THE SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM AFTER THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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,,,Of4. Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The Soviet Nuclear Power
Program After the
Chernobyl' Accident
A Research Paper
Secret
SOV 87-10032X
June 1987
464
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
The Soviet Nuclear Power
Program After the
Chernobyl' Accident
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Economic Performance Division, SOVA~
Secret
SOV 87-10032X
June 1987
25X1
25X1
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The Soviet Nuclear Power
Program After the
Chernobyl' Accident
Key Judgments The disruptions to the Soviet nuclear power industry through 1990 caused
Information available by the Chernobyl' accident will be minor when measured in broad
as oil May 1987 economic terms and will not derail Soviet intentions to increase reliance on
was used in this report.
this energy source. The Soviets remain strongly committed to reducing
dependence on oil and gas, antinuclear elements of public opinion will have
only a weak effect, and the large investment and substantial infrastructure
in the commercial nuclear program will ensure continued growth. Beyond
1990, however, some modification of the nuclear power program is likely; a
few changes could set back the timetable by several years. These would
probably involve the design and location of future nuclear plants and a
shift in emphasis resulting from the competition of coal and oil interests for
investment resources.
The USSR-and to some extent its CEMA partners-will bear a variety
of energy-related costs because of the Chernobyl' accident. The loss of
electricity generated by the Chernobyl' reactors and the increased use of
fossil fuels in thermal power plants to partially offset the loss are key short-
term consequences. Eastern Europe already had to bear some of the burden
of electricity cuts during the 1986-87 winter period of peak power demand.
During 1987 enough power plant capacity probably will be restored at
Chernobyl' or brought on line elsewhere to alleviate this problem. Longer
term consequences for the Soviet civilian nuclear industry include the
investment writeoffs of at least three reactors at Chernobyl' and the costs
of improvements to the safety of other Chernobyl'-type reactors. A rough
total of these capital costs shows them to be the equivalent of two or three
years' investment in the industry. Since the accident, Moscow has also
spent about $80 million on Western equipment for use in the entombment
of the destroyed reactor and in other aspects of the recovery
Despite increased costs, we expect the Soviets will strive to minimize the
impact of the accident on their long-term plans for nuclear power and will
continue broadening the role of this energy source. We believe they will be
largely successful in this damage-limitation effort. The fixes proposed for
implementation over the next several years for Chernobyl'-type reactors
are not likely to take them out of service for long, and the costs are
manageable. Moreover, power plants with Chernobyl'-type reactors have
long been slated to play a diminishing role in the Soviet nuclear program of
the 1980s and 1990s as the emphasis shifts to other reactor types. These
other types represent 80 percent of the nuclear energy capacity currently
under construction or planned
Secret
SOV 87-10032X
June 1987
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Longstanding problems in manufacturing components for nuclear power
plants and delays in plant construction will account for the majority of the
shortfalls in bringing new capacity on stream between now and 1990,
overshadowing the impact of Chernobyl' on the growth of the USSR's
commercial nuclear program. The cumulative effect of the Chernobyl'
accident (both the direct effects and the turmoil caused by the recovery ef-
fort) will probably mean that only three or four fewer new nuclear reactors
(out of 35 planned) will be completed during the 1986-90 plan period. The
loss of these reactors and delays in the construction of others will mean
that roughly 10 percent less electricity will be produced from nuclear
power. We believe the USSR will have about 48,000 megawatts of
commercial nuclear capacity by yearend 1990 (compared with 28,300
megawatts in 1985) and will produce some 260 billion kilowatt-hours of
electricity at nuclear power plants in 1990 (compared with 167 billion
kilowatt-hours in 1985).
The Soviets are likely to encounter only a minor domestic backlash against
nuclear power. The psychological blow of Chernobyl' may be enough to
catalyze some Soviet groups with reservations about nuclear energy and
the supporters of other energy sources into challenging plans for some
nuclear facilities. Advocates of other reactor types and other energy
sources will use the accident to bolster their arguments. The plans most
vulnerable to pressure for nonnuclear alternatives are those for eight
Chernobyl'-type reactors where little construction has taken place and
those for 20 units of a new type of nuclear plant designed to be sited near
cities to provide a dedicated source of heat beginning in the 1990s.
The Soviets have sought a high-profile involvement of the West in the
postaccident events. Moscow chose the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) as the forum in which to defuse Western concerns about
radioactive contamination and safety in the USSR's nuclear program. The
Soviets will probably continue to use the IAEA to certify that the proposed
modifications to Chernobyl'-type reactors are adequate and that all Soviet
reactors are safe-particularly types they hope to export.
Given the long-term need to monitor the environment and the leadership's
intent to keep expanding its nuclear energy program, Moscow is likely to
look to the West for radiation monitoring and decontamination equipment
and, possibly, nuclear power plant components and services. A role for the
West as supplier of plant components is more likely if Moscow chooses to
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accelerate construction of pressurized-water reactors to replace Cherno-
byl'-type reactors that may be canceled; Soviet equipment suppliers have
not been able to meet the demand at the current pace of construction.
Any market in the USSR for Western nuclear vendors is likely to be highly
competitive. Firms from the United States, France, Finland, West
Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and Japan can offer many comparable
components and services. The US vendors will probably have little
advantage over their competitors in sales of components and only a modest
edge in services experience. US firms are likely to trail the others in terms
of financing packages and ease of technology licensing.
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The Accident: Prescription for Disaster
1
Managing the Nuclear Power Capacity
7
Choice of Reactor Types
9
Maintaining the RBMK Reactor Option
10
Outlook for Achievement of Nuclear Industry Goals for 1990
12
Impact on Soviet Nuclear Energy Policy
16
An Underlying Commitment to Nuclear Power
17
The Influence of Nuclear-Industry Infrastructure
20
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Scope Note For several decades the Soviets have viewed nuclear energy as the key to
growth in the electricity supply-and recently in the heat supply-in the
European USSR. The Chernobyl' accident on 26 April 1986, however, has
robbed the commercial nuclear power program of some momentum and
challenged many Soviet concepts regarding its safety, reliability, and low
costs. The special August 1986 meeting of the International Atomic
Energy Agency showed that the Soviets were beginning to make changes
based on their analysis of the accident. This meeting also revealed that the
Soviets expect to study their nuclear program a good deal more, which
means we are now getting only a first look at the possible changes._25X1
This report explores how the Chernobyl' disaster will probably influence
the USSR's plans for nuclear power and heat supply and evaluates the
implications for total primary energy production.
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The Soviet Nuclear Power
Program After the
Chernobyl' Accident
Short-Term Consequences of the Accident
The accident that destroyed reactor unit 4 of the
Chernobyl' nuclear power plant in late April 1986 had
many and varied consequences-from the tragic hu-
man costs (see inset) to marginally greater fossil-fuel
consumption, safety upgrades on Chernobyl'-type re-
actors, and some reexamination of the commercial
nuclear program in the USSR.
The Accident: Prescription for Disaster
The Soviet accident report filed with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates that the
errors that doomed unit 4 began on 25 April when
technicians started a poorly executed experiment to
test the emergency electricity supply to the reactor.
Major violations of the procedures for reactor opera-
tions were committed, such as switching off the
emergency shutdown system and operating the reac-
tor with too many control rods withdrawn. These
human errors, coupled with a design flaw that allowed
reactor power to surge when uncontrolled steam
generation began in the core, set up the conditions for
the accident.
The final moments of the accident occurred in a
period of about 40 seconds at 0123 local time on
Saturday, 26 April. Operator errors had put the
reactor in an unstable condition, so reactor power
increased rapidly when the experiment began. Subse-
quent analysis of the Soviet data by US experts
suggests the power surge may have accelerated when
the operators tried an emergency shutdown of the
reactor. According to Soviet data, the energy re-
leased was, for a fraction of a second, 350 times the
rated capacity of the reactor. This burst of energy
resulted in an instantaneous and violent surge of heat
and pressure, rupturing fuel channels and releasing
The Human Costs of the Chernobyl'Accident
The 31 initial casualties resulting from the explosion
that destroyed unit 4 will ultimately account for only
a minor part of the human toll of the Chernobyl'
disaster. Two power plant workers were killed imme-
diately, and burns and high radiation exposures
eventually claimed the lives of another 29 people- 25X1
most of them firemen and site emergency personnel.
