supporters, their loss
has narrowed the base of the party and deprived it of
skills needed to explain the party program, mobilize
voters, and function as government leaders. In
Punjab, the PPP has lost the following groups:
? Leftwing leaders like Khurshid Hasan Meer and
Taj Muhammad Khan Langah, both with small
followings, who formed the Awami Jamhoori Party
(People's Democratic Party) in 1977. Meer and
Langah were disillusioned with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
and hoped to refashion the left wing of the Punjab
PPP as a new worker-peasant party. Their efforts to
form a viable party failed, largely because Sheikh
Mohammad Rashid, the titular head of the PPP
Punjab left wing and a member of the PPP Central
Committee from the beginning, stuck with Bhutto
to the end and now supports his daughter.
? The Islamic socialist group around Mohammad
Hanif Ramay, Chief Minister of Punjab (1974-75).
A key group in the early propaganda and ideological
effort of the party, Ramay left in 1976 and later
founded the Musawat (Equality) Party after toying
with a recrudescence of the Muslim League. After
some years in political exile, Ramay returned to
Pakistan and has now thrown in his lot with the
newly established National People's Party.
? The rural landholder group around Ghulam
Mustapha Khar, former governor and Chief
Minister of Punjab. Jailed when he returned from
exile in the United Kingdom in 1986-he had been
convicted in absentia by a martial law court-Khar
is a potentially influential figure. He has acquired
some popularity as a defender of Punjabi interests,
and his connections with rural powerholders-
Rajput and Jat clan leaders-should not be
underestimated. He has developed ties to Ghulam
Mustapha Jatoi and can be regarded as a founder-
member of the National People's Party.
Pakistan Muslim League
The Pakistan Muslim League is being organized from
the top down. The secretary general for the Punjab
organization is Ghulam Haider Wyne, a member of
the Punjab Assembly from Multan.
We doubt the League will gain a significant mass
following anytime soon. Although it has gained the
adherence of many of the old landed families of the
Indus basin-valuable if a future election elicits
' This paper was prepared by an outside contractor. It was not
coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of
the author.
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Key Leaders in the PPP From Punjab
Gen. (Ret.) Tikka Khan, secretary general of the
national party. Known at one point as the `Butcher of
Bengal," Tikka Khan was a highly respected o.~icer
who commanded Pakistani victories in the Rann of
Kutch fighting and the 1965 war. He showed a
willingness to serve under civilian leaders, and
Bhutto gave him command oj'the Army in 1972.
Retired in 1975, Tikka joined the PPP, stuck with
Bhutto, and went to jail several times c3f'ter the Prime
Minister's fall. Originally from the Potwar region,
Tikka is assumed to retain some support in the
Army, and PPP politicians undoubtedly hope he will
serve as a link to serving o.~cers discontented with
President Zia.
Jahangir Badar, chief of the Punjab PPP. Badar is a
relatively unknown jigure who rose within the PPP
organization. He stood out as a public opponent of
Bhutto's execution and has been jailed several times.
He replaced Sardar Farroq Leghari as head of the
Punjab PPP, an action by Benazir Bhutto that
confirmed the hold ojleR-oriented urban
professionals over the provincial organization.
Sheikh RgTq Ahmed, Central Formation Secretary
of the PPP and former Speaker oj'the Punjab
Assembly. Experienced and able, Rgfiq inclines to the
left-at one point he was in the National Awami
Party-but he also is pragmatic. He has ties to the
urban trade union and professional circles.
Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, member oj'the Central
Committee. Rashid is elderly and unwell but retains
traditional respect in the left wing of the party. A
lawyer who has specialized in land cases and an
activist whose career goes back to the Muslim League
(1946) and the Azad Pakistan Party (1951), Rashid is
a seU--made man who sees himself as the leader of
Punjab's peasantry. He lacks alorceful personality,
however, and stayed loyal to Zu(f kar Ali Bhutto
when others would have taken umbrage at his
treatment by the.1ormer Prime Minister. He recently
returned.irom medical treatment in Eastern Europe
to a massive welcome in Lahore.
