TRANSITION ISSUE PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001500230002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 24, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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- Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
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Charles E. Wilson
Deputy Director, Public Affairs
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24.November 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Acting Deputy Director for Administration
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
Comptroller
LAalrector of Public Affairs
Director of Personnel Policy, Planning, and Management
FROM
SUBJECT
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director
: Transition Issue Papers
1. Attached are preliminary draft transition issue papers discussed
at this morning's staff meeting. Please review for duplication and over-
lap, but particularly review the "CIA Recommended Position" paragraphs to
assure they are consistent with current Agency policy.
2. Th-e7-papers7will=bre7ThscussedlledneKddS, morning at=1.1z00_in the_D&I
(Conference Room?:
Attachments
cc: Executive Secretary
DCI
DDCI
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The DCI's Community Role
In order to perform his Community role effectively, the DCI must have,
in addition to his statutory authorities, the acknowledged confidence of the
President. This ensures that he:
--Receives the full and willing cooperation of the Community
--Is the Community spokesman on substantive intelligence matters, and
--Speaks for the Executive Branch when defending the program and
budget before Congress.
The DCI's budget authority is an appropriate means for implementing
his Community responsibilities. It constitutes real power over matters of
importance. It ensures that the organizations of the Community must take
him seriously. If he makes wise budget ?decisions and is an effective advocate,
the budget provides an important role of leadership for a DCI. This role can
benefit him in other transactions within the Community. The budget, however,
is too blunt a tool to use to exert control over the substantive content of
intelligence. He cannot use it to stifle substantive disagreement. Instead,
there should be free expression of opposing views within appropriate channels.
In the time that the DCI has been exercising this authority, major
investment programs have been managed more coherently than before. The
programs required to support processing, disseminating, and analyzing the
data from new imagery and SLGINT systems have been weighed at the same time.
The issue of balance among technical collection and other activities has also
been addressed. Traditionally reluctant Program Managers have been encouraged
to share information that they might otherwise have withheld.
Finally, OMB and the Congress are organized to deal with the DCI as
the advocate for the Community as a whole. In the final negotiations with
Congress, the DCI is in the best position to speak for the Executive Branch
on tradeoffs among programs.
This document is unclassified.
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OVERSIGHT
SUBJECT: Oversight of intelligence activities within the
Executive Branch and by the Congress has undergone considerable
development during the last four. years. The new Administration
will have to decide how to structure oversight within the
Executive Branch and how to carry out the oversight relatidn-
ship with the Congress, recently embodied in statute.
BACKGROUND: The mechanism for oversight of the legality and
propriety of intelligence activities within the Executive
Branch is the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (I0B).
Created by President Ford, the IOB was continued in existence
under Executive Order 12036. It consists of three part-time
prominent citizens from outside government, at the present
time assisted by one professional staff member, a lawyer.
Under E.O. 12036 the General Counsel and the Inspector General
of each intelligence agency, as well as the Director, are
specifically charged with reporting to the Board intelligence
activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
The Agency is not subject to external audit by the General
Accounting Office, but is audited vigorously by the 'Office
of the Inspector General, particularly to ensure the proper
exercise of the Director's special authorities.
On the congressional side, oversight is exercised by the
permanent intelligence committees in the two Houses. Operating
under E.O. 12036 the Agency has developed a generally satis-
factory oversight relationship with these two committees.
The committees have been given broad programmatic information
about the Administration's activities and, in general, have
had access to virtually all finished intelligence product.
By and large they have neither sought nor been given access
to sensitive operational information, such as the identities
of agents or sensitive collection programs not involved in
the budget process. A great deal of the committees' insight
into Agency activities, in fact, derives from the budget
process in which the committees and professional staffers
have demanded and obtained great amounts of detailed information.
? A strong push to create a statutory basis for this
oversight relationship resulted from the intelligence charter
legislation. In the end, oversight provisions were adopted,
the only portion of the charter bill to survive. These
provisions, enacted as part of the FY 1981 Intelligence
Authorization Act, retain the requirements of the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment for Presidential findings and reports to
Congress with respect to covert actions, but reduce the
number of committees receiving such reports from eight to
the two oversight committees. The bill requires prior
reporting of covert actions, subject to an exception in
certain circumstances. In general terms the bill also
requires prior reporting of all significant anticipated
collection activities and that the Congress be kept fully
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and currently informed of all Agency activities. There are,
however, two essential limiting principles. One is that thc.
President's inherent constitutional powers are preservd;
the second is a statutory recognition that information may
be withheld from the Congress in order to protect intelli?
gence sources and methods. The language of these oversight
provisions was hotly contested between the Administration
and the Congress. The statute and its legislative history
are complex and murky; in effect, they represent an agree-
ment to disagree and to continue the status quo, which both
sides recognize largely has been adequate.
CURRENT PROBLEMS/ISSUES: The new Administration will have
to decide whether to retain an internal Executive Branch
oversight mechanism outside the agencies themselves and, if
so, whether that mechanism should be the.I0B in its present
form. . The Board by and large has not presented any great
problem to the Agency; neither has it been a markedly effective
mechanism of oversight. Its lack of effectiveness is due in
part to the part-time participation of the members and the
lack of a professional staff. Under E.O. 12036 the precise
powers and duties of the Board are not clearly defined. A
considerable amount of the Board's energy during the Carter
Administration has been devoted to bureaucratic wrangling
with agencies over the Board's authorities rather than to
issues of substance. The standard for reporting items to
the Board under E.O. 12036 is unsatisfactory; if taken
literally, it sweeps too broadly. The history of the Board's
creation (as a reaction to the investigations of the mid-70's)
has left a pejorative connotation to reporting which makes
it hard for the Board to gather information simply for
purposes of understanding the nature, effectiveness and
necessity of legal restrictions on intelligence activities.
Notwithstanding these problems, the requirement to report to
the IOB in itself probably has strengthened internal oversight
procedures of the General Counsel and Inspector General.
A problem has arisen with respect to highly compartmented
information known to the President personally and which the
President did not want information disseminated to the I0B.
This became an issue in the past several years, causing
tension between the IOB and the Agency and between the IOB
and the President.
Respecting the Congress, the new Administration will
face the issue of working out the practical application of
the new statutory intelligence oversight provisions. In the
last four to five years, a pattern has grown up under which
large amounts of information are supplied directly by the
intelligence agencies to the Congress (both to the two
oversight committees and to numerous substantive committees).
This phenomenon is due in part to: the investigations of
the mid-70's; the congressional oversight provision of E.O.
12036; the increasingly rigorous budgetary scrutiny of the
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authorizing and appropriating committees; and growth of
increased congressional demands on the agencies The
requirement to provide information to the two oversight
committees has now been embodied in statute in the FY 1981
Intelligence Authorization Act. The manner of providing
intelligence information to the oversight committees, to
other committees and to individual congressmen continues to
be governed solely by ad hoc practices. The FY 1981 Authori-
zation Act provides, however, that the President shall
establish procedures for carrying out the provisions of the
Act. . The legislative history makes it clear that this
provision is intended to allow the President to centralize
the process of releasing certain kinds of intelligence
information to the oversight committees. There is no
statutory or Executive Order requirement affecting provision
of intelligence information to other congressional bodies.
RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION:
Executive Branch Oversight: There should continue to
be a body within the Executive Branch to conduct overall
oversight of the legality and propriety of intelligence
activities on behalf of, and as an advisor to, the President.
This body could be the Presidents Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board or a subcommittee thereof if the PFIAB is
reestablished. It would be desirable that the oversight
body also be charged with some advisory role relating to
substantive intelligence matters, so that it could conduct
oversight in the context of evaluating the impact of legal
restrictions on the effectiveness of the Agency. The reporting
requirement of Agency officials to the oversight body should
be clarified and phrased in terms that separate the reporting
of actual wrongdoing from the provision of information for
general evaluative purposes.
Congressional Oversight: The President should establish
procedures under the FY 1981 Intelligence Authorization Act
for the provision of intelligence information to the Congress.
Serious consideration should be given to negotiating with
the congressional leadership procedures by which substantive
intelligence requested by the non-oversight committees of
the Congress would be filtered through the oversight committees
in a manner that would protect source-revealing information
and reduce the number of inappropriate requests.
