HPSCI STAFF STUDY ON NFAC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 23, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFI 'TIAL
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment 23 November 1979
MENORANDUM FOR: DD/OPA DD/OSI SA/ProducTn
DP/OCR DD/OWI NFAC/Plans
DD/OER DD/OGCR EA/D/NFAC
DD/OSR NIC/John Whitman
SUBJECT: HPSCI Staff Study of NFAC
1. The staff of the Subcommittee on Evaluation of the Hose
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has completed a study of
NFAC production of finished intelligence and of the NIO system. Copies
of the staff stmly have been forwr.rded to the DCI from Chairman Boland
with the notation that the Committee would welcome any comments we
would like to make about the points discussed in the staff report.
The staff report contains both general comments with respect to NFAC
production and organization and a number of specific reconmendations.
2. A Special Panel is created for the purpose of reviewing the
staff report; assessing the recommendations contained in the report;
advising me, the DCI, and the DDCI concerning possible further action
with respect to the recommendations; and preparing comments on the
staff report for the DCI to send to Chairman Boland.
3. The Special Panel is chaired by
following members:
4. I would like to meet with the Panel on 30 November to discuss
its initial views, looking to completion of a letter from the DCI to
Chairman Boland by 7 December.
cc: DCI
DDCI
OLC
CONF1 TIAL
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
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HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EVALUATION
STAFF REPORT
ON
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER (NFAC)
NOVEMBER 1979
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I. PURPOSE
II. STUDY APPROACH
A. Research Program
B. Evaluation Norms
III. NFAC PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
A. Overview
B. NFAC Offices
1. Office of Scieritific Intelligence and Office of Weapons Intelligence
2. Office\of Strategic Research
3. Office,of Political Analysis
4. Office of Economic Research
5. Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research
IV. NIO SYSTEM
A. Background
B. NIOs and the NIE Process
C. Adequacy of the NIO System
1. DCI's surrogate
2. Link to consumers
3. Focal point for warning
4. Link to academics and other experts
D. Need for Clarity of Purpose
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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PREFACE
This staff report on the Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC) culminates a year-long effort at examining NFAC's
production of finished intelligence studies and the National Intelligence
Officer (Nb) system. While this report summarizes the staff's findings, it
should be noted that as in past Subcommittee on Evaluation efforts, the staff
will continue to monitor NFAC's activities. The sample of intelligence studies
upon which many of the findings are based were produced during the first-three
quarters of 1978, and the cut off date for other information was 31 August 1979.
The staff realizes that changes are presently underway which will impact on
the observations made in this report. However, the staff holds that many of
the observations are likely to remain valid and need to be given serious consider-
ation in any future structural realignment within NFAC.
This detailed examination of the intelligence process as it operates
within NFAC could not have been completed without the assistance of intelligence
analysts, branch chiefs, office directors, and the management of the National
Foreign Assessment Center. Their cooperation allowed the staff considerable
opportunity to observe how the intelligence product is produced and how NFAC
personnel interact with the principal users. The judgments are those of the
staff based on their reading of the product, and on interviews with users and
producers of intelligence.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. While the large majority of NFAC production addresses consumer needs,
"nice to have" production and duplication do occur. This problem has been
avoided only where the NFAC office, division, or branch maintains close enough
contact with users so that the intended user and the likely need are identified
when the study is initiated.
The principle of production relevance should be emphasized in production
management and in contemplated organizational changes.
mOrlp
2. Production management across NFAC offices has been almost non-existent
until recently, and the problem at the community level remains considerably
greater.
Coordination of production planning by NFAC offices should be strengthened,
whether through the Production Board or some other mechanism that provides a
forum for the office directors. At the community level, an interagency production
board should be revitalized and provided with a small coordination and planning
staff.
3. A community-wide bibliography of finished intelligence products is needed, both
to serve the consumer by pointing out the existence of a study on a particular
subject, and to identify and thereby help to reduce unnecessary duplication.
The DCI should investigate the feasibility of developing a community-wide
bibliographic system.
4. Evaluation of finished intelligence is nearly absent both within NFAC and at
the coMmunity level. The effect of the Senior Review Panel to date has been quite
limited, in part because the Panel has become integral to NFAC's routine production
machinery.
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- An in-house evaluative element should be established within NFAC,
...while at the community level, the Senior Review Panel should be subordinated
directly to the DCI, and enabled to function as an independent evaluator of
interagency production and of the quality of single agency production on issues
that are particularly important or contentious.
5. Inordinate delays in the production of NIEs and IIMs, and uncertainty as to
their form and purpose, have seriously undermined their quality and responsiveness
although recent steps have begun to address these problems.
The Director of NFAC should continue current efforts to define the
nature and role of all interagency production; and greater guidance should be
provided to the NIOs in the production of estimates.
6. Although NIOs contribute significantly in several capacities, the potential
of the NW system has never been realized, primarily because of confusion about
NIOs' purpose and functions.
The NIO system should be maintained and its effectiveness strengthened
by clearly defining the roles of the NIOs.
7. NFAC has not taken on such community-wide responsibilities as monitoring -
or at least being able to identify - the allocation of analytic resources devoted
to a given subject by all elements of the intelligence community.
The DCI must consider reestablishing an element at the community level which
Is cognizant of and capable of dealing with community-wide analytic resource issues.
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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
AmP.
I. Purpose_
This study had as its fundamental purpose to consider whether the current
organization and management of NFAC maximizes its contribution to intelligence.
Of particular interest was the effect of major structural changes introduced by
the DCI in 1977. These included a restructuring of what once was CIA's Deputy
Directorate for Intelligence. That Deputy Directorate hence became known as the
National Foreign Assessment Center and the Director, National Foreign Assessment,
charged with improving the overall quality of the intelligence product. He was
also given responsibility for the National Intelligence Officers, (NI0s) who had
previously reported directly to the DCI. The Subcommittee staff was not only
interested in how well the National Foreign Assessment Center was producing ex-
clusively CIA analyses, but in how well the NIO system was functioning in the
--oduction of National Intelligence Estimates.
Hence, NFAC was understood at the start of this study to have two major
roles: (1) the production of intelligence studies that had traditionally been
performed by the CIA and (2) the pulling together of the community's expertise by
the NIOs to produce National Estimates and interagency assessments.
Both in scope and in purpose the staff study was broader than the present
report. The study was undertaken as a vehicle for a sustained and systematic
effort by the staff to become fully cognizant of NFAC - its structure and personnel,
traditions and current priorities, consumer relations and production management,
strengths and weaknesses. The familiarity developed through an extensive program
of interviews and reading of intelligence products (described below) provided the
foundation for the judgments and observations in the present report.
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ONDENTIAL
Like previous studies by the Evaluation Subcommittee, the following report,
is intended both to address informational needs of the Committee and to communicate
Subcommittee onderns and observations to the intelligence community. Its two
principal purposes are:
--to communicate to the intelligence community the observations of the
Subcommittee staff concerning the strengths and weaknesses of NFAC's
current structure and production management, and to offer recommendations
based on these observations;
--to provide a thoughtful discussion of some of the issues and trade-offs
that are inherent in efforts to improve analysis, management and performance.
It is hoped that such discussionwill contribute to their constructive con-
sideration, both within the intelligence community and in the oversight
relationship between this Committee and the community.
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II. Study Approach
A. Research Program
To approach the question of whether NFAC's current organization and
management maximizes its contribution to intelligence analysis, the Subcommittee
staff had to address such fundamental and subjective issues as: does NFAC production
closely match intelligence users' needs? Is NFAC production managed so as to
maximize the benefits of competitive analysis with other agencies while avoiding
wasteful duplication? Do NIOs function effectively in the present organization?
Clearly the research program required both breadth and depth - to familiarize the
staff more fully with the structure and production of each NFAC office and with
Its major consumers, as well as to enable the staff to examine selected issues in
detail.
There is no way to understand the intelligence production process but to
read intelligence studies and then talk with their authors and the users. The
staff attempted not to make independent judgments as to the quality of studies, for
no staff can have that breadth or depth of expertise. The staff structured its
inquiry - which ultimately encompassed many hours of interviews conducted over a
nine month period - around a preliminary review of intelligence studies written by
NFAC analysts during the first three quarters of 1978. A computerized listing of
titles of NFAC intelligence studies written during that period was requested. It
was decided that the present study would focus primarily on the production of
finished Intelligence Assessments or Research Papers, with minimal attention to
current intelligence and periodic reporting.
From the list of titles, approximately 100 studies were selected 'for
review. The selection was not conducted in a scientific random manner, but efforts
were made to ensure that the sample reflected a wide range of subjects and types
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of products. Individual work sheets were prepared on each of the studies, on which
4?11e4.
the staff lade tentative observations on their estimative content and probable
timeliness, and also noted questions which warranted additional data requests. For
a smaller number of these studies, NFAC was requested to provide additional infor-
mation to include:
o the requirement for the study, i.e., who asked for it or was it
self-generated
o the distribution of the study
o to what consumer was the study directed, and
o what feedback was received on the study
These were also the kinds of questions that were pursued with all of those inter-
viewed.
