USSR REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000200040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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USSR Review
i 1"s
SOY UR 83-003X
July 1983
cony 5 8 3
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Intelligence
USSR Review
articles are welcome.
The USSR Review is published by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the
Secret
SOV UR 85-003X
July 1985
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Contents
Gorbachev Takes Over Perspective
The youngest party chief since Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev has
moved quickly to strengthen his political position and articulate his
policy agenda. His imprint has been most evident in a series of
recent economic initiatives designed to enforce discipline, restruc-
ture investment, and-most important-challenge the vast Soviet
bureaucracy to improve its economic management. Gorbachev has
quickly asserted his primacy in foreign affairs, although his impact
has so far been mostly stylistic. It is too soon to know if Gorbachev's
agenda will include more radical policy departures, but his rapid
consolidation of power suggests that he may succeed in advancing
his program at an earlier stage than did any of his recent
predecessors.
The unprecedented speed of Gorbachev's election following Kon-
stantin Chernenko's death appeared to confirm earlier indications
that the succession had already been settled in the Politburo.
Gorbachev's rapid rise from regional party chief in 1978 to the top
in 1985 was based on his ability to attract support from officials
across the Soviet political spectrum. He apparently succeeded in
holding the support of younger officials who favor forceful leader-
ship to address the USSR's social and economic problems, even as
he reassured senior Politburo members that his succession would not
mean a direct challenge to their political position or policy interests.
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Consolidating Power
Gorbachev's political clout was exhibited dramatically at the April
and July 1985 plenums, where he engineered an impressive number
of promotions to the leadership. He is also off to a fast pace in
replacing Brezhnev-era holdovers at the lower levels with more
sympathetic officials. The 27th Party Congress scheduled for early
next year affords Gorbachev the opportunity to place his stamp on
the party's new program and the next five-year economic plan and
to effect what could be the largest turnover in Central Committee
membership since 1961.
Gorbachev has outlined an economic agenda that features ambitious
targets for growth. The measures he has proposed to achieve his
goals are similar to proposals made before but only halfheartedly
implemented. Gorbachev evidently believes that, like Andropov, he
can give the economy a boost by vigorously following through on
them. Although he has yet to squarely address some of the
economy's major problems, he has hinted that he intends to do so
and that bolder, more innovative economic proposals may be in store
once he has consolidated his political strength.
International Affairs: A More Dynamic Diplomacy?
Despite shifts in tone and style during Gorbachev's first months in
office, continuity has been the main theme in Soviet foreign policy.
The collective nature of Politburo decisionmaking and its focus on
domestic issues will limit changes in foreign policy-particularly in
East-West relations-in the near term. There are a number of
regional issues, however, where initiatives from a more dynamic
leadership could enhance Soviet leverage and create potential
problems for the United States.
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Other Topics The USSR in Africa: An Update
Soviet policy in Africa has changed little since early
1984. Military assistance remains the major instrument of Mos-
cow's Africa policy, and Soviet success in obtaining military access
and building political influence has been mixed.
The economic advisers on whom Mikhail Gorbachev reportedly
intends to rely hold mainstream policy views but share a history of
involvement in controversy for criticizing aspects of the Soviet
system. They probably will reinforce his inclination to press forward
with measures to modernize management and planning and to
increase Soviet economic competitiveness with capitalist countries.
Afghanistan: New Emphasis on Old Military Problems
The war in Afghanistan has not so much posed new problems for the
Soviet military as it has highlighted longstanding problems and
weaknesses in the armed forces. Recent journal articles by senior
officers closely associated with the war illuminate Soviet views on a
number of issues having relevance to Soviet forces as a whole and
may signal moves toward corrective action.
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Gorbachev Takes Over
Perspective
Mikhail Gorbachev has moved aggressively to take charge in his first few
months as General Secretary. He has cultivated an activist image, moving
quickly to strengthen his position in the Politburo and place his mark on
Soviet policy. His informal and straightforward style has won him plaudits
from foreign visitors and raised expectations among his domestic audiences
for a meaningful improvement in the quality of Soviet life. His bold efforts
to breathe new life into domestic policy and politics represent a clear
challenge to the old guard and entrenched Soviet bureaucrats, but he
currently has momentum in his favor. From all indications, opposition to
Gorbachev will be difficult, and, as he acquires added strength, he will
probably put increasing content into his far-reaching pronouncements.
We know little about the personal qualities and circumstances that enabled
Gorbachev to become, at age 54, the youngest party chief since Stalin.
Luck was undoubtedly a factor-he has had the good fortune to be in the
right place at the right time throughout his career and benefited from a
high attrition rate in the aging senior leadership. But political shrewdness
played a key role. His reported mastery of the consensus style of politics in
the Politburo evidently enabled him to draw support from a wide spectrum
of party leaders. However, now that he is in charge, a more aggressive and
risk-taking decisionmaker has emerged.
Gorbachev's election to the top party post seemed almost certain when
Konstantin Chernenko died in March (see "Climb to the Top"). Gorbachev
had emerged from the Andropov succession as the unofficial "second
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secretary"-a position that enabled him to chair Politburo and Secretariat
meetings in Chernenko's absence and gave him a clear advantage in the
presuccession maneuvering.
The timing of his accession, only a month before a scheduled plenum of the
Central Committee, gave Gorbachev an opportunity to move quickly to
strengthen his support in the Politburo (see "Consolidating Power"). He
took full advantage of it, promoting three of his supporters to full Politburo
membership and bringing another probable associate into the Secretari-
at-an impressive demonstration of political strength that no other party
leader had equaled at such an early stage in his tenure. His momentum
continued in July, when he succeeded in promoting three like-minded
younger leaders, removed his erstwhile rival, Grigoriy Romanov, and
increased his control over foreign policy through Foreign Minister Gro-
myko's reassignment to the presidency.
The election of a new Central Committee at the 27th Party Congress was
pushed back to February 1986, giving Gorbachev additional time to
prepare for a further broadening of his political base. His first steps as
General Secretary indicate he will exploit it. Turnover in party and
government positions that carry Central Committee membership already is
proceeding at a faster pace than under his three predecessors, and the
congress is likely to ratify the greatest turnover in Central Committee
membership since 1961.
An institutionalization of the General Secretary's preeminence during the
past decade may also give Gorbachev advantages in consolidating his
power that earlier General Secretaries did not have and that Andropov and
Chernenko served too briefly to exploit. He has already been referred to as
the "head" of the Politburo, and probably will soon be acknowledged
publicly as chairman of the Defense Council (the national security forum
comprising top political, military, and defense industry officials).
Gorbachev has moved forcefully to place his personal stamp on economic
policy, telling managers that they must change the way they do business or
"get out of the way" (see "Economic Agenda"). At a Central Committee
conference in June, he was sharply critical of the draft guidelines for the
1986-90 economic plan, faulting it for relying too much on additional
resources rather than improved productivity to achieve growth targets. He
placed partial blame for this failing on a number of industrial ministers,
whom he criticized by name. His frankness illustrated the strong emphasis
he is placing on the need for competent personnel and for tougher
standards of performance evaluation. He apparently believes both are
essential to improved economic performance and presumably hopes to
broaden his base of support by promoting officials beholden to him.
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Gorbachev's imprint has also been apparent in several economic decisions
announced since his accession. The proposed doubling of investment in
machine building in the next five-year plan reflects his long-held view that
increased investment in that sector is essential for improved productivity.
His earlier support for expanding production on private garden plots also
was reflected in a May Politburo decision, which he later criticized as
being inadequate, to give the plots increased material and technical
support.
Although Gorbachev has demonstrated his commitment to streamlining
the economic bureaucracy and instituting other measures to improve
economic performance, few specific programs have yet been announced. In
all likelihood, Gorbachev is temporizing until these programs can be fully
developed and he has further consolidated his power. Gorbachev's speeches
and the statements of knowledgeable Soviet officials, however, suggest that
his moves, when they come, will be bold. His recent crackdown on the
Soviet worker's consumption of alcohol showcases his commitment to
tackle longstanding problems. His public description of the Politburo's
recent decision to increase the number of private garden plots as inade-
quate and "fundamentally weak," moreover, manifests willingness to push
for his programs against high-level resistance.
Gorbachev has cultivated the image of a vigorous and accessible leader by
holding several unrehearsed meetings with the public. He is actively
working to exploit popular support for his programs to undercut the
bureaucratic resistance that has stymied past efforts to reduce corruption,
raise productivity, and encourage innovation. He risks a political backlash,
however, if he fails to follow through on his policy initiatives and falls short
of the popular expectations of change that he has raised.
Gorbachev's initial impact on Soviet foreign policy has been more stylistic
(see "International Affairs: A More Dynamic Diplomacy?"). But his
accession also has enabled the Soviet Union to project a more vigorous, dy-
namic image in the international arena than was possible under his ailing
predecessors. He has a disarmingly straightforward approach that has
impressed many foreign leaders and has enabled him to gain a more serious
hearing for Soviet positions in the West.
Continuity has been the hallmark of Gorbachev's foreign policy to date.
Managing relations with the United States remains at the top of the
leadership's agenda. Gorbachev appears to be encouraging a gradual
restoration of bilateral contacts while-through a combination of tough
rhetoric and policy actions-attempting to step up pressure on the United
States to moderate its policies toward the USSR. His tough criticism of US
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policy seems calculated to signal that the Soviet Union does not intend to
be forced into concessions for the sake of reduced tensions with the United
States.
We have not yet seen the more imaginative efforts to strengthen West
European and other foreign opposition to US policies that many had
expected. Heavyhanded criticism of the Kohl government continues to
inhibit better relations with Bonn. Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader in 20
years to meet with a Chinese official but has still shown no sign of
reexamining the Soviet policies that have blocked a more significant
improvement of relations. The Soviets also have continued to temporize on
setting a date for the Foreign Minister's trip to Japan and have shown no
new flexibility on the northern territories dispute. It is too early to
conclude, however, that Gorbachev's unconventional high-risk approach
will be limited to domestic issues. The reassignment of Foreign Minister
Gromyko will allow Gorbachev to place his personal stamp more firmly on
foreign policy as well.
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Climb to the Top
When Konstantin Chernenko died on 10 March 1985,
the issue of who would succeed him as General
Secretary evidently had been settled. Gorbachev's
position as Chernenko's heir had been signaled for
weeks in the private remarks of Soviet officials and
the public indicators of leadership ranking. The Cen-
tral Committee plenum that elected Gorbachev Gen-
eral Secretary was concluded with unprecedented
speed, suggesting that there was little if any real
opposition to his selection.
