LUNCH WITH DAVID ACHESON, CSIS 17 AUGUST 1988, 12:30, METROPOLITAN CLUB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000700040006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 11, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
L�utiye Secretary
12 Aug 88
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NOTE FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
11 August 1988
DCI
Lunch with David Acheson, CSIS
17 August 1988, 12:30, Metropolitan Club
S TAT
David Acheson called on behalf of CSIS. He invited me to
lunch and we agreed upon Wednesday, 17 August, at 12:30 at the
Metropolitan Club. He is bringing along Jim Morrison, a
full-time Director of the CSIS study of national space policy.
According to Acheson, the SIG-Space coordinating mechanism
has proved to be ineffective. They are considering alternate
proposals to suggest, at least one of which would borrow on the
DCI dual authority concept. I think they are talking primarily
about a civil space Assistant to the President, probably drawn
from an existing Agency head.
Mr. Acheson wants to talk off-the-record on the way the
DCI system works, its strengths and weaknesses. I think I can
do this appropriately.
However, I recall some recent communications either from
NSC or Defense which outline some new approaches to space
coordThatibkwithiri the-pasat-Week or so. What I'd like to have
by Wednesday is anything that's available or useful on
coordination of space efforts so that I can better understand
what Mr. Acheson is proposing (not to be passed along to him).
Any help would be appreciated.
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Lunch with David Acheson, CSIs
DELIVER TO:
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RENARIS:
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STAT
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POINT PAPER ON COORDINATION OF SPACE EFFORTS
Why is there a need for space coordination mechanisms?
o The nation has four separate but closely coordinated space programs:
Civil Governmental (Includes the NASA and NOAA space programs).
Defense (Includes DoD space programs for Comms, Warning,
Surveillance, Navigation, Weather, ASAT, etc.).
DCI (Includes NRO space programs).
Commercial (Includes private sector ventures in Comms, Space Launch,
etc. These programs are regulated by the government, e.g., DoT
regulates private sector launch activities.)
o These programs have many common interests that require interagency
coordination. Examples include:
Common interests in certain space technologies, e.g., launch
technologies, remote sensing technologies.
International cooperative activities that require coordination
because of foreign policy and technology transfer interests.
DoD procurement of new expendable launch vehicles for national
security use. This procurement is establishing the industrial base
on which much of the commercial launch industry will depend.
Potential need for all space sectors to use the Space Station.
What are the current mechanisms for space coordination?
o SIG(Space)
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To provide a forum to all Federal agencies for their policy views, to
review and advise on proposed changes to national space policy, and
to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues to
the President for decisions as necessary.
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Members include Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense
(Doi)), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Transportation
(DOT), Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Other executive agencies or
departments will participate as the agenda of meeting shall dictate.
SIG(Space) is chaired by William Cockell of the NSC Staff.
Representation- is at the subcabinet level. The DCI representative is
DDCI Gates. DoD representative is DepSecDef Taft. NASA
representative is the administrator or his deputy.
An NSC meeting (expanded, if necessary) will be convened if the issue
requires cabinet level review.
SIG(Space) is supported by an IG(Space) and working groups as
required. DCI IG(Space) representative is D/ICS.
o Commercial Space Working Group of the Economic Policy Council (EPC). (The
EPC is a cabinet-level coordinating body chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury.)
High-level focus for commercial space issues.
Members include DOC, NSC Staff, NASA, DCI, OMB, DoD, USTR, DoS,
Treasury, CEA, DoL, and DoJ.
The Commercial Space Working Group is chaired by DOC. Members are at
the Deputy Assistant Secretary level (or equivalent).
Issues are normally brought to the EPC for decision. However,
SIG(Space) and the Commercial Space Working Group may address issues
cooperatively. Such issues may be further addressed by SIG(Space).
-- There have been jurisdictional disagreements ("turf battles") between
the SIG(Space) and the Commercial Space Working Group.
What are typical SIG(Space) and Commercial Space Working Group Activities?
Current SIG(Space) Activities
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o Space Debris Working Group--Providing recommendations on the
implementation of the Space Debris Policy--that all space sectors will
seek to minimize the creation of space debris.
o Space Station Negotiations--Coordinating policy for cooperative agreements
with Europe/ESA, Japan, and Canada.
o US/USSR Space Cooperation--Developing policy for space cooperation
projects. Considers foreign policy and national security interests,
including technology transfer.
SIG(Space) Actions/Activities in the Last Five Years
o National Space Policy Update--Update signed by President in January 1988.
