NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR SANDINISTA CONSOLIDATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201790008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Ticaraua: Prospects for
~ndinista Consonidation
National Intelligence Estimate
N/E 83.3-87
August ! 987
ropy 3 ~ 6
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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N I E 83.3-87
NICARAGUA: PROSPECTS FOR ?~,,,
SANDINISTA CONSOLIDATION
Information available as of 21 August 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 28 August 1987.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 9
Progress Toward Consolidation ........................................................... 9
The Peace Plan ..................................................................................... 9
Facing Internal Challenges .................................................................. 9
The Economy .................................................................................... 10
Popular Unrest .................................................................................. 11
The Internal Opposition ................................................................... 13
The War ................................................................................................ 18
Insurgent Strengths ........................................................................... 21
Weaknesses ........................................................................................ 21
Political Dynamics ............................................................................ 22
The National Democratic Resistance .............................................. 22
Outlook for the Insurgency .................................................................. 23
Probable Effect of the Peace Plan ................................................... 23
The Sandinista Military ........................................................................ 23
Military Capabilities ......................................................................... 24
Counterinsurgency Strategy ............................................................. 24
Military Weaknesses ......................................................................... 25
Military Outlook for the Regime ..................................................... 26
Soviet Bloc and Cuban Support ........................................................... 27
Increasing Economic Aid ................................................................. 27
Growing Military Assistance ............................................................ 28
Declining Western Economic Support ............................................ 29
Prospects for a Regional Peace Agreement ........................................ 29
Key Variables and Alternative Outcomes ........................................... 30
Aid to the Insurgency ....................................................................... 30
Leadership Unity .............................................................................. 32
Soviet Bloc Support ........................................................................... 32
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SCOPE NOTE
Although the outlook for the Nicaraguan insurgency has been the
focus of two Intelligence Community Estimates over the past two years,
the last overall assessment-Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista Con-
solidation-was completed in January 1985. The judgments of all three
Estimates generally have proved accurate in predicting the continued
consolidation of Sandinista control and the growth of the insurgency as
the major regime obstacle. However, there have been significant political
and economic developments in Nicaragua during these last two years that
merit further analysis of the prospects for Sandinista consolidation:
- The Sandinistas remain in firm control, but they are concerned
with mounting popular discontent, fueled primarily by a signifi-
cant deterioration of the economy. This deterioration is general-
ly worse than we had estimated and has probably resulted in
growing popular disillusionment with the regime.
- The Sandinistas have promulgated a new constitution designed
to consolidate their control of the political system, and they
have retained the state of emergency to keep the internal
opposition under control. Nevertheless, the opposition has tried
to take advantage of the economic situation to force the regime
into permitting greater political f reedoms.
- The Soviet Bloc has substantially increased the amount of aid
being sent to Nicaragua to bolster the faltering economy, its
military aid has increased, and Cuba maintains a considerable
advisory presence. Nevertheless, both Moscow and Havana are
concerned about Sandinista ability to keep the insurgents at bay
and avoid direct US intervention, and they fear having to get
even more heavily involved in Nicaragua.
- Finally, the recent Guatemala summit has produced a regional
peace agreement among Central American countries, and it is
crucial to examine how it will ultimately affect the pace and di-
rection of Sandinista consolidation and the outlook for the
insurgency.
The Estimate will provide an assessment of prospects for the
Sandinista regime over the next year and a half, taking into account the
new Peace Plan. Specifically, it will assess the Sandinistas' domestic
policies, focusing on economic, political, and military developments,
along with key variables and alternative outcomes.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe the Sandinistas have not changed their longstanding
goal of building aMarxist-Leninist state. The new Central American
Peace Plan-while perhaps delaying Ma.nagua's timetable for consolida-
tion-probably will fail to guarantee significant democratic pluralism in
Nicaragua. The Sandinista decision to sign the Plan is primarily a
tactical step designed to achieve three major objectives:
- Eliminate the anti-Sandinista insurgency as a threat to the
regime. The insurgency has begun to strain Nicaragua's military
resources considerably, and Managua faces the prospect of a
long and costly struggle should US support for the rebels be
continued.
- Reduce the economic burden to Nicaragua of a prolonged
counterinsurgency effort. The Sandinistas are beset by a sharply
deteriorating economy and rising popular dissatisfaction, and
there are no quick fixes in sight.
- Gain renewed international recognition and support for the
regime. Although the Soviet Bloc has poured nearly $2 billion in
military and economic aid into Nicaragua over the last two
years, Moscow probably wants i:o reduce the burden and avoid
the appearance of Nicaragua as a Soviet client state.
The Sandinista regime has strengthened its internal control mecha-
nisms considerably during the past few years, and it thus appears
willing to begin to implement a regional peace agreement in which it
promises some democratic pluralism anal a lifting of constraints on the
opposition in return for an end to all external support of the insurgency:
- The Sandinistas control all the major levers of internal power,
including the military and internal security forces, the govern-
ment bureaucracy, and the mans media.
- The new Nicaraguan Constitution, while honoring civil liberties
in the abstract, has provided the Sandinistas a legal cornerstone
to restrict opposition activities while cementing the political
dominancy of the Sandinista Party.
- The Sandinista Directorate, despite some internal differences
over tactics, remains firmly united over the basic goal of
consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist revolution.
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- The internal political opposition is weak and disorganized, and
it has been hampered by regime repression and its own internal
disputes.
Thus we see little prospect that the democratic opposition will be
able to coalesce and gain enough strength to seriously challenge
Sandinista control over the next year or so, even if the current Peace
Plan is implemented in its initial stages by the regime. Nevertheless, the
Peace Plan will offer democratic opposition parties an opportunity to
test the regime's willingness to ease restrictions on political activity
inside Nicaragua:
- Much ,will depend on whether the internal opposition and the
armed resistance can forge links to exploit the democratic
opening promised under the Peace Plan.
- Most internal opposition leaders have been reluctant to identif y
closely with the armed resistance cause for fear of Sandinista
retaliation, and they will probably remain cautious until they
can determine the full effect of the new Peace Plan on their
ability to challenge the regime and avoid serious reprisals.
- The majority of the urban population, although increasingly
dissatisfied with the Sandinistas, probably will remain apathetic
about the resistance leadership and reluctant to embrace openly
the insurgent cause.
- The regime also will have to confront strikes and demonstrations
by independent labor unions, which-because of tf,e dismal
economic situation-have the potential to embarrass the Sandi-
nistas seriously.
In our view, the insurgents have improved their combat capabili-
ties substantially since the renewal of US military assistance in October
1986. They now pose a significant military challenge to the Sandinistas,
but are unlikely to be able to overthrow the regime over the next 18
months. Moreover, it will be extremely difficult for them to remain a
viable force under the terms of the Peace Plan:
the insurgents have been able to infiltrate
and sustain the bulk of their troops-some 14,000 combatants
out of a total force of about 18,000-inside Nicaragua. Under
the Peace Plan, many insurgents are likely to return to Hondu-
ras, which is required to cease all support for the rebels after
early November 1987.
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- The insurgents also are better trained and are fighting more
competently. They have the tactical initiative in northern and
central Nicaragua, but a cutoff of all external support would kill
their momentum and severely damage their prospects.
- Insurgent dependence on external resupply has increased con-
siderably, and it will be difficult for them to remain in
Nicaragua during the cease-fire called for in the Peace Plan
without a reliable source of hurnanitarian aid, particularly food
and medicine. Furthermore, compliance with the cease-fire is
likely to put the insurgents at a considerable military
disadvantage.
- Finally, the rebels are likely to have significant problems
attempting to maintain their manpower strength. They have
been unable to recruit in the more heavily populated Pacific
coastal lowlands of Nicaragua over the past several years, and
their rural recruits may begin to abandon the struggle if they see
little hope of future support.
Perhaps equally damaging for the rebels' prospects will be the
difficulty of building a political progrann to take advantage of the Peace
Plan. On balance, the pace of rebel political efforts has continued to lag
that of their military operations:
- Propaganda efforts have improved over the past year as a result
of the startup of Radio Liberation and a greater awareness on
the part of some rebel commanders of the need for effective
psychological operations.
- The Plan does not provide any political role for the insurgents
other than to accept an amnesty and abide by the cease-fire,
however, and Radio Liberation is required to be shut down
under the Peace Plan.
- The new Nicaraguan Resistance political directorate has the
potential to bolster the insurgents' credibility both inside Nica-
ragua and abroad, but differences over strategy under the Peace
Plan may cause splits within the leadership.
- We believe the Sandinistas will take strong steps to intimidate
the Resistance leadership and prevent any effective political
challenge inside Nicaragua.
For their part, the Sandinistas faces no constraints on their military
efforts under the Peace Plan beyond the call for acease-fire, and,
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although there is a provision for an eventual regional arms control
agreement, no time frame is set:
- Over the next year or so, the Sandinista military will probably
wage an intense campaign to destroy any rebel units that ref use
to take part in the cease-fire. The Sandinistas' manpower and
firepower superiority-over 70,000 troops on active duty and
some 46,000 in reserve-have allowed the regime to maintain
the overall strategic advantage despite mounting rebel pressure.
Soviet Bloc and Cuban military and economic assistance will
remain critical for the survival of the regime, and we expect the aid to
continue to flow despite recent indications that Moscow is increasingly
irritated with Nicaragua's waste and mismanagement of economic
resources:
- Economic disbursements from Communist countries totaled
over $1 billion during the last two years, and Moscow is likely to
continue substantial economic support under the new Peace
Plan.
