DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10C00522R000101450001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 01' Secrct
Intelligence
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Developments in Afghanistan (u)
4 April 1985
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Developments in Afghanistan (u)
4 April 1985
1 Perspective?The Dynamics of Insurgent Cooperation
Tribal, ethnic, and religious differences will cause regional variation in insurgent
cooperation; prospects for interregional cooperation remain dim.
5 Briefs
9 Mixed Prospects for Soviet Elite Units in Afghanistan
Soviet elite units perform better than other troops in Afghanistan, but their
effectiveness is limited by the inadequacy of the basic Soviet approach to the
counterinsurgency.
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Abdul Haq: A Capital Insurgent
Afghan insurgent commander Abdul Haq has kept the insurgency active in the
Kabul area, but operations this year may be curtailed by increased Soviet and
Afghan regime security measures.
17 Afghanistan: Assessing the War
Indian Government officials, and the US
Embassy in Kabul emphasize Soviet gains in Afghanistan during the past year; the
insurgents, however, are optimistic.
19 Afghanistan Chronology
This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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Developments in Afghanistan
4 April 1985
Perspective The Dynamics of Insurgent Cooperation
We believe the Afghan insurgency will continue to develop under different
leaders and along different paths from region to region in Afghanistan. In
the north and west, the Jamiat groups, which are well organized and have a
common ethnic background, probably will gradually consolidate their
control. In the central area, military pressure from the Iranian-backed
groups probably will result in domination from Tehran. In the south and
east, intraregional cooperation among the fractious Pushtuns will evolve
slowly. Interregional cooperation among the ultimately dominant groups
probably will remain a distant prospect.
The Jamiat-i-Islami groups predominate in the northern and western
provinces, primarily because of the dominance of the Tajik social structure.
Despite the marked language differences among Tajiks from Kapisa
Province and those in Herat Province, there is little history of rivalry.
Relations among the Jamiat groups, the Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin) groups,
and others vary from province to province.
The central region, the Hazarehjat, is generally controlled by Shiite
Hazara groups. Internecine fighting?prompted mainly by Iranian-backed
groups?has resulted in increasing control for the Sepah-e Pasdaran and
Sazman-i-Nasr, at the expense of the Shura-Inqilab-i-Itifaq-i-Islami orga-
nization, which has refused to offer its allegiance to Khomeini.
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Fighting has also been widespread among groups in the southern and
eastern provinces. These groups, dominated by Pushtuns, often are divided
along tribal lines and have many personal rivalries. The most effective
groups in the fighting have been the Hizbi Islami of both the Khalis and
Gulbuddin factions.
The Afghan insurgency embraces hundreds of groups. They have signifi-
cant disagreements with one another?even on what it means to defend
Islam. However, most groups, we believe, want considerable autonomy for
their regions or ethnic groups. They prefer minimal interference from the
Peshawar-based resistance organizations.
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Major Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan
Boundary repretentation is
not necessarily authoritative.
China
Iran
PesIfiwar. .*
ISL MABAD India
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Iran
Unclassified
704703 (A01776) 3-85
Pakistan
200
Kilometers
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Harakat-i-Ingilab-i-Islami
LJ Harakat-i-Islami
EIIIJ Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin)
Hizbi Islami (Yunus Khalis)
Islamic Union
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan
Jamiat-i-Islami
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami
Sazman-i-Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran
Shura-Ingilab-i-Itifag-i-Islami
IM Independent fronts
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Several insurgent commanders in Afghanistan have promoted unity, but
ethnic, cultural, political, and religious differences deter cooperation, as do
difficulties in communication resulting from terrain, distances between
groups, and the presence of Soviet, Afghan regime, and rival insurgent
forces. Most insurgent leaders have few political skills and care about little
but their own small areas of influence.
Though many insurgent groups are affiliated with Peshawar-based resis-
tance organizations, these affiliations have done little to advance resistance
cooperation in Afghanistan. Most groups ally with the Peshawar organiza-
tion that will provide them with the most aid; allegiances shift depending
on the ability of the Peshawar organization to meet the needs of the
fighters in Afghanistan. Few groups in Afghanistan, we believe, under-
stand the political goals of the Peshawar organizations, which frequently
squabble among themselves.
