HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94M00837R000300170013-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2014
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 19, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Location: Dirksen Building, room 342
Topic: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
Witness: CIA Director William Webster
The editor of the report is Robert Doherty. Steve
Ginsburg, Tim Ahmann and Eric Beech also are available to help
you. If you have questions, please call 898-8345. For service
problems, call 1-800-8-REUTER.
This transcript is provided by News Transcripts, Inc. If
questions of content arise, call 682-9050
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SEN. JOHN GLENN
Exactly fifteen years ago today, on a hot day in a
remote, dusty corner of a South Asian desert, the world awoke
to the news that India had detonated a nuclear device. Although
India declared at the time that this was a so-called "peaceful
nuclear explosion" -- a phrase that now seems to come from
another age -- this event triggered a major international
effort to tighten controls over the global spread of the bomb.
The concern was not so much with India -- which, to its credit,
has wisely chosen not to develop a nuclear arsenal -- but with
the new uncertainties that were created and now risks that
someday, somehow, we would all become embroiled in a nuclear
holocaust.
That was the way things were when I first entered the
Senate, and I have devoted a substantial amount of my career
here to preventing just such a nightmare from occurring.
To identify what new steps are needed to stop the
spread of these weapons, we must learn some hard lessons from
our past experiences. The last declared nuclear weapon state
was China, which exploded its first device in 1964. Since then,
the lack of any new declarations of nuclear tests in additional
countries -- good news though it is -- should not give us any
grounds for complacency:
We see Pakistan continuing its pursuit of the bomb, and
both India and Pakistan facing off in what may be an arms race
that involves both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Any
day now India may test launch its now Agni intermediate-range
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ballistic missile.
We see Pakistan having joined South Africa, India and
Israel into the club of "De Facto Nuclear Weapon States."
We see Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, India,
China, and other nations continuing their refusal to join the
international community of nations that has signed the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. We see others who have signed -- like
Iraq, Iran and Libya -- showing continued interest in acquiring
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
We see a dangerous proliferation of missile technology
worldwide, despite the previous Administration's efforts to
establish an international missile Technology Control Regime
technology that can be used to deliver nuclear as well as
chemical or biological weapons.
We see report after report of weaknesses in the
nuclear export control systems of our closest friends and
allies, and have witnessed for years the resistance of these
friends and allies to our long-standing concerns about these
problems. Some of these problems now appear to be getting some
attention, but it remains to be seen if these reforms will be
"too little, too late."
We see the International Atomic Energy Agency
which is charged to "safeguard" peaceful international
nuclear commerce -- handicapped by a zero-growth budget,
despite the near impossible tasks it faces in the future of
keeping track of hundreds of tons of toxic, weapon-usable
plutonium that Japan, France, and other notions wish to use and
transport as a commercial nuclear fuel.
Fortunately, we have here today three spokesmen for
a new Administration, an Administration that has publicly
committed itself to a strong national policy against the spread
of nuclear weapons and missiles.
We will hear from CIA Director William Webster,
whose recent speeches and testimony on the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons and missiles have helped us all
to understand how these weapons threaten our security. Today,
he will provide additional details about the nuclear
proliferation threat. I am sure that the material he will
discuss will underscore that we have a lot of work to do before
these "Weapons of Hell" -- as A.M. Rosenthal aptly called
them -- are under effective control.
We will hear from Ambassador Ronald Lehman, the new
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who
arrives at his post with fresh experience working on
proliferation issues as Assistant Secretary of Defense. We are
grateful to have him here today for his first public testimony
as Director of ACDA.
We are also fortunate to have with us today
Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, the Undersecretary of (State)
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for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, who has
responsibility for nonproliferation policy at the State
Department. Ambassador Bartholomew is also making his first
appearance before Congress In his new position.
The hearing today will give us the opportunity to
hear from the now Administration about the threats we face from
nuclear and missile proliferation, the remedies that are being
considered to these problems, and the organization of their
efforts to find some solutions.
Today's testimony and questions will help us
decide about the stops we must take tommorow, as we continue to
struggle to achieve our nonproliferation goals. It is no secret
that I had major differences with the previous Administration
in this area. I look forward, however, to working with the now
Administration to restore nonproliferation to a top national
priority.
CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM WEBSTER (as delivered): Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to discuss publicly issues
that consume a substantial portion of the time and resources of
the intelligence community: the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and missiles to deliver them.
We cannot now tell you when or where these weapons
may be used. We can say that the odds-on use are growing as
more countries develop the technologies to develop old scores
by new means.
Mr. Chairman, your long and distinguished leadership
on nuclear issues has helped keep that issue near the top of
our national security agenda. Senator Ross' eight years of
service on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have
given him insights into the unique intelligence challenges
associated with the issues that we consider today.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community can develop
critical information about the spread of nuclear weapons and
missiles, and the intentions of countries with these weapons.
The wisdom required to formulate policies to deal with
proliferation is shared by the executive and the legislative
branches of our government.
I want to begin by thanking the committee for
understanding my need to be circumspect in my testimony this
morning in order to protect some of our more sensitive sources
and methods.
I'll not be able to share detailed intelligence
information at this forum.
However, we can have a meaningful discussion about
many of the fundamental issues, and elements of the issues.
I'll leave the policy implications of the
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intelligence we provide to my executive branch colleagues who
will also testify today, and to you and your colleagues in the
Congress.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been collecting
and analyzing intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear
weapons for decades. We employ some of our most sophisticated
collection methods and analytical techniques to address this
critical issue.
Generally, we focus on determining the status of
nuclear development in all countries. On acquisition of
nuclear materials by countries suspected of developing nuclear
weapons programs, and any general procurement that would
support nuclear programs in countries that do not now possess
nuclear weapons.
We could use our full range of intelligence
collection capabilities and strategies to provide policymakers
timely and finished intelligence about nuclear developments.
Our collection and analysis begins with the premise that given
a reasonably sophisticated nuclear energy and research program,
any nation requires many years to develop a nuclear weapons
capability.
As a nation begins to develop nuclear weapons, we
have found that technical and political tipoffs provide key
indicators for intelligence analysts. Our analysts not only
examine technical capabilities and programs; they also consider
whether the activities really make sense for a purely civilian
nuclear program.
For example, we would be concerned if a nation began
developing a difficult and expensive uranium enrichment
capability not required by existing nuclear power reactors.
While our intelligence successes in this field cannot
be discussed publicly, we have helped slow down the spread of
nuclear weapons through timely intelligence that has enabled
our policymakers to take appropriate action to discourage
weapons development.
Future success will be hard to come by. Today we are
finding that tracking both nuclear development and procurement
is more complicated.