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LEGISLATTUR hr.PATIA
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SUBJECT: Key legislative issues of concern to the Intelli-
gence Community over the past several years have included
Intelligence Charter Legislation, modification of the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment, protection of Intelligence Identities, and
relief from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The
major items of continuing interest are Identities and FOIA
legislation.
BACKGROUND: Strong interest on the part of the Carter
--ildministration and a segment of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) in pursuing comprehensive Intelligence
Charter Legislation resulted in several years of intensive
and ultimately successful effort by the Intelligence Community
to avert the enactment of overly detailed and unrealistic
statutory restrictions on intelligence activities. At the
same time, the Administration's focus on a comprehensive
Charter impeded Intelligence Community efforts to promote
separate and prompt legislative action on Identities and
FOIA initiatives.
CURRENT STATUS: Provisions modifying the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment and establishing a statutory system for congressional
oversight of intelligence activities were incorporated
in the Fiscal Year 1981 Intelligence Authorization Bill
enacted on 14 October 1980 (P.L. 96-450). The Intelligence
Community supported enactment of these provisions and believes
that the codification of existing practices contained in the
oversight language is consistent with both constitutional
authorities and duties and the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. The enactment of these provisions has,
moreover, effectively dissipated any remaining congressional
impetus for further pursuit. of comprehensive Intelligence
Charter Legislation.
Action on Identities legislation picked up following
resolution of the charter issue, and Identities bills have
been favorably reported by the House and Senate Intelligence
and Judiciary Committees. The Intelligence Community supports
the Bill (H.R. 5615) reported by the House Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees, as well as the somewhat different version
(S. 2216) reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. These
proposals are carefully crafted and narrowly drawn so as to pro-
vide an effective remedy for the problem of unauthorized disclo-
sures of identities, while remaining capable of withstanding
challenge on constitutional grounds. The version of S. 2216
reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, is
unacceptable because its failure to provide realistic hope
for successful prosecutions deprives it of any deterrent
value.
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The 96th Congress also initiated serious consideration
of efforts by the Intelligence Community to obtain relief
from the FOIA. The Department of Justice and the Intelli-
gence Committees of the House and Senate expressed support
for modifying the handling of requests for intelligence
information under the FOIA, and testimony on the need for
FOIA-related legislation was taken at hearings held by the
House Intelligence and Government Operations Committees.
CURRENT PROBLEMS/ISSUES: The section of the identities
legislation which would apply to individuals who have not
had authorized access to classified information, and which
would criminalize their disclosures of identities even if
these disclosures cannot be shown to have come from classified
sources, will continue to face strong opposition from civil
liberties groups and from legal scholars concerned about
First Amendment implications.
? Decisions are needed now as to the new Administration's
position on the pending identities Bills, and on the advisability
of attempting to complete action during the lame duck session.
Senator Chafee, the key Senate proponent of identities
legislation, opposes going forward during the lame duck
session. In the House, however, the measure has been
scheduled for floor action and it will probably be acted
upon during the lame duck session.
On FOIA, the new Administration needs to formulate
a specific legislative initiative. H.R. 7056, a Justice
Department proposal which would provide partial FOIA relief
by precluding judicial review of information certified by
the DCI to fall within certain specified categories, was
introduced earlier this year and became the tacit Carter
Administration position. This approach, however, does not
fully solve the resource, operational, and security problems
currently besetting the Intelligence Community under the
FOIA. These problems can best be addressed by entirely
excluding certain categories of files from the search and
review requirements of the FOIA process. Justice Department
support for such an FOIA initiative will be extremely
important. Strong opposition can be expected from the ACLU,
the Center for National Security Studies, and elements of
the academic community. Opponents will concentrate on the
House Government Operations Committee, but changes in the
makeup of that Committee in the 97th Congress augur well
for success.
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RECOMMENDED POSITION
IDENTITIES
The Agency considers identities legislation to be of
critical importance. If action is not completed by the
96th Congress this issue should be of priority concern
in 1981. The Agency recommends Administration endorsement
of the legislation already reported by the House
Intelligence and Judiciary and Senate Intelligence
Committees.
FOIA
The Agency recommends that the Administration work
quickly toward formulation and introduction of legis-
lation that would provide Intelligence Community-wide
relief from the full range of FOIA-related problems.
Such a measure was formulated by the Agency last
year and is available for immediate consideration,.
ADDITIONAL MEASURES
The Agency believes that there is a need for legislation
to facilitate investigations by appropriate Executive
Branch entities of unauthorized disclosures of intelli-
gence information. Such legislation should broaden
statutory authority for administrative investigations
and provide administrative sanctions for unauthorized
disclosures. In addition, the Agency believes that the
new Administration should consider changes to the
Espionage Laws to deal with the increasing epidemic
of leaks of classified information.
?3?
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RELIEF FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SUBJECT:
The Freedom of Information Act as amended in 1974 is so
poorly constructed that its objectives cannot be met by CIA
without excessive manpower and taxpayer costs. More impor-
tantly, the aggregate release of information over several
years (a) reveals more about clandestine activities than
intended, and (b) inhibits cooperation of recruited sources
and friendly foreign services due to their fear of exposure.
BACKGROUND:
To date, the Directorate for Operations (DO) has received
or processed about 20,000 requests for information under the
FOIA statute, resulting in the release in whole or in part of
some 50,000 documents. By far the largest proportion of requests
received by the Agency are for information from DO files which
involves clandestine operations, intelligence and security
liaison relationships, and information on sources and staff
members of intelligence services. The FOIA Act even gives
foreigners the same request rights as American citizens and
permanent resident aliens--indeed, even one case from East
Germany. Although the Congress originally projected the total
U.S. Government annual costs for FOIA at about $100,000, in fact
DO costs alone have never been that small, and this year will
approach 17 times that original estimate.
CURRENT STATUS:
Almost all DO information is classified. Because the DO
indexes its records by topic and name, each request causes a
search for information that reasonably might pertain to the
request. This usually produces a quantity of classified paper
which must be researched and sanitized. This virtually pro-
hibits meeting the 10-day response requirement of the law.
Frequently, the requester appeals, and failing the second dead-
line, sues the Agency for release. This causes us to place
court suits and appeals ahead of initial FOIA requests and creates
a self-defeating circle that diverts effort from initial requests
to prepare for litigation. In the end, because of the exemptions
to release of classified information allowed by the law, the
requester receives largely trivial or useless expurgations,
which operate to defeat the purpose of the law in any event.
ADMINIIRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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CURRENT-ISSUES:
The Agency is underfunded and understaffed to meet FOIA
requirements unless personnel and money are diverted from the
Agency's principal missions. But more importantly there is an
increasing perception abroad from cooperative sources and
friendly foreign intelligence and security services that the
Agency cannot guard its secrets, which in turn has accounted
for reduced or refused cooperation in several situations.
Finally, the Act is subject to serious abuse by some requesters,
who have used it to delay other legal processes, to support
personal research and publications at taxpayer expense, and to
harass the Agency by frivolous or malicious requests.
RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION:
The Agency should be exempted totally from the provisions
of the Freedom of Information Act.
It is especially noted that we do not seek exemption from
the Privacy Act. This Act is better structured and the Agency
can and should supply a U.S. citizen with data on himself that
he rightly is entitled to.
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight and Access to Classified Information
BACKGROUND:
Historically, four committees of Congress oversaw the activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency: the Senate and House Appropriations Committees;
and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The former focused on
the Agency's budget--which was not subject to the authorization process until
1976. The latter, which had referral jurisdiction over legislation derived
from the National Security Act of 1947, focused on intelligence operations.
Prior to 1974, however, the Agency operated under guidelines that only the
senior Members of these four committees were entitled to information on
clandestine activities or other information "protected" under the CIA Act of
1949, e.g., budget, organization and personnel.
The oversight status of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs
Committees was codified in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 which provided
that no funds may be appropriated for operations in foreign countries
unless and until the President reports, in a timely fashion, a description
and scope of such operations to the appropriate committees of Congress.