Unification of the Peshawar exile groups would have little effect on the in-
surgents in Afghanistan. Most exile leaders have only limited influence
with the fighters in Afghanistan and appear to have little control over
insurgent battle plans.
Prospects for cooperation among the resistance groups in Afghanistan are
improving most rapidly in urban areas. Urban Afghans, especially Push-
tuns in and near Kabul and Qandahar, have become detribalized, and
parochialism has diminished. Coordinated military operations are much
more common in these cities than in rural areas. Areas inhabited by people
with weak tribal associations, such as northeastern Afghanistan where
detribalized Tajiks predominate, also offer a good environment for cooper-
ation because cultural and ethnic divisions are less intense.
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Briefs
Increasing Soviet Activity in Western Afghanistan
The Soviets and the Afghan regime probably are preparing to launch new
offensives in western Afghanistan this spring to counter declining security
in Herat City, interdict insurgent supply caravans from Iran, and attempt
to halt attacks on the new fuel pipeline.
Insurgents in and near Herat City have been very active, despite repeated
large-scale Soviet operations. They have captured supplies during convoy
ambushes and raids on Afghan regime and Soviet garrisons, and their
attacks?together with accidents along the pipeline?have resulted in the
loss of thousands of tons of fuel
Most of the aid received by insurgents in the west
transits Iran.
Air Violations During the First Quarter of 1985
Aircraft from Afghanistan bombed Pakistani territory 12 times during the
first three months of 1985 and killed five people
All these attacks occurred within several kilometers of the
Afghan-Pakistani border across from Konarha and Paktia Provinces.
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Pakistani officials report 43 air violations?including 25X1
attacks and overflights?from Afghanistan so far in 1985 compared with
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The bombings and overflights probably reflect support for the larger-than-
usual Soviet and Afghan regime winter campaign along the eastern border
of Afghanistan.
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Pakistani Concerns About Soviet Pressure
Pakistani officials are fearful that the Soviets will step up pressure to
reduce Islamabad's support for the Afghan resistance. They expect more
military pressure along Pakistan's western border and more Soviet intru-
sions into Pakistani airspace
Moscow is convinced that the Afghan insurgency would be crippled
without Pakistani support. How far the new Soviet leadership is willing to
go in pressing Zia is unclear, but heavier pressure on the border?possibly
including incursions by Afghan forces?appears likely as spring fighting
intensifies. The Pakistanis may be citing the possibility of greater Soviet
pressure in part to impress on Washington the need for increased US
support for Islamabad.
Soviets Improve Fuel Resupply and Distribution
The Soviets have been continuously upgrading the logistic system to assure
adequate fuel supplies for their activities in Afghanistan. The latest
improvements include the completion of a pipeline in February extending
200 kilometers (km) from the Soviet border to Shindand in western
Afghanistan and the construction of a new fuel storage site at Herat with
about 1 million liters of capacity. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviets
started construction of a 375-km-long fuel pipeline from Termez in the
Soviet Union to Bagram Airfield to serve northeastern Afghanistan and
supplement supplies delivered by trucks. This line became operational in
1982. We believe the Soviets completed a second, parallel line last year. In
addition, the Soviets have more than doubled the capacity of tactical fuel
storage facilities in Afghanistan to slightly more than 100 million liters.
Approximately 70 percent of this storage is along the pipeline routes.
The two pipeline systems and additional storage capacity give the Soviets
more flexibility to adjust to seasonal fuel demands, changing operational
needs, and interruptions caused by insurgent activities. The pipelines?
approximately 15 centimeters in diameter,
l-have an estimated normal delivery capacity of 100,000 liters
per hour for a single line.
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Mixed Prospects for Soviet
Elite Units in Afghanistan
The Soviets are relying more on a variety of elite
units?airborne troops, special-purpose forces (Spets-
naz), and reconnaissance detachments?for combat
operations in Afghanistan. Compared to regular units,
elite forces are more mobile and have superior quality
troops and leadership.
Despite recent increases in the number of elite troops
and some indications of improved unit tactics, we
believe these forces are still not being used to best
effect. Poor intelligence, the desire to hold down
casualties, poor security, and rigid tactics have been
obstacles to improved performance. Major improve-
ments in effectiveness probably would require changes
in the basic Soviet approach to the war.
