ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000300340055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: July 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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6~ 4
u 1 niE
Director of Congressional Affairs
OCA#86-2499
Record'
16 July 1986
NOTE FOR: Ron Sable
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director, Legislative
Affairs, NSC
SUBJECT: Angola
At Monday's meeting you asked for a list
of who CIA had briefed. You also asked for
a collection of classified and unclassified
publications. Having none of the latter, I
enclose the briefing list and a collection
of classified publications.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - D/OCA
OCA Registry
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TIME
PLACE 25X1 EVENT
13 Jan
1400 Brf Sen Byrd's (D., WV) stfr D'Amato on
3F29, Hqs Angola
16 Jan
1400
S-406 Capitol
Brf HFAC, SFRC & SSCI stf on Angola
28 Jan
1530 Brf Rep Michel, (R., IL), House Minority
H-405 Capitol Leader, and Rep Dick Cheney (R., WY) re
Angola and Nicaragua
30 Jan
1000
S-116 Capitol
Bfg SFRC on Angola
30 Jan
1600 Brf SSCI on Nicaragua, Cambodia and
219 SHOB Yemen (plus Angola)
(also Gerner, DO/EPS attended)
31 Jan
1000 Brf Sen Mitch McConnell (R., KY) and
120 SROB SSCI stfr Cleveland on Angola
31 Jan
1100
219 SHOB
Brf SFRC stfrs on Angola
13 Feb
1500 Brf Sen Glenn's (D., OH) stfrs Eckert
CIA PARTICIPANTS
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.. pia r
1300 Staff Briefing on Angola PF for Shekmar
119 SDOB of SAC Def Subcmte
12 Mar
1400 Testimony on Angola for HPSCI
H-405 Capitol (w/Sec State)
14 Mar Member Briefing on Angola for SSCI mbr
1030 Sen Boren (D., OK) (POSTPONED)
20 Mar
1400
219 SNOB
21 Mar
1100
219 SHOB
04 Apr
1000
6D01 Hqs
04 Apr
1330
3F29 Hqs
15 Apr
1430
137 CHOB
Staff Briefing on Angola for SSCI Stfr
McMahon
Member Briefing on Angola for
Sen DeConcini (D., AZ) of SAC
Staff Briefing on Afghanistan and
Angola for Finn and Levine, SSCI stfrs
Staff Briefing on Angola and Mozambique
for Philip Christenson of SFRC stf
Member Briefing on Angola for Rep
Siljander (R., MI) of HFAC
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Breakfast bfg on Nicaragua, Angola and
Soviet activities abroad for Sens.
Wallop (R., WY) and Quayle (R., IN)
(Agency,Seal Medallion to Wallop)
Member Briefing on Angola & Afghanistan
for Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D., AZ) of
SAC
Member Briefing on Mozambique &
Angola for Senator Trible (R., VA)
Pre-trip staff briefing on Angola for
Holliday, Cleveland, Kettlewell &
Ockenden of SSCI
Staff Briefing on Ethiopia & Angola for
Peckham, Pitchford, Loney, HFAC stfrs
Staff Briefing on Angola for O'Neil
and Giza of HPSCI
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Central Intelligence Agaxy
14 July 1986
Options and Scenarios for South African Actions Against Its Neighbors
stance in the region
South Africa's economic and military dominance of the region provides it with a broad range of
options for actions against its neighbors, many of which it has exercised repeatedly. Pretoria's
regional policy under State President P. W. Botha, who came to power in 1978 after 13 years as
Defense Minister, has been especially prone to coercive measures, ranging from "economic
pinpricks" such as recently restricted supplies of lubricants for Zimbabwean diesels to full-fledged
support for Angolan insurgents. This memorandum:
- Provides a menu of South African economic and military options for each of Pretoria's
neighbors, with actions listed in order of severity, including the probable impact on the country,
the country's probable response, and an estimate, where possible, of the costs to the United
States and the West of compensating a country for damage.
- Formulates several scenarios, starting with a baseline assessment, that project Pretoria's
probable regional reaction to alternative US and Western initiatives toward South Africa,
indicates the options and targets the South Africans are likely to choose, and assesses the
impact on US and Western interests.
- Outlines briefly our understanding of the general priorities and factors that affect Pretoria's
policies toward its neighbors.
We begin by examining the forces that affect Pretoria's calculus, reflecting our judgment that the
evolving crisis inside the country has caused Pretoria to take an increasingly demanding and coercive
Section I
We doubt that South Africa proceeds within the region from any "grand strategy" but rather
believe that leaders in Pretoria react to events and seize opportunities as they present themselves.
