RESPONSE TO ARNOLD BEICHMAN, HOOVER INSTITUTION, REGARDING TRUST PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 109
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 15, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Arnold Beichman
Research Fellow
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305
I am sorry I had to cancel our breakfast. I had very much
wanted to see you. Unfortunately, the Director was out of town
and, when that happens, I am all too subject to last-minute
changes of schedule to fill in for him.
. I am pleased that you received the 1969 Agency informal
compilation of materials on "The Trust." The paper is
available for release to any requestor, and therefore we have
no objection to any plans the Hoover Institution might have for
publishing it.
I am also enclosing a copy of a thesis on the subject
completedin 1985 at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey. On pp. 27-28 the author quotes from a Rand
Corporation study, The Trust, yet at least one of these
quotations appears to be an almost verbatim quotation from the
1969 Agency study. You may wish to sort this out with Rand.
Finally, I am enclosing a speech I gave in Dallas several
weeks ago. I hope you will find it of interest -- I would be
interested in your reaction.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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,DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS
19 JANUARY 1988
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
,THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNIST PARTY.
1
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HOW THEN DO I ANSWER WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR
GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL? I BELIEVE THAT TO THE DEGREE HE
IS EVEN MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL THE UNITED STATES WILL.FACE IN THE
1990S AND BEYOND A MILITARILY POWERFUL, DOMESTICALLY MORE VITAL
AND POLITICALLY MORE ADROIT SOVIET UNION -- A SOVIET UNION
WHOSE AGGRESSIVE OBJECTIVES ABROAD AND ESSENTIAL
TOTALITARIANISM AT HOME REMAIN LARGELY UNCHANGED. I BELIEVE A
STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE
BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS
WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES.IN THE YEARS
AHEAD.
21
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
THESIS
THE TRUST:
THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE
OF SOVIET MANIPULATION
Stephen A. Harris
September 1985
;?~~.F..,... ,... ..f. S~~ A -,G a rr e t t,_-
Thesis MAdvi'sor.
,,App ed=..fo.rm..pubhc ?rdelease_;,,..di.str?abut?iori unlimited
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-.ngence Agency
..ashington, D.C. 20505
DCUDDCi ExeCUtive Stall
NOTE FOR:
12 January 1988
Historical Intelligence Collection
(Room 1E-41A HQS)
Attached is the letter we discussed
over the telephone this afternoon.
Thanks,
Attachment: a/s
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* Hoover Institution * Stanford, CA 94305
.4 January 1988
Robert Gates, Esq.,
Central INtelligence Agency,
Washington,D.C.
On page 800, footnote #30, of Anthony Cave Brown's
biography of Menzies (which I'm revip-wing for the Washington
Times) there is a statement that the Agency has done an
historical study of "The Trust." If this is an unclassified
work, can you tell me how I can get a copy ?
I thought your Foreign Affairs piece excellent and
'I am making some reference to it in a column I've clone for the
Washington Times.
With all best wishes for 1988,
Sincerely,
Research Fellow
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INTERNAL USE ONLY
15 JAN 1988
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection
SUBJECT: Beichman Request for "The Trust"
1. Attached is a copy of the document referred to in Arnold Beichman's
letter of 4 January. I recommend you send the copy to Beichman and have
drafted an appropriate letter for your signature.
2.. The passage in Anthony Cave Brown's book cited by Beichman is taken
from the last paragraph on Page 10 of the document. Several months ago I sent
a copy of the entire document to Cave Brown. The subject had come up in a
telephone conversation. I knew the document is and always has been
unclassified and has been circulated to individuals outside CIA. I was and
remain grateful to Cave Brown for having persuaded the Donovan family in May
1986 to donate Wild Bill's uniforms and numerous personal effects to the
Agency.
3. On 12 January I verified the document's unclassified nature and
outside distribution in telephone conversations with Walter Pforzheimer, who
was Curator when the Historical Intelli ence Collection acquired the document;
with Agency staff employee assistant to both Pforzheimer
and his successor; and with CIA retiree a specialist on "The
Trust" and the history of Soviet intelligence.
4. I also alerted the Freedom of Information Act Staff on this matter.
Their records show no formal request for the document under FOIA. Their
function, however, particularly with regard to recordkeeping, is to monitor
the release of declassified documents. This document does not fit that
category.
5. Per your instructions, this response has been coordinated with the
Office of Public Affairs, the Deputy Director for Administration, and the
Office of General Counsel.
Attachments:
As Stated
cc: DDI
DDA
OGC
D/PAO
ADMINI AL USE ONLY
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__01 i ?i. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Beichman Request for "The Trust"
STAT
DI/OIR/ISD/HIC
addressee
EA/DDCI
Executive Registry
D/PAO
OCG
DDA
DDI
D/OIR
C/OIR/ISD
C/OIR/ISD/HIC
C/OIR/DSD/FOIA Staff
15 January 1988) D
2 S I~~
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Arnold Beichman
Research Fellow, Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305
I am pleased to send you a copy of the document on "The
Trust." Anthony Cave Brown quoted from the last paragraph
on Page 10.