- Substantial increases in Western aid, however, are unlikely.
Over the past two years sympathy for the regime has faded as
Sandinista intentions have become more apparent. There may
be some increase in multilateral aid, however, if the Central
American states are able to sustain a viable peace plan.
On the military side, the Soviet Bloc has supplied almost all the
hardware for Nicaragua's military buildup, and we believe Moscow and
its allies will continue to provide the Sandinistas with the materiel
needed to sustain the counterinsurgency effort:
- Soviet and East European military deliveries to Nicaragua rose
to $584 million in 1986, and the total this year is likely to be
close to that figure. The Peace Plan does not place any limits on
Soviet or Cuban support for the Sandinistas, although Moscow
may use the opportunity presented under the Plan to reduce
somewhat its military aid and appear to be supportive of the
peace process with little, if any, adverse effect on Sandinista
consolidation.
- We believe that Moscow will continue to be sensitive to US
injunctions against the presence of advanced fighter aircraft in
Nicaragua. Nevertheless, Moscow may eventually deliver the
MIGs if permitted to do so under a regional arms agreement.
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- We believe Cuba, for its part, will remain heavily committed to
supporting the Sandinista regime. It probably would agree to
withdraw the bulk of its some 1,500 to 2,000 military advisers
and technicians currently in Nicaragua, but only in exchange
for a concurrent US withdrawal :from the region.
We see no likelihood that Nicaragua will adhere to a regional
peace agreement that meets all major US concerns. Managua probably
will take some cosmetic steps to permit a democratic opening, suspend
support for other regional insurgencies, and engage in arms limitation
talks, all for temporary advantage:
- In our view, Managua is likely to continue its strategy of using
regional peace negotiations to buy time for the consolidation of
the regime, to ease external pressures by demonstrating flexibili-
ty to outsiders, and to try to obtain a guarantee that the United
States will not attempt to overthrow the regime.
- We believe that, even though Managua has agreed to support
democratic pluralism, it will not follow through on internal
democratic reforms that would risk its hold on power.
- The Sandinistas probably will continue clandestine support for
regional insurgencies once it is safe to do so.
We believe that the future of US funding for the rebels is the single
most critical variable:
- In our view, US military and nonlethal assistance has generated
considerable military momentum for the opposition, and the
fate of the US program will have major implications for the
prospects for democracy in Nicaragua.
- A continuation of US aid to the insurgents and the internal
opposition, contingent on full Sandinista compliance with a
comprehensive peace agreement, would keep the pressure on
Managua to allow greater democratic freedoms.
- Increased and extended US support for the insurgents would
prevent Sandinista consolidation over the next 18 months, and
beyond that, continued aid would make regime consolidation
increasingly uncertain.
- On the other hand, the Central ?imerican democracies probably
calculate that a halt of all US suX-port to the rebels would enable
Managua to consolidate its internal revolution, barring direct US
military intervention.
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- As a result, pressures from Nicaragua's neighbors for continued
US support to rebuild their economies and contain potential
subversion would increase. At the same time, they would be
under greater pressure to seek an accommodation with
Managua.
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DISCUSSIC>N
Progress Toward Consolidation
1. During the last two years, the Sandinistas have
made continued progress toward their longstanding
goal of building aMarxist-Leninist state in Nicaragua.
An expanded state of emergency-combined with
behind-the-scenes pressure and harassment-has re-
duced the maneuvering room of the democratic oppo-
sition and kept opposition groups in the Sandinista-
dominated National Assembly under wraps. By
skillfully exploiting divisions among the opposition and
by intimidation and arbitrary arrests, the Sandinistas
have reduced their opponent's political stature at
home and abroad, prompting several prominent oppo-
sition leaders to go into self-imposed exile. Tightened
censorship, highlighted by the closure of La Prensa,
the country's last independent newspaper, cinched the
regime's monopoly of the media, making it nearly
impossible for the opposition's voice to be heard inside
Nicaragua. Similarly, the expulsion last year of several
prominent antiregime clerics and the closure of the
church radio station has put the Catholic Church, the
Sandinistas' strongest domestic opponent, increasingly
on the defensive.
2. Simultaneously, Managua's military buildup,
keyed to providing a shield behind which the Sandinis-
tas can consolidate their control and support other
regional revolutionaries, has continued apace. The
armed forces-which now number over 70,000 active-
duty troops plus some 46,000 inactive reserves and
militia-are the largest and best equipped in Central
America. In addition, the large and pervasive Interior
Ministry gives the Sandinistas an effective tool for
maintaining internal control and political consolida-
tion.
They Peace Plan
3. On 7 August 1987, at a presidential summit in
Guatemala, President Ortega decided to sign a Central
American Peace Plan that essentially requires the
Sandinistas to grant considerable democratic freedoms
to the unarmed internal political opposition in return
for a commitment by other regional states to cease all
fortns of support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents.
Nonregional states, which would include the United
States, are requested to suspend such aid. The primary
factor that motivated Ortega to sign the agreement
probably was a US peace plan announced lust before
the summit, which he feared might result in continued
US aid to the insurgency. The Sandinistas were to be
given until 30 September 1987 to implement the US
plan
4. Ortega probably viewed the proposed Central
American Peace Plan as more advantageous to Nicara-
gua, which has been under considerable military and
economic strains:
-- It would not require the Sandinistas to negotiate
with the armed opposition.
-- Managua would not have to grant political free-
doms to the opposition until 7 November 1987,
but the United States probably would have to
halt aid to the insurgents when current legislation
expires on 30 September 1987.
They Sandinistas are essentially gambling that they can
keep the opposition under sufficient control while
forcing an end to the insurgency. This would give
them some hope of reversing a serious economic
decline and obtaining additional international eco-
nomic aid for the regime.
Through its control over the police and the
national telephone, postal, and prison systems, the
ministry reaches into the daily life of potentially every
Nicaraguan.
Facing Internal Challenges
5. The Sandinistas enter their ninth year in power
facing maior domestic challenges, which, in addition
to the intensified insurgency, have ensued from their
efforts to consolidate the revolution. A deteriorating
economy and growing frustration over Sandinista re-
pression have undermined popular support for the
regime, increased cynicism among some regime offi-
cers, and given opposition parties some hope that they
could broaden their political space. Reflecting the
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Figure 1
Rebel Operating Areas in Nicaragua
anduras
E{
Salvad
Golfo de
Fonseca
Notch Pacific
Ocean
~ ERN-South
(Nicaraguan
0 YAMATA
ERN-North
ce Army~lorth)
(Nicaraguan Resistan
` \ \\~\\\\\\r~~
\\\~\\\\
\~ ~ \ \\\
.~ ~\\\..
\xr .\\\\\~~\
\t3oaco. \ ~ \ ~\ \ \ \
r_a o da ~ Depa/'tmerrt\ \ \ \ \'
g \ \\\\\\ \\' ~
Managua ~~ \\\\\\~\\
\` .\ \\\\
Chonta ~ \ \ \ \
Deparfinerit \~ \ \ ~
\` \ \\\\
\\\\\\'
\\\~`~\
\\\ \w
tago de \ ~\\ \
Nicaragua ~ \ ~ \
\\~~
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_~_
(Atlantic Coast Indian Organization)
Concentrated rebel activity
0 50 Kilometers
1 ~ 7~
0 50 Miles
heightened popular dissatisfaction with regime poli-
cies, several small disturbances, some of them violent,
have erupted over the past year. In addition, the
continued insurgency has put serious strains on the
Sandinistas' limited economic and manpower re-
sources. Finally, as Managua has become almost totally
reliant on Soviet Bloc military and economic support
for its survival, it has seen its independent image erode
both domestically and internationally.
Sea
The Economy
6. Halting Nicaragua's deep economic slide will be
the key challenge for regime strategists, and they
probably hope that the new Peace Plan will allow
Managua to devote more resources to economic devel-
opment. The economy has been in a tailspin because
of Sandinista economic mismanagement, and during
the past 18 months it has been further strained by the
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growing civil war, continuing problems related to the
US trade embargo, and the negative impact of increas-
ing state control on overall productivity. Real wages
and personal income are half of pre-1979 levels and
inflation has skyrocketed, jumping from 330 percent
in 1985 to nearly 750 percent last year. We estimate
real per capita GDP fell by about 7.5 percent in 1985
and 1986, and that overall economic activity is now
one-third below prerevolutionary levels. Hard curren-
cy export earnings are less than half of 1984 levels and
just a fraction of the prerevolutionary amount.
7. The impact of the decline on the living standards
of the bulk of the Nicaraguan populace has been
severe, and, although the government is moving to
ease shortages, living standards will almost certainly
continue to decline during the period of this Estimate.
Despite emergency food shipments from the Soviet
Union, staples such as rice, cooking oil, and beans are
likely to be periodically unavailable. Electrical brown-
outs, water shortages, and other disruptions in public
services will multiply. Although many middle- and
upper-income citizens resort to the black markets,
where commodities cost many times their official
price, this option clearly is not open to most families.
As a result, many low-income families, especially in
urban areas, must rely increasingly on the informal-
barter economy.