Soviet doctors reported that nearly 300 people re-
ceived enough radiation to require hospitalization.
These individuals will experience substantial addi-
tional risk of cancer.
Longer term health consequences in the USSR will
result from radioactive contamination spread by the
accident over an area of about 1,000 square kilome-
ters. Many thousands of persons were exposed to this
radiation (or will be exposed to residual amounts of
radiation as daily routines are reestablished), in-
creasing their long-term risk of cancer. This cancer
threat poses unique medical and psychological prob-
lems, even though the overall statistical increase in 25X1
cancer rates is likely to be minimal. 25X1
half in new homes.
of the 135,000 evacuees have been resettled, about
Soviet reactions to the accident included a massive
evacuation and a cleanup effort that will probably be
a long-term battle. An area with a 30-kilometer
radius around the reactor was evacuated, and Mos-
cow reported that about 135,000 people were moved.
In addition to these official evacuees, perhaps as
many as 270,000-mostly women and children-left
cities (such as Kiev) in the region around the reactor 25X1
site but outside the evacuation zone. The official
evacuation started about 36 hours after the explosion
and took about 10 days to complete. Most evacuees
will never be able to return to their homes. Nearly all
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steam that disrupted large portions of the core. Some
of the shattered core material was propelled through
the roof of the reactor building.
The hot core material that was released started about
30 separate fires in the unit 4 reactor hall and turbine
building, as well as on the roof of the adjoining unit 3.
All but the main fire in the graphite moderator
material still inside unit 4 were extinguished in a few
hours by the heroic efforts of firefighters. The graph-
ite fire continued to burn for nearly two weeks-
carrying radioactivity high into the atmosphere-
until it was smothered by sand, lead, dolomite, and
boron dropped from helicopters.0
Unit 3 was shut down four hours after the destruction
of unit 4. Units 1 and 2, located several hundred
meters from unit 4, continued producing electricity
for 24 hours after the accident. The Soviets reported
considerable radioactive contamination of units 1, 2,
change to night shift work to reduce daytime electric-
ity demand. These steps were a likely preparation for
coping with the prospective shortage of electricity,
since the Soviets were only able to restore two reactors
at Chernobyl' to partial service by the onset of winter.
The effect on total fuel demand of the effort to offset
Chernobyl'-induced electricity losses appears to have
been minor. Given the fuel-use capability of the
replacement plants, the Soviets were probably using
an extra 45,000 barrels per day (b/d) of oil, 220
million cubic meters per month of natural gas, and
400,000 tons per month of coal.' During the five-
month period when the Chernobyl' plant produced no
electricity, the nationwide demand for fuel oil in-
creased 1 to 2 percent, natural gas use grgw 0.2
percent, and coal use rose by 0.3 percent.
and 3.
Electricity Losses and Increased Fuel Use
For five months following the destruction of the
Chernobyl'-4 reactor, the plant's three surviving reac-
tors were idled. This loss of generating capacity-
roughly 10 percent of the total in the Ukraine-would
have led, if uncompensated, to an average monthly
deficit in electricity production of 2.4 billion kilowatt-
hours (kWh). But, during the summer lull in electric-
ity demand, the Soviets were in a favorable position to
offset much of this potential deficit by stepping up
electricity production from power plants burning fos-
sil fuels. Beginning in September, however, the sea-
sonal upsurge in demand for electricity probably
eliminated most of the painless adjustment mecha-
nisms
The Ukraine experienced electricity problems even
during the summer lull in demand. Ukrainian party
chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, in a July speech, called
for additional energy conservation measures, and
Ukrainian Council of Ministers chairman Aleksandr
Lyashko noted that some enterprises needed to
In addition to the power losses at Chernobyl', the
Soviets are expecting cuts in output during 1987 at
the four other nuclear power plants operating RBMK
(Chernobyl'-type) reactors.
fixes to improve safety will reduce power
output at these plants by about 10 percent, or nearly
10 billion kWh, in 1987. ave not
indicated whether this is a one-time loss in power
generation due to temporary downtime or a derating
of the capacity of these reactors.
Returning the Chernobyl' Plant to Service
As soon as the Chernobyl' accident was under control,
Moscow began promoting a rapid recovery of power-
generating capability at the idle plant, evincing con-
cern for longer term considerations affecting the
nuclear power program as well as for the immediate
exigencies:
? Moscow desired to spare the economy the degree of
electricity shortfall that would come in winter unless
much of the Chernobyl' capacity was returned to
service.
' The total monthly fuel bill was nearly 800,000 tons of standard
fuel. A unit of standard fuel contains the energy equivalent of 7,000
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? With roughly half the Soviet nuclear power plant
capacity in Chernobyl'-type reactors, restoration of
confidence in these units was imperative.
? The leadership probably viewed the recovery of the
Chernobyl' plant as an implicit test for the manage-
ment of the nuclear industry-proof that nuclear
power is reliable and that Soviet management is
competent.
The Soviets restarted Chernobyl' unit 1 in late Sep-
tember and unit 2 in November, thereby missing their
early optimistic goal.4 Adequately decontaminating
the site to resume operations tested Soviet ingenuity
and resources (see inset on page 6). A major realloca-
tion of managers and technicians was needed to solve
problems such as the entombment of the destroyed
reactor and decontamination of the highly radioactive
turbogenerator hall, which houses the turbines of all
four of the plant's units (see figure 1). Part of the price
for this success was a slowdown in the construction of
at least three reactors at other power plants due for
startup in 1986. Intermittent operation of Chernobyl'
units 1 and 2 through mid-December suggested that
problems remained.
The fate of Chernobyl' unit 3 is still uncertain.
Although entombment of unit 4 is now complete, the
recovery of unit 3 will drag on for some time,
especially if critical electrical and ventilation assem-
blies were damaged in the fires following the accident
or if radiation contamination is too extensive for rapid
cleanup. If the reactor of unit 3 is not fully recovered,
Moscow will have to reassess the "shared facilities"
design at RBMK reactors. Three nuclear power
plants now use this type of design and one other such
plant is at an early stage of construction.'
' Shortly after the April accident, plans were announced to restart
Chernobyl' units 1 and 2 in June. During August the deadline for
restart was shifted to October as the Soviets became more con-
cerned about radiation exposures of operations staff.
' In order to save on plant investment and simplify designs, the
Soviets construct RBMK plants to share facilities for functions
such as reactor hall ventilation or water treatment. Although
designs for Western nuclear power plants use similar logic, a much
greater effort and investment are made to assure that the integrity
of functions is maintained in the event of disruption at any one
Meanwhile, the Soviets appear to have abandoned
efforts to recover the partially constructed units 5 and
6. This was announced without elaboration by the
chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of
Atomic Energy, Andronik Petrosyants, on 25 April
1987. Factors in stopping construction probably in- 25X1
clude high radiation at the site, rising construction
costs, and possibly difficulties in recruiting skilled
labor to finish the project.'
Short-Term Economic Costs
The immediate economic costs of the accident
include:
? The opportunity costs of using additional fuel oil in
plants replacing electricity from Chernobyl' instead
of selling the fuel oil for hard currency.
? Increased purchases of Western equipment to facili-
tate the cleanup after the accident.
ing for the evacuees
? The diversion of construction labor, equipment, and
materials to the tasks of decontaminating the Cher-
nobyl' plant and surrounding area, entombing the
destroyed reactor of unit 4, and building new hous-
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The forgone hard currency earnings from reduced
sales of heavy fuel oil at prevailing world-market
prices during 1986 potentially amounted to roughly
$100 million. This opportunity cost was halved when
two Chernobyl' units were brought back on line in
December 1986. Continued losses of potential sales of
fuel oil (at the reduced level) will nevertheless equal
nearly $10 million per month until another 2,000
megawatts (MW) of power plant capacity is brou ht
into the power network, probably late this year. 25X1
addition to decontamination and construction work on the power
plants themselves, housing and basic amenities would need to be
organized for the 10,000 to 13,000 workers needed to finish
construction. These people and their families were displaced from
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Figure 1 (cont.)
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A Chronology of the Recovery Effort at the
Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant
26 April Reactor unit 4 explodes, causing
fires in that unit and some damage
to adjoining unit 3. Radioactive con-
tamination forces shutdown of un-
damaged units 1 and 2 and suspen-
sion of construction on units 5 and 6.