Characteristics of Elite Units
Elite units?frequently called commandos in insur-
gent reports?are generally airborne troops, recon-
naissance battalions or companies (attached to motor-
ized rifle divisions and regiments), or Spetsnaz units
organized into independent motorized rifle battalions
(IMRB). These units have a number of common
features that make them more effective than conven-
tional ground forces:
? Heavy reliance on helicopters for rapid transporta-
tion and fire support. Air mobility helps achieve
surprise and allows elite units to take the tactical
"high ground," blocking insurgent escape routes
and exposing them to artillery and air attacks.
? A willingness to fight on foot and close with the
insurgents rather than staying in tracked vehicles, a
common criticism of motorized rifle troops.
? A readiness to operate alone, increasing flexibility
and reducing vulnerability to resistance intelligence
networks.
? Strong emphasis on small-unit raids and ambushes
to achieve surprise.
? The ability to operate at night and remain outside
secured compounds for up to 10 days to carry out
ambushes and intelligence operations. Regular units
generally abandon the night and the countryside to
the insurgents.
? Elite units are in almost all cases more rigorously
trained, have better quality conscripts, and are
better led than regular units.
Comparison of Elite Units
There is little to suggest major differences in the types
of operations conducted by airborne, Spetsnaz, and
reconnaissance units. All have participated in heli-
borne assaults, raids, and ambushes as well as support
for conventional ground force operations. Although
airborne; Spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units normally
have different missions, it appears that combat experi-
ence in Afghanistan has caused them to arrive at
roughly similar approaches to the counterinsurgency.
Airborne. The initial use of airborne forces in Afghan-
istan fits the standard Soviet role?a light, quick
reaction force designed to seize key objectives ahead
of advancing main forces. In the August 1968 inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, they landed at the main
airports after these had been secured by the KGB and
special-purpose forces and remained there until No-
vember.
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Abdul Haq: A Capital Insurgent (u)
Afghan insurgent commander Abdul Haq has been an
important player in keeping the insurgency active in
the Kabul area. Haq's sense of organization and his
understanding of tactics and strategy have contribut-
ed to his success, but recent heavy Soviet and regime
security measures and operations may be decreasing
his effectiveness. His potential as a regional com-
mander is limited by ethnic, political, and religious
differences among the insurgents. While Abdul Haq
expresses hope for better cooperation among insurgent
groups, he apparently is willing to let it evolve gradu-
ally. His group is affiliated with the Hizbi Islami
faction of Yunus Khalis.
Leadership and Tactics
In our view, Abdul Haq's leadership and tactical
expertise have made him the most effective command-
er in the Kabul area. In the fall of 1984 Abdul Haq
told a Western journalist that he saw Kabul as the
symbol of Soviet occupation, and that attacks on
Kabul were particularly important because diplomats
and international organizations would publicize the
insurgents' activity.
Hag maintains
records on the performance of each commander and
on possible successors and distributes arms according
to each commander's effectiveness. He delegates to
subcommanders the authority to mount minor opera-
tions and seeks to avoid charges of favoritism by
meeting periodically with each commander to review
performance.
We believe that Abdul Haq's organization is responsi-
ble for many of the rocket attacks on Soviet and
regime installations inside Kabul; he has told US
officials that his organization is responsible for nu-
merous attacks on power stations and on Kabul
Airport. In a recent interview, he praised improve-
ments in coordination among insurgent groups and in
arms supplies, particularly 107-mm rockets.
Abdul Haq's forces total approximately 6,000 to
7,000 men. He has arrayed them in Kabol Province
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outside the capital into seven units that surround the
city. The largest group is in the Paghman area, a
short distance northwest of Kabul, from where he can
attack Soviet and regime outposts and convoys and
seek refuge in the nearby mountains when confronted
by superior forces.
Inside the city of Kabul,
Abdul Hag has divided his forces into eight or
nine cells, each comprising five or six persons aware of
the identities of only their own cell members. The
cells gather intelligence and relay it to Haq, who
passes it on to one of the seven units outside the
capital. Unit actions in the city usually are small-scale
raids, kidnapings, or assassinations.