8. The depth o t e economic falloff, the threat of
more public unrest, and possibly pressure from Mos-
cow have spurred Managua to lift some controls on the
distribution of consumer goods in an effort to ease
shortages. The regime has removed roadblocks around
the capital that had been set up to stop the flow of
contraband goods and suspended police raids on illegal
markets. To increase the flow of consumer goods, some
production incentives have been implemented, and
restrictions were lifted on private importers of con-
sumer goods. Other moves are possible, especially
those aimed at reducing corruption and limiting inef-
ficiencies in the distribution system. Although the
regime has recently displayed an unprecedented will-
ingness to discuss economic issues with private-sector
leaders, we believe the Sandinistas remain unwilling to
make concessions to them that would jeopardize San-
dinista control over major economic decisions.
9. Although the loosening of some economic restric-
tions probably will help ease distribution bottlenecks,
the Nicaraguan economy has deteriorated to the point
that there are no quick fixes. With no expectations for
significant increases in domestic production, dramatic
upswings in Western aid, or a major increase in Soviet
assistance, we expect to see continued economic dete-
rioration over the next two years. So do the Sandinis-
tas. In an unusually blunt warning to the people, a
gavernment spokesman admitted that economic
growth in 1987 will be negative and that Managua's
prime objective will be to keep the deterioration from
worsening. In such circumstances popular morale will
continue to slide.
Popular Unrest
10. Popular dissatisfaction with Sandinista policies
is likely to intensify, but the regime probably will be
able to contain opposition strikes and other demonstra-
tions should it fully lift the state of emergency as
required under the Peace Plan by early November.
Economic distress is-and probably will continue to
be-the root cause of discontent, but Sandinista ha-
rassment of the Catholic Church, human rights viola-
tions, repression of individual liberties, and indoctrina-
tion efforts also rankle many Nicaraguans.
Disgruntlement with forced military service continues
to run high, although overt resistance has diminished.
In the countryside, some 250,000 peasants have al-
ready been moved away from areas of insurgent
activity-most of them forcibly-exacerbating ten-
sions caused by intrusive government policies and
shrinking social services. Deep-rooted ethnic tensions
will keep most Atlantic coast Indians suspicious of the
Sandinistas.
11. Growing disgruntlement has not yet turned into
o~ren resistance, and we doubt that it will unless
Nicaraguans come to believe they can successfully
challenge the regime under the Peace Plan. Antire-
gi:me incidents so far appear spontaneous, have lacked
clear leadership, and have been suppressed easily. The
overwhelming presence of Sandinista security forces
accounts for much of the quiesence, although
the citizenry is
preoccupied with the daily search for food and other
necessities, especially in urban areas. Emmigration is a
safety valve. We estimate upwards of 50,000 individ-
uals left Nicaragua last year, most going to Honduras
acid Costa Rica. Recent US border patrol statistics
indicate, however, that the flow of undocumented
Nicaraguans into the United States is increasing-up
by over 50 percent so far this year.
12. Regime officials closely monitor the public
mood, and they have been focusing on minimizing
rural discontent in order to undermine support for the
insurgents. Peasants comprise the bulk of insurgent
recruits and in some areas supply rebel field units with
food, shelter, information on Sandinista troop move-
ments, and medical assistance. Within the limits im-
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Cease-Fire
- Takes place in 90 days (7 November 1987).
- "Within constitutional framework."
- No provision for direct talks with rebels.
External Aid to Insurgents
- Governments will request cutoff of aid to irregular
forces to take place in 90 days; permits aid for
repatriation or relocation.
-Governments will request rebels to refrain from
receiving aid.
- Governments reiterate pledges to prevent their
territory from being used by rebels and to refrain
from giving or permitting military logistic support
for those "who try to destabilize" the Central
American governments.
Amnesty
- Takes place in 90 days.
- (Unclear if all political prisoners must be released.)
- Rebels must release their prisoners simultaneously.
National Reconciliation Commission
- To be formed within 20 days from signature.
- Purpose is to verify fulfillment of pledges on
amnesty, cease-fire, democratization, and
elections.
Composition: one member and one alternate from
government, church, opposition parties, and lead-
ing citizens; government chooses church and oppo-
sition members from lists they provide.
- Takes place in 90 days.
- "Broad, democratic, and pluralist systems" but
each nation has right to choose economic and
political system without foreign interference.
-Complete liberty for television, radio, and press;
no prior censorship; all ideological groups may
own and operate news media; full access to media
for political groups.
-All political organizations have right to organize
and hold public demonstrations.
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- "Once the conditions that characterize a democra-
cy have been established," the governments must
establish free elections.
- Central American Parliament elections by July
1988; OAS, United Nations, and (unidentified)
third states to observe.
-Municipal, legislative, and presidential elections to
be overseen by international observers; schedule in
accordance with current constitutions.
- Security and verification agreements to be negoti-
ated with Contadora mediation; talks to include
measures to disarm rebels.
- (No date for termination of negotiations.)
Refugees
- Governments pledge to protect and aid; facilitate
repatriation.
Development
- Governments pledge to reach accords to expedite
development; joint negotiations for international
aid.
- Purpose is to verify and follow up on provisions of
document, including reconciliation.
- Membership: OAS and UN Secretary General;
Central American, Contadora, and support group
foreign ministers.
- Will analyze progress within 120 days.
- Central American presidents to meet within 150
days.
(Other)
- Accord is a presidential agreement, not a treaty;
no provision for legislative ratification.
- Agreement, not a treaty; no provision for legisla-
tive ratification.
- Agreement is open ended.
- No sanctions for violations of agreement.
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Signature (7 August 1987)
-Governments appeal to regional states suffering
from insurgencies to reach agreement ending
hostilities.
15 Days (22 August 1987)
- Central American Foreign Ministers meet as an
Executive Commission to regulate and make via-
ble compliance with agreements contained in this
document; organization of work commissions.
20 Day (27 August 1987)
- National Reconciliation Commissions to be
formed.
90 Days (7 November 1987)
- Cease-fire takes place.
-Governments request cutoff of external aid to
rebels.
- Governments ask rebels not to receive aid.
- Government grants amnesty; rebels release
prisoners.
- Democratization provisions take effect, including
political freedoms, press freedom, and end of state
of siege restrictions.
20 Days (7 December 1987)
- International Verification and Follow-Up Com-
mission analyzes progress made in fulfillment of
agreement.
150 Days (7 January 1988)
- Central American Presidents will meet to discuss
the report of the Verification Commission.
By First Semester 1988 (30 June 1988)
-Simultaneous elections for the Central American
Parliament, with international observation.
-Arms control talks begin, with Contadora
mediation.
posed by the economic crisis and the Peace Plan,
Managua is likely to pursue aggressively the two-
pronged strategy it adopted in late 1985 to del with
rural unrest-expand socioeconomic benefits-includ-
ing distribution of individual land titles-while step-
ping up legal sanctions against regime opponents.
13. Although maior urban areas are securely under
government control, discontent in the cities would be
rriore potentially damaging to the regime. Unrest there
could be more explosive, especially if it were wide-
spread. The regime will have to confront embarrassing
strikes and labor unrest. Even if it lifts the state of
emergency, however, it still has the legal right to use
force to control public disorders and prevent violence.
Nevertheless, the regime would be required by the
Peace Plan to remove all restrictions on freedom of
assembly and the mass media, thus permitting greater
opposition freedom to challenge Sandinista policies.
The owners of La Prensa, Nicaragua's last indepen-
dent newspaper shut down in 1986, already have
requested permission to resume publication without
censorship.
14. We believe the unity of Sandinista leaders will
reinforce the ability of the security apparatus to deal
with potential unrest. Top Sandinista leaders, since
coming to power in 1979, have maintained a unity
extraordinary for any collegial-type government lead-
ership. Policy differences have been tactical rather
than strategic, and we believe there is little disagree-
ment over basic goals and directions. Moreover, be-
cause the Army, the bureaucracy, and the National
Assembly are dominated by Sandinistas, institutional
roadblocks to implementation of Directorate policies
are almost nil:
the Peace Plan.
Nevertheless, although details are sketchy, there
are signs that differences over economic policy
within the ruling nine-man Sandinista National
Directorate have become more pronounced in
recent months. Underscoring hardliner opposi-
tion to recently announced reforms, Directorate
member Luis Carrion, a strong backer of Interior
Minister Tomas Borge, has publicly criticized
advocates of economic pragmatism as following a
path benefiting " ...the interests of the rich and
the merchants." On balance, although we believe
hardliner dissatisfaction is unlikely to lead to
serious splits in the Directorate or decisionmak-
ing paralysis, the regime probably will have
continued differences over whether and how to
implement the various democratic provisions of
The Internal Opposition
15. Opposition political leaders appear convinced
that the country's mounting economic woes are creat-
ing aclimate of discontent that will work to their
benefit under the Peace Plan, but we are not so
sanguine. Deep factional disputes plaguing most par-
ties, as well as serious penetrations of their ranks by
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Figure 2
Nicaragua: Economic Indicators, 1978-87
-25 100 I -40
_nr,nr,nl-I
-30 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 0 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 45 1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Imports ~ 8
Exports
a Dces not include large losses by government-
owned businesses.
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Sandinista agents, probably will undermine their grass-
roots organization efforts as well as their ability to
mobilize popular support. The Democratic Coordinat-
ing Board-the main opposition coalition and one that
includes political, labor, and private-sector groups-is
moribund, torn by internal splits and divided over the
extent to which it should participate in political
structures dominated by the regime. Nevertheless,
opposition groups already have held several small
demonstrations, and more are probable in the months
ahead as the opposition seeks to test Sandinista willing-
ness to adhere to the agreement.