As a result of the recommendations of the Church and Pike Committees,
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) were established in May 1976 and
July 1977, respectively, to "oversee and make continuing studies of
intelligence" activities and programs, and to "submit appropriate proposals
for legislation". The enabling resolution for these new committees not
only failed to provide exclusive jurisdiction over covert operations, i.e.,
repeal Hughes-Ryan, but was careful to avoid providing exclusive jurisdiction
over substantive intelligence products: "Nothing in this resolution shall
be construed as affecting the authority of any standing committee to obtain
full and prompt access to the product of intelligence activities...."
CURRENT STATUS:
Executive Order 12036 directs the DCI to keep the SSCI and HPSCI fully
and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, providing any
information or document upon request, and to facilitate the use of national
foreign intelligence products by the Congress.
In recent testimony before the HPSCI and SSCI on Charter Legislation,
the DCI reconfirmed his intention to keep these committees "fully and
currently informed" but was careful to delineate two restrictions on their
access to classified information: information which revealed sources; and
information acquired from friendly foreign liaison services with strict
caveats concerning dissemination to Congress. Such reassurances were
instrumental in overcoming much of the Congressional resistence to the
Agency's desire to reduce the number of oversight committees.
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The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981 repealed the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment and established the exclusive responsibility of the two
Intelligence Committees for overseeing intelligence operations. While this
Act codifies important jurisdictional principles and reduces access to
sensitive intelligence operations, its major significance is in its impact on
outside perceptions, particularly with liaison services and foreign agents.
In practice, it will change very little the extent or nature of the Agency's
interaction with Congress.
Congress has developed an insatiable appetite for, and a dependency
upon, Agency information and analysis. At the DCI's direction, the Legislative
Counsel has developed a multi-layered program for providing substantive
intelligence support to Congressional consumers on matters within their
jurisdiction and for providing the HPSCI and SSCI with the information
required for their legislative oversight and budget authorization functions,
consistent with the obligation to third Agency interests and the responsi-
bility for protecting sources and methods. Access to information, depending
on its sensitivity, can range from full committee and staff to only the
Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member; dissemination can range from
automatic distribution to in camera briefings.
Within the restrictions noted above, the SSCI and HPSCI have full
access to all Agency personnel, components, files and products. Each Staff
Director has his own system of internal compartmentation, and access to
intelligence operational data is limited to a few designated staff members.
The SSCI, which was created in an atmosphere of skepticism toward the Agency,
tends to concentrate on investigations of alleged abuses. The HPSCI, with a
much smaller staff, many with prior intelligence experience, began with a
less accusatory perception of its role and has concentrated its activities
in the area of oversight of intelligence operations and assessment of intelli-
gence quality. In both cases, the relationship with the Agency can be
characterized--with few exceptions--as fiduciary rather than adversarial.
CURRENT PROBLEMS/ISSUES
One of the DCI's most difficult tasks has been to overcome the institutional
reluctance to accept the oversight process and to recognize the Congress as a
legitimate consumer of the A ency's product. The current realities have been
generally accepted--if not em. aced--by the Deputy Directors and independent
Office heads. Agency personnel at the desk, or working level, are still
receiving conflicting signals fr., other senior officials. The result is an
inconsistency and failure on occas on to be responsive which has a negative
impact on Congressional perceptions f the Agency.
In order to retain our reputation or independent and objective intelligence
assessments, the Agency's flow of infor tion to the Congress must be apolitical.
The Agency's credibility is severely thre.ened when the Executive withholds,
delays or otherwise impedes this flow for political?rather than national
security--purposes.
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The impact on Agency resources would be greatly reduced if the Intelligence
Oversight Commitees would assume some of the responsibility for keeping other
Committees and individual Congressmen informed on appropriate intelligence
matters. The HPSCI and, to a lesser extext, the'SSCI have been reluctant to
assume this role.
Although the SCI and HPSCI staff members, who have access to virtually
all Agency infor tion and operations, undergo a complete background investiga-
tion, they are nit subjected to the initial polygraph examination and
re-polygraphing program required of Agency employees. In view of their
special access a modified polygraph, concentrating on contacts with foreign
agents and th leaking of classified information to the press, does not seem
to be an unr asonable condition of their employment.
Althou
the two In
his servi
his offi
crafted
sessio .
Chair n
h there has never been an indication of a leak from one of
elligence Oversight Committees, at least one Member has politicized
e on the Committee by issuing unclassified press releases from
e on topical intelligence issues. The releases, although carefully
rom open source material, are based on testimony provided in closed
The Committee adopted a rule to control such practices but the
has never enforced it.
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SUBJECT Handling the dissemination of intelligence in-
formation to the Congress.
BACKGROUND The volume of substantive intelligence fur-
nished to Congress has greatly increased since the mid-1970s.
-- Requests for finished intelligence have risen from
200 in 1976 to more than 1,400 last year; in response over
3,500 intelligence and biographic reports were sent to the
Hill in 1979.
-- Briefings of committees, members, and staffs have
doubled in the same period to about 450 a year.
This increase reflects both the Congressional oversight
role and the growing awareness by non-oversight committees
that the Agency is a valuable source of information on inter-
national issues. Moreover, the Agency itself has taken the
initiative in-providing its product to committees with a valid
need to -know. For example, the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources was briefed extensively in 1980 in
executive session by OPA and OER analysts on the geopolitics
of oil.
CURRENT STATUS AND PROCEDURES The cutback to two formal
oversight committees is not expected to reduce overall Congres-
sional demand for intelligence information, at least under
current control practices.
Aside from the National Intelligence Daily (NID) and
the International Economic and Energy Weekly (IEEW), dissem-
ination of intelligence publications to the Congress is normally
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automatically
requests; none of the committees
The National Intelligence Daily is provided to the over-
sight committees, the House and Senate Armed Services, Appro-
priations, and Foreign Relations Committees, and to the Senate
Office of Classified National Security Information.
-- National Intelligence Estimates, Interagency Memoranda,
and NFAC intelligence reports are listed in weekly NFAC publi-
cations which are sent to the two oversight committees and also
by special request to Senate Foreign Relations to facilitate
its numerous requests for documents.
-- The oversight committees frequently ask for title listings
on specific topics. These are checked through the appropriate
offices to exclude or clear sensitive memos prepared exclusively
for the White House.
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PROBLEMS Decisions on providing intelligence information to
the Hill are on a case-by-case basis.
-- Application of source- and policy-sensitive criteria has
been uneven.
-- Denials of intelligence reports to the oversight com-
mittees nearly always lead to protest letters from committee
chairmen. The upshot usually is the release of the requested
material in a form which protects sources and methods.
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-- Denials to committees other than the two oversight com-
mittees have rarely met with serious resistance so long as a
briefing is given in lieu of the actual document.
-- Considering the increase in material provided to Congress,
there have been few instances of Congressional leaks or mis-
handling of CIA intelligence. Proper classified storage and
secure facilities for briefings are available on the Hill.
RECOMMENDATIONS The key problem is consistency in our
approach to provi g intelligence products and information to
Congress, particula ly to the oversight committees.
-- A concrete me hanism, such as a committee or panel with
full DCI authority, should be set up to decide on release to
the oversight committees of those few reports flagged by NFAC,
DDO, or other components a highly policy- or source-sensitive.
Such a panel at the same tim should approve or deny further
Congressional dissemination.
-- Source-sensitive reports should be evaluated prior to
publication to determine if minor evisions of source descriptions
would allow release. Denials on the grounds of sources and methods
shouLd be accompanied by offers of briefings on the substance of
the report in question,
-- Policy-sensitive reports usually nvolve a matter of timing;
background briefings should be offered unti the policy options stage
is completed.
-- Current restrictive policies on dissemi ation of sensitive
reports to non-oversight committees seem adequate o ensure control.
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UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND SECURITY ISSUES
SUBJECT: The problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified
intelligence information ("leaks") has always existed, but
it has reached devastating proportions in the last several
years, with serious adverse effects on U.S. credibility
abroad as well as on intelligence activities.
BACKGROUND: A particularly disturbing development has been
an increase in leaks, not merely of substantive intelligence
information but of details about sensitive technical and
human collection resources. These leaks are beginning to
result in discernible degradation of our intelligence gathering
capabilities.