I would not describe the document as a formal Agency
publication, but rather a gisting of unclassified historical
material available as of March 1969. Within that limitation
it has served a mildly useful role in educating a number of
Agency employees on certain Soviet intelligence techniques.
It was good to hear from you.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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ova:. 6 V 5 63
0-1
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
12 January 1988
STAT NOTE FOR:
Historical Intelligence Collection
(Room 1E-41A HQS)
Bill,
Attached is the letter we discussed
over the telephone this afternoon.
Thanks,
STAT
Attachment: a/s
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C ( / r2 f I t t.4 `' / l Q G~/L L % !
Nti;-& - ,--U-4/ , THE TRUST
In his speech at the Ninth Congress of the Soviets in Moscow on
23 December 1921, Lenin referred to this meeting as the "Congress
for Peace", because the civil war had been brought to a victorious
conclusion,and overt foreign intervention on Russian soil had ceased.
He said that the rebuilding of the country was the next task of the
Bolshevik party. Dwelling on this topic,he indicated that a new
policy, the NEP, would ease considerably the daily life of the average
Russian by opening the door to private enterprise, but it would also'
entail great risks to the Bolshevik party, since it constituted a
clear deviation from its teachings. He therefore called for increased
vigilance against dangers from abroad and from within.
Irritated by the stance of the Soviet Union, some foreign powers
might still be tempted to exploit the obvious weakness of the country.
The second enemy was the White russian emigration, which was trying
to stir up the people of Russia against the new ruler.
Officially, Lenin's call for vigilance was addressed to the Red
Army; but there are indications that it was directed at the Cheka also.
This meant, among other things, that the Cheka was expected to increase
its penetration of the emigre organizations at home and abroad.
The Cheka had not been idle in this field.
As early as 1920
UNSHLIKHT had established the operation MAYAK (Beacon), the prupose
of which was to create confusion in emigre organizations so they
could not distinguish between foe and friend. It was also designed
to learn their intentions and assess their capabilities. The
Supreme Monarchist Council in Berlin had been penetrated through
the recruitment of one TRETYAKOV. A Cheka agent, MIKELSON, had
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become a member of KERENSKI's entourage in Europe and had managed
to pilfer important documents from his files. Inside the USSR
parallel efforts had been made. Lev NIKULIN, in his book about
the Trust, hints that STAROV (whose true name was STYRNE or KOZLOV)
had specialized in this field.
Nor could the Cheka disregard the internal opposition, that is,
officers and bureaucrats working for the Soviet government but
secretly devoted to the Tsarist regime. The position of these
Monarchists had become hopeless and tragic. Living outside the law
1 "without a biographv they were constantly in danger of being
betrayed, arrested .,and shot. In no position to develop a significant
political opposition, they gathered together in cells chiefly for
self-protection. Yet there was a chance that they might get noticed
together for mischief. Indeed, in November 1922, the Cheka believed
they noticed signs of incipient coalescence. Between certain groups
there appeared to be a connection that was loose and nebulous
owing to Cheka vigilance and poor communications that existed at the
time. In Moscow there existed the Monarchist Association of Central
Russia (MOTSR) of vthich one A.A. YAKUSHEV was a leading member. This
fledgling organization had fairly regular communication with the White
groups in Petrograd, and little contact elsewhere. The hypothesis
that MOTSR was an invention of the Cheka, to he used as cover for
penetrating all Monarchist cells in the country, is not convincing;
the suspicious nature of the former Tsarists would have precluded
the use of such a contrived organization for a penetration of their ranks.
In 1921/22 MOTSR and its affiliations posed no real danger to the
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Bolshevik regime. But, with the introduction of the NEP policy,
certain freedom of action was given back to the Russian people, and
a feeling developed that the Bolshevik regime had seen its best days,
and was about to be replaced by some other form of government. It
provided opposition-elements with an, opportunity for starting a
political movement, and a better one still of establishing contact
with emigre organizations abroad.
This was the potential danger facing the Cheka and the one
possibly in Lenin's mind when he issued his warning. Thus the Cheka
gave priority to an attempt to penetrate all White Russian groups in
and outside of Russia. Agents suitable for such a task had to be
found, and in this connection the attention of the Cheka was drawn
to A.A. YAKUSHEV.
November1921 YAKUSHEV, a high-ranking employee of the
Ministry of Waterways, had been sent on TDY.either to Norway or
Switzerland, and en route he had stopped in Tallin (Estonia) to visit
a former White Guardist, Yuriy ARTOMONOV. Different reasons are
ascribed for this visit. R. WRAGA states that YAKUSHEV was in love
with Mrs. ARTOMONOVA (who had remained in Moscow) and he wanted to
persuade her husband to grant her a divorce. Lev NIKULIN maintains,
more plausibly, that YAKUSHEV (an old ladies' man) had a mild affair
with Varvara STRASHKEVICH, a cousin of ARTOMONOV, and called to deliver
a letter from her.