Malik Meraj Kha[id, member of the Punjab PPP
Executive and,former Chief Minister oj'Punjab.
Khalid is a more centrist urban politician. At one
point he was in the Convention Muslim League. He is
skilled and has stayed loyal to the Bhuttos when
many others jell away.
Salman Taseer, Propaganda Secretary for the Punjab
PPP. A biographer oj"Bhutto and a teacher, Taseer is
another organization man who has emerged in the
Punjab PPP since the execution oj'the former Prime
Minister. Taseer is also believed to be close to
Benazir.
multiple candidates in single-member rural
constituencies-the party has a far weaker footing in
the cities.
Prime Minister Junejo is trying to build an urban
constituency through his program to give proprietary
rights to urban squatters, but he will have to do much
more to reach key Punjabi social groups-the bazaar
merchants, lower middle-class groups, students, and
professionals. Thus far, the most notable legislation
pressed by the League has been to permit landholders
to use land as collateral for loans-an effort clearly
designed to enable large rural landholders to move
into commercial and industrial ventures.
National People's Party
Founded in August 1986, the National People's Party
is the most credible group so far to have split from the
PPP. It was formed in Lahore by Ghulam Mustapha
Jatoi, a Sindhi, and includes in its membership several
other former PPP leaders, including Mohammad
Hanif Ramay and Ghulam Mustapha Khar. Jatoi
served under Bhutto both in the Federal Cabinet and
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as Chief Minister of Sind. A major landlord and
political moderate, he has long been viewed as the one
PPP figure acceptable to the Army.
Although Jatoi claims to represent the original PPP,
we doubt that his party will attract a significant
portion of the PPP rank and file in Punjab or
elsewhere as long as Benazir Bhutto remains active.
For now, the main significance of the National
People's Party is that it constitutes a credible
alternative to the Muslim League should Prime
Minister Junejo and his Cabinet falter badly. The
party is a core around which an alternative
government could be constructed, either by itself or in
coalition with the Muslim League.
Tehrik-i-Istiglal
The Tehrik, or Movement for Self-Determination, is a
party of lawyers and other urban professionals, retired
military officers, and retired senior government
bureaucrats. Its national leader, Air Marshal (Ret.)
Asghar Khan, is a man of integrity if not of notable
political skill. Originally a moderate, Asghar Khan
has adopted more "Third World" positions in recent
years, possibly to attract more of a mass following. He
became a bitter opponent of Prime Minister Bhutto in
the mid-1970s and was one of the first to call for the
Army to intervene against the PPP. Asghar is now
critical of Army involvement in politics and supports
the restoration of the 1973 Constitution. He has kept
his party affiliated with the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy, but the Tehrik opposes the
return of the PPP to power and has not cooperated in
opposition mass campaigns.
In Punjab, the party has an elite following in the
major cities but lacks either the rural connections or
urban following it needs for electoral success. In
Punjab, the Kasuris-a political family founded by
Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, aself-made man and
internationally respected lawyer-have been
associated with the Tehrik since the early 1970s.
Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri had belonged to the
National Awami Party but joined Bhutto before the
1970 election. He gained a seat in the National
Assembly and served as Bhutto's first Minister for
Law and Parliamentary Affairs, but he broke with the
PPP to protest Bhutto's effort to create a presidential
rather than a parliamentary system in the 1973
Constitution. Kasuri subsequently joined the Tehrik.
His son, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, currently serves
as Information Secretary for the party. Others from
Punjab in the Tehrik include Arif Fasihuddin Vardag,
who is from the Rawalpindi area, as secretary
general, and Malik Haider Usman, a Lahore lawyer
who is Punjab chief of the Tehrik.