For example, we're beginning to see procurement of
unrelated technologies for nuclear missile and CBW programs
through common purchasing agents. These agents are often
associated with either an amorphous science and technology
organization, or with a large industrial user.
Consequently, identifying the real purpose for which
a suspect item was procured is now more difficult.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing
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May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(First Add)
x x x more difficult.
WEBSTER (cont.): Our collection and analytical
problems are, of course, compounded by sales of items that
could be used either for purely legitimate industrial purposes
or for the production of nuclear weapons. These so-called dual
use technologies require us to track an item to its final
destination.
We often accomplish our mission, but the effort is
extremely costly in terms of our time and very scarce
resources.
The key to a nuclear weapons program is acquiring
plutonium 239 or highly enriched uranium. Sensitive and highly
specialized technologies are required to obtain enough of these
materials for even the simplest nuclear weapon.
The ability to acquire and master these technologies
determines how quickly a nation can develop and produce nuclear
weapons.
While plutonium is important, potential proliferators
are dependent on a broad range of aid from states with nuclear
weapons. Even some of the most advanced countries need more
than hardware. They need technical expertise, from the chief
scientists down to the technicians who run the plant.
Furthermore, after they acquire the knowledge and
equipment required for nuclear weapons development, we find
that they have continuing need for spare parts, and expert
maintenance.
From an intelligence perspective, foreign assistance
is a wild card in assessing progress towards weapons
development. It helps Third World nuclear programs leapfrog
technical obstacles that might take years, or perhaps a decade,
to overcome with their own limited resources.
Since the early 1960s, we have found foreign
suppliers providing the following types of assistance for the
possible development of nuclear weapons.
Complete nuclear facilities; technical and operations
expertise; significant equipment and material; ancillary
equipment and material and training for personnel.
As this committee well knows, sensitive nuclear
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technologies are subject to U.S. and international expert
controls. However, we have found that nuclear technology is
acquired illicitly and clandestinely through front companies;
false export documents; and multiple transshipment points.
We're finding that regulations are being circumvented
by ordering equipment or material in quantities that fall just
below the export control guidelines, but which in the aggregate
would be subject to controls.
Many commercial suppliers know exactly what their
products will be used for. Others suspect, but perhaps care
more about the dollar, mark, yen or frank, than about the
consequences of nuclear proliferation.
We all become discouraged at times about the
continuing spread of nuclear weapons, despite the
nonproliferation treaty. The efforts of the international
atomic energy, and various laws designed to check nuclear
proliferation.
But I want to reflect for a minute on the value of
the various nuclear control regimes from an intelligence
perspective. As an intelligence organization, we must be
concerned about the development of nuclear weapons in any
country, or by any subnational group.
If a country refuses to join a nuclear control
regime, we have a clear signal that we should focus additional
attention on its nuclear development programs. And we
certainly do.
From my perspective, the nonproliferation treaty, and
the activities of the international atomic energy, help us use
our intelligence resources more effectively to track nuclear
developments.
We've also seen the deadly consequences of missile
proliferation. Ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads were used against civilians when Iran and Iraq
launched scores of missiles during the war of the cities.
Iraq's ability to hit Tehran caused a sizeable
portion of the population to flee. We have found that the use
of missiles in war against the cities has had an impact beyond
Iran and Iraq.
The demand for ballistic missiles has increased among
Third World governments.
Because the ability to develop a nuclear or other
weapon or mass destruction to a distant target affects both
regional and global stability, ballistic missile programs are
as important a target of intelligence collection and analysis
as the weapons they carry.
To some extent data concerning the status of missile
development programs is less difficult to track than nuclear
weapons development.
New missile systems must be tested thoroughly, and in
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the open, while much of the work involved in the development of
nuclear weapons is more easily concealed in the labs.
However, the intelligence challenge associated with
discovering the initial intent to develop a missile, and to
acquire the expertise and material to do so, is about the same
as for nuclear weapons.
Ballistic missiles enter Third World arsenals most
quickly through the purchase of operational missile systems.
The Soviet Union has been a traditional supplier of short-range
ballistic missiles. It has sold Scud B missiles widely in the
Middle East.
Ironically, the Soviets may soon be competing with an
old client, North Korea, which now manufactures its own copy of
Scud.
China has emerged as a willing supplier, as evidenced
by its sale of the CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile
to Saudi Arabia. China is actively promoting the export of
shorter-range ballistic missiles.
A mix of financial and political objectives appear to
motivate these sales.
In the long term, many countries will not want to
rely on foreign nations for their arsenal of strategic
missiles. By the year 2000 at least 15 developing countries
will be producing their own ballistic missiles.
Although may missiles being developed by these
countries are not as accurate as U.S. or Soviet weapons, they
are cause for great concern.
The Scud missiles Iran and Iraq used in the war of
the cities were first produced in the Soviet Union in the
1950s. Nevertheless, they hit their targets in Iran and Iraq.
Even 1950s technology can become a truly strategic weapon in a
region of conflict such as the Middle East.
Like nuclear weapons programs, Third World missile
programs rely on foreign technology to some degree. No country
that we know of in the Third World has been able to develop a
ballistic missile without some foreign assistance, and none is
likely to be able to do so for the foreseeable future.
A number of firms in Western Europe have a well
established record of supplying equipment and technical
assistance to Third World ballistic missile programs.
This aid has included transfer of critical missile
components, and the direct participation by European missile
specialists in missile development programs.
As with nuclear programs, countries will often claim
falsely that a technology they are seeking for a missile
program will be used for an entirely benign and plausible
purpose.
Cover firms, which are frequently little more than a
post office box number, are established where export controls
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are more lenient.
Recently, we have begun to find that once a nation
establishes a procurement network in one field--missiles, for
example--that network is used as a conduit for procurement in
other fields, such as nuclear or chemical weapons.
We anticipate finding more of an overlap in
procurement networks and strategies in many Third World missile
and nuclear and chemical-biological warfare programs in the
years ahead.
We in the intelligence community fully understand
that much of the technology critical to ballistic missile
development was passed from the developed to the developing
world long ago.
Now, we find Third World countries sharing
technology, pooling their resources and technical knowhow in
areas such as solid rocket fuel production.
Countries that a few years ago were wholly dependent
on foreign suppliers for their own missile programs are now
retransferring technology to new Third World missile
development efforts.
Not all critical technology has passed from our
control. Technology control efforts in the intelligence
collection and analysis to support them remain important.
Third World countries often seek new, state of the
art Western technology and expertise to overcome critical
hurdles in their missile programs.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (first
add)
May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Second Add)
x x x missile programs.