Whatever the truth of this matter, during the visit YAKUSHEV told
ARTOMONOV that although he was serving the Bolshevik regime, he-was
opposed to it and that, in this, he was by no means alone. He said
that many ex-Tsarist officials and officers remained strongly anti-
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Bolshevik at heart. So heavily were the government apparatus and the
Red Army infiltrated by this element that the Bolshevik regime itself
was undergoing a subtle change; hence the NEP.
To ARTOMONOV this sounded like important news and he lost no time
in reporting it, by letter, to his su~dperiors, the Monarchist Council
in Berlin. Somehow, by means not disclosed, the letter fell into the
hands of the Cheka. WRAGA speculates that TRETYAKOV might have
intercepted it but6ives no evidence in support of this opinion.
On his return to Moscow, YAKUSHEV was immediately arrested, and
after lengthy interrogations, was recruited to serve Cheka in its
battle against the Monarchists. There are two different versions
to this recruitment. OPPERPUT, after his so-called defection,
testified that he was in a death-cell with YAKUSHEV, and that it was
he who persuaded YAKUSHEV to cooperate with the Cheka to avoid being
shot out of hand. NIKULIN gives a different and more detailed
account of the affair, as follows:
Before YAKUSHEV's return to Moscow on 22 November 1921, ARTOMONOV's
letter had been intercepted and brought to DZERZHINSKIY. Realizing
YAKUSHEV's potentialities, DZERZHINSKIY entrusted the task of his
recruitment to two Cheka officials, ARTUZOV and PILLAR. Together
they set up a carefully planned scenario. YAKUSHEV was sent on another
TDY mission to Irkutsk, and on his way to the station was arrested
and brought to the Lukyanka. There he was told not to worry about his
family; they would be informed in due course by telegram from Irkutsk
that he had come down with a severe case of typhoid.
For the first three weeks, YAKUSHEV was interrogated mostly about
his past, that is, about his work during the Tsarist regime. In this
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way he was kept in a state of tension, and also kept in the dark about
ttie-
h-i-& real purpose of the investigation. ARTUZOV, the chief interrogater,
also dwelt on YAHUSHEV's extramarital affairs and his lack of morals
to further sensitize his conscience.
Having made his point, ARTUZOV interrupted the interrogation for
a week to let it sink in. When recalled, YAKUSHEV assumed he would
be questioned further on the subject of girls; but ARTUZOV gave the
subject a sudden twist. He said that the Cheka knew YAKUSHEV e4 met
Mr. MASSINO in the dressing-room of a female. dancer in 1917; that the
future of Russia had been discussed; that MASSINO had mentioned the
concessions the British government would request for its continued
support; and that YAKUSHEV had in general agreed to his proposals.
Now ARTUZOV played his trump card. MASSINO, he said, was Great Bri-
tain's greatest spy, Sydney REILLY, a sworn enemy of Russia; so, ob-
viously, YAKUSHEV had shown himself willing to sell Russia to the
British. What kind of patriotism was this? How could such betrayal
of the motherland be defended? Again YAKUSHEV was left alone for
another week to think things over.
The next time YAKUSHEV was called, it was to a well-appointed
office, and both ARTUZOV and PILLAR were there. After a few casual
questions, the crucial one was posed: what had YAKUSHEV discussed
with ARTOMONOV in Tallin? When YAKUSHEV denied having visited any-
one in Tallin, Mrs. STRASHKEVICH was brought into the room, and she
stated that he must-have called on ARTOMONOV because she had given
him a letter to deliver. After she left the room, YAKUSHEV was---shown
the letter ARTOMONOV-had written to the Monarchist Council, and at
this point, he fainted.
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Back in his cell,expecting to be executed at any minute,
YAKUSHEV began writing a complete report on MOTSR and about the
role he had played-in the organization. After a few days, ARTUZOV
told him that, after careful consideration of his case, it was
decided that he was not a complete traitor, for he had counselled
emigres against terrorism, and against expectations of any quick
return to Russia; therefore mercy would be shown. He was to rdurn
to his home, resume his work, and forget what had happened in te
Lubyanka. From now on, he reported regularly to ARTUZOV on his
contacts with members of MOTSR. Then, in the spring of 1922,
DZERZHINSKIY, appealing to his patriotic feelings, asked him to
collaborate formally with the Cheka, and YAKUSHEV agreed.
While YAKUSHEV was still in prison, a Cheka official,
KOLESNIKOV, contacted ARTOMONOV on behalf of "his good friend"
YAKUSHEV, explaining that the latter was sick in Irkutsk. He
confirmed all that YAKUSHEV had previously said about disaffection
in Russia, and, getting down to specifics, disclosed the exist-ence
of MOTSR, led by supposedly anti-communists like General
ZAYONCHOVSKIY (the chief), General POTAPOV (specialist in
military matters), and YAKUSHEV (the political brain). ARTMONOV
and his friend SHCHELGACHEV were delighted and agreed to
establish contact with the organization. They further agreed to
KOLESNIKOV's suggestion that the middleman, for the time being,
should be a member of the Estonian embassy in Moscow, Roman BIRK.