Nevertheless,,,the Botha government's decisions on dealing with individual black states appear to fall
within a framework of general objectives and priorities. We believe, however, that several key
factors, many of them reflecting domestic political conditions, critically affect how Pretoria
Attacking Anti-South African Insurgents. Pretoria's hostility toward a neighbor is directly
influenced by the extent to which it supports-or is perceived to support-the African National
Congress (ANC), the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the Pan-Africanist
implements its regional policy
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Ccntral Intdlig me Agrncy
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 June 1986
Angola: Surge in Soviet Arms Deliveries
Summary
Soviet ships and heavy-lift transport aircraft have delivered large
amounts of militarLcargo to Angola over the past six months. We believe
Moscow's increasing effort this year almost certainly is intended to re-
plenish Luanda's supply of weapons and materiel before the government
steps up the tempo of military operations against UNITA. The recent in-
crease in deliveries adds to Moscow's already high level of military assis-
tance for Angola over the last three years, when nearly $2 billion in arms
were provided. We believe the equipment received since November 1985
will significantly augment Angola's ability to prosecute the war this
year,and additional improved weapons systems are likely to arrive in
1986
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F T
nftMaC.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 March 1986
ANGOLA: UNITA Leader Savimbi Today--His Goals and Prospects
Summary
The visit by Jonas Savimbi to Washington last January gave
US officials a closer look at the longtime Angolan guerrilla
leader and helped place him in current perspective. The UNITA
leader's comments were largely consistent with his earlier
statements and confirmed our view of him as a pragmatic African
Savimbi's goal is to force the Angolan Government to the
bargaining table by waging a protracted war that convinces the
MPLA regime that it cannot win and must negotiate. Confident
of his staying power and South African backing, Savimbi
believes UNITA can blunt this year's major offensive by the
Angolan government, which managed to regain the military
initiative in 1985 for the first time in several years.
Savimbi calculates, by his own private admission, that several
years of standoff will be necessary before negotiations with
the MPLA are feasible.
In the near term--the next 12 to 18 months, we believe the
fighting probably will be the most intense of the civil war,
with tactical-gains and losses on both sides, but that neither
side will deliver-a knockout punch. However, there is a
ALA M 86-20015
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cen omm Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 July 1986
Angola-Zaire: An Uneasy Peace
Summary
The traditionally uneasy relationship between Angola and
Zaire has worsened noticeably in recent months as suspicions on
both sides have mounted about each other's willingness to
increase aid to dissident groups. The summit scheduled for 10
July in Luanda between Angolan President dos Santos and Zairian
President Mobutu is unlikely,to relax growing tensions, even
though we expect both leaders to give l i p. service to improving
diplomatic relations. Our reading of a large quantity of
special intelligence leads us to conclude that Angola has
already proceeded with a number of low-risk diplomatic and
psychological measures in hope of inhibiting Zairian support to
Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA). Although we doubt that Kinshasa will reduce
its involvement with UNITA, President Mobutu is working hard to
reduce Zaire's regional isolation, project a more nonaligned
foreign policy, and improve relations with Moscow in the
unrealistic hope that such cosmetic moves will paper over
growing difficulties with Angola.
Should tensions continue to mount in the wake of the
summit, we believe Angola will take limited military moves
against Kinshasa; probably including increased hot pursuit
operations against UNITA forces using Zaire as a sanctuary or
limited cross-border raids by regular Angolan Army troops. We
ALA M 86-20033C
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Directorate of
Intelligence
ret
Angola:
UNITA's Prospects in 1986
COPY 4 //
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Directorate of
Intelligence
et
-Seef
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V1EntwVlon RC. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 November 1985
Summary
A Party Congress--only the third since the MPLA seized
control in 1975 with Soviet and Cuban backing--is slated for
6-10 December. President dos Santos's position within the
Party appears more secure than at any time since he came to
power in 1979. On the eve of the Congress, the MPLA
leadership, undoubtedly encouraged by its recent military
successes against UNITA, appears even more determined to pursue
a military solution to the insurgency. Although dos Santos is
likely to gain increased personal power at the Congress, we
believe his policy options are narrowed because of the regime's
growing military dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. The
Congress is likely to adopt some reforms to improve party
discipline and to revive the economy, but we expect these
measures will do little to broaden the regime's narrow base of
support or to arrest the economic decline]
The MPLA's current air of confidence could well be short-
lived in our view. The regime still faces the difficult task
of buildin? on the momentum of the past year, as the
government s improved performance against the insurgents in
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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
15 November 1985
THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was prepared under the auspices
of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Assessment was
coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating
were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; and the Headquarters, Marine Corps. Information
available as of 8 November 1985 was used in the preparation of this
Assessment.
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SNIE 71/11-85
SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT
TO ANGOLA: INTENTIONS
AND PROSPECTS
Information available as of 24 October 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved bi the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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