CIVIL DEFENSE AND SHELTER CONSTRUCTION IN HUNGARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001300050002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
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1st? 80
CIVIL DEFENSE
AND SHELTER CONSTRUCTION IN HUNGARY
CIA/RR 59-2
January 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
'This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
CIVIL DEFENSE AND SHELTER CONSTRUCTION IN HUNGARY
CIA/BR 59-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This report has been compiled largely from information furnished
by Hungarian refugees. For this reason it principally shows the status
of some civil defense preparations at the time of the Hungarian up-
rising) October-November 1956. The amount and type of preparations
made, particularly in the construction of heavy air-raid shelters, are
believed to be 'significant. The air-raid shelters, which are the most
costly civil defense items, undoubtedly are still in place and are pre-
sumed not to have been extensively damaged. Some reorganization as
well as renewed civil defense training has recently been reported.
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CONTENTS
Summary and Conclusions
Page
1
I.
Organization
3
A.
Soviet Guidance
3
B.
Command
4
C.
Cities and Counties
4
D.
Industrial Enterprises
E.
Railroads
9
F.
Dwelling Units
10
Paramilitary Organizations
10
A.
History
10
B.
Mission
11
C.
Organization
11
D.
Membership
12
E.
Activity After November 1956
12
III.
Plans and Training
13
A.
National Planning
13
B.
Training
15
1. Civil Defense Leaders
15
2. Civil Defense Battalions
16
3. Industrial Enterprises
16
4. City Services
17
5. General Public
18
C.
Instructions for Alerts.
18
1. Civil Defense Alert
18
2. Air-Raid Alarm
18
3. Chemical Alarm
18
IV.
Air-Raid Shelter Program
19
A.
Directives
19
B.
BGS Shelters
19
C.
Basement Shelters
23
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1. Apartment Dwellings
2. Industrial Shelters
3. Government Shelters
4. Medical Shelters
Page
23
25
25
? 25
D. Special Plant Galleries
26
E. Other Types of Shelter
26
1. Arched Tunnel Shelters
26
2. . Prefabricated Controllers' Shelters
26
F. Possible Changes in Plans
.
27
V.
Budapest Shelters
27
A. Tunnel and Gallery Shelters
27
B. Subway Shelters
28
C. Government and Communist Party Shelters
29
1. Ministry of Defense . . . - . . . ..
.??. OOOOOO
29
2. Communist Party Headquarters .,.
29
3. Hungarian News Service Building
30
4. Hungarian State Railroads . . . . .
. . . O ' ......
',
30
5. Police Buildings
30
6. Other
30
D. Transport and Communications
31
E. Industrial Enterprises
32
F. Public Buildings and Apartment Basements
? ..
34
VI.
Shelters in Other Areas ? OOOOOOOO ? ?
? ? ? ?
35
? ,
A. Tunnel and Gallery Systems
35
B. Government and Communist Party Shelters
35
C. Transport and Communications
36
D. Industrial Shelters ?
'
36
E. Apartment Basements - . - . . . . . OO .
. '. ... . . ? ?
38
. Appendixes
Appendix A. Decree No.. 01/67-1951 VI of the Hungarian .
Minister of the Interior . . - . . . . 39
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ILLEGIB
Appendix B. Decree No. 0138.952/VI of the Hungarian"-
. Minister of the Interior
Page
49
Illustrations
Figure 1. Hungary: Civil Defense Organization
(Chart)
Following Page
4
Figure 2. Hungary: Civil Defense Students Shoring a
House Wall (Photograph) 16
Figure 3. Hungary: Basic Construction Requirements
for an Air-Raid Bunker (Sketch from
Memory) 20
Figure 4. Hungary: Floor Plan of the First Floor of a
Typical Air-Raid Bunker (Sketch from
Memory) 22
Figure 5. Hungary: Typical Air-Raid Shelter in a
Munitions Plant (Sketch from Memory) 24
Figure 6. Hungary: Floor Plan of a Basement Air-Raid
Shelter (Sketch from Memory) 24
Figure 7. Hungary: Underground Departments in an
Ammunition Plant at Eger (Sketch from
Memory) 26
Figure 8. Hungary: Construction Details of an "Atomic"
Air-Raid Shelter (Sketch from Memory) . . . 26
Figure 9. Hungary: A Three-Man Air-Raid Shelter
(Sketch from Memory) 26
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Figure 10. Hungary: The Air-Raid Shelter System at
Var Hill in Budapest (Sketch)
Figure 11.. Hungary: Subway Systems in Budapest
(Sketch)
Following Page
28
28
Figure 12. Hungary: Air-Raid Bunker for 1,000
Persons (Sketch from Memory) 34
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CIVIL DEFENSE AND SHELTER CONSTRUCTION IN HUNGARY*
Summary and Conclusions
Before the uprising of October-November 1956, Hungary had devel-
oped an extensive civil defense system which was monitored and guided
in Most respects by the USSR. Evidence indicates that the Hungarian
civil defense program, although disrupted by the revolt, is now being
reestablished and that its training is being directed toward defense
against nuclear weapons.