(Not to be confused with the Estonion Minister, Ado Birk, about -
whom, more later.)
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KOLESNIKOV explained the activities of MOTSR, stressing its
program and goals, but remaining vague as to personalities
involved, owing to the rules of conspiracy allegedly in effect.
He did, however, mention in passing that the membership was
approximately 400. MOTSR, he said, would pose abroad as a "Trust";
and the code to be used in communications to and from emigres
abroad would be based on normal business terminology appropriate
to concerns operatie% under the NEP. Thus, communists were to be
referred to as "competitors", the MOTSR Central Comittee as "The
Board Management of the Trust", etc. Such a code was childishly
simple and easy to decipher, but appears appropriate to the spirit
of the times. So too does the cover name for the Trust (i.e., Moscow
Municipal Credit Association) seem appropriate to a time when new
enterprises were springing up every day under the auspices of the
NEP. But code names selected facer certain leaders of MOTSR, such
as the "Supreme Commissar" of "Boyar VASSILIY"* for General
ZAYONCHOVSKIY, and "Captain Prisoner" for the political council,
c
were singularly inappropriate, starkly sma'king, as they did, of
the clandestine.
Be this as it may, ARTOMONOV and SHCHELGACHIEV saw nothing wrong
with any part of the deal. They bought the story, lock, stock and
barrel. They informed the Monarchist Council by open mail. In due
course, Roman BIRK was in business, with a steady flow of letters
between the emigres in Tallin and the so-called "Trust" in Moscow.
In this exchange of information, the emigres gave their order of
battle, the numerical strength and location of battle units, etc ,
but the Trust for its part supplied nothing but doctored-up
*Boyar means "nobleman" or "knight".
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information. Before long, ARTUZOV decided that YAKUSHEV should
go to Berlin and gain direct access to the Monarchist Council and
similar circles.
At this point the stage for the Trust operation must be set up;
otherwise the drama may be unintelligible.
Between one and two million Russians left their homeland when
the Bolsheviks defeated the White Russian forces in the civil war,
and they scattered over the world, mainly in the capital cities of
Europe. Homeless, impoverished, with no positions they could aspire
to, and barely tolerated by the host countries, their lot was a
sorry one. This outward misery was topped by exhaustion and
frustration, which stimulated recrimination and the search for
scapegoats in a hopeless cause.
They banded together in political organizations, either leftist
or monarchist, in wreched hope of giving meaning to their lives. The
so-called leftist groups accepted the February revolution and
favored the parlijmentary system that had ensued, while the monarchists
hoped for the re-establishment of-a Monarchy, with little understanding
of how this could be brought about. It was the latter group, in its
various splintered forms, that the GPU hoped to-reach, exploit and
destroy through careful manipulation of the so-called "Trust".
The senior leader of the Russian emigres was Grand Duke Nikolai
Nikolayevich, the grandson of Tsar Nikolai I. Taciturn, ascetic
and devout, yet imperial in bearirfg, he was a model of Russia's
military virtues. His goal was as simple as it was unrealistic:-
a return of the "Old and Holy Russia", under the rule of a patriarch--
the Tsar. His call had a strong appeal to some emigrants, even though
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he bore a strong responsibility for the disaster that had over-run
Russia. Prior to World War I, as Inspector-General of the Cavalry,
he had stubbornly resisted the modernisation of the Russian Army;
and during the war this same army had suffered its worst defeats
under his leadership. This had alienated the loyalty of many
Russian officers. Further, he was mistrusted by his own family,
because it was he and his wife who had introduced the mad monk
RASPUTIN to empress Alice. He and his Supreme Monarchist Council
lived in virtual isolation near Paris, begrudgingly respected by
some emigres, but disliked by nearly all.
The most outstanding of the White Russian leaders (even according
to Soviet historians) was General Petr Nikolayevich Baron WRANGEL,
a "political general" with a breath of vision not normally found.
in the old school of Russian generals. Ttis made him a tragic
figure. Time and again, during the civil war, he had pointed out
mistakes made by White generals, and at the very moment when he
realized that all was lost, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of
the White Forces. This made him accept defeat as final. He now
knew in his heart that the Bolsheviks would rule for years to come.
All he could now hope for was to keep the emigres together as a
national group until the Bolsheviks permitted their return to Russia.
On September 1923, with this in mind, he created the "Russian
Armed Services Union" (Russgkiy Obshcho-Voyenskiy Soyuz), to which
all. Russian veterans were supposed to belong. This organization,
(i.e. ROVS) established posts in most European countries, and its
policy was determined by WRANGEL's "wait and see" attitude. He
considered the sending of terrorist groups across the border or
otherwise trying to foment internal disorders as inappropriate,
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10
and ridiculed such actions as "pinpricks".