29 September Unit I restarted; unit 2 restart
promised in two weeks.
10 October Plans for units 3, 5, and 6 an-
nounced-unit 3 restart scheduled
for mid-1987; construction on units
5 and 6 to resume after unit 3
brought on line.
28 April Soviets publicly acknowledge the
accident.
13 May the graphite fire in
unit 4 extinguished.
14 May Gorbachev appears on TV, describ-
ing the accident and announcing
goals for recovery.
15 May Tunnel for access to the area under
the unit 4 reactor started; construc-
tion on entombment for unit 4
begun.
22 May First recovery timetable announced,
proposing to complete entombment
and `prepare" units 1, 2, and 3 for
operation by 15 June.
2 June Restart of units I and 2 scheduled
for October; restart of unit 3 put on
hold.
4 July Tunnel to unit 4 completed.
13 October- Unit 1 shut down for "adjustments."
8 November
Unit 2 reactor restarted; trial opera-
tion at low power.
25X1;1
15 November Pravda reports entombment of unit 4
complete.
units 1 and 2
11-16 Janu-
ary
are on line and ready for normal
service.
IAEA director Hans Blix inspects
entombment and "verifies" its
integrity.
decontamination or
construction work beginning on units
5 and 6.
13 March Soviet press reports that units 1 and
19 July Special CPSU Politburo meeting
discusses Chernobyl' investigation
results, announces reorganization of 25 April
nuclear power industry.
25-29 August IAEA special meeting on Chernobyl'
held in Vienna.
2 are operating at full power.
The chairman of the USSR's State
Committee for Utilization of Atomic
Energy, Andronik Petrosyants, an-
nounces that units 5 and 6 will not
be completed.
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Table 1
The USSR's Nuclear Program in an
International Perspective
Capacity
(Yearend 1986 a)
(megawatts)
Reactors
(Yearend 1986 a)
Output
(1986 Total a)
(billion kilowatt hours)
Percent Share of
Total Power Output
Soviet Union
29,312 b
42 b
161.0
10
Japan
24,686
32
164.8
29
West Germany
18,295
17
117.4
33
Britain
12,940
37
59.1
19
a Preliminary data.
b Does not include Chernobyl' units 3 and 4.
Announced changes in fuel enrichment at existing
reactors will initially cost about 115 million rubles.
There will also be hard currency costs; by September
1986 some $80 million had been spent on imported
goods to aid the recovery. Much of the cost of these
imports could be charged to the nuclear program
because they were used in the entombment of the
Chernobyl' unit 4 reactor. The eventual costs to the
nuclear industry are likely to be much higher.'F_
The Soviets have made relatively small purchases
from the West to facilitate cleanup after the accident,
speedily return Chernobyl' units to use, and construct
new housing for workers displaced from their apart-
ments and homes by radioactive contamination. The
Soviets bought a wide variety of products: remote-
controlled robots and tunneling equipment for decon-
tamination work and entombment of the unit 4
reactor, radiation monitoring equipment, radiation
'Unconfirmed Soviet estimates of the cost of the Chernobyl'
accident range from 2 billion to 25 billion rubles. The minimum
estimate was quoted in the Soviet press during the summer of 1986
and probably accounts for only direct damage to the plant,
immediate site cleanup, and possibly population relocation expendi-
tures. The higher estimate was provided unofficially by a Soviet
engineer who claimed to be assigned to the Chernobyl' Investigat-
ing Commission. The upper estimate would probably cover a total
protection items for personnel, and prefabricated
housing units. In addition, the USSR received from
international contributors several million dollars
worth of donations in the form of cash, medical
supplies, and household items.
Background
The USSR ranks among the leaders worldwide in the
development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (see
table 1). After a quick start as the first country to
operate a nuclear power plant, the USSR fell behind
the United States and, later, France. Soviet industry
has not been able to meet in timely fashion the
technological and logistic challenges of nuclear power
plant construction, so plant startups are lagging three
to five years behind original plans. The USSR, never-
theless, has managed ambitious nuclear power re-
search that has yielded the world's largest capacity
reactors used for commercial applications, one of the
most advanced breeder-reactor programs, and numer-
ous designs that Soviet energy planners hope to
implement in future uses of nuclear energy in urban/
municipal and industrial projects (see figure 2).I
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Figure 2
Soviet Nuclear Power Plants
The Uott.d 8ldkaa Ga??rnrn~nt tan not recognized
tka tncozpotgt(ua'pt 6N.et.. LNYitl, cod t ithoania
ti1w tea Savtae;4rdon. Other boond.,y ncro?antrtloa
N not naeaaaaplyautheritNlw ______. __.
4/
Bilibino ATETs'
(northeastern. Siberia)
Rovno
l' Kursk
Ch
b
erno
y
2 ~~
Voronezh AST
0 %Novovoronezhskiv
Kharkov
Power Plants
(capacity in megawatts)
3,000 and above
? 1,500 to 3,000
? Less than 1,500
O Under construction
Note: Figures indicate number of operational
reactors as of January 1987.
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USSR: Commercial Nuclear Reactor and
Plant Types
RBMK. A graphite-moderated, boiling-water reactor
currently used at the Chernobyl', Leningrad, Kursk,
Smolensk, and Ignalina nuclear power stations. It is
produced in two standardized capacities: 1,000 MW
and 1,500 MW (electrical rating). Although boiling-
water reactors are used outside the USSR, there is no
close Western counterpart to the RBMK, which is
operated only in the USSR. I
VVER. A pressurized-water reactor, in which the
water is used as both a moderator and a coolant. It is
produced in two standardized capacities: 440 MW
and 1,000 MW (electrical rating). This reactor is
similar to many Western designs. VVERs are operat-
ed in the USSR at the Armenian, Balakovo, Kola,
Novovoronezhskiy, Rovno, South Ukraine, and Za-
porozh 'ye plants. VVER reactors are also operated in
Eastern Europe and Finland.n
BN. A fast-breeder reactor that, as its name implies,
will produce or "breed" nuclear fuel for other reac-
tors as it operates. This reactor is cooled by liquid
sodium. The Soviets are running two prototypes: 350
MW and 600 MW (electrical rating). Plans
An important difference in viewpoint exists between
the Soviets and the West on the economics of com-
mercial nuclear power. In the West, the focus on the
"bottom line" of financial projections means that the
cost and revenue projections for an individual utility
play the leading role in decisions on how much
nuclear power capacity to build or, as more recently,
in decisions to cancel nuclear projects. The Soviets, on
the other hand, are less guided by the costs of
individual projects than by the cost-benefit ratio of a
proposed power plant with respect to Soviet fuel-
supply logistics and the reliability and quality of
electricity supplied to end users.' In the USSR,
' Inadequacies in electricity supply-including low voltage, AC
frequency below established limits, and intermittent brownouts or
call for the design, construction, and operation of
800-MW and 1,600-MW versions. Only a few other
countries have mastered this technology on a similar
scale. l
AST, ATETs. These two types of nuclear plants are
designed to supply heated water for centralized heat-
ing. The AST will use a specially modified reactor of 25X1
500 MW (thermal rating) that the Soviets plan to
dedicate solely for centralized heat supply to cities.
Production has just started on this reactor. Current
plans call for its use at Gor'kiy and Voronezh by
1990 and eventually at many other cities. The
ATETs plant will supply both electricity and heated
water to cities. The ATETs will use a VVER-1000
reactor to power a steam turbine-generator, modified
to permit release of heated water to the central heat
network in cities. Although the ATETs design incor- 25X1
porates a standard VVER reactor model, the loss of
energy to the heat network lowers the electrical rating
of the reactor to 900 MW. Current plans call for
startup of ATETs plants at Odessa, Minsk, and
Khar'kov by 1990 and extensive use in the European
USSR in later years.
nuclear power plants are highly valued because they
substantially reduce the burden of fossil-fuel produc-
tion and transportation, and, until Chernobyl', nucle-
ar plants were more reliable electricity producers than
either fossil-fueled or hydroelectric plants. Although
nuclear power plants are likely to become more costly
as Chernobyl'-inspired design modifications are im-
plemented, they will retain their attractiveness in the
Soviets' broader economic evaluation.