Consolidated previous Presidential Directives and established new policy
relative to exploration of the solar system, commercial space policy, and
launch policy. Fact sheet and Q&As are attached.
o Shuttle Recovery Policy--Provided policy recommendations on national plan
for launch recovery following the CHALLENGER accident. Considered
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-related actions as well as procurement of
a replacement orbiter.
o Launch-Related Activities (prior to CHALLENGER)--Considered a variety of
issues related to the Shuttle and ELVs including shuttle pricing for
commercial payloads, DoD's initiation of the Titan IV program, procurement
of a fifth shuttle orbiter, etc.
o Space Station--Provided policy analysis and recommendations relative to
NASA's proposal to begin the development of a Space Station. Considered
governmental �and commercial uses, international cooperation, and risks.
EPC/Commercial Space Working Group Activities
o Private Sector Space Facility--The President announced an intent for the
Federal Government to lease space as an "anchor tenant" in an orbiting
space facility suitable for research and commercial manufacturing that is
financed, constructed, and operated by the private sector.
o Spacehab--The Administration committed to make best efforts to launch
within the Shuttle payload bay, in the early 1990s, the commercially
developed, owned, and managed Shuttle middeck module: Spacehab.
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o Microgravity Research Board--The President will establish, through
Executive Order, a National Microgravity Research Board to assure and
coordinate a broader range of opportunities for research in microgravity
conditions.
o External Tanks--The Administration is making available for five years the
expended external tanks of the Shuttle fleet at no cost to all feasible US
commercial and nonprofit endeavors, for uses such as research, storage, or
manufacturing in space.
o Insurance Relief for Launch Providers--The Administration will take
administrative steps to address the insurance concerns of the US
commercial launch industry which currently uses federal launch ranges.
(See attachment for additional information.)
How well are the existing mechanisms working?
o ICS believes that the existing mechanisms have generally worked well.
However, there have been criticisms by some in Congress and the
civil/commercial space community. Criticisms include:
lack of dynamic space leadership,
-- too slow a process for decisionmaking, and
-- national security domination of civil interests leading to slow
growth in civil space budget as compared to national security.
o We do not share these perceptions for the following reasons:
Coordination mechanisms do not provide leadership. This must come
from the agencies/departments with program responsibilities and the
White House. Clearly, budget constraints have prevented the rapid
civil space growth desired by some.
Interagency coordination takes time. These is a need to gather
facts, perform analyses, and build consensus to the extent possible.
In the case of Shuttle Recovery Policy, the SIG(Space) was criticized
as being slow and delaying the process. In actuality, SIG(Space)
completed its work in a few months, but the Administration decision
on the funding dragged on for several more months.
Although SIG(Space) has representatives from NSC Staff, DoD, JCS,
DCI, and State, it is not correct to say that it is dominated by
national security agencies. This representation does, however,
ensure that national security interests will always be considered.
Most members believe that SIG(Space) is a forum where all agencies
can "get a fair shake."
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�o In summary, we believe SIG(Space) mechanisms are working well. We have:
a coherent national policy,
a forum where interagency problems can be worked out, and
most participants (including NASA) feel that the forum has been fair
and is preferable to the EPC forum.
o Can we do better?
Main current problem (in the last year or so) is the turf battle
between SIG(Space) and EPC. Changes to fix this problem would be
helpful but should not come at the expense of the SIG(Space) in its
role as the overall coordinating body for space policy.
Attachments:
A. White House Press Secretary Fact Sheet
B. National Space Policy Questions/Answers
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SUBJECT: Point Paper on Coordination of Space Efforts
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy 1 - DCI
2.- DDCI (ER File)
3 - D/ICS (LtGen Heinz)
4 - DD/PPO
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6 - PPO Chrono
7 - ICS Registry (w/o attachments)
DCl/ICS
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release February 11, 1988
THE PRESIDENT'S SPACE POLICY AND COMMERCIAL SPACE
INITIATIVE TO BEGIN THE NEXT CENTURY
FACT SHEET
The President today announced a comprehensive "Space Policy and
Commercial Space Initiative to Begin the Next Century" intended
to assure United States space leadership.
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The President's program has three major components:
o Establishing -a long-range goal to expand human presence and
activity beyond Earth orbit into the Solar System;
o Creating opportunities for U.S. commerce in space; and
o Continuing our national commitment to a permanently manned
Space Station.
The new policy and programs are contained in a National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) signed by the President on January 5,
1988, the FY 1989 Budget the President will submit shortly to
Congress, and a fifteen point Commercial Space Initiative.
I. EXPANDING HUMAN PRESENCE BEYOND EARTH ORBIT
In the recent NSDD, the President committed to a goal of
expanding human presence and activity in the Solar System. To
lay the foundation for this goal, the President will be
requesting $100 million in his FY 1989 Budget for a major new
technology development program "Project Pathfinder" that will
enable a broad range of manned or unmanned missions beyond the
Earth
s orbit.