His headquarters were in Yugoslavia, and there his command was
supreme. But elsewhere in Europe, his authority at best was only
nominal. In Paris, General KUTEPOV, with neither the patience or
foresight of WRANGLE, decided to follow an independent course. He
had seen how the Bolsheviks had come to power through brute force,
and concluded that only by the use of brute force could they be
dislodged. Terrorism on a large scale was needed. This would
confuse the Bolsheviks, force them to commit blunders, and ultimately
bring about the collapse of their regime. For this prupose, he'pulled
out from WRANGLE's "ROVS" (to which he was deputy commander) the
most daring and ruthless members and formed his own "Combat
Organization". He gave them training in clandestine activities and
sabotage; and for their protection against Soviet penetration, h
formed a special CI unit which was later called the "Inner Line'.
In theory, the emigres appeared to be organized for some kind
of effective action, but in reality they floundered. Eking out a
living took precedence over patriotic service, and the emigres mulled
over paper plans as a spare-time activity. As a whole they were
divided by internal friction, geographical divisions and a lack of
funds. Lack of funds was both a psychological and operational handi-
cap because it forced the emigre organizations to depend on hand-outs
from western intelligence services. The latter, concerned with
their own particular interests, often rode rough-shod over the
idealism of emigre activities, and provided food for Soviet propaganda
which claimed the emigres were simply hirelings of hostile western
intelligence.
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11
The GPU could not have been very well informed about the actual
activities and living conditions of the emigres, for,otherwise,
YAKUSHEV would not have been sent to Berlin to penetrate the upper
strata of all emigre organizations and report on their activities
A controlling upper-strata simply did not exist. There were too
many chiefs, too many self-serving plans, too much dissension,
undermining and mischief making.
Before his trip, YAKUSHEV was-briefed by ARTUZOV and STYRNE-
STAROV. In approaching emigre circles, YAKUSHEV was to make it
clear that the "Trust" considered the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevi th
as the only man acceptable as the future leader of the newly
emerging Russia. Further, he was to support the views held by the
Grand Duke, namely, that the Monarchy was to be re-established with
not one iota of change. YAKUSHEV was also advised to get in touch
with the Grand Duke, as a way of gaining prestige with a minimum
of effort. This would have an additional advantage, for among all
the emigres, the members of the Supreme Monarchist Council were the
most uninformed about actual conditions in Russia and would, in all
probability, be the least critical.
In November 1922, YAKUSHEV took off for Berlin, ostensibly
as an official representative to the Koenigsberg Fair. His first
meeting was with members of the Monarchist Council headed by
E. MARKOV. He delivered the following messages: Russia was
beginning to awaken from a horrible revolutionary nightmare; anti-
communist elements were gaining control of the system. The "Trust",
with YAKUSHEV acting as its "Foreign minister" would supply all
necessary information about the movement and fulfill all intelligence
missions. The emigre groups should forego all activity inside Russia,
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and should dissuade foreign powers from aggressive acts. Work
inside Russia would be performed by members of the Trust, and
their efforts should not be jeopardized by outside interference.
YAKUSHEV conducted himself with aplomb and an air of authority;
and he appears to have convinced the Monarchists of his sincerity.
A few days later, YAKUSHEV had a meeting with three of WRANGEL's
representatives; his chief of intelligence, General KLIMOVICH; his
political adviser, N. CHEBYSHEV; and a well-known journalist,
SHULGIN. On this occasion, YAKUSHEV's charm failed to impress, -a
and his story failed to convince. Sharp questions were posed and
YAKUSHEV parried them as best he could. When KLIMOVICH!\asked how
all this activity could take place in the midst of Cheka agents,
YAKUSHEV said that obviously KLIMOVICH was not well-informed about
conditions in the USSR, but he saw that he was now confronted with
men who would not simply accept his words at face value. The meeting
was soon over. SHULGIN proclaimed himself convinced of YAKUSHEV's
sincerity. KLIMOVICH voiced some skeptical reservations. CHEBYSHEV
told his colleagues outright that he believed YAKUSHEV was a Cheka
stooge. His views on Monarchism were simply too pat for a man who
had lived for years under Soviet rule; in other words, he had
learned his lessons too well.
At another meeting with the Monarchist Council, it was agreed
that the Council would appoint representatives in several capitals
to act as liason-men with the Trust. Later, for this purpose,
Captain ARTOMONOV was sent from Tallin to Warsaw under the rame-
of LIPSKI, and in Paris young Prince Shirinskiy SHAKHMATOV was
assigned to the job.
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Back in Moscow, YAKUSHEV reported to ARTUZOV on the results
of his trip. He pointed out that a :barrier divided the Monarchist
Council and WRANGEL's organizations (i.e., the ROVS), and that the
Trust would have to work with one of the other; to keep in touch
with both might not be possible. He also reported that the young
emigres were disenchanted. with both these organizations and
suggested that a third organization, "the Eurasians", should be
approached as possible unwitting collaborators. YAKUSHEV's
report and suggestions were favorably recieved, but decision as
to the best course of action was postponed.