Choice of Reactor Types
After making a commitment to nuclear power, Mos-
cow turned to the RBMK graphite-moderated,
boiling-water reactor in the 1960s and 1970s (see
inset). This enabled the USSR to get substantial
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Secret
Figure 3
Construction of Soviet Commercial Nuclear Reactors, 1981-85
= Planned for startup
= Finished during period
nuclear power capacity on line during the protracted
period of tooling up to produce other types of reactors.
The RBMK was less technically demanding to build
than other large-capacity reactor types. Consequently,
the RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500 are the backbone
of the current program. The Soviet pressurized-water
model has two standardized capacities (VVER-440
and VVER-1000).' The larger version is scheduled to
become the workhorse of the 1990s. Moscow hopes
the prototype fast breeder reactor (BN-600) will be-
come the model for expansion in the 1990s and
beyond to increase efficiencies in the nuclear fuel
cycle and to lower costs. Within the next year or so,
the Soviets will probably begin operating a new
reactor (AST-500), which will replace some fossil-
fueled plants in supplying hot water to centralized
heating systems.
' The numeric part of a power-reactor designation refers to the
capacity of the reactor. For the VVER, RBMK, and BN reactors
this capacity is expressed in megawatts of electricity generation
capability. For the AST reactor, this capacity is expressed in
megawatts of thermal (heating) capability.F_~
Maintaining the RBMK Option
The seriousness of the Chernobyl' accident has over-
shadowed the history of more than 80 reactor-years of
RBMKs operating reliably and without serious inci-
dent, F_ I A number
of positive characteristics of RBMK reactors, de-
scribed in Soviet technical handbooks, are probably
still valid and will contribute to a Soviet willingness to
keep these reactors operating. The RBMK- 1000 reac-
tor in recent years has had a better record for on-time
assembly than other large power reactors (see figure
3). Plants with this reactor can generate more electric-
ity on an annual basis than either fossil-fueled or
VVER-equipped power plants of equivalent capacity
because the RBMK is subject to fewer unplanned
outages.10 Online refueling capability helps RBMK
reactors to maintain high utilization rates.
'? In 1985, for example, the 14 RBMK-1000 reactors averaged 72-
percent utilization of capacity, while the six online VVER-1000
reactors averaged 64 percent and a representative sample of fossil-
fueled generating capacity averaged 70-percent utilization.
25X1 ,
25X1
25X1
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Because the 14 existing RBMK reactors compose 53
percent of the nuclear power plant capacity and
provide 6 percent of all the electricity generated in the
USSR (60 percent of nuclear-generated power), a
prolonged safety-related equipment refitting of exist-
ing reactors could seriously disrupt the Soviet electric-
ity supply. We believe Moscow is not planning exten-
sive modification of RBMKs, although Soviet
inquiries to Western companies suggest Moscow is
considering a retrofit of additional equipment besides
that mentioned in their accident report to the IAEA."
The Soviets appear to have rejected wholesale upgrad-
ing of RBMK containment on the grounds of techni-
cal difficulty and costs."
The technical shortcomings of the RBMK reactor
that contributed to the accident include a complex
nuclear core that requires moderately sophisticated
monitoring with computer-assisted control, and the
potential instability of the nuclear reactions in the
core during low-power operating conditions or if
coolant is rapidly lost. These were known to Soviet
specialists well before the Chernobyl' events. Report-
ing in the Soviet nuclear industry's technical journals
showed that design engineers were working on these
problems, so fixes may not require extraordinarily
long downtimes or construction delays.
Another concern surfaced by the catastrophe is the
possible vulnerability of Soviet nuclear power stations
to multiple reactor failure. All five of the existing
plants using RBMK reactors are built around pairs of
" Western suppliers have been contacted about equipment for
hydrogen monitoring and ignition to detect and prevent the forma-
tion of an explosive mixture that could result in the Chernobyl'-type
destruction of a nuclear reactor. Other possibilities for retrofits may
involve adding backup emergency core cooling and improving the
automated reactor-control systems
'Z The Soviets have already set a precedent on refusal to retrofit for
containment. Soviet planners had decided by the mid-1970s to add
containment to designs for pressurized-water reactors (VVERs).
The containment function was incorporated in phases, with later
model VVER-440 reactors receiving containment or localization of
certain critical components. In 1980 the Soviets built their first
reactor with full containment, equivalent to that used in the West.
They did not, however, retrofit any of the eight earlier model
VVER-440s with containments. The decision not to enforce the
same safety standards at all VVERs was probably influenced by the
technical difficulty of such extensive reconstruction and by costs,
estimated by some Western experts to equal the original investment
reactors. The explosion at Chernobyl' unit 4 damaged
components of unit 3, calling attention to the risk that
other events such as major fires or large pipe ruptures
in one reactor could endanger the other member of a
pair. Modifications to reduce this risk of multiple
reactor failure in future plants would require time-
consuming redesign work, which would increase con-
struction costs.
Modifying the RBMKs. Of the 29 RBMK reactors
built or planned, the projects most vulnerable to
cancellation if basic design flaws cannot be easily
remedied are the eight reactors at the earliest stages
of construction. These are located at the existing
Kursk and Smolensk plants and at the proposed
Kostroma plant. In an April 1987 announcement of
the remaining RBMK projects, the Soviets implied,
by omission, that the four reactors at Kostroma had
been dropped. The Kostroma plant is in the earliest
stages of design and site preparation work and could
be canceled with the least disruption. The plans cited
in the Soviet press call for construction of four 1,500-
MW RBMK reactors at Kostroma, due to come on
line at two-year intervals from 1992 to 1999. A power
station operated on natural gas could be proposed as
an effective alternative to the Kostroma nuclear plant,
since large gas-fired power plants are already in 25X1
existence in the region. A gas-fired replacement for
Kostroma could be built with only minor delays to the
plan for expanding power-generating capacity=
25X1
Replacement of Smolensk units 5 and 6 (RBMK-
1500s) and Kursk units 5 and 6 (RBMK-I000s) would
pose greater problems. Although assembly has just
begun on some of these reactors, abandoning them
would mean a costly writeoff of the construction
infrastructure that is already being used to complete
four other reactors at each location. Replacement
electricity-generating capacity could be either conven-
tional gas-fired or even nuclear, using VVER reac-
tors. It is unlikely that the Power Ministry could
complete the process of site selection, design, and
construction of this replacement capacity in time to
avoid a tightening of power supplies to the central
region, because the units at Smolensk and Kursk were
expected on line in the early 1990s.~ 25X1
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JCLl Vt
Figure 4
Soviet Nuclear Power: Performance Versus Plan
0 1970
CIA estimates
for 1990b
Pre-Chernobyl'
/'~ Post Chernobyl'
a Total capacity on line at end of five-year
plan; 1990 capacity includes nuclear heating plants.
b Midpoints of established ranges.
0 1970
Plan
Actual
CIA estimates
for 1990b
I'I`Pre-Chernobyl'
, #-Post Chernobyl'
Seven RBMK reactors are in later stages of construc-
tion, with four at an advanced stage, including the
reportedly canceled Chernobyl' units 5 and 6. Modifi-
cations already proposed by the Soviets could proba-
bly be done on the remaining five without major
extensions to completion times. If the Soviets decide
to curtail the RBMK construction program sharply-
following through on Petrosyants' announcement
about the two Chernobyl' units-they still might be
able to salvage some prestige. Moscow would be able
to claim, with some justification, that they are only
accelerating a long-planned shift to VVER reactors.
The emphasis in construction of nuclear power plants
has moved from RBMK reactors to VVER reactors
over the last three five-year planning cycles. In the
Plan
Actual
1976-80 plan period, six of the 11 completed reactors
were RBMKs, and in 1981-85 the share declined to
eight of 17. The plan for 1986-90 shows only seven
RBMKs among the 35 reactors due for completion.
Outlook for Achievement of Nuclear Industry
Goals for 1990
Soviet targets for nuclear power plant capacity and
output were out of reach even before the Chernobyl'
accident shocked the nuclear industry (see figure 4).