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's seventh party leader,'
is the first from the generation of officials who began
their careers after Stalin died. His election at age 54
capped a rapid rise for the former regional party
chief, in a period when seniority was usually rewarded
ahead of youthful vigor. His success has been based
on his ability to win the approval and support of
officials across a wide political spectrum, from the old
guard of the Brezhnev era to those who hoped that
Andropov's tenure would bring new discipline and
dynamism to the leadership.
Rise to National Prominence
A combination of technical skill in agricultural ad-
ministration, political acumen, and patronage fueled
Gorbachev's swift rise in Stavropol' Kray. He was in a
good position to join the leadership in Moscow when
the party secretary for agriculture, Fedor Kulakov-
who had been Gorbachev's patron and predecessor as
Stavropol' party chief-died suddenly in 1978. With-
in two years Gorbachev had reached Kulakov's status
Age 39 ... named Stavropol' Kray
party chief... reportedly attracts fa-
vorable attention of senior leaders in
Moscow.
Age 47 ... becomes Central Committee
secretary for agriculture.
Age 48 ... elected candidate Politburo
member.
Age 49 ... becomes full Politburo
member ... only other senior secretar-
ies are Brezhnev, 74; Suslov, 78; Kiri-
lenko, 74; and Chernenko, 69.
Age 51 ... Chernenko and Gorbachev
emerge as senior secretaries under An-
dropov following deaths of Suslov and
Brezhnev and retirement of Kirilenko.
Age 52 ... Gorbachev's role in Secre-
tariat is expanded under Andropov to
include overseeing personnel
appointments.
Age 53 ... Gorbachev emerges as
second in command and heir apparent
after Andropov dies and Chernenko
takes over ... Gorbachev handles
General Secretary duties as Chernen-
ko's health fails.
' Following Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and
Chernenko. This count does not include Georgiy Malenkov, who
ranked first in public listings of the Secretariat during the first
eight days after Stalin died, but then dropped out of that body.
Nikita Khrushchev was the first leader after Stalin to be given the 1985
title of First Secretary. (The title General Secretary, used by Stalin,
Age 54 ... Gorbachev takes over after
Chernenko dies.
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as a senior secretary, having become a full member of
the Politburo.'
same time, Gorbachev's emergence in the unques-
tioned number-two spot indicated that the near-term
interests of the old guard may have been assured at
the expense of strengthening support for Andropov's
Gorbachev benefited from fortuitous circumstances.
During 1982, for instance, Suslov and Brezhnev both
died and Kirilenko retired. Gorbachev and Chernenko
were then the only remaining senior secretaries under
General Secretary Andropov. Chernenko represented
the political coalitions committed to the policies of the
past, and Gorbachev was the ally Andropov needed in
the Secretariat to carry out a program requiring
change in personnel and policies.
Andropov was reportedly impressed with Gorbachev's
intelligence and administrative skills and took advan-
tage of Chernenko's serious illness in the spring of
1983 to increase Gorbachev's role in the Secretariat.
By the time Chernenko returned to his duties in June,
Gorbachev's official activities indicated that he had
been entrusted with overseeing party personnel mat-
ters and supervising administrative organs in addition
to handling agricultural affairs
0 Andropov relied heavily on Gorbachev to run
the Secretariat.
Gorbachev's position-and his prospects for succeed-
ing the ailing Andropov-suffered a setback as An-
dropov's health deteriorated in the second half of
1983. Chernenko emerged in protocol standings as the
number-two man in the party. Honorary nominations
to the USSR Supreme Soviet in December showed
Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov sharing a position
directly below Andropov, while Gorbachev was in the
next lower echelon, among the other Politburo mem-
bers.
The Andropov Succession: Gorbachev Has To Wait
The succession to Andropov showed evidence of a
compromise in the leadership between the proponents
and opponents of change. The choice of Chernenko as
General Secretary symbolized the reassertion of
authority by senior leaders in the Politburo. At the
' As members of both the Politburo (which formulates Soviet policy)
and the Secretariat (which oversees policy implementation and
controls personnel appointments), "senior secretaries" have more
influence than leaders who wear only one of those hats and have a
decided advantage as succession candidates. In theory, the General
Secretary heads only the Secretariat; in practice, this position has
program in the long run.
The order of Politburo speeches for the March 1984
Supreme Soviet elections revealed Gorbachev's new
status within days of Chernenko's selection as General
Secretary. Traditionally the General Secretary speaks
last, the Premier next to last, and the party's number-
two executive before that. The speakers in this case
were Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachev.0
in public
statements of the Western-but not the Soviet-
press, Soviet officials were consistent and unhesitating
in identifying Gorbachev as the most probable future
General Secretary. Thus, while officially there is no
number-two man or designated successor to the Gen-
eral Secretary, in the case of Gorbachev the Soviet
regime came as close as it ever has to making that
status explicit.
During Chernenko's reign, the most powerful of the
Politburo elders-Premier Tikhonov, Defense Minis-
ter Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko-became
unusually prominent in leadership affairs. These three
typically flanked Chernenko at public functions. Gro-
myko and other Politburo elders had reportedly
blocked the broad domestic personnel replacement
program that Andropov had wanted to implement,
and Gromyko,
Ustinov, and Tikhonov had a stronger say than ever in
leadership decisionmaking under Chernenko. Central
Committee official Menshikov acknowledged to for-
eign interviewers, for example, that Gromyko strongly
influenced Politburo decisions on domestic affairs,
despite his preoccupation with foreign policy.
senior Politburo members were impressed with Gor-
bachev's abilities and liked him personally. Nonethe-
less, they were apparently not yet prepared to see him
take over as General Secretary.
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Gorbachev's Ups and Downs Under Chernenko
Events in the summer of 1984 allowed Gorbachev to
strengthen his position as heir apparent. When Cher-
nenko left Moscow on vacation in July and suffered a
health crisis in August, Gorbachev began to act as
General Secretary. Foreign diplomats in Moscow
were told that he had chaired some Politburo sessions
even before Chernenko's vacation. At the Eastern
Bloc athletic games in August, Gorbachev was shown
on Soviet television receiving the flowers presented at
Nevertheless, when Chernenko's health began to im-
prove in the fall of 1984, Gorbachev's position ap-
peared to suffer. A series of developments suggested
growing Politburo concern that Gorbachev's advance
violated decorum and was undermining Chernenko's
position:
? The chief editor of Pravda was reportedly called on
the carpet for allowing foreign interviewers to de-
scribe Gorbachev as the "second General
Secretary."
? Gorbachev's closest rival among younger leaders,
Grigoriy Romanov, was given new prominence in
party leadership activities relating to foreign affairs.
? Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin confided to an Ameri-
can that the publicity for Gorbachev had created
"animosity" between Gorbachev and Chernenko.
? Gorbachev attended but did not participate in the
Central Committee plenum in October that ap-
proved a major agricultural program seemingly
inconsistent with his past policy preferences.
Eve of the Succession: Gorbachev in Position
Despite this apparent setback, Gorbachev's position as
heir presumptive was reestablished as Chernenko's
health worsened in December and January. In retro-
spect, Gorbachev's address to a national conference of
ideological workers in December appears to have been
an unofficial declaration of the policy program he
intended to follow when he became General Secre-
tary. Moreover, his much publicized trip to the United
Kingdom-which had been planned since the early
summer of 1984-established him as a popular and
potentially dominating presence in the conduct of
foreign affairs with Western countries.
During this period the ailing General Secretary ap-
parently became increasingly dependent on his second
in command, and Gorbachev acquired new authority
to act on his behalf
? Several officials, including Central Committee offi-
cial Leonid Zamyatin, said that Gorbachev had
acquired a special strategy-making or "coordina-
ting" role in the leadership.
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The obviously stage-managed-and almost maca-
bre-displaying of a seriously ill Chernenko on tele-
vision during Supreme Soviet election ceremonies
suggested an attempt by some in the leadership to
reassert Chernenko's authority, perhaps in the hope
that they could buy time and move another leader into
the Secretariat to contest the succession
Subsequently, dissident Soviet historian Roy Med-
vedev told US Embassy officers last May that a short-
lived contest did occur in the Politburo. Medvedev
said he had heard that Moscow party boss Viktor
Grishin had been nominated first. Discussion of
Grishin's candidacy was quickly dropped when KGB
Chief Viktor Chebrikov began to cite information
implicating him in graft and corruption in Moscow.
The Swift Conclusion: Gorbachev Takes Over
Chernenko's steady deterioration may have under-
The speedy march of events after Chernenko died
appeared to confirm that the issue of succession had
already been decided.' The signs of a smooth succes-
sion-its speed and the selection of Gromyko, the
most powerful remaining member of the old guard, to
nominate Gorbachev-probably reflected a blend of
propaganda and reality. The regime, after three years
of change and turmoil in its top leadership, wanted to
send a strong message of unity and purpose to the
outside world as well as to the party rank and file.
' Andropov and Chernenko were elected two days after their
predecessors died; in contrast, Gorbachev's election was accom-
Gorbachev's rapid rise and speedy election as General
Secretary was first of all a demonstration of his broad
support in the Politburo. He almost certainly enjoyed
the support of most younger Politburo members as
well as older members not associated with the old
guard. He seems to have forged at least a temporary
alliance as well with key members of the old guard:
? The April plenum's announcement that Premier
Tikhonov would deliver a report to the party con-
gress in 1986 seems to imply that he will play on
Gorbachev's team for the time being.
Foreign Minister Gromyko's comment, in his nomi-
nating speech for Gorbachev at the March plenum,
that the new General Secretary's grasp of foreign
events was quick and his conclusions "correct"
suggests that Gromyko is also on board.
continued tenure in the leadership.
Gorbachev was apparently able to capitalize on a
growing desire in the Soviet establishment for strong
leadership at the top to address chronic economic and
social problems. With his reputed consensus-building
talents, Gorbachev apparently succeeded in holding
the support of younger leaders even as he moved to
reassure senior Politburo members that his succession
would not mean an immediate challenge to their
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Consolidating Power
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is off to a
strong start in consolidating his power. He has ad-
vanced four of his allies to full Politburo membership
without any counterbalancing promotions for the old
guard. He has accelerated the pace of personnel
changes in key positions just below the top level and
appears to be laying the groundwork for a broad-
based housecleaning by giving new impetus to Andro-
pov's discipline and anticorruption campaigns.