From the 100 NFAC studies surveyed, approximately 35 were selected for
further examination. Although the selection once again was made to provide as
broad a perspective as possible, the staff recognized that it could not be relied
on as a representative sample of all NFAC intelligence production. Observations
about these studies, therefore, were not extrapolated into generalizations about
the quality or usefulness of NFAC production, but rather the detailed inquiry into
the origins and ultimate use of these studies served as a vehicle enabling the
staff to explore the strengths or weaknesses of various NFAC elements, their procedures
and their relationships with various groups of consumers.
Using these studies as a starting point, the staff interviewed most of
the authors, as well as their branch or division chiefs, NFAC office directors, and
Intelligence consumers in five executive branch departments. In addition, intel-
ligence analysts in other agencies were interviewed to determine better what relation-
ship the NFAC products bore to other intelligence production on the same or related
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subjects. By combining the consumer viewpoint with that of the intelligence
producer and the views of other intelligence analysts, the staff was able to
develop a good understandingof the content of these analyses and some measure
of their utility to users without relying completely on its own judgments.
Interviews were also conducted with most of the NIOs and with several
deputy and former NI0s. These interviews, which occurred as part of the process
of evaluating the usefulness of particular studies and of assessing producer-consumer
contact in various subject areas, also helped the staff to assess the various roles
played by NI0s.
B. Evaluation Norms
Believing that the major criterion for evaluatin ency's production
management should be the relevance of its product t , the staff paid
.
particular attention to the manner in which intelligence studies were initiated.
Through data requests and interviews, inquiries were made about whether given studies
were undertaken at the initiative of NFAC or some element thereof, or in response
to a consumer request. Nevertheless, the staff fully recognized that such a distinc-
tion alone could not reveal the usefulness of a product, since the degree to which
a product could be described as "self-initiated" was determined largely by the product's
function. For example, a product which served a warning or alerting function would
clearly be "self-initiated." While a study or briefing produced in response to a
specific request by a policymaker would not be "self-initiated," the staff recognized
that the majority of intelligence production falls into a gray area, neither fully,
"self-initiated" nor clearly identified with a specific user request. These include
studies initiated by analysts in response to obvious or expressed priorities of
policymakers, including those formally described as NITs (National Intelligence Topics);
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studies prepared prior to international meetings or visits, responding to
general qiiiitions raised by the President or others at high level meetings;
and analyses undertaken as "building blocks" necessary to reach other intel-
ligence judgments.
Self-initiated production clearly has its place as it may reflect the
foresight and professionalism of the intelligence community in addressing
users' information needs. Nevertheless, in this study of NFAC production
production not responding to a particular consumer request can be readily
c\-
management a special burden is placed on the community to ensure that any
justified as serving one of the other important functions noted above, and
that it not be merely "nice to have."
As the foregoing indicates, the staff held that production management
must be judged according to its success in allocating available resources so
that finished intelligence is relevant to consumer needs, and so that there
are no major gaps in coverage. Specifically, it assumed that where production
management was good there would be little or no unnecessary production, nor
would there be failures to note significant trends and attempt analytic
predictions of major developments. Furthermore, while the individual product
would reflect all available information and expertise and would be sensitive
to the possible contributions of other disciplines, the management and coordin-
ation process would not be excessively cumbersome.
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III. NFAC-Production Management
A. Overview
The-National Foreign Assessment Center consists of seven major
production offices. The staff concentrated its study on the political,
economic, scientific and military related analytical activities of NFAC.
While the Office of Imagery Analysis products were examined, it was the staff
-iew that this office provides support not only to other offices within NFAC,
but also some community services of common concern, hence, no in-depth review
was undertaken of OIA.
Contrary to some expectations, NFAC's creation in 1977 has not sub-
stantially changed the relationship between CIA's analytic elements and those
of other intelligence agencies. In spme subject areas CIA has continued to be
the primary producer, while in others either active competition or frequent
collaboration with other agencies occurs. Most of NFAC's analysis takes the
form of single agency, rather than interagency, production.
Although NFAC's offices are not, and should not be, regarded as
anything other than CIA, NFAC does have a community-wide dimension in two areas.
First, it includes the National Intelligence Officers (NI0s), whose various
functions lie largely at the interagency level. (These functions, and factors
which have prevented the full realization of the NIOs' potential, are discussed
In Section IV.)
Second, the Director of NFAC is in a position to gain an overview of
intelligence analysis throughout the community. This overview is possible
primarily because of the breadth of NFAC's work - CIA analysts work actively
in all subject areas, interacting with DIA's analysts, with State Department's
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INR, and with the somewhat specialized intelligence activities of other depart-
vents such-as the Military S&T centers. This breadth provides a necessary basts-
for NFAC's leadership to be aware of the trends affecting production throughout
the community: increasing demand in certain areas, shortages in analytic resources,
or substantial overlap in the production by two or more agencies. Although the
community-wide role of the Director for NFAC has never been fully defined, the scope
of NFAC's work and the fact that EFAC_Indudes...thesiiI0s-implicitly..gime tbefflosition
a measure of community-wide responsibility. At a minimum, the Director of NFAC
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has the responsibility for ensuring that the interagency estimative products are
undertaken to meet the needs of intelligence users, and that these studies are
completed in a timely and useful form. In addition, the Director of NFAC wQyi
appear to have responsibility to identify for the DCI any areas of unnecessary
duplicat' n among agencies or of serious analytic weakness and to make appropriate
reco....majlEalalag.rauurces. (To date the staff has seen little evidence
that the latter community-wide responsibility has been assumed.)
This section discussing NFAC production is structured to reflect the
staff's views of NFAC's proper relationship to the rest of the community. On the
one hand, it must remain clear that the NFAC production offices are CIA elements.
Accordingly, the discussion of each office centers on its production of intelligence
assessments and certain other work that is done on a single agency basis. On the
Jther hand, NFAC production management cannot be discussed in isolation from the
rest of the community. Thus, the discussion of each NFAC office considers its
relationship to all other elements in the community that produce intelligence on
the same or similar subjects.
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B. NFAC Offices
Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Weapons IntelliOnce
a. Background
Initially, four studies by the Office of Scientific Intelligence
were selected for detailed review. It was found that three of the four were self-
generated, and that the requested study was on the South African policy process
and produced
which is part of OSI. For each of the studies, the staff interviewed the analysts
and/or branch chiefs responsible for the studies.
In the Office of Weapons Intelligence, four studies were selected
for detailed review. Here, too, three of the four studies were self-generated,
with one having been requested by the now defunct Office of Net Technical Assess-
ment - Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense. Similarly,
analysts, consumers and authors were interviewed.
After completing this initial survey with intelligence analysts
at CIA, consumers, and other intelligence community personnel, the staff felt that
perhaps most of the production in OSI and OWI was self-generated. The small sample
that the staff had selected suggested that this was the case but it felt uncomfortable
making any conclusions that the majority of OSI and OWI production was self-
generated because it could have been coincidental with the sample chosen. Thus,
the staff requested that for all studies produced in calendar year 78 by OSI and
OWI that the requirement for each study. be identified.
For the Office of SCientific Intelligence it was found that 46
studies were self-initiated and 11 were requested by consumers. However, of those
studies which were requested by consumers, 9 out of 11 were studies which were
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produced by the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior ...
(CAPPB). The studies by CAPPB differ from OSI's technical productionlbeing
more political/behavioral sociological studies
Thus, it could be concluded that of those studies that are
truly of a scientific or technical nature in the Office of Scientific Intelligence
well over 90% were self-initiated. The response from the Office of Weapons
Intelligence indicated that all of their studies were self-generated, although
an earlier response had indicated that several studies on anti-ship systems had
been requested by an office in the Department of Defense.
The OSI and OW! studies were compared with scientific and
technical intelligence studies appearing in DIA's Scientific and Technical
Tntelligence Register (STIR) and DIA's Monthly Production Summary. These two
publications index DIA S&T and Service S&T (Air Force's Foreign Technology
Division, Navy's Naval Intelligence Support Center, and the Army's Foreign
Science Technology Center) finished products. It was found that some subjects
studied by the Department of Defense were also addressed by the CIA, in some
cases within months of each other. There was some duplication in areas where
duplication did not appear to be necessary. OSI produced a study in 1978 on
while Navy's Naval Intelligence Support
iter (NISC) had produced a study in June 1976 on
Although nuclear proliferation is a high priority intelligence
interest, the excruciating detail in OSI's study of
is perhaps more than anyone would want to know on the
subject. The facility appeared adequately covered in an October 1976 DIA study
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With the exception of some OSI studies on Agro-technology
and the spetialized production by CAPPB, it is difficult to find any topics
in OSI's CV 7.8 publications that did not receive coverage by the Department of
Defense in some form. In other cases, studies were produced by the Office of
Scientific Intelligence such as on the East African Desert Locust Threat
Increasing which would not appear to have relevancy to any major set of
consumers either at the tactical level or in Washington.
b. Self-Generation
In discussions with NFAC's Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI) and Office of Weapons Intelligence (OWI), the office directors and
analysts were aware from the beginning of the staff's view that perhaps too
much of its production activity was self-generated. During our discussions
they pointed to the need to anticipate requirements from users and that many
of their studies, because they are detailed and long-ranging, cannot be accom-
plished within a few weeks or even in some cases, several months' time. Thus,
the analyst has to go out and anticipate what the requirements of consumers will
be. The problem, however, is more complex.
