THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

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• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1963
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 11-2A-63
2 JULY 1963
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-2A-63
The Soviet Atomic Energy Program
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
2 JULY 1963
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This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee which is composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, NSA, and FBI.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside
of his jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
NUMBER 11-2A-63
2 JULY 1963
This estimate supersedes NIE I1-2A-62, 16 May 1962.
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, which is composed of representatives of
the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. The representative of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained, the subject being outside
his jurisdiction.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM 1
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS 1
SUMMARY 4
DISCUSSION
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PRO-
GRAM 25
II. NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Research and Testing Reactors 27
Nuclear Electric Power Program 27
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems 28
Aerospace Applications 29
III. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Uranium Ore Procurement 32
Uranium Feed Materials 33
Plutonium-Equivalent Production 34
U-235 Production 35
Other Nuclear Materials 38
IV. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
Nuclear Weapon Rearch and Development Installations 39
Weapon Development Program 41
Low-Yield Devices 41
Theromonuclear Weapon Developments 42
High Altitude Tests 43
Nuclear Weapons and Systems 44
Delivery Systems Information 44
Weapon Production and Stockpiling Sites 45
National Assembly-Stockpile Sites 47
Operational Storage Sites 47
Military Regional Depots 48
IRBM/MRBM Support 48
ICBM Support 48
Naval Nuclear Weapon Storage 49
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Soviet Nuclear Weapon Storage in the European Satellites 49
Logistics 49
Command and Control 50
V. FUTURE WEAPON DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 51
VI. SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
RELATED TO NUCLEAR ENERGY 53
ANNEX A: EVALUATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS (29 Au-
gust 1949-25 December 1962) 57
LIST OF TABLES
Page
TABLE II. Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials Production . . 12, 37
TABLE III. Soviet Research Reactors and Reactor Experiments . 14
TABLE IV. Soviet Nuclear Power Stations and Experimental Cen-
ters 18
TABLE V. Estimated Characteristics of Soviet Nuclear Sub-
marines 20
TABLE VI. Soviet Heavy Water Production 39
LIST OF MAPS
Page
FIGURE 1. Nuclear Weapon Research and Test Areas - 7
FIGURE 2. Nuclear Materials Production Sites 21
FIGURE 3. Soviet Nuclear Electric Power Reactor Sites 23
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THE SOVIET ATOMIC
ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current status and probable future course
of the Soviet atomic energy program to mid-1968.
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
Nuclear Testing and Technology
1. The Soviets have a highly developed nuclear weapon tech-
nology which differs in design philosophy and emphasis from
that of the West. They have tested thermonuclear devices in very
high yields (up to 63 megatons) well above any in Western ex-
perience, and in this range have achieved an outstanding yield-to-
weight performance. They have also shown an excellent per-
formance in thermonuclear devices of lower yields, down to about
two megatons. In the submegaton thermonuclear class, their
yield-to-weight performance has improved considerably but has
not equaled that of the West.
2. The Soviets have conducted many tests below 50 kilotons.
3 Weapon Stockpiles
3. A small number of individually produced weapons for interim
use could be fabricated within a few months after device testing.
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Thus, a few weapons with very high yields of up to 100 MT could
now be available. However, we believe that the Soviet time lag
between nuclear tests of a device and initial stockpile entry of a
serially produced weaponized version is about two years at a mini-
mum. On this basis, some of the new devices tested in 1961
could be entering stockpile during the latter part of 1963 if a
priority development is assumed. It is estimated, however, that
this could be done only on a limited scale, and that, in general,
the devices tested in 1961-1962 would be stockpiled in 1964 and
1965. We believe that weapons currently stockpiled are derived
primarily from devices tested in 1958 or earlier; these weapons
range in yield from a few kilotons up to 6 megatons.
Requirements for Further Testing
4. Soviet nuclear weapon technology appears to be highly
sophisticated and adequate for present delivery systems, but
significant advancements can still be made through further de-
velopment and -testing. Probably one of the strongest require-
ments is in the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets conducted several such tests in 1961-1962, but prob-
ably need additional tests to obtain weapon effects data pertinent
to antimissile development and countermeasures. They also
lack direct information on effects of high-yield weapons on
hardened ground targets and on the effects of lower-yield weap-
ons on deep underwater targets. The Soviets probably also have
requirements to conduct further tests to improve yield-to-weight
ratios particularly in the lower weight range and to develop new
weapon capabilities such as light-weight thermonuclear warheads
for smaller missile systems, and very small weapons for tactical
employment.
5. We believe that the Soviets are continuing a vigorous weap-
ons research and development program, and that they are main-
taining a posture to resume nuclear testing promptly if a decision
is made.
Fissionable Materials Production
6. We estimate the mid-1963 "cumulative Soviet production of
fissionable materials at about 15,000 kilograms of plutonium
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equivalent and 130,000 kilograms of U-235.1 These quantities
are somewhat lower than previously estimated for mid-1963, as
the result of further analysis and additional evidence. The So-
viets are continuing to expand their fissionable material produc-
tion capability at a significant rate. We estimate that by mid-
1968 cumulative production will amount to about 35,000 kilo-
grams of plutonium equivalent and 380,000 kilograms of U-235.