Gorbachev probably wants to act quickly to maintain
his political momentum and to tap the enthusiasm of
younger officials who want change. He still faces
hurdles, however, as he moves to get his team in place
for the party congress next February. Direct opposi-
tion seems increasingly unlikely, but-given the con-
sensus nature of Politburo decisionmaking-other
leaders could potentially block personnel actions as a
means of resisting Gorbachev's policy program. Until
he can get his allies into positions of authority, he
must contend also with the foot-dragging of
Brezhnev-era holdovers at lower levels.
Gorbachev Advances His Allies
Gorbachev's success at the April plenum exceeded
even the best showing of his patron, Andropov, during
the latter's 15-month tenure. Gorbachev advanced
three of his allies-party secretaries Yegor Ligachev
and Nikolay Ryzhkov and KGB Chief Viktor Chebri-
kov-to full membership in the Politburo. Defense
Minister Sokolov was promoted to candidate member,
and Vladimir Nikonov, the RSFSR Minister of Agri-
culture, was named to the party Secretariat.
The promotions of Ligachev and Ryzhkov particularly
underscored Gorbachev's success and add to his power
base. They were advanced directly to full membership
without first serving as candidate members. The last
such promotions were in 1973, when the Ministers of
Defense and Foreign Affairs became full members.
Gorbachev's momentum continued at the July ple-
num, which promoted three officials who seem to
share his policy orientation and removed his onetime
rival, Grigoriy Romanov, from the Politburo and
Secretariat. Georgian party chief Eduard Shevard-
nadze advanced to full membership in the Politburo,
and Central Committee department head Boris
Yel'tsin and Leningrad party chief Lev Zaykov joined
the Secretariat. At the Supreme Soviet session that
followed the plenum, Gromyko was named President
and Shevardnadze succeeded him as Foreign Minis-
ter-moves that probably will increase Gorbachev's
ability to shape Soviet foreign policy.
As a result of these personnel moves, Gorbachev can
probably count on majority support on most issues
before the Politburo (table 1).
his closest allies are
Ligachev, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, and Vitaliy Vorotni-
kov. In addition, Gorbachev can probably expect
support on most issues from independents like Geydar
Aliyev and Mikhail Solomentsev, who were promoted
under Andropov. Septuagenarians promoted under
Brezhnev are now a minority among full Politburo
members.
Ligachev is perhaps Gorbachev's closest supporter.
He was selected by Andropov as junior secretary for
cadres (overseeing the appointment of party and gov-
ernment officials) and in that capacity worked very
closely with Gorbachev, Andropov's senior secretary
for personnel. Their collaboration continued during
Chernenko's brief tenure, with Ligachev playing a
prominent role in reviving Andropov's anticorruption
campaign. Since April, he has assumed the ideology
portfolio from Gorbachev and has been identified by
some Soviets as "second secretary"-a role that
would accord with his high public profile at the
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Table 1
The Current Soviet Leadership
Mikhail Gorbachev, 54
General Secretary
Viktor Chebrikov, 62
KGB chief
Yegor Ligachev, 64
Party secretary
Nikolay Ryzhkov, 55
Party secretary
Promoted at July plenum
Eduard Shevardnadze, 57
Foreign Minister
Promoted under Andropov
Geydar Aliyev, 62
First Deputy Premier
Mikhail Solomentsev, 71
Chairman, Party Control
Committee
Andrey Gromyko, 75
President
Nikolay Tikhonov, 80
USSR Premier
Viktor Grishin, 70
Moscow party chief
Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 73
Kazakh party chief
Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, 67
Ukraine party chief
Promoted at April plenum
Sergey Sokolov, 73
Defense Minister
Promoted under Brezhnev
Boris Ponomarev, 80
Party secretary
Vladimir Dolgikh, 60
Party secretary
Vasiliy Kuznetsov, 84
Vice President
Science and Technology (S&T) Conference in June.
He will probably continue to oversee personnel affairs,
as well as ideology, and will presumably play a
leading role in preparations for next year's party
congress.
Like Ligachev, Ryzhkov is a member of the Andropov
team, which shifted its allegiance to Gorbachev after
Andropov's death. In one of his first moves as General
Secretary, Andropov moved Ryzhkov to the Secretari-
at and put him in charge of a new Central Committee
department to oversee planning and economic reform.
Gorbachev and Ryzh-
kov have developed a close working relationship. If
Gorbachev mounts a major campaign against the
central ministries, he may want to give Ryzhkov a
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The promotion of KGB Chief Chebrikov from candi-
date 'to full Politburo membership will probably also
contribute to Gorbachev's consolidation of power.
Chebrikov (like Ligachev and Ryzhkov) was promoted
under Andropov-to KGB chief in December 1982
and to candidate membership in December 1983. The
US Embassy's Soviet contacts have usually placed
him in the Gorbachev camp, an assessment bolstered
by evidence that the KGB helped promote Gorba-
chev's political position before Chernenko's death.
The KGB has also been closely identified with the
discipline and anticorruption campaigns that Gorba-
chev champions. Roy Medvedev has passed a rumor
that Chebrikov played the key role in sidetracking an
effort by Romanov and Moscow party boss Grishin to
block Gorbachev's accession to power in March.
While the story itself may have been fabricated to
embarrass Grishin and Romanov, it tracks with the
other evidence that Chebrikov is a strong Gorbachev
backer.
Gorbachev and the Old Guard
Gorbachev has advanced his allies without apparent
counterbalancing concessions to the old guard. Soviet
officials had speculated that one of the old guard,
perhaps Moscow party boss Viktor Grishin or Foreign
Minister Gromyko, might be named to the Secretariat
as a quid pro quo for some of the appointments
Gorbachev desired. Other promotions rumored by
Soviet officials, like the advancement of party secre-
tary Dolgikh to full Politburo membership, also have
failed to materialize. Gorbachev may have bought
support for his personnel actions, however, with a
promise of at least temporary security to old guard
members currently in the leadership. The April ple-
num, for instance, announced that Premier Tikhonov
would present a report on the five-year plan to next
year's congress-suggesting that Gorbachev may not
move against him until after the congress. Gorba-
chev's unabated criticism of the ministries, however,
makes Tikhonov's position increasingly untenable.
Gorbachev apparently faces no serious opposition in
the Politburo at this time. His success may reflect the
fact that some members of the old guard now support
him, while others, like Premier Tikhonov, are too
weak and isolated to block his consolidation of power.
Gromyko's speech nominating Gorbachev strongly
suggests that he is behind the new General Secretary
and probably did not oppose the recent personnel
moves. Grishin may also have decided belatedly to
join the Gorbachev bandwagon. He was the first
Politburo leader to identify Gorbachev as the "head of
the Politburo."
Shaking Up the Bureaucracy
Gorbachev's apparent intention to shake up the bu-
reaucracy to get the economy running more efficiently
probably will result in the replacement of holdovers
from the Brezhnev era with more sympathetic offi-
cials. Judging by his initial policy statements, Gorba-
chev apparently will favor strict penalties, including
the firing of corrupt or inefficient party and state
bureaucrats, to tighten discipline. At the S&T Con-
ference, for instance, he criticized four ministers by
name, implying that they would lose their jobs if they
did not to turn over a new leaf.
In his speeches, Gorbachev has made it clear that he
intends to demand a higher standard of accountability
for party personnel and criticized the halting pace of
the anticorruption campaign under Chernenko. Im-
plying that such policies were producing a crisis
within the party, he has called for replenishing the
ranks of officialdom with new people and warned that
those who do not adjust to the new demands must
"get out of the way." He attacked the traditional
Soviet practice of promotion through patronage as
contributing to corruption and complacency. He indi-
cated that competence should play a determining role
in the selection of new leaders and encouraged criti-
cism from below of those in leadership positions. By
contrast, Chernenko in his initial speeches as General
Secretary sought to reassure the party apparatus that
he was satisfied with its performance.
Gorbachev has backed up his tough words with
action. The rate of personnel change during his early
weeks as General Secretary has been running ahead 25X1
of the pace set by Andropov, another proponent of
cadre change, and considerably higher than that
under Chernenko, who appeared to be devoted to
cadre stability (see table 2). As a result of Gorbachev's
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Table 2
Personnel Changes in the First Six Weeks
Under New General Secretaries a
Other 5 0 2
Total 11 5 14
a Personnel changes include promotions, transfers, demotions,
retirements, or deaths affecting full members of the Central
Committee elected at the 26th Party Congress in March 1981. The
changes are categorized according to the status of the member at
the time of the personnel action. For instance, the transfer of
republic first secretary Aliyev to Moscow under Andropov is
counted in the "regional leaders" category, while the promotions of
KGB Chief Chebrikov and Defense Minister Sokolov under Gorba-
chev are included in the "other" category.
initial personnel moves, a deputy premier who was a
crony of Brezhnev and Chernenko has been sacked,
several ministers who were criticized under Andropov
have been removed, and 11 new regional first secre-
taries have already been named-including nine who
are likely to be elected to the Central Committee for
the first time in February 1986. During Chernenko's
entire tenure, only seven regional first secretaries with
Central Committee membership were changed, and
four of those changes came during a period when
Gorbachev was reportedly chairing both the Secretar-
iat and the Politburo.
Gorbachev
has received Politburo approval to follow a policy of
transferring party leaders from one region to another
more frequently in order to break up local cliques and
minimize corruption. This report is consistent with the
pattern of personnel change that is emerging under
Gorbachev.
Gorbachev's Prospects
Gorbachev is likely to gather some additional trap-
pings of power. Already identified as "head" of the
Politburo by Grishin and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, he will probably be acknowledged
publicly as chairman of the Defense Council some-
time soon, despite reports of his personal modesty.
he may
even assume the premiership when Tikhonov retires.
Gorbachev also appears to be in position to build a
solid base of support for his policies. With the party
congress now scheduled for next February (instead of
later this year, as earlier rumored), he has additional
time to make personnel changes at the Central Com-
mittee level. Over the next several years many of the
current party leaders could retire or die. Five full
Politburo members, three candidate members, and
three junior secretaries are over 70, and three of them
are over 80.
Having shown his frustration with the current man-
agement of the economy, Gorbachev may try to get
his supporters into key positions on the Council of
Ministers, a likely center of opposition to his efforts to
reform the economy. Nearly a dozen holdovers from
the beginning of the Brezhnev era remain on the
Council, including Nikolay Baybakov, chairman of
the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), who is
rumored to be a Gorbachev target. Premier Tikhonov,
sidered as particularly vulnerable.