Pakistan Democratic Party
The Pakistan Democratic Party is like the Tehrik in
its support base, although it is in decline and has even
less potential as an electoral party. In 1970 it gained
2.3 percent of the Punjab vote in the National
Assembly election but won four seats in the Punjab
Assembly election, mostly because the party
concentrated its efforts in a handful of constituencies.
It is largely the party of one individual, Nawabzada
Nasrullah Khan, a figure of some note during the
partition period. A Muhajir-a Muslim who
immigrated from India after partition-Nawabzada's
chief asset is his reputation for integrity and passion
for democratic politics. This, together with his lack of
a popular base, has made him the natural convener of
coalition groups. His party belongs to the Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan is probably the
largest of the Islamic parties in Punjab. It represents
the mainstream culture of Sunni belief and practice in
Pakistan. The party is strongest in the old trading
towns of Punjab-Chiniot, Eminabad, Sharagpur-
and in the old city wards of Lahore, Rawalpindi,
Gujranwala, Sialkot, and Jhang. Its supporters are
the long-established artisan communities, like weavers
and goldsmiths, and the small traders. The party has
made a name for itself in both anti-Ahmadiya and
anti-Shia agitations.
The leadership in Punjab is composed of respected
figures, but the party is not well organized. It depends
on the lower clergy who control individual mosques
and who are sufficiently powerful to ignore the
directives of the national or Punjab organizations.
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During the Zia period, the mainstream Sunni clergy
in Punjab have responded to Zia's Islamization
program far more positively than the party leadership.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam is a reformist
"orthodox" Sunni party that has its strongest
influence in the most backward parts of the country-
Dera Ismail Khan and Kohistan in the North-West
Frontier Province, the Zhob Valley in Baluchistan,
and the southwestern fringes of Punjab. The party is
more socially radical than the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Pakistan. Apart of the anti-British underground in
the 1920s and 1930s, its founders admired the Soviet
Union and promoted a program of social reform in
India. Its institution at Delhi, the Jamia Millia, was
organized to oppose Aligarh University, the
intellectual center of the Pakistan Movement.
The party has had difficulty shedding this past and
has little support in Punjab, where Maulana
Obeidullah Anwar is the primary leader. The national
leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, son of the late
Maulana Mufti Mahmud, has kept the party in the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy,
although the Punjab wing does not support this policy
and may break with the parent organization.
Jama'at-i-Islami
The Jama'at-i-Islami represents the Islamist or
fundamentalist thrust in Pakistan. It is a party of the
educated-students and professionals-who have
turned to a purified Islam rather than to Marxism or
to Western models as a guide to the proper working of
government and society in the modern age. For them,
"Islam is a complete code of life," sanctioned by
Allah through the Prophet, containing all one needs to
know about how life individually and communally
should be lived. They hold that the troubles of the
Islamic community can be traced both to an Islam
weakened by the cultural and scholastic freight
acquired over centuries and to an overenthusiastic
acceptance of non-Islamic models by modernizing,
secular elites. The party has contact with the Muslim
Brotherhood in the Middle East and with the Saudi
clergy and royal family. Zia clearly has been
influenced by the Jama'at, quite beyond the fact that
both he and the party's leader, Maulana Tufail
Mohammad, are Arains from Jullundur (in Indian
Punjab) and are distantly related.
The party is not large and has never done well in
elections, but it is probably the best organized and
financed in Pakistan. Its membership is carefully
screened and vetted. The party concentrates on
students, often providing security, academic
assistance, and jobs to students coming into the major
cities from villages and small towns. The student
wing, the Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulaba, controls student
unions in key universities, including Punjab
University, and has influence throughout the
academic community through alliances of
conservative students and teachers. The party aims
more to take over from the inside-by penetrating the
bureaucracy, commercial and academic
establishments, and even the military-than to win
power through elections. It has an active program of
targeting and then courting influential, respected
citizens. The party and its student wing were a crucial
element in the anti-Bhutto movement of 1977. The
party made a major effort in the 1985 election,
gaining seven seats in the National Assembly. Its
group in the National Assembly is formally part of
the Independent Parliamentary Group but often
supports the Junejo government.