Civil defense in Hungary and in the Soviet Bloc differs in concept
from civil defense in the US in the following ways:
1. The Hungarian' civil defense program is carried on without pub-
licity and without clearly visible evidence. Civil defense signs have
not been reported, as Hungarian instructions require their posting only
on notice of an air alert. Western observers have reported evidence of
the construction of air-raid shelters or small-scale drills only in rare
instances. The construction of shelters has been concealed, and civil
defense publicity has been largely limited to special manuals and civil
defense instruction courses.
2. The Hungarian civil defense program operates under security re-
strictions.
Insofar as is known, civil
defense officials have not been identified in the Hungarian press, and
refugees tell of classified training instructions and building plans.
3. Possibly for security reasons, Hungarian authorities are reluc-
tant to give full information to the Hungarian public on the probable
effects of nuclear weapons. Although planning since 1952 is known to
have been based in part on the effects of atomic weapons, the informa-
tion which was generally available on civil defense berore 1955 avoided
the subject of the effects of atomic weapons. One article on atomic
civil defense planning is known to have been published since the revolt
of 1956, but this appeared in a specialized military periodical, not in
the popular press. The Hungarian citizen probably does not know the
size of the areas of blast damage from the larger nuclear weapons or the
size of the areas of contamination and the possible persistence of radio-
activity from nuclear weapons in general.
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 November 1958.
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4. It seems evident that Communist authorities emphasize control
and do not intend to grant mobility to the population in the event of
air attack. All known civil defense instructions advise the popula-
tion to take refuge in nearby shelters in case of attack.
5. A priority system has been used in Hungary for setting up air-
raid shelters and organizations for air defense. The heaviest shelters
and the earliest training were provided for installations of the
government; of transport and communications, and of important indus-
tries. in the event of air attack, 50X1
40-percent casualties were expected among the general public but only
10 percent among the industrial labor force--.an apportionment which
probably reflects the priorities that have been set up for these seg-
ments of the population.
6 Civil defense in hungary, which is centrally controlled and
monitored by the USSR, has used compulsion in varying degrees to in-
sure enrollment in organizational units and participation in train-
ing.
? The organization of civil defense in Hungary,. 'which is under
the Ministry of the Interior, includes a corps of staff officers.
assigned at various governmental levels for planning :w direction.
Both military personnel and civilian specialists are employed.
The more significant aspects of HungArian civil defense prep-
arations include the following:
1. .Efforts to develop civil defense are on a long-term basis.
The staff organization as well as the construction of air-raid shel-
ters and the conduct of training courses dates back to 1949:
2. The construction of heavy air-raid shelters has been wide-
spread in Hungary. Bunkers with 16-foot ceilings and 10-foot walls
of reinforced concrete are frequently reported. ?It is estimated
that between 100 and 400'of these structures exist in Hungary, with
an average capacity of 10,000 persons. Supplementing, or built in
place of these, are a number of underground tunnel and gallery sys-
tems in Budapest and elsewhere. Several munitions plants have shel-
ters of the latter type.
A universal order to build air-raid shelters
of large new masonry buildings has been in effect in
other countries of the Soviet Bloc, since about 1949
tion-of these shelters,has been frequently reported.
ing of World War II shelters and the construction of
the basement type in older buildings have also taken
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in the basements
Hungary, as in
. The construc-
The refurbish-
new shelters of
place.
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If new construction of state and subsidized housing since 1950
has inCluded shelter generally, more than 300,000 Hungarians may have
been provided with new .shelters of the basement type. No estimate can
be made of the amount of usable basement shelter remaining from World
War II .or of that newly constructed in older masonry buildings.
3. Special civil defense battalions somewhat like national guard
units were formed and trained during 1954-56.
4. Training of workers for civil defense has been widespread in
Hungary since about 1951. This training has been compulsory and has
taken place principally in government offices,.institutions, and
Important industrial installations.
5. There can be no doubt that Soviet advisers have had a major
rple in directing the Hungarian civil defense program.
it must be concluded that the Hungarians, under Soviet direc-
tion, have conducted.a serious and costly effort to develop civil de-
fense.' The volume of .construction of heavy shelters and the efforts
5tdmaintain secrecy.tend-to negateany argument that Hungarian prepa-
rations for civil :defense have been:cohdudted solely for psychological
effect in order to reassure the population. Rather, it appears that
a-serious effort has.been made to-afford good protection for those
elements of the4cpulation which would be considered militarily im-
portant..-- that is, governMental control personnel, transport and
communications.workera, and workers in essential industry. At the
same time, a continuing policy has been in effect to provide increas-
ing numbers of the urban population with limited protection such as
basement shelters. In suitable masonry buildings.
.,Numerous.linksand:aimilarities exist between civil defense in
Hungary and that in the USSR-and. other countries of the Soviet Bloc.
It may be suspected, therefore, that other important Bloc countries,
particularly-the USSR, have implemented civil defense measures similar
to or better 'than those reported from Hungary.
I. Organization. -
A. Soviet Guidance.
By 1952 the USSR had assumed the role of leadership in the prep-
aration of measures for air defense of the principal European Satellites.
By that time, Soviet commissions were sent to the various Satellites to
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standardize and organize their air defense. li* The parallels which
have developed between Satellite and Soviet civil defense are evidence
that Soviet guidance has been a dominant factor in the Satellite sys-
tems.