The rationale provided by OSI and OWI as to the need for self-
generation is a good one. The staff, in many respects, agrees with OWI's
conclusion that "experience has proven that we cannot wait for outside requests
for studies on given subjects because the deadlines given are usually so short
the detailed analysis to support studies would be impossible unless it were
already underway." While this is a valid reason for self-generation, a few
Issues have arisen as a result of the staff's analysis that would tend to place
self-initiation of such a large proportion of studies in a negative light.
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First, in discussing the production program with personnel
at the agEhty, the staff found that OSI's production schedule is not formulated
In light of what DIA's Sta directorate and the Service StiT centers are producing.
DIA publishes monthly a Production Summary which identifies all of the studies
they have produced that month, what they plan to produce the following month,
and what longer range efforts they have underway. In addition, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Register identifies
all SIAT production and indicates when these studies are to be updated. While
the staff believes that CIA should not be dissuaded from undertaking studies where
they feel they can make a contribution or on issues where they believe there is
a divergence of opinion within the intelligence community, the staff believes
that more attention should be paid to the better coordination of intelligence
production by OSI and greater concentration placed on those critical areas of
high-level interest with lesser priority subjects that have already received
adequate coverage left alone.
Another issue is whether the production decision of one office
takes into account production by other NFAC offices. Recently, the Executive
Director of the NFAC Production Board placed all of NFAC's production planning
on a yearly cycle. This had not been the case before. Each office had been
free to develop its own production plan independently of the other offices.
While there is always apt to be some redundancy between
different production agencies within the intelligence community, there should
be a concerted effort to minimize overlap between offices within the same agency.
More importantly, an NFAC production planning cycle can help facilitate efforts
at interdisciplinary analysis.
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As part of its response to the staff's questions, OSI noted
that much of its production attempts to anticipate external requests and is
In response tosuch requests. Yet in following their production for calendar
year 1978, the staff could not find evidence of any such external requests
with the exception of those studies which were done by the Center for the Study
of Personality and Political Behavior.
If CAPPB is excluded it would leave only two studies which were
requested externally; one by the National Reconnaissance Office entitled,
and another which had
been requested by NFAC on
Both studies were in a sense self-generated
by the intelligence community, NFAC internal to CIA, and the NRO as a consumer of
intelligence information for operational requirements.
The staff found in its interviews with intelligence analysts
in NFAC that they received little, if any, consumer feedback. In light of the
large number of studies produced by DoD and the Service S&T Intelligence Centers,
it leads us to question how much of the CIA product is being read and what its
contribution may be. Although the staff has endeavored to touch base with
consumers in the Washington area and at the U&S commands as to their views of
NFAC products, it believes that a detailed consumer survey of the Office of
Scientific Intelligence and of the Office of Weapons Intelligence product could
be helpful to determine their consumer public and what utility the users find in
their products.
In some ways the intelligence community is its own consumer.
There is nothing wrong with this, and in fact, on many issues that there is a
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strong requirement to provide balance and competing analysis. An example of a
product which appeared to have greater utility to other intelligence analysts
than to outside users was the OSI study on
k,dhere the analyst felt the community needed a study assembling all the data
on the issue in one publication to provide a baseline to track future developments.
This is a good point to keep in mind -- that as much as there is a requirement for
Intelligence studies to be of utility to users, it is also important that the
community at least have some perspective as to where it has been so it will know
where it is going. Sometimes it is not sufficient that all of the raw data be
available to other intelligence community analysts, but that it be assembled in
one place.
There are clearly areas where the CIA should be engaged in
publishing studies on critical issues where there may be some significant dis-
agreement in interpreting the intelligence evidence or in the weight that is
given to certain data that may build a case one way as opposed to another. Thus,
in February, 1978,
for example, DIA published a study on
CIA approximately three months later published their study entitled,
This, however, was an issue
of critical importance to national decision makers, had been in the news, and
re there was a difference in judgment between the two agencies. In such cases,
analyses even though self-generated, benefit the intelligence community and its
users. However, there are other areas within the Office of Scientific Intelligence
where it is questionable whether the studies were actually needed or to what user
they were directed.
This report has attempted to steer away from making organizational
recommendations; however, it does find that the Center for Study of Personality
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and Political Behavior (CAPPB) has little in common with other elements of OSI,
and that its analysts could serve NFAC and the community more effectively if it
were placed in the Office of Political Analysis (OPA). The staff understands the
rationale for originally placing CAPPB in OSI, that being to tie the personality
assessments with the physical health assessments of leaders. However, as CAPPB
develops their personality assessments with their understanding of the culture
and society of a particular country, it would appear that such analyses could have
greater impact on interdisciplinary analysis if CAPPB were part of OPA.
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2._ Office of Strategic Research
Nine finished intelligence studies out of 27 produced by the Office
of Strategic Research were examined in depth. The studies were evaluated according
to the following criteria: clarity, timeliness, usefulness of judgment, accuracy of
judgment (if known), and a general assessment on the quality of analysis. Addition-
ally, the staff review attempted to identify what major judgments, estimates or
forecasts were made in the studies. Additional OSR studies were read, but interviews
were not conducted with intelligence consumers of the analysts who authored the
studies.
The staff found that the content of OSR's reporting appeared to focus
clearly on areas of critical interest to intelligence consumers both from a. policy
and an operator perspective. Most of the OSR studies concentrated on the Soviet
-ion/Warsaw Pact and the People's Republic of China. The sample also included two
studies on third world areas
which were well written and received high user
acceptance in that they provided a thorough understanding of the complexities of
these issues. Consumers have noted that the third world appears not to receive
strong enough analysis, whereas the Soviet Union and PRC receive heavy coverage
by the Departments of Defense and State as well as by NFAC. While it is accepted
that the Soviet Union and PRC are high priority targets, OSR ought to give consider-
ation to broadening its finished intelligence production on the Middle East and
certain third world areas, and perhaps reducing its coverage in others.
A useful feature which consumers found in many agency studies Is their
publication at two classification levels.
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Consumers also noted that in making assessments and comparisons between
the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and the U.S./NATO that care has to be exercised in
making value judgments as to the superiority and/or capabilities of one side versus
the other. Users felt that while intelligence studies ought to be encouraged to
utilize "blue data" for comparison purposes, the community needs to be careful in
king value judgments which might appear to step outside the bounds of intelligence
analysis. The consumers were not singling out NFAC alone, but appeared to make it
as a general comment applicable to the entire community.
There were only two OSR studies which the staff reviewed and discussed
with consumers and other analysts where there appeared to be some critical comment.
One was the study on The Soviet View on the Use of Intercontinental Forces and the
other on China's Defense Strategy and Force Posture. A study of such an issue as
Soviet views on the use of intercontinental forces is admittedly difficult, but
those with whom the study was discussed considered that the study talked around the
subject rather than addressing it head on. They observed also that the study was
not well organized, and while usefully informing the reader of what was not known,
it could have done a better job of informing as to what was known. The study on
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Chinese Defense Strategy and Force Posture appeared to come at a time when an NIE,
was also Oderway on the same subject with the analysis of actual strategy lacking.
..Other OSR study efforts that the staff reviewed received high user
acceptance. One analysis on THE SA-X-10 As a Cruise Missile Defense: A Preliminary
Analysis of Force Effectiveness was found to be highly regarded by intelligence
users. It was well written, integrated data effectively and clearly identified
the specific limitations and assumptions in the study. OSR's analysis
also found ready acceptance from consumers since it
addressed a critical issue of major importance to decision makers. Another OSR
effort which responded to a request by the National Security Council Staff on
Soviet Military Readiness received high marks primarily because of the responsive-
ness of OSR to the request, though the finished published verison of the study
appeared much later. The study was clearly written and although quite lengthy it
established an analytic evidential base for other analysts within the community.
In some sense many OSR studies appear to fill a void within the community by estab-
lishing a written position on issues which otherwise might be dealt with through
informal publications and/or briefings.
The OSR analysis on East German Ground Forces, although well structured
and thorough, was a self-initiated effort whose utility could be questioned because
of its interest to a narrow user audience. It was determined in discussions with
the analyst that this study was a first or starter project so that he could attempt
to work a problem which would integrate all sources of intelligence information.
Elements within DoD to include DIA and Service Intelligence activities have primary
responsibility for analysis of East German ground forcespalthough the OSR eff t did
address military mahpower problems which many DoD analyses do not include.
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was also
a self-initiated effort, but came about as a result of informal discussions between
OSR, DIA and State Department analysts which revealed an analytic void in this
subject area and where consumers had not requested a study. The analyst felt that
sufficient material was available and that it ought to be addressed. Publication
; this study came at a very critical time
Additionally, after the OSR analyst took the lead in getting
the study published, DIA and State followed with similar but more limited efforts.
The OSR analysis on the Libyan arms build-up found favor with its
users because it assembled in one publication a wide range of information concerning
the Soviet deliveries of arms to Libya and provided an assessment of the manpower
and transportation problems associated with this weapons build-up, and how these
weapons might impact on the Middle East balance.
From this small and limited sample which the Committee staff studied
and discussed with other intelligence analysts and consumers, it found a high range
of acceptance and general satisfaction with OSR's quality and subject content.
A strong point of the OSR analysis appears to be in its ability to integrate more
than one aspect of a particular problem and assess their relationship, something
that has not always been apparent in studies produced by other elements of the
community on military related issues.