At present, information revealing intelligence sources
and methods is disseminated much more widely in the Federal
Government than is consistent with application of the need-
to-know principle on which good security is based. There is
no mechanism within the Executive Branch for control over
authorized disclosures of classified information by Government
officials. No one knows clearly, therefore, who has authority
and in what circumstances to make such disclosures. In the
Congress there is such a procedure as regards information
imparted to the two oversight committees although adherence
to it has not been perfect. Information imparted directly
to individual congressmen or other committees, however, is
at risk of being disclosed with no effective sanction.
The lack of adequate uniformity of security practices
in the Federal Government is disturbing. This is seen
especially in the uneven use of the polygraph despite the
obvious utility of this technique at CIA and NSA. In these
two agencies polygraph examinations are required for all
personnel (except military at NSA) given access to classified
information. Other departments and agencies (e.g., State,
Justice, NSC Staff) do not require a polygraph examination
and otherwise have somewhat varying security practices and
capabilities from those seen at CIA and NSA. In addition,
at the present time CIA is the only agency requiring execution
of a comprehensive secrecy agreement, including the requirement
of prepublication review of writings on subject matters
related to intelligence. Under the new APEX system currently
being implemented for Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence,
such an agreement would be required throughout the government,
but only with respect to SCI material. Moreover, this
requirement has met with considerable resistance on the part
of various departments and agencies. Finally, the Executive
Branch has very little control, if any, over the security
practices of the Congress, which again do not include the
use of the polygraph in clearing staff members and impose
absolutely no clearance procedures in the case of Members of
Congress.
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The investigation of leaks is stalemated by a variety
of legal limitations and Department of Justice policies.
Under the Carter Administration, the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice has followed a consistent policy
of refusing to take on any leak investigation that would
involve the media. The Department has declined to permit
the FBI to interview journalists or other persons with
respect to contacts with journalists. The Department itself
has declined to use the powers of the grand jury or of
search warrants. In general, the Department has thrown, up a
succession of bureaucratic hurdles, with the result that
not a single leak case referred to the Department in the
last four years has led to any prosecutorial action and
almost none have resulted in even the most rudimentary
investigative activity.
Although in testimony before Congress, Justice Department
representatives have maintained that the existing espionage
laws are adequate to deal with leak cases, in practice the
inadequacies of the antiquated espionage statutes have been
cited repeatedly by the Criminal Division as one, of many
reasons not to go forward with investigations. On the
administrative side, the investigation of leaks for purposes
of disciplinary sanctions against government employees have
been hampered by two factors. One is the inability of the
intelligence agencies, under E.O. 12036 and other legal
constraints, to carry a security investigation beyond interviews
of ciirrent employees. The second has been the refusal, as a
matter of policy, by the FBI and the Department of Justice
to use investigative techniques for purposes of possible
civil or administrative enforcement proceedings. The result
is a vacuum in which no one investigates possible leaks
beyond the perimeter of any specific agency.
CURRENT PROBLEMS/ISSUES: An immediate issue confronting the
new Administration will be whether to restructure procedures
for the dissemination of intelligence information within the
Executive Branch, and conceivably to the Congress, and
whether and how to improve security practices. Specifically,
the Administration will have to decide whether to retain the
new APEX system for SensitIve Compartmented Intelligence,
either in its present form or in a modified form, and whether
to institute a similar system for other intelligence informa-
tion.
The Administration will have to determine what kinds of
security clearance procedures to impose on new appointees,
as well as holdover officials, outside ?the intelligence-
collecting agencies who will require access to intelligence
information. The Administration will have to decide whether
to impose a system for controlling authorized disclosures of
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classified information. Similarly; decisions will have to
be made as to the media relations policy of the Executive
Branch as a whole, and of various departments and agencies.
Decisions as to the proper roles of the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and the NSC staff,
while presumably driven principally by other concerns, will
have a direct impact on the problem of leaks.
RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION:
Controls on Dissemination: The President should decide
and communicate throughout the Administration that authorized
disclosure of classified information will be made only by
designated senior executive officials and should require
such officials to account for and record each such disclosure.
All other officials would automatically be guilty of a
disciplinary breach if found to have disclosed classified
information. The Administration should institute a system
for reducing to an absolute minimum the number of officials
given access to source- or method-revealing intelligence
information and should institute uniform security practices
throughout the Executive Branch, including the use of the
polygraph, as a condition to access to such information.
The Administration should attempt, through negotiation with
the congressional leadership, to institute a similar tightening
of security practices and dissemination on Capitol Hill.
"Investigation and Prosecution of Leaks: The Administration
should ensure that the new senior leadership of the Department
of Justice adopt changes in current Department policies so
as to ensure (a) vigorous use of criminal investigative and
prosecutorial resources in cases of serious leaks, and (b)
the use of FBI investigative resources to supplement Agency
security investigations for purposes of identifying and
disciplining, administratively or through civil procedures,
government employees responsible for leaks. Alternatively,
the Administration should sponsor legislation to grant the
agencies suitable investigative powers for disciplinary purposes.
The Administration should undertake a revision of the espionage
laws.
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Dissemination of NFAC Finished Intelligence
NFAC publications appear in three broad categories: regular, periodic
serials; ad hoc studies; and unclassified analytical and reference items. The
scope of dissemination varies with the subject, the classification of the
item, and its relevance to the recipient. Because of the large US interest in
international economic and resource-related issues, OER publications are
generally the most widely disseminated within and outside NFIB, followed
closely by those of OGSR. Publications of OSR and OSWR are, by their nature,
disseminated most widely within the Defense Department. OPA's papers are sent
primarily to the President's National Security Adviser and senior officials of
the NSC, State Department, and Defense Department.
There has been a concerted effort over the past year to tailor dissemination
to the needs of recipients.
Nbst classified NFAC publications are printed to an average of 350 copies,
with about 150 sent outside the Agency. Obvious exceptions occur in the case
of sensitive items, where only 50 copies might be printed, with as few as 10
sent outside of the Agency. The International Economic and Energy Weekly--
considered by OER as its prime publication--is printed in 1,085 copies, 619 of
which are sent outside the Agency. By contrast, OSR's Strategic Intelligence
Monthly Review?also a prime publication vehicle?is printed in 290 copies,
with 64 distributed outside CIA. Classified publications also have been
disseminated in growing numbers over the past few years to Congress through
the Office of Legislative Counsel.
NFAC also has published unclassified reports which are released to the
public and to standard government recipients. Since 1972 when the Agency
began participation in the DOCEX program at the Library of Congress, the
number of issuances made available and the number of copies provided of each
has grown. In 1972, 27 Agency publications were sent to DOCEX in 165 copies
each for distribution to their subscribers. We are currently making available
over 150 publications a year, 625 copies of each, free of charge. Another
outlet was established in December 1978, when the Agency signed a contract
with the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) at the Department of
Commerce. Everything sent to DOCEX is also made available to NTIS. Ten
copies are provided free; a fee is charged for any over the amount. NTIS
determines its needs for each publication offered, the number varying from 35
to 310.
Each unclassified report must be specifically approved by DD/NFAC before
issuance. The release is then coordinated with NSC and State. The number
printed varies depending upon subject and anticipated interest. The more
narrowly focused ones receive a printing of between 1,700 and 2,000 copies;
those of more general interest are printed in as many as 6,000 copies. In
addition to the DOCEX and NTIS distribution, other prime consumers of our
unclassified publications are the Office of Public Affairs, Domestic Collection
Division, the Coordinator for Academic Relations, the Office of the Legislative
Counsel, and OER for academic distribution. They are also made available to
foreign intelligence through liaison channels.
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t
Incentives and Disincentives for Overseas Service
I. Background
a. CIA has a continuing need for a large cadre of highly
qualified and motivated employees overseas.
b. During the 1950's and 1960's employees had strong
motivations for overseas service. Morale and
esprit were high. Employees believed they were
a part of a unique and elite organization and that
their special contributions were recognized and
appreciated. Disincentives were either non-existent
or of lesser degree than today.
c. As perceived by employees today, incentives for
. overseas service are being neutralized by
disincentives..
II. Current Status
A. Incentives for Overseas Service
a. Quarters, post, transfer, and other allowances,
were developed to permit the employee and
family to maintain a living standard overseas
comparable to that in the United States.
b. Employees in career tracks that require overseas
duty realize that career advancement depends,
to a large extent, on their willingness to
accept overseas assignments that are not always
consistent with their personal desires and
convenience.