In addition, Hun-
garian civil defense officials have visited the USSR for extended
periods. ?./ Because of this known Soviet leadership and because of
similarities in the civil defense preparations of the various countries
of the Soviet Bloc, additional credence can be given
regarding Hungarian civil defense if similar measures have been-
detected in the USSR or in other countries of the Bloc.
B. Command.
The Ministry of the Interior (Belugyi Miniszterium), under the
Council of Ministers, is responsible for civil defense it Hungary. 1/
(For the organization of civil defense in Hungary, see the accompanying
chart, Figure 1.**) The national civil defense headquarters (Legoltalom
Orszagos Parancsnoksaga LOP) is located at the Ministry building. V
It is estimated that command and staff personnel for civil de.-.
fense in Hungary total between 400 and 500 military officers selected
by and assigned to the Ministry of the Interior. Technically trained
civilian architects, engineers, and other specialists are also em-
ployed. 2/
Civil defense officers wear khaki uniforms with green epaulets.
Crossed bombs are said to be worn as the service insignia on green
collar patches, ?I although engineer insignia have also been observed
on troops taking part in civil defense exercises. //
Subordinate to the LOP are civil defense headquarters in
counties, and under these are civil defense headquarters in cities
Or towns.
C. Cities and Counties.
The commander of civil defense operations in a city or county
is nominally its highest ranking civilian authority -- the president Of
** Following p. 4.
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HUNGARY: CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Council of Ministers
Industrial Ministries
Civil Defense Office
Soviet Advisers
Civil Defense Staff
Services:
I. Observation
2. Communisations
3. Antichemical
4. Alarm and Blackout
S. Shelter
6. Order
7. Medical
8. Fire Protection
9. Repair
10. Veterinary
Ministry of the Interior
National Civil Defense Headquarters
Ministry of Defense
National Antiaircraft and Air Force
Headquarters
County Civil Defense Headquarters
City Civil Defense Headquarters
Budapest
Civil Defense Headquarters
District Civil Defense
Headquarters
Figure I 50X1
Ministry of Communications and Postal Affairs
Dept. XI, Managing Directorate
of the Hungarian State Railroads
Enterprise Civil Defense
Services:
I. Observation
2. Communications
3. Order
4. Fire Fighting
5. Medical
27096 12:58
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SubortNnatiol
1
Air Raid Groups (Buildings)
Ilnitr
I. Order
2. Fire Defense
3. Chemical Defense
4. Medical
5. Repair
6. Shelter
Civil Defense Battalions
nor larger dna)
Companies:
I. Headquarters
1. Political
3. CBR
4. Signal
S. Engineer
6. Medical
7. Bomb Disposal
Railroad Stations, S ops, and Yards
Services:
I. Observation
2. Communications
3. Order
4. Fire Fighting
5. Medical
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the council or the mayor in a city and the town notary in a village. 8/
A full-time civil defense staff* is assigned, however, in each county
and in each city having a mayor and a city administration. 9/ Such
staff's are commanded by lieutenant colonels or majors in counties and
by captains or first lieutenants in cities. 10/ In 1957 the mayor of
Budapest had a lieutenant colonel serving as the civil defense commander
or chief of staff. Each district of Budapest has several officers
assigned to an air-raid defense staff. 11/ The staffs of the opera-
tional units and their commanders are reported to perform the following
functions 12/:
1. All administrative work related to civil defense opera-
tions.
2. Procurement and handling of supplies.
3. Registration and training of personnel.
4. Supervision of the execution of published civil defense
orders.
Additional members of the city civil defense staff reportedly include
a finance officer, a supply officer, a medical officer, a director of
troops (in charge of rescue squads and clearance of debris), a director
of fire fighters, a director of antichemical and decontamination groups,
and a veterinary. 12/ Some functions, such as supply, probably will
require the services of a full-time civil defense supervisor, but other
staff leaders probably are drawn from existing organizations. These
might include the senior medical officer, the fire chief, and others
whose functions and organization fit logically into civil defense. In
one city the employment of a political officer has been reported.111/
It is believed that full-time civil defense staff officers are not
employed below the city headquarters level (or possibly below the
district headquarters level in Budapest).
The units controlled by city civil defense headquarters which
are to operate in an emergency have not yet been clearly defined. A
Hungarian civil defense manual of 1952 describes the organization and
operation of public civil defense** in the following manner. 12/
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** The term public civil defense refers to the functions of civil
defense operational units and staffs at the city level or above -- that
is, in cities, counties, and the larger enterprises. In contrast, the
term publicly directed individual civil defense refers to civil defense
or self-defense units formed from workers or residents in smaller enter-
prises, dwelling areas, or smaller towns.
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The main task of the public civil defense organization is to
prevent or repair damage in public areas. In general, it is responsi-
ble for salvage work and rescue operations performed in the interests
of the "working people." This operation requires unified leadership
and execution within the area of a single town, city, or county.
Another task of public civil defense is to attend to all rescue opera-
tions which surpass the capacities of those civil defense organizations
that are in individual enterprises or plants and dwelling houses (that
is, the publicly directed individual civil defense organizations) in '
order to insure the effective performance of their duties. Local city
and county councils have jurisdiction over public civil defense as well
as over the organization and direction of publicly directed individual
civil defense.