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3. Office of Political Analysis
a. OPA Production
, OPA production was evaluated almost exclusively on the basis of
a review of its Intelligence Assessments. From a total of 72 Intelligence Assessments
produced by OPA during the first three quarters of 1978, the staff reviewed 28,
-king preliminary observations about the studies' timeliness and quality. Of these,
fourteen were selected for detailed review and discussion with users, OPA personnel,
and other analysts. Interviews tended to be wide ranging, enabling the staff to
consider the context in which the selected study was produced, and to become aware
of significant production not included in the sample.
This detailed review revealed considerable unevenness in the
usefulness of the fourteen studies. Although most of OPA production appears to
justifiable, this sample suggests that a significant proportion of OPA production
during this period may lack a very close bearing on actual consumer needs.
Of the fourteen studies, five were significant, or at least
clearly justified as a response to a high level request: these included a study
Items which the
staff concluded to have been justified, but about which unresolved questions remained
concerning the degree to which the sutyd addressed consumer needs, included an
analysis of
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The staff concluded, after interviewing intelligence users as
well as analysts in NFAC and INR, that one study - a very general paper on
should probably not have been produced at all, and that a
periodic quantitative analysis of Sino-Soviet relations, which is prepared six
times a year, serves no identifiable purpose to intelligence users.
Three of the fourteen studies were prepared in direct response
to requests from outside the intelligence community. The study of
was requested by the State Department
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The study of the
was requested prior to an official trip, and the study of
China and global issues responded to an informal request from the Policy Planning
Staff of the Department of State.
The remaining studies all appear to have been initiated within
the intelligence community. The analysis of succession politics
was in
the broadest sense a warning product, which was initiated by a senior analyst and
ultimately brought to the attention of the President, while the study of Soviet
SALT decision making and the paper on dissidence in Eastern Europe responded to
the obvious importance of the subject and high degree of consumer interest. The
Intelligence Assessment on evolved from a paper which the DCI
requested with the intention of using it to brief the President prior to his trip
The study of Soviet perceptions of the Carter administration began as
a training project, which because of its unusually high quality, was published;
nevertheless the staff concluded that this study was not as useful as it might have
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been if it had originated from identifiable consumer needs. The periodic quanti-
tative studyf Sino-Soviet Relations originated several years ago within CIA,
and received an initial push from officials in DoD and the NSC staff who favored
the use of Bayesian and other quantitative techniques. The study, produced jointly
by OPA's Soviet and China analysts and FBIS personnel, has continued indefinitely
without evaluation.
The staff found that in general the studies which required many
man hours were self-initiated, while those initiated in response to a user request
required less time. This observation of course reflects the fact that user requests
often have a short deadline, providing insufficient time to do extensive research.
Thus, the Office clearly has a responsibility to undertake studies necessary to
develop the analytic base enabling it to respond to foreseeable requirements.
Additional reasons why a significant amount of OPA effort might appropriately take
1 the form of self-initiated production include the need for political intelligence
to serve a warning or alerting function, and also the fact that in the fluid market
for political intelligence it is sometimes necessary to pioneer the production of
intelligence on new subjects in order to find out where the demand lies.
Despite these justifications for self-initiated production, the
significantly greater amount of effort consumed by a self-initiated study places
(.ecial burden on OPA to ensure that such studies meet actual or foreseeable user
needs, or, if they are "building blocks," that they constitute part of an identifiable
research program addressing an issue of foreseeable significance. The staff finds
that for the period reviewed OPA production management appeared uneven, in that
certain divisions and branches evidenced much closer contact with consumers than
did others. Through its interviewing, however, the staff also encountered some
Indications that greater contact with consumers and higher standards of relevance for
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production are being promoted by the new Director of OPA.
b. Political Intelligence
OPA's production management can best be understood in the
context of the market for political intelligence. The following brief discussions
of selected areas of political intelligence highlight the major roblems confronting
The need to keep up with a major change in the external environ-
ment can best be illustrated by intelligence on China. After many years of relatively
fixed demand for intelligence, and quite limited information, the intelligence
community now faces an increasingly broad and diverse demand for analysis, as well
as a flood of information, much of it in public channels. INR resources have been
increasingly absorbed by requirements for briefings and other short term projects,
leaving OPA with greater responsibility to ensure that long term analysis is not
neglected.
Intelligence on Latin America illustrates common problems faced
by political intelligence analysts in establishing and maintaining effective relations
with policy level users. These include the fact that the degree of policy level
attention focused on any country varies widely over time. Subjects which for years
received no attention suddenly become the focus of a crisis, whereas other subjects,
perhaps of considerable inherent importance, may be pushed to a back burner indef-
initely. These circumstances make it difficult, during non-crisis times, for
relations between users and producers to become well established, increasing the
likelihood of intelligence producers misgauging the degree of potential consumer
interest in a given subject.
The subject of nuclear proliferation illustrates the difficulties
of intelligence in a subject area where the user community is diffuse. The staff
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found thatt by providing information on the capabilities and intentions of indi-
vidual countries, the various intelligence elements working on the subject were
reasonably well serving the needs of those consumers who focus on non-proliferation
as an issue. However, the broader issues - the political implications of nuclear
proliferation in various regions and on particular international conflicts - had not
been adequately tackled. The staff further recognized that, since policymakers do
not routinely frame many of these questions, the intelligence community must assume
significant initiative in conceptualizing these issues in the most policy-relevant
terms possible.
In addition to these problems - the need to keep up with changing
external situations, fluctuations and consumer interest, and the need to initiate
production on new subjects to which consumers are not yet fully oriented - producers
of political intelligence are faced with the fact that many policymakers tend to be
their own political intelligence officers. This problem is aggravated when policy-
makers perceive that they have greater depth of experience in the region than the
regional intelligence experts. The staff found considerable variation from one
region to another as to whether OPA or INR/DOS was perceived as having the greater
expertise.
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4, Office of Economic Research
a. OER Production
an,
.011t.
As with the other NFAC offices, the staff focused its evaluation
of OER production on the topical reports published as Intelligence Assessments. Some
attention was also directed at the sizeable proportion of OER efforts that takes
the form of either typescript memos responding to specific requests, or periodic
reports. The latter include the Economic Intelligence Weekly Review, whose articles
the staff found to be generally well received. For example, at least one article
out of every two issues is read by the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs,
and about two-thirds of the articles are read by his Executive Assistant.
From a total of 70 Intelligence Assessments produced by OER
euring the first three quarters of 1978, 17 were selected for review. Of these
were evaluated more thoroughly, on the basis of interviews with users, with
OER personnel and other intelligence analysts,
studies by other elements of government. This
all, OER production can be readily justified.
and in comparison with related
sample suggests that most, if not
Of the nine studies, two - on the
- contributed significantly
world oil market and on
to policy level consideration of major issues. Four others, also of evident value,
dealt with the economies, with communist military support
for Rhodesian insurgents, and with arms flows to LDCs.
The need for two other studies - on USSR benefits from South
African trade sanctions and on Argentine nuclear exports - was somewhat less evident,
but discussions with analysts and users persuaded the staff that their production
was adequately justified. The single product that appeared unnecessary summarized
recent_patterns in trade restrictions - a subject that seems to have been dealt
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'with extensively in open literature. Even this report was described as useful
by the ilitelligence support office at Treasury, which noted its probable value to
an expanding circle of policymakers whose work relates in some way to international
trade.
All nine of the studies were in some sense "self-initiated."
One would expect to find a high proportion of self-initiated production among
OER's assessments partly because of the production pattern at OER under which an
analysis that may have begun as an ad hoc memorandum responding to a specific user
request later leads to a more comprehensive article in the Weekly or to published
assessments. A second reason is that a considerable proportion of OER production
consists of "building blocks" - research on particular aspects of a problem which
can then be used to build an understanding of the entire problem. Finally, OER
prides itself on having projected economic trends and thereby foreseeing, for
example, demand for more and better intelligence analysis of
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and
study
Each St
dy was initiated
initiated by
to serve
Carter's
was part
of the
differently.
OER in response
as an input for
talks with
of continuing
For example, the study
to widespread interest
major executive branch
on
studies
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for papers used in President
of the world oil market
licy importance. The studies
research by
DER of obvious
economies were
initiated by OER, to support the economic summit
trip, respectively. The analysis of arms
and a Vice Presidential
flows to LDCs was at least partly
Initiated within OER based on the OER Director's judgment that there had been an
analytic gap on the subject. The study of communist military support for-Rhodesian
insurgents was undertaken by OER partly in response to requests from the Department
of State, but also reflected an OER judgment that demand for this intelligence was
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likely to iacrease. The study of USSR benefits from South African sanctions and....
the analysis of international trade restrictions were each initiated by OER analysts,
the former because of recognition that discussions on South African sanctions were
underway at the UN and this kind of question frequently arises. The latter study
was apparently a spin-off from other analytic work, and was authorized by the
Director of OER with some misgivings because he was not convinced that it was
essential.
