AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT--N804X

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00836R000300040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 131
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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AIRCRArr AC( I DENT-N804K
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USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
CHECKLIST AND INDEX
f
/
/ii/g
0
f
IR
ft
A
AF FORM 711
X
B
AF FORM 711a
X
C
AF FORM 711b
X
D
AF FORM 711c
X
AF FORM 711d
X
F
AF FORM 711e
1
X
G
AF FORM 711f
1
X
H
AF FORM 711g
X
'
.,
I
UNSATISFACTORY REPORT
---
X
J
TEARDOWN DEFICIENCY
REPORT
X
_
- ?
-
K
LIST OF TECHNICAL ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH
X
---
i
AFTO FORMS 781 SERIES
'--A,
,
X
'
AF FORM 5
X
-----
.,..,--f.
--
N
STATEMENTS ,
0
REBUTTALS
,_.?...?
P
ORDERS APPOINTING INVESTIGATING BOARD
- ---,---,.
.
-,.......,,,-
A...------
---------,..-_,--,
BOARD PROCEEDINGS
Q
R
DD FORM 175 OR DD FORM 1080
_------7-:;,---,-
X
-::.-
S
DD FORM 365 (Weight and Balance Clearance Form F)
,--------_,---
X
:;-,:=----
!"-
--
T
STATEMENT OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
X
--,-
!,,,,--_?,---",
U
CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE (List of Parts Damaged), MANHOURS REQUIRED TO REPAIR, AND COST
..------;:.-
V
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS
,----
Xs
----..----
W
ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA REPORTS
--------
,
X
.------
-...,......----
X
OTHER AF FORMS Consumption Reports,
-_-_,---
(Failure and Etc.)
X--_-:--_-
Y
DIAGRAMS (Fall Out?Impact Area, Etc.)
- -_..-.- ,-.,...? ? - -

Z
PHOTOGRAPHS
-------
,--,----
Whenever "Applicable but not attached" column Is marked for any of the above items, information must be entered under remarks to indkate what action has been taken or will be
taken to obtain the required attachment. Lettered tabs shown above will be inserted for corresponding attached items, Lc; Tab N will always be used for Statements, Tab P for
Orders Appointing Investigating Board, etc. Tabs will be omitted on those items not applicable.
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USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)
1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Year, month and day)
1965 April 26, Monday
2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIEL INVOLVED
(TMS & Serial Nr., if applicable)
11-.20 N804X (382)
3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY
(Base Code and Report Serial Nr.)
N/A
4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: STATE, COUNTY; DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN. IF ON
diyailigii,orrilAartistravrioINAREyslaski North of North1
Edwards Air Force Base Tower
5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE LOCAL
1313 Filf
6.
DAY NIGHT
DAWN D DUSK
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING
Major Command
N/A
OWNING VEHICLE
Subcommand or AF
N/A
OR MATERIEL Al' TIME OF MISHAP
Air Division
N/A
Wing
N/A
Group
N/A
Squadron or Unit
WISP TV
Name and Base Code
North
dwards AP13
.
(List organizations of second
vehicle, if they differ from
Item 7 above)
9. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not Abbreviate)
North Edwards AFB, California
lo. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED
(For aircraft Include operator and all other persons whether in plane or not. If more space is required to list all personnel, use additional sheet(s).)
Last Name First Name M.I.
Grade
Service No.
Assigned Duty
Aero
Rating
Injury
to Individual
Buster B.
Civ,
VA
P
Pilot
Feta
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT; Give a detailed history of flight, or chronological order of facts and circumstances leading to the mishap as applicable, the results of
investigation and analysis to include discussion atoll cause factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken. (Continue on reverse, if more space needed.)
832 UTACIIMIC1fr.
1/ AUTHENTICATION
CERTIFICATION BY (Title)
Board
President
AM rinDLI mw.mm
TYPED NAME AND GRADE
Alfred K. Patterson,
It. Colonel, IMF
. .
. ..
DATE 25
3 May 1965
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AF Form 711
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Item 11
History of Flight
At 1300 PDT, 26 April 1965, U-2G Number N804X (382), tactical
call sign Crisp 16 took off from North Edwards Air Force Base piloted
by Mr. Buster E. Edens. Purpose of the mission was to accomplish a
series of simulated carrier mirror landing patterns during a scheduled
one hour period.
His initial climb was normal and he proceeded to approximately
13,000 feet to check fuel balance and stall characteristics. He
entered the pattern for his first landing at 1310 PDT entering on the
downwind leg for a touch and go landing on Runway 06, North Edwards
Air Force Base.