WEBSTER (cont.): For example, most Third World
nations lack the expertise to build missile guidance systems.
Cutting off the supply of guidance technology can cripple a
Third World missile program.
Even with the most effective control regimes, and
with the best intentions, a country can become an unwitting
partner to a ballistic missile program, particularly through
dual-use technology.
For example, in the mid-1960s, the United States
accepted a young Indian scientist into a training program at
the Wallops Island Rocketry Center. This scientist returned to
India and with the knowledge he gained from his work on
civilian space programs, Dr. Kalom became the chief designer of
India's Priv-V and Agne (phonetic) ballistic missiles.
Unfortunately, most technologies applicable to a
space launch program can be used in ballistic missile
development. Several countries have space and missile programs
which overlap. Space programs have been used as a conduit for
materials and equipment designed for a ballistic missile
development effort.
Moreover, as both the United States and the Soviet
Union have demonstrated, space launch vehicles themselves can
be converted into ballistic missiles.
The intelligence community is using its resources to
support the objectives of the missile technology control
regime. We understand the objectives of the seven nations that
signed the regime, but note that many of the key countries
involved in missile and advanced technology sales are not party
to it.
This was highlighted by China's sale of the CSS-2 to
Saudia Arabia.
Even for its own members, the missile technology
control regime is a voluntary, nonbinding agreement that
imposes no sanctions on violators.
The agreement is only as effective as each member
wishes it to be. For the intelligence community, the voluntary
nature of the regime means that we have to be particularly
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alert for violations.
As always, we face the problem of protecting our
sources of intelligence when policymakers take action, based on
information about violations.
We're following missile programs in South Asia and
the Middle East very closely. We're particularly concerned
about the growing missile race between India and Pakistan. Both
countries have, within the past 15 months, announced successful
test launches of indigenously developed short-range ballistic
missiles.
India has also announced it is preparing to launch an
indigenously produced medium-range ballistic missile. The
regional impact of ballistic missile proliferation is
graphically illustrated in the Middle East. Iraq appears to
have doubled the range of its Soviet-supplied Scuds by reducing
the amount of high explosives in the warhead.
That technique brings Tehran and Tel Aviv within
striking range.
Iran recently claims to have produced its own
ballistic missile with a range of 200 kilometers. The pace of
ballistic missile development in both countries likely will
accelerate as they are able to redirect resources formerly
devoted to their respective war efforts.
Iraq hopes to acquire and eventually produce the
Condor II short range ballistic missile currently under
development in Argentina.
Libya, Egypt and Syrian have received Scud missiles
from the Soviet Union. Tripoli fired two missiles against U.S.
forces on Italy's Lampadus Island after the U.S. air strike in
1986.
Israel placed a small satellite into orbit last
September. That launch suggests that Israel has the capability
to produce medium or intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Third World Countries can now deliver nuclear,
chemical or biological warheads by artillery or aircraft more
precisely and more cheaply than with current ballistic
missiles. But we judge that ballistic missiles will be the
preferred delivery system of many nations because they cannot
be defended against as effectively as artillery or aircraft.
For that reason the deterrent value of ballistic
missiles is higher. Furthermore, they are more prestigious
than conventional systems.
We believe the missile proliferation problem will
affect every region in the world. It will become worse, and
may never become better. The intelligence community will
continue to provide intelligence support to policymakers'
efforts to implement missile proliferation control regimes.
Efforts to implement missile proliferation control
regimes will continue. We'll also devote the resources
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required to understand a world in which ballistic missiles
loaded with nuclear or chemical or biological warheads are a
major factor of the conflicts in each region of the world.
Because the ability to develop a nuclear or other
weapon of mass destruction to a distant target affects both
regional and global stability, the spread of ballistic missiles
has been as important a target of intelligence collection and
analysis as the weapons that they carry.
Mr. Chairman, your hearings today provide us with a
timely opportunity to review one of the most dangerous
conditions that our world faces today.
Nuclear proliferation, combined with the spread of
chemical and biological weapons, and the missiles to deliver
weapons of mass destruction, have the potential to place many
regional conflicts on the brink of catastrophe.
I can assure you that we in the intelligence
community will use all the means at our disposal to provide
policymakers with the information that they need to confront
the problem.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal statement, and
I'd be very pleased to respond to questions at this time.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (second
add)
May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Third Add)
x x x this time.
SENATOR GLENN: Thank you, Mr. Webster, your summary
of where we stand these days--and it's a rather grim one,
obviously. You know, back when we were working on NPT and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, we felt that we had at that
time, back in the mid-seventies, maybe some 12 to 15 years to
get some agreement with the Soviets and try and work down the
nuclear stockpiles while trying to encourage other nations not
to go the nuclear route.
And we were reasonably successful, and I think the
current count is we have something like 137 nations that have
signed NPT, but, as you indicate, it's voluntary, and some of
those nations get a little restive, and we have another one of
the five-year reviews coming up--I believe it's next year.
So we're trying to keep everybody in line while we
get some of the other negotiations going, but, as you point
out, with some 15 countries with ballistic missiles and so on,
it's a tough one.
You mentioned that Iraq may be trying to get the
Condor II ballistic missile from Argentina, and that would lead
me to my first question, along a nuclear line: Is Argentina
selling or planning to sell nuclear technology in the Middle
East or elsewhere?
WEBSTER: Well, Mr. Chairman, the Argentine
government does have a significant nuclear export agreement
with Algeria, and it's currently discussing nuclear deals with
Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Last year Egypt and Argentina
signed a 15- year nuclear cooperation agreement, which includes
a research reactor, research program, research for waste
disposal and radioisotopes production.
It's also agreed to supply a 20-percent enriched
uranium to refuel Iran's Tehran nuclear research reactor.
So I think the answer is yes
SENATOR GLENN: Do you then see Argentina moving as a
significant supplier of nuclear technology or equipment?
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WEBSTER: I do. There are several reasons why it
would seek to do so, and I suppose that our principal
intelligence concern here is that they are not being produced
under international safeguards, and that produces some
considerable environmental hazard as well
SENATOR GLENN: What are the key developments in
Argentina's nuclear program you would regard as most
significant from a proliferation standpoint?
WEBSTER: Well, I think that's just it, Mr. Chairman,
they are not under international safeguards, including uranium
enrichment, spent fuel processing, heavy water production
efforts. Argentina has refused to sign the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty. And we're also frankly concerned
about Argentina's efforts to be a nuclear supplier to a third
world. We're seeing these transcontinental arrangements between
underdeveloped countries
SENATOR GLENN: We've seen competition back and forth
in the past in this field between Argentina and Brazil. What
are the key developments in the program of Brazil that are most
significant from a proliferation standpoint?