Project Pathfinder will be organized around four major focuses:
Exploration technology;
Operations technology;
Humans-in-space technology; and
Transfer vehicle technology.
This research effort will give the United States know-how in
critical areas, such as humans in the space environment, closed
loop life support, aero braking, orbital transfer and
maneuvering, cryogenic storage and handling, and large scale
space operations, and provide a base for wise decisions on long
term goals and missions.
Additional highlights of the NSDD are outlined in Section IV of
this fact sheet.
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II. CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. COMMERCE IN SPACE
The President is announcing a fifteen point commercial space
initiative to seize the opportunities for a vigorous U.S.
commercial presence in Earth orbit and beyond -- in research and
manufacturing. This initiative has three goals:
o Promoting a strong U.S. commercial presence in space;
o Assuring a highway to space; and
o Building a solid technology and talent base.
Promoting a Strong U.S. Commercial Presence in Space
1- Private Sector Space Facility: The President is announcing
an intent for the Federal Government to lease space as an
-"anchor tenant" in an orbiting space facility suitable for
research and commercial manufacturing that is financed,
constructed, and operated by the private sector. The
� Administration will solicit proposals from the U.S. private
sector for such a facility. Space in this facility will be
used and/or subleased by various Federal agencies with
interest in microgravity research.
The Administration's intent is to award a contract during
mid-summer of this year for such space and related services
to be available to the -Government no later than the end of
FY 1993.
2. Spacehab: The Administration is committing to make best
efforts to launch within the Shuttle payload bay, in the
early 1990s, the commercially developed, owned, and managed
Shuttle middeck module: Spacehab. Manifesting requirements
will depend on customer demand.
Spacehab is a pressurized metal cylinder that fits in the
Shuttle payload bay and connects to the crew compartment
through the orbiter airlock. Spacehab takes up
approximately one-quarter of the payload bay and increases
the pressurized living and working space of an orbiter by
approximately 1,000 cubic feet or 400 percent in useable
research volume. The facility is intended to be ready for
commercial use in mid-1991.
3. Microgravity Research Board: The President will estab-
lish, through Executive Order, a National Microgravity
Research Board to assure and coordinate a broader range of
opportunities for research in microgravity conditions.
NASA will chair this board, which will include senior-level
representatives from the Departments of Commerce,
Transportation, Energy, and Defense, NIH, and NSF; and will
consult with the university and commercial sectors. The
board will have the following responsibilities:
o To stimulate research in microgravity environments and
its applications to commercial uses by advising Federal
agencies, including NASA, on microgravity priorities,
and consulting with private industry and academia on
microgravity research opportunities;
o To develop policy recommendations to the Federal
Government on matters relating to microgravity
research, including types of research, government/
industry/and academic cooperation, and access to space,
including a potential launch voucher program;
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o To coordinate the microgravity programs of Federal
agencies by:
reviewing agency plans for microgravity research
and recommending priorities for the use of
Federally-owned or leased space on microgravity
facilities; and
ensuring that agencies establish merit review
processes for evaluating microgravity research
proposals; and
o To promote transfer of federally funded microgravity
research to the commercial sector in furtherance of
Executive Order 12591.
NASA will continue to be responsible for making judgments on
the safety of experiments and for making manifesting
decisions for manned space flight systems.
4. External Tanks: The Administration is making available for
five years the expended external tanks of the Shuttle fleet
at no cost to all feasible U.S. commercial and nonprofit
endeavors, for uses such as research, storage, or
manufacturing in space.
NASA will provide any necessary technical or other
assistance to these endeavors on a direct cost basis. If
private sector demand exceeds supply, NASA may auction the
external tanks.
5. Privatizing Space Station: NASA, in coordination with the
Office of Management and Budget, will revise its guidelines
on commercialization of the U.S. Space Station to clarify
and strengthen the Federal commitment to private sector
investment in this program.
6. Future Privatization: NASA will seek to rely to the great-
est extent feasible on private sector design, financing,
construction, and operation of future Space Station require-
ments, including those currently under study.
7. Remote Sensing: The Administration is encouraging the
development of commercial remote sensing systems. As part
of this effort, the Department of Commerce, in consultation
with other agencies, is examining potential opportunities
for future Federal procurement of remote sensing data from
the U.S. commercial sector.
Assuring a Highway to Space
8. Reliance on Private Launch Services: Federal agencies
will procure existing and future required expendable launch
services directly from the private sector to the fullest
extent feasible.