The civil defense headquarters of a city is organized under
the local; council and is in charge of the management and control of
local civil defense services. The civil defense staff, in the civil
defense headquarters, is under the direction of the president of the
local executive committee (mayor), who is also the local civil defense
chief. In practice, the operations of the civil defense staff are
directed by the civil defense chief of staff. The work of the civil
defense staff is supported by technical lecturers such as engineers,
chemists, physicians, and fire-guards. Damage caused by an air raid
Is repaired by civil defense units centrally directed by civil defense
headquarters.
The civil defense center of a city is located in an air-raid
shelter, which is furnished with technical equipment and is protected
against enemy attack. From there the activity of the civil defense
organization of the city is directed by the civil defense staff during
the entire emergency period commencing with the ordering of an alert.
When a civil defense alert is ordered, part of the personnel
assigned to the civil defense headquarters (officials, messengers, and
telephone operators) must remain on permanent duty at the center. In
case of an air alarm the entire personnel, including the technical lec-
turers, must report to the center and perform their assigned duties
there. The civil defense headquarters obtains information about the
air raid.through communications equipment and through messengers and
then gives instructions to the subordinate units, directing them to the
scenes of damage. The civil defense headquarters has special service
units at its disposal for repairing the damages caused by an air raid,
as follows:
1. The observation and reconnaissance service reports inci-
dents connected with an air raid to the civil defense headquarters.
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2.. The signal service maintains steady communications with the
civil defense center and its subordinate civil defense organs as well
as with civil defense and political organizations and other authorities.
3. The chemical or antigas service is in charge of locating
the places when gas attack has occurred and of preventing ill effects.'
4. The alarm and blackout service must alert the civil defense
organization in case of the danger of an air raid and must inform the
civilian population of the existence of the danger as well as its pass-
ing. This service must be performed efficiently and accurately and must
also enforce full compliance with blackout regulations.
5. The housing and shelter service is entrusted with the pro-
tection of the lives of the civilian population. Its tasks include the
following: to locate and keep in repair the private and public air-
raid shelters remaining from World War II; to post the number of people
to be accommodated by each shelter; to initiate, in the event of a civil
defense alert, preliminary proceedings for the evacuation* of cities,
towns, or other endangered areas; to transform suitable cellars into
air-raid shelters; to make suggestions to the authorities about repairing
damaged air-raid shelters; to provide housing for persons and families
who have become homeless; .to make a record of and to assist those of
the civilian population who have suffered material losses in consequence
of an air-raid; and to maintain public air-raid shelters and their equip-
ment.
6. The service in charge of maintaining public order must per-
form not only the duties of the peacetime police but also those tasks
which may occur in connection with public order and security during
a civil defense alert as well as during and after an air attack. It
must also watch public air-raid shelters and maintain order in them.
? 7. The medical service must locate persons injured by an air ?
raid, give them first aid as well as medical aid, and move them to a
sheltered place and care for them until such time as they can be trans-
ported to a first aid station or to a hospital where they can be given
complete medical attention.
? 8. The fire protection service has a twofold duty: first,
fire prevention, or taking measures to prevent the spreading of fires
caused by incendiary bombs (for example, clearing attics and impregnation
* Children, bedridden invalids, and the like are the only groups sug-
gested for evacuation.
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with fire-resistant substances), and, second, extinguishing fires caused
by incendiary bombs and rescuing persons, animals, and objects from
such fires.
9. The repair, technical aid, and rubble-clearing service is
to be used to diminish the effects of damage caused by enemy air
attack and to reestablish as soon as possible the normal course of city
life and the continuity of production in plants. In connection with
these duties it must rescile persons and goods (machinery, technical
equipment, raw materials, and the like) buried under the ruins of
buildings destroyed by an air raid or blocked in shelters; prop up or
pull down damaged sections of buildings; repair minor damage in
buildings; repair damage to transportation lines, bridges, public
utilities (water, gas, electricity, drain pipes, and the like); neu-
tralize unexploded bombs and other ammunition; and, finally, bury
persons killed by air attack.
10. The veterinary service must protect animals from the
consequences of air attack -- splinters, fire, and the poisoning
effects of chemical warfare -- as well as provide veterinary treat-
ment for injured animals. In case of severe injuries it must perform
emergency slaughter and must decide whether the meat is suitable for
consumption or industrial purposes.
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A significant development, however, has been the initia-
tion of civil defense battalions (legoltalmi zaszloalj) in Hungary 17/
similar to national guard units. 50X1
The pre- 50X1
cise assignment and missions of the civil defense battalions are not
clear. Their functions (in most cases duplicating those of the city
services) may be deduced from the titles of the component companies.
They therefore appear to represent auxiliary groups which may act as
disaster relief columns.
Each battalion was to have more than
400 men and approximately 9 officers -- a battalion commander and
executive officer plus 7 company commanders. 21/ A Budapest civil
defense battalion was described as having the following companies:
headquarters, political, CBR (chemical, bacteriological, and radio-
logical), signal, engineer, medical, and bomb disposal.