16. Winning international support will be an uphill
battle for the democratic opposition, and they need
considerable external support if they are to have any
hope of prospering. Most West European governments
sere the opposition as uninspired, hopelessly divided,
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and too weak to challenge the regime. We believe
Western capitals are unlikely to provide meaningful
financial or political backing, despite the opportunity
provided by the Peace Plan. The majority of South
American and Caribbean governments probably share
similar sentiments. Guatemala provides political and
limited financial assistance to the Social Christian
Party and may increase its support as a result of the
Peace Plan. Other Central American governments,
wary of being accused of interference in Nicaragua's
internal affairs, are likely to continue to focus on
verbal efforts to get the Sandinistas to live up to the
democratic provisions of the Plan.
17. Additionally, the internal opposition will be
hard pressed to take advantage of any potential open-
ing to expand political cooperation with the insurgents'
political leadership.
Moreover, because many in the internal opposition
probably are uncertain about the viability of the
insurgency, we believe they will probably see stronger
links to rebel political leaders as too dangerous, at least
until they can fully assess the implications of the Peace
Plan
19. Managua has been quick to state that its consti-
tution and existing amnesty law already guarantee
most of the political rights demanded by the Peace
Plan. Further, the Sandinistas probably will delay
lifting all the state-of-emergency restrictions or per-
mitting other opposition rights until the insurgents
fully comply with the cease-fire and foreign states
cease all support for the insurgency. The Sandinistas
have a political advantage in dealing with the insur-
gents because the Peace Plan requires them to initiate
a dialogue only with the unarmed opposition groups.
of any kind."
21. Against this background, it probably will be
difficult for the International Verification Commis-
sion-which will consist primarily of the Contadora
and Support Group Foreign Ministers-to reach a
consensus about any violations in Sandinista compli-
ance with the Peace Plan. In the past, these Ministers
have been reluctant to take any strong actions that
could be regarded as interference in a state's internal
affairs. The Peace Plan itself also does not provide for
sanctions in the event of violations. Thus the Plan is
heavily weighted in favor of the governments in
power, which are given the right to determine their
own "political model ... without outside interference
ately after the Constitution went into effect.
20. The new Constitution, promulgated in January
1987, while honoring civil liberties in the abstract,
provides the Sandinistas a legal cornerstone to restrict
opposition activities while cementing the political
dominance of the Sandinista Party. Underscoring the
Sandinistas' narrow definition of democracy, the Con-
stitution is described in the preamble as an instrument
for the institutionalization of the achievements of the
revolution. Restrictive parameters for political partici-
pation-for example, the Constitution stipulates that
groups "advocating a return to the past" will not be
recognized-will give the regime a legal rationale to
undermine the opposition even further while main-
taining apositive international image. Reflecting the
regime's determination to keep the opposition in
check, the state of emergency was reinstated immedi-
22. With extensive external support, the anti-Sandi-
nista armed opposition have become a significant
challenge to the regime and its consolidation. Never-
theless, we do not believe the insurgency is capable of
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Creating the New Constitution
Drafting a new constitution that would cement Sandinista dominance absorbed the attention of the National Assembly for
much of the past two years. Assembly members made highly publicized trips to Western Europe, Latin America, and the So-
cialist Bloc to consult with constitutional experts. The Sandinista-controlled press gave wide coverage to Assembly-sponsored
town meetings held to canvas popular opinion. Underscoring the Sandinista recognition of the importance of winning
international applause, several meetings were held in the United States. The final draft was completed last fall and approved
by the National Assembly in December 1986. The Sandinistas will almost certainly point to their Constitution as proof of their
compliance with the Peace Plan.
Even though major democratic parties are excluded from the Assetbly because they boycotted elections in 1984, the regime
stacked the drafting process in its favor:
-The Sandinistas and their allies among the legal opposition parties dominated the Assembly commissions charged with
drafting the Constitution.
- "Open town meetings" sponsored by the Assembly to foster "debate" on the Constitution were a triumph of rhetoric over
substance; comments and questions were subject to prior review and participation was limited to regime backers.
Even though Assembly President Carlos Nunez, a member of the Sandinista National Directorate, privately characterized
the Constitution as a tool of the revolution and said it would not provide a legal basis for the overthrow of Sandinista power,
there are signs that the Constitution has caused concern among regime hardliners. Some idealogues fear it will provide an
opening for the political enemies of the Sandinistas. Others see it as a departure from the radical line of the revolution.
The final draft passed by the National Assembly was far less dogmatic than the two earlier versions. Wording that would at-
tract negative international comment was excised or watered down. A close look at the document, however, leaves little doubt
that it ties Nicaragua's future to that of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Key provisions include:
Provision
Political pluralism
Exists without ideological re- Provision is so broad that any politi-
strictions except for those cal opposition group who advocates
that seek a return to the changes in the political system
conditions present under could be declared illegal.
former President Somoza or
advocate a similar system.
Mixed economy
All forms of property must Allows broad limitations on private
serve the nation's higher in- property and profits by assigning a
terest and contribute to the public purpose to private property.
creation of wealth to meet
the needs of the country.
National economy
The state directs and plans Makes the state the manager of
the national economy to every aspect of the national
guarantee and defend the economy.
interests of the maiority and
to guide it in terms of the
objectives of socioeconomic
progress.
National defense
The Army is a national The Army, in reality an armed
army, and as the direct heir wing of the Sandinista Party, is the
of the National Sovereignty permanent guardian of party
Defense Army is the peo- interests.
ple's armed force.
Provision
Presidential prerogatives
Issues executive decrees with Confirms preeminence of presi-
the force of law in fiscal and dent. Reelection allowed. Will
administrative matters. As- make succession question potential-
sumes legislative powers ly divisive.
when Assembly in recess.
Cary declare a state of emer-
gency.
National assembly
Can grant and cancel the We believe these provisions will be
legal personality of civil and abused to suppress political parties
reli;~ious entities. and the Catholic Church.
Electoral council
Proposed by President, ap- Gives regime total control over
proved by Assembly. To or- electoral process.
ganize and supervise elec-
tions. Final arbitrator of
complaints and challenges
presented by parties.
Constitutional reform
Assembly can reform at Ensures that only the Sandinistas
presidential request, or at will be able to make changes.
the request of at least one-
third of the members of the
Assembly. Approval of par-
tial changes to provisions re-
quires 60 percent of Assem-
bly delegates. Two-thirds
vote required for total
change.
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Insurgent Leadership
.' ' Adotfa - Alfonso
Calero Robelo
The Resistance Assembly
Currently composed of eight delegations of six mem-
bers each, the Assembly represents a cross section of the
political opposition in exile and includes members of
the Social Christian Party, the Social Democratic Party,
the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Southern
Opposition Bloc, labor, business, and agriculture/rebel
military organizations. Six seats have also been allocated
for Atlantic coast natives, pending their decision to
subordinate their organization to the movement. The
Assembly is responsible for drafting and legislating
studies, laws, and regulations pertaining to the resis-
tance. It is also charged with establishing the economic,
social, and juridical precepts for a future provisional
government. The Assembly also elects the Resistance
Directorate.
The Resistance Directorate. Currently consists of
six members-seventh seat is vacant awaiting participa-
tion by Atlantic coast representatives. The directorate is
the resistance's executive body and is responsible for
managing and administrating financial and material
resources in agreement with the rules established by the
Maria Azucena _ "? -LL? I Pedro
Ferret' es~i'! ' ~hairrworro
central, and southern Nicaragua. Headed by former
Somoza National Guard Col. Enrique Bermudez, it is
composed largely of peasants and some former National
Guard and ex-Sandinista personnel.
The ERN-South. Known previously as the Southern
Front, the ERN-south consists of groups affiliated with
the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) and formerly allied
to ex-Sandinista leader Eden Pastora. It claims a combat
strength of 1,800 men and has reported a low to
moderate level of operations, largely in southeastern
Nicaragua.
The Atlantic Coast Indian Organization
Called Yatama, this recently formed organization
unites three Indian guerrilla factions formerly known as
Kisan, Misura, and Misurasata. Yatama-concerned
mostly with Atlantic coast autonomy issues-thus far
has been reluctant to formally ally itself with the
Nicaraguan resistance, and its own tenuous unity is
threatened by bitter, underlying personal rivalries be-
tween some of its leaders. Yamata may have over 600
fighters operating along Nicaragua's east coast, but, thus
Assembly.
The Nicaraguan Resistance Army (ERN)
The ERN-North. Formerly called the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN), the ERN-North is the largest
and by far the most active rebel military organization.
It claims an overall strength of some 16,000 and has
conducted widespread operations in rural northern,
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far has carried out only limited tactical activity.
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toppling the regime over the next 18 months. More-
over, the Peace Plan represents a maior blow to the
military prospects of the insurgents, and they will face
a variety of serious problems and uncertainties in the
coming months.~~
fully infiltrated and maintained the bulk of their
combat forces inside Nicaragua. The guerrillas' logistic
pipeline has improved and usually is meeting basic
ammunition and quartermaster supply needs of tacti-
cal commanders on a timely basis. In their areas of
operation in northern and central Nicaragua, the
rebels have sustained a larger force presence and
generally maintained the tactical initiative. They have
forced the Sandinistas to react to a widespread and
much more intense campaign of attacks, ambushes,
and sabotage. Rebel military successes have increased
the regime's casualties and economic costs and clearly
strained the capabilities of its armed forces. Rebel air
defense also has improved as a result of the acquisition
of Redeye missiles.