9. Insurance Relief for Launch Providers: The Administration
will take administrative steps to address the insurance
concerns of the U.S. commercial launch industry, which
currently uses Federal launch ranges. These steps include:
o Limits on Third Party Liability: Consistent with the
Administration's tort policy, the Administration will
propose to Congress a $200,000 cap on noneconomic
damage awards to individual third parties resulting
from commercial launch accidents;
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o Limits on Property Damage Liability: The liability of
commercial launch operators for damage to Government
property resulting from a commercial launch accidentwill be
administratively limited to the level of insurance required
by the Department of Transportation.
lf losses to the Government exceed this level, the
Government will waive its right to recover for damages.
If losses are less than this level, the Government will
waive its right to recover for those damages caused by
Government willful misconduct or reckless disregard.
10. Private Launch Ranges: The Administration will consult with
the private sector on the potential construction of
commercial launch range facilities separate from Federal
facilities and the use of such facilities by the Federal
Government.
11. Vouchers for Research Payloads: NASA and the Department of
Transportation will explore providing to research payload
owners manifested on the Shuttle a one time launch voucher
that can be used to purchase an alternative U.S. commercial
launch service.
Building a Solid Technology and Talent Base
12. Space Technology Spin-Offs: The President is directing that
the new Pathfinder program, the Civil Space Technology
Initiative, and other technology programs be conducted in
accordance with the following policies:
o Federally funded contractors, universities, and Federal
laboratories will retain the rights to any patents and
technical data, including copyrights, that result from
these programs. The Federal Government will have the
authority to use this intellectual property royalty
free;
o Proposed technologies and patents available for licens-
ing will be housed in a Pathfinder/CSTI library within
NASA; and
o When contracting for commercial development of
Pathfinder, CSTI and other technology work products,
NASA will specify its requirements in a manner that
provides contractors with maximum flexibility to pursue
innovative and creative approaches.
13. Federal Expertise on Loan to American Schools: The Presi-
dent is encouraging Federal scientists, engineers, and
technicians in aerospace and space related careers to take a
sabbatical year to teach in any level of education in the
United States.
14. Education Opportunities: The President is requesting in his
FY 1989 Budget expanding five-fold opportunities for U.S.
teachers to visit NASA field centers and related aerospace
and university facilities.
In addition, NASA, NSF, and DOD will contribute materials
and classroom experiments through the Department of
Education to U.S. schools developing "tech shop" programs.
NASA will encourage corporate participation in this program.
15. Protecting U.S. Critical Technologies: The Administration
is requesting that Congress extend to NASA the authority it
has given the Department of Defense to protect from whole-
sale release under the Freedom of Information Act those
critical national technologies and systems that are prohib-
ited from export.
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III. CONTINUING THE NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE SPACE STATION
In 1984, the President directed NASA to develop a permanently
manned Space Station. The President remains committed to
achieving this end and is requesting $1 billion in his FY 1989
Budget for continued development and a three year appropriation
commitment from Congress for $6.1 billion. The Space Station,
planned for development in cooperation with U.S. friends and
allies, is intended to be a multi-purpose facility for the
Nation's science and applications programs. It will permit such
things in space as: research, observation of the solar system,
assembly of vehicles or facilities, storage, servicing of
satellites, and basing for future space missions and commercial
and entrepreneurial endeavors in space.
To help ensure a Space Station that is cost effective, the
President is proposing as part of his Commercial Space Initiative
actions to encourage private sector investment in the Space
Station, including directing NASA to rely to the greatiSt extent
feasible on private sector design, financing, construction, and
operation of future Space Station requirements.
IV. ADDITIONAL HIGHLIGHTS OF THE JANUARY 5, 1988 NSDD
o U.S. Space Leadership: Leadership is reiterated as a
fundamental national objective in areas of space activity
critical to achieving U.S. national security, scientific,
economic and foreign policy goals.
o Defining Federal Roles and Responsibilities: Government
activities are specified in three separate and distinct
sectors: civil, national security, and nongovernmental.
Agency roles and responsibilities are codified and specific
goals are established for the civil space sector; those for
other sectors are updated.
o Encouraging a Commercial Sector: A separate,
nongovernmental or commercial space sector is recognized and
encouraged by the policy that Federal Government actions
shall not preclude or deter the continuing development of
this sector. New guidelines are established to limit
unnecessary Government competition with the private sector
and ensure that Federal agencies are reliable customers for
commercial space goods and services.
o The President's launch policy prohibiting NASA from
maintaining an expendable launch vehicle adjunct to the
Shuttle, as well as limiting commercial and foreign payloads
on the Shuttle to those that are Shuttle-unique or serve
national security or foreign policy purposes, is reaffirmed.