WEBSTER: Well, I think I ought to leave that
question primarily to the policy makers, but I can tell you
that we've noted that Brazil continues to construct and operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We have noted that the
centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility that's being constructed
about 90 kilometers west of Sao Paulo is a matter of potential
concern. Brazilian officials have stated that this plant will
produce uranium enriched to less than 20 percent for use in
nuclear submarines, research reactors, and power reactors
SENATOR GLENN: How advanced is that submarine
effort, Brazil's nuclear submarine effort? Can you tell us
that?
WEBSTER: I would not say that it's far advanced, and
I think it will probably take them into the next century to
come up with something. But it's just another indication of a
move into an area that has been highly restricted in the past
by people willing to accept controls
SENATOR GLENN: Brazil's been willing in the past to
talk to or to cooperate at least to some extent with many
nations around the world. Can you tell us what the status is
between Brazil and Iraq and what they're cooperation on in the
nuclear arena?
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WEBSTER: Well, they signed an agreement in Bagdad
about ten years ago for cooperation in the field of the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. The major areas of cooperation
identified are studies of uranium, supply of national uranium
and low enriched uranium for use in nuclear reactors, supply of
equipment and construction services for nuclear reactors,
security for nuclear reactors, exchange of visits to research
and development facilities, and training of human resources.
That's going to expire in October of this year, and
it can either be renewed for a one-year period, or either party
can terminate it
SENATOR GLENN: We've been concerned, as I've
indicated, what triggered off some of the interest in this
whole field was India's explosion back in '74. What is the
status of India's uranium enrichment effort now?
WEBSTER: Well, they can produce weapons-grade
plutonium. Their first such plutonium production capability
was a research reactor built near Bombay with the assistance
indicators, and beryllium is usually used to enhance the
fission reaction. There are other indicators that tell us that
India is interested in thermonuclear weapons capability. I
would prefer, if you want more detail, to have a more expert
response prepared and submitted for the record
SENATOR GLENN: If you could furnish that for the
record, we'd appreciate it. Thank you very much.
What is the principle concern about India's current
nuclear program?
WEBSTER: Well, I suppose that there are many ways to
put it, but one of the areas that I think is of concern to the
policy makers, and certainly to all of us who are watching
this, is the rivalry between India and Pakistan which has all
the earmarks of a race, and yet there have been no real efforts
made in the international community to try to head off that
race based on insecurity on both sides of the border.
And I think for those two countries to be devoting so
much of their resources in this area is a cause for
international concern about stability in the region
SENATOR GLENN: According to India's Department of
Atomic Energy, 1986-87 annual report, the Babba (phonetic)
atomic research center had conducted studies on the extraction
and refining of thorium and lithium, separation of stable
isotopes.
Now, the annual report for '87-88 stated the center
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was continuing studies on the recovery and purification of
uranium, lithium and helium gas. Studying how to obtain
purified lithium has many peaceful applications, but studying
how to separate lithium isotopes suggests and interest in
thermonuclear fuels. Lithium 6 can be used for thermonuclear
devices.
Now, is that information basically correct, or is
that one you'd just as soon take for--
WEBSTER: No, that's basically correct, Mr. Chairman.
And it's just another indicator of interest leading toward
capability.
SENATOR GLENN: Where is Iraq getting foreign
assistance in its nuclear program?
WEBSTER: Well, prior to the war, the Iran-Iraq war,
it was getting its help from Italy and France and the Soviet
Union in building its facilities at its Towaitha (phonetic)
nuclear research center. Last month, there was a report of
cooperation with Egypt, but it was officially denied.
I'm not prepared to comment on that in this forum.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (third
add)
May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Fourth Add)
x x x this forum.
SENATOR GLENN: One more. In 1974, two Israeli
scientists applied for and were granted patents in France and
West Germany for a method to produce enriched uranium by using
laser beams.
According to an Israeli newspaper account, the method
was developed by two scientists from Tel Aviv University, and
the defense ministry. An Israeli scientist was quoted as
saying that Israeli scientists had been seeking a method of
purifying uranium for use in reactors for peaceful purposes.
In 1981, the Israelis were conducting laser isotope
separation research at Ben Gurion University. Is Israel today
carrying out R&D on uranium enrichment? What can you tell us
about that?
WEBSTER: Well, it is carrying out research. It's at
a very low level of funding. The Israelis did not expect a
significant increase in laser isotope enrichment funding unless
the government decided to build nuclear powered reactors. So I
suppose that would be another indicator we would be watching
closely.
SENATOR GLENN: If there's any additional information
on that you could supply for the record, we'd appreciate it.
WEBSTER: Yes, I will, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR GLENN: My time on the first round is up.
Senator Roth?
SENATOR ROTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Webster, in your opening testimony you make
reference to the fact that there is a voluntary missile
technology control regime that's been signed by, I think, seven
countries--six NATO countries and Japan.
You also mention in your testimony that there are a
number of firms in Western Europe that have a well established
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record of supplying equipment and technical assistance to third
world ballistic missile programs.
Are any of these well-established firms in countries
that have signed these agreements, and are those companies
identified publicly or is that classified information?
WEBSTER: It's a little of both. I think, Senator
Roth, the best way for me to handle that would be to offer to
provide the details of answer to your question in a private
briefing or closed session or for the record under appropriate
classification.
SENATOR ROTH: Could you answer this question, and I
don't want you to answer anything that you feel is not in the
interest of your agency.
But are any of these well-known firms located
primarily in countries that have signed this agreement?
WEBSTER: Yes. I can answer that much. There are
companies within countries that are signatory to the
agreements.
SENATOR ROTH: Do those countries--are we aware of
whether or not any effort is being made to prevent sales so
that they are in good faith compliance with this agreement?
I guess what I'm trying to get at--
WEBSTER: Yes, it's a very valid question. I'm
trying to figure out how I can answer that properly in this
kind of a session. And perhaps the other witnesses on the
policy side can give you some indication of what they have been
told about it.
Certainly we have seen some examples recently, not in
the nuclear area but in the chemical and biological area, where
both revisions in local laws and moral suasion through
publicity has turned some of those companies down in their
effort to provide that kind of assistance. Turned them down
means slowed them down.
SENATOR ROTH: Well, it seems to me that if this
agreement is to mean anything, that it's certainly appropriate
for those countries to take the kind of action that would
prevent the disclosure of this technology. Otherwise, it seems
to me, we've entered into agreement that not only has no teeth
but no effect.
WEBSTER: I agree with you completely, Senator.