Reactor Development
7. Soviet research reactor development continues to be com-
petent in most areas and is unique in a few. However, the orig-
inal, unrealistic Soviet nuclear electric program has been aban-
doned and they are now proceeding with one which is more com-
mensurate with their economic requirements and the state of their
reactor technology. Moreover, the Soviets have encountered nu-
merous difficulties with the nuclear propulsion of the icebreaker
LENIN, and there is considerable evidence of similar difficulties
with Soviet nuclear powered submarines. Soviet work on ion
propulsion and nuclear auxiliary power supplied for space appli-
cations is continuing, and we believe that they have a program
to develop materials suitable for nuclear rocket motors. The So-
viet aircraft nuclear propulsion program appears to have been
delayed and may have been cut back or even canceled.
1 See page 13 for the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (In-
telligence) .
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SUMMARY
I. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM
1961-1962 Soviet Nuclear Tests
8. Between 1 September 1961 and 25 De-
cember 1962
112 nu-
clear tests which brings the total number of
detected Soviet tests to 186. (See Figure 1
and Annex A.) A tabulation of tests to date
is as follows:
YEAR
Semipa-
latinsk
1949-1958 42
1961 16
1962 28
LOCATIONS
Novaya
Zemlya
27
25
36
Total . . . 86 88
Sary
Shagan-Ka-
pustin Yar
4
4
3
11
Totskoye
1
0
0
1
9. Only low-yield tests have occurred at
Semipalatinsk since 1957. Test operations at
Semipalatinsk have included ground bursts,
air drops, and tower shots; some of these tests
were designed to determine the effects of nu-
clear detonations on arrays of military equip-
ment. Only two underground tests have been
detected, both near Semipalatinsk?one in
1961 and one in February 1962.
10. Except for several missile-associated
tests in the Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan
areas, all high-yield tests since 1957 have been
held at Novaya Zemlya. In addition, there
have been some lower-yield air-bursts at the
Novaya Zemlya test areas near the center of
the island, and several low-yield detonations on
or under the sea off the southern coast. We be-
lieve that the majority of airburst tests in the
Novaya Zemlya area were delivered by medium
and heavy bombers. In addition, Soviet state-
ments and various intelligence sources indi-
cate that a number of the 1961 and 1962
Novaya Zemlya tests probably involved Opera-
tional missile systems.
11. Several tests in the 1961 and 1962 series
were conducted at high altitudes. In Septem-
ber 1961; a 25 KT shot was conducted near the
Kapustin Yar rangehead; it probably involved
a surface-to-air missile warhead. Another, in
October 1961, at Kapustin Yar involved deto-
nation of a 200 KT warhead; it probably was
designed to provide data on effects at high
altitudes. In addition, five very high altitude
tests were conducted on the Kapustin Yar-
Sary Shagan missile test ranges, two in 1961
and three in 1962. The 1961 tests yielded
about 1 KT each, whereas two of the 1962
tests yielded about 200 KT, and the third
about 2 MT. The test devices were delivered
by medium range (1020 n.m.) missiles fired
from the Kapustin Yar rangehead. We be-
lieve that these tests provided basic high alti-
tude effects data and other data applicable to
the antimissile problem.
Weapon -Development Program
12. Fission Weapon Developments. From
1949 through 1958, the Soviets conducted
about 40 tests of low-yield devices (1-200 KT)
By 1958, the Soviets had developed
implosion warheads ranging in yield from
about 1 to 200 KT.
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1961 and 35 in 1962.
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27 fission tests in
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IThe 1962 test series,
where the majority of fission tests were 10
KT or under,
14.
15. Thermonuclear Weapon Developments.
Between 1955 and 19518, tests of full-scale
thermonuclear devices were held by the So-
viets at a variety of yields from about 200
KT to 7.6 MT. Over two-thirds of the tests
were between 1 and 5 MT.
16. Of the 112 tests of the 1961-62 series, 50
were thermonuclear devices with yields rang-
ing from about 150 kilotons to 63 megatons.
We esti-
mate that yield-to-weight ratios of some of
their nuclear devices have been substantially
improved over 1958. In addition, new weight
classes appeared with yields ranging from
25-63 megatons, which permit the develop-
ment of weapons with yields up to 100 mega-
tons.
17. The two largest Soviet detonations (30
MT and 63 MT) were both clean thermonu-
clear devices. As a normal (dirty) weapon,
the 63 megaton device could yield 100 mega-
tons. The Soviets also tested a new thermo-
nuclear design at yields from 3 to 25 mega-
tons.
Weapon and Systems
19. A small number of individually produced
weapons for interim use could be fabricated 50X1
within a few months after device testing.
Thus, a few weapons with very high yields of
up to 100 MT could now be available. How-
ever, we believe that the Soviet time lag be-
tween nuclear tests of a device and initial
stockpile entry of a serially produced weap-
onized version is about two years at a mini-
mum. On this basis, some of the new devices
tested in 1961 could be entering stockpile dur-
ing the latter part of 1963 if a priority develop-
ment is assumed. It is estimated, however,
that this could be done only on a limited
scale, and that, in general, the devices tested
in 1961-1962 would be stockpiled in 1964 and
1965.
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Future Weapon Development and Testing
20. The status of Soviet nuclear wear50X1
technology, while highly sophisticated and in
most respects apparently adequate for their
present delivery systems, is such that sig-
nificant advancements can still be made
through further development and testing.
Such advances can be made in at least four
areas: (a) adaptation of present designs to
meet the needs of future delivery systems; (b)
development of very small weapons for tactical
employment; and (c) improvement in yield-
to-weight ratios.