Most research projects are done on a team basis, with branch
chiefs and division heads expected to provide analytic leadership as well as manager-
ial direction. This tight review process extends throughout OER, ensuring that
little or nothing leaves the office without the Director reading it and often even
rethinking it. This arrangement has the potential for frustrating analysts and
stifling creativity, and in theory greater delegation of responsibility would be
preferable. Nevertheless, in interviews with OER analysts, their counterparts at
INR, and users of OER material at the Treasury, State, and Energy Departments, the
staff found relatively little evidence of OER analyst frustration, and it did
encounter considerable esprit de corps at OER and widespread high regard for OER
products elsewhere. One explanation for the apparent success of a management style
that could lead to serious frustration is that, at least in recent years, junior
analysts have been assigned to team projects working on studies with a definite
likelihood of publication, rather than being relegated to the thankless task of
monitoring less active subjects and countries. The use of analytic centers or
standing teams, as has occurred on Japan and petroleum supply, may also
contribute to morale. OER's centralized style of management appears to be at least
partly responsible ior the generally high quality of production, and probably helps
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eliminate most "nice to have" production.
b. OER's Relationship to Other Producers of Intelligence
? The line between producers and users of economic intelligence has
never been sharp, since most of the information that goes into economic analysis is
unclassified, and the line between foreign and domestic economic policy analysis is
also blurred. Economic intelligence includes subjects in which there are well
established user-producer relationships (e.g., analysis of Soviet steel production),
and subjects in which requirements and intelligence production patterns are changing
(such as energy technology). OER's contribution relative to that of other producers
varies from one'issue to another.
OER dominates analysis of the economies of closed societies,
its preeminence resting on the scale of its effort, and perhaps also on the importance
of clandestine sources. Other topics dominated by OER include the international
,rms trade (although much of the work is coordinated with DIA and INR), the inter-
national petroleum market (although other NFAC offices and the Department of Energy
are significant producers on various energy topics), and the economies of developing
nations and economic aid (in which OER's role appears to have grown partly to compensate
for cuts in AID resources in recent years).
There is also active competitive analysis, the primary area being
the economies of western industrialized nations, in which OER, State and Treasury
Department analysts each contribute particular strengths. The staff encountered
widespread agreement that the independent modeling capabilities exercised by State
and NFAC, and the perspectives brought by Treasury attaches, provide an environment
of constructive intellectual competition. Despite the absence of much competing
analysis on the economies of closed societies, the staff found that there is often
controversy among the many intelligence and policy elements that closely follow
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'ispects of the Soviet economy. One topic dealing with Soviet Bloc and Chinese ?
economies-in which there does appear to be real competitive analysis is in grain
forecasting, where the Agriculture Department and NFAC's OGCR address the subject
In different ways but also engage in considerable dialogue.
An important subject on which DER's role is not preeminent is
International monetary affairs, which is worked primarily by the Treasury Department.
However, the analysis of OPEC assets - the flow of petrodollars - is primarily an
DER job.
The staff found that there appears to be relatively little
redundant or irrelevant production in economic intelligence, an area where inter-
disciplinary analysis is exercised routinely. It is also an area of considerable
estimative intelligence, and the community enjoys a favorable record in anticipating
major economic developments and mobilizing analytic resources to address anticipated
intelligence needs. The staff found that intelligence production on energy is
surprisingly well coordinated, considering both the rapid growth in policy attention,
and the bureaucratic changes and uncertainties in the responsibilities of the
Department of Energy and other relevant executive departments.
Despite all of the above, significant limitations in economic
analysis must be recognized. These include weaknesses of the science of economics,
which, like other social sciences, has yet to develop definitive theories and in
models to describe and predict complex reality. Weaknesses in available data further
limit analysis. Finally, no allocation of analytic resources can ensure coverage
of every subject of interest. Several possible "production gaps" were mentioned to
the Committee staff, but none was judged so significant as to represent a misalloca-
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5. Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research
*qr.
The stafffound that review of OGCR production during the selected
period provided an inadequate measure of the Office's production management, in
part because of the recent establishment of OGCR's Environment and Resource Analysis
Center (ERAC), which significantly increased OGCR's size and affected the structure,
If not the mission, of OGCR's analytic elements. Another reason why a sample of
Intelligence assessments would not be an adequate approach is that a substantial
proportion of OGCR production consists of contributions to studies issued by
other NFAC offices.
Given these limitations, the staff inquiry focused on just a few
aspects of OGCR production. It found, with regard to Soviet and Chinese grain
_Ijmates, that there appears to be effective "competitive analysis" with the
Agriculture Department and also the necessary coordination of effort. (See
discussion of economic intelligence in Subsection 2b above.) There also appeared
to be significant informal contact between OGCR and other NFAC offices and community
elements on several other subject areas.
Although not able at this time to form a judgment concerning the
degree to which OGCR production is geared to users' actual needs, the staff notes
with some concern that the very breadth of problem areas addressed by the ERAC, plus
the newness of some of the subjects and the absence of established users for some
of the intelligence, places a special burden on OGCR to actively cultivate the
necessary contact with intelligence users to ensure the maximum relevance of its
interdisciplinary production.
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IV. THE NIO SYSTEM
A. Background
The National Intelligence Officer system, consisting of a senior intel-
ligence officer covering each of about twelve geographic or functional areas,
established in 1973 and shaped primarily by Director of Central Intelligence
Colby. The idea of a special assistant to the DCI for a given region arose
several years earlier in the form of Director Helms' Special Assistant for
Vietnam Affairs, who served from 1966 to 1973, and then under Director Schlesinger
the idea was applied to the Middle East as well. These assistants had been
instructed to focus in each region on behalf of the DCI, looking at products and
activities as though the DCI himself were looking at them, and ensuring that the
DCI knew what he needed to know about the subject.
With this experience as a prototype, a system of some twelve NIOs was
devised. As Colby explained in his book, Honorable Men, he looked to the NIOs
to range "throughout the intelligence community and out into the academic world"
to make him, as DCI, "the best informed intelligence officer in the government
about every one of the major substantive problems" confronting policy officials.
Colby also looked to the NIO system to address a second problem -
management of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Prior to the establishment
-f the NIOs these interagency products were drafted by analysts in the Office of
National Estimates (ONE). They required the approval of a twelve member Board of
National Estimates and then of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Over
the years this arrangement lost much of its vitality. The Board of National Estimates
ceased to provide the intended critical review by knowledgeable outsiders,, and
became increasingly'ingrown, its membership drawn from the senior analysts in ONE.
al?
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,The Board's_review process frequently provided little more than tedious wordsmithing.
Increasing-ly estimates became solely the product of the ONE, reflecting the talents
or weaknesses of the relevant ONE analysts. Although contrasting views from
agencies other than CIA were occasionally integrated in the drafting process, NIEs
came to be perceived of as CIA products, and often dissenting views from other
agencies were relegated to footnotes.
Addressing what was widely recognized as a problem of stultification,
Colby abolished the ONE system. Instead NIE production was to be governed by the
newly created NIOs. Criteria for selection of the NIOs revealed other implicit
purposes of the NIO system. Initially either the NIO or the Assistant NIO was
to be an active duty military officer, demonstrating the intent to give the system
an interagency character. Furthermore, traditionally a number of the NIOs have
been drawn from academia and major research organizations outside of government,
both to help overcome the appearance of CIA domination, and to stimulate fruitful
contact between intelligence analysts and outside experts.
Initially established to perform two primary functions, with others
implicit, the NIO role has come to include the following five functions:
--initiator and manager of interagency estimates;
--the DCI's surrogate on a region or problem, aware of both the
substance and relevant collection and production;
--link between analysts and consumers, and guarantor that subjects
of current or potential significance are covered;
--focal point for warning, responsible for monitoring trends in the
region and informing the DCI of possibly serious developments;
--stimulator of contact with academics and other outside experts.
The inclusion in 1977 of the NIOs in the newly-established National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC) narrowed their role. Their placement within a subordinate
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organization .undermined their authority as the DCI's personal representatives and
tended to-Fittrict the NIO role to managing NIEs and IIMs.
Nevertheless, each demanding function persists to some extent, although
rarely are all five actively performed by an NIO. The following sections discuss
the performance of the various functions.
B. NIOs and the NIE process
Production of national intelligence estimates (NIEs) and interagency intel-
ligence memoranda (IIMs) consumes a substantial portion of analysts' time, coordina-
tion being inevitably a cumbersome process. Although some such estimates are
clearly important to the policy process, it is often questionable whether the
effort expended on producing a definitive and coordinated study could have been
better spent in some other way. Without attempting a fundamental evaluation of the
NIE as a product form, the Subcommittee staff concludes that, in order to direct
analysts' resources where they are most needed and to ensure the greatest relevance
of production, the decision to undertake an NIE must be made judiciously, with great
awareness of prospective policy needs. Moreover, the drafting and coordination
requires skillful management.
Under the NIO system the quality of NIEs and IIMs has been uneven, with
t-nme thoughtful and relevant analyses, while other pieces have been irrelevant
bland, sometimes providing little more than a collection of data on the subject.
Problems which were associated with the ONE have been replaced by others under the
NIO system serious enough to make some NFAC personnel consider a return to a Board
of National Estimates. Although the report does not attempt to compare the quality
of NIEs produced under the old system with those done under the NI0s, the.following
comments concerning' the strength and weakness of each system can be made based on
interviews and selective review of product.
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First, the contribution of analysts outside of CIA now tends to occur
earlier in the NIE process. This has largely overcome a criticism of the ONE system -
that it was not an interagency effort - although much drafting continues to be done
by CIA analysts.