Insurgent Strengths
24. The rebels are better trained and equipped and
are fighting more competently, carrying out more
night operations, and more effectively breaking con-
tact when confronted by superior Sandinista numbers
or firepower. Although the bulk of insurgent actions
have focused on relatively small and poorly defended
ob~e~ctives, they have also hit some military outposts
and small garrisons. Some recent actions indicate the
rebels are increasing their capability to operate suc-
cessfully against more significant military targets. The
rebels have suffered setbacks when they eschewed
small-unit tactics and became decisively engaged by
Sandinista counterinsurgency units. However, they
have periodically inflicted losses on similar Sandinista
units. Although we have received some reports of rebel
desertions, we fudge overall morale to be good, and the
to be strongly
2:i. Although individual operations are often tacti-
cally successful, the ability of the insurgent strategic
command to coordinate these efforts toward overall
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strategic objectives is still limited. Leadership effec-
tiveness among rebel commanders also is uneven, and
the level of tactical success attributable to some units
appears relatively low.
26. The rebels remain highly dependent on external
support for the logistic resources needed to fight the
war and for the technical expertise required for
fire then comes into effect, the rebels will need
humanitarian assistance, particularly food and medi-
cine, to sustain their forces inside Nicaragua.
27. Despite their tactical gains, the rebels' numeri-
cal strength has not grown, primarily because their
rural recruitment base has been largely exhausted over
the past several years. Rebel operations remain con-
fined largely to relatively remote rural areas where
low population densities will not afford much prospect
for substantial force growth in the near term. The
various insurgent factions continue to report an overall
strength of some 18,000, about 14,000 of which are
said to be in country. The rebels have not yet demon-
strated the capability to penetrate major towns or
conduct significant operations in the more populous
western portions of the country. Any increases in
strength over the longer term will continue to depend
on the insurgents' ability to expand their operations
into urban areas, further improve their logistic capa-
bilities, and undertake more meaningful efforts to gain
the political support of the population.
Political Dynamics
28. Although insurgent leaders appear to better
recognize the value of psychological operations, the
pace of rebel political efforts in the countryside
continues to lag well behind that of their military
operations. Some commanders are conducting political
lectures in their tactical areas of responsibility, but we
do not know their impact on the population. They also
lack a firm political infrastructure in their areas of
operation. Moreover, many commanders are not polit-
ically sophisticated and are often inclined to rely on
military rather than political means to extend insur-
revolution that still enjoy popular support.
gent influence.
29. Although the rebels' overall human rights re-
cord appears to have improved considerably, reports
persist of violations by some units. Rebel attacks on
some economic infrastructure targets and armed agri-
cultural cooperatives are increasing the costs of the
war to the population as well as the regime, but these
have played directly into Sandinista propaganda ef-
forts to portray the rebels as brutal. The insurgents still
lack a charismatic spokesman and have not articulated
a positive political program that distinguishes their
antipathy toward the Sandinistas from their attitudes
toward those goals and achievements of the 1979
30. A clandestine AM station, Radio Liberation, has
been established to broadcast the rebels' political
message, and it is attracting an increasing audience of
Nicaraguans seeking independent reporting of events.
The regime is now jamming the radio in most of the
Managua area, where one-third of the population
lives. Aerial leaflet drops have also been conducted on
the insurgents' behalf. These developments are in-
creasing the population's awareness of the insurgency.
However, the creation of the in-country economic and
political infrastructure needed to sustain the anti-
Sandinista insurgents over the longer term will contin-
ue to depend on more effective rebel efforts at the
grassroots level.
31. The recent formation of a new, more broadly
based insurgent umbrella organization, the Nicaraguan
Resistance, has begun to enhance the rebels' political
image abroad, but its effectiveness in challenging the
Sandinistas' international and domestic credibility will
depend on its various factions overcoming longstand-
ing policy differences and personality conflicts. Over
the past several months, Resistance political leaders
have for the first time met openly with several Latin
American leaders. Guatemala's President Cerezo, for
example, recently held meetings with them and of-
fered Guatemala as a site for future meetings, and
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they also have held meetings with Presidents Duarte
and Azcona. Polls conducted among refugees from
Nicaragua, however, suggest the rebel leadership still
is little known in country. Moreover, past infighting
and resignations of key leaders hurt the organization,
and it will probably continue to have difficulty coordi-
nating strategy.
32. The ability of the Resistance to establish more
effective links within the internal political opposition
will probably be limited by effective Sandinista inter-
nal security measures. Most will remain reluctant to
place their lives and political and economic interests at
risk, especially while the rebels' long-term prospects
are uncertain. The regime has fully penetrated most
opposition organizations, and their leaders have little,
if any, capability to operate clandestinely. The depth
of popular support enjoyed by most groups and their
ability to mobilize it within Nicaragua are also prob-
lematic.
Outlook for the Insurgency
Probable Effect of the Peace Plan
33. If adherence to the Peace Plan results in a
cutoff of US support for the insurgency at the end of
September 1987, along with an end to support from
Honduras and other regional states by early Novem-
ber, we fudge there will be serious negative conse-
quences for the Nicaraguan resistance. Unlike the
Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels, the anti-Sandinista
insurgents do not have an adequate internal support
network, and they have little remaining time to
develop one. Thus, a key to the insurgents' survival
inside Nicaragua would be to get enough humanitar-
ian support to sustain themselves as a viable and
cohesive force:
The reduction in military support will probably
make the rebels reluctant to engage in heavy
combat operations over the next few months, and
they are likely to lose the tactical initiative.
Morale is likely to plummet, and the insurgents
may be hard pressed to prevent increased
desertions.
-Over time, many insurgents may be tempted to
return to Honduras either armed or as refugees,
causing considerable problems for Tegucigalpa.
- Efforts to increase the Nicaraguan population's
awareness of the insurgency, such as Radio Li-
beracion and leaflet drops, will have to cease
under the Peace Plan, which prohibits any out-
side propaganda support for the insurgent
groups.
- It will be difficult for the insurgents to comply
with the cease-fire without placing themselves at
considerable military risk. Even an in-place
cease-fire, with adequate verification, would put
them at a military disadvantage should the cease-
fire break down.
- In addition, the insurgent directorate will have to
deal with such problems as whether to accept
amnesty, how to be represented in cease-fire
negotiations, and what links to attempt to form to
the internal political opposition. Such issues may
cause splits within the directorate.
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34. The Peace Plan calls for the verification com-
mission to analyze the progress made toward fulfill-
mf;nt of its provisions beginning 30 days after the
cease-fire begins. Its report will not be presented to the
five Central American presidents until early January
1988-150 days after signing. It is doubtful that the 25X1
commission will be prepared to find Nicaragua out of
compliance unless the Sandinistas blatantly violate the
agreement. Even if the commission's report includes
allegations of noncompliance, there is no clear basis in
the agreement for justifying resumption of outside aid
to the insurgents. The longer the rebels are cut off
from external support, the greater the probable degra-
dation of their capabilities.
35. If the peace process should fail and aid be
restored by early 1988, we believe the insurgents
would encounter near-term difficulty in resuming
their operations and regaining lost momentum. Over
time, however, we fudge they would again become a
considerable drain on the regime's economic and
military resources. The rebels' prospects for maintain-
int; political unity and implementing an effective
grassroots political strategy would remain less certain
and would be a key variable to the insurgency's future.
We continue to believe increased military success
coupled with a viable political program that produced
active support in the cities would begin to shift the
strategic balance in the rebels' favor. Intensified rebel
military action in rural areas alone eventually may
force the regime to yield control of some portions of
the country to the insurgents, but would not result in
the regime's defeat, barring the direct intervention of
external forces.
The Sandinista Military
36. Sandinista leaders regard the next 18 months as
critical to the regime's survival, and their military
strategy will be designed to destroy the insurgency as a
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viable force while discouraging any intervention of US
forces. The regime appears to calculate that the next
US administration will be less inclined to take direct
military action against Nicaragua. If the regime can
survive politically, economically, and militarily for the
next year and a half, the Sandinistas believe their
prospects for consolidating power over the longer term
will be greatly improved
Military Capabilities
37. Over the past two years, the size and capabili-
ties of the regime's conventional defense and counter-
insurgency forces have continued to increase. We
estimate the Sandinista armed forces now number
over 70,000 active-duty troops and that inactive re-
serve and militia elements hold an additional 46,000
personnel. Although command and control problems
persist, the military's ability to integrate ground, air,
and artillery forces in defense and counterguerrilla
operations continues to improve gradually.
38. Conscription has been successfully institutional-
ized and is affording the Sandinistas a significant
military manpower base. Ongoing Soviet deliveries are
maintaining the regime's firepower capabilities and
are adding to equipment inventories for counterguer-
rilla and conventional defense operations. These devel-
opments have allowed the regime to maintain the
overall strategic advantage despite growing rebel mili-
tary pressure. Nevertheless, Sandinista capabilities are
being strained by the level of rebel activity.
Counterinsurgency Strategy
39. The Sandinistas initially attempted to prevent
the infiltration of large numbers of insurgents into
Nicaragua. That effort failed, and since early this year
the regime has sought to wage an intense war of
attrition designed to wear down insurgent forces and
outpace their resupply efforts. The Sandinistas have
continued aggressive small-unit patrolling across the
Honduran border and have undertaken several large-
scale but short-lived operations against rebel base areas
inside Honduras. The Sandinistas' manpower and fire-
power advantage have so far prevented the insurgents
from seizing and holding terrain and from moving into
more heavily populated areas of Nicaragua. The regi-
me's military operations probably have forced some
rebel units to divert from their assigned to less lucra-
tive targets. Nevertheless, Sandinista forces have not
been able to destroy any sizable rebel units nor
significantly impair rebel resupply activities.