The targets call for starting electricity output or heat
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Table 2
USSR: Plan for Additions to Nuclear Power Plant Capacity
(Scheduled Startups, 1986-90) a
1986
Kalinin 2
VVER-1000
Zaporozh'ye 6
VVER-1000
Zaporozh'ye 3
VVER-1000
Tatar 1
VVER-1000
Chernobyl' 5
RBMK-1000
Smolensk 4
RBMK-1000
Ignalina 2
RBMK-1500
South Ukraine 3
VVER-1000
Rovo 3
VVER-1000
Minsk ATETs 1
VVER-1000
Balakovo 2
VVER-1000
Khmel'nitskiy 2
VVER-1000
Khmel'nitskiy 1
Ignalina 3
RBMK-1500
Gor'kiy 1
Gor'kiy 2
AST-500
1987
1990
Zaporozh'ye 4
VVER-1000
Rovno 5
VVER-1000
Smolensk 3
RBMK-1000
Crimean 2
VVER-1000
Balakovo 3
VVER-1000
Rostov 2
VVER-1000
1988
Odessa ATETs 2
VVER-1000
Khar'kov ATETs 1
VVER-1000
Zaporozh'ye 5
VVER-1000
Kursk 5
RBMK-1000
Chernobyl' 6
RBMK-1000
Voronezh 2
AST-500
Rovno 4
VVER-1000
Totals
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
32,000 MW (electrical)
24 VVER-1000s
VVER-1000
2,000 MW (thermal) in ASTs
5 RBMK-1000s
2 RBMK-1500s
4 AST-500s
35 All types
generation at as many as nine new reactors in a single
year, 1988 (see table 2).13 The 1990 electricity output
goal for nuclear power is even more ambitious than
the capacity goal-390 billion kWh, compared with
the 167 billion kWh produced in 1985.
13 Soviet near-term plans for nuclear power were summarized in the
12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90). Full details of the plan have not
been published, but the general goal is clear-a doubling of
operational nuclear power plant capacity, from 28,300 MW in 1985
to about 60,000 MW in 1990. An alternative plan for 41,000 MW
of new capacity, which would bring total nuclear capacity in 1990
to about 70,000 MW, has also been cited by Soviets in the nuclear
industry. This total is not confirmed, however, in the literature on
construction at individual plants. The 41,000-MW target probably
represents both the capacity they hope to brim on line and the
capacity in late stages of construction)
Before the Chernobyl' accident, we estimated that the
Soviets would achieve good growth in both capacity
and output but still fall short of plans for 1990. We
projected that capacity would increase to about
50,000 MW and that electricity production would
grow to about 285 billion kWh. Such an outcome
would have been consistent with Soviet performance,
which continues to fall short in component manufac-
ture and plant construction.
As a result of the Chernobyl' accident (both the direct
effects and the turmoil caused by the recovery effort),
we estimate that by yearend 1990 nuclear capacity
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Figure 5
New Capacity at Soviet Nuclear Facilities, Planned and Projected, 1986-90
RBMK
Type of reactor
will reach only 48,000 MW and electricity output
only 260 billion kWh. We expect that three or four
fewer new reactors will be completed because labor
and materials have been drawn from other nuclear
plant construction sites to speed the Chernobyl' recov-
ery (see figure 5). Indeed, Chernobyl'-induced delays
are likely to affect much, if not all, of the construction
of nuclear power plants. Such delays on unit 1 at the
Odessa nuclear heat-and-power plant, unit 2 at the
Voronezh AST, and possibly unit 5 at the Kursk plant
could postpone startup of these units until the early
l 990s.F___1
In making these projections we assume that the
Soviets will succeed in limiting the disruptions caused
by retrofitting RBMKs and will not have to disrupt
construction of the VVER-1000 reactors, including
almost all of those due on line by 1990, for safety
upgrades (see table 3). These assumptions are based
on our observation that only a few individuals in the
Soviet nuclear-power decisionmaking hierarchy (the
CPSU, the scientific community, and involved minis-
tries) have expressed reservations about the basic form
of the nuclear program.
Assuring the Future: VVER and AST Reactors
The VVER and AST reactors, representing 80 per-
cent of the capacity under construction or planned,
are the future of the Soviet nuclear program to the
year 2000. The Soviets want to use these reactor types
in power plants, in plants supplying heat to central-
ized municipal distribution networks, and in plants
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vc~ cI
Table 3
USSR: Actual and Projected Additions to Nuclear
Power Plant Capacity, 1986-90
1990
Kalinin 2
VVER-1000
Rovno 4
VVER-1000
Zaporozh'ye 3
VVER-1000
Zaporozh'ye 5
VVER-1000
Rovno 3
VVER-1000
Rostov 2
VVER-1000
1987
Kalinin 3
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
Odessa ATETs 1
VVER-1000 a
RBMK-1500
Kursk 5
RBMK-1000 a
AST-500
Totals
Zaporozh'ye 4
VVER-1000
Crimean 1
VVER-1000
Rostov 1
VVER-1000
Khmel'nitskiy 1
VVER-1000
14 to 15 VVER-1000s
AST-500
1 to 2 RBMK-1000s
AST-500
2 RBMK-1500s
3 AST-500s
RBMK-1500
V VER-1000
V VER-1000
RBMK-1000
that will provide both electricity and heat to munici-
pal and industrial customers. Because these reactors
are central to the expansion of the USSR's nuclear
program, their involvement in a Chernobyl'-inspired
safety review that resulted in major changes in equip-
ment and procedures would have a larger impact on
growth prospects for the nuclear industry than would
changes to RBMK reactors alone. Such a safety
review has already been suggested as a possibility by
several leading scientists in the USSR's nuclear estab-
lishment.
The nuclear power plants under construction that will
use VVER and AST reactors are already caught up
indirectly in the post-Chernobyl' activity. Construc-
tion of a VVER-1000 reactor at Rovno in the Ukraine
was accelerated so that the loss of Chernobyl' to that
region could be reduced. Despite some delays, this
reactor started generating electricity in 1986 instead
of in 1987 as we had projected earlier. Construction at
several other plants, however, slowed as resources
were drawn off to complete the entombment of the
destroyed reactor at Chernobyl' or to accelerate the
installation of safety modifications. 25X1
Another set of postaccident concerns that could affect
VVER and AST reactors relates to the number of
reactors colocated at any one plant. Some Soviet
specialists may challenge the wisdom of colocating
multiple reactors that can be rendered inoperable for
months or years by an accident in one unit. Plans
made before the Chernobyl' accident call for most
plants to colocate four to seven reactors. Reducing the
number of reactors at plants would substantially slow
the growth and increase the cost of the nuclear power
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program. The larger number of smaller plants would
also reduce economies of scale in operation and
maintenance.
what had been considered a low-probability event. If
the Soviets decide to improve safety, the eight uncon-
tained VVER reactors may be reviewed first because
of the potential risks if the integrity of components is
In addition, the widespread radioactive contamination
around Chernobyl' and the increased risks of cancer
to people exposed to this radioactivity are likely to
motivate Soviet specialists to reconsider the decision
to locate nuclear heating plants in heavily populated
areas. At present, in order to operate economically,
plants supplying both electricity and heated water for
central heating are located 25 kilometers or less from
the heat-distribution network of a city. Plants that
produce only heated water for heating are sited even
closer-within 15 kilometers of the centers of major
cities.'
Before the Chernobyl' accident, Soviet nuclear spe-
cialists had convinced critics in the USSR that the
nuclear heating plants were equipped with safety
backups adequate to ensure that their proximity to
cities posed acceptable risks. Construction is under
way on nuclear heating plants at Gor'kiy, Voronezh,
Odessa, Minsk, and Khar'kov that are scheduled to
come on line before 1990. Canceling or modifying
these plants probably would be prohibitively expen-
sive, according to Soviet calculations. The post-
Chernobyl' safety reviews are likely, however, to
reopen the discussion of site locations for the roughly
20 nuclear heating plants that exist only on paper in
long-term plans.
Until the mid-1970s Soviet experts believed that the
probability of a major accident in a nuclear power
plant was so small that massive and expensive con-
tainment structures were unnecessary. All later model
reactors (both RBMK and VVER), however, have
some form of containment. The earlier uncontained
reactor models may now come under closer scrutiny
since Chernobyl' has shown the potential impact of
" Existing Soviet standards for nuclear plant locations-minimum
distances of 3 kilometers (km) from any populated area, 25 km from
cities with populations of at least 300,000, or 40 km from cities with
populations of 1 million or more-were amended for nuclear
heating plants (ASTs) following a review in the late 1970s.1
breached.