21. Probably one of the strongest require-
ments for further Soviet nuclear testing is in
the area of high-altitude effects of nuclear
weapons. The Soviets have not detonated a
warhead in the vicinity of a re-entering missile 50X1
nosecone, nor do we have firm evidence that
the Soviets have placed instrument pods near
their high altitude bursts. We also have no
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knowledge of Soviet activities in providing
information on effects upon hardened missile
launch sites. Other areas where the Soviets-
require additional effects information may
exist; in particular, the Soviets lack experi-
ence with very deep underwater bursts.
22. We believe the Soviets are currently
maintaining a vigorous weapon research and
development program and are in a posture
to resume nuclear testing promptly if a de-
cision is made.
Organization and Facilities
23. The Soviet atomic energy program is
directed by two organizations recently placed
under the supervision of the newly created
Supreme Council of the National Economy.
One of these, the State Production Committee
for Medium Machine Building, USSR, is re-
sponsible for the overall direction of the
atomic energy program including the produc-
tion of fissionable materials and nuclear weap-
ons. The Ministry of Defense participates
with this Committee in the development, test-
ing, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The
other organization, the State Committee for
the Utilization of Atomic Energy, is responsible
for nonmilitary applications of the program
and all official contacts with the atomic energy
programs of foreign countries.
24. The USSR maintains a substantial de-
gree of control over the atomic energy activi-
ties of the Soviet Bloc nations through inter-
locking associations of top Soviet personnel
and by means of bilateral agreements and the
Standing Committee for Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy of the Council for Mutual
Economic Aid (CEMA). This relationship is
such that the Soviets have precluded the de-
velopment of an independent nuclear military
capability by the other participating nations.
Communist China, an observer rather than a
member of CEMA, has proceeded independ-
ently with its own nuclear program since the
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withdrawal of Soviet technical aid in mid-
1960.2
25. The oldest Soviet center specifically con-
cerned with nuclear weapon research, design,
and development is located at Sarova about
200 miles east of Moscow. A second nuclear
weapon research and development center, near
Kash in the Urals, probably became opera-
tional late in 1959. Although the installa-
tion, which is quite similar to Sarova, is con-
siderably smaller than that center, we believe
it represents a major addition to the Soviet nu-
clear weapon development potential. There is
evidence that there is a research and develop-
ment establishment, probably concerned with
nuclear weapon systems development at the
Kerch/Bagerovo airfield in the Crimea. The
Soviet nuclear weapon program has also been
supported by research conducted at a number
of other institutes in the USSR probably in-
cluding the Institute of Atomic Energy, Mos-
cow; the Physics Institute, Obninsk; Physical-
Technical Institute, Sukhumi; and especially
the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow.
Weapon Fabrication Sites
26. Nuclear weapon fabrication complexes
have been identified in the Urals at Nizhnyaya
Tura and at Yuryuzan. A possible third com-
plex is located in Central Siberia near Kras-
noyarsk. National reserve stockpile sites are
co-located with these complexes.
Weapon Stockpile Sites
27. The Soviet nuclear weapon logistic sys-
tem includes (a) National Reserve Stockpile
facilities at interior locations; (b) National
Assembly Stockpile sites located near major
order-of-battle concentrations; and (c) Re-
gional and Operational storage sites at mili-
tary bases for the direct support of military
operations.
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USSR: NUCLEAR WEAPON RESEARCH AND TEST AREAS
Figure 1
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28. Between 1951 and 1955, the USSR acti-
vated a total of about 6 stockpile sites of all
classes. Over the next three years at least 17
additional stockpile sites of all classes were
activated, bringing the total to about 23 at
the end of 1958. This expansion supported
primarily the growing nuclear capability of
the Soviet strategic bomber force which was
then rapidly converting to jet aircraft, and a
limited development of nuclear capability in
Naval and Tactical Aviation and probably
ground and naval forces as well. Since 1958,
a third stage of rapidly accelerated stockpile
site construction has coincided with the de-
ployment of strategic and tactical missiles
with a nuclear capability, and with a wider
distribution of nuclear weapons among Soviet
military forces. In this period, the USSR has
substantially increased the capacity of about
two-thirds of the previously existing stockpile
sites, and has more than doubled the total
number of stockpile sites.
29. The National Reserve Stockpiles and the
National Assembly Stockpile facilities are
characterized by isolation, extreme security,
hardened bunkers (either earth-mounded or
underground) and self-sufficiency in housing
and other services required by the permanent
cadres.
30. Operational and regional military stor-
age sites now positively identified include
three generations of airfield sites, sites at two
staging bases in the Arctic, regional military
depots resembling in design the third genera-
tion airfield sites, and a naval site used pri-
marily to support missile-carrying submarines.
These sites are typically situated apart from
other facilities at their associated base, and
are characterized by stringent physical secu-
rity and by hardened storage bunkers.
31. We believe that nuclear warheads are
available to all operational ICBM, IRBM, and
MRBM complexes either on-site or at nearby
9
storage facilities. Soviet ground forces may
have field storage facilities in addition to the
regional depots which probably serve them.
Some nuclear storage probably is required by
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Naval Aviation for its BADGER-delivered air-
to-surface missile. We have no evidence of
nuclear storage facilities at surface-to-air mis-
sile sites. No nuclear warhead storage facili-
ties have been identified in European satellites
nor is there definitive information that nuclear
weapons have been deployed to any of the
Soviet forces stationed there.