Table 1
Trends in the Military Buildup
Armored personnel carriers and
reconnaissance vehicles
185
272
Artillery
122-mm BM-21 multiple rocket
launchers
24
36
122-mm single tube rocket launchers
0
14
Howitzers (various calibers)
69
69
Antitank guns (various calibers)
125
149
Air defense
Air defense guns (various calibers)
188
449
Surface-to-air missile launchers,
SA-7/14
379
480-F
40. Sandinista efforts to ensure the loyalty, or at
least the neutrality, of the rural populace will remain a
key dimension of their counterinsurgency strategy.
Within the limits imposed by the economic crisis,
Managua is likely to pursue its policies of expanding
socioeconomic benefits, particularly distribution of
individual land titles. In areas of high discontent in
central and southern Nicaragua, the regime probably
will continue resorting to more repressive measures-
including broad land confiscations-to discourage lo-
cal support for the rebels. Forced resettlements also
are likely to continue. Managua probably is counting
on a highly touted autonomy program to help reduce
antiregime sentiments along the Atlantic coast.
41. Over the next year or so, the military will
continue to attempt to wage an intense, all-out cam-
paign designed to eliminate any rebel units. The
Sandinistas will try to set a tempo of operations that
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Improved Sandinista Miliitary Capabilities
Air Force and Air Defense Forces
With substantial Soviet equipment deliveries, the
conventional forces-those designed to meet the contin-
gency of a US invasion-have grown steadily and now
include some nine mechanized infantry battalions and
seven armor battalions. At least six, perhaps seven,
brigade headquarters have been established to provide
regional command and control. Platoon and company-
level training is conducted routinely and brigade-size
exercises-large scale by Central American standards-
have been carried out on an annual basis. Although
numerous problems persist, brigade-level exercises con-
ducted in December 1986 showed marked improve-
ments in the Sandinistas' ability to integrate tank,
infantry, and artillery tactics and to coordinate helicop-
ter combat air support to ground forces. The fact that
those exercises took place while large-scale counterin-
surgency operations were under way indicates that the
capacity of the regime to manage and plan the overall
military effort also has improved.
Counterinsurgency Forces
The development of counterinsurgency forces also
has progressed significantly and the number of specially
trained units has continued to grow. The regime has
maintained 13 large irregular warfare battalions (BLI)
designed to provide strategic maneuver capability for
major operations against the insurgents. At least 10 light
hunter militia battalions (BLC) also have been created
to enhance the tactical maneuver capability of regional
commanders. In the past 12 months, the regime has
increased the number of border guard battalions from
seven to eight, raised the number of active-duty reserve
battalions from 17 to 20, and increased the number of
active-duty militia brigades committed against the in-
surgents from 12 to 20. Although command, control,
and communications problems are widespread, the
Sandinistas' ability to use infantry, artillery, and air
support for counterinsurgency operations gradually is
improving.
outpaces any residual rebel resupply effort and forces
the insurgents to expend their munitions. Assuming
that the Honduran Government suspends all support
for the insurgents, the Sandinistas are likely to under-
take new efforts to seal the Honduran border and
prevent any transit of rebel personnel.
Military Weaknesses
42. The lack of widespread domestic support for
the war and poor troop morale in most units continue
Although increasingly vulnerable to rebel air defense
weapons, the regime's armed helicopters remain critical
assets in the counterinsurgency war. Soviet deliveries
thus far have offset most of the regime's aircraft losses,
and the helicopter inventory has grown over the past
two years to about 40 MI-8/17 transport helicopters and
11 MI-25 attack helicopters. Despite occasional aircraft
losses, pilot proficiency and the willingness to take risks
on behalf of committed troops has grown. Aircraft
maintenance, although strained and backlogged, has
kept 70 to 80 percent of the helicopter force operation-
al. The Sandinistas remain intent on acquiring high
performance jet fighters, but thus far have not been
able to persuade the Soviets to ignore US warnings and
provide such aircraft.
The number of air defense weapons and radars has
increased, but the military's ability to identify and react
to unknown aircraft remains severely constrained by
command and control problems, poor maintenance, and
inadequate training. When forewarned of rebel resup-
ply drops, however, the military does attempt to pre-
position its air defense assets to threaten specific insur-
gent aerial resupply missions. The introduction of more
sophisticated air defense guns and surface-to-air missiles
is probable over the next two years, but these will not
decisively enhance air defense capabilities significantly
without improved command and control.
The Sandinistas are giving renewed emphasis to the
development of their reserve force structure. Overall
reserve strength is now about 46,000 men. Some 8,000
demobilized counterinsurgency veterans have been in-
corporated into the general reserve manpower pool and
are being recalled annually for 30 days of training.
Periodic training of organized reserve units is continu-
ing and some have been recalled for conventional
defense and counterinsurgency operations. However,
the morale, training, and logistic support to these units
is generally poor.
to cause serious problems for the regime. Conscription
has been highly unpopular, and the regime appears
reluctant to increase the burden of the war on the
large urban population base around Managua for fear
o:f provoking internal unrest. Desertion rates remain
relatively high-10 to 20 percent among first-time
conscripts and as high as 30 percent among some
mobilized reserve units. Moreover, the unrelenting
pace of operations the regime has been attempting to
achieve against the rebels is causing battle fatigue in
engaged units and casualties among key personnel.
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The regime's tactical commanders and helicopter pi-
lots are spread thin relative to the level of insurgent
activity, and they have been sustaining casualties that
will be difficult to replace.
43. The regime also is facing growing logistic short-
falls made worse by the country's deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions. Food shortages are increasing and
shortages of quartermaster supplies and communica-
tions equipment have also been noted, especially in
recently mobilized units. Logistic support capabilities
have been adversely affected by the military's abys-
mal vehicle maintenance, and spot shortages of petro-
leum products have been reported. The Sandinistas
already devote some 60 percent of their national
budget to defense, and they would need increasing
external support to meet their military resource needs
should the conflict continue at its current intensity.
Military Outlook for the Regime
44. With the Peace Plan in effect, the Sandinista
armed forces will probably attempt to take full advan-
tage of it to deal a potentially decisive blow to the
insurgency. The Sandinistas may be able to regain the
tactical initiative even before acease-fire as a result of
possible rebel efforts to conserve resources and man-
power in anticipation of a complete suspension of US
support. After November, any rebel units that fail to
abide by the cease-fire would be at a maior disadvan-
tage; Managua would probably seek to concentrate its
forces and attempt to defeat them in detail. Further-
more, the Sandinistas are likely to undertake new
efforts to patrol the Honduran border and prevent any
clandestine resupply or infiltration.
45. As the insurgent threat diminished, the Sandi-
nistas probably would begin to reduce their active-
duty force strength, both as a propaganda gesture and
to reduce domestic political and economic pressures
ensuing from the military buildup. Recently activated
reserve units would be demobilized and some militia
units currently committed against the rebels would
probably revert to inactive status. Depending on the
tactical and political situation, and the regime's per-
ceptions of US intentions, a reduction of active-duty
troop strength from over 70,000 to perhaps some
40,000 to 50,000 would be possible over the next 18
months.
46. Even with a Peace Plan in effect, the Sandinis-
tas would still seek to make qualitative improvements
in their force structure through training and new
equipment acquisitions from the Soviet Union. Al-
though the regime might abide by the letter of a peace
agreement over the next year and a half, the Sandinis-
tas would almost certainly disregard its provisions
when convenient over the longer term. The regime's
total military establishment would remain the largest
in the region and a threat to the security of neighbor-
ing countries.
47. If the peace process should fail, the Sandinista
armed forces would continue to make further, gradual
improvements in organization, tactics, and command
and control, but would be unlikely to achieve any
quantum increase in capabilities that would provide
the regime a decisive strategic edge or allow it to
defeat the insurgency while the rebels receive ade-
quate external support. An increase in active-duty
strength-perhaps to some 80,000-would be probable
over the next year, but would further strain logistic
and leadership shortfalls and would require more
Soviet and Cuban support. The regime's military
capabilities against the insurgents would continue to
depend on the level of Soviet and Cuban assistance,
Cuban Military Presence
The Intelligence Community has reviewed its analy-
sis of the Cuban military presence in Nicaragua in light
of new information
We now iu ge t e num er
of Cuban military personnel in Sandinista military
region headquarters, national-level logistic centers, na-
tional and regional intelligence entities, and the Air
Force to be somewhat less than previously estimated. At
the same time, we have generally reaffirmed our past
estimates of Cuban presence in maior unit headquar-
ters, military schools, and the Nicaraguan Ministry of
Interior.
Maior unit headquarters
229-445
220-445
Military region headquarters
70-105
21-35
Advisory groups
70-140
0
Military schools
450-600
450-600
National-level logistic units
150-250
30-100
General stafF
30-50
20-30
National military intelligence
activities
100-150
30-50
Cuban Embassy
5-10
5-10
Air Force
60-70
20-30
Navy
20-30
20-30
Ministry of Interior
550-800
550-800
Administrative cell
20-25
0
Total
1,754-2,675
1,366-2,130
(Rounded)
(2,000-2,500)
(1,500-2,000)
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especially Havana's willingness to make up pilot losses
and Moscow's readiness to replace equipment and
aircraft and ensure adequate supplies of fuel.