In addition, policies endorsing the purchase of commercial
launch services by Federal agencies are further
strengthened.
o National Secu'A:ity Space Sector: An assured capability for
national security missions is clearly enunciated, and the
survivability and endurance of critical national security
space functions is stressed.
o Assuring Access to Space: Assured access to space is
recognized as a key element of national space policy. U.S.
space transportation systems that provide sufficient
resiliency to allow continued operation, despite failures in
any single system, are emphasized. The mix of space
transportation vehicles will be defined to support mission
needs in the most cost effective manner.
o Remote Sensing: Policies for Federal "remote sensing" or
observation of the Earth are established to encourage the
development of U.S. commercial systems competitive with or
superior to foreign-operated civil or commercial systems.
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� ��
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
Q: How long Was the policy in preparation?
A: The Interagency Group for Space (IG-Space) held its first
meeting On July 31, 1987, to begin revising existing
national space policy. The Senior Interagency Group for
Space (SIG-Space) held its final review meeting on December
17, 1987. The remaining time until the President signed the
new policy was devoted to final administrative preparation
of the directive, and final policy and legal review.
What agencies participated in preparing the new policy
directive?
SIG-Space member agencies include the National Security
Council Staff (chair); the Departments of State, Defense,
Commerce, and Transportation; representatives of the
Director of Central Intelligence, Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,. Office of Management and Budget, and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. In addition, the
Treasury Department participated throughout the review
process.
Q: Why did it take so long?
A: This was a comprehensive review of all aspects of national
space policy--the first since 1982.
O: The trade press reported thatthe interagency process
encountered numerous serious arguments among the agencies.
Will you comment?
Over the course of the review, a range of options was
considered on the various issues. The important thing is
that any differences that existed were resolved in an
A:
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orderly process that thoroughly examined all of the options
identified.
Q: Did some of the issues go to the President for resolution?
A: I will not comment on the specific issues considered by
SIG-Space or the President. Suffice it to say that a
structured process exists to obtain decisions within the
interagency process when consensus cannot be obtained.
4: Was the reestablishment of the National Aeronautics and
Space Council considered during the policy review? If so,
why was the idea rejected?
A: The idea was surfaced during deliberations, but it did not
enjoy much support. Replacing one interagency process
(SIG-Space) with another (the Space Council) accomplishes
little. The President has established an effective
interagency process not only for space, but for all
important U.S. matters that cut across agency boundaries.
To single space out for different treatment would invite
other areas to demand their own tailored decision-making
process--a sure recipe for bureaucratic gridlock. SIG-Space
works as an effective forum for senior-level consideration
of space issues, and if agreement cannot be obtained there,
an orderly process exists to elevate decisions and if
necessary, secure Presidential decisions. The very fact
that SIG-Space was able to produce this revised national
space policy attests to its effectiveness.
How did the SIG-Space process and the Economic Policy
Council's deliberations on space commercialization work --
together or separately?
Q:
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A: SIG-Space was responsible for the revision of national space
policy, integrating all the broad elements of governmental
space activity (civil and national security) as well as
private sector, nongovernmental space activities. To
encourage the private sector, SIG-Space developed policies
to make certain that the government avoids actions that may
deter or preclude the development of the commercial sector,
and within a framework that ensures that government agencies
are reliable customers for private sector space goods and
services. Consistent with this policy, the EPC, consistent
with its central role for private-sector space activities,
developed a number of significant commercial space
initiatives to further these overall national objectives fogt
space commercialization. In summary, the efforts were
complementary, well-coordinated, and substantial numbers of
the participants were involved in both processes.
Q: Were the reports of the National Commission on Space (Paine
Report) and Sally Ride's report on "Leadership and America's
Future in Space" used in the preparation of this revised
space policy?
A: Both of these reports were considered in the preparation of
this policy.
Q: What else was used?
A: IG-Space representatives used a wide variety of source
documentation including previous National Security Decision
Directives relating to space, proposals developed by the
Economic Policy Council's Commercial Space Working Group,
testimony before Congressional committees, as well as
numerous editorials and policy papers on the topic of
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America's future in space. Other key sources of information
were comparisons that were accomplished of U.S. space
activities versus those of other countries in three areas:
civil, commercial, and national security.
Q: Can you comment on the conclusions of these comparisons?