Lesser Parties and Groups
Strongly leftist parties have little following in Punjab,
where they tend to be connected to leftist labor
unions, such as the Railway Workers Union, and to
the pro-Moscow All-Pakistan Trade Union
Federation. Many of their leaders have backgrounds
in the old Communist Party of Pakistan, a
postpartition offshoot of the Communist Party of
India. Punjab lacks a party with its own pro-Punjab
platform, although the Punjab Forum in Lahore seeks
to promote both Punjabi interests and a better
understanding between the provinces-two quite
contradictory tasks.
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Afghanistan: Supplying andahar-
Problems and Prospects
To weaken resistance activity in and around
Qandahar city~ne of the most hotly contested areas
in the seven-year war in Afghanistan-the Soviets
have placed intense pressure on insurgent supply
routes to the area since late 1985. These efforts-
which include ambushes, mining operations, and air
attacks-have made it more difficult for resistance
commanders to supply their men and have
contributed to escalating transportation costs.
Nevertheless, through adaptations in tactics and the
overall increase in availability of supplies to all
insurgents in Afghanistan, the insurgents in
Qandahar received sufficient materiel to maintain an
effective presence against Soviet and regime forces in
1986. Insurgent supply problems will almost certainly
persist in 1987, but we believe the overall logistic
situation will improve. The increased availability of
air defense weapons to the resistance in the area
should help reduce the Soviet air interdiction threat.
Putting the Pressure On
Most caravans leaving Pakistan for Qandahar are
formed in Chaman in Baluchistan Province. The
insurgents use both trucks and camels to move men
and supplies into the Qandahar area. After departing
Chaman, the caravans take a variety of routes into
and through Qandahar Province. The Spin Buldak
route through southern Afghanistan and the Salesun
route running north of Qandahar city traditionally
have been two important routes into Qandahar.
the ability of resistance groups operating in the
surrounding countryside to receive financial and
material support from civilians within the city. In
recent years, much of the population in Qandahar
Province that has not fled to Pakistan has taken up
residence within the city limits.
Improved intelligence has been crucial to Soviet and
Af h n
Convoys
subsidized by Red Crescent during the past few
months have had high attrition rates, apparently
because Soviet and regime forces received
forewarning of their planned routes and times of
departure.
The most notable KHAD success in co-opting tribal
elements is Ismatullah Achekzai, who defected to the
regime with his men in early 1985. Ismatullah
succeeded throughout much of 1986 in impeding the
flow of insurgent supplies through the Spin Buldak
area of southern Qandahar.
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Because of the high level of resistance activity in the
city, Soviet and regime forces in December 1985
increased military pressure on resistance supply routes
leading into Qandahar Province,
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regime successes in co-opting border tribes are likely
to be short lived. To a large extent the tribes in the
Stepped-up Soviet a orts me u e
mining operations and the establishment of new
security outposts along routes normally used by the
insurgents, making it more difficult for the insurgents
to infiltrate men and supplies into Qandahar city. The
Soviet and Afghan regime measures have also limited
areas, through which many insurgent supply routes to
Qandahar transit, show no loyalty to either side. They
offer their services to the highest bidder.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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The Soviets also stepped up their ambush operations
by increasing their deployment of Special Purpose
Forces-whose primary assignment is road
interdiction-to the Qandahar area.
Insurgent Countermeasures
The insurgents have adopted a number of
countermeasures during the past year to reduce the
risk of interdiction. Resistance convoys now travel
more at night and vary their routes. They also make
greater use of secondary dirt roads.