Second, under the present system estimates are written by the analysts who
cover that particular subject matter on a day-to-day basis. Potentially this
provides important advantages over the ONE system: analysts drafting the NIE should
have the greatest expertise, and they should be familiar with past consumer requests
and with the kinds of intelligence issues that must be addressed in order to be
relevant. In practice, sometimes these advantages are outweighed by factors des-
cribed below.
Although the enervating wordsmithing sessions of the Board of National
Estimates no longer occur, the intellectual process in the production of some NIEs
. reportedly equally vapid. Depending on the leadership provided by the NIO and
the analysts themselves, drafting sessions can sometimes be little more than a
superficial review of a compilation of chapters written by different authors. There
Is no guarantee that difficult, policy relevant intelligence questions are addressed,
or that analysts challenge each other's assumptions and judgments.
In the absence of a specialized staff such as ONE, estimates are sometimes
written by people who have had no previous experience in estimate production. A
lack of guidance. over the NIOs has also contributed to much unevenness in the format
and quality of the estimates, and in the degree to which they attempt estimative
judgments. Greater uniformity, however, may result fkm efforts under the new NFAC
Director to define and establish standards for NIEs and IIMs.
?
The absence of a staff dedicated only to estimative production also means
that an NIE effort must compete for analysts' time with the press of current intelligence
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and other scheduled and ad hoc production. In some subject areas this arrangement
+Olt
is satisfactory, particularly if the importance of the NIE is evident, and the
participating.analysts can be relieved of some of their other duties. Often, however,
NIEs are written by analysts for whom the project is an unrewarding and time consuming
distraction from what they perceive is more important business.
Competing demands on analysts and on the relevant NIO, coupled with the
absence until recently of systematic oversight of the NI0s, has permitted inordinate
delays in the production of NIEs. Such delays have been costly both to consumers
for whom the product is intended, and to the morale of participating analysts whose
efforts are wasted during the process. However, the staff finds that the practice,
undertaken in 1979 by the NFAC Production Board, of systematically monitoring the
progress of NIEs and IIMs promises to identify the cause of delays and perhaps to
expedite production.
Finally, a Senior Review Panel has recently begun to function. As
described by the DCI in January 1978, the Panel of "nationally recognized authorities"
was to "review and critique important national intelligence products (and) set new
and higher standards which the entire community can emulate." However, the Panel
has been integrated into NFAC's production machinery, its December 1978 Charter
providing for it to review products throughout their preparation, to assist in
rroduction planning and resource allocation, and to undertake special studies as
the DCI or Director of NFAC might direct. Although the staff sees some value in
this role, it finds that the Panel's close integration with NFAC and its seeming
Inability to set its own agenda and priorities may prevent it from providing the
kind of independent reivew by well-qualified generalists which has been lacking since
the early days of the Board of National Estimates. Arguably, such independence
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may be more,difficult to maintain indefinitely while the Panel is part of NFAC
than it would be if the Panel reported directly to the DCI.
Having considered the factors discussed above bearing on the ONE and NIO
approaches, the staff concludes that, despite the strengths demonstrated by the ONE
system in its earlier years, a return to such a structure is not warranted. This
judgment is based on two factors. First, the staff recognizes the enormous costs
to performance caused by organizational disruption. The re-establishment of an
ONE would require withdrawing some of the most able analysts from other production
-9nts. Second, the staff recognizes the NIO system as potentially far superior
in meeting the needs for high quality, timely, and relevant estimative products. By
ensuring that estimates are produced by those who regularly serve the intended users,
the system is structured to provide the close contact essential to meeting users'
needs.
The potential inherent in this structure has yet to be fully realized, and
the staff notes that the uneven leadership exercised by the first Director of NFAC
appears to have contributed significantly to the shortfall. Improvements in the
management and coordination of the NIO process must occur, both to increase the
uniformity and timeliness of the estimates, and to help strengthen the stature and
authority of NI0s. This in turn would increase the perceived importance of estimate
Auction, and would help analysts to devote higher priority to those projects.
Therefore, the staff credits the steps that have been taken recently by
the NFAC Production Board to monitor the production of estimates and overcome
unwarranted delays. Continuation of such efforts, and other measures suggested
elsewhere in this study, can lead to a fuller realization of the NIO system's
potential for the production of interagency estimates.
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C. Adequacy of the NIO System in Fulfilling Other Functions
1. DCI's Surrogate
NIOs have never exercised the full range of managerial oversight with
which the original Special Assistant for Vietnam was entrusted, which included not
only the oversight and coordination of intelligence production, but considerable
participation in collection management as well. The degree to which NIOs have
functioned as the DCI's surrogate for particular subjects, ensuring that collection
and production by all community elements adequately meet consumer needs, has varied
among individuals, in general this wide-ranging managerial function appears to have
declined since the NIOs were subsumed into NFAC.
However, one aspect of the function - that of being the DCI's substantive
expert - appears to have grown in importance. Almost all of the geographic NIOs
play an active role in this regard, while the functional NIOs vary considerably
according to subject area and incumbent. The staff distinguishes between this
important role of being the DCI's focal point for expertise on the subject, and
that of a "super analyst" - someone who personally drafts most important products,
and is closely involved in current intelligence production and briefing - and notes
that the tendency for NIOs to act as "super analysts" can degrade both the NIOs'
performance and the quality of intelligence production itself.
2. Link to Consumers
The NIO's role of linking intelligence consumers and producers has
been subject to uncertainty and frustration. It is inherently difficult to speak
for the needs of consumers, given policymakers' usual inability to describe much
less to forecast their information needs. Compounding the problem, the NIO may
either threaten or 'feel threatened by the office director. There certainly is
room for considerable conflict and confusion in any arrangement that seems to
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disrWt the vital bond between analyst and consumer by interposing a liaison person,
eipecially when that person's authority to levy requirements is unclear. In practice,
?
however, the-arrangement has rarely been as intractable as this suggests. Instead,
different arfangments have been worked out reflecting the particular personalities
and subject areas.
The role of the geographic .NIOs is clearly distinguishable from that
of any one of the office directors, in that they serve to pull together resources
from across several NFAC offices and other community elements as well. The regional
NIOs contribute the most where they do regularly cross these disciplinary and
organizational boundaries, being as fully acquainted with the relevant analysis going
on in OSI as in OPA, and becoming attuned to the use of intelligence by consumers
across the government. NIOs who by training or inclination draw almost exclusively
on political analysis risk duplicating the functions of OPA division chiefs, and,
since they are probably dealing only with the same primary consumers of political
alysis as OPA, they are unlikely to contribute new insights into the needs of
Intelligence users or to provide policymakers with a needed "handle on all the relevant
Intelligence resources.'"
Similar observations can be made about the functional NIOs. The NIO is
most valuable where the role he carves out for himself does not too closely parallel
that of an office director or division head. In the case of the NIO for nuclear
proliferation the complexity of the subject and the number of agencies involved both
as producers and consumers is so great that the NIO's job differs markedly from that
of any office head. In other areas - for example, political economy and strategic
forces - the roles of the NIOs and of the office directors must be reconciled. Some-
times this can be done by fairly explicitly dividing up the responsibilities according
to issue areas or voups of consumers. As in the case of the regional NIOs, it is
essential that the functional NIOs not deprive the office and division chiefs of the
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contact they Should be having with their primary consumers. Rather, a major value
of the NIOs lies in their being a contact point for policymakers who may not be
.r
regular users of a given office's output, and who, therefore, are unfamiliar with its
resources.--it must be stressed that any effective office director serves to a 4arge
extent as his or her own NIO, making it a point to understand the user of intelligence
and to project consumers' future requirements. Ideally, NIOs should facilitate the
offices contact with its regular consumers, while particularly serving the needs of
those policymakers who do not customarily deal with a given office.
Undoubtedly this ideal has not been fully realized. However, the staff
concluded that the ideal has been more nearly approximated in practice than is often
realized. Although there is certainly some tension, there is little fundamental
conflict between the roles of NIOs and office directors, as long as both are suf-
ficiently aggressive and knowledgeable about the policymakers they serve, and as
long as the NIOs emphasize the interagency and interdisciplinary dimension of their
roles.
Implicit in being a link between consumers and producers is the
function of spotting analytic gaps, and then mobilizing and coordinating the resources
to address them either through an inter-agency paper or through production by a
given office. This is not to suggest that the NIOs should in any way preempt the
office directors in the allocation of the offices' resources, but to recognize the
1 potentially valuable perspective of someone whose primary concern is not the manage-
ment of resources. There is a natural tendency for any manager such as an office
director or division head to be blinded to some extent by what he perceives as the
,ilable resources. That is, he is less likely to consider the need for analysis
on a subject for which he knows he has no competent analyst available. The NIO, having
no direct responsibility for the resources, should in theory be more likely to point
out a gap which others have not felt willing or able to address. By serving in this
way as a stimulant, the NIO may assist the office directors in reallocating analytic
effort or in highlighting the need for certain additional resources.
saw.