A: In general, these studies do not support claims that the
U.S. is years behind the Soviets in space capabilities,
popular impressions of "lost U.S. leadership in space"
notwithstanding. The reality is that in most important
areas the U.S. is ahead technologically. In fact, by most
important quantifiable measures (data accuracy, timeliness,
quality, and quantity), U.S. space systems are the world's
finest and will remain so for the foreseeable future
(notable exceptions are in manned spaceflight, deployed ASAT
capabilities, and space transportation systems). Most
comparisons that appear in the trade and popular press have
highlighted the fact that U.S. manned and unmanned launch
systems suffered disastrous accidents that essentially
prevented launch of most U.S. space systems in 1986 and most
of 1987. While true, these statements rarely go on to say
that the U.S. has made major technical and policy changes to
prevent a recurrence of these launch problems. Moreover,
the successful Titan launches at both east and west coasts
late last year have signalled that all U.S. expendable
launch vehicles are once again operational, and we're
confident the Shuttle will be returned to safe, reliable
operation later this year. Furthermore, during the launch
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4:
hiatus caused by the Shuttle and Titan failures, our
on-orbit spacecraft continued to function extraordinarily
well and provided us with necessary services through that
difficult period. That fact attests to the aualitv of our
space systems. The U.S. does not need to duplicate Soviet
space capabilities; we must use space systems efficiently to
support U.S. requirements. The comparisons point out that
the U.S. is not preeminent in every aspect and discipline of
space activity. However, our space policy acknowledges that
space leadership in an increasingly competitive
international environment does not demand this universal
preeminence; rather, it states that the U.S. objective is
leadership in those areas critical to important U.S. goals.
What are the implications of these assessments?
A: In the civil sector, the assessment revealed that the space
capabilities of our competitors are indeed growing, and in
some cases, at a more rapid rate than ours. However, in
most critical areas (space transportation and manned
spaceflight being notable exceptions) U.S. technological
capabilities remain the best in the world. It is clear,
though, that the launch hiatus has diminished the
traditional U.S. lead in several key science and exploration
areas--a trend that will continue until the Space Shuttle is
returned to safe, reliable operation and we begin to launch
the backlog of important civil payloads that are awaiting
access to space.
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In the national security area, U.S. space capabilities,
under conditions short of direct attack on our space
systems, are clearly superior to those of our potential
adversaries. In the event of a conflict involving attacks
on space systems, our technological lead would tend to be
offset by demonstrated Soviet antisatellite capabilities for
which the U.S. has no direct counterpart. Nonetheless, the
national security space sector has taken a number of steps
to assure continued mission capability even if we experience
failures in our on-orbit or launch assets, whether from
natural causes or hostile action.
In commercial space systems, U.S. efforts, although still in
an embryonic stage, promise important economic, industrial �
base, and national security benefits as long as government
policies continue to provide a climate conducive to
sustained commercial growth in space-related activities.
As a direct result of these policies, American firms are
aggressively marketing launch services worldwide and, to
date, U.S. ELV companies have signed contracts to launch 12
satellites, contributing approximately $500 million to the
U.S. balance of trade. Investments totaling approximately
$400 million have been made in this emerging business by
commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) companies, which
may result in the creation of some 8,000 new jobs. For its
.part, the U.S. Government is making its facilities and
services available to commercial launch firms at direct
cost. Martin Marietta Corporation, General Dynamics
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Q:
Corporation, and Space Services, Inc. have each signed
agreements agreements with the U.S. Government to use
national launch facilities. A streamlined licensing
process, administered by DOT, is already in place.
In exactly what areas are the Soviets ahead?
A: The Soviets are pursuing particularly aggressive programs in
areas of long-duration manned spaceflight and heavy-lift
launch capability which serve particular Soviet needs for
which there is not always a direct U.S. counterpart. And,
as previously mentioned, the operational Soviet
antisatellite program is a continuing and troublesome
asymmetry.
Is NASA's budget adequate to ensure U.S. leadership?
0:
A:
The President's FY 1989 budget, to be submitted to Congress
shortly, supports the objective of space
of critical importance to the U.S. while
leadership in areas
remaining
consistent with the President's commitment to deficit
reduction. "Leadership" is achieved not through just NASA's
budget, but through the funding requested for all U.S.
government space activities, as well as the important
contributions provided by the U.S. private sector. The
budget provides for a
research, development
science, exploration,
carefully balanced strategy of
, operations, and technologies for
and appropriate applications. NASA's
FY 1989 funding request is a significant increase over the
funds appropriated in FY 1988. NASA agrees that the FY 1989
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:
budget projections support the civil leadership objectives
in the policy.
Would you explain what the establishment of this human
exploration goal means? Is this a commitment to fly people
to Mars or return to the Moon? What is the dollar
commitment associated with the Pathfinder technology program
announced in the policy?
A: This new long-range goal establishes the general direction
and focus for efforts and technologies guiding the Nation's
civil space sector.
It is not a commitment to any particular mission at this
time. It is premature now to decide whether Mars, the Moon,
or even another body in the solar system represents the
appropriate pathway for future exploration. We first need
to understand the many challenges that such potential future.
missions would encounter. The Pathfinder technology program
consists of studies and research efforts to examine the key
challenges expected before mission-specific decisions are
made.
The funding for the Pathfinder program is contained in the
President's FY 1989 budget, to be submitted to Congress
shortly.
0: When would a specific manned planetary decision be made?