Limitations
Abdul Haq's effectiveness is limited by the size of his
force, by Soviet and regime security, by weak leader-
ship among the other groups he cooperates with, and,
inside Kabul, by the lack of internal support structure.
Soviet and regime security prevents insurgent groups
from maintaining large weapons caches and from
making prolonged or large-scale attacks in the capital;
insurgents in the city cannot expect timely support
once they run out of ammunition,
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The Man
Abdul Hag has been fighting Kabul regimes since
1974. He claims to have commanded Hizbi Islami-
Khalis faction units in Paktia and Nangarhar Prov-
inces before assuming his current post near Kabul.
Hag has frequently journeyed abroad to promote the
Afghan cause in recent years, traveling to Western
Europe three times and the United States twice. He
seems favorably disposed toward the West, although
he has expressed dismay at the indifference he has
encountered toward Afghanistan, particularly among
European socialists. About 27, Hag is a Pushtun
from the Jalalabad area. US Consular officials in
Peshawar describe him as frank, tough, and optimis-
tic.
Reports from the US Embassy in Kabul indicate little
insurgent activity in the capital during 1985. In-
creased security in the city?evident since Decem-
ber?high levels of helicopter activity over Kabul
suburbs and the surrounding area, Soviet and regime
operations in Lowgar Province, and winter weather
probably caused the insurgents to curtail operations.
in
spring 1984, Haq's group was more effective than a
10,000-man group backed by Peshawar fundamental-
ist leader Sayyaf, as well as local Jamiat insurgents
and Hizbi Islami groups belonging to the Gulbuddin
faction. poor leadership and lack
of central control in some of those groups resulted in
high casualties for limited gains and also made it
difficult for Hag to coordinate operations with them.
In winter 1985, Haq told a Western journalist, howev-
er, that coordination among commanders had im-
proved.
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Hizbi Islami-Yunus Khalis Faction
The Yunus Khalis faction of the fundamentalist
Hizbi Islami resistance organization comprises main-
ly Push tun tribesmen who are Sunni Muslims. The
organization's strength is concentrated in Kabol,
Lowgar, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Paktika Provinces.
Khalis 's faction still is linked with the seven-party
fundamentalist alliance, though he pulled out of the
organization in December 1983, charging alliance
leader Sayyaf with misusing funds. Khalis has often
been at odds with other fundamentalist alliance
members and with the moderates, but his organiza-
tion has had good personal relations with the Jamiat-
i-Islami which is strong in northern and western
Afghanistan.
Goals
Although Abdul Haq's modest political role in the
insurgency has grown since 1982, he is still reluctant
to push for resistance unity. In February 1985, in fact,
Haq defended resistance disunity, telling a Western
journalist that the diversity of the Afghan resistance
was evidence of its democracy.
I in snrinv 19R2 Han
In Abdul Haq's view, development of a working
alliance of insurgents would have to proceed in stages.
It would involve first the negotiating of a joint
platform on political strategy, such as accepting the
principle of negotiating with the Soviets, determining
the acceptability of former King Zahir Shah, and
adopting a common policy toward the Arab countries
and the West. A spokesman could be chosen once a
common platform is established, and a joint commis-
sion created to settle local conflicts. Another essential
task, in Haq's judgment, is to establish an education
system in the refugee camps and inside Afghanistan.
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Haq condemns Arab countries for reserving their aid
for "stooges" rather than distributing it equitably. He
publicly advocates evenhanded treatment of other
groups and hopes that they will accept the plan for
gradual union.
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Afghanistan: Assessing the War
Recent assessments he
Indian Government emphasize Soviet and Afghan
regime gains in the war in Afghanistan during the
past year,
US diplomats in Kabul also report an
improved situation for the Soviets and Afghan Gov-
ernment
The Indian View
The Indians,
believe:
? The regime fully controls nine out of 10 urban
centers and 9,000 villages, and has the "dominant"
position in 9,000 more villages.
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? The Soviets are confident of success over the long 25X1
run and find the costs of the war manageable.