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3. Focal Point for Warning
The function of the NIO as a focal point for warning is implicit in
the original concept of the NIO serving as the DCI's substantive expert for the
region. However, the role was made explicit in 1978 with the establishment of a
mechanism that required the NIOs to meet regularly with analysts from the various
offices and agencies dealing with the region, in order to consider likely changes
of consequence to the U.S. There is no doubt that this process has contributed to
the NIOs' ability to fulfill their warning function, even though the "warning
meetings" have apparently varied in style and usefulness. Nevertheless, the staff
notes with some concern the practice in some if not all regions of having the
warning meetings attended primarily by those analysts or managers who "have some-
thing to warn about." A primary value of the warning meetings should be in requiring
analysts of even calm regions to at least briefly consider whether trends of serious
consequence are apparent. The staff recognizes that every warning meeting cannot
possibly include all relevant analysts, as the numbers are far too large, but it
urges that analysts dealing with countries of potential consequence to the U.S. attend
these meetings periodically whether or not they have concluded that they have
something to warn about.
4. Link to Academics and _Other Experts
Another function of NIOs is to stimulate necessary contact between the
analytic elements and academics or other experts. As with the other NIO functions
discussed so far, it would be a serious mistake to regard this role as exclusive to
the NIOs. Clearly every office and division head has a responsibility to ensure
that analysts do not work in a vacuum but expose themselves to currents of opinion,
and keep up with industrial and scientific developments. Nevertheless, the NIOs
can, and often do, contribute significantly in this area. It is a natural function
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for: them, particularly when a cross-disciplinary examination of a region seems t9,_
be indicated:- D. Need Need for Clarity of Purpose
The Subcommittee staff finds that although NIOs contribute significantly
in each of about five roles, the potential of the system may be much greater than
what is actually realized. The reason for the shortfall is a widespread lack of
clarity about the purpose and functions of NIOs. This clarity, which needs to
be articulated consistently at the NFAC and DCI levels, should then guide the NIOs
themselves and the personnel with whom they interact.
The fact that tension exists between the NIOs and production managers
needs to be acknowledged and its value recognized. It is not necessary or desirable
to do away with all tension and potential overlap in the activities of NIOs and
office directors. What does need to be overcome is the uncertainty which paralyzes
the NIOs, the office director, or both in their ability to function creatively with
consumers and analysts.
The role of each of the NIOs should be defined to avoid replicating
the function of any single division chief or office director. For example, the
recruitment and guidance provided to regional NIOs should make it clear that they
are not high-grade political analysts, but rather that their perspective should be
interdisciplinary and interagency. Similarly, consideration should be given to the
parameters of the functional NIOs to ensure that they do not coincide too closely
with, for example, the Director of the Office of Strategic Research.
The demands of each of the five functions described above should guide
the recruitment and selection of NIOs. He or she must be well acquainted with the
Intelligence process, particularly the use of intelligence in the relevant policy-
makinl'offices. In managing estimates the NIO needs skill in spotting analytical
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inconsistencies and in enabling analysts to identify their own assumptions. Heor
she must be adept in putting the right people in touch with each other and in facil-
itating fruitfdl interaction among analysts and between producers and consumers.
These abilities, beginning with exceptional familiarity with both the intelligence
producer and consumer communities, are the essential criteria for NIO selection.
Persons drawn from the military services and academic or research institutions
may provide desirable new perspectives, but those who do not also have extensive
familiarity with the intelligence community should not be selected as NIOs. However,
such "new blood" might well serve as Assistant NIOs.
Particularly since the NIOs are subsumed into NFAC, the question of their
authority to task analysts is in critical need of clarification. It is greater
clarity - more than any substantial change in their authority - that is required.
Confusion about the NIOs' authority in this area raises the specter of the NIO
undermining the ability of the intelligence manager to set and fulfill the priorities
of his NFAC office or other production element. Conversely, the uncertainty may
constrain the NIO from actively monitoring and stimulating production and seeking
out consumers' requirements.
In practice, however, NIOs have been neither powerless nor rampant
ursurpers of authority. The following parameters of NIO authority have been
generally observed: the NIO may initiate the production of an estimate, and may
actually assign portions of the drafting to participants from the various agencies;
however, the office director has substantial control over the availability of any
given analyst to participate in the estimate. Thus, even in the area of interagency
products, where NIO authority is the greatest, their ability to task particular
analysts is subject to some negotiation with the responsible intelligence managers.
In production other than interagency studies, the role of the NIO is one of persuasion
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and' collaboration with the various NFAC office heads or other managers. Such a
role has by-bemeans been powerless, but it relies on tact and persuasion rather--
than on line authority.
NIOs create - or at least enhance - their own authority by the extent
to which they succeed in serving as a channel for consumers' intelligence needs.
Consumers turn to an NIO only if he is effective in responding to their needs, and
In turn the fact that the NIO is in touch with consumers' needs strengthens his
ability to persuade office managers on production priorities. Thus, in addition
to whatever authority NIOs are granted by the DCI, their actual influence reflects
their own effectiveness.
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the authority of NIOs could be
overcome without substantially changing the necessarily flexible relationship
between the NIOs and the office directors. A first step, which has been initiated
by the NFAC Production Board, is to provide for systematic monitoring of the
production of interagency estimates, so that the initiation or postponement of a
paper not appear to be merely the whim of an individual NIO. The mechanism provides
guidance and accountability to the NIOs and also, by ensuring that NFAC office
directors coordinate in the approval and timing of NIEs and IIMs, this mechanism
endows the NIOs with greater implicit authority as they assign drafting responsib-
ilities to NFAC analysts.
Second, authoritative statements by the DCI and by Director of NFAC
need to be made concerning the role of the NIOs. The need for NIOs to play an
activist role in reaching out to consumers and in working with the relevant
analysts must be emphasized. It should be made clear that the NIOs have deliberately
not been granted line authority over NFAC or other production elements, to enable
production managers to exercise overall responsibility for their analytic resources.
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However, it_should also be stressed that the NIO still must be cognizant of the,
totality of in various offices bearing on his region or functional area,
and ensure that this production generally matches the priorities of intelligence
consumers. When the NIO perceives a need to redirect priorities he has several
means at his disposal, including persuading the relevant office directors, under-
taking an appropriate interagency estimate, bringing the issue to the attention
of the NFAC Production Board, and if necessary pointing out to the NFAC Director
the need to strengthen the analytic depth of a given division or branch. While
a statement outlining the NIOs' authority and powers might not change their authority
in any way, such an official acknowledgment, reiterated as appropriate in relevant
job descriptions or directives, would help to clear the air of some of the more
extreme concerns about the NIOs' role, and would enable NIOs and the production
personnel with whom they interact to recognize that a certain amount to dynamic
tension is expected and can be used productively.
NFAC must have the capacity to provide definitional clarity about
NIO roles, to guide individual NIOs as necessary, and to monitor the progress of
interagency studies. An administrative reference point for the NIO system.should
be maintained, although no major administrative organization is indicated, and
considerable flexibility should be preserved for NIOs to interpret their roles.
Once the fundamental nature of the NIOs' role is acknowledged and
given the explicit backing of the DCI, it becomes almost immaterial whether the
NIOs are organizationally placed under the Director of NFAC or under the DCI. The
staff has encountered persuasive arguments that the NIOs' authority to task analytic
elements outside of NFAC would be enhanced if they reported directly to the DCI and
were not so closely associated with CIA. It has also encountered the argument that
the NIOs' ability to task elements of NFAC would be undermined if they were removed
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from NFAC. The success of the system requires that the NIOs' role be recognized
1.
as community-Wide, rather than internal to CIA; whether they report directly to ae
DCI or not, the NIOs' effectiveness in this regard rests largely on their own
conduct in dealing with the "sub-community" of intelligence elements addressing
their region or functional area. On balance, it appears to the staff that the
fundamental problem preventing NIOs from realizing their full potential either as
managers of interagency estimates or in their other functions has been the lack
of clarity about the NIOs' role, and particularly the lack of any explicit acknow-
ledgement of the intended value of the dynamic tension between NIOs and intelligence
managers. The solution is not necessarily to move the NIOs from one organizational
locus to another, but rather to ensure that their role is fully understood.
mannritrrial
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions about about the management of intelligence production by the National
Foreign Assessment Center must take into account the significant variation from
one office to another. Generalizations tend also to be undermined by changes over
time - turnover among senior personnel within the offices or in the NIO system,
changes in the configuration of a given office or branch, and changes in the
leadership of NFAC itself. Acknowledging these variations, the Subcommittee staff
offers the following observations:
1. The staff finds that while the large majority of NFAC intelligence production
is relevant as it relates to consumer needs, there is still the never-ending problem
of studies which fall in the "nice to have" category. Others might describe these
studies as "necessary redundancy" and/or "useful duplication." The staff is of the
view while there is a need for competing analyses on major issues of user interest,
It notes as stated in the Classified Annex to the Fiscal 80 Budget Authorization
Bill (HR 3821) that the community needs to decide what areas require competing
analyses and which do not.
As the discussion in Section III indicates, the staff found that a high
percentage of NFAC studies are initiated within NFAC. For many of the products
initiated in this way, the staff was unable to identify a relevant user community,
or in some cases found that the product did not meet the needs of the intended
consumer. Finding, for example, that nearly all of the studies produced by OWI
and an almost equally high proportion of those produced by OSI to be self-generated
suggested to the staff that some may have been undertaken independently of any
perceived need, or might duplicate other analyses. With so much self-generated
Intelligence production in the two offices and in some cases on similar issues,
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economies might be obtained by concentrating on those issues that require and ?
demand competitive analyses, and that the resources of both offices concentrate
on those critical issues as opposed to tackling those "nice to have" areas, for
which there may be a limited consumer public.