A: Decisions on manned planetary programs will follow when such
programs can be realistically achieved. As we learn more
about the long-term aspects of living and working in space,
identifying and meeting the technical challenges ahead of
us, the more we will understand about when and where
specific programs are possible. Until we have the results
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from Pathfinder, it is premature to speculate when a manned
planetary mission might be appropriate. As we study such
programs, we will also begin to understand and consider the
cost implications as an input into when the Nation could
afford the associated investment.
Q: Isn't this just another way for the Administration to delay
indefinitely a real leadership decision on America's next
big space program?
A: No. The Administration has committed to the long-term goal
of human expansion, and proposes the Pathfinder program as
the best way to reach a realistic decision on specific
missions to achieve this new goal. To do otherwise at this
time, by committing prematurely, for example to a manned
mission to Mars by a certain date, could turn out to be a
hasty, costly, and even dangerous decision based on current
data and technology.
Q: Might the U.S. and the Soviets cooperate in a future manned
mission?
A: International cooperation is a goal of U.S. space policy.
Such cooperation will consider U.S. national security,
foreign policy, scientific and economic interests. The
current U.S. - Soviet cooperative agreement on space (signed
April 15, 1987) outlines cooperation in 16 space science
projects, all unmanned. These projects could conceivably
form the basis for discussions concerning future cooperative
manned missions, but it is very premature to speculate on
such cooperation. The U.S. has not committed itself to any
manned mission to Mars, and the current budget situation
makes such an outlook, even in the future, difficult at
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best. Moreover, we are presently rebuilding our space
cooperation relationship with the Soviet Union after a five
year interruption, and it will take some time to restore
confidence to the level at which more ambitious cooperative
projects could be considered.
In the manned realm, NASA's Space Station program continues
to be the focus of our international efforts through the end
of this century, emphasizing the cooperation with friends
and allies which the President is seeking.
Why has the military space budget been rising faster than
NASA's?
A: Decisions on military space spending are made within the
overall DOD budget based on the contribution that space
systems make in the overall national security strategy and
independent military requirements. Rising military space
spending reflects recognition that military space activities
are increasingly critical to our national security. Part of
the increase in DOD's space spending reflects the costs
associated with its launch recovery program initiated in the
aftermath of the ELV and Space Shuttle Challenger accidents.
Q: Doesn't this risk military dominance over civil space
activities?
A: As the new space policy states, the civil and national
security sectors of the overall space effort are distinct
and independent, responding to their own requirements, yet
they are strongly interacting to avoid unnecessary
duplication. The relative magnitude of the efforts should
not be the focus of attention as each responds to
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independent requirements, and funding for one sector is not
at the expense of another.
0: What restrictions remain on government regulation of civil
Earth remote sensing?
A: There are no predetermined limitations or restrictions on
the performance of civil Earth remote sensing systems. In
reviewing licensing applications for civil Earth remote
sensing systems, the federal government will consider
national security and foreign policy factors, including
those required by 11.1. Such considerations have not
precluded licensing in the past. A key national space
policy objective is to encourage US-operated commercial
systems that are competitive with or superior to
foreign-operated systems.
What about the Soviet lead in heavy lift launch systems;
doesn't this provide them with a significant advantage?
Not necessarily. U.S. launch capability responds to
identified launch requirements, as it did during the Apollo
program when the Saturn V provided the necessary lift. The
current and planned family of U.S. launch vehicles meets all
current U.S. launch needs. On the other hand, we do not
completely understand how the Soviets will use their heavy
lift capability. It could certainly give them new
capabilities for manned space activities or planetary
missions. It could also allow them to duplicate military
capabilities we have achieved using lower weight systems.
In addition, the President has recently(1-4-88) approved
the management and funding plan for the joint DOD-NASA
4:
A:
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Advanced Launch System program which will address the future
U.S. need for more capable launch systems by the end of the
1990s.
0: What role do U.S. commercial space ventures play in this new
policy?
A: The policy clarifies and reaffirms the government's
commitment to rely on the private sector for space-related
goods and services where feasible and commercially .
available. Both "feasible" and "commercially available" are
defined in the policy. It directs that U.S. government
actions that preclude or deter commercial space activities,
except for national security and public safety, are to be
avoided. By seeking to eliminate laws and regulations that
unnecessarily impede the private sector, the policy seeks to
encourage the private sector and allow the space environment
to become another arena for free enterprise.
0: What does the policy have to say about commercial launch
vehicles?
A: Commercial launch operations are recognized as an integral
part of the Nation's launch strategy. DOT's lead role
within the government for establishing Federal policy and
regulatory guidance affecting commercial launch operations
is reaffirmed. The policy also directs government agencies
to encourage a domestic commercial launch industry by
contracting for necessary ELV launch services directly from
the private sector whenever feasible. It also provides
guidelines for the use of government launch-related
facilities by U.S. commercial launch operators.