Soviet officials have speculated that
Gorbachev would like to name Russian Republic
Premier Vorotnikov, an Andropov appointee, or Ryzh-
kov to head the Council of Ministers. Tikhonov's
designation as rapporteur to next year's party con-
gress probably means he is safe for now, however;
and, given his age, Gorbachev may wait until Tik-
honov retires or dies, to avoid a confrontation.
Gorbachev probably plans more changes in the party
apparatus. He has already replaced three Central
Committee department chiefs, most recently naming
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Georgiy Razumovskiy-a protege who was first secre-
tary in Krasnodar Kray-to head the Central Com-
mittee department in charge of personnel appoint-
ments. he may
want to move into the Central Committee other
individuals who have impressed him, such as Alek-
sandr Yakovlev, director of the Institute of the World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).
Gorbachev may still face resistance in this area. Key
senior leaders, including Tikhonov, Grishin, and
Gromyko-who reportedly objected to Andropov's
personnel policies-could still oppose personnel deci-
sions before the Politburo.
Gorbachev has strong incentives, however, to press his
political advantage and move boldly. His speeches
have raised expectations for change and put the
entrenched bureaucracy on the defensive. He must
take decisive action to match his tough rhetoric or risk
sending a signal of business as usual to the bureaucra-
cy. He probably also wants to avoid the disappoint-
ment that reportedly materialized midway through
Andropov's tenure, when many supporters of the
General Secretary in the middle levels of the appara-
tus became discouraged by the old guard's ability to
block personnel and policy change. Finally, he needs
to seize the opportunity offered by the upcoming
congress to put his supporters in place throughout the
bureaucracy, place his stamp on the party's new
program, and use the five-year plan discussion to set
his economic priorities. All indicators so far point to
his determination to push decisively ahead on the
personnel and policy fronts.
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Economic Agenda
Since succeeding Chernenko three months ago, Mik-
hail Gorbachev has outlined an economic agenda that
features ambitious targets for growth. The measures
he has proposed to achieve his goals are similar to
proposals made before but only halfheartedly imple-
mented. Gorbachev has been increasingly blunt in
making this point and evidently believes that, like
Andropov, he can give the economy a boost by
vigorously following through on them. Although he
has yet to squarely address some of the economy's
major problems, he has hinted that he intends to do so
and that bolder, more innovative economic proposals
may be in store.
Economic Goals and Means
In his speech to the Central Committee in April,
Gorbachev described the acceleration of economic
growth as his major domestic goal and laid out a
growth strategy that includes increasing the pace of
scientific and technological (S&T) progress, restruc-
turing investment, reorganizing management and
planning, and tightening economic discipline. In a
more recent speech, he called for an annual increase
in national income of at least 4 percent during 1986-
According to a source of the
US Embassy in Moscow, however, CEMA economic
leaders more recently set growth targets for industrial
production at 5 percent. All of these goals are ambi-
tious. Tightening economic constraints caused by the
labor shortage and the increasing inaccessibility of
vital resources-oil, coal, and iron ore, for example-
will make their achievement difficult.
S& T Progress. Gorbachev clearly views the accelera-
tion of S&T progress as crucial to the success of his
economic program. A special conference was held in
June to develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing
with S&T issues. In his address to the conference, as
in past speeches, Gorbachev focused on the need for a
rapid introduction of new production technology, in-
sisting that the Soviet Union must launch a revolu-
tionary program to reequip its factories and farms
with the most up-to-date machinery.
Restructuring Investment. To further this moderniza-
tion effort, Gorbachev has also called for a significant
restructuring of investment policy. In a particularly
forceful statement in his speech to an ideological
conference in December, he insisted that the current
practice of allocating economic branches the same
proportions of new investment from one plan to
another must be "changed decisively" and urged that 25X1
special priority be given to the "development and
introduction of fundamentally new systems of ma-
chines and technologies.'
Gorbachev has pressed hard for the incorporation of
his views in the guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-Year
Plan-a draft of which was largely completed under
General Secretary Chernenko-and is evidently pre-
pared to do battle publicly with bureaucratic foot-
draggers to ensure that they are fully reflected. In his
speech to the S&T conference, Gorbachev faulted the
draft for failing to concentrate capital investments in
priority areas and for relying too much on additional
resources to achieve growth targets and not enough on
improving productivity. He placed partial blame on
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castigating four industrial ministers for squandering
resources. Gorbachev also complained that the draft
did not go far enough in shifting funds away from new
construction to the retooling of existing plants. Invest-
ment in the latter, he insisted, should be increased
from the present one-third to one-half of total invest-
ments.
Gorbachev has stressed in all his recent speeches that
to meet this goal for retooling industry, priority
should go to the development of the machine-building
sector. In his S&T speech, he accused Gosplan of
paying "verbal tribute" to the role of machine build-
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ing while continuing to starve it of resources, and
called for a twofold increase in investments for the
sector in the next plan period. He suggested that this
increase could be achieved by the partial redistribu-
tion of capital investments from the industries that
use the machines, noting that most of these industries
were far better funded.
At the same time, Gorbachev hinted that the empha-
sis on machine building might affect the priority
status of two of the biggest claimants on investment
resources, energy and the agro-industrial complex. He
suggested that investment in energy could be "stabil-
ized" by giving greater attention to conservation and
described the present level of investment in the agro-
industrial complex as having reached the "rational"
limit. Moreover, the return on this investment, he
said, continues to be unsatisfactory because of the
inadequate concentration of resources on the "deci-
sive" sectors. Despite repeated "talk" of the effective-
ness of investment in the development of storage,
transportation, and processing, there has been no
perceptible improvement, he claimed, and nearly one-
fifth of the harvest is lost.
Reorganizing Management and Planning. Previous
attempts to redirect investment resources and other
economic initiatives have often been frustrated by
entrenched bureaucratic interests-a problem that
Gorbachev clearly recognizes. He has been particular-
ly caustic in describing the adverse effects of such
interests on the large-scale planning and management
experiment launched under Andropov. "The minis-
tries," he charged in his S&T speech, "in their present
form, in the way they operate, have no interest in the
experiment." They have no interest, he continued, in
extending the independence of enterprises and-with
"the aid" of the Ministry of Finance, the State
Committee on Labor and Wages, and Gosplan-have
had little trouble ensuring that "nothing is left" of the
principles of the experiment.
Gorbachev indicated in this and other speeches that a
reorganization of the economic bureaucracy will be a
major part of his strategy. His June speech in Dnepro-
petrovsk suggested that plans for such a reorganiza-
tion have now reached an advanced stage and that
they include the creation of superministerial bodies,
starting with agro-industrial and machine-building
sectors. His speeches also suggest that these super-
ministries will be restricted to "strategic" planning
and leave operational control of enterprises in the
hands of the managers on the scene.
Economic Discipline. Gorbachev is banking on a
stepped-up discipline campaign to bolster economic
growth while waiting for the more long-term benefits
of his modernization program to accrue. The threat of
imposing penalties for poor performance is part of this
campaign, but the party chief has also suggested that
he sees a close link between the demand for greater
"accountability" of managers and workers and such
measures as the expansion of enterprise autonomy and
greater use of collective contracts in agriculture. He
also has pledged to increase the material rewards for
good performance as well as the penalties for viola-
tions of economic discipline.
Prospects for Implementation
The economic strategy that Gorbachev has outlined
has much in common with proposals that his predeces-
sors made but, as the new party chief has bluntly
pointed out, never fully implemented. For example:
? For years, Brezhnev reiterated the need to stream-
line economic management and planning and urged
the creation of a new ministerial structure. Repeat-
edly, however, he proved unwilling to try to over-
come the bureaucratic resistance that these propos-
als generated. As an Andropov supporter later
commented, there was no lack of sound reforms
enacted under Brezhnev, but in the lax political
atmosphere that prevailed at the time they remained
only paper measures.
? Andropov set about to rectify this and achieved
some success-as witnessed by the economy's im-
proved performance in 1983 and 1984. His efforts,
however, were cut short by illness and political
difficulties. Chernenko, who was hampered by even
more serious problems than Andropov, marked time
throughout his tenure.
Gorbachev's speeches indicate that he is extremely
impatient with the failure to implement past decisions
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and equally impatient, as one Soviet official stated in
private, "to get on with the job at hand." He appears
to have important political assets to bring to bear on
the economy's problems. Compared with Andropov
and Chernenko, he has youth and energy on his side.
He has taken charge in the leadership with remark-
able speed. The elevation of three of his political allies
to full membership in the Politburo at the April
plenum gives him a strong core of top-level support. In
addition, because of the advanced age of many mem-
bers of the top government hierarchy, he will probably
soon have the opportunity to appoint officials of his
own choosing who will be sympathetic to his policy
views. Premier
Tikhonov will retire at or before next year's party
congress, and Gorbachev's scathing criticism of
Gosplan and the four ministers suggests that other
changes may be imminent. His control of personnel
assignments, moreover, gives him a powerful weapon
against bureaucratic obstructionism.
Gorbachev's program is likely to result in improved
economic performance if vigorously pushed. Priority
development of the food industry, for instance, cou-
pled with greater attention to transportation and
storage facilities could considerably reduce the
present enormous waste and spoilage of agricultural
produce. Moreover, the discipline campaign, which
was evidently a significant factor in the economic
upswing during Andropov's tenure, could again have a
favorable impact on economic performance.
Nevertheless, the outlook for Gorbachev's critically
important modernization program seems problemati-
cal. Successful implementation would require a de-
gree of innovation in machinery manufacturing that
heretofore has been lacking. Furthermore, Gorba-
chev's apparent determination to step up investment
in machinery manufacturing capacity even if this
means squeezing other critical sectors, is likely to
cause serious bottlenecks and is certain to be hard
fought by the managers who will be expected to do
more with less. Allocating more investment to the
machinery sector also could divert resources from
consumption and defense to a degree the regime
would consider unacceptable.
Prospects for Bolder Measures
While Gorbachev's economic strategy is politically
bold, he has yet to indicate whether he intends to
address more basic problems plaguing the economy.