The turn to final approach was normal and when he had visual
mirror indications, he reported his fuel as 299 gallons to the Landing
Signal Officer. Approximately 3,000 feet from touch down point, the
Landing Signal Officer told him he was slow and a power correction
was made back to a normal approach. At the Landing Signal Officer's
direction, the pilot cut his power and extended spoilers for landing.
Just as the wheels were about to touch the runway, the left wing
dipped sharply and dragged the runway for 50 feet. During this time
the wheels were also on the runway and power was added for a go
around. After take-off the pilot was advised to climb out to check
the aircraft. He climbed to the North in a shallow climb. When 2.1
miles North of the North Base Tower, the aircraft entered a spin
from low altitude and crashed, resulting in fatal injuries to the
pilot who had ejected just prior to impact.
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AF Form 711 Item 11 ---
Investigation and Analysis
1. Impact Area:
The main impact area was established as being 2.1 miles North of
the North Edwards Air Force Base Control Tower (See Attach. #1). The
aircraft contacted the ground "right side up". There was evidence
to support that it was spinning to the left at impact.
The fuselage section forward of the wing was completely gutted
by fire. Both leading edges and portions of the wing where the fuel
was located was also burned out by fire to various degrees. The aft
fuselage was rotated to the right looking forward 90?. The fuselage
severed just forward of the tail section by crushing and twisting
type loads, probably on impact. The wings were pulled away from the
fuselage at the root section.
The right hand dive flap was found broken off and the piston was
extended. The left hand dive flap was fully extended on impact'
causing an indentation on the ground to indicate A/C rotation on
impact.
The control cable disconnects and cables aft of Sta 555 were' found
to be installed in a satisfactory manner.
The engine was rotating at moderate speed as evidenced by the
bending of the rotor blades. The EGT indicator showed a reading of
3250 C. The fuel control lever arm was in the operating range some-
what ahead of idle.
Observations of left and right wing tips indicated symmetrical
failure of the upper panels, apparent upload on contact. Rivets were
pulled or popped on both left and right wing tips and loose rivet
heads were found in the adjacent area. Closer scrutiny of the left
hand wing tip and skid did not show any apparent damage which might
be attributed to other than final impact loads.
The left hand aileron tab was near neutral and the landing flaps
were in the faired configuration. The right hand aileron bend tab
was deflected up from apparent impact loads. Left and right wing
spoilers (carrier landings) were retracted and locked down. There
was no evidence in any part of the wing of high flight loads.
The assembly was complete and portions of the control surfaces
were dislodged or broken off on impact. The rudder bend tab was very
near neutral or slightly bent to the left. There was no evidence of
high flight loads or loading.
Elevator tab actuator was checked for extension in the shop and
was found to be extended 5-1/4 inches. This amounts to 8? of nose-up
trim at elevator neutral.
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The tail and main gear were up and locked. The main landing gear
area was badly burned out.
Seat ejection appeared to operate in a normal manner. The canopy
was found intact a few hundred feet away from the aircraft and it
appeared that the right hand thruster showed more indentation on the
thrust pad than the left. The carrying chain on the seat pack was
found locked to the ejection D-ring wedges. Although this did not
have any direct bearing on the final outcome since the pilot was dis-
connected from the seat pack, corrective action has been taken to
remove the chain handle. There were no impact marks on any portion of
the horizontal tail which could be attributed to canopy damage after
the canopy jettisoned.
Portions of the flight instrument systems found in the wreckage
were badly burned. Initial laboratory testing did not reveal any
unusual conditions. All instruments, fuel, oil, hydraulic fluids,
the engine fuel control and auto pilot are presently undergoing
extensive laboratory testing. Upon receipt of detailed reports
the Accident Board will be reconvened if data having a significant
bearing on the accident is developed.
The seat and body were found approximately 108 feet from aircraft
impact area. Both had struck the ground forcefully in left posterio-
lateral position in close proximity to each other. The pilot's body
was found 11 feet from the seat and his parachute was in initial
stage of deployment. Parachute deployment.,had been initiated by the
automatic release; the zero delay lanyard was not attached to the
parachute D-ring.
2. Flight Plan:
This mission was scheduled for one hour to accomplish simulated
carrier mirror landings at North Edwards Air Force Base. The DD Form
1080, Local Flight Clearance was filed and the aircraft was to remain
in the local North Base pattern after his initial climb to altitude
to check stall characteristics.