Command and Control
32. In the USSR, the Presidium of the
Party Central Committee exercises ultimate
control over nuclear weapons, and its author-
izations govern their use, storage, movement
and issuance. In a war situation, control
would be exercised by the Presidium Chair-
man in his capacity as Supreme High Com-
mander who, through the Ministry of De-
fense, would authorize the principal com-
manders of the forces directly concerned to
use nuclear weapons.
33. We believe that the national stockpile
storage sites are administered by the State
Production Committee for Medium Machine
Building, and operational storage sites by the
Ministry of Defense. The Committee for
State Security (KGB) is responsible for the
security of nuclear stockpile facilities, pro-
vides their guard force and is responsible for
escorting movements of nuclear weapons to
and from national stockpile facilities and mil-
itary depots. There is some evidence that
responsibility for the management of logis-
tical functions, such as storing, maintaining
and delivery of nuclear weapons in support of
military operations has been assigned to or-
ganizations operating in direct support of the
major force components of the Ministry of
Defense.
34. The flow of orders from the Supreme
High Command is arranged so as to achieve
maximum control and minimum delay in ac-
tion. In the Strategic Rocket Forces, for in-
stance, orders pass through the Commander
and his main Staff directly to regiments re-
sponsible for nuclear fire. In the case of
Theatre Forces, once employment of nuclear
weapons has been authorized, responsibility
for alerting forces and ordering execution of
nuclear fire is delegated to major joint service
commanders at the Military District, Group
of Forces, or Front Level. The Commander
at this level may allow his subordinate corn-
manders down to Army level some discretion
in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons,
but it is evidently rare for commanders below
that level to have any such discretion. In
the case of special nuclear attack groups of
tactical missiles and artillery, the Joint Serv-
ice Commander evidently issues the order to
prepare and execute nuclear fire directly to
the units concerned, and their immediate
superiors merely supervise execution of the
order. Presumably Long Range Aviation, the
Naval Forces and the Air Defense Forces op-
erate in similar fashion.
35. There is abundant evidence that the
USSR was seriously preoccupied with the
problem of improving its command and con-
trol procedures for nuclear weapons from
1959 through at least 1961. The intro-
duction of strategic missiles had complicated
the problem of central control and had made
more rapid response an urgent necessity. In
addition, Soviet
Theatre forces
under field conditions many of
the logistical practices and procedures gov-
erning the issue and servicing of nuclear
weapons were cumbersome and operationally
impractical. Some streamlining of the con-
trol system has probably occured by now, al-
though precise details are not yet known.
36. We have no evidence to indicate
whether or not the Soviets have either con-
sidered or installed mechanical or electronic
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safeguards in their nuclear weapon control
procedures? (such as permissive links) .
II. FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
(See Figure 2)
Uranium Ore Procurement
37. Soviet Bloc uranium reserves are esti-
mated at several hundred thousand tons in
medium grade ores and an even greater quan-
tity in low grade deposits. A number of well-
designed ore concentration plants of 500 to
1000 metric tons capacity are currently in
operation, and active prospecting for addi-
tional orebodies continues.
38. We estimate that the annual procure-
ment of uranium ore by the Soviet Union is
currently 20,000 metric tons of recoverable
metal equivalent and will gradually increase
to 25,000 metric tons per year over the next
five years. The cumulative recoverable
metal ?through mid-1963 is estimated at
190,000 metric tons and-through mid-1968 at
300,000 metric tons. These amounts of ore,
which could be higher or lower by as much as
50%, are believed to be sufficient for the fis-
sionable material production estimated here-
in and for a substantial stockpile in addition.
Uranium Feed Materials
39. Uranium metal and other feed mate-
rials are produced at Elektrostal, near Mos-
cow; at Gla,zov, just west of the Urals; and
at Novosibirsk in Central Siberia. The large
size of these facilities and the process im-
provement detailed in the Soviet published
literature suggest that the USSR has ade-
quate feed materials plant capacity for the
program estimated herein.
Plutonium-Equivalent
40. Three major plutonium-equivalent pro-
duction sites have been identified in the USSR.
The earliest and largest is located near
Kyshtym in the _ Urals, the second is collo-
cated with the U-235 production complex at
the atomic energy site north of Tomsk in
Central Siberia, and the third is located
within the large atomic energy site northeast
of Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. Review
of all available information led to the conclu-
sion that there are no other major produc-
tion reactor sites in operation in the USSR.
41. We estimate that mid-1963 Soviet cu-
mulative plutonium-equivalent production is
about 15,000 kilograms. Interpretation of
available data would permit a mid-1963 cumu-
lative production estimate as large as 23,000
kilograms; however, it is almost certain that
actual mid-1963 cumulative production is not
less than 12,000 kilograms.
42. It is estimated that annual plutonium-
equivalent production will increase at a rate
consistent with performance during the period
1958-1962, resulting in a cumulative pluto-
nium-equivalent production of about 35,000
kilograms by mid-1968. (See Table II.)
Even with an extremely high priority effort,
the cumulative plutonium-equivalent stock-
pile would not exceed 45,000 kilograms by
mid-1968. Alternatively, the minimum likely
cumulative production by that date will not
be less than 25,000 kilograms.
43. Highly irradiated plutonium will be
produced as a byproduct of the nuclear power
and propulsion programs of the USSR in
amounts gradually increasing to about 600
kilograms per year in 1968, and has been in-
cluded in Table II. This production could
be used in weapons by mixing with plutonium
produced at considerably lower irradiation
levels and would have other uses.