Impact of Soviet Interdiction F~`orts in
Qandahar Area
The Office of Soviet Analysis believes
that Soviet and Afghan
this article.
efforts to reduce insurgent activity in and around
Qandahar have had more effect than is reflected in
new security posts had nearly closed oj1-
access and retreat routes, causing many insurgents to
withdraw from the city and nearby villages. Soviet
and Afghan attacks on insurgent base camps have led
many groups to move farther from the city. Insurgent
countermeasures are both costly and time consuming.
Although judging whether the level of insurgent
activity in the area has been reduced is dif.]^icult,
analysis shows that Soviet ground force activity
levels in the Qandahar area are some 60 percent less
than in 1985. Although Soviet units from other parts
o j. Afghanistan frequently participated in local
operations in 1985, operations in 1986 have been
conducted exclusively by the single Qandahar-based
Soviet brigade and Afghan regime troops. This is a
sign that the Soviets may not perceive the insurgent
threat to be as great this year as in the past. Given
these developments, it is premature to suggest that
the situation is likely to improve in 1987. Even (f the
insurgents receive more and better air defense
weapons, these will have only a limited effect on
Soviet interdiction strategy, which relies on a
combination of mining, out osts, small-unit
ambushes, and air attacks.
The insurgents have also placed increased reliance on
camels and other pack animals. Camels often are
preferred because of their better capability in difficult
weather. The animals are also less vulnerable to
landmines, and pack animal convoys are less easily
Camels can a so a use m winter w en i
is impossible for trucks to move through the snow.
Some roads are not passable by truck or jeep in any
terrain,
spotted by Soviet units patrolling at night.
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To protect their arms caches against Soviet air
attacks, commanders have been careful not to
concentrate their stores of weapons in one place.
Many insurgent leaders in Qandahar followed the
example of Comdr. Mula Malang of the Hizbi Islami
(Khalis) Party and established base camps in the
rugged valleys near Chenartu, approximately 90
kilometers east of Qandahar city
Insurgent Constraints
Despite their adjustments, insurgent commanders in
Qandahar still face several constraints to keeping
their fighters well supplied. The depopulation of much
of the countryside has reduced the amount of support
insurgents can expect from the local population.
Resistance groups now must devote more of their
supply caravans to bringing in food and other
necessities that they could formerly obtain locally.
Although those groups with access to the bazaars in
Qandahar city can still obtain food and other items,
prices have risen considerably,
s sy tem
Some insurgent commanders also complain about
delays and inefficiencies in the arms allocation
promised to them.
commander's success is determined by his personal
connections, social and tribal origins, and political
loyalties. The process can take as long as five months,
and on some occasions commanders do not even
receive the quantities and types of weapons originally
Nevertheless, we believe that the insurgents'
adaptations in strategy and the overall increase in
availability of supplies for all insurgent groups in
Afghanistan this year enabled most groups in
Qandahar to receive sufficient materiel to maintain a
high level of activity in 1986 and to prevent Soviet
and Afghan regime forces from consolidating control
over the city and the surrounding area.
Outlook
Despite adjustments by the insurgents, some logistic
difficulties-particularly financial constraints-are
likely to continue in Qandahar. Greater reliance on
pack animals will increase the demand for camels and
donkeys and may lead to even higher transportation
costs unless more animals are made available. To
cover these costs, resistance groups may be forced to
divert money from other purposes, such as food and
support of the civilian population, reducing insurgent
effectiveness.
Still, we believe that some steps being taken by the
insurgents should have a positive impact on the supply
situation and overall insurgent performance. For
example, greater acquisition and effective utilization
of air defense weapons-such as surface-to-air
missiles and Stingers-by the resistance will almost
certainly reduce the threat of Soviet air interdiction
efforts. Furthermore, increased cooperation among
insurgent groups in their efforts to keep supply routes
open may lead to greater cooperation in combat
operations against the Soviets.