Impact on Soviet Nuclear Energy Policy
At the time of the Chernobyl' accident, a distinctive
Gorbachev imprint on the USSR's nuclear goals was
not yet apparent. Gorbachev's new assignments at
energy ministries were too recent to have had a visible
effect on the nuclear program-the new Minister of
Power and Electrification was appointed in March
1985. The new leadership in the various major energy
ministries (oil, natural gas, coal, and power) apparent-
ly did not alter the long-term energy goals when the
opportunity presented itself in late 1985. At that time,
the plan for 1986-90 (pushing natural gas production
and calling for sustained growth in oil output) and the
existing Long-Term Energy Program (setting goals
for expanded roles for coal and nuclear energy in the
1990s and beyond) were publicly endorsed without
changes
Early in 1986, however, there were signs that the
Gorbachev energy team was considering some shift
away from coal, with a corresponding greater empha-
sis on nuclear power in the longer term. A key
element in the program for a coal resurgence-direct-
current ultra-high-voltage (UHV) electricity transmis-
sion-was challenged on the grounds of high develop-
ment costs and lack of progress in achieving new
technical capabilities. The critics of coal argued that
nuclear power plants are better suited to supplying
electricity to the Urals than would be UHV transmis-
sion lines linked to distant coal-fired power stations."
25X1
25X1
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Since the accident, a number of Soviet viewpoints
relating to the effects of Chernobyl' on the USSR's
nuclear program have been set forth in the Soviet
media and expressed by Soviet officials in conversa-
tions with Western counterparts. There appears to be
broad agreement on several judgments:
? The USSR's need for nuclear energy as the main
alternative to fossil fuels was not changed by the
Chernobyl' disaster.
? Operator error in performing tests at unit 4 was the
chief, although not the sole, cause of the disaster.
? Soviet targets for completing nuclear power plants
and for generating electricity in 1990 should not be
changed.
Some disagreement among Soviet authorities is evi-
dent, however, on:
? The extent to which the basic design flaws in the
RBMK reactor that contributed to the destruction
of Chernobyl' unit 4 and damage to the adjoining
unit 3 can be fixed.16
? The amount of work needed to restore reliable
operation of Chernobyl' units 1 and 2 and provide
housing- and services to workers.
? The feasibility of returning Chernobyl' unit 3 to
operation and whether construction could be re-
sumed on Chernobyl' units 5 and 6 (a decision not to
recover units 5 and 6 was apparently made in
March/April 1987).
? The functions and authority of the several organiza-
tions that deal with nuclear energy.
" For example, the first official statements on the cause of the
accident singled out operator error and poor management in the
Power Ministry and State Committee for Safety in the Nuclear
Industry. By 19 July the Politburo had extended its public criticism
to include the firing of a key designer of the RBMK reactor, an
official in the semisecret Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
By implicating design shortcomings as at least a contributing cause
of the accident, the Politburo had called into question not only the
design integrity of existing and planned RBMKs but also possibly
the design philosophy underlying the entire nuclear program. It was
not until the August IAEA special meeting that the Soviets directly
acknowledged that design faults were partly responsible for the
Given the complexity of these issues, the contradic-
tory viewpoints on some matters, and the number of
bureaucracies involved in making the necessary deci-
sions, Soviet policies on the nuclear program could
remain unsettled for another year or more. The
immediate attention of decisionmakers was directed
at Chernobyl' cleanup activities, the effort to entomb
unit 4, and the recovery of units 1, 2, and 3. Mean-
while, the nuclear industry has been rocked by reorga-
nization and uncertainty about the authority of key
players such as the Power Ministry, the State Com-
mittee for Nuclear Safety, and the new Ministry of
Atomic Energy (see inset).F____-] 25X1
25X1
An Underlying Commitment to Nuclear Power
Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen continue to affirm a
strong commitment to the growth of nuclear energy.
This commitment is bolstered by the large infrastruc-
ture dedicated to the nuclear industry-a factor that
will carry considerable weight with policymakers as
they review long-term plans for nuclear energy. Long-
range goals for Soviet nuclear power to the year 2000
were defined in terms of their projected impact on
economywide fuel use.l J 25X1
Specifically, Moscow had set goals for the develop-
ment of nuclear energy during the 1986-2000 period
that were designed to mesh with other energy pro-
grams so that:
? Consumption of oil and gas could be reduced.
? Retirements of obsolete power plants could be
speeded.
? The quality of electricity supply could be improved.
? Fossil fuels could be conserved in increasing quanti-
ties by using nuclear energy in more applications. 25X1
? Growth in the demand for electricity in the Europe-
an USSR could be met; nuclear power stations are
concentrated in the area west of the Ural Moun-
tains.)
Our conversion of these targets to actual reactor
construction goals implies that over 120,000 MW of
power plants and about 20 nuclear heating plants
would have to be added during the 1986-2000 period.
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.,c1.. ca
Reorganization of the Soviet Nuclear Program
After studying the results of the Chernobyl' investiga-
tion in July, the CPSU Politburo began a reorganiza-
tion of the Soviet nuclear industry. It fired the head
of the All-Union State Committee for Nuclear Safety
and the main designer for RBMKs, as well as key
personnel in the Ministry of Power and Electrifica-
tion and in the Ministry of Medium Machine Build-
ing (probably for its role as overseer of RBMK
design).a In addition, the Politburo set up a new
Ministry of Atomic Energy and increased the party's
influence on the operation of nuclear plants by assign-
ing people from the central CPSU apparatus instead
of local party representatives to each nuclear power
station
Major questions remain on which organizations and
people will wield authority for such functions as
operation of nuclear power plants, preparation and
disposal of nuclear fuel, enforcement of safety rules,
construction of nuclear plants, and fabrication of
in the earliest stages of development, however, and
some 30,000 to 40,000 MW of the nuclear capacity
needed to achieve the objectives for the year 2000 has
not yet been approved at even the drawing-board
stage.
Disagreement, moreover, is evident in the Soviet
media on several aspects of nuclear energy develop-
ment over the longer term. Among the points at issue
are:
? The adequacy of Soviet nuclear safety standards
and standards of enforcement.
? Whether reactor types other than the RBMK
(VVER or AST) should receive thorough safety
reviews.
? The need for a reevaluation of quality control in
component manufacture for nuclear plants.
? The criteria for site locations of future nuclear
plants.
? The feasibility of pushing ahead with more and
larger breeder reactors.
? The need for development of an inherently safe
reactor.
25X1
25X1
components
many areas of au-
Before Chernobyl' the Soviet safety philosophy was
based on a perception of the probability of certain
types of accidents rather than on an evaluation of the
consequences of both probable and unlikely occur-
rences. The Soviets believed that their nuclear plant
designs, operating parameters, and rules for plant
operations assured that any failures would be small
thority have yet to be clearly defined. The Ministry of
Atomic Energy, for example, will assume responsibil-
ity for operating all nuclear power plants, taking over
from the Ministry of Power and Electrification and
the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic
Energy (stafJ`ed with nuclear experts from the Minis-
try of Medium Machine Building). Whether even
more authority will be transferred from other key
ministries to the new Atomic Energy Ministry is not
events that could be contained safely.
now evident
a The responsibilities of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building
include functions in both military and civilian nuclear programs.
The civilian nuclear industry depends on this ministry for nuclear
fuel, for design and construction work on the RBMK reactor, and
for expertise in nuclear materials transportation, storage, and
reprocessing.F__~
If the Soviet nuclear industry is instructed to
give greater weight to ensuring safety for even low-
probability events with major consequences, this new
philosophy will impact on plant site selection, designs,
component manufacture, and plant operation.