The staff also finds that self-initiation is not necessarily all bad,
finding examples throughout NFAC, and notably in OER, of studies undertaken with
keen awareness of actual or anticipated user needs. The essential distinction
between strong and weak production management is whether the production element
(office, division, or branch) maintains close enough contact with users so that
the intended user and the likely need are identified when the study is initiated.
For example, the staff found that among the nine OER products it examined closely,
there was one which was inadequately framed to address the current policy questions,
and attributed this to the absence of contact between the principal State Department
consumers on this issue and the OER analysts. There is no magic number, therefore,
to describe the desirable proportion of self-initiated production. The ultimate
criterion must be the value of each product in meeting identifiable user needs.
Recommendation: The principle of production relevance should direct all
day-to-day production management, and should guide any contemplated change in NFAC
organization. For example, contact between analysts and consumers should be
encouraged, and both the NIOs and Office Directors should be recognized to play
a major role in this regard.
2. Together with meaningful user-producer contact, the key to allocating
available resources so that finished intelligence is relevant to consumer needs
and so that there are no major gaps in coverage, is production planning and
coordination. The'staff found that until the middle of 1979 production management
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across NFAC_9ffices was almost non-existent, and the problem at the community level
lderabiTi
It was was only with the appointment of the Executive Secretary of the NFAC
Production Board last spring that production planning was given impetus. Its
major achievement to date has been tbe development of a schedule for NIEs and IIMs
which provides for the status of a study to be identified, a yearly coordinated
production cycle for these papers, as well as a set of guidelines for the production
of interagency papers. Continued efforts to strengthen coordination of production
planning across NFAC offices, whether achieved through the Production Borad or some
other mechanism, are clearly necessary to avoid inadvertent duplication among NFAC
offices and to strengthen the interdisciplinary dimension of the studies.
At the community level, the staff notes the absence of production planning.
An Interagency Production Board ostensibly was created by the DCI but the staff
has been unable to discern if it ever functioned. In the course of its limited
investigation it found several examples of NFAC studies which addressed subjects
which appeared to have been covered recently by other community production elements
and for which "competitive analysis" would not seem to be warranted. At present
there is no element at the intelligence community level whose responsibility it is
to even note the existence of such apparent duplication.
Recommendation: Coordination of Production planning by NFAC offices should
be strengthened, whether through the Production Board or some other mechanism that
provides a forum for the office directors. Whatever the mechanism, a small and
active staff should be provided to stimulate the necessary coordination. The staff
notes that such coordination is facilitated by ensuring that all NFAC offices conduct
their production planning on the same cycle. While the staff believes that each
. _
a enc ou ht to be responsive to its particular set of users it does find that in
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an era of diminishing resources that agencies and/or organizations, to include ...
not only NFAC but elements within the Department of Defense, ought to be more
selective on what issues they choose to publish. For this reason, it believes
that the concept of an Interagency Production Board ought to be revitalized.
Such a Board should be pro with a small coordination and planning staff
reporting directly to he DCI. hrough such a mechanism, a community-wide
production planning c uld be established. Such a community-wide coordination,
however, must not undermine the authority of each agency to establish its own
priorities. Its purpose should be informational, both to serve the consumer by
pointing out the existence of a study dealing with a particular subject, and to
identify unnecessary duplication where it occurs.
3. Associated with the need to improve production planning is the requirement
to inform intelligence users of what is available. As noted by the Office of
Management and Budget in a report (May 1978) on intelligence consumer attitudes,
there is a need for ,._.giurav__Wtyzyide bil212graRhy of finished intelligence products.
At present to identify what has been produced on a particular subject requires a
bevy of publications, both finished as in the case of DIA's Monthly Production
Summaries, as well as raw computer runs. None of these bibliographies are compatible;
some are automated and others are not. The data fields are often different, so it
is impossible to perform any type of research to identify what particular studies
were done during a six-month period on some topic, or which studies may have been
disseminated at a particular classification level. This bibliography, while beneficial
to the user, would probably also be of great value to members of the intelligence
community in that they would have an up-to-date and complete list of all finished
intelligence studies from all producers. The staff believes that if such a list
were developed, established and maintained on a community-wide basis that it might
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v?
eventually lead to a reduction in the so-called "nice to have" studies.
Recommendation: The DCI should investigate the feasibility of developing
a community-wide bibliographic system.
4. The staff notes the absence of finished intelligence evaluation, both
within NFAC and at the community level. In a report to the Congress in 1978 the
DCI announced that "a full-time review panel of about 5 nationally recognized
authorities will be created to review and critique important national intelligence
products." By the end of of 1978, when the Charter for the Senior Review Panel
was written, the concept had evolved from that of evaluation to a broader role, in
which the panel was expected to assist in the planning of intelligence production
and the allocation of analytic resources in NFAC. During the first six months of
operation, the panel, whose members had been carefully selected, applied itself
seriously to observing the NIE process and improving the quality of NIEs currently
underway. However, through interviews with the members of the panel, and with
other intelligence personnel, the staff has concluded that the effect of the
Senior Review Panel to date has been quite limited. It has not as yet attempted
to evaluate single agency production other than NIEs and IIMs, nor has it conducted
post mortems. More importantly, the staff finds that the panel has became integral
to the routine machinery, seriously inhibiting its ability to set its own agenda
for evaluation, and to maintain the independence necessary to perform that function.
Recommendation: The Senior Review Panel should be subordinated directly
to the Director of Central Intelligence and its charter should be reexamined.
Its role should be clearly that of an independent evaluator, rather than an
integral part of the production machinery. Independence from CIA should be main-
tained in order to underline thepanel 's objectivity on interagency issues. Its
? ?-?
purpose should be to evaluate significant national intelligence, to include not
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only NIEs arid IIMs, but the performance of the intelligence community on selecter
????1111....,
Issues of of major importance. Thus, it should from time to time undertake postmortems,
and should examine the quality of single agency production on issues that are
particularly important or contentious.
No external critiques can substitute for in-house evaluation; an evaluative
element should be provided within NFAC to examine the utility of the present
reporting and also to try to identify any gaps in analytic coverage.
5. The staff has found significant difficulties in NIE production, which are
discussed in Section V. These have included inordinate delays in NIE production,
some of which threaten the integrity of the product, subjecting it to actual or
apparent manipulation by interested parties. Delays associated with interagency
production make it unresponsive to users' needs. In addition there has been
considerable uncertainty as to the form and purpose of NIEs and IIMs, with much
unevenness in their format and quality and the degree to which they attempt estima-
tive judgments. The staff has also observed that several steps have been taken in
recent months to address these problems.
Recommendation: The Director of NFAC should continue current efforts to
define the nature and role of all interagency production, including but not limited
to NIEs and IIMs, and provisions should be made for the timely production of brief
interagency products which can be produced in a more responsive manner. Greater
guidance should be provided to the NIOs in the production of estimates. An admin-
istrative reference point for the NIO system should be maintained, which should
provide for systematic monitoring of the production of interagency estimates,
although no major administrative organization is indicated and considerable flexi-
bility should be preserved for NIOs to interpret their roles.
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6. The-staff finds that in addition to the production of estimates, NIOs ?
contribute significantly in other capacities - as the DCI's focal point for
expertise, as a link to consumers, in warning, and as a link to academic and other
experts. However, the staff finds that the potential of the NIO system has never
been realized, and that the primary reason for the shortfall is a widespread lack
of clarity about the purpose and functions of 1(I0s. In particular, the tension
between the NIOs and production managers needs to be acknowledged and its value
recognized, while at the same time the role of each of the NIOs should be defined
to avoid replicating the function of any single division chief or office director.
In addition, the recruitment and selection of NIOs should reflect the abilities
and backgrounds necessary to perform the full range of NIO functions.
Recommendation: The NIO system should be maintained and its effectiveness
strengthened. Authoritative statements by the DCI and the Director of NFAC need
to be made defining the role of the NIOs, emphasizing the need for NIOs to actively
reach out to consumers and establishing the NIOs' role as community-wide, rather
than internal to CIA.
7. The staff finds that the community-wide responsibilities of the Director,
National Foreign Assessment, must be clearly defined. The intention implicit in
establishing NFAC and in subsuming the NIO system to it was that NFAC would take
on greater community-wide responsibilities. This has not occurred. For example,
inquiring into intelligence performance on the North Korean order of battle, the
staff found that the DCI's suggestion to have NFAC handle the issue to be beyond
its capabilities since the problem had far broader implications with the answers to
the majority of questions that needed to be answered found in the Department of
Defense. The intelligence community staff also lacked the capability to identify
the intelligence analysis resources devoted to the subject by all elements -of the
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intelligence .community. The staff believes that this capacity ought to exist at.,
the DCI levell The Committee expressed this view in its Classified Annex to the ,
FY 80 Budget Authorization Bill (HR 3821).
Recommendation: The DCI should reestablish an element at the community
level which is cognizant of all community analytic resources. This element might
be the community production coordination element urged above in recommendation
number 2.
4.31.
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