U-235 Production
44. Three large gaseous diffusion isotope
separation complexes capable of concentrat-
ing U-235 up to weapon-grade production are
in operation in the USSR; one at Verkh-
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Neyvinsk in the Urals, one north of Tomsk in
Central Siberia, and the third at Angarsk in
the Lake Baykal region. A fourth large
gaseous diffusion complex is under construc-
tion north of Zaozerniy near Krasnoyarsk.
We believe that no undetected large gaseous
Table II
ESTIMATED SOVIET FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
PRODUCTION
(Cumulative Production in Kilograms Rounded)
U-235
MID-YEAR
(93% )8,5
TOTAL
AVAILABLE FOR
WEAPON USE
PLUTONIUM
EQUIVALENT
1950
25
25
100
. 1951
160
160
330
1952
600
600
550
1953
1,550
1,550
1,000
1954
3,350
3,350
1,600
1955
6,300
6,300
2,200
1956
10,500
10,500
2,900
1957
16,500
16,000
3,800
1958
24,500
24,000
4,500
1959
36,500
35,500
6,000
1960
53,000
51,000
8,000
1961
72,000
70,000
9,700
1962
100,000
96,000
12,000
1963
130,000
125,000
15,000
1964
170,000
165,000
18,000
1965
210,000
200,000
22,000
1966
260,000
250,000
26,000
1967.
320,000
310,000
30,000
1968
380,000
370,000
35,000
8 Production of less highly enriched uranium is in-
cluded as equivalent quantities of 93% material.
Non-weapon uses of plutonium are expected to
be negligible during the period of this estimate.
See Page 13 for view of the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Intelligence) , Department of the
Navy.
Our current and future estimates of cumulative
production of fissionable materials represents some
decrease from those estimated in NIE 11-2A-62.
These changes are the result of further analyses
and the acquisition of additional information. How-
ever, it should be noted that the margin of error
involved in any one year's value of cumulative pro-
duction is larger than the magnitude of these
changes.
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diffusion plant is currently in operation.
Continued construction of large gaseous dif-
fusion plants in the USSR suggests that sig-
nificant U-235 production by other means
such as the ultracentrifuge is unlikely.
45. Early Soviet gaseous diffusion plant op-
erating efficiencies are derived from informa-
tion supplied by German scientists who worked
on the program through 1952. Later plant
operating efficiencies have been extrapolated
from this base primarily on advances in So-
viet compressor technology and changes in
process building design. Changes in process
building design indicate the use of an
improved barrier starting in 1958. The
efficiency of this barrier can only be esti-
mated, since there are no data on its operat-
ing characteristics.
46. Our estimate of U-235 production is
based upon estimated electric power consump-
tion, available site data, and on estimated
plant operating efficiencies. Estimates of the
growth of electric power supplies taken in
conjunction with agailable site data indicate
that the Soviet U-235 program is still under-
going significant expansion. It is believed
that the current program of expansion will
not be completed before 1968.
47. Our estimate of total Soviet cumulative
U-235 production is presented in Table II in
terms of cumulative production of uranium
enriched to 93 percent U-235 content. It in-
cludes the 93 percent equivalent of material
produced at lesser enrichment. Estimated
expenditures for weapon tests and non-weapon
uses have been subtracted from the value of
cumulative U-235 production to give our esti-
mate of equivalent 93 percent U-235 available
for weapon use.
48. It is estimated that the Soviet cumula-
tive U-235 production for mid-1963 is 130,000
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kilograms.7 It is unlikely that actual Soviet
cumulative production in mid-1963 could be
less than 80,000 kilograms or more than
180,000 kilograms. We estimate that the mid-
1968 cumulative production will be 380,000
kilograms and that the actual U-235 produc-
tion would not be less than 190,000 kilograms
or more than 570,000 kilograms.
Other Nuclear Materials
49. Thorium and U-233. A moderate in-
terest in the procurement of thorium ores was
noted during the 1946 and 1952 period. The
only certain evidence of the production of
U-233 from thorium is the single appearance
of U-233 on 22 November 1955 in the thermo-
nuclear weapon test JOE 19.
50. Lithium. Lithium ores have been ob-
tained primarily from three areas in the USSR.
Soviet nuclear weapons have probably been
using lithium enriched in the lithium-6 iso-
tope since late 1955. The locations of So-
viet lithium-6 isotope separation plants have
not been positively identified, but could be
located in certain facilities at the Nizhnaya
Tura and Novosibirsk atomic energy sites.
51. Tritium.
We are unable to determine which of
the Soviet reactor sites is used to produce
tritium or the amount of tritium produced.
52. Zirconium. Zirconium-niobium alloys
are used to clad fuel elements for the nuclear
reactors of the icebreaker LENIN and by impli-
cation the nuclear submarine cores. Ade-
quate zirconium-niobium production capacity
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (In-
telligence) , Department of the Navy, believes that
the lower limit of the estimated value for the cumu-
lative production of U-235 is the more nearly cor-
rect. He believes that the evidential base is in-
sufficient to support the production efficiency which
a higher cumulative total would require.
13
is believed available for the needs of the So-
viet atomic energy program.