SENATOR ROTH: Would it be--maybe I'm getting again
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into policy. Would it be helpful, in your judgment, if these
companies became known publicly as at least one measure to help
put some restraints on their activities?
WEBSTER: I can see no real down side to that. I
think there is a policy question of who should do the
publicizing. But I can see no down side to pointing out what
countries are doing contrary to the--companies are doing
contrary to the policy of their own country.
SENATOR ROTH: Has any effort been made to your
knowledge to arrive at any agreement to establish any kind of
guidelines, be it voluntary, or how it will be enforced, how
compliance will be met.
WEBSTER: I don't know the answer to that question,
Senator.
SENATOR ROTH: Let me ask you a question about your
own agency. Have you adequate funds in your judgment to follow
the proliferation of this technology, or have you had to--are
you undermanned and--
wEB8TER: I think in general the Congress has been
very general with us in this area, particularly in the nuclear
side. We're going to come on more difficult times.
I mentioned in my opening statement some of the
complexities now of procurement of this type of technology in
Third World countries. Some of the types of weaponry are more
difficult to detect than others. That is, I've given previous
testimony on how difficult it is to identify chemical and
biological weapons production facilities because they're so
similar to legitimate facilities such as pharmaceutical or
fertilizer plants.
As those weapons come into greater demand, we're
going to have more pressure on ourselves to be able to
identify-- locate and identify those facilities. It comes down
in the end to what level of our confidence is sufficient for
you and the policymakers to take action, whether we can give
you--we could only tell you the level of our confidence. And I
can't really complain about the resources for this particular
effort.
SENATOR ROTH: Very good. Let me go back to your
testimony. As I recall, you mentioned one Indian student who
attended one of our institutions and acquired technology that
was useful in India's program to move ahead on nuclear matters.
Is that an isolated instance? Or are there many
instances where those who come here to study or on any kind of
exchange have been a source of high-tech that's helped their
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native countries to proceed, and if so is it of such serious
moment that this ought to be something we try to address
legislatively?
WEBSTER: I'm not in a position to say whether it
should be addressed legislatively, but it is certainly a
problem which has to be carefully monitored.
In the scientific community there's a great built-in
pressure to share, particularly at international levels. And
much of the technology that goes into proliferation of nuclear
and chemical and biological weaponry has a dual use that is
completely legitimate, and advances quality of life around if
properly used.
So it is--I think the challenge is to devise ways to
detect when that technology could be converted to illegitimate
purposes, and knowing when it has been converted for that
purpose, and on the first side, when you know that it could be
converted, deciding whether or not you want to let it out at
all, or under what circumstances.
SENATOR ROTH: Well, my time is up, but I'd like to
ask you one last question in this same area. Are you aware as
to whether there are any guidelines or requirements guiding the
universities and other institutions as to whether or not
foreigners should be permitted to study there or become
involved in their activities? Or is this left pretty much to
the discretion of the individual institution?
WEBSTER: I believe that there are very few
guidelines of this nature in existence. Some of the other
witnesses may have more knowledge of this.
If you're talking about fresh research being
conducted on the campuses, I doubt there are very many, if any,
limitations on. That's only when we identify the potential of
that research that the governmental interest comes to bear.
And I'm not entirely conversant with how that is
conveyed to the scientists on campus. But I doubt that there's
very much local university control over that.
SENATOR ROTH: Well, certainly we don't want to do
anything to inhibit the access of foreign students to our
institutions.
At the same time it does seem to me that there ought
to be some kind of guidance by the federal government as to
what should be done in cases where technology could be utilized
in the proliferation.
So I appreciate very much your response, Mr. Webster.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge Webster, I regret that I
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had to step out for a moment to attend another hearing during
your opening statement, but I have had an opportunity to read
it and I thank you for it.
And I just want to say for the record how important
it is that you as director of the Central Intelligence Agency
are coming forward in a public forum to talk about these
issues, because I think it contributes immeasurably to the
formation of policy by Congress, not to mention the executive
branch, and in that sense contributes to our efforts to achieve
a more peaceful world. And I appreciate very much what you're
doing.
If I may begin with a very general question, just to
create the context, which countries do you believe at this time
are developing nuclear explosive capabilities?
WEBSTER: Senator, having just complimented me for
coming out in the open, you ask a question that I am not
prepared to answer in an open forum. But I will be happy to
supply information, either in proper classification for the
record, or in a private session on this one.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (fourth
add)
May 18, 1989
More
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Fifth Add)
x x x this one.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Fine. Nobody's perfect. Thank
you. Let me try another one. Let me ask this question.
What is the possibility that terrorists may develop
or acquire nuclear weapons from proliferating nations?
WEBSTER: This has been a matter of great concern to
all of us for at least a decade. We followed it very closely
when I was director of the FBI, and were very much concerned
that this type of terrorist threat would introduce an entirely
different dimension, whole cities being held hostage.
I don't think we're there yet. But I can see a
degradation or degrading of control as these capabilities pass
out of the hands of the five or six major powers who develop
them and other countries who then develop the capability and
then sell that technology, as is taking place at the present
time may ultimately find its way into the hands of people who
don't care, and who will make that technology available to
terrorist groups who engage in activities that they support
through state-sponsored terrorism.
I must say, however, that I'm really less concerned
about the immediacy of that problem than I am about terrorists
getting control over other forms of weaponry, including
chemical and biological weaponry, because it requires less
technology. They don't have to be as good at producing it.
It generally is a kind of material that can be
transported with less risk of detection. And besides that they
have a whole range of stockpiles of rockets and other types of
conventional weapons that are at their disposal and do about as
much damage as they want to see done.
But we cannot discount this ultimate threat. And I
think that in the intelligence, through counter-terrorist
intelligence collection, must be very, very alert to the
possibility that nuclear technology can fall into the hands of
terrorists.
We have--I think--I know it's no secret that for some
time, we have battlefield nuclear weapons that can be carried
on the backs of soldiers. So that type of weapon would be very
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attractive to a terrorist, provided they could get their hands
on a completed weapon.
And it's my own view that, with so much technical
information on nuclear devices being available in our public
libraries, probably the key to controlling and reducing the
risk lies in controlling the fuel itself, the plutonium and the
enriched uranium.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge Webster, do you believe
from the information you have that the Soviet Union shares our
concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
WEBSTER: Well, we're beginning to hear those noises,
and they are very welcome expressions of concern.
We have been cooperating with them for several years
at various international fora, the International Atomic Energy
Agency. It does, as a supplier, require certain safeguards on
its specific exports.