YAKUSHEV returned from his Berlin trip with greatly enhanced
self-assurance. He considered himself more thaf a match for the
leaders he had met, and had convinced himself that none had the caliber
to lead a change of government in the USSR. This left him with the
heartfelt conviction that Russia's future was in the hands of the
Bolsheviks for better of for worse; and this being so, he could now
devote himself to the activities of the GPU-controlled Trust with
no twinges of distaste or hypocrisy.
The Trust now started to get involved with foreign intelligence
services. The mechanics of these contacts have not been disclosed,
but it seems likely that this was done through the emigre laison-men
located in capital cities. WRAGA claims that the Trust was in contact
with ten Western intelligence services, but he provides no evidence
in support of the allegation. From available documents it can be
deduced that, at best, the Trust was in laison with the Estonians,
Polish, Finns and the English, and that communications moved along
two channels: (1) through diplomatic couriers such as Roman BIRK
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14
(who brought Trust material out in the Estonian diplomatic pouch)
or (2) through so-called "windows" (i.e.,co-ntrolled points on the
border for letting Trust agents in and out of Russia.)
Thus, fabricated information of every description found its way
into foreign countriecs, with sufficient accurate data to make the
remainder appear authentic. Most of the material was prepared by
"RAZVEDUPR", which had a special "Disinformation Bureau" for the
purpose. All the information sent out was designed to convey the
same message: Don't make war against the USSR of execute acts of
terror, for great changes are taking place and Russia soon again
will become a respectable member of the community of nations.
As this traffic in disinformation became more or less routine
in character, ARTUZOV planned a deeper penetration into emigre
circles, and towards this end, YAKUSHEV was slated for a trip to
Paris to meet Grand Duke Nikola Aware of the importance
of such an encounter, ARTUZOV decided that YAKUSHEV should be
accompanied by General POTAPOV, ostensibly now a leading member
of the Trust. Actually POTAPOV belonged to the General Staff of
the Red Army, but he had been given leave of absence (as arranged
by the GPU) to enable him to devote himself to Trust, affairs.
The selection of POTAPOV as an emmisary was an astute choice, for
he had occasionaly been received at the Tsar's court by the Grand
Duke in former times.
Both YAKUSHEV and POTAPOV arrived in Paris in August 1923 and
had a meeting with the Grand Duke which lasted for three hours-
YAKUSHEV pushed his well-known line, which, merely being a re-
iteration of the Grand Duke's own, found a sympathetic listener.
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Nilolai Nikolayevich promised his cooperation and, although he did
not later measure up to the promise, the visit was a success for
YAKUSHEV, for he now was able to trade on the prestige given him
by a senior member of the Imperial family.
This newly acquired prestige paid off in two ways. It enabled
YAKUSHEV to conclude a working agreement with the KUTEPOV group
in Paris. And, because of it, he now was listened to with increased
respect by his old MOTSR co-conspirators inside Russia.
The GPU had started the Trust operation with some idea of its
importance, but without realizing the full extent of its potentialities.
As its possible scope became clear, DZERZHINSKIY wrote a memorandum
delineating its goals. The Trust, he said, was to control "public
opinion" among emigres, to convince them of the futility of terrorism
and debunk their idea of intervention. They must be persuaded that
a counter-revolution was in the making, in which they could only play
a supporting role. Dissension must be provoked by keeping alive
controversial issues such as the elimination of classes, the nation-
alization of heavy-industry, the agrarian problem. KUTEPOV and
WRANGEL should be put of loggerheads, by fanning the rumor that the
latter was a future Bonaparte. These, according to NIKULIN, were
the goals outlined by DZERZHINSKIY, but apparently there were others.
A check on the activities of Monarchist,elements inside Russia was ,
certainly part of the operation, as was the feeding of disinformation
to foreign intelligence services.
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The Case of Boris Savinkov
Emboldened by success, the GPU decided to go. after special game,
and Boris SAVINKOV was chosen as a target. DZERZHINSKIY himself
made this decision in the summer of 1923 after learning that Savinkov's
personal adjutant, Leonid Danilovich SHESHENYA, had been captured
while crossing the border into the USSR. At that time SAVINKOV was
the only remaining anti-communist leader with a charisma of his own,
acquired in continuous battle for a democratic Russia against
totalitarian forces both right and left.
SAVINKOV began his political career at an early age and achieved
fame during the Tsarist regime as a member of the SR Party terrorist
group. In this capacity, he took part in the assassination of the
Grand Duke Sergius and of PLEHWE, the Tsarist Minister of the Interior.
He was several times imprisoned, but always escaped miraculously.
After the February Revolution, he joined the Provisional Government
of KERENSKIY. When the Bolsheviks seized power, he turned his
revolutionary experience against them, and organized counter-
revolutionary conspiracies in Moscow and Jaroslav. These activities
were successfully combatted by the Cheka.
With the defeat of the White forces in 1920, SAVINKOV founded
"The People's Association for the Defense of the Motherland and
Freedom", with headquarters in Warsaw. An intellectual, Dimitriy
Vladipierovich FILOSOFOV,and an activist Yevgeniy Sergeyevich
SHEVCHENKO, were selected to run the show in Poland. SAVINKOV
himself, with his two assistants, Aleksandr Arkadyevich DICKHOF-_
DAEHRENTAHL and Colonel Sergey Eduardovich PAVLOVSKIY, chose to
reside in Paiis. This higher echelon maintained contact with Polish,
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French and British intelligence services, also with the governments
of these countries in a marginal sense.