He has not, for example, squarely addressed such
problems as the arbitrary nature of Soviet prices,
which prevent planners from making economically
rational decisions, or the lack of sufficient consumer
input into decisions on what to produce. Nor has he
explained how, in a period of likely resource stringen-
cy, with investment to grow at an accelerated rate and
defense likely to have a strong claim on resources, the
consumer's needs can also be addressed.
There have, however, been hints in Gorbachev's past
and recent speeches and in the statements of some
knowledgeable Soviet officials that the General Secre-
tary may eventually tackle some of these problems. In
his Lenin Day address in April 1983, for example,
Gorbachev stressed the importance of greater reliance
on prices as an economic lever. Gorbachev returned to
this theme in his June 1985 address to the S&T
conference, calling for a more decisive shift from
administration to economic methods of regulating the
economy. In the same address he also called for an
end to "the domination of the consumer by the
producer."
There is also growing evidence that Gorbachev favors
an expanded role for private initiative as a way of
improving the consumer's lot. Such a policy could
help alleviate some consumer problems without re-
quiring much additional state investment or affecting
the way the socialized sector is organized and
managed.
In the past Gorbachev has been a staunch supporter of
expanding production on private agricultural plots,
and in his speech to the Central Committee plenum in
April he twice referred to the contribution that the
private farming sector can make to improving the
quality of life. In May he returned to this subject in a
speech in Leningrad and expressed disagreement with
the Politburo's recent handling of the issue. He
contrasted the Politburo decision to earmark land for
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ACCfC~
an additional 1 million private market gardens with
Soviet citizens' requests for some 15 million new plots.
"Mathematically," he noted with evident sarcasm,
"our approach to this problem is fundamentally
weak."
Gorbachev's remarks in Leningrad also lend credibil-
ity to earlier reports that he favors the more contro-
versial policy of allowing a greater role for private
initiative in the service sector. He called for a "more
realistic evaluation" of the major role "moonlighters"
currently play in providing such services as home
repairs and seemed to suggest that the state should
not just tolerate such activity but should actively
support it. Materials used, he said, are generally
stolen and "come from the state anyway."
Gorbachev may well have decided to refrain from
translating such vague expressions of support for
controversial measures into specific proposals until he
has fully formulated his plans and/or consolidated his
political strength.
Gorbachev may have refrained from bolder measures
because he hopes that the steps he has already
proposed will be sufficient to remedy the economy's
ills. In either event, the political momentum he al-
ready enjoys augurs well for his future ability to take
bolder steps, and the ambitious nature of the goals he
has set increases the chances that he will have to do
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International Affairs:
A More Dynamic Diplomacy?
The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet
Union's new leader aroused expectations, in the
USSR and abroad, of new foreign policy initiatives.
chev has already demonstrated a more dynamic style
of personal diplomacy. He quickly endorsed in princi-
ple a summit meeting with President Reagan, re-
ceived the Chinese delegation to Chernenko's funer-
al-the first meeting between top Soviet and Chinese
leaders since 1969-and established a busy schedule
of meetings with foreign leaders. So far the shifts have
been mainly in tone and style, however, and continu-
ity has been the main theme in foreign policy.
Gorbachev's Reputation-Expectations of Change
A number of Soviet and Western observers expected
that the transfer of power from the Kremlin's old
guard to a younger leadership would result in a fresh
approach to Soviet foreign policy. In the months
preceding Gorbachev's succession,
a generation gap
in the Politburo, blaming the downward spiral in
East-West relations on party elders.
East European officials also spoke optimistically
about the leadership change in the Soviet Union.
Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Polish officials pointed in
particular to what they saw as Gorbachev's apparent
tolerance of divergent approaches to economic reform.
Unlike his putative rival in the Secretariat, Grigoriy
Romanov-whom they considered a strict hardliner-
Gorbachev was viewed as a pragmatist who would not
react to East European reforms along strictly doctrin-
al lines.
Despite the expectations of change, there is no direct
evidence to suggest that Gorbachev's foreign policy
views diverge significantly from those of his Politburo
colleagues. As might be expected of a leader with
caustic criticism of the Reagan administration.
relatively little experience in foreign affairs, Gorba-
chev's statements on international issues have hewed
closely to well-established Soviet positions; expres-
sions of support for better relations with the United
States, for instance, have blended with increasingly
The Regime's First Steps
Since he came to power the new General Secretary
has projected a vigorous public image, maintaining an
ambitious schedule of meetings with foreign leaders
and issuing several policy statements and initiatives.
In meetings with foreign officials he has demonstrated
an ability to skillfully repackage familiar Soviet posi-
tions. In contrast to his highly publicized steps to
improve domestic economic performance, however,
Gorbachev apparently has no urgent agenda on the
international side. Continuity has been the prevailing
theme of foreign policy during his several months in
office.
The United States. By all accounts, managing rela-
tions with the United States is the new leadership's
first priority. Gorbachev's strategy, like that of his
immediate predecessors, appears designed to blunt
current policies of the United States by cultivating
ties to Western Europe and encouraging US domestic
opposition to the administration's policies toward the
USSR. He appears to be encouraging a resumption of
bilateral contacts while-through a combination of
tough rhetoric and policy actions-attempting to step
up pressure on the United States to moderate its
policies.
the new General Secretary sees Soviet
interests as best served, for now, by tough talk to the
United States.
Gorbachev initially adopted a position more flexible
than that of either Chernenko or Andropov on the
prospect of a meeting with President Reagan-drop-
ping any requirement of "appropriate preparations"
prior to the event. He went to unusual lengths in his
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Secret
8 April Pravda interview to emphasize the potential
benefits of a move to "break the ice" of recent
tensions. In mid-March, Soviet officials stated that
Gorbachev was encouraging new trade agreements
with the United States, particularly in the agricultur-
al sector. The Soviets, in fact, agreed to an early
meeting of the US-USSR Commercial Commission
(held on 20-21 May), laying the groundwork for a
possible expansion in US-Soviet economic ties.
Gorbachev has since emerged-in his public com-
ments and private meetings with foreign leaders-as a
tough critic of the United States. His 23 April plenum
speech explicitly attacked the Reagan administration
on a number of fronts, accusing Washington of
"sabotaging disarmament" and violating the accords
governing the resumption of the US-Soviet arms talks
in Geneva only days after the first round had ended.
Gorbachev's 8 May Kremlin address marking the
40th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany-
while alluding favorably to past episodes of US-Soviet
cooperation-portrayed current US policy as increas-
ingly "bellicose." Although a summit meeting is now
on the agenda, Gorbachev's tough rhetoric has con-
tinued.
Gorbachev's rhetoric and recent Soviet actions appear
designed to convince the United States that the USSR
will not be pushed into making concessions. Soviet
statements in the aftermath of the shooting of US
military liaison officer Maj. Arthur Nicholson in East
Germany, for example, held Washington entirely
responsible and publicly repudiated the US interpre-
tation of an agreement supposedly worked out be-
tween the two superpowers to prevent a reoccurrence.
Soviet intransigence during the first round of the
renewed arms talks was followed by Gorbachev's
veiled threat in April to repeat the USSR's 1983
walkout-a threat that he made more explicit in an
address delivered in June.
Western Europe. Gorbachev's major foreign policy
initiative so far, the moratorium on Soviet missile
deployments in Europe announced on 8 April, under-
scores the continuity in the new leadership's European
policy. In substance, it repeated a move by Brezhnev
in March 1982 that the Soviets rescinded in Novem-
ber 1983; its manner of presentation-an interview in
Pravda-was patterned after a number of similar
gestures on European arms beginning with Brezhnev.
Other initiatives publicized by Moscow also indicate
that the Gorbachev leadership will continue to rely
heavily on appeals to Western Europe to influence US
arms policies and restrict the deployment of US
missiles. In a 28 March letter to a West German
peace group, Gorbachev charged that the United
States was using the Geneva negotiations as a cover
for a defense buildup and implied that US policies
would be responsible for any failure of the talks to
produce results. Gorbachev's frequent calls for a
return to detente and appeals to political forces in the
West who favor such a course also appear designed to
exploit European doubts about US policies and create
problems for the Reagan administration.
Soviet officials have been frank in asserting Moscow's
intention to exploit differences between the United
States and its allies in an effort to undermine the US
Strategic Defense Initiative. Appearing on a Soviet
news program recently, Director of the Institute for
the Study of the United States and Canada Georgiy
Arbatov stressed the "community of interests" exist-
ing between the Soviet Union and Western Europe
and expressed the hope that increased pressure from
the Europeans would be a decisive factor in producing
results at Geneva.
Recent visits to Moscow by Italian Prime Minister
Bettino Craxi and West German Social Democratic
Party Chairman Willy Brandt highlighted Soviet
efforts to build support in Western Europe for its
positions at the Geneva talks, particularly on the
issues of space weapons and INF. Moscow's desire to
cultivate improved relations with Western Europe was
underscored by Gorbachev's proposal-going beyond
proposals by previous Soviet leaders-endorsing a
political dialogue between the CEMA countries and
the European Economic Community to facilitate ex-
panded trade and economic contacts.
As part of this strategy, Moscow may be moving
haltingly toward a more conciliatory posture toward
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West Germany. Soviet media have continued to at-
tack the Kohl government's alleged encouragement of
West German "revanchism." But, in a 28 March
letter to an FRG peace group, Gorbachev vehemently
denied that Moscow harbored any hostility toward the
German people or that the 40th anniversary of V-E
Day would be an occasion for "fanning anti-German
sentiments." Although he assailed the growth of
revanchism in his anniversary address, he appeared to
place much of the blame on Washington rather than
Bonn.
Eastern Europe. Gorbachev took advantage of the
recently concluded Warsaw summit meeting to reas-
sert leadership of the "socialist commonwealth." The
lack of strong policy direction from Moscow in the
last two years has encouraged the East Europeans to
pursue independent policies and has weakened Mos-
cow's ability to impose a coherent Bloc strategy. In
April, Gorbachev's speech to enterprise directors in
Moscow was extremely critical of the economies of
other CEMA members. Apparently referring to the
corruption and inefficiency of East European Com-
munist parties, Gorbachev stated that "something is
rotten in Denmark." The tone of his public remarks
suggests that he may push for greater economic
integration among CEMA members. On security
issues, Gorbachev's unilateral moratorium on deploy-
ment of Soviet missiles opposite Europe has already
received strong endorsement from the East Europe-
ans, suggesting that he may be more successful than
his predecessors in managing East European con-
cerns.