I think that more recently--it's difficult for me to
separate nuclear and emerging biological and chemical warfare
capability. These are all the kind of threats that I think
major superpowers such as the Soviet Union and the United
States have to pay attention to.
Proliferation is a major problem. It gets out of
control, the people that can suffer the most from that can be
the superpowers.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Let me turn now for a moment to
the West. Have we shared information with our allies about the
involvement of companies within their territories in nuclear
proliferation?
WEBSTER: Yes, we'll have, and we'll try to continue
that dialogue.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: In your best judgment, how many
countries do you think are likely to possess nuclear-powered
submarines in the next decade, let's say?
WEBSTER: Well, as you know, Senator, there are five
countries which currently build nuclear-powered submarines--the
United States, the Soviets, Great Britain, France, and China--
and I think there is no plan we've detected from any of those
countries to veer away from continuing to build and operate
nuclear-powered submarines.
India has one leased submarine, which it acquired in
1988. It might be moving toward getting a few more nuclear-
powered submarines in the next few years. To the extent that
it does so I suppose there'll be pressure on China and other
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suppliers of weaponry to provide neighboring countries with
offsetting capability.
The Brazilian navy minister has stated that Brazil's
not building nuclear submarines at this time, but he thought
that kind of information was vital to the development of any
country. He said that he doesn't expect Brazil to have
indigenously built nuclear submarines in this decade, but hopes
maybe to begin construction on them in the beginning of the
next century.
We're not hearing very much in Argentina. They lack,
in all probability, the economic resources to even consider
working on a project as expensive as an indigenously produced
nuclear-powered submarine within the next 10 years.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge, the Middle East is clearly
one of the most unstable regions in the world, and Libya one of
the most unpredictable and unstable countries in that region,
and in the world.
Do you believe that the Libyans now possess or will
soon possess the capability to, for instance, attack Israel by
air?
WEBSTER: Yes, I do. It possesses the capability to
attack Israel by air, although there are limitations to it.
I think I should defer to the chairman on matters of
this kind. But it's my understanding that range of these long-
range bombers depend on their trajectory.
And if they go up high enough--they have to go up
high in order to expand their range, when they do that they
increase the risk of air interdiction, either from the ground
or from the air.
And so some would argue that they lack the low-flying
capability to attack Israel. But in a pure sense, they can
reach it. Whether they get shot down in the process is a
matter of military technology that I'm not competent to testify
on. And some of these would require air fueling in order to
assure a safe round trip.
But it's a threat. And it shouldn't be considered
anything else but a threat.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: One final question, returning to
the Soviet bloc, do you have reason to believe that any other
Eastern European nations are seeking to develop their own
nuclear weapons capability?
WEBSTER: Well, Romania claims that it could but
doesn't want to. I think I shouldn't comment further on it.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Okay. Thank you. My time's up.
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SENATOR GLENN: Thank you very much. I wanted to go
back a little bit and ask some questions that I wasn't able to
ask before.
I asked about the research in Israel and their
development of uranium enrichment. I'd like to follow that on
with another question about krytrons (phonetic). Krytrons are
small, very fast-acting electrical switches capable of
switching very large currents at high voltages with very good
timing, and they're a key element in nuclear weapons.
They fire the detonators in the high explosive system
of a nuclear weapon, and they can also be used for other
purposes, for lasers, other missile development.
But according to U.S. news accounts published in '85,
Israel admitted obtaining a number of krytrons over the period
'79 to '83. The Israeli defense ministry claimed the devices
were used only in conventional research and development and
testing equipment.
Nevertheless, federal prosecutors in Los Angeles
indicted a U.S. citizen for illegally exporting 810 krytrons to
Israel between 1980 and '83. Israel later returned some of
these unused krytrons.
But what can you tell us about Israel's use of
krytrons? Did they acquire those? Do you think they're using
them in their nuclear program? Or what is the status on that?
WEBSTER: Well, they have attempted to acquire them.
I believe that they have successfully acquired some. They've
returned others that were illegally sold into Israel.
I have to be a little more careful about this one
because while krytrons, which is sort of a small, fast-acting
electrical switch, is one of the key devices in firing the
detonators in a nuclear weapons high-explosive system, it does
have other uses. And I don't think we can draw any firm
inferences from the situations you've described.
But it is the kind of thing that we have to watch
very closely, and it often leads us to judgments about
intentions and capabilities.
SENATOR GLENN: We followed in Pakistan's efforts
some years ago, and they claimed they were going to use them
for strobe lights for runways, and by our calculations I think
they had enough for roughly 400 airports or something like that
that they were going to build with the use of their krytrons.
Will Pakistan be able to acquire a nuclear power
plant through foreign sources, such as Soviet Union or China? I
think, Mr. Chairman, that's a question I probably should ask to
defer on until another means of responding to you.
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The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (fifth
add)
May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Sixth Add)
x x x to you.
SENATOR GLENN: Another one that's along a little
technical line also.
In a late April press conference held by the
Bundestag investigatory committee, German investigators
reportedly confirmed exports of a tritium collection and
purification facility, zirc alloy tubes, uranium hexafluoride
containers, and fuel fabrication equipment to Pakistan.
The ongoing investigations of exports of nuclear
equipment or material from West Germany have focused on two
companies, NTG and PTB, and the German criminal justice system,
they were looking to charge the suspects with violating German
law banning military exports to regions of conflict. Now, this
would be a more serious charge than that of violating German
export regulations.
Pakistan may have sought the tritium recovery
equipment to remove tritium from heavy water at its CANDU-type
(phonetic) reactor at Karachi, although the West German
investigators recently contradicted claims of peaceful use. A
buildup of tritium in the heavy water moderator in such
reactors is a radiological health hazard.
In your view, is this information about Pakistan's
acquisition of tritium and tritium recovery equipment correct?
WEBSTER: That corresponds, Mr .Chairman, with
information that has come to me, although those facts are mixed
with charges that I don't know have been substantiated.
Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear
capability. What creates problems for the United States is
whether that capability has reached a point that it implicates
various amendments that apply to other systems and relief for
Pakistan.
SENATOR GLENN: Switching countries, are there
developments of concern from a nuclear proliferation standpoint
in South Africa?
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WEBSTER: Well, South Africa has an unsafeguarded
uranium enrichment plant at its Valendaba (phonetic) nuclear
facility. It started operating a pilot enrichment plant in
1975, and it's completing a commercial-scale enrichment plant.
Although South Africa has used the pilot enrichment
plant to supply enriched fuel for its safeguarded reactor, we
are concerned about the unsafeguarded enriched material that
has been and will continue to be produced at the plant.