By 1922, SAVINKOV had been able to set up an impressive
organization inside the Soviet Union, under the direct command of the
ruthless general, BULAK-BULAKHOVICH. Members had succeeded in spread-
ing terror among the Bolsheviks. In 1923, the tide began to turn.
The Peace Treaty of Riga, concluded in 1921, had forced the Poles to
disband military units belonging to SAVINKOV, and could no longer
give him open support. His cells within Russia began to flounder and
were picked up by the GPU one by one. Worse still, SAVINKOV began to
lose faith in his own life-long ideal of a democratic Russia, and
started to flirt with new ideologies such as the fascism of Mussolini.
DZERZHINSKIY, aware that SAVINKOV was capable of staging a come-
back if given the slight opportunity, decided that the time was ripe
for-his elimination. He called together certain trusted GPU offi-
cials, ARTUZOV, PUZITSKIY, PILYAR, SYROYEZHKIN, DEMIDENKO, and FED-
OROV. He explained that SAVINKOV, adventurous, vain and intelligent,
yet so egoistic that he could not bear the humiliation of set-backs,
mighlt now be willing to run great risks for uncertain gains. In a
psychological ploy, SAVINKOV was to be fed information about an anti-
communist organisation of Liberal Democrats inside Russia, which was
incapable of action simply for want of an able leader. In this way
SAVINKOV, with his colossal conceit, could be lured into the Soviet
Union and into the clutches of the GPU.
The Trust, as such, could riot be used for such an operation,b
cause SAVINKOV detested Monarchists as much as he did the Bolsheviks.
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A parallel Liberal Democrat (LD) organization must be set' up under
the control of a few selected GPU officials. Unlike the Trust, its
recruited agents would be kept under strict control, with no freedom
for personal initiative.
ARTUZOV (as Nikita INikitovich TVERDOV) was appointed as head of
the bogus LD; PUZITSKIY (as Nikolay Nikolayevich NOVITSKIY) was made
head of the Moscow LD unit; FEDOROV (as MUKHIN) was given the job of
getting in personal touch with SAVINKOV, ostensibly on behalf of im-
patient LD elements in Russia.
Almost simultaneously with the capture of SHESHENYA (mentioned
above), the GPU apprehended a group of Savinkov partisans, under
the leadership of one ZEKUNOV. SHESHENYA and ZEKUNOV were placed
under pressure and soon gave their promise to collaborate.
ZEKUNOV was sent to Poland on a courier mission ostensibly as a
LD representative. There he informed both Polish intelligence and
Savinkov representatives that both he and SHESHENYA had managed to
establish contact with an anti-soviet underground in Moscow (i.e.,
the LD) and that the latter were anxious to have contacts abroad for
the furtherance of their somewhat parochial activities. To give
weight to his story, he handed certain military documents to the
Poles.
And here a departure from Trust operational methods is to be
noted. Whereas the Trust passed material that was for the most part
fabricated, material given to the Poles through LD channels, though
outdated and not of first class importance, was genuine. DZERZHINSKIY
knew that the LD was bona fide, otherwise the latter could never be
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lured to.Moscow. The use of authentic documents was a high price
to pay, but appeared necessary as a means to an end.
Both recipients of the news about the LD manifested interest b
such extent that a direct approach seemed warranted, and a GPU
official, FEDOROV (alias MUKHIN), was despatched to Warsaw and
Paris. On this occasion, however, MUKHIN did not go to Paris,
because he was advised in Warsaw that SAVINKOV refused to see him.
SAVINKOV's message stated that MUKHIN should return to Moscow
accompanied by a genuine Savinkov disciple, FOMICHEV. The latter
would meet SHESHENYA, satisfy himself that he was not under GPU
control, meet other LD people, then return and report directly to
SAVINKOV.
FOMICHEV's stay in Moscow was carefully stage-managed. He j'~ under the name *,TRP7'17.
ire'7 ' aved in '"nsco':' until la27, and meanwhile, in 1925, they were
11 .,i tf l nc tools in luri_nc F'`'dnev ?TIL,LY into 'Tu,sia. In 'ori _1_ 1927
to '-'i.nlan'' with ?3r'T~ bu soon returned to Tosco.' on
a ^?.'~ ltacTe T^ ?1nn, and '.?Ia Trilled in an exchange or gunfire.
". member of the LT?.7I(T10'7 team that went to Leningrad in June 1927
and liccess1~1ully bombed a communist meetinq-hall beF'ore returning to
"i_nla.nd.. Tn 71.izr.u.st of the same year he and cr.?O7T'.7 entered T'.ussia on a
second ,abotane m.isson, and both `.'.'ere '?'illed, in the Petrozavod district.
in T_ucu,t 1'a"'7, and bath ~?,ere killed.