3. Sequence of Events
During Mr. Edens' first MLP and shortly after the "cut 2" (extend
spoilers), the left wing dropped rather sharply and the left wing skid
hit the runway just before or at the same time as the main gear and
dragged for approximately 50 feet along the ground before the pilot
was able to lift the left wing. At the moment of touchdown the air-
craft had also yawed to the left and continued to the left side of the
runway. Power was applied very shortly after touchdown and the air-
craft became airborne, wings level and heading slightly left of the
runway before the intersection was reached. This point is exactly
half-way down the runway. Power was reduced shortly after becoming
airborne and remained consistent with that which would be used in a
normal MLP pattern. There was no visible damage to the left wing
tip skid. Upon turn out to the left, it appeared that the pilot was
about to remain in the NIP pattern and was, therefore, not undutT con-
cerned with the fact that the skid had hit the runway. He was then
requested to depart the pattern to check the aircraft. He acknowledged
this request and rolled the aircraft out on a northerly heading (about
900 turn to the left from the runway heading). Two witnesses stated
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that power was applied after the 900 left turn but the Board considers
that not much more, if any extra power was applied after this turn.
Three witnesses were directly aft of the aircraft and saw black smoke
from the exhaust but this would be much more evident from their
locations even with a moderate power setting. The pilot continued to
the north in a modest angle of climb and when last seen by an ex-
perienced witness was at about 2,500 feet. It appears to the Board
that at this stage the pilot had not decided to climb up to altitude
in order to check stall the aircraft again (the characteristics of
which he already knew) but rather to climb up to an altitude at which
he could ascertain that he had full aileron travel and that the
left aileron travel had not been restricted in any way by the left
wing tip skid contacting the runway. That he had adequate aileron
control at fairly low speed was evidenced by the fact that he was able
to raise the left wing while still on the ground and also by the fact
that the left turn after take-off was normal when his airspeed was,
in all probability, less than 100 k and finally by the fact that the
pilot made no comment over the radio of any unusual control problem.
The pilot's comment of "wow" shortly after becoming airborne is con-
sidered to have been a jocular comment adequately descriptive of the
landing. Indeed, to make this transmission the pilot would have had
to use one hand to put the mask to his face since the mask had been
hanging free. This would also indicate no control problem. The
flaps were seen to be in the process of retracting but not fully re-
tracted at the time of turn out after the MLP. This again is normal
practice when conducting closed pattern 111,P's.
Of all the witnesses who state that they saw the moment of entry
to the spin, only one states that the aircraft did anything except
enter what appeared to be a left turn from a very slight climb or
level flight and thence into a left spin. He stated that the aircraft
first of all pitched up, then rolled partly one way, then the other
way and continued into a spin in the last direction of roll. The
Board considers that in all probability, the pilot was either about
to, or in the process of checking the aileron controls at approximately
2,500 feet at a fairly low airspeed. It is considered that it was
not the intention of the pilot to stall at this altitude since he
well knew the characteristics of this aircraft at the stall, i.e., a
fairly marked left wing drop and yaw to the left. For a reason not
known to the Board, the aircraft stalled, either in one "G" flight
or possibly accelerated flight due to a pitch up. Turbulence may have
been a contributing factor but insufficient in itself to have caused
the stall unless a transient turbulence phenomenoll was encountered
at that instant. The stall was immediately followed by a sharp left
wing drop and a turn to the left which developed directly into a spin.
The first turn of the spin appears to have been only slightly nose
low but rapidly developed into a steeply nose low spin. Some three
turns of the spin had been completed by the time the ejection sequence
commenced at an estimated height of 300-400 feet. At or just before
this point the aircraft appeared to flatten out to a degree and com-
pleted re further turn of the spin before striking the ground intact
in a 30 nose low and 15 left wing low attitude. Explosion and fire
was immediate upon impact. The pilot had barely separated from the
ejection seat when he struck the ground and was killed instantly.
4. Other Factors
Pilot Individual Flight Record, AF Form 5 was maintained on Mr.
Edens for informational purposes by the Unit. He had flown a total
of 2916 hours, 1094 of which were in the U-2 aircraft. Normal Air
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Force Manual 60-1 requirements and checks were required as a basis for
proficiency for Mr. Edens. Training records revealed that he received
an instrument check on 15 October 1964 in a T-33 aircraft. He received
a proficiency check in the T-33 aircraft on 11 September 1964 and
another on 11 March 1965. No flights were accomplished during January
(TDY) and February (DNIF) 1965. He had 16 T-33 flights in March and
one U-2 flight; eight T-33 flights and four U-2 flights in April prior
to the accident.
The briefing for this flight was more extensive than normal. He
received a general and specialized briefing at 1200 PDT, one hour
before take-off. He was the Mobile Control Officer during a morning
flight and had observed all landings. During the lunch period a
detailed discussion of the first flight was accomplished between Mr.