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�
Q: Most of the policy seems to focus on launch systems and
commercialization. Does this imply that space science is
being downgraded?
A: No, quite
objective
knowledge
Q:
A:
the contrary. Under this policy, the first
of U.S. civil space activities is to expand
of the Earth, its environment, the solar system,
and the universe. This policy, and the implementing
guidelines, reaffirm the long-standing objective of
supporting a vigorous and far-reaching program of space
science.
What about unmanned space exploration? Are we ending this
program?
No, not at all. The policy guidelines state that NASA will
conduct a balanced program of manned and unmanned
exploration. The new guidelines on unmanned exploration
make the importance of this activity to the achievement of
overall space objectives clear. The fact is that we need
both manned and unmanned exploration, with determinations
made on the basis of cost, safety, suitability, and expected
results given the specific mission objectives involved.
0: What is the significance of the policy statement on space
debris?
A: We have long recognized that space debris could have an
impact on future space missions. NASA and the Air Force
have had the problem under study for several years, and the
DOD has addressed the issue
statement last year. Space
which has complex technical
in its own space policy
debris is a long-term problem
and economic implications. An
interagency group will be established to consider this issue
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4:
A:
4:
fully and to make recommendations on actions we can take
that are cost effective and consistent with mission
requirements.
Isn't this (space debris) an international problem? What
are other countries doing? The U.N.?
In the long run, solving the space debris problem will
require action by all major spacefaring nations and
organizations. Several countries have expressed concern
about the problem, and the issue has been mentioned in the
committees of the International Telecommunications Union and
in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
However, the general feeling is that it is premature for
discussion in the U.N. and that it would be a mistake to
rush through politically-driven measures to deal with this
problem. We do not believe there are any simple, easy
solutions to the space debris issue.
What are the reasons for including a statement on continued
government support for research and development of advanced
space communications technologies?
A: Our review reaffirmed that space communications are critical
to a wide range of U.S. goals. NASA's past work in
developing and transferring communications satellite
technology to industry resulted in a commercial space
communications program of unparalleled success. The policy
recognizes the need for an active U.S. Government role in
developing appropriate space communications technologies to
meet special government needs.
0: In your guidance and implementation section, you refer to
studies of financing alternatives for the space
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infrastructure developments. What are space infrastructural
elements?
A: These are the elements not used up or degraded by their role
in supporting a specific mission. Ground and
(eventually
space) deployed Support facilities; nonrecurring development
and production costs; space utilities; space habitats, etc.
are examples.
Q: What are the objectives of the infrastructure financing
study?
A: We would like to understand the opportunities and potential
for enlisting the private sector capital sources in the
initiatives, risk assumption and the profit potential of
space undertakings. The desirability of such undertakings,
the specific mechanisms, the legislative or regulatory
procedures, the relationships to the mission-responsible
agencies, the cash flow and profitability are essential
expected results.
Does the policy say anything about SDI?
Q:
A: The policy does state that DOD will ensure that the military
space program incorporates the support reauirements of the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
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(THE FOLLOWING Q & As ARE NOT TO BE HANDED OUT)
Why is there no mention of U.S. space reconnaissance in the
policy? . (OR) What can you tell us about satellite
reconnaissance?
A: As you know, the U.S conducts satellite photoreconnaissance
for monitoring arms control agreements. As a matter of
policy, this subject is not discussed outside of classified
channels, and I prefer not to address it.
THE FOLLOWING EXPANDED RESPONSE SHOULD BE GIVEN ONLY WHEN A
FURTHER RESPONSE CANNOT BE AVOIDED:
The only "facts of" the United States photoreconnaissance program
that have been declassified are that: (1) the United States
conducts satellite photoreconnaissance for peaceful purposes,
including monitoring of arms control agreements, intelligence
collection, and providing defense related information for
indications and warning, and (2) photoreconnaissance has a
near-real-time capability. I want to make clear that all other
information about this activity is classified, and the current
policy does not in any way signal a relaxation in our classified
protection of this sensitive source of information. Other than
what I've just mentioned, as a matter of policy this subject is
not discussed outside of classified channels.
Q:
But so much has been written about satellite reconnaissance,
how can you continue to pretend that this information is
classified?
A: There is always speculation in the open press, as well as in
the academic and scientific worlds, concerning the full
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range of classified activities--intelligence, space, and
defense. This is an area we do not discuss.
ALL OTHER QUESTIONS ON THIS TOPIC
Other than what I've just mentioned, as a matter of policy this
subject is not discussed outside classified channels, and I am
not authorized to discuss this subject further.
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