..'en.t to 'Tuns .=l in 1.''24 wit, r:r _ , , TT ^ to rV the
1 ,I and O .I'1 _che~ on t_z?c tivities o' the "'rust, on '7eha1_` o-I' ;enera1 'TTT`I'F''O\'. ''e'r'rence is
nT^^.'1t .i.n rust arterial, but there is no Yecord
ec.a di ?r li_ subsequent activities, or o` his
ate.
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nn (' olonel)
Chief or the "Inner Line", the C'I branch of General 773-7POV' s
was considered. a:z able man, but after the
uctinn ( _.e. de=t ) n` r'TiTFPrIN?, th victiI? of
emigre intriques; as a result, he -1-?as deooserd and his organization
dissolved.
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T3. ' PT? OVT--ICI LS, T,c:;JT1TS n,?1 COLL'~T30 r.1 0D5 ~T `PTT T7 'T'r'?.TJcT O?'F-- 7 `r'IO'1
71,7tIPOV, fnu (at_a SI-?alr)T)
One of the leading "T'urasians" in Faris, who with the heln of the
^ru,':, entered ' ussia. in 1924 to attend the "First T'urasian "onference"
in ,fo,cow, as a cTuest of honor.
a golden lette "T"' with crossed
ad.c?.resse the conference and delineated the oroaram of the organization.
T,.s they did in regard to "DTSF., the CPi7 set uo a branch of the
";~?urasi..ans" in the TTccn as a means of inFiltratina and directing the
"rur. as ian" croup in Furone.
~mTT^nT 7 , ( .-~ TA( F r .,T T(' ^T rnr,. T(.UT )
'nu a T T ' 'T
T, ~T
Chief of the Counterintelligence section of the qPU an one of
its "ice-"residents.
".ccordinc to 'Z. T'' A V...'.TTZ!)VV ''?S }-)')rn in ``'nioste with Italian
blood in his veins, and his real name was ?Ir'rI. During T?Torld War I,
he served with Austrian intelligence, spent some time as a POT-7 in
?us 7, a, and then became a member of the
Lev TTi!TT I'T t.** simol i revers to him as _.T'TT17OT.1, and descniveS
him
as a former onciineer with 1.?er', dark eves any. a ssiall pointed beard.
on -out,tanc'.i no c'1e'_i,ts
Under the alias of 'Ir. -he
forth anni varsary of the
m t?.~n I~T7 an,' 'i.r. r' T' TS- un T:'1~.1, his true name `-?'as
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7T-RTTO' -7'~FT;T'T:'ITT fnu, any?. wIFT?
Secretary of ?oris !7.71.77T'.770 V after world T'Tar I, and, like his Chief
an old re"nl'.1=~ par fia'.;te, r. TTi 1 ire camp from similar o _ circle-
r 1.) 7uicu_st 1024, both 'al''T'HO' and his wife accomoanied SAN7I?TKOV
to ?.us_sia and were arrested with him. 'eoortedly released on
I O . s recTuest, the remained in oscow unmolested, and worked as
Tntouur,_st guides.
The real relationship between S?.Vi'1KOV and this couple remains
obscnnre. On one occasion, "Tf OT) . told American newspapermen that
been lured into the TTSS1 by a "beauitiful operator" and that
she had been permitted to soencd nights T:Tit`i after hi-, arrest.
Since .."lc. 7T( T,unr i i the onl"?' PUT.
Te achieved some prominence s?rvinc as a c;uidn for V:1.`.'.
cT-?TT_ cI-j during the latter's trio through ''.cassia in 1)25, and. he
rece creel `requent mention in C TTTTT,r;I'T' s book , The ^hree r'a ita]_S ,
o` a. well-1knowwwn professor of medicine in ''oscow, he was
oF*:i.cer duri na the ?"ivil T^ar and was decorated with the
rl "-nner medal for br:averv. IT is first recorded lob for the rpuT
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was to establish a branch or the "Eurasian" organization in 1oscow and
arrange the "First Eurasian Congress" in }Moscow in 1924. In the
fn. 1_lo .,-in(- sear he attended another "Eurasian Congress" held in Berlin.
?v this time he had become liason man with "olish intelligence
ostene ihl v for the Trust, and in this canacitu he established two
n~..7indows" on the Soviet-Doli.sh border. nisguised as a smuggler, he met
cT?TT- rT'I at the border in 1925 and helped him cross into the TTSST?, again
on behalf of the "'rust.
'lccordina to r; "I, , he was a member of the Soviet '4.ili tarn 'lission
Oon"':erence in Geneva in the late twenties, under the name of general
"1T'7TT QOTT
TT*'rT- TT' ~ T,,ho ' lter~vi e_wed him extensively before writing his hook
The 'well, states that LANGOVOv died in Moscow on 26 ''ebruarv 1964.
nT,nFnnTTI R - `"')
aluard (see.. 7NI_ SIT-1
n TVLONT gnu
'e hearer o` a letter prom Colonel P 7LO"'S'