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In addition, although the Soviets have demonstrated
that by concentrating their forces they can place
severe pressure on insurgent supply routes to
Qandahar, they probably cannot maintain this
pressure long enough to have a decisive impact on
resistance capabilities because of the relatively small
number of Soviet forces in the area and the poor
performance of Afghan regime troops who man the
outposts. Even if supply routes from Pakistan became
impassable, some insurgent commanders in Qandahar
believe they could remain active for a number of
years, although at a reduced level, by relying on
captured arms and munitions.
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Afghanistan: The Fall of Farkhar
Panjsher Valley Commander Masood's capture of the
Afghan army garrison at Farkhar on 21 August was a
major step in the insurgent leader's campaign to
increase the tempo of the war in northern Afghanistan
and marked the first successful offensive deployment
of Masood's central units, the multiethnic, specially
trained groups that he has been developing over the
past year. The attack demonstrates both Masood's
ability to bring together insurgent units from several
northern provinces and his growing influence and
power outside his home base in the Panjsher
of State Security, police, and other regime officials
were also stationed at Farkhar. There were no Soviet
advisers
' Central units are 25-man multiethnic, highly trained units with
insurgents drawn from different provinces. They are expected to
operate throughout the north as autonomous units as well as to ioin
for conventional assaults against high-value targets.
: Mobile groups are 30-man elite units that are drawn from and
operate, in their own region. They have a specialty such as convoy
The fall of Farkhar resulted in the capture of large
numbers of prisoners and a large amount of weapons
and equipment at relatively low cost to the insurgents.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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Uneven Execution
In the initial attack against the garrison, the
insurgents captured all but one of the main bases and 25X1
one of the security outposts, 25X1
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The assault resumed the next morning following a
meeting between Masood and his commanders to
discuss tactics. 25X11
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Press reports indicate resistance booty included a
76-mm field gun and over 70 tons of foodstuffs.
Masood's forces suffered only five killed and eight
wounded, according to press reports. Masood's success
at Farkhar apparently encouraged him to go ahead
with asimilar-and equally successful-attack on an
Afghan garrison at Nahrin in mid-November.
Looking Ahead
Masood will almost certainly be looking for similar
targets to attack this winter. He will want to build on
his military success to enhance his political standing
throughout the north. Masood's willingness to
minimize his own role in the planning and
implementation of these attacks and allow local
leaders to take the credit will probably ease some of
the frictions that have inhibited insurgent operations
in the north in the past.
The Panjsher Valley commander's careful planning,
skillful use of intelligence, and relatively sophisticated
tactics underscore his reputation as perhaps the most
effective insurgent commander. His operations at
Farkhar, Nahrin, and, last year, at Peshghowr
demonstrate that he has made a start toward building
the kind of national guerrilla army that he has talked
about.
Farkhar and Nahrin demonstrate the continued
vulnerability of isolated Afghan army garrisons and
show that the army is still plagued by poor morale,
ineffective leadership, and dependence on Soviet air
and artillery. The absence of Soviet or Afghan regime
air support at Farkhar indicates that regime air
resources are too limited to defend remote outposts
and that the Soviets are not willing to take over that
role.
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Near East and
South Asia Brief
India-Sri-Lanka Sri Lankans Arrested for Bombing in South India
According to Indian press reports, nine Sri Lankan Sinhalese-members of that
island's majority ethnic community-were arrested in India early this month for
suspected involvement in the bombing of a rail line in Madurai, south India. Police
speculate this group may be the same one that bombed the residence of a
prominent Sri Lankan Tamil dissident leader in Madras, India, earlier this year.
Police officers said that some of the arrested were retired Sri Lankan police
personnel.
The nine arrested Sinhalese-including four women-may have been operating at
the direction of Sri Lankan intelligence or possibly on orders from the Sri Lankan
High Commissioner in Madras, who has been implicated in anti-Indian activities
in the past. The railway bombing is the first instance we have seen of Sri Lankan
Sinhalese saboteurs attackin Indian tar ets.
Madurai is a likely target for future Sinhalese efforts to disrupt arms
consignments to the Tamil insurgents
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-028
19 December 1986
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