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company was reported to include no doctors, making it likely that
professional medical personnel would be called to support the battalions
when an emergency situation warranted such action. At least one civil
defense battalion was on duty in Budapest at the outbreak of the 1956 '
uprising. Its barracks were reported to be located on the road to
Dunakeszi, a suburban town north of Budapest. 23/ In 1954, another or
the same battalion had an office in the city hall. 24/ Other cities
at which civil defense units allegedly were to be stationed included
Gyor, Miskolc, Pecs, Szeged, Szekesfehervar, Diosgyor, and Debrecen. 22/
Men from all of these cities were reported to have attended a summer
training camp in 1956. g?/
D. Industrial Enterprises.
In major offices and industrial plants or enterprises the
manager is trained in civil defense and is responsible for civil defense
preparations. He is assisted by other workers who are specially
trained. 27/ In major plants a full-time civil defense director is
assigned. 28/ Plant civil defense preparations are directed and admin-
istered by special offices within the parent ministry. 22/
Operational civil defense services within plants include the
following: (1) an observation unit charged with spotting aircraft and
reporting damage, (2) a communications unit to maintain civil defense
communications, (3) an order or safety unit to supervise movement to
shelter and to supervise the execution of air-raid precautions such as
shutting off utilities, (4) a fire-fighting unit consisting of a plant
fire brigade and auxiliaries, and (5) a medical unit consisting
principally of women who have received some medical training. 30/ Local
city civil defense headquarters probably monitor civil defense prepara-
tions in peacetime and assume operational control in time of emergency.
E. Railroads.
The organization of Hungarian railroads for civil defense is
not clear. A "Department XI" has been confirmed at the Managing Direc-
torate of the Hungarian State Railroads. 31/ This department is
charged with military liaison, preparations for mobilization, and civil
defense. It was headed by a colonel before the November 1956 uprising.
Civil defense training has been reported to be well advanced in railroad
Installations, and the usual functional teams probably are organized in
stations yards, and shops. First aid, repair, and observer groups in
stationsi
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F. Dwelling Units.
The organization of air-raid groups (legoltalmi osztagok) in
buildings used as dwellings was ordered in Budapest in 1952. 33/ These
are "volunteer" units headed by a trained warden or block leader. 34/
In Nagykanizsa, with a reported population of 33,000, there were
120 units of 46 persons each, 35/ indicating an organized self-defense
group for every 275 urban dwellers instead of the prescribed 300. Six
units are organized within each-self-defense group, as follows: order,
fire defense, chemical defense, medical, repair, and shelter. 36/
IT. Paramilitary Organizations.
The paramilitary training organization active at the start of the
Hungarian uprising was the Hungarian Voluntary Home Defense Federation
(Magyar Onkentes Honvedelmi Szovetseg MOHSZ, sometimes abbreviated
as MOHOSZ). 37/ It was later abolished, but its functions have re-
appeared in a new organization, the Hungarian Home Defense Sports
Federation (Magyar Honvedelmi Sportszovetseg MHS). 38/ Informa-
tion on the latter is limited, but it is expected that organizationally
and functionally MHS will be similar to the older MOHSZ and to other
Soviet Bloc paramilitary societies. The latter are modeled after the
Soviet Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy
(Dobrovol'noye.Obshchestvo Sodeystviya Armii Aviatsii i Flotu --
DOSAAF) and acknowledge its leadership. i2/
A. History.
In 1950 the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation (Magyar
Szabadsagharcos Szovetseg MSZHSZ) was formed. 4o/ This paramilitary
society reached a strength of about 150,000 41/ by 1954. It had a
national headquarters and a presidium with subordinate secretariats at
county (megye) and town levels. The society operated primary organi-
zations (alapszervezetek), which were organized in industrial plants,
villages, producer cooperatives, and the like. Membership was on an
ostensibly voluntary basis, but recruiting pressure was exerted on
industrial workers. It was apparent that military training of the
basic type was to be given members of the MSZHSZ, following which they
were free to choose activity in an advanced military specialty. 42/
The formation of MOHSZ in February 1955 was accompanied by some
fanfare. It involved the merger of MSZHSZ and the Hungarian Aviation
Federation (Magyar Repulo Szovetseg MRS). 43/ The initial presidium
group included well-known leaders from the police, sports, the Com-
munist Party, trade unions, the Red Cross, and other. organizations. 44/
The new federation held its first national conference in July 1955. 75/
An announced goal of the association at that time was a membership of
1 million. 46/
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On the occasion of this conference of MOHSZ) the Hungarian Minis-
ter of Defense stated that any person who imagined that the danger of war
was past was deceiving himself with pacifist illusions and that to meet
the needs of national defense MOHSZ should be expanded. LI/ At the con-
ference, MOHSZ was given the task of arranging training for civil defense,
and the statement was made that greater attention should be given to this
training and to the organization of civil defense groups. 11L3/
B. Mission.
A fourfold mission of MOHSZ was apparent in Hungary, as
follows: (1) to give premilitary training to youths approaching draft
age 49/; (2) to permit interested persons to gain useful military
skills in such fields as glider flying, vehicle driving, radio opera-
tion and maintenance, parachute jumping, and partisan combat train-
ing .?.E; (3) to disseminate political propaganda among the members 51/;