China and Japan. The succession brought indications
of an invigorated Soviet commitment to improved
relations with China but no sign of concessions on
substantive issues. Responding to Chinese gestures to
the new General Secretary, Gorbachev met with Vice
Premier Li Peng at Chernenko's funeral, the first
such meeting at that level in 20 years. Gorbachev's
plenum speech on 11 March called for a "serious
improvement" in relations with China, a goal since
reaffirmed in other leadership speeches. Press attacks
on China also have become less strident. Nonetheless,
Gorbachev and other leaders have made a point in
public remarks of making improved relations depen-
dent on "reciprocity" by Beijing. To date, little
progress has been made in this direction. The sixth
round of political talks between deputy foreign minis-
ters in April resulted in no change in Moscow's
position on substantive issues.
The Soviets have continued to temporize on setting a
date for the Foreign Minister's long-awaited visit to
Tokyo and have shown no new flexibility on the
Northern territories dispute. Gorbachev's initial re-
fusal to meet with Prime Minister Nakasone at
Chernenko's funeral reflects the Soviet Union's ap- 25X1
parent unhappiness with Nakasone's strong pro-US
stance.
Third World. The regime's initial actions have given
no hint of new initiatives or of increased Soviet
sensitivity to the broader consequences of its actions
in the Third World. Gorbachev's speech to the plenum
that elected him General Secretary confirmed con-
tinuing Soviet support for Third World nations fol-
lowing a path of "independence and social change."
In May, Gorbachev's highly publicized meeting with
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi signaled that Moscow
continues to give priority to nurturing close relations
with India. Gorbachev used the occasion of Gandhi's
visit to suggest a "common comprehensive approach
to the problem of Asian security," apparently borrow-
ing an idea originally broached by Leonid Brezhnev.
Gandhi declined to endorse the proposal, however,
and it was not mentioned in the joint communique
published after the visit.
Early actions by the regime have also signaled strong
support for allies in Afghanistan and Central Ameri-
ca. Gorbachev's tough line on Afghanistan in discus-
sions with Pakistani President Zia following Chernen-
ko's funeral has been echoed in a continuing Soviet
media propaganda campaign against Islamabad's
support for the insurgents.
The regime may be adopting a higher profile on
Central America. In a highly publicized 24 April
meeting with Nicaraguan President Ortega, Gorba-
chev promised continuing assistance and political
support to the Sandinistas. In his speech to the April
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Central Committee plenum the previous day, Nicara-
gua was the only Third World country singled out for
a rhetorical gesture of Soviet support.
Moscow has also demonstrated some receptivity to
recent Iranian overtures to improve ties between the
two nations. a high-level
Soviet official will visit Tehran soon, and the Soviets
have toned down media criticism of Iran. Although
the Soviets may expand economic cooperation with
Tehran, they will not risk destroying their carefully
The intractable issues involved in East-West rela-
tions make dramatic moves in that area unlikely in
the near term, even if the regime moves more force-
fully than now seems likely. But there are a number
of regional issues where initiatives by Moscow could
enhance Soviet leverage and create potential prob-
lems for the United States. Gorbachev could:
cultivated alliance with Iraq.
Prospects for. Policy Change
Gorbachev's chief preoccupation for the time being
will be with internal affairs. Soviet officials have
acknowledged in private remarks that the extension of
Soviet influence abroad depends to a large extent on
improved economic performance at home. The lethar-
gy of the "Brezhnev era" has left a crowded agenda of
unresolved domestic problems. In addition, because of
the collective nature of the Soviet decisionmaking
process, Gorbachev must concentrate on consolidating
his power base at home before lobbying for major new
programs or policies abroad.
The increased complexity and bureaucratic nature of
the foreign policy making process also reduces the
chances of rapid policy change. Since the Brezhnev
era, the number of individuals and institutions in-
volved in foreign policy formulation has greatly in-
creased. The promotions of the Defense Minister,
Foreign Minister, and KGB Chairman to the Polit-
buro in 1973 were symbolic of the more prominent
role in foreign policy decisionmaking of the major
bureaucracies involved. This pattern has been restored
with the recent promotions of KGB Chairman Che-
brikov, Defense Minister Sokolov, and Foreign Minis-
ter Shevardnadze.
Gromyko's replacement as Foreign Minister by the
inexperienced Shevardnadze, however, is likely to give
Gorbachev more influence in the conduct of foreign
policy and increase his ability to impart a more
dynamic image to Soviet diplomacy. His success in
advancing his allies will limit the ability of the
Brezhnev old guard to oppose policy changes. The
likelihood of an extended tenure as General Secretary
? Attempt to disrupt expanding Sino-US ties by
offering some token concessions on the long-
stagnated Sino-Soviet border issue or related mili-
tary deployments.
? Exploit recent US-Japanese trade frictions by
agreeing to a visit by Foreign Minister Gromyko to
Japan.
? Increase pressure on Pakistan, provoking President
Zia to request expanded US support, which, if
granted, would impede any US-India rapproche-
ment under the Rajiv Gandhi government.
? Respond more aggressively to recent Iranian over-
tures by expanding economic cooperation and eas-
ing restrictions on the flow of arms, thereby
strengthening Tehran's anti-US posture and giving
the Soviets added leverage with Iraq.
? Attempt to exploit increasing US pressure on Ma-
nagua by stepping up economic and military sup-
port for the Sandinistas and encouraging the Cu-
bans and Nicaraguans to improve Salvadoran
guerrilla capabilities
also may strengthen his ability to gain support for new
policies.
As he consolidates power and sorts out his foreign
policy agenda, moreover, Gorbachev will find a do-
mestic political climate conducive to more vigorous
initiative. Dissatisfaction over a lack of direction in
Soviet foreign policy is reportedly widespread among
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the younger members of the Soviet elite. Gorbachev
may want to move aggressively to capitalize on the
desire for strong leadership.
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Other Topics
The USSR in Africa: An Update
The Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship
Moscow gains a key ally in the strategically
significant Horn of Africa and the use of Ethiopian
air and naval facilities. The Mengistu regime in turn
gets the large-scale military equipment and advisory
support that it needs to protect itself against a variety
of internal and external challenges. We noted points
of friction in the relationship-Ethiopian resistance to
Soviet attempts to broaden the role of civilians in the
government, Soviet stinginess with much-needed eco-
nomic aid, and Mengistu's reluctance to allow Mos-
cow regular access to the ports of Mits'iwa and
Aseb-but concluded that, largely because of the
regime's need for Soviet military backing, these ten-
sions would not significantly disrupt ties.
Since January 1984, several additional factors pro-
moting continued and even intensified mutual depen-
dence have emerged:
? The Ethiopian famine has forced Moscow and
Addis Ababa to demonstrate solidarity in order to
save political face.
? Growing pressure from the northern insurgencies 25X1
and Mengistu's attempted spring counteroffensive
have heightened Addis Ababa's military depen-
dence on the USSR.
? Mengistu's formation last year of the Workers
Party of Ethiopia, the vanguard Marxist-Leninist
party long sought by the Soviets, improved Mos-
cow's chances of institutionalizing its influence in
the Ethiopian Government.
? The continued upgrading of the Western naval
posture in the Indian Ocean has reinforced the
importance of Ethiopian naval facilities to the
Soviets.
We believe tensions are likely to persist in the rela-
tionship, notably over the amount and terms of eco-
nomic assistance Moscow extends to Addis Ababa
and the possible renewal of Soviet lobbying for a
negotiated settlement between the Mengistu regime
and at least some antigovernment rebel groups. The
basic interests that underlie the Soviet-Ethiopian rela-
tionship remain strong, however, and probably will
ensure Moscow's solid position in Ethiopia for the
foreseeable future.
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the Soviet military role in 25X1
southern Africa focused on the deteriorating econom-
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is and security conditions facing Moscow's allies in
the region and the potential problems they posed for
Soviet influence there. In late 1983, both Angola and
Mozambique confronted severe economic difficulties
and expanding insurgencies backed by South Africa.
We noted that Moscow responded by stepping up
shipments of military equipment but was providing
very little economic aid, leading both Luanda and
Maputo to turn to the West for such assistance.
Moscow's lack of success in
building influence elsewhere in southern Africa.
We judged that the Soviet position in Angola and
Mozambique had not deteriorated sufficiently to force
Moscow to reassess its policy in the region and that
the costs of military support to its allies were out-
weighed by the potential returns in Namibia and,
eventually, South Africa. We also noted, however,
that the economic and military trends in the area were
running against Luanda and Maputo and discussed
what we viewed as growing Soviet concern that
Western economic inroads and pressure from South
African-backed insurgencies might lead Angola or
Mozambique to reorient its policies. Finally, we spec-
ulated that the Soviets might be interested in explor-
ing a negotiated settlement between the Luanda
regime and the UNITA I insurgents and that they
might eventually welcome a deal between Maputo
and Pretoria that would counter the RENAMO'
challenge to Mozambique.
Several key developments have unfolded in southern
Africa since January 1984:
? A South African military incursion deep into Ango-
la pointed up Moscow's inability to guarantee the
security of its client.
? Luanda signed an agreement with South Africa in
February 1984-apparently without consulting the
Soviets-that committed Angola to stop its support
for the Namibian guerrillas of the South-West
Africa People's Organization in return for a staged
withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.
? In March Mozambique signed a nonaggression pact
with Pretoria in an effort to gain military and
economic relief from the burdens of the RENAMO
insurgency, again apparently without consulting
with the USSR.
? In August the Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister
announced that Luanda "accepted the principle" of
a partial Cuban troop withdrawal as part of a
Namibian settlement, potentially opening the way
for progress in the US-sponsored Namibian negotia-
tions.
We probably overestimated Moscow's support for
negotiations between its allies and their internal and
external adversaries. This revised judgment is based
on Soviet warnings to their allies on
the futility of making a deal with Pretoria, Moscow's
generally unenthusiastic public statements, and its
attempts to discredit the accord in the eyes of other
African leaders. Our overestimation was probably
rooted in our assumption that Luanda and Maputo
would have consulted the Soviets in advance of any
dealings with South Africa or their insurgent oppo-
nents. The apparent absence of consultation undoubt-
edly raised Moscow's concern over a serious loss of
influence in Angola and Mozambique and led the
Soviets to sharply oppose the accords with Pretoria.
In general, other judgments made prior to these
events have held up quite well. The Soviets continued
to count on the military dependence of Angola and
Mozambique to ensure Soviet influence and presence
and limit any gains in Western political influence.