? The Soviets are placing most of their emphasis on
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up free of factionalism. 1
Afghans and expect that this generation will grow 2255X)(11
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The View From Kabul 25X1
A US Embassy assessment from Kabul on 17 March
reports that during the past 12 months the Soviets
have consolidated their position in the capital and 25X1
other urban areas and prevented resistance gains
elsewhere in the country. According to this
assessment:
? The basic stalemate is hurting the resistance more
than the Soviets.
? Kabul appears calmer, less affected by the war, and
more firmly in Soviet and Afghan hands than in
past years. There are no outward signs that the
population is restive under regime and Soviet con-
trol. Fuel and food supplies in the city are better
than last year.
? The bureaucracy in Kabul continues to grow in size.
? The campaign against the Panjsher Valley is a
success for the Soviets because it has "thrown
Masood off balance" and severely hampered his
ability to interfere in the flow of traffic from the
USSR to Kabul.
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? The Shomali Plain, north of Kabul, was quieter as a
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ment gang the main road.
? Mazar-e-Sharif and other population centers in the
north were more secure.
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The Insurgent Perspective
the insur-
gents remain optimistic about the future. Morale is
good, and insurgent confidence has been boosted by
their ability to keep a superpower on the defensive for
five years. The insurgents believe "time is on their
side."
? Insurgent forces are becoming more aware of the
growing national scale of their effort.
? Most guerrillas have adapted to disruptions in their
family lives and are confident they will be able to
continue fighting.
? The insurgents are developing a new generation of
commanders?Ismail Khan in Herat and Masood in
the Panjsher are the main examples?who will
prosecute the war more effectively and have strong
support within Afghanistan.
The Balance
In our view, resistance attacks on Kabul probably
have declined in part because of winter weather,
because the insurgents have been concentrating their
attacks elsewhere in the east, and because of in-
creased Soviet and Afghan security
We support the insurgent assessment that morale is
high among most fighters and that they are prepared
for much more intense fighting this spring and sum-
mer. We believe Masood's Panjsher resistance forces
remain well organized and have been active in fight-
ing Soviet and Afghan forces this winter. Elsewhere in
the eastern provinces, insurgent forces continue to
overrun and threaten regime posts.
The Indian assessment of the extent of government
control is clearly overstated,
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Afghanistan Chronology
Noteworthy events relating to Afghanistan that have occurred or come to light
23 February
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A Soviet convoy, the fourth in February, attempted to reach a besieged Afghan
garrison near the Afghan-Pakistani border in Konarha Province but, like the
previous three, was stopped by insurgent attacks. US Embassy 25X1
officials in Kabul that Soviet and Afghan troops have suffered some 200 casualties
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26 February-1 March
a large insurgent force attacked
the Afghan military outpost in the northern Panjsher Valley, causing 83 regime
casualties while suffering 13 killed. On 1 March the insurgents in this area
reportedly shot down two transport helicopters.
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2-11 March
US Embassy sources in Kabul reported large Soviet and Afghan Army sweep
operations along the main road between Qandahar and the Pakistani border.
7 March
Four aircraft from Afghanistan fired eight rockets on Pakistani territory near the
Afghan-Pakistani border approximately 100 kilometers north of Quetta.
Insurgent attacks on Soviet and Afghan regime convoys near the Kowtal-e Salang
(Salang Pass) reportedly closed the highway for a short period of time. The number
of convoy attacks, especially south of the Tunel-e Salang (Salang Tunnel) on the
main highway, is increasing.
14 March
In Moscow, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev received
Pakistani President Zia "coldly," with each repeating standard positions vis-a-vis
Afghanistan
15 March US Embassy officials in Kabul reported that a bomb exploded in an Afghan
intelligence service (KHAD) building in midmorning.
16 March
18, 19, 24 March
18-25 March
Afghan forces initiated a brief firefight with Pakistani border troops after
Mujahedin had seized three Afghan observation posts near the Towr-Kham?
Khyber Pass border crossing.
Insurgents exploded one bomb each day in Kabul shopping areas frequented by
Soviets causing at least 35 Soviet and Afghan casualties, according to US
Embassy officials in Kabul.
The US Embassy in Kabul reports the highest level of air activity at Kabul
Airfield this year. On 19 March, more than 60 MI-24 attack helicopters flew
missions east of Kabul.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/25: CIA-RDP10C00522R000101450001-9