Barnes, the first mission pilot, and Mr. Edens. Also present were
Colonel Gregory, Lt. Col. Van Cura, Lt. Col. McCarthy, and Lt. Kaup,
the Landing Signal Officer. Mr. Barnes had encountered a left wing
drop on his first touch down and used aileron and rudder corrections
on the remainder of his landings to maintain level touchdown attitude.
This was the main point of the discussion and it was the concensus
that this tendency required re-evaluation by Mr. Edens during the
initial stall check at altitude which precedes MLP landing practice.
Colonel Gregory informed Mr. Edens that if any unsafe conditiOn
existed, the scheduled landing practice would not be performed.
The Board concluded that weather, with the possible exception of
turbulence was not a factor in this accident. A U-2 pilot flying in
the general area about 30 minutes after the accident reported light
turbulence 12 miles southwest of the accident scene.
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Board Findings
Cause: Undetermined
Most Probable Cause: The aircraft entered a low altitude wing low
stall while the pilot was flight checking
aileron control. This resulted in a spin which
he was unable to recover. Possible contri-
buting factors are: unknown failure of an
aircraft system component or turbulence.
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TO: Director, OSA
FROM: Chief of Base,
SUBJECT: Reviewal of Aircraft Accident Report, Article 382
11 June 1965
1. I have reviewed the aircraft accident report on Article 382 and
concur in the findings and recommendations. I consider the investigation
and report to be thorough in scope and fair and impartial in its analysis.
2. In addition to the most probable cause listed in the report, there
are other possible causes that could be considered; such as sudden "hard
over condition" by the auto pilot, or inadvertent activation of the spoiler
switch, which could have a tendency to induce a stall more quickly in a slow
flying aircraft.
3. Action on recommendations is as follows:
a. Recommendation Number 1: KWBEIGE has designed retractable
stall strips and the prototype model has been tested and considered satis-
factory. This modification will be installed on all aircraft if approved
by Headquarters.
b. Recommendation Number 2: This item is for action of KWBEIGE.
C. Recommendation Number 3: An altitude of between 15M and 20M
has been established for performing stall checks.
d. Recommendation Number 4: An oxygen mask with an installed
microphone will be worn on all flights when partial pressure suit and
helmet is not worn.
e. Recommendation Number 5: A service bulletin is being written
and kits are being prepared to eliminate this problem.
f. Recommendation Number 6: Concur in requirement for 4 sorties
per month, per pilot, in the Article. However; this cannot be complied
with until more articles are assigned. It is anticipated this will be
accomplished in the near future.
and
g. Recommendation Number 7a: For action of Headquarters, KWBEIGE
h. Recommendation Number 7b: An automatic pilot seat separator
is currently being investigated.
i. Recommendation Number 7c: The pilot is required to call in
to Mobile Control prior to commencing stall checks to verify that low
altitude lanyard is hooked up, in the event he fails to do so the Mobile
Control is required to remind the pilot to hook up the lanyard prior to
entering the landing pattern.
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Recommendation Number 7d: All pilots have been reminded to
keep flight suit pockets closed during flight.
k. Recommendation Number 7e:. Pilots have been reindoctrinated
on present escape limitations.
4. In addition to aforementioned actions taken, pilots have also
been cautioned to make a special effort to avoid inadvertent actuation
of spoilers when system is armed during MLP or carrier work. Also, in
case of uncontrolled flight, to bail out at the safest altitude possible.
5. I wish to commend Col Alfred K. Patterson and his board for the
very thorough and exhaustive investigation which was accomplished.
Commander
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Recommendations
The Board recommends that:
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1. Action be taken to configure the aircraft to provide improved
stall characteristics. (symmetrical wing stall)
2. Fuel tanking be arranged to prevent fuel "stacking" in yaw and
that a valve be provided in the fuel transfer line to prevent cross
flow when the pump is not operating.
3. An altitude be established for control and trim checks that will
assure safe ejection should an uncontrollable situation be encountered.
Adherence should be mandatory except where specifically waived by the
Commander.
4. The use of a "hands off" microphone capability be made mandatory
on all flights.
5. Projections behind the circuit breaker panel (post lights) be
eliminated to prevent possible fouling of equipment or clothing.
6. While not considered a factor in this accident, it is noted that
pilots of this organization average only two flights per month due to
lack of availability of aircraft. It is recommended that sufficient
aircraft be made available to provide 4 flights per pilot per month.
7. Life Survival
a. U-2 aircraft should be provided with an improved low altitude
escape capability.
b. The ejection seat should be quipped with an automatic pilot-
seat separator.
c. A procedure of assuring low altitude attachment of the Zero-
delay lanyard should be established.
d. Pilots should fly with flight suit pockets closed.
e. Pilots should be re-indoctrinated on present escape limitations.
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