Rather than change its policy, Moscow made a virtue
of the necessity of taking a wait-and-see attitude
toward its allies' dealings with Pretoria and Washing-
ton, asserting that these dealings would ultimately fail
to provide Luanda and Maputo with the economic and
security benefits they sought. Both states reportedly
have become disenchanted with their accords with
South Africa and apparently have decided to re-
emphasize military solutions to their insurgency prob-
lems. The Soviets probably are encouraged by this
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development because it ensures that these countries
will remain militarily dependent on the USSR.
Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa
described Moscow's extensive use of
military assistance in pursuit of its goals in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which include obtaining access to air
and naval facilities and building Soviet political influ-
ence. We noted that African governments that per-
ceive internal or external threats are frequently vul-
nerable to Soviet offers of military support, which
Moscow subsequently attempts to translate into ex-
panded presence, heightened political influence, and
military access.
We characterized the Soviets' record in achieving
their goals as a mixed one. Moscow has done well in
turning its willingness to supply the extensive military
needs of a handful of states to its advantage, obtaining
varying degrees of military access, and establishing
itself as a major player in Angola, Ethiopia, and, to a
lesser extent, in Mozambique. The Soviets have also
been able to use arms transfers and advisory support
to expand their presence in a number of states,
including Congo, Zambia, Seychelles, and Benin.
They have not been very successful, however, in
obtaining access to military facilities as a result of
these arms transfer relationships, mainly because
recipient states fear alienating Western suppliers of
vital development aid.
We expected that Moscow would continue its efforts
to expand its presence and access to facilities using
military aid as its primary inducement, and that it
would continue to have mixed success. We noted that
naval access probably is not a major priority for the
Soviets, but that access in Sub-Saharan Africa for air
transport and long-range reconnaissance flights is of
some importance to the Soviets, especially in West
Africa and the southern Indian Ocean, and that this
might lead the Soviets to intensify their efforts in this
area.
Military assistance continues to be Moscow's main
policy instrument in Sub-Saharan Africa. The past
year and a half has seen greatly increased arms
supplies to Angola and Ethiopia, and Mozambique is 25X1
expecting new deliveries in the near future. The
Soviets have also concluded new deals with traditional
customers such as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Madagas- 25X1
car. But Seychelles has reduced the number of Soviet
advisers present,
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al countries are unhappy with the poor quality of
Soviet arms and support. 25X1
Moscow has not obtained new access in West Africa,
nor has it made extensive efforts to gain such conces-
sions in recent months. The Soviets have been more 25X1
active in the Indian Ocean, showing the flag with ship
visits to Seychelles and deploying two IL-38 ASW
aircraft to Mozambique for 12 days. Whether the
aircraft deployment represents the beginning of regu-
lar Soviet access to Mozambican airfields or a one-
time concession by the Machel government, it proba-
bly presages continued Soviet efforts to acquire such
access in the region.
Soviet economic links with 25X1
Sub-Saharan Africa, describing the rapid expansion
of trade and aid ties in the 1970s, the concentration of
Soviet trade with a handful of key partners, and the
heavy Soviet emphasis on military as opposed to
economic assistance. political 25X1
and military factors are often decisive in determining
Soviet trade patterns but that Moscow expects to be
paid back in some form by even its most favored
clients. We judged that the Soviets were not likely to
make much headway in building influence in Africa
through their trade and aid policies, and that military
assistance would dominate Soviet policy in the region.
Nothing has happened in the past 18 months that
would lead us to revise these judgments. The Soviets
remain unwilling to supply substantial development 25X1
aid to African states, even when this policy leads
Soviet arms recipients such as Congo and Guinea-
which were once quite close to Moscow-to seek
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Western aid and investment. The Soviets probably
calculate that these states will not be able to obtain
much military aid from the West, leaving these
countries militarily dependent on the USSR to a
degree that ensures a continued Soviet role there.
The Soviets have increased their economic aid to
Ethiopia in recent months in response to the famine
emergency, but the quantity of Soviet assistance falls
far short of Ethiopia's needs and is much less than
that being supplied by the West. Moscow's main
concern in Ethiopia appears to have been to avoid the
unfavorable publicity generated by its apparent un-
willingness to help a client in desperate economic
straits. Soviet policy continues to be centered on
military assistance to the Mengistu regime.
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Secret
Gorbachev's Economic Advisers
The economic advisers on whom Mikhail Gorbachev
reportedly intends to rely are a diverse group, includ-
ing a supporter of greater enterprise autonomy, the
director of a center for international economic re-
search, and a specialist in economic forecasting. Only
the first of these-the economist Abel Aganbegyan-
has been an outright advocate of economic reform,
and even he has taken pains to emphasize the com-
patability of his views with the central planning
system. Nonetheless, all three have been critical of
some aspects of the Soviet system and have been
involved in controversy with the Soviet establishment.
They probably will reinforce Gorbachev's inclination
to press forward with measures to modernize manage-
ment and planning and to increase Soviet economic
competitiveness with capitalist countries.
Abel Aganbegyan,
Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Aleksandr Anchishkin as
individuals whose advice the new General Secretary
will seek in devising his economic program. The three
enjoy prestigious positions that give them access to top
political leaders, and Aganbegyan and Anchishkin
have particular economic concerns that Gorbachev
has said he shares. Yakovlev is not an economist by
training but, of the three, enjoys the closest ties to
Gorbachev, and the Institute of World Economics and
International Relations (IMEMO), which he heads, is
one of Moscow's leading economic "think tanks."
their statements and articles may shed some light
on the economic policies the new party chief will
pursue.
said that the 52-year-old Aganbegyan would
be one of Gorbachev's key economic advisers. Agan-
begyan is director of the Institute of the Economics
and Organization of Industrial Production of the
Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences (the
Novosibirsk Institute) and is well known in the West,
where he has a reputation as a critic of the Soviet
economic system. In 1965 he wrote a report exposing
Soviet economic defects that was leaked to Western
reporters and received much attention abroad, but the
incident did not prevent his promotion the following
year to directorship of the Novosibirsk Institute.
In the early 1980s, Aganbegyan supported arguments
for the expansion of small-scale private enterprise in
the service sector-a controversial issue but one on
which members of then party secretary Gorbachev's
staff were reported to hold similar views. In apparent
recognition of the controversial nature of the subject,
Aganbegyan subsequently took care to clarify his
position. In conversations with a US Embassy official
in May 1984, he insisted that small-scale service units
could operate on a private basis without detracting
from the planned nature of the Soviet economy.
Aganbegyan was on the fringes of another economic
controversy in mid-1983, when a seminar paper deliv-
ered by Tatyana Zaslavskaya at Aganbegyan's insti-
tute was leaked to the Western press. The paper
criticized excessive centralization and bureaucratiza-
tion and called for a restructuring of Soviet economic
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management. Once again, however, Aganbegyan did
not seem to suffer from the publicity this incident
received. Indeed, the industrial management experi-
ment introduced in enterprises of five ministries in
January 1984 addressed criticisms presented in the
Zaslavskaya paper. The experiment increases enter-
prises' rights and responsibilities by giving them
greater control over investment and incentive funds
and by linking managerial and worker bonuses to
fulfillment of delivery contracts. It was expanded this
year to 20 additional industrial ministries and is to be
extended throughout the industrial sector during the
12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90).
Aganbegyan has supported the experiment in the
Soviet press but has called for its continued improve-
ment. At the same time, he has accompanied his
support for greater autonomy for enterprise managers
with a critical appraisal of their capabilities. In an
interview with Izvestiya in March, for example, he
noted that the typical Soviet enterprise manager lacks
the educational background of his Western counter-
part and has little formalized training in management
or experience in using computers and other modern
managerial tools. He implied that a massive reeduca-
tion program will be required to improve lower level
economic management and described the manage-
ment training provided at his institute as far too little
to meet the economy's needs. He has recommended
managerial and computer training for enterprise di-
rectors, greater use of the brigade form of labor,' and
closer linkage between incentive payments and
results.
Gorbachev echoed Aganbegyan's views on 8 April at
a Central Committee meeting with industrial and
agricultural managers, suggesting that a major effort
be made to improve the lower levels of management.
He also supported the current experiment to increase
enterprise rights and responsibilities and stated the
need for further measures. He criticized higher level
bodies, including the ministries, for persisting in old
styles of work and hindering successful implementa-
tion of the experiment. Gorbachev also complained
that enterprises have not made full use of rights
' In the brigade form of labor, small groups of workers are assigned
resources and tasks according to a contract with enterprise manage-
ment, and remuneration is tied to output of the brigade as a whole
Yakovlev
granted to them because managers were not properly
prepared for the change in procedures.
Yakovlev, who has headed IMEMO since September
1983, as another individual who is likely to influence
Gorbachev's economic program. Yakovlev, 61, is a
historian rather than an economist by training. In the
past two years he has written several crude anti-
American diatribes that US Embassy officers have
attributed to his desire to ingratiate himself with
Soviet hardliners. Earlier, however, Yakovlev had
been involved in controversy with Soviet conserva-
tives. According to an emigre source, an article
Yakovlev wrote in 1972 that was critical of Russian
nationalism met with party secretary Suslov's displea-
sure and led to Yakovlev's dismissal from the Propa-
ganda Department of the Central Committee. Yakov-
lev was then "reassigned" as Ambassador to Canada,
losing his position on the editorial board of the party
journal Kommunist. He was serving as Ambassador
during Gorbachev's successful visit to Canada in May
1983. His contacts with Gorbachev during the visit
and his connections on the Central Committee proba-
bly were instrumental in winning his appointment to
head IMEMO in September 1983. He subsequently
accompanied Gorbachev on his state visit to the
United Kingdom in December 1984.
Upon his appointment as director of IMEMO, Yakov-
lev indicated that he wanted the institute to have a
greater role in formulating and implementing domes-
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tic policy. Gorbachev's ascendancy may give him the
opportunity to realize this goal. In February of this
year, when Chernenko's illness had evidently already
left Gorbachev effectively in control of the Politburo,
although as a protege of Fedorenko he at times shared
criticism directed at his mentor by planning officials.
Yakov-
lev's deputy had been tapped to play a major role in
preparing the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan in an effort to
draw upon his knowledge of managerial practices in
capitalist economic systems. This is an area in which
IMEMO has considerable expertise.
planners hoped to draw upon IMEMO's expertise in
international economics. Yakovlev himself has experi-
ence in this area from his days as Ambassador to
Canada, when he helped achieve sizable increases in
Soviet-Canadian trade and concluded general agree-
ments on scientific, technological, and agricultural
cooperation. Shortly after his appointment as
IMEMO's director, a member of his staff told US
Embassy officers that the institute was studying ways
of increasing Soviet exports of machinery to the West.