53. Beryllium. The USSR processes large
reserves of beryllium ore at Izumrud in the
Urals, and established, in the pre-war period,
a combine there to manufacture beryllium-
copper and other alloys. Returned German
scientists have reported interest in beryllium
metal shapes at the Elektrostal feed materials
plant as early as 1946. Sufficient quantities
of beryllium ore and metal producing facilities
are believed available to support both nuclear
weapons and reactor programs of the USSR.
54. Polonium. Reactor-produced polonium
has been available for use in nuclear weapons
initiators since at least as early as 1950.
55. Heavy water. Since 1945 the USSR has
operated heavy water (D20) production plants
at some 8 locations, using at least 4 different
processes. All the plants are relatively small,
but it is believed that cumulative production
has been adequate for Soviet needs. We esti-
mate that the current annual production of
heavy water is about 90 metric tons per year
and the cumulative production through mid-
1963 about 1,100 metric tons. The actual
production could be up to 50% more than that
estimated if hydrogen distillation processes
were adopted at all plants, or if an unknown
large additional facility exists.
III. NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
Research and Testing
56. The Soviets have constructed, and are
currently operating, 23 research reactors of 13
different types within the USSR, and have
supplied 12 foreign countries with research
reactors. (See Table III.) While in recent
years the Soviets have adopted the light-water
moderated and cooled IRT swimming-pool
type as their general purpose research reactor,
they have also built a few research reactors
of unique design which have proved to be
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Table III
SOVIET RESEARCH REACTORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
Max. Thermal
Power Neutron Flux
Reactor
Thermal (neutrons/
Date
Designation
Location
(KW) cm2 sec)
Fuel Moderator
Coolant
Critical
Operating Research Reactors
1. Fursov Pile
Moscow Inst. of
500
A.E.
(max) ..
45 tons of natural
Graphite
Air
1946
2. TR (rebuilt)
Moscow, Inst. of
2,500 2.5x1013
270 kg of 2%
Heavy Water 4.5
Heavy
June
Theoretical &
enriched U
tons
Water
1957
Exp. Physics
3. RPT?III
Moscow Inst. of
20,000 2x1014
90% enriched U
Beryllium &
Water (20
Under
A.E.6x10"
Water
atms.)
const.
(flux trap)
4. BR-1 Fast
Obninsk
0.10 ..
12 Kg Pu
none
none
Early
Reactor
1955
5. BR-3 combined
fast thermal re-
actor
Obninsk
0.05
Pu
none
none
Mid-
1957
6. VVR-2 (rebuilt)
Moscow Inst. of
A.E.
3,000 4x1013
45 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1955
Remarks
Similar to US CP-1,
served as prototype for
1st Soviet production
reactor.
Originally a 500 kw proto-
type for Soviet heavy
water production re-
actors. Critical in April
1949. Rebuilt version
has 9 vertical & 52
horizontal experimental
channels.
Old RPT loop facilities to
be retained; 200 atm.
coolant loop; 60- atm.
helium loop; 2.5 MW
power loop.
Uranium & copper re-
flectors.
Uranium & water reflec-
tor.
Original version critical in
1952. Tank-type re-
actor designed for test-
ing of shielding ma-
terials & configuration.
Now has 5 horizontal
channels with choppers,
3 vertical channels, & a
"neutron multiplier"
(spent fuel elements in a
tank adjacent to reactor).
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7. VVR?S
Moscow, Moscow'
State Univ.
2,000
2.5x1013
60 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1955
8. VVR?S
Tashkent, Inst. of
Nuclear Physies
2,000
2.5x1013
60 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
Late
1959
9. IRT
Moscow Inst. of
A.E.
2,000
3.2x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
Nov.
1957
10. IRT
Tbilisi
2,000
3.2x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
Nov.
1959
11. IRT
Moscow Inst. of
Physical Engi-
neering
2,000
3.2x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched IJ
Water
Water
1962
12. IRT
Riga
2,000
3.2x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1962
13. IRT
Minsk
1,000
1.6x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1962
14. IRT
Tomsk
1,000
1.6x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1962
15. IRT
Sverdlovsk
1,000
1.6x1013
40 kg of 10% en-
riched U
Water
Water
1962
16. VVR?M
Leningrad Physical-
Technical Insti-
tute
10,000
lx1014
20 kg of 20% en-
riched U
Water
Water
Dec.
1959
17. VVR?M
Kiev Physical Tech-
nical Inst.
10,000
lx1014
20 kg of 20% en-
riched U
Water
Water
Feb.
1960
18. Intermediate
Flus Trap (SM-2)
Melekess,
Ul'yanovsk
50,000
2.2x1014
13 kg of 90% en-
riched UO2 in a
Water
Water
Oct.
1961;
Oblast
Ni matrix
Full
Power
Nov.
1962
19. IBR (Merry-go-
Dubna Joint Inst.
1 Ave.
1017 during
UO2 impregnated
Graphite
Water
June
round)
of Nuclear Re-
100,000
burst
in graphite Pu
1960
search
Max.
02 in stator
Tank-type; 10 vertical
channels, 9 horizontal
channels. Supplied to
Rumania; Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, E. Ger.,
Poland & Egypt.
Tank-type; 10 vertical
channels; 9 horizontal
channels.
Swimming-pool type for
use in universities &
institutes. Reactor to
be modified to 4000 KW
using 36% 15-235.
Swimming-pool type for
use in universities &
institutes.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Beryllium reflected, used
for neutron diffraction
studies, probably in con-
nection with solid-state
work in Leningrad.