Some employees go overseas because:
1. they have commitment and dedication
to their Agency and country; and,
2. they find their professions
personally rewarding.
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B. Disincentives for Going Overseas
a. Employees increasingly believe that their
contributions and the sacrifices inherent in
overseas service are not adequately recognized
? and appreciated.
b. Hardships imposed by the cost-of-living and
the devalued dollar, lack of adequate medical
care, poor sanitation, limitations on movement,
foreign languages, substandard school facilities,
lack of recreational facilities, and inadquate
protection against crime.
c. Increased susceptibility to terrorist activities
resulting from disclosure of employees' names and
growing real concern for the protection of self
and family.
d. Problems associated with serving and living
under cover combined with the stress of
e.
Cover-induced reduction in status and
perception of declining benefits combined
with harder and more complex responsibilities
in relation to the Agency employees' mission
contemporaries.
f. Host country, cover and legal limitations
on operational activities.
g.
Decrease in foreigners' respect and trust
in the United States Government in general
and particularly in the CIA's ability to
protect secrets.
h. Deferral of career aspirations of the
spouse because of the limited job
opportunities at overseas posts.
i. Reluctance of the employee and family to
continually relocate, separation from
relatives and friends, and disruption of
the educational progression of dependent
children.
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III. Current Problems/Issues
We are deeply concerned about the above disincentives because they
adversely impact on our ability to perform the Agency's foreign mission.
IV. Recommended CIA Position
%
We are presently working to develop entitlements and allowances
to counter disincentives and return the esprit of our overseas staff to
the level that existed in the 1950's and 1960's. This will require the
Administration's support and comititment for additional fiscal and personnel
resources.
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UNUASSIMW
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LIMITATION
Problem:
Recent reporting has shown that the Soviet, Soviet Bloc and PRC intel-
ligence services are heavily involved in the acquisition of U.S. technology.
Techniques for acquiring U.S. technology include the establishment of "dummy"
firms, third country transfers and espionage. The present structure of con-
trol and limitation is still inadequate to the task. In addition to more
effectively addressing the problem of clandestine acquisition, the new
structure must provide for integration of efforts against such activity with
efforts to control overt acquisition and to enforce export laws.
Recommendation:
That the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor establish a more effective structure
and program, involving a clearer enunciation of policy and better apportion-
ment and implementation responsibility, especially in regard to countering
the clandestine acquisition of U.S. technology.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UlNk...LASSIFIED
PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS
Problem:
At present each agency of the U.S. Government establishes its own criteria
for the conduct of security investigations and the issuance of non-SCI security
clearances. This independence has led to considerable variance ?in the requirements
among agencies for access to the same information. For SCI, the DCI estab-
lishes investigative standards; however, no such universal standard exists
for collateral information. There is a clear need to ensure that information
of comparable levels of sensitivity is given the same level of protection in any
agency. The DCI Security Committee staff was asked earlier this year by the
NSC/SCC/CIWG to provide a recommended set of personnel security standards for
uniform governmental use but has not done so. In the interim, other govern-
mental bodies, e.g., the Office of Personnel Management-Department of Defense
Task Group on personnel security investigations, are solidifying positions on
such standards for use in non-intelligence environments. Unless there is a
national-level effort to coordinate these efforts in a timely manner, we risk
increasing divergence of personnel security procedures between the Intelligence
Community and the rest of the Government.
Recommendations:
That the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor:
a. Review existing procedures on a priority basis to determine
standards for the scope and conduct of security clearance investiga-
tion and processing throughout the Government; and
b. Where no satisfactory procedure now exists, for example in
the case of deception detection (lie detection), establish a means
to guide research and development efforts and, when developed, to
certify acceptance of new equipment or methods.
UNCLASSIFIED
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COUNTERING OVERT HUMINT COLLECTION
Problem:
The Soviets are currently the beneficiaries of a large volume of sensitive
or classified information which is made available to them through public
release. The mechanisms involved range from legally required release through
the FOIA and Defense contract procedures to the publication of unauthorized
information "leaks." In some cases such as the sale of documents by the
National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce, the
release of information is subsidized by the U.S. Government. Countering the
problem will require broad policy direction as well as specific corrective
action by releasing agencies.
Recommendation:
That a working group be established by the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor
to review the problem from a national level and to recommend policy changes
to the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor for implementation.
UNLLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIHW
NEED FOR SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAM
Problem:
National responsibility has not been established for conducting a general
security awareness program to alert individuals in the Government and in the
private sector to the objectives and techniques of hostile intelligence
agencies. Such an awareness program should be a fundamental ingredient of a
national counterintelligence effort. The open society of the U.S. and the
limited resources of counterintelligence require that individuals be sufficiently
aware of the threat to recognize and protect sensitive information and to
report indications of hostile intelligence activity. The use of many tech-
nical as well as human source collection techniques and the wide range of
targets involved in the operation of foreign intelligence services dictates
the participation of many agencies--Defense, State, Commerce, CIA and FBI--in
portions of the security awareness program.
Recommendation:
That the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor establish a working group to review
the problem and recommend a program assigning primary responsibility and
requiring the participation of requisite agencies.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
INFORMATION CONTROL OVER CRITERIA COUNTRY
NON-IMMIGRANT VISITORS TO THE U.S
Problem:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) information system for
control of data on non-immigrant alien visitors to the U.S. from criteria
countries is inadequate for counterintelligence purposes and is a serious
problem. ("Criteria countries" are those foreign governments whose intelli-
gence activities are so hostile to, or of such concern to, the national
security of the United States that counterintelligence activities against
such countries are determined by the Attorney General to be warranted.
They are identified by the FBI and Department of Justice in cooperation with
the Department of State, and are reviewed annually. They include all Com-
munist countries and certain non-Communist countries that engage in or sponsor
international terrorist activities.)
A contract study, to be completed in the spring of 1981, is currently
under-way. The study will define the critical information needs of INS and
other U.S. Government agencies with respect to non-immigrants visiting the
U.S., determine the capabilities of existing systems in terms of informational
outputs, and identify ways to improve the existing system and ways to use
other potential sources of information on non-immigrants to satisfy infor-
mational requirements. Although the study is a step in the right direction,
past experience suggests that high-level attention may be necessary to ensure
that the results of the study are translated into timely and adequate action.
Recommendation:
That the NSC/SCC/CI or its successor ensure that INS moves quickly and
provides sufficient resources to implement those study recommendations that
will close existing informational control gaps on criteria country non-
immigrant visitors.
UNCLASSIFIED
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SUBJECT: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
SYNOPSIS:
The program of Systematic Review for Declassification mandated by Executive
Order 12065 is a disaster. It is not cost effective; it syphons off valuable,
scarce resources from CIAls primary mission; and it poses security risks. It
should be abolished. The General Accounting Office has also recommended its
abolition.
BACKGROUND:
Section 3-4 of Executive Order 12065 (E.O. 12065) effective 1 December 1978
requires the Executive Branch to institute programs to review all "permanently
valuable records" when they reach 20 years of age (30 years for foreign govern-
ment information) to determine whether the records should remain classified. If
they remain classified after such review, they then must be reviewed again 10
years later, and every 10 years thereafter until declassified, unless a longer
period is agreed to by the Director, Information Security Oversight Office (IS00).
Such ISO? exemptions can be difficult to come by.
The above requirement is not new. The idea started during the Eisenhower
administration and in 1972 President Nixon issued E.O. 11652 which contained a
similar declassification review requirement with two major differences: the
initial review was to take place when records reached 30 years of age, and the
time interval for re-review was left to Department Heads. E.O. 12065, recog-
nizing that agencies were not geared up to switch from the old 30-year period
to the new 20-year requirement overnight, allowed agencies 10 years to close
the gap. Hence, by 1 December 1988 all permanent records dated 1 December 1968
and before are to receive an initial review.
CURRENT STATUS:
Our best estimate indicates that we still have approximately 22,000 cubic
feet of permanent records that must reviewed by 1 December 1988 if we are
to complyperforming with E.O. 12065. We have people perfoing the review. Because
of the sensitive nature of our records, we must use mostly senior analysts with
long years of experience. They are highly trained in their jobs and utilize
procedures designed to maximize their production. In spite of this devotion of
resources, we are able to review on an average only 640 cubic feet per year.