48. Under these conditions, we fudge the Sandinis-
tas would continue to hold the strategic advantage,
although the regime's control in some parts of the
countryside might gradually erode. A string of major
tactical defeats coupled with mounting and unre-
placed helicopter losses probably would force the
Sandinistas to adopt a more defensive strategy that
would afford the rebels more maneuver room and
increase their prospects for more popular support.
Although the regime would not survive an insurgency
that enjoyed widespread active support and increased
operational capability in the populous urban centers of
western Nicaragua, this is unlikely to occur over the
next 18 months.
Soviet Bloc and Cuban Support
Increasing Economic Aid
49. Despite signs that Moscow is increasingly irritat-
ed with Nicaragua's waste and mismanagement of
economic resources, Soviet Bloc and Cuban support
probably will continue at a high level. Economic
disbursements from Communist countries reached
$582 million in 1986, reflecting the Soviets' continued
long-term objective of exploiting the Nicaraguan con-
flict to isolate Washington diplomatically and encour-
is crucial to keeping the Nicaraguan economy afloat, it
is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse the country's
economic deterioration
50. Soviet assistance is unlikely to reverse continued
economic deterioration. It probably will follow the
pattern set last year, when the USSR committed $312
million in consumer and nondevelopment capital and
only $25 million in long-term investment capital.
Credits for current expenditures are likely to be used
to import food and other consumer goods, machinery,
and spare parts, although the largest single expendi-
ture probably will be for petroleum products. Moscow,
which became Nicaragua's virtual sole source of petro-
leum products after Mexico suspended deliveries in
mid-1985, provided over $114 million in oil in 1986.
We believe that recent claims by Nicaraguan diplo-
mats that the Soviets are halving oil deliveries are
disinformation designed to put pressure on Mexico and
Figure 3
Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc Economic and
Millitary Assistance, 1982-86
313993 8~Si25X1
also may continue to make hard currency loans to
purchase critically needed Western spare parts, to pay
priority debts owed to Western creditors, and to retain
access to trade credits and development funds. Future
East European assistance is likely to include, as did
1986 disbursements, consumer and capital goods,
large-scale investment projects, and short-term hard
currency loans.
6~1. Cuban assistance-which is mostly in the form
of training for Nicaraguan students and in labor
services provided by Cuban advisers, construction
woxkers, teachers, and medical personnel-dropped to
$45~ million last year from a peak of $70 million in
1982 and 1983, and is likely to stay there for the
period of this Estimate. The cutbacks reflect the
gradual withdrawal of several hundred Cuban civil-
ians over the past two years, many of whom left
because of Havana's own financial problems and the
completion or cancellation of many of Cuba's training
and construction projects. We estimate that there are
now about 2,000 to 2,500 Cuban civilians working in
Nicaragua.
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Table 2
Summary of Economic Assistance
Disbursements to Nicaragua, 1979-86
necessary to prevent the Sandinista economy from
collapsing. Moscow will try to pace the growth of its
assistance and shift more of the burden to its reluctant
East European allies. However, Moscow already has
warned the Sandinistas that they must use more
effectively the aid provided. Although we believe
Managua's recent decision to ease some restrictions on
the private sector reflects Soviet pressure, we doubt
the Sandinistas will move quickly to make other
reforms the Soviets may be urging. Both Managua and
Moscow probably hope that the Peace Plan will enable
the Sandinistas to get increased Western aid, thus
reducing the burden on the Soviet Bloc and avoiding
the appearance of Nicaragua as a Soviet client state.
Growing Military Assistance
53. The Soviet Bloc has supplied almost all the
hardware for Nicaragua's military buildup, and we
believe Moscow and its allies will continue to provide
the Sandinistas with the materiel needed to counter
the insurgent threat. Soviet and East European mili-
tary deliveries to Nicaragua climbed to $584 million in
1986, and preliminary data suggest that the value of
Communist military deliveries to Nicaragua during
the first half of 1987 was $360 million. Radars, air
defense weapons, helicopters, munitions, and trucks
probably will continue to top the aid list. At least 30
helicopter transports and gunships were delivered last
year, doubling the size of the Sandinista helicopter
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fleet. Seven more helicopters were delivered in June
1987, and more are expected. To enhance Sandinista
ability to counter insurgent resupply efforts, at least six
early warning radars, 18 radar-directed air defense
guns, some 80 smaller optically guided antiaircraft
guns, and two coastal patrol boats also were delivered
earlier this year. The Soviets might be willing to
augment their small contingent of military advisers
and technicians, but will probably continue to main-
tain aloes profile.
54. Despite periodic reports that the delivery of
Soviet advanced fighter aircraft to Nicaragua is immi-
nent, we believe that the Soviets continue to be
sensitive to US injunctions. Moscow still believes that,
at a minimum, the United States would destroy the
aircraft and might well use their introduction as an
excuse for a direct invasion of Nicaragua. Indeed, the
recent US decision to sell F-5 aircraft to Honduras, a
development both Moscow and Managua previously
had indicated would justify Nicaragua's arming itself
with similar aircraft, sparked little public reaction
from Moscow. Nevertheless, Moscow will continually
reassess the prospects of US military response to the
introduction of MIGs and might well deliver the
aircraft if permitted to do so under a regional agree-
ment.
55. We believe Cuba, for its part, probably will
remain heavily committed to supporting the Sandinis-
ta regime. Cuba's 1,500 to 2,000 military advisers are
currently involved in counterinsurgency operations,
intelligence activities, the training of military con-
scripts, and helping Nicaragua absorb, maintain, and
operate its growing inventory of Soviet weapons.
Cuban pilots are performing a variety of combat
support missions, including troop transport, medevac,
and air cover for arms convoys. Moreover, Cuban-
piloted Nicaraguan helicopters fly combat missions
against insurgent forces. Havana may also offer to
participate in any further arms control negotiations in
order to formally insert itself into a negotiation process
from which it has so far been excluded. Cuba probably
would agree to withdraw the bulk of its military
advisers from Nicaragua, but only in exchange for a
concurrent US withdrawal from the region.
Declining Western Economic Support
56. The Peace Plan calls on the Central American
governments to undertake joint negotiations for inter-
national aid, but Managua's approaches are unlikely to
meet with significant success. Although total financial
support from the Soviet Bloc has been increasing by
more than $100 million during each of the last two
years, official financial support from the West has
fallen by an average $70 million annually, reaching a
low of $152 million in 1986. Managua's nonpayment
of debt-combined with growing international disen-
char-tment with Sandinista internal repression and
with. the regime's poor human rights record-spurred
the falloff. Some additional foreign aid is probable,
however. The major Contadora and Support Group
status, such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, probably
will provide token support, and various West Europe-
an si:ates may be more forthcoming. Sweden, Norway,
Spain, and Finland-which together accounted for
more than half of West European aid to the Sandinis-
tas last year-are either increasing aid or maintaining
their levels of assistance in 1987. The Scandinavian
countries view their aid to Managua as leverage to
influence the regime to moderate its political system,
and Spain apparently wants to maintain its historical
ties.
Prospects for A Regional Peace Agreement
57. We believe that Managua has not deviated from
its strategy of using regional peace negotiations to buy
time for the consolidation of the regime, to ease
external pressures by demonstrating reasonableness to
outside observers, and to try to obtain a guarantee that
the United States will not overthrow the regime. Thus
the Sandinistas are likely to give the appearance of
abiding by the new Peace Plan, while continuing to
call for direct talks with the United States to settle
outsi:anding differences. Managua may delay some of
the democratic provisions called for in the agreement,
however, such as the lifting of censorship and full
freedom of assembly, by claiming that the insurgents
are :not abiding by the cease-fire or that all external
support for the rebels has not ceased. Reports indicate
that the Sandinistas are worried about allowing the
opposition too much initial freedom, and Managua
will probably play for time while seeking to under-
mine the insurgency.
5E.. Managua also is likely to continue trying to
entice or coerce its neighbors, particularly Honduras
and Costa Rica, into signing bilateral accords. Mana-
gua most likely will strive to embarrass Tegucigalpa
further by calling attention to any continued presence
of insurgent camps, hospitals, logistic centers, or politi-
cal offices in Honduras. Managua also is likely to press
Costa Rica by dangling the prospect of reinitiating its
suit at the International Court of Justice. We also
believe the Sandinistas will direct new campaigns
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against both Costa Rica and Honduras, portraying the
insurgents as defeated and the United States as willing
to abandon its Central American allies.
59. The Sandinistas also may be preparing to sus-
pend support to insurgent groups in El Salvador and
Guatemala, at least temporarily.
Salvadoran insurgents believe they have been sold out
by Managua at the Guatemala summit. At the same
time, they are publicly insisting that-unlike the anti-
Sandinista rebels-they have a firm popular support
base and do not receive any external assistance. Both
the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents have said
they welcome a dialogue with their governments but
will not disarm first, as required by the Peace Plan.
Over the longer run, the Sandinistas probably will
continue clandestine support for these insurgencies
once they are ensured it is safe to do so
60. The Sandinistas probably will move aggressively
to undertake their commitment to participate in nego-
tiations under Contadora auspices concerning security
verification and arms control. In this way they can
continue to demonstrate their desire for peace while
seeking continued Contadora political and economic
support. Managua may calculate that it will have
greater leverage in these talks than its neighbors,
because its own insurgency is likely to be defeated
more quickly and, therefore, it will not require a large
military force or substantial numbers of foreign mili-
tary advisers. It can also seek to remove the US
military presence in the region and to halt the delivery
of F-5's to the Honduran Air Force. If it should fail in
these efforts, it can argue that its own acquisition of
fighter aircraft is justified.