Gorbachev recently mentioned this goal in his speech
to enterprise managers in early April
Aleksandr Anchishkin
Anchishkin, an
adviser to Gorbachev on economic issues, is less well
known in the West than Aganbegyan or Yakovlev. At
51, he was elected last December to full membership
in the Economics Department of the Academy of
Sciences. He had served since 1971 as chief of the
economic forecasting department in the Academy's
Central Mathematical Economics Institute (TsEMI)
headed by Nikolay Fedorenko.
Fedor-
enko was removed from his post in mid-May and
TsEMI was replaced with two new institutes, one of
which is headed by Anchishkin. This might herald an
effort to placate TsEMI's bureaucratic critics and at
the same time continue much of its work under
Anchishkin's leadership. TsEMI came under high-
level official attack in June 1983 for failing to address
economic problems in a practical way, and Fedorenko,
as head of TsEMI, bore the brunt of that criticism.
Anchishkin was able to maintain a lower profile,
Anchishkin's research on planning methods and his
emphasis on long-term forecasting complement the
leadership's recent interest in improving planning-
yet another theme of Gorbachev's 8 April speech to
Soviet managers and his 23 April speech to the
Central Committee plenum. Gorbachev apparently
hopes to draw upon Anchishkin's expertise to promote
work long under way on setting stable indicators for
industrial enterprises for entire five-year planning
periods and on devising a long-range economic plan
until the year 2000
Shared Views
Aganbegyan, Yakovlev, and Anchishkin-like Gorba-
chev himself-subscribe to views that lie well within
the mainstream of Soviet economic thinking. They all
have described themselves as advocates of more effec-
tive central planning, and none has given any hint of
support for radical changes in the Soviet economic
system such as moves toward market socialism. Yet,
each at some time in the past has antagonized conser-
vative forces by questioning traditional procedures or
by criticizing the way the Soviet system works. Gor-
bachev's speeches since he became General Secretary
indicate that he shares this critical attitude toward
the economy and a willingness to experiment. Advis-
ers such as Aganbegyan, Yakovlev, and Anchishkin
are likely to reinforce his determination to streamline
and modernize the Soviet economic system and may
provide the intellectual direction for such change.
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Afghanistan: New Emphasis on
Old Military Problems
Several recent articles in Military Herald-the pro-
fessional journal of the Soviet Ground Forces-by
senior Soviet officers closely associated with Afghani-
stan provide insight into problems the Soviets are
experiencing and lessons they are learning in Afghani-
stan. Such issues as troop management, tactical intel-
ligence, and an aggressive approach to combat opera-
tions have relevance to Soviet forces as a whole but
are particularly acute in Afghanistan, where short-
comings are less easily concealed and have more
serious consequences.' Among the solutions the senior
officers propose are closer ties between officers and
their men, better reconnaissance at the battalion level,
and more aggressiveness on the part of unit com-
manders.
Problems of Troop Management
One recurring theme in the Soviet military press is a
campaign to improve management at the troop level.
In a broad sense, this encompasses all activities of
commanders and staffs directed toward the accom-
plishment of a unit's mission both in combat and in
the development and maintenance of training stan-
dards, readiness, discipline, and morale. In a word, it
concerns the concept of leadership.
the Soviet military
press-have noted troop management problems in
Afghanistan that are also typical of those experienced
by Soviet units elsewhere: dereliction of duty and lack
of professional competence by officers; black mar-
keteering by officers and soldiers; poor and sometimes
brutal relationships between officers and soldiers,
between sergeants and soldiers, and between senior
and junior enlisted men; alcoholism in all ranks; and
ethnic tensions. Soviet efforts to solve such problems
concentrate on the officer corps itself-both because
the commander is held accountable for the actions of
his subordinates and because the officer corps is a
major part of the problem.
Commanders are reminded of the importance of
individual work with their subordinates and the neces-
sity to avoid "coarseness" in superior-subordinate
relations. This was the subject of an article by Army
Gen. Dmitriy Sukhorukhov, commander of the Air-
borne Troops, in the October 1984 issue of Military
Herald. The article, directed specifically at junior
officers, cites three airborne officers who served with
distinction in Afghanistan and who had excellent
relations with their troops. Leadership principles that
these officers used and that Sukhorukhov recom-
mends to others include leading by example; taking an
individualized approach to each soldier and paying
attention to his strengths, weaknesses, problems, per-
sonal background, and interests; and supporting sub-
ordinates and considering their suggestions. Sukhor-
ukhov emphasizes that commanders need to "mix"
with their troops-in the field and in garrison-in
order to develop personal relationships with each.
Sukhorukhov's views reflect longstanding "prescrip- 25X1
tions" for recurring problems, but his emphasis on
Afghanistan is significant. The shortcomings previ-
ously noted are disruptive enough in a peacetime
army but have even more serious consequences in
wartime. In this sense, combat experience in Afghani-
stan probably has highlighted weaknesses in Soviet
junior and middle-level leadership and given impetus
to efforts to improve the Soviet officer corps
forcewide
Problems in Tactical Intelligence
One of the most serious and persistent problems for
the Soviets in Afghanistan has been the organization
and effective operation of their tactical intelligence
effort. They repeatedly have been frustrated in at-
tempts to locate elusive insurgent forces in a suffi-
ciently accurate and timely manner to enable combat
forces to engage them. Augmentations and organiza-
tional changes in the Soviet intelligence structure in
Afghanistan in 1984 were designed to improve intelli-
gence support for the counterinsurgency campaign.
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In the October and December 1984 issues of Military
Herald, Col. Gen. Fedor Gredasov and Army Gen.
Aleksandr Mayorov addressed tactical intelligence
from the perspective of their considerable experience
in Afghanistan. Gredasov, associated with the Intelli-
gence Directorate of the Soviet Ground Forces, was a
frequent visitor to Afghanistan in the entourage of
Marshal Sergey Sokolov during the period 1979-84
when Sokolov, then First Deputy Minister of Defense,
oversaw the direction of the war. Mayorov is the First
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground
Forces and a former chief of the Soviet Military
Assistance Group in Kabul.
Gredasov's article deals with the necessity for units at
battalion level and below to conduct reconnaissance
effectively. It emphasizes the commander's (and
staff's) responsibility to organize reconnaissance using
all resources available. Suggestions include establish-
ing specific tasks for reconnaissance as far in advance
as possible, conducting reconnaissance by foot patrols
in mountainous regions in advance of units in vehicles,
and maintaining constant communication with recon-
naissance elements
General Mayorov touches on some of the same themes
in his article discussing factors that contribute to
combat effectiveness. Citing Gredasov's article, he
notes that reconnaissance is the most complex and
most important type of combat support. He charges,
however, that many Soviet battalion commanders
tend to rely too heavily on intelligence support from
other units rather than fully utilizing organic recon-
naissance assets. Mayorov criticizes commanders who
complain of inadequate resources to conduct effective
reconnaissance and says that battalions should be able
to accomplish their intelligence missions if command-
ers use their assets wisely.
The repeated failures of Soviet tactical intelligence
efforts in Afghanistan--of which both Gredasov and
Mayorov are well aware-may serve as an impetus
for increased attention to this area forcewide. Soviet
commanders probably recognize that tactical intelli-
gence must be improved not only to pursue the
Afghan war successfully, but also for units to be able
to cope with targeting problems in a more convention-
al war. Mayorov specifically notes, for example, that
developments in foreign armies, such as the use of
precision-guided munitions and advanced fire-control
and target-acquisition systems, will demand more
effective reconnaissance on the part of Soviet forces.
Aggressiveness in Combat
The ultimate measure of a military unit's effective-
ness is its ability to close with and defeat an opposing
force. To a considerable extent, this depends on a
unit's aggressiveness and ability to react in a quickly
changing combat situation. This, in turn, depends
largely on the commander's ability to exercise initia-
tive and take decisive action at critical junctures in
the battle
In this respect the Soviet combat record in Afghani-
stan has been mixed. The insurgents as well as senior
Soviet officers have commented on the lack of aggres-
siveness by Soviet units in combat.
for the most part have been more impressed with the
performance of Soviet airborne and special-purpose
troops than with that of regular motorized rifle units.
The importance of combat "activeness," decisiveness,
and initiative on the part of units and commanders is
addressed by Lt. Gen. Valentin Kostylev, the first
deputy commander of the Airborne Troops, in a
January 1985 article. Kostylev has firsthand knowl-
edge of Afghanistan, having made several trips there
to visit airborne forces in 1983 and 1984. He sees the
goal of officer training to be the development of
tactical maturity on the part of commanders-a
maturity that will enable them at a given moment to
cast aside a previous plan, evaluate a new situation,
and develop a new plan. Commanders, he argues,
must be unafraid to take calculated risks to conduct
aggressive combat operations.
Kostylev notes approvingly the achievements of some
airborne units and commanders in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, but also admits that not all commanders
and units measure up. Many commanders are still
characterized by inertia and rigidity of thought, and
Kostylev undoubtedly knows the consequences some
airborne units have suffered in Afghanistan because
of this.
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Breaking the mold of the "school solution" and
displaying initiative and aggressiveness in Afghani-
stan may be hindered by two unique factors. First, the
Soviets have pursued an economy-of-force approach
to the war to keep down the personnel and material
costs. Commanders may, therefore, be more con-
cerned with limiting losses than with inflicting maxi-
mum casualties on the insurgents. Second, the high-
level direction of the war-evident, for example, in
repeated and prolonged visits to Afghanistan by senior
Soviet military officers-would suggest that com-
manders at all levels probably perceive themselves to
be on a "tight rein" and may not be willing to risk
great displays of initiative.
Implications
The war in Afghanistan has not so much posed new
problems for the Soviet military as it has highlighted
longstanding problems and weaknesses in the armed
forces. By exposing these deficiencies, the Soviet
experience in Afghanistan will more clearly focus the
attention of military leaders on the need for corrective
action. Most of the problems noted are common to
warfighting in general-not unique to a guerrilla
war-and journal articles by senior officers drawing
on experience in Afghanistan suggest that the Soviet
military recognizes the relevance of this experience in
their efforts to better prepare for combat forcewide.
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