SENATOR GLENN: Let me return to the line of
questioning that Senator Lieberman was on, and I'll follow up
with a question that follows on with his last question.
Has China ever supplied unsafeguarded heavy water to
any other nation, to your knowledge?
WEBSTER: It seems to me that one of their officials
acknowleged sending some heavy water to Argentina some years
ago. If I'm not correct in my recollection, I'll correct it
for the record. But I'm informed the Argentines denied it.
SENATOR GLENN: GAO concluded a study for our
committee last year which found very significant inadequacies
in foreign visitor controls at our nuclear weapons
laboratories. I know we all had concerns about this. Have you
followed up any as far as what potential proliferation threat
this might pose?
WEBSTER: I'm aware of the report. I can't give any
firm statement as to what follow-on has taken place. It's
certainly an area of concern and vulnerability that should be
addressed.
SENATOR GLENN: You mentioned, you commented on the
possibility earlier that terrorists may develop or acquire,
what is the possibility that terrorists may develop or acquire
nuclear weapons from proliferating nations. You talked about
that just a little bit, but could you expand on that just a
little.
WEBSTER: I think I've said about all that I know on
that Mr. Chairman. It is a possibility, and the possibility
increases as the proliferation increases, as the capabilities
and technology fall into less responsible hands. There is at
least for the moment sort of the why buy a cow and eggs when
milk is so cheap idea that there are so many other alternative
weapons more readily available and requiring less technical
capability, that that I think has slowed the process of
terrorists seeking to acquire this kind of capability,
althrough even in the United States there are a couple of dozen
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nuclear terrorist threats a year, none of them having any
validity.
But we can't discount the drift and the trend, and
must be very alert to the possibility that a sophisticated
terrorist group enjoying the sponsorship of a country which has
developed that technology may come into possession of
particularly smaller nuclear devices and have the fuel to
energize them.
SENATOR GLENN: Let me skip down here to one other
question since my time is almost up.
Can you identify which third world space and missile
programs overlap, you indicated in your earlier statement that
there was some overlap between those programs.
WEBSTER: Well as I'm sure you realize, those
countries that are engaging in an overlap do try their best to
keep that fact a secret, and this is probably not the forum for
me to discuss it, but I would be happy to again, make the same
offer for a classified briefing or response.
SENATOR GLENN: Senator Roth.
SENATOR ROTH: Mr. Webster, what do we believe South
Africa's primarly potential nuclear delivery system to be?
WEBSTER: I think I'm in the same position, Senator
Roth, and I think that I would like to defer that question to
be answered either in classified record or private briefing.
SENATOR ROTH: Okay, that's all the questions I have,
Mr. Chairman.
question.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge Webster, let me ask you a
WEBSTER: Your question was South Africa or China, I
want to be sure that I answer that.
SENATOR ROTH: In reference to South Africa.
WEBSTER: Yes, my answer is the same.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge, has the CIA or U.S.
Director appointed a single high level official to oversee all
proliferation issues?
WEBSTER: Yes, Senator, the Deputy Director for
Intelligence, who oversees three or four of our major
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analytical divisions has that responsibility. The various
offices, Office of Special Missions, Office of Global Issues,
and a number of other divisions that focus their expertise in
particular ways all report through the Deputy Director of
intelligence and he has that responsibility.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: In your testimony, you stated
that the countries that a few years ago were wholly dependent
on foreign suppliers for their own missile programs are not
retransferring technology to newer development efforts. Can
you identify the countries that are involved in that
transition?
WEBSTER: I'm afraid I'm circumscribed by the same
problems in an open hearing.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: I'll try an other one. A recent
press report alleged that several United States' provided
equipment to a facility to Iraz involved in that country's
ballistic missile development program. Do you know if this is
true, and more generally, does our intelligence community
monitor the activities of U.S. firms that may be missile
technology suppliers.
WEBSTER: We always have the problem of, I don't
collect domestic intelligence. But we do work closely with the
FBI and the U.S. Customs Service for any indication that a
United States' firm might be involved in missile proliferation.
If we pick it up through assets abroad, that information is
conveyed back to the FBI and the Customs Service to be worked
domestically in this country. That is a high and very good
level of cooperation between our agencies, but that's about as
much as I can say about it here.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Can you answer the question of
whether it's true that any American firms participated in the
development of that facility in Iraq?
WEBSTER: I know the article you are talking about,
I'm personally not aware of any information that suggests first
that it was a witting participation or even that it was in fact
true. So much of that kind of technology can go through
diversion where the equipment or facilities or even the
technology pass to people who are authorize it who then through
various processes divert that technology to other places. So I
can't give you any solid information about it. I know it's
being persued, but I don't know the answer to it. I don't know
that it is true.
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SENATOR LIEBERMAN: You mentioned in your testimony
that Iraq has increased the range of their SCUD missiles by
reducing the weight of their warheads. Is that a difficult
process?
WEBSTER: Well it does involve some tinkering with
the guidance system's stability of the missile. But it's not a
major deal. And I know that in some other areas we have talked
to other countries who have had shorter range missiles that
they could make longer, and longer range missiles that they
could make shorter, depending on how much accuracy they want to
have at the far end. I think that Iraq is believed to have
practically doubled its range by lowering the payload.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: What in your estimate is the
range of their missiles now, the outer limits of how far they
might reach?
WEBSTER: Well, I believe the SCUD is about 300
kilometers under normal circumstances. So you can extend that
out if you want. I'm not sure what type of missiles you are
talking about. We use, I think the general protocols are that
a thousand kilometers, below that is considered to be short
range missiles, and below 300 kilometers are generally not
under any control regime. But there are a number of missiles
that are in that 300 to 600 kilometer range that are out there
for use in third world countries.
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (sixth
add)
May 18, 1989
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HIGHLIGHTS OF A SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING
May 18, 1989
(Seventh Add)
x x x world countries.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Still in the Middle East, can you
expand on your statement that Israel's recent launch of a
satellite may have fueled regional desires for an indigenous
missile production capability?
WEBSTER: I think when they launched their satellite
it had a lot of people worried that they were testing a missile
rather than a reconnaissance satellite. Some of the same
launch capabilities are involved. Some of the same technology
levels were involved. It made a number of their neighbors very
nervous about what comes next. And I think I can't go much
beyond that answer than to say you get an immediate response
these days in that part of the world. If one country can
demonstrate a capability, the others are busy trying to catch
Up.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: Judge, recent legislation has
been introduced that would impose sanctions on countries which
violate the provisions of the MTCR. If you are aware of that
legislation, do you have an opinion on it, how effective do you
believe it would be.