and ) to assist in civil defense organization and training through
air defense schools, local courses, 52/ and appropriate publications. 53/
MOHSZ conducted courses in civil defense for key civilian
personnel in principal Hungarian cities. Instructors included Army
personnel and qualified civilians. Following graduation from a 3-month
course the civilians in turn organized small classes in their home
areas. Subjects of instruction included maintenance of order) fire
fighting, communications, sanitation, repair of buildings and utilities,
the air-raid alarm system, air-raid discipline, inspection of air-raid
shelters, and BGS* defense. 54/
C. Organization.
MOHSZ was a mass organization in Hungary and therefore was
subordinate to the Communist Party according to the usual Communist
pattern. 22/ Its central administration probably was nominally
directed by a presidium elected by its national conference. 56/
the organization's activities
the national chairman of MOHSZ and his staff
under the guidance of the Hungarian Minister of Defense. 57/
were actually directed by
The national headquarters of MOHSZ employed a large, partly
military staff estimated to be Woo persons. 58/ Subdivisions of the
headquarters were not clearly defined. Staff divisions reported
include a Transportation Department, a Technical Department, a Flying
Department, a Technical Inspections Department, a Communications
Department, 22/ a division of reserve officers, 60/ and a partisan
branch. 61/ In view of the fact that MOHSZ was assigned premilitary
training and civil defense roles, it seems probable that central offices
would also have been maintained to direct these activities.
* See the first footnote on p. 19, below.
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County headquarters of MOHSZ directed the work of the clubs
and probably of the primary organizations in their areas. ?2/ One
county headquarters was reported to employ about 5 military officers
and 2 or 3 civilians. ?1/ Each city also had MOHSZ headquarters
subordinate to the county headquarters. 64/
The ldwer units Of MOHSZ included premiliiary centers in urban
districts and country villages, 65/ primary organizations (those on the
lowest level), 66/ and clubs such as those for aviation, vehicle opera-
tion, motorcycling, 67/ and radio amateurs. 68/
D. Membership.
The total membership of MOHSZ in Hungary was not mafie public.
Inasmuch as its predecessor (MSZHSZ) hada membership of 150,000,
MOHSZ may have attained a membership of 200,000 or 300,000. This
estimate is complicated by a report that there were two types of
members -- aCtive or participating members and inactive or nonpartici-
pating members. Age limits for active membership were 16 to 35, while
inactive members were accepted to age 60. Dues in either case amounted
to 1 forint monthly. 69/
The membership or MHS, the present paramilitary organization,
cannot be estimated. It undoubtedly is Modest because of the govern-
ment's insistence on political indoctrination /2/ and the desire to
avoid "mistakes" which led MOHSZ members to take part in the 1956 up-.
rising. 11/
E. Activity After November 1956.
There is no doubt that military and partisan-trained mem-
bers of MOHSZ played an embarrassing part in the 1956 uprising in
Hungary. /2/ The dissolution of the organization was announced-on
8 January 1957, when the government authorized the separate opera-
tion of the Hungarian National Aviation Federation (Magyar Nemzeti
Repulo Szovetseg MRSZ) and of MSZHSZ. 11/ An effort' has been made
to reestablish the training disrupted by the upriaing.. Notice was
given in the press of renewed driver, radio, motorcycle, and mechanic
training early in 1957.--n/ MR8Z also renewed flight training and
related activities.
Ih August 1957 a conference of leaderS of a new organization
was held 7- the Hungarian Home Defense Sports Federation, or MHS.
The conference proposed the reuniting of MSZHSZ and MRSZ, 76/- which
was actually announced on 19 September. 77/ The preliminary con- ?
ferenee made it clear that MHS is to be more closely monitored than
the old MOHSZ. Party guidance and. political indoctrination are -to-
be emphasized. The aims of MHS were stated to be to develop "mass
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defense sports activity"; to provide premilitary and postmilitary
training; and to educate the population in "self-defense, air defense,
and atomic defense." /?/
III. Plans and Training.
A large part of the civil defense activity in Hungary has been
obscured by security precautions. Information available to the general
public has been controlled and probably has been limited to elementary
self-defense training and instructions on behavior during air alerts.
Several examples of security precautions may be cited. Plans for the
construction of air-raid shelters are classified and must be signed
for and returned at the end of each working day. Attempts are made to
conceal the construction of shelters, and after completion the shelters
are sometimes closed, and locked. /2/ Another example of security is
the safeguarding of operational instructions in city civil defense
headquarters.
A. National Planning.
Because of the stress on security in Hungary, little informa-
tion is available on actual civil defense planning at the higher staff
levels. Planning has certainly been greatly influenced by Soviet
advisers, and the planning assumptions of the Hungarian government
have been based on foreign literature and on information furnished by
the USSR.
There is little doubt that planning assumptions envisage
rather large-scale attack.
within a limited govern-
mental circle it is expected that an initial attack would result in
deaths amounting to 20 percent of the population and in incapacitated
casualties amounting to another 20 percent, but that less than 10 per-
cent of the industrial labor force would become casualties.
The 10-percent casualty
figure probably refers to the labor force in important war-potential
Industries which were furnished with heavy air-raid shelters.