Thus, by 1 December 1988, unless we more than triple our staff, we will accom-
plish less than 30 percent of our objective. Also, in December 1988, as we
continue to attack the remaining 70 plus percent, we will have to begin the
second review of all material once reviewed and on which the decision was made
to continue classification. Since our experience shows that we continue clas-
sification on over 85 percent of the records reviewed, we will have to re-review
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most of the material we review by December 1988. At that time, we will be
faced with the first review of records beginning to mature in December 1988.
It is an impossible job.
CURRENT PROBLEMS:
CIA's program for systematic review of classified material entails the
following:
1. Dollar Costs: We will spend
by PQRS
ander our current
if we are to comply).
scarce senior
STAT
STAT
STAT
program and still not comply with E.O. 12065
2. Human Resource Costs:
mostly valuable,
analysts, s end full time reviewing classified documents under our current
setup; over eople would be required if we are to comply with E.O. 12065.
These people cou d and should be used to collect and produce intelligence.
3. Results of Review: On the average, 15 percent of the material
reviewed is declassified. The declassified material that does eventually
reach the public will be of little interest.
4. Security Risks: Given our workload and time pressures, there is
always the danger of human error resulting in the release of compromising
information. Also, the release of the declassified material adds to the total
picture our adversaries have access to. When added to material released under
FOIA, books, and leaks, this total picture is awesome and frightful.
5. Chilling Effect on Intelligence Relationships: Because of past
Congressional investigations, FOIA releases, books by former employees, and
leaks, many agents and foreign Intelligence contacts who would have cooperated
in the past now perceive that we are unable to keep their relationship secret.
With systematic review for declassification added to the list, we guarantee
these folks that if their names haven't come up for review previously, they
will come up when documents containing their names or identifying data become
20 years old.
RECOMMENDATION:
It is recommended that E.O. 12065 be modified to eliminate Section 3-4
or, alternatively, to exempt CIA from its provisions. The General Accounting
Office has concluded after a lengthy investigation that this program should
be abolished Government wide. If so, then it is submitted that even more so
should it be abolished with respect to CIA.
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UNCLA5SI1IED
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION
SUBJECT:
Executive Order 12065 requires that all classified
information of permanent value be systematically reviewed for
declassification when it is 20 years old (30 years old for
foreign government information). If not declassified at that
time, it must be reviewed again every ten years until it is
declassified.
BACKGROUND:
Less than 46 of Directorate of Operations documents
reviewed have been declassified. Those which have are only
of trivial value. Foreign governments have consistently
refused to give permission for us to declassify their infor-
mation through systematic review and have expressed concern
over the implications of those provisions in the Executive
Order.
CURRENT STATUS AND PROBLEMS:
Experience in systematic review over the past two years
shows that intelligence sources and methods information must
remain classified. Systematic review is a waste of time and
money.
RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION:
The Agency should be relieved from systematic (automatic)
declassification review of intelligence sources and methods
information and Executive Order 12065 should be amended accord-
ingly. Mandatory review for declassification pursuant to law
or regulation is not at issue.
UNCLASSIFIED
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SECRET
20 November 1980
Intelligence Analysis in NFAC
I. General trends over the past ten years.
A. As US foreign policy, interests have become more diverse, NFAC
intelligence analysis has had to cover a broader range of countries,
regions, and issues; the old preoccupation with political, military,
and economic developments in Communist countries is no longer adequate.
B. As the problems of foreign policy formulation have become
increasingly complex, so the intelligence support required has demanded
a more integrated and multidisciplinary approach.
C. We can acquire more high-quality information with greater
speed and frequency. Result: enhanced ability to monitor developing
events and to warn, especially in the military sector. Corollary:
increased demand for up-to-the-minute description and analysis.
D. The use of ADP-assisted methodologies is increasingly widespread
and found in every substantive area. With the computer, the intelligence
analyst of today can: 1) manipulate quickly large quantities of data;
2) quantify, forecast, and measure impacts of alternative scenarios,
in all disciplines but particularly military, scientific, and economic.
II. Trends by functional area--political, economic, geographic and
sociological, military, and scientific.
A. Political analysis
-- Is heavily directed toward policy deliberations of the
present, both in Washington and abroad. (The politics of
theater nuclear force modernization in NATO, Cuban refugees,
reactions to grain embargo, etc.)
--Has a demanding integrative function, pulling together
political, economic, military, and other considerations.
(Nuclear proliferation questions; multi-dimensional impli-
cations of situation in Poland.)
-- Must look at regional and worldwide implications, as well as
country-specific ones.
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an...A.0100w 9,
20 November 1980
Intelligence Input to Policy
The ultimate purpose of intelligence is the infoiming of policy.
It has long been an article of faith--not wholly accurate in practice--
that intelligence activelyandpositively contributes to the policymaking
process. It is nonetheless clear that intelligence does indeed give
policymakers an accurate general view of the world confronting them, and
in many key respects provides unique insights into specific world dangers
and opportunities.
This process of informing policy takes place constantly in a number
?of settings, levels, and fashions. A daily stream of reports and assess-
ments feeds into the various working levels of policymaking: not only
to State, Defense, and the NSC structure, but numerous offices of Commerce,
Treasury, Energy, and so on.
--Intelligence gets high marks for the support it gives policy manage-
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--On a regular basis senior decision-makers request specific infor-
mation or assessments.
--Intelligence input also occurs in the numerous occasions where the
DCI OT his officers brief the Executive Branch, or contribute
through their presence in policy meetings at various NSC levels.
--The most formal and authoritative input to policy is made in the
National Intelligence Estimates (UEs) and other judgments prepared
for the DCI by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and coordi-
nated with the Intelligence Community.
The policy relevance and tiMeliness of intelligence are being enhanced
through both the National Intelligence Topics process conducted by the
PRC (I), and by perfecting the NIO system.
--The contact on a regular basis of the NIOs with policymaking groups,
added to that of the DCI, the DDCI, and senior NFAC officers, guides
the programming of NIEs and NFAC research, furnishes authoritative
feedback from senior consumers of intelligence, and thus enhances
the utility of estimative intelligence.
Nonetheless, numerous continuing problems demand further remedy:
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--Can intelligence be kept fully policy-relevant, yet policy-free?
Although the danger remains that objective intelligence will become
advocacy, resulting from too close an association with policy-
making, experience to date demonstrates the greater problem to
still be an inadequate degree of contact with policymakers, a
failure to be fully aware of the needs of policy and of the many
US dimensions present in the foreign scenes being evaluated.
o Top consumers of intelligence are sometimes- as well or more
fully informed on a subject than are the particular producers.
Improved feedback loops with these consumers are needed.
o Do policymakers in fact receive what intelligence analysis
,and estimates have to contribute--especially in crisis situa-
TiaTTF-17fillotb-e------ answered affirmatively with full confi-
dence. Des ite th o
I- I
I-
S
II I ? I-
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o How can even the best intelligence penetrate the consciousness
of busy and harassed policymakers? This is one of the toughest
problems of all. Those consumers intelligence is most eager
to inform are the very ones with the least available time and
energy to so devote, particularly so in instances where their
attentions are consumed with today's crises, while intelligence
is trying to warn them of tomorrow's.
o Policymakers need more reflective, long-range analysis than
they _receive, yet current demands continue to drive intelligence
? prnduction and demand, alike. This is an ever-present problem.
Its dangers can be lessened through fuller contact of intelli-
gence and policy officers, and by additional steps to set a
number of imaginative analysts aside from daily intelligence
demands. On the production side, analytic components designed
to protect long term analysis on selected topics have been
created and the intelligence production planning process has
been substantially tightened. On the demand side, policymakers
need to make themselves more available specifically for focusing
on longer term analytic problems.
--What balance should be struck in grinding US considerations into
assessments of foreign situations? Too little concern for US
strengths, etc., can render an assessment one-dimensional or worst-
case; too much concern can make it appear that intelligence judgments
are trying to drive policy decisions. This question of proper balance
remains a significant and divisive one within the Intelligence Com-
munity, especially with respect to NIE 11-3/8, the annual estimate
on Soviet strategic weapons.