The Soviets appear to have begun work-ranging
from preliminary paperwork on the plant designs to
actual plant construction-on about three-quarters of
the projects needed to meet the long-term goals (see
table 4). More than half of these nuclear projects are
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Table 4
The Soviet Nuclear Program to the Year 2000:
Outlook Before Chernobyl'
Total planned
170,000 to 180,000 a
60 to 70
230 to 250
Operating (generating power as of 24 April 1986)
28,312
15
41
Of which RBMK
15,500
5
1'5
Capacity at some phase of construction or planning
111,300 a
39
162
Of which RBMK
19,500
6/1 b
15
35,000 a
16/8 b
36
7,000
3/0
6
19,300 a
11/3
18
4,500
3/0 b
3
Planning and design
31,000 a
12/5 b
29
Of which RMBK
8,000
3/0 b
6
Site proposals
26,000 a
18
38
Of which RBMK
None
None
None
Capacity awaiting go-ahead on site selection and design 30,000 to 40,000
Of which RBMK Unknown
a Includes capacity partially or wholly dedicated to supplying heat
for space heating and industrial-process applications.
b Number at left of diagonal (/) shows total of plants with activity
in the category, number on right shows plants exclusively in the
category.
6 to 15 30 to 45
Unknown Unknown
We believe the Soviets will try to accommodate both
old and new safety philosophies to minimize costs and
delays. Existing plants and plants at advanced stages
of construction would continue to be judged according
to the current safety standards. The new safety
philosophy would be phased in at plants on the
drawing board and possibly at selected plants now in
the earliest stages of construction. This approach to a
more comprehensive safety philosophy would leave
plans for new nuclear power plant capacity untouched
in the 1986-90 period but could lead to delays in the
1990s. Support for this theory of Soviet reactions was
evident in discussions during British Energy Secretary
Peter Walker's visit to the USSR in December 1986.
Mr. Walker's host, Nikolay Lukonin, head of the new
Ministry of Atomic Energy, informed him that con-
struction of RBMKs would cease after the last two
Chernobyl' reactors were completed (units 5 and 6,
scheduled for the early 1990s). We believe the Soviet
reference to a construction halt on RBMKs would still
allow for completion of many of the remaining 15
reactors now at some phase of assembly.' 25X1
The plans for power plants based on VVER reactors
will probably survive the post-Chernobyl' scrutiny,
although some additional safety requirements could
be mandated. However, the slowing of the Soviet
" If new safety measures that go beyond what has already been
proposed make new RBMK reactors prohibitively expensive, the
Soviets could drop as many as six RBMK reactors that are now in
very early stages of planning. Such an action could be taken
without a major impact on electricity supply if Moscow is willing to
rapidly replace these reactors with conventional thermal power
plants fueled by natural gasF__~
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The Manufacturing Infrastructure for the
Nuclear Power Industry
The manufacturing infrastructure for the Soviet nu-
clear power industry is divided into two more or less
distinct subsets. One group, composed of over 500
major enterprises, makes components for RBMK
reactors. The logistic nightmare of the RBMK sup-
port industry is a main reason this reactor has been
scheduled for gradual phaseout. The other-and
much smaller-group of support enterprises manu-
factures components for VVER reactors and is sched-
uled to produce for the breeder reactor program. In
the latter group of enterprises are the Izhorsk Heavy
Equipment plant near Leningrad and the Atommash
plant outside Volgodonsk, two of the largest nuclear-
component-fabrication facilities in the world. But the
Atommash plant has shown a disappointing perform-
ance since production of VVER pressure vessels
began in 1978. Far from being a showcase nuclear
assembly plant, Atommash has been plagued with
problems poor management, production of substan-
dard components, and plant damage from ground
subsidence
nuclear program as well as safety reviews will proba-
bly mean that the economic rationale for a large-scale
breeder-reactor program currently targeted to start in
the late 1990s will be eroded.
The Influence of Nuclear-Industry Infrastructure
The large investment the Soviets have made in manu-
facturing plants that supply the nuclear industry will
bolster their commitment to a growing and little-
changed program (see inset). Plants manufacturing
components for Soviet-designed reactors are located
not only in the USSR but also throughout Eastern
Europe. The Soviets have invested tens of billions of
rubles and millions of dollars of hard currency im-
ports in building and equipping their facilities. They
have accomplished many of their goals for centraliz-
ing component production and for integrating the
capabilities of the CEMA. The East European coun-
tries, for example, can produce nearly all the compo-
nents for power plants using VVER-440 reactors-
with the notable exception of nuclear-fuel assemblies.
Moreover, VVER and RBMK nuclear power plants
built in the USSR contain many key components
manufactured in Eastern Europe
Because it appears likely to Western observers that
the failure of or an inadequate operational range of
certain components could have contributed to the
Chernobyl' accident, the absence of repercussions in
the Ministry of Power Machine Building or the
Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry is
surprising. The IAEA special meeting on Chernobyl'
provided insight on this matter
in a perverse way, the Chernobyl' accident is goo
news for the equipment manufacturing ministries
because they were implicitly certified as competent.
Indeed, it is possible that more resources will be
assigned to them so that equipment for modifications
can be produced quickly.
Antinuclear Voices in the USSR
Antinuclear movements as they exist in the West are
not possible in the USSR. Moscow's control organs
probably would effectively prohibit the organization
of an antinuclear group of substantial size and almost
certainly would prevent public demonstrations or cir-
culation of publications containing views opposed to
official policies on nuclear energy. The Soviets have
also minimized the opportunities for an antinuclear
lobby by mounting an effective pronuclear campaign
that advertises the advantages of nuclear power: fuel
savings, less environmental impact than coal, and
lower overall costs.
Nevertheless, antinuclear sentiments exist in the
USSR, and they receive some degree of official
acknowledgment. Three groups that have questioned
18 In the nuclear industry, as in other Soviet industries, responsibil-
ities for designs of equipment and plants are handled by institutes
and bureaus that operate nearly independently of the manufactur-
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the nuclear program are likely to respond to the
Chernobyl' accident with increased activity: (1) spe-
cialists on ecology, (2) those regional Communist
Party authorities who have shown reluctance to back
nuclear projects, and (3) scattered individuals who
reveal a grassroots expression of doubt and concern
about the locations and operations of nuclear plants.
Although Soviet ecologists have generally supported
the nuclear program as providing an energy source
much less disruptive to the environment than fossil
fuels, particularly coal, a few scientists have criticized
the impact of nuclear energy. The most prominent of
these critics has been Nikolai Dollezhal, original
designer of the Chernobyl'-type reactors. In an article
published in a leading Soviet journal in 1979, Dollez-
hal argued that a large nuclear program in the
European USSR could eventually require withdrawal
of lands from agricultural production, make excessive
demands on water resources, and release ecologically
threatening quantities of heat into the atmosphere.
Dollezhal's solution (to consolidate nuclear power
plants in large, remote complexes) could now gain
more backing from ecologists, whose opinions recently
have had increasing, though still minor, influence on
policy formulation."
Since the Soviets are unlikely to allow direct question-
ing of the safety of nuclear plants, the ecology issue
could provide an acceptable surrogate for use by
groups whose real concerns are safety and public
health. A harder look at the ecological impact of
nuclear power could jeopardize the extensive use of
this energy source for central heating, because the
reactors used for this purpose must be located close to
populated areas. Moreover, ensuring that nuclear
facilities are more ecologically benign probably would
drive up the capital costs of most nuclear plants.
Many regional party and government organizations
saw real advantages to nuclear power and supported
nuclear power plant projects. A few regions (the
" The view that ecologists, or arguments couched in ecological
language, have had influence on Soviet policymaking is supported
by their role in recent events: the decision not to divert Siberian
rivers, the followup to the Dnester River chemical spill, and the
Ukraine, for example) gambled heavily on the suc-
cessful operation of nuclear power plants; nearly all
new power plant construction there since the late
1970s has been nuclear. The leadership of the Geor-
gian republic, however, opposed building nuclear
plants until early 1986, when the construction of a
power station was announced. The basis for opposition
to nuclear plants in Georgia was not fully discussed in
the Soviet press, but concern about radiological conse-
quences on Georgian agriculture was evident. The
Chernobyl' catastrophe is likely to revive the Geor-
gian antinuclear lobby, which may now be more
successful in arguing that untapped hydro resources
and local coal deposits can meet future Georgian
electricity needs.