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A recently translated article from a Hungarian military engi-
neering journal of 1957 gives some factors to be considered in
planning nuclear civil defense. 84/ As the first such article known
to have appeared in an unclassified Soviet Bloc publication, it may
represent either an isolated breach of security or a step toward
declassifying information on civil defense planning. The reason for
including the item in an engineering journal is obvious from the text,
which states, "The engineering units of the armed forces must be called
In to help" the civil rescue service in coping with the damage expected
from modern weapons. The bibliography of the article cites sources of
1955 and 1956, and it is possible that the considerations which it
mentions were used even earlier in civil defense planning. According to
this article, the factors governing civil defense planning include the
effectiveness of the weapons of attack; the importance, characteristics,
and vulnerability of the target area; and "what the country can afford."
With regard to effectiveness of the weapons of attack, the Hun-
garian article .states that the maximum pressure factors for dRmage from
nuclear blast are 14.22 psi (pounds per square inch) causing complete
destruction of most buildings, 5.7 psi causing serious damage, 1.8 psi
causing medium damage, 1.1 psi causing light damage, and 0.4 psi break-
ing windows only. Noteworthy in the article is a statement that a
20-megaton bomb would exert "critical super pressure" at 6.2 miles. The
reader can hardly fail to note that this pressure (14.22 psi) will cause
total destruction of most buildings to a radius of 6 miles. Similarly,
it is stated that 0.4 psi (equated above to window breakage) will occur
at distances up to 62 miles. The only comparable unclassified statement
noted is from a Soviet military publication which stated that at a US
test (March 1954) the "heavy devastation" radius reached 4.35 miles
(7 kilometers). ?.5/ In the past, civil defense literature in the Soviet
Bloc has carefully avoided mentioning the radii of blast damage which
would result from the larger nuclear weapons. The article does not
give any information on the persistency of fallout and the possible ex-
tent of the area of contamination.
With regard to the target area, the Hungarian article gives a
series of conclusions concerning city planning. These include recom-
mendations limiting the size of cities and their population density,
dispersing important new industries and residential areas, and planning
for transportation networks always to remain clear. It is also stated
that "cities threatened by atomic attack" should plan on new residen-
tial areas placed at least 6.2 miles away. The author notes happily
that the civil defense principles for city planning are identical with
those for socialist town construction.
Several other points are made in the Hungarian article,
including statements that helicopters are the best means for observa-
tion and reconnaissance after attack, that outlying hospitals should be
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provided, and that observation posts must be placed in more secure
areas (presumably outside urban centers). The posts should be equipped
to determine the epicenter of an atomic explosion. The construction of
air-raid shelters using prefabricated elements is stated to be not
"advantageous." Only a monolithic reinforced-concrete structure is
considered to be a 'suitable shelter.
B. Training.
Civil defense training has been the subject of frequent reports
from Hungary since 1951. Two basic civil defense orders were issued by
the government in that year, 86/ and training was reported in indus-
trial plants, places of business, apartment houses, 87/ and schools. ?11/
First aid courses for Hungarian women were also carried on during
1951. !!5/
1. Civil Defense Leaders.
During the past 6 years a variety of courses and schools in
Hungary have been giving civil defense training to selected individuals
who, after graduation, are utilized as instructors or civil defense
leaders.
A Hungarian advanced technical course in air defense was
reported in operation early in 1955. Students were selected govern-
ment employees, probably from construction enterprises, who had dis-
charged their military obligation. During a 6- to 8-week course,
students were instructed about defense principles to be considered in
construction of buildings, in town planning, in camouflage, and in con-
struction of air-raid shelters. In addition to technical instruction,
students were taught administrative procedures for filling out the
permits and documents necessary to obtain approval from the military
air defense command for new buildings or improvements of old ones. 52/
Another Hungarian civil defense school was located at
Alsogod (47041' N - 19008' E) near Budapest (see Figure 2*). Initiated
in 1953 by the Ministry of the Interior, this school gave full-time
courses of 3 weeks' duration to prospective civil defense instructors
and section leaders of the voluntary civil defense groups. It is said
that trainees were recruited in large part from MOHSZ, the paramili-
tary organization. Subjects studied at the Alsogod school included air
defense measures, first aid, aircraft recognition, effects of atomic
weapons, and atomic countermeasures. 51/ It seems probable that most
of the graduates of the Alsogod school were assigned as leaders of
self-defense groups in factories and dwelling units. A graduating class
* Following p. 16.
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of 150 if this rate was continuous,
nearly 4,000 civil defense leaders could have been trained in this
school before the 1956 uprising.
2. Civil Defense Battalions.
The training of militarized civil defense battalions in
Hungary started by 1954. Members were drafted for training. 93/ The
training cycle consisted of a 3-month summer camp plus assemblies
during the remainder of the year at the draftee's place of residence.
The summer training camp was located at Szentendre (Izbeg)
(47040' N - 19005' E). 94/ Instruction remembered by refugees trained
under this program included atomic and chemical defense involving
reconnaissance, monitoring, and decontamination and employing protec-
tive clothing, instruments, and decontamination apparatus mounted on
vehicles. The various companies were trained in their specialties --
the signal company in radio and telephone, the engineer company in
damage and route clearance, the medical company in first aid (members
were litter bearers and ambulance drivers), and the bomb-disposal
company in deactivation or destruction of unexploded bombs. 95/ It
is probable that the CBR company of the battalion took more advanced
training in defense against chemical, bacteriological, and radio-
active weapons. The headquarters and staff (tors) company included
transportation personnel, cooks, and supply personnel, but no report
as to their training has been received. The training of the politi-
cal company is similarly undefined. (Communist Party and political
units of Soviet civil defense during World War II were charged with
organizing political talks and education of civil defense workers,
raising the-level of spirit and discipline, and providing newspapers
and the like during periods when civil defense units were required to
live in barracks. 96/)
Members of Hungarian civil defense battalions received
military pay and allowances during summer training. Time lost from
work during the balance of the year probably was paid for by the
place of regular employment. Evidently, some of the better trainees
were used as cadre members or instructors, returning to camp a second
year. 97/
A full-time military civil defense battalion with a 2-year
training cycle for 400 to 500 men
. 3. Industrial Enterprises.