--Can clear and useful messages to policy survive the interagency
coordination process? Progress has been made in these respects:
the NIOs are directed to prepare NIEs which fully and clearly present
differences of judgment, where they occur, rather than produce
-2-
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watered-down papers which say nothing. The coordination process
nevertheless still consumes inordinate time, usually because the
State and Defense bureaucracies require so much turn around time,
and it takes a firm and gifted NIO to bring home a product whose
sharpness has not been somewhat dulled.
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SUBJECT:
The need for a public affairs program that explains to the public
the vital role of intelligence in a free society and describes the
intelligence process. Its objective is to raise the level of under-
standing of, and restore the public's confidence in, the intelligence
function, its mission and the various intelligence services, while
at the same time emphasizing the absolute necessity to protect
classified information and sources and methods of collection.
BACKGROUND:
*In the 50s and 60s there was little need for more than a
minimal public affairs effort.
*Vietnam, Watergate, and the White House and Congressional
investigations of CIA in the mid-1970's generated Congressional
and public demand for more knowledge of what the CIA does, and
greater control of its activities.
*Continued public exposure and media sensationalism
contributed to widespread public perception of ineffective CIA
and U.S. intelligence effort.
*Public Affairs program established in 1977 to restore
public confidence and elicit support by educating public to
critical role and true efficacy of national intelligence.
CURRENT STATUS:
The Office of Public Affairs:
*Advises DCl/DDCI on all public affairs matters; supports
DCl/DDCI public appearances; guides all Agency components that interface
with the public.
*Provides the public a variety of printed and audio visual
informational materials; sponsors group visits to CIA and
maintains an active speakers bureau.
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2
'Researches, prepares, and coordinates answers to some 1,800
media inquiries, 1,500 written public inquiries, and 5,000 telephone
inquiries annually.
'Chairs and provides Executive Secretariat for Agency-wide
Publications Review Board that reviews manuscripts written by current
and former employees for non-official publication. (327 books and
articles reviewed since 1977; additional statistical data attached.)
'Conducts weekly in-house news conferences, coordinates Notes
from the Director, publishes daily media highlights, maintains a news-
clipping library, services news bulletin boards in nine Washington-
area facilities, publishes a daily executive summary of media queries,
briefs training courses and Management Advisory Groups (MAGs) on
Public Affairs activities.
'Distributes wide variety of unclassified research materials to
the public; provides advice on public affairs perspective to wide
variety of Agency committees and activities, such as
(reedom of Information and Privacy releases and chairs
the Agency-wide Public Affairs Advisory Group; maintains liaison with,
and supports as appropriate, retirees and retiree organizations;
supports overt employees in the field, such as recruiters,Domestic
Contact activities and Equal Employment Opportunity actions.
'Maintains liaison with Intelligence Community components, and
particularly with the White House, the NSC Staff, State and Defense,
for purpose of coordinating public statements and activities;
represents CIA on NSC Public Information Committee; and sponsors
periodic conferences of Intelligence Community Public Affairs
Officers.
CURRENT PROBLEMS/ISSUES:
None
RECOMMENDED CIA POSITION:
Sustain the on-going Public Affairs program at approximately
the current level of activity.
STAT
STAT
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.r,
140
130
120
HO
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Number of
ubhcations Svibmitted
to the o rd for ViW
144
1977 1978 1979
1980
as of end of Oct 80
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As of End
Sept.
Performance
1978
1979
1980
Internal distribution of
daily press clippings
90
134
145
Response to media queries
2,200
2,605
1,727
Background briefings to media
128
139
110
DCl/DDCI speeches
48
31
17
DCl/DDCI media interviews
15
27
10
DCl/DDCI news conferences
(including editorial boards)
16
8
1
DCl/DDCI media appearances
9
5
0
Other CIA officers public appearances
-
125
Public groups visits to CIA
32
41
55
Public mail answered
1,655
3,117
1,394
Requests for unclassified
publications
1,204
3,520
1,026
New CIA unclassified publications
released to the public
158
93
Publications Review Board
submissions
62
94
99
Note: Dash (-) indicates statistics
not kept for those years
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Agency Personnel Management Reforms
I. Background
A. At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, a four-person
team from the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) reviewed the
CIA, personnel management system. Their conclusions in March 1979 were that:
a. The current CIA system, characterized by rank-in-the-
person and decentralized management to Directorates,
has served the Agency well.
b. The caliber of employees in the Agency is high, and
managers have evidenced their interest in the personnel
management system, recognized their responsibility
for administering the system, and are acutely aware
of the importance of balancing the needs of the Agency
and the needs of the employees.
c. With some minor adjustments, the existing personnel
policies are sound, the best available for CIA, and
able to accommodate the environmental changes most
likely to affect the Agency's future.
d. The Agency's personnel system is one which most
Federal agencies would envy for its flexibility
and its potential to respond to management needs.
B. The NAPA Team did recommend some fine tuning particularly in the
areas of:
a. Centralized policy guidance.
b. Goal-setting, the evaluation of results, and implementation,
with goal-setting and evaluation being done by top
management, and implementation being decentralized to
the operating components.
c. Uniform treatment of employees.
d. Better definition of the roles and relationships
in personnel management.
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C. A NAPA Project Group, formed by the DDCI of officers from all
five Directorates, addressed 27 issues and conducted Agency-wide
fact-finding and interviews, appropriate research, in-depth review,
and consultation. The Project Group published its findings in the NAPA
Project Group Report under four major issue areas:
a. A Framework for the Agency Personnel System
b. Personnel Selection and Development
c. Manpower Planning, Recruitment and Separation
d. Personnel Program Evaluation
After Directorate and Independent Office review, the conments were discussed
by the Executive Committee, and the resulting recommendations were approved
by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
II. Current Status
A. During 1980, the following Executive Committee recommendations were
implemented. to strengthen the framework for the Agency's personnel system:
a. The DCI's authorities in personnel administration
have been better defined.
b. Personnel regulations have been revised to clearly
distinguish policy.
c. The authorities of the Director of Personnel Policy,
Planning, and Management (D/PPPM) have been enhanced
by establishingthepersonnel function as an Independent
Office with direct reporting to the DDCI and DCI.
d. The role expected of personnel officers has been more
clearly delineated.
e. A Personnel Management Advisory Board, chaired by
D/PPPM,has also been established as an inter-Directorate
forum' to initiate or review policy changes and
initiatives in the personnel management area.
B. In the area of personnel selection and development:
a. A revised vacancy notice system has been instituted.
b. A uniform personnel evaluation board and panel system
has been established.
2
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c. Uniform precepts and guidelines for the operation
of boards and panels have been developed.
d. An Agency-wide handbook that will replace the
individual Career Service handbooks has been
compiled.
C. In the area of manpower planning, separation, and recruitment:
a. Flow-through and reduction policy have been defined.
b. We are working with the Office of Personnel Management
to gain competitive transfer status for our employees.
c. A totally new recruitment and processing system has
been introduced to significantly reduce the processing
of professionals from an average of 325 to 80 days;
and clericals, from 167 to 42 days.
D. In the area of personnel program evaluation:
_a. Personnel evaluation is being strengthened by the
development of tools for line managers to use in
assessing the effectiveness of their personnel
management programs.
b. The Annual Personnel Plan has been revised to
better reflect managerial needs and desires.
E. The Agency's Senior Intelligence Service is now established; and,
we now have a Senior Officer Development Program which defines our
rotational assignment policy and provides developmental programming for
both managers and specialists.
III. Current Problems/Issues
None
IV. Recommended CIA Position
None
3
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Recruitment and Processing of New Employees
I. Background
A. The Agency is exempt from Civil Service rules governing hiring of
personnel. To meet Agency requirements for new applicants there are
12 regional recruitment offices. Applicant processing involves extensive
and rigid security and medical clearances. In the past this clearance
process has required an unacceptable period of time--the average time
for professional positions took 11 months and six months for clerical
employees.
B. A system dynamics computer model study showed that we were recruiting
and processing too many applicants at one time. This resulted in the loss
of many qualified applicants because of the time taken to clear them.