Key Variables and Alternative Outcomes
61. US funding for the rebels is the single most
critical-and immediate-variable that could tilt the
situation more favorably to either side. Developments
affecting the unity of regime and opposition leaders, as
well as continued Soviet support for the Sandinistas,
also are important factors that could come into play.
Aid to the Insurgency
62. US Aid Cuto,$. In our opinion, a total cutoff of
US military and nonlethal assistance would kill most of
the momentum generated against the regime and
severely damage insurgent prospects. If the insurgents
anticipate acutoff-and probably some of them do-
they most likely would respond by scaling back com-
bat activity and stockpiling as many weapons and as
much ammunition as possible. Morale, however,
would suffer, and many probably would give up the
fight and accept amnesty or return to Honduras or
Costa Rica as refugees. Others would go into hiding or
continue fighting indefinitely. The current insurgent
political structure is unlikely to survive, and leaders of
the smaller factions eventually might begin negotiat-
ing with the regime to return to Nicaragua. Tegucigal-
pa probably would conclude that, if no further US aid
to the rebels is forthcoming, it should begin to curtail
its own military cooperation with them, while pressur-
ing them to leave Honduras entirely.
63. After a cutoff in US aid, the Sandinistas might
initially lift the state of emergency and permit some
democratic freedoms to satisfy international opinion,
but not enough to risk its hold on power or jeopardize
the continuation of the revolution in Nicaragua. As a
result, most democratic political leaders and business-
men probably may eventually lose hope in the possi-
bility of a regime change and swell the exodus of
refugees. The regime, however, probably will continue
the trappings of democratic pluralism indefinitely in
order to retain international support.
64. From a regional perspective, the Central Amer-
ican democracies probably would calculate that a
decision to halt US support to the rebels would enable
Managua to consolidate its internal revolution, barring
a direct US military intervention. Because refugee
outflows to Honduras and Costa Rica would probably
increase substantially in the wake of Sandinista con-
solidation, both Tegucigalpa and San Jose almost
certainly would demand greatly increased US econom-
ic assistance to help them respond to the influx and the
greater perceived threat to their internal security.
Honduras and El Salvador also probably would re-
quest continued US military aid as a hedge against
subversion by internal leftists.
65. Over the longer run, we judge that Honduras
and Costa Rica would eventually attempt to reach an
uneasy accommodation with the Sandinista regime,
either bilaterally or through the regional peace pro-
cess. However, such deals with Managua would proba-
bly exacerbate the growing concern of military leaders
and rightist elements in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador over the domestic and regional impact of the
peace process. These forces might move to take power
from a civilian government that sought accommoda-
tion with the Sandinistas, especially if US military and
economic aid decreased substantially after the Peace
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Nicaraguan Export of tlhe Revolution
Export of the revolution is a key facet of Nicaraguan
foreign policy, and in recent years, Managua, like
Havana, has taken steps to institutionalize its aid to
leftist revolutionaries. The Sandinista Party's Interna-
tional Relations Department (DRI) is responsible for
selecting foreign leftists for political and military train-
ing. The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM), a
component of the Sandinista People's Army, oversees
instruction as well as the transfer of insurgents passing
through Nicaragua for training in Cuba. The Interior
Ministry also is involved in the training of
foreign leftists an maintains an armory to remodel and
renovate weapons used by them.
Rebels often transit Nicaragua on their way
to Cuba for advanced training, and Soviet Bloc funds
for Salvadoran insurgents are funneled through Nicara-
gua. Some wounded guerrillas apparently are treated in
a Managua hospital
Aid to Other Regional Leftists
The Sandinistas also maintain close links to other
radicals throughout the region, providing weapons,
supplies, military and political training, communica-
tions and propaganda support, free transit and safeha-
ven, and funds:
Salvadoran insurgents remain the prime beneficiaries
of Nicaraguan support.a Nevertheless, Managua began
to cut back weapons deliveries to them in 1984, largely
out of heightened concern about possible US military
action in the wake of the intervention in Grenada the
previous year. The supply pipeline remains in operation
with the Sandinistas' focusing on providing explosives,
communications gear, and other expendables.
- Managua has aided the infiltration of Cuban- and
Nicaraguan-trained Honduran subversives into
Honduras in the past four years
in an attempt to set up an insurgent network.
-Costa Rican Communists-part of the so-called
Mora-Canas Brigade-have undergone training in
Nicaragua. Brigade members have obtained com-
bat experience by serving with government units
fighting anti-Sandinista rebels in southern Nicara-
gua.
believe Managua probably relies primarily on land
routes through Honduras to resupply the Salvadoran
rebels. The Nicaraguan-Honduran border is relatively
porous and Honduran leftists-many trained in Nicara-
gua-play key roles in the supply effort. Seaborne
deliveries reportedly still occur as well, but aerial
resupply appears, at best, infrequent.
continue to receive political and military training in
Nicaragua. In addition, the Salvadoran rebel high com-
mand remains headquartered in Managua
Beyond Central America
Nicaragua, working in tandem with Cuba, is a kev
source of training and support for South American
guerrillas. In addition, the regime facilitates contacts
among Latin American leftists:
- Ties to Colombian leftists are especially extensive
and well documented. All major Colombian guer-
rilla groups have received training in Nicaragua
and one of them, the M-19, maintains an office
there. Guerrillas captured by Colombian security
forces last year claimed that Nicaragua was the
principal source of support for the America Battal-
ion, acoalition of Colombian insurgents and some
Ecuadoreans fighting in southwest Colombia.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the M-19 seizure of
the Palace of Justice in Bogota in November 1985,
Colombian authorities recovered six rifles that can
be traced to Nicaragua-four from stocks of the
former Somoza regime and two from supplies sent
to the Sandinistas by Venezuela in 1979.
- Nicaragua has longstanding ties to Argentine Mon-
toneros, and last year Nicaragua reportedly was
backing efforts by an exiled Argentine leftist to
unify radical groups in South America.
- Managua provides organizational assistance to
Ecuador's major terrorist group, Alfaro Vive Car-
ajo. Militants from the group reportedly have
received military training in Nicaragua.
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Nicaraguan Export of the Revolution (continued)
Nicaragua also has links to a handful of Caribbean
leftists. Last year, for example, Managua agreed to
provide military training to members of the two maior
leftist parties in the Dominican Republic-the Domini-
can Communist Party and the Dominican Liberation
Party. Subsequently, Sandinista officials met with rep-
resentatives of Jamaica's People's National Party to
discuss political cooperation. Nicaragua also is in con-
tact with Haitian Communists, some of whom resided
there during the Duvalier regime.
Plan was in effect. They may also respond to any
increase in leftist subversion in their own countries
with violent repression.
66. Continued U5 Aid. We believe that continued
US aid to the insurgents, perhaps contingent on full
Sandinista compliance with the peace agreement by 7
November, would boost rebel morale and keep the
pressure on Managua. Nevertheless, even increased
and extended US aid is not likely to result in the
overthrow of the regime within the next 18 months,
although it would probably prevent full Sandinista
consolidation. If US aid should continue beyond the
next 18 months, however, the prospects for Sandinista
consolidation would likely become increasingly uncer-
tain. However, much will depend on the degree the
rebels are able to survive the peace process and
maintain and eventually increase their troop strength:
- There is some danger, however, that the Sandi-
nistas would use contingency aid as an excuse to
abrogate the Peace Plan. Nevertheless, it is more
likely that Managua will continue to nominally
abide by the agreement, gambling that it can risk
increased democratic pluralism in order to de-
stroy the insurgency.
Leadership Unity
67. Open fissures in Sandinista ranks, although un-
likely, almost certainly would weaken the regime's
grip on power. Competing agendas among Directorate
members over implementing the terms of the Peace
Plan could damage party loyalties, undermine already
flagging popular support, and embolden the opposi-
tion. To avoid a repetition of the debacle in Grenada,
where leadership splits led to a US military interven-
lion, Moscow and especially Havana probably would
step in to try to diffuse disagreements among Sandinis-
ta leaders. President Ortega's visit to Cuba almost
immediately after signing the Peace Plan may in part
have been designed to demonstrate Castro's public
support for the agreement.
68. For the insurgents, maintaining leadership unity
while adapting to the Peace Plan will be a key
variable. Resignations of political moderates from the
recently expanded insurgent directorate would not
only damage the rebels' international image, but give
Sandinista propagandists additional ammunition to
cast them as throwbacks to the Somoza era. Moreover,
failure to develop strong links to the internal political
opposition would weaken insurgent prospects for in-
creasing political support inside or outside of Nicara-
gua. To do so, however, both they and the internal
political opposition will need considerable external
financial support, as well as more effective efforts at
the grassroots level.
Soviet Bloc Support
69. Although there is little likelihood that the Soviet
Bloc and Cuba will substantially reduce support for
Nicaragua, their willingness to increase aid is less
ensured. Moscow may use the opportunity presented
under the Plan, however, to reduce its military aid and
appear to be supportive of the peace process with little
if any adverse effect on Sandinista consolidation.
Sandinista calls for new infusions of aid might lead
Moscow to counsel Nicaragua to offer some conces-
sions-especially with respect to political freedoms-
as ameans of increasing the prospects for western aid
and avoiding identifying Nicaragua as a Soviet client.
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