Beryllium reflected, used
for isotope production,
prod. of trans U ele-
ments.
Be0 reflected, central water
cavity where max. ther-
mal neutron flux is ob-
tained.
Used with a 1 km time of
flight spectrometer.
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Reactor
Designation
20. Isotope Reactor
(IR)
21. BR-5 Fast Re-
actor
22. VVR?Ts
23. OR
Location
Power
Thermal
(KW)
Max. Thermal
Neutron Flux
(neutrons/
cm2 sec)
Unknown-Possibly 50,000 3-4.5x1013
Kyshtym
Obninsk
Alma Ata
Table III (Continued)
Fuel
Moderator
Operating Research Reactors
3 tons of 2% en- Graphite
riched U
5,000 101s (fast) 50 kg Pu Oxide None
10,000 1x1014
Moscow Inst. of 20,000
A.E.
1. Fast Zero Power Obninsk
Critical Assembly
(BFS)
1. Beryllium Physi-
cal Reactor
(BFR)
2. BR-2 Fast Re-
actor
3. UF 6 Gas-fueled
reactor
Obninsk
Obninsk
Moscow
A.E.
25 kg of 20% en-
riched U
U-unknown con-
centration
Water
Organic Fluid-
possibly isopro-
pyl-diphenyl
Low Power Reactor Experiments Now in Operation
U discs
Date
Coolant Critical
Water
Remarks
1952 Experimental facility for
production of isotopes.
Uranium & nickel re-
flector.
Sodium June
1958;
full
power
July
1959
Water 1963
Same as
moder-
ator
No Longer in Operation
0.05 . . U308 with 20% Beryllium metal none
enriched U
100 Pu-U none
10"
(fast)
Inst. of 1.5 2.7x101? UF with 90% en- Beryllium metal none
riched U
Specialized radio-chemical
research reactor.
Prob. The first organic cooled &
1962 moderated reactor in
the Soviet Union.
1962 Used to study large di-
luted reactors
? Aug. Zero-power critical assem-
1954 bly, bare & reflected.
Mercury Early Uranium reflector. (Dis-
1956 mantled to make BR-
5).
Aug. Probably dismantled.
1957
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valuable experimental facilities. These in-
clude a pulsed reactor which provides a burst
of neutrons over a period of 40 microseconds;
a plutonium fueled, sodium cooled, fast reac-
tor; and a 50 megawatt, intermediate fluxtrap
reactor.
57. The Soviet series of fast reactors are
being used in the development of breeder-type
reactors for the production of electric power
and, it is believed, in connection with the de-
velopment of compact propulsion reactor sys-
tems and/or as an auxiliary power source.
Nuclear Electric Power
58. Following the successful operation of a
5 electrical megawatt (MWe) nuclear electric
power station at Obninsk in June 1954, the
USSR announced plans in February 1956 for
the installation of 2000-2500 MWe of nuclear
generating capacity by the end of 1960. This
ambitious program was cut back considerably
in 1958 and has consistently been slipping be-
hind subsequently revised schedules. Soviet
officials have stated that their nuclear power
program was reduced for economic reasons,
since their nuclear reactors are not yet com-
petitive with conventional power sources ex-
cept in special locations. However, it is also
certain that Soviets underestimated the en-
gineering difficulties in a major nuclear power
program. (See Table IV and Figure 3.)
59. We estimate that, including the dual-
purpose reactors in Siberia, the USSR will have
about 500 MWe of nuclear generating capacity
installed by the end of 1963 and about 1500
MWe by the end of 1968.
60. Soviet ?research on controlled thermo-
nuclear reactions (CTR) began about the
same time as the US. Both programs have
been proceeding at about the same pace. It is
estimated that the USSR will not achieve a
useful controlled reaction within at least the
next 3-5 years; and consequently will not
attain useful power from nuclear fusion within
the next decade.
Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems
61. Three different classes of nuclear pow-
ered submarines are known to have been con-
structed in the USSR and identified in opera-
tional status. We estimate that a fourth
class will be completed and undergo trials
within a year or two and will probably have
an improved propulsion system.
62. It is estimated that the Soviet Navy has
about 26 nuclear submarines. The Northern
Fleet has under its command about 20 nuclear
submarines in operational or near operational
status composed of ballistic missiles-carrying
submarine of the "H" class and attack type
("N" class) submarines, while the Pacific
Fleet is currently operating six cruise missile
type submarines ("E" class) . We believe that
the Soviets can fabricate at least the number
of reactors needed to support the estimated
construction program of 8 to 10 nuclear sub-
marines per year. (See Table V.)
63. The reactor systems used on the nuclear
< icebreaker, LENIN, and the nuclear sub-
marines are of the pressurized-water type. It
is believed that many of the design charac-
teristics and the performance of the LENIN
Power Plant are reflected in the submarine
propulsion system, particularly for the early
submarines. In general, the design and in-
tegration of propulsion system components is
poor compared to US standards and limits the
reliability of their nuclear submarines. On
at least five occasions in the past four years,
propulsion plant failures have necessitated
towing nuclear-propelled submarines back to
base. We continue to estimate that Soviet
technical and operational experience with
pressurized-water reactor propulsion systems
is limited in comparison to US experience.
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Station
Location
Tomsk
Beloyarsk
Novo Voronezh
Obninsk
Obninsk
Table I-V
SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS
No. of
Reactors
and Type
Elec.