II. Current Status
A. As a result of our study, a new recruitment and processing system
was started in May 1980. Among the key concepts of the system are:
a. More realistic and accurate forecasts of the
number of new employees required.
b. More accurate and current descriptions of the
work to be performed and qualifications required
of new employees.
c. More targeted recruiting.
d. Greater involvement of offices in recruiting.
e. Publication of:
1. a shorter, two-part application form;
2. medical and security criteria used in
evaluating applicants; and,
3. unclassified fliers describing the
work and qualifications required by
offices with the most numerous personnel
requirements.
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f. Consolidation of four decision-making points on
applications to one, thereby reducing the time
from 21 to 2 days.
g.
Use of expediters to ensure strict adherence
to rigid deadlines by applicants and offices
at every step of the processing.
h. Reduction of the number of applications in the
system and those undergoing medical and security
clearances reduced from 1200 to 400.
i. Detail of Security and Medical Services personnel
to the Office of Personnel Policy, Planning,
and Management to screen out applicants who
obviously do not meet Agency standards.
B. So far, the new hiring system:
a. Would have reduced hiring time by one-half had
it not been for the freeze.
b. Increased hiring in FY-1980: overall by 39%;
minorities by 29%; and women for professional
and technical positions by 65%.
c. Filled a higher proportion of shortage categories,
such as computer scientists and electronic technicians.
III. Current Problems/Issues
We expect that even greater efforts will be needed to meet our personnel
requirements, particularly for women, minorities and shortage occupational
categories (e.g., engineers, computer science, electronic technicians,
and secretaries) in an increasingly competitive labor market.
IV. Recommended CIA Position
Although considerable progress has been made, further refinements are
needed to make the new system fully effective. Determination of long-term
personnel requirements need to be linked more closely to the budget cycle
with provision for full resources to meet requirements. Hiring freezes
have proved to be very disruptive and expensive in relation to an orderly
hiring process.
2
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Liu UM. 6
TRANSITION BRIEFING BOOK
SUBJECT Internal Management/Decision Mechanisms: The Goals Program
BACKGROUND: Until the last few years, the four Directorates in the
Agency operated fairly independently of one another.
Setting goals and defining objectives varied considerably
across Directorate and office lines. The gradual trend
toward a "one Agency concept", and the growing number
of more complex issues requiring interdisciplinary
approaches led to the creation of an Agency Goals Program.
CURRENT The DDCI Goals Program was initiated in 1978 to track
STATUS progress being made on Directorate goals for the fiscal
year. The DDCI initiates some goals with an Agency-level
perspective and the Directorates add those they feel
? appropriate. With its focus on short-term Directorate-
level issues, the Goals Program complements the Executive
Committee mechanism, with its Agency-level, longer-
? term perspective. The DDCI's quarterly review sessions
with the Deputy Directors and their line managers have
generated increased cross-directorate understanding
of programs, objectives, and problems and set the stage
for increased emphasis on Agency-wide goals. A concerted
effort has been made to minimize required paperwork.
CURRENT : The Goals Program should gradually become more integrated
PROBLEMS/ with the long-range planning process as the latter evolves.
ISSUES
RECOMMENDED: Maintain and continue to improve on the Goals Program as
CIA a management tool.
POSITION
!:?",
'!!
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4
TRANSITION BRIEFING BOOK
SUBJECT Internal Management/Decision Mechanisms: Executive Committee
BACKGROUND: During the early 1970s incoming DCIs and DDCIs realized
that the Agency consisted of four isolated Directorates,
sometimes referred to as "individual fiefdoms." As more
and more policy and management issues began to transcend
Directorate and functional boundaries, the need for a more
collegial management approach was perceived. The Management
Committee, consisting of the line Deputies and eventually
chaired by one of them, was the first attempt in this
direction. This was succeeded in 1976 by the Executive
Advisory Group (EAG), headed by a new DDCI with an
Executive charter to run the Agency on a day-to-day basis
and a general charge from the new DCI to "bring CIA
together."
The EAG made significant headway in creating a constructive
problem-solving environment for senior Agency managers.
By 1979 the DCl/DDCI thought a revitalization was required
to improve decisions and sharpen the Agency's performance.
The Executive Committee, supported by a small staff,
then evolved from the EAG. The addition of the Staff has
facilitated better problem identification, agenda develop-
ment, recording of decisions and monitoring of decision
implementation.
CURRENT : Since 1979 the Executive Committee, meeting on the
STATUS average of once a week, has become a vital, integral part
of the Agency's management process. Focusing on inter-
directorate long-term issues, the Committee has reviewed
more than two dozen difficult Agency-level issues resulting
in DCl/DDCI decisions or guidance. (Examples include
reforming the personnel management system, developing
legislative strategy, developing an information handling
strategy, reviewing and revising budget decisions, and
initiating an Agency-wide, long-range planning process.
The Committee's success to date has been attributed to
DCl/DDCI commitment to an action oriented forum to support
their decision making; a limited membership that encourages
frank constructive decisions; thorough staff work in
advance of meetings to provide an effective basis for
discussions; and careful selection of topics to avoid
those which can be treated in other forums.
CURRENT : Immediate agenda concerns include completing the
PROBLEMS/ first attempt at an Agency-wide planning process and
ISSUES evaluating what has been learned to improve the next cycle;
developing a legislative strategy for the coming year;
and developing policies responsive to the new Administration's
needs.
.1.1
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ragWif.pfk ..4; 4;7
lifiMa ar'A 11'4 J
Organizationally, the Committee iill enhance its effective-
ness as individual members continue to break through the
functional barriers of the past and place more importance
On their toles as Senior executives of the entire Agency.'
RECOMMENDED: Maintain and continue to improve the Executive Committee
CIA as a senior Agency management forum for seeking Agency-
POSITION wide solutions to Agency problems; assisting the DCl/
DDCI in policy formulation; and addressing long-range
issues.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/9.9./:11, ::0CulA4-RuDiriy9OG01353R001500230002-3
In May 1980 the CIA Executive Committee (EXCOM) initiated an Agency-
level long-range planning process. The goals are to develop Agency-wide
flexible objectives by which to operate and evaluate our efforts; provide
executive direction on what we will be doing in the future and how we will
be doing it as an Inputl to the budget; integrate planning efforts at the
directorate level, and develop a process to satisfy congressional interest
in planning and evaluation.
Background:
With the exception of short-lived efforts in the mid-sixties and early
seventies, there has been no Agency-wide planning process. The budget process
includes outyear projections but does not lend itself to true long-range planning
because of its focus on resource constraints and solving near-term resource
allocation problems. There are planning activities at the directorate and lower
management levels. These have generally resulted in multi-year plans for specific
activities, such as communications, automatic data processing, etc. While of
generally high quality they have lacked Agency-wide executive perspective and
review. There are also annual plans for research and development with longer
term plans for some specific development areas, such as agent communications
equipment.
Current Status:
Since May 1980, under the guidance of the SA/DDCI and the EXCOM Staff, an
interdirectorate planning group has identified long-range issues in two categories:
foreign policy intelligence topics of vital interest and management issues focusing
on intelligence collection, operations, and analysis. The issues were assigned
to interdirectorate working groups to develop background, likely trends, and
alternative courses of action. These issues are now being presented to EXCOM.
A final summary EXCOM session is scheduled for early December.
Problems and Issues:
The current effort is a pilot test to determine how to meet the Agency's
planning needs. It has relied heavily on line personnel with minimal central
staff involvement except for overall coordination, and strong DCl/DDCI backing.
It has produced characterizations of the spectrum of intelligence areas of interest
over the next five-ten years and their impact on our collection and analysis
activities. The Proposed courses of action often reflect short-term line
perspective and do not always uncover real policy issues or alternatives for
executive decision. Although this first cycle is not yet completed, and the
effort is still in the early development stage, there is already evidence of
the utility of long-range planning, i.e., recognition of the need to completely over-
haul the overseas communications system, positive feedback from the DCI and DDCI,
and use of ideas developed at the session by senior Agency personnel on many of
the issues.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP90G01353R001500230002-.3
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Recommendation:
We should continue this long-range planning effort. The developing
process ,t/hould be evaluated as to focus on policy-oriented proposals,
increas 'd top management input, improved cost estimates or proposed alterna-
tives for the budget process, reduced paperwork, and as a mechanism for moni-
torin future actions and evaluating results.
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lino Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/11: CIA-RDP90G01353R001500230002-3