The assorted production and research bureaucracies
of the energy ministries that compete for resources
with nuclear power (oil, gas, and coal) will use the
Chernobyl' accident and its associated capital costs as
an opportunity to promote their claims for investment
resources at the expense of the nuclear industry (see
inset). In the short term, the oil and natural gas
industries may be the quickest to take advantage of 25X1
the Soviet nuclear industry's setback. Oil and gas
provided 70 percent of the USSR's energy production
in 1986 and will remain the most important Soviet
energy sources well into the 1990s. Spokesmen for oil
and gas industry interests will be able to make the
case that over the next several years these fuels will be
even more necessary for the Soviet economy because
the nuclear industry will fall short of plans while it is
reorganizing and regrouping in reaction to Cherno-
byl'. The oil and gas interests will probably link this
argument to a bid for increases in their already
escalating requirements for investment and skilled
labor, promising that they can meet the energy needs
of the economy.
Coal is nuclear power's main long-term competitor.
Coal-based energy strategies have backers in the
State Planning Committee (Gosplan), in the Power
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At a minimum, the nuclear industry will need to
write off the 400-million-ruble reactor destroyed at
Chernobyl'. If the Soviets must abandon Chernobyl'
unit 3 and the work done on units 5 and 6 because
they are too contaminated to recover, another 800
million rubles of investment would be lost. Addition-
al outlays of hundreds of millions of rubles would be
necessary if new rapid shutdown equipment for reac-
tors is installed at all RBMKs. The VVER reactors,
particularly the eight early, uncontained ones, may
also need safety upgrades that, if extensive, could
cost several hundred million rubles.
During 1981-85, yearly spending on equipment and
construction for nuclear plants averaged nearly 2
billion rubles, almost 35 percent of all power industry
investment. Additional sums, perhaps several hun-
dred million rubles, are annually invested in infra-
structure for the nuclear industry. A rough total of
the capital costs of the accident (ranging from actual
to possible) to be borne by the nuclear industry shows
these to be the equivalent of two or three years'
current investment.
Ministry, in the Coal Ministry, and in many research
institutes. Expanded coal use is supported in the
Soviet Long-Term Energy Program; planners are
counting on coal, in conjunction with nuclear power,
to supply nearly all new energy output once natural
gas production levels off in the mid-1990s. However,
the Soviets have not been devoting the resources
needed to get the coal industry moving toward its
ambitious goals. The industry's leadership is now in a
strong position to bid for a larger resource share,
using the argument that coal-fired plants will be able
to deliver electricity more cheaply and safely than
nuclear plants.
Soviet Purchases From the West
The Soviets are likely to continue to need Western
equipment for monitoring radiation and health,
amounting to several million dollars per year for at
least a decade. Moscow probably hopes to meet these
specialized needs through IAEA-sponsored donations,
but will import what is necessary. Other products and
services that the Soviets may want to purchase from
the West are: reactor simulators and teaching aids for
training reactor operators and equipment for nonde-
structive testing of nuclear power plant components.
A more important role for Western imports is possible
in the next few years if the Soviets want to accelerate
their VVER program or decide to implement rapidly
safety features used in reactors operated in the West.
For example, the Soviets would probably need service
contracts with Western machine-tool specialists to
boost construction of VVER reactors because effec-
tive utilization of machine tools that have been pur-
chased in the West is essential to the production of the
major components used in these reactors. Many com-
ponents of a generic nature (such as pipes, valves, and
pumps) could also be purchased from the West, since
these would require little modification to operate in
Soviet plants
Any market in the USSR for Western nuclear ven-
dors is likely to be highly competitive. Firms from the
United States, France, Finland, West Germany, Swe-
den, Great Britain, and Japan can offer many compa-
rable components and services. The US vendors will
probably have little advantage over the competition in
sales of components and only a modest edge in
services experience, and US firms are likely to trail
the others in terms of financing packages and ease of
technology licensing.
Soviet Nuclear Sales Abroad
Before the Chernobyl' accident, the USSR was step-
ping up its campaign to sell nuclear power plants in
the West. The accident has dampened the prospects of
all suppliers of nuclear power plants but may have a
more lasting impact on Western suppliers than on the
Soviets (see inset). The Soviets have tried to sell
nuclear power plants with VVER reactors to new
customers in 12 countries in the past two years. The
Soviets agreed, several months before Chernobyl', to
supply a nuclear power station to North Korea, hosted
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Impact of Chernobyl' on Nuclear-Support
Industries Are the Soviets in Better Shape
for a Comeback Than the West?
With the likely exceptions of France and Japan, most
developed Western countries (including the United
States) could suffer greater setbacks to their nuclear-
support industries during the next decade than will
the USSR as a result of reactions to Chernobyl'.
While the nuclear industry in the developed West and
several other countries-South Korea, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and India-was in recession before Cher-
nobyl', before the fall in oil prices, and even before
the Three Mile Island accident, there were several
immediate backward steps in the months after the
Chernobyl' accident. Austria and the Philippines
finally chose to give up their previously troubled
nuclear programs. A number of planned orders for
new stations-in Finland, the Netherlands, and
Italy-were put on hold, permanently in some cases.
Further postponing of orders for nuclear power plants
is most likely to occur in the West as doubts about
nuclear power increase. As a result, shakeouts and
retrenchment in the developed West's nuclear-support
industries are now more the rule than the exception;
possibilities for new business are dwindling at home,
and reactor-export possibilities are shrinking. In an-
other five years or so, industrial capacity in the West
devoted to supplying nuclear power plants could be
greatly reduced.
In contrast, new orders for nuclear plants in the
USSR continue. Because the state-operated nuclear
power equipment industry of the USSR can weather
this period of slack international demand for nuclear
plants, the Soviet Union could find itself in a better
position than most suppliers in the West to take
advantage of a rebound in nuclear plant orders in the
1990s. Such a rebound currently seems remote. Nev-
ertheless, selling nuclear power plants and equipment
could again become lucrative if confidence in nuclear
power is restored and conventional energy costs rise
sharply.
a Chinese visit to Soviet nuclear plants, sought Ku-
waiti assistance as a broker for possible sales in the
Middle East, and offered to sell nuclear plants to
India, Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia. Before Cher-
nobyl' they also discussed constructing reactors in
Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and planned to bid on plants
for Finland and Yugoslavia. In the wake of the
Chernobyl' disaster, the Soviets probably have lost
some nuclear plant sales; Finland (with two operating
Soviet reactors) and Yugoslavia immediately put their
nuclear orders on hold, while other potential Soviet
customers indicated that nuclear plans were being
reviewed.) 25X1
Before the Chernobyl' accident, Soviet nuclear plant
marketers hoped to get several commitments for
purchases of VVER reactors. Potential buyers in
Finland and Yugoslavia seemed close to placing or-
ders cumulatively worth roughly several billion dollars
over the next five to seven years. Given the trade
arrangements between each of these countries and the
USSR, however, these transactions probably would
have been largely barter agreements, with very little
hard currency transferred to the Soviets. Although
the Soviets were actively discussing contracts for
commercial nuclear plants with a number of other
non-Bloc potential buyers, this segment of business
was at a preliminary stage.
The Soviets are jointly engaged with the East Europe-
an countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germa- 25X1
ny, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) in marketing
Soviet-designed nuclear plants to power industries
inside and outside the CEMA area. These plants use
the VVER pressurized-water reactor in either of two
capacities: 440 MW or 1,000 MW. Reactors of the
Chernobyl' type have never been offered for export.
With the exception of nuclear fuel, all of the compo-
nents for the VVER-equipped plants can be manufac-
tured in Eastern Europe, largely in Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Hungary. The 1,000-MW VVER
reactors currently being marketed have full contain-
ment and other safety features functionally compara-
ble to those used in the West. The Soviets are also 25X1
jointly marketing a VVER-440 nuclear power reactor
with a Finnish company that operates a plant of this
model in Loviisa, Finland.F___1 25X1
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In public testimonials, a number of East European
officials have reaffirmed their confidence in the safety
and reliability of Soviet-designed reactors. Privately,
however, East European energy experts concede that
the Chernobyl' accident has increased concern about
the safety systems engineered into Soviet designs
(especially the older VVER-440s without even Soviet-
type containment), but they expect that Soviet-
designed reactors will continue to be operated, built,
and ordered.
The East Europeans have a large stake in the success
of Soviet-designed VVER models-19 reactors with a
combined capacity of about 8,000 MW are now
operating in these countries, and 50 others (some
36,000 MW) are under construction or on order.
Although we believe that the East Europeans will
follow through on plans for nuclear energy, their
nuclear programs could experience delays (while pub-
lic confidence is restored with safety reviews) and
increased costs.
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Secret
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