Before the 1956 uprising, each industrial enterprise or
plant of consequence in Hungary was required to have an air-raid
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Figure 2. HUNGARY: Civil Defense Students Shoring a House Wall
27097 12-58
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defense organization, and employees were required to take training.
The factory mapager's deputy in charge of civil defense was sent to
attend a special training course. 99/ The deputy then supervised
training within the enterprise, which was monitored in addition by
civil defense officials. 100/
ried on
ployees
There were at least two types of civil defense training car-
in enterprises from 1952 to 1956 -- general training for em-
and special training for groups having operational assignments.
there were three graduated training
courses given in a Budapest tool factory. Drills and readiness tests
were held regularly, during which air attacks were simulated, order
crews patrolled, and first aid and fire-fighting crews took up their
positions. 101/
civil defense training
in Hungarian industry from 1951 to 1956. Training was compulsory,
particularly in major plants, with fines levied in the later years for
nonattendance. 102/ Women were recruited extensively for first aid
training. 103/ operative groups in training
In 1954 included those for giving the alarm, for blackout, for main-
taining order, for medical duties, for clearance of debris, and for
antigas measures. 104/ All personnel probably were to be trained in
elementary first aid, fire fighting, and use of the as mask. 105/
Some atomic defense instruction was introduced in mid-1956,
but it is not believed that such instruction before the October-November
1956 uprising had proceeded further than issuing elementary pamphlets
and giving occasional lectures on the subject. 106/
4. City Services.
Training of city civil defense units has not been exten-
sively reported from anywhere in the Soviet Bloc. Such services
normally would include police, fire, utility repair, and medical
personnel reinforced with civilian auxiliaries unified under citywide
command. The Hungarian training of civil defense leaders, opera-
tional factory groups, civil defense battalions, and the general
public in urban areas seems to indicate a fairly advanced state of
preparation. It is believed, therefore, that some training of city
services may have been accomplished under effective security cover.
Citywide drills have not been
observed, however, and it must be concluded that coordinated training
of city services is not well advanced in Hungary.
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5. General Public.
Although it is certain that some civil defense instruction
has been conducted widely in schools, offices, and various places of
work in Hungary, the extent of training for the general public not
reached through these programs is not clear. Some refugees have stated
that they were wholly unfamiliar with the civil defense training
program and others that they had only hearsay knowledge. It must be
concluded, therefore, that the basic Self-defense training program was
incomplete in 1956.
Compulsory courses in air
fighting were, however, carried on in
Women in particular were called on to
character of the instruction seems to
C. Instructions for Alerts.
defense, first aid, and fire
Budapest and other major cities.
undergo first aid training. The
have been quite elementary.
Two stages of readiness in air defense are described in a
Hungarian civil defense manual, as follows:
1. Civil Defense Alert.
This state of readiness corresponds closely with the
Soviet "threatening situation," which signifies that enemy air attack
may possibly occur. At this stage, civil defense units are activated,
and they draw supplies and set up duty routines. Headquarters shelters
are activated, and all equipment is checked. 108/ Orders for this stage
of alert are believed to be passed by messenger, telephone, or other
secure means. Shelters for the population must be readied for use and
directional shelter signs posted. 109/
2. Air-Raid Alarm.
This alarm signifies the approach of enemy planes and is
signaled by sirens with a fluctuating sound lasting one-half minute,
repeated three times at half-minute intervals. (Bells, whistles, or
other locally available means may be used.)
According to instructions, civil defense forces report for
duty, equipment is readied for action, and the general public not having
civil defense assignments must seek reftige in the assigned air-raid
shelter. 110/
3. Chemical Alarm.
Gas alarm is signaled in the conventional manner by a gong
or other metal-on-metal signal. in/
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IV. Air-Raid Sheltet Program.
Hungary has been helped in establishing an air-raid shelter program
by experience gained during World War II and by the presence of protec-
tive structures remaining from that period. Old shelters have been en-
larged, strengthened, and refurbished in recent years. New shelters have
also been built, but the adaptation of older shelters may have resulted
in savings of money and materials as well as in more shelters being made
available for the amount expended.
In the development of shelters the Hungarians have also utilized
brewers' cellars and underground strongholds which in some instances date
back to medieval times.
A. Directives.
The basic directive for the construction of air-raid shelters in
Hungary is believed to be Decree No. 01/67-1951 VI of the Minister of
the Interior, which was promulgated in 1951. 112/ The fullest available
text of this decree is given in Appendix A.
this directive also outlined a category system
for the protection of institutions, industries, and the like, as follows:
Category A-1: Munitions factories) radio and electronics
factories, steel mills, and food processing and preservation plants