Power
Per
Reactor
(MW)
3 reactors in var- 200
ious stages of (est.)
construction
Thermal
Power
Per
Reactor
(MW)
Fuel
Loading
Per
Reactor
1400 200 metric tons
(est. of natural U
peak
power)
1 Graphite-moder- 100 286 90 metric tons of
ated water 1.3% U metal
cooled, pressure
tube configura-
tion
Unit 2 200
1 water-moderated 210
water-cooled
pressure vessel
configuration
Unit 2 360
1 Graphite-moder- 5
ated, water
cooled, pressure
tube configura-
tion
1 package power
water-moderat-
ed water-cooled,
pressure vessel
'2
760 23 metric tons of
1.5% UO2 %
17 metric tons
of natural
UO2 (820 kg
U-235 metal
equivalent)
30 550 kg of 5% U .
metal
10 .
Conver-
sion
Ratio
Annual
Con-
sump-
tion
ETP
U-235
Per
Reactor
(Kg)
Annual
Produc-
tion Pu
Per
Reactor
(Kg)
0.8 400
0.65 at 74 66
begin-
Ding of
cycle, 0.55
at end
0.75
to
0.80
0.32
0 . 5
assumed
Estimated
date of
Fuel Full
Life- Power
time Operation Remarks
1st reac- Construction to be
tor crit- completed by end
ical 1958; of 1968.
in mid-
1960 at
100 MWe.
2 yrs 1963 Employs nuclear
superheat. Est.
schedule: 1st. reac-
tor, 1963. 4 origi-
nally planned.
1966
108 117 1 . 5 1963 Zr-Nb alloy clad fuel
elements. 2 origi-
nally planned.
3 100
days
1966
1954 First Soviet nuclear
power station. Pro-
totype of Beloyarsk
reactors. Used ex-
tensively for experi-
ment as well as
power production.
1959 Assembled for testing
at Obninsk.
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13?1D3S daL
1321D3S d01
L 008E00 SI
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Melekess, Ul'yanov- 1 boiling water re- 50
sk Oblast actor
Bohunice (Czecho-
slovakia)
Rheinsberg (East
Germany)
1 organic reactor
(ARBUS)
1 gas-cooled heavy
water reactor
1 pressurized
water reactor
similar to Novo-
Voronezh
250 .
0.75 5 22.5 Kg 10-15%
U-235
150 590 25,400 kg nat-
ural U
0.60
assumed
70 265 19,600 kg UO2 . 75-0 . 80 36
1.5%
43 1965 Same type fuel ele-
ment as large
F'WR's. Plant fac-
tor assumed 0.6.
1963 Package power re-
actor.
1965 Possible trouble with
pressure vessel in
1962.
40 1.5 yr. 1965 Progress very slow.
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Aerospace Nuclear Applications
64. No installations concerned with an air-
craft nuclear propulsion (ANP) program have
been identified in the USSR, and there is no
evidence that the Soviets have conducted a
flying test bed experiment. The ANP pro-
gram appears to have been delayed and may
have been cut back or even canceled. In any
event, we do not believe that a militarily use-
ful nuclear powered aircraft could appear prior
to 1968.
65. There is no specific evidence that the
Soviets have a nuclear ramjet missile or a nu-
clear rocket under development. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet scientific literature indicates
that an extensive research program exists
which is capable of developing the materials
and establishing the technology required. We
estimate that the Soviets will not conduct a
static test of either a nuclear rocket or a nu-
clear ramjet engine before 1966, at the earliest.
66. An extensive effort appears to be under-
way in the Soviet Union to develop a nuclear
electric propulsion system for space vehicles.
The contact ion engine program is the most
advanced of the various electrical propulsion
systems in a practical sense. If no major
difficulties are encountered in developing a
suitable nuclear power source, it is estimated
that the Soviets could flight test a full-scale
ion propulsion system operating at a power
of about 75 KWe as early as 1964 or more
probably 1965-1966.
67. There is substantial evidence that the
Soviets are conducting research fundamental
on the development of nuclear space power
supplies capable of producing on the order of
several hundred watts. We believe, that they
could have a suitable thermoelectric device
capable of generating about a kilowatt of elec-
tric power in 1964. For higher power systems,
we believe that the Soviets will probably use
a turboconversion type nuclear power supply
of about 100 KWe and that a system of this
size could be flight tested as early as 1965.
The Soviets have conducted extensive research
on thermionic phenomena and the develop-
ment of suitable high-temperature materials.
Such a system would permit the direct conver-
sion of heat to electricity. We estimate that
a thermionic nuclear power supply will be-
come available towards the end of this decade.
Table V
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
Class Type
Length
Over-all Beam
(ft) (ft)
Displace-
ment in
tons
N A torpedo attack 330 32 surfaced
submarine 3,800
submerged
4,300
Maximum
Surface
Speed
(knots)
Maximum
Sub-
merged
Speed
(knots)
about 20 about 20
Estimated
Maximum
Depth
(ft)
Estimated Reactors
Horsepower
750 15,000 hp. probably pres-
surized water reactor.
? Ballistic Missile
Firing
315 32 surfaced
3,500
submerged
4,000
about 20
about 20
750 15,000 hp. probably pres-
surized water reactor.
? Cruise Missile
Firing
385 33 surfaced
5,600
submerged
6,700
about 20
18 750 15,000 hp. probably pres-
surized water reactor.
TS 0038001
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USSR: NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION SITES
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Figure 3
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