WEBSTER: I really should defer the answer to that
question to the Administration policy makers. It calls for
policy. There are some down sides to sanctions from an
intelligence collection point of view, which I'm not at liberty
to discuss here. But I guess I happen to believe that unless
there is some element of truth to legislation, the history of
compliance has not been particularly reassuring.
The down side of sanctions is that you inevitably get
into a discussion of the intelligence that supports the view
that there has been a violation. But we have to find some way
to accomodate our protection source's methods to the need to
educate the world on infractions that are leading to world
instability.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: The Bonn government as you know
has recently admitted that West German firms were involved with
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the Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabka (phonetic), but
that admission obviously came only after a series of
embarrasing press reports.
To your knowledge have similar reports stymied other
third world missile programs?
WEBSTER: Well if you had not asked me to go beyond
my generalized answer, I think that wherever there has been
exposure, there has been a tendency for those who has skirted
the edges of their own laws or taken advantage of loopholes in
the law to slow down their activity.
There is indeed a moral suasion available on the
world scene and we have seen examples of how it works, not
necessarily indefinitly. Certainly I think the German
government should be complimented for seeking tighter laws, as
well as moral suasion. But the biggest weapon we have these
days I think is to draw attention to business who proport to be
legitimate who are engaging in activities which threaten the
security in the world.
SENATOR LIEBERMAN: My time is about up, I will yield
to the Chairman.
GLENN: Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
How do you define a missile as being nuclear capable,
and which ballistic missiles under development in the third
world meet that definition?
WEBSTER: Well the MTCR defines a nuclear capable
missile as one that can deliver a 500 kilogram or 1,100 warhead
a distance of 300 kilometers.
While this threshold is a reasonable general minimum
standard for a nuclear warhead, each country trying to mate a
nuclear weapon to a missile will have its own design
specifications and limitations that will either fall under or
exceed that standard. That's about as much as I can say about
it in a public forum.
GLENN: Okay. You stated that there are some 15
nations that will be producing ballistic missiles by the year
2000. Is that a pretty firm estimate, are there any additional
nations you can see that might get that capability?
WEBSTER: Well there are some countries that are
capable of developing ballistic missiles but for political or
economic reasons have chosen not to do so. If they get caught
in the middle of a regional conflict or potential for conflict,
they may decide for reasons of self defense that they want to
get into the act and play with the big fellows.
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GLENN: Of concern to us also has been the fact that
there might be chemical weapons used on that. You commented on
that in your previous testimony of course earlier.
WEBSTER: I think there's a very high probability
that chemical weapons would be used by such countries and
others in advance of nuclear capabilty, because it's not that
tough to do.
GLENN: You testified on that before. You had
excellent testimony, I remember you said you could have a
credible chemical weapons plant in an area the size of this
room.
WEBSTER: That's right. And you could convert it to
a legitimate facility in eight or twelve hours, and put it back
when the heat's off.
GLENN: The product of that kind of a laboratory
could be used as a devastating weapon on a missile as well as a
nuclear weapon.
WEBSTER: I think those SCUDS are just sitting out
there, it's an option, it's currently available.
GLENN: How accurate do these missiles need to be in
order to be militarily effective? Can we tell what type of
warhead will be used on a missile if we know that missile's
accuracy?
WEBSTER: I think the answer to that is no, because
there are so many variations, such as the one that Senator
Lieberman asked about where they modify their warhead to
achieve a different range capability.
missile?
GLENN: What's your definition of short or long range
WEBSTER: Well the MCTR I think defines 1,000
kilometers or above in the short range. I think it goes 1,000
to 3,000 kilometers is in the short range category.
GLENN: We can ask Mr. Lehman about that later. I
think the arms control people have very definite ranges that
they specify for short, intermediate and long range missiles.
WEBSTER: Yes they do, and I think that's a thousand
kilometers, one to three. And intermediate would be between
3,000 and 5,500 kilometers, and intercontinental above that.
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GLENN: You mentioned that space launch vehicles can
be converted into ballistic missiles. What's needed in order
to make that conversion, just a different guidance system?
WEBSTER: That's my understanding.
GLENN: And can other military missiles such as
surface to air missiles be converted into surface to surface
missiles, have you seen any of that going on?
WEBSTER: I'm informed that it can be done, it has
been done, but I can't specify in an open forum.
GLENN: Okay. Do you believe, what are your feelings
about cruise missiles, do they pose a significant proliferation
threat compared to ballistic missiles in the next decade or so?
WEBSTER: I guess on that one, I'm in a sort of watch
and see mode. The additional technology that's involved there
would seem to me to be an impediment to rapid development of
cruise missiles.
GLENN: Our technology and that of the Soviets is
going ahead quite rapidly in that particular field, that's no
secret, and the question was whether you felt that some of
these third world countries are making the same kinds of
strides that we and the Soviets have both been making. I know
they are very highly technical guidance systems that we have to
have to make those systems work. I would presume that most
third world countries do not have that capability, at least not
yet.
WEBSTER: When we talk about acquisition, we have to
sometimes distinguish between getting a system or getting an
indigenous production capability.
As you know this also depends upon global positioning
satellite systems for the use of cruise missiles. And as that
proliferates we could probably see a trend towards cruise
missiles. It would be more likely in my opinion that third
world countries would seek to acquire the whole system if it
would be made available to them by another country rather than
to go the hard route, at least at this time. They have enough
on their plate.
SENATOR GLENN: When we find something wrong around
the world we are going to send a demarche to one of these
foreign governments about the activities of their firms and the
individuals. Do you get involved with that, is your advice
counseled on that?
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WEBSTER: We are very much involved. Our approach is
to supply reliable intelligence and get it into a shape that
can be used by our policy makers in making these demarches.
And from time to time we are of assistance in trying to seek
through our own contacts and liaison clarification of
statements that have been made to our officials or public
statements that are ambiguous in their inference with respect
to missiles and to try to seek clarification in that way.
We can be used in other ways, but I want to emphasize
that the intelligence community does not have a policy making
role in this area.
GLENN: Thank you. My time is not up yet, but I
think in the interest of moving on, we are going to move along,
we have other witnesses here, we'll have to go ahead. Do you
have any more questions?
Judge, thank you very much. We may have some
additional questions to present from other members of the
committee, and we appreciate your being here this morning. This
has been a long session and we appreciate your willingness to
share this information with us this morning. You are very, very
helpful.
WEBSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GLENN: Thank you very much.
END WEBSTER TESTIMONY; END HEARING HIGHLIGHTS
The Reuter Transcript Report
Highlights of Senate Governmental Affairs hearing (seventh
and final add)
May 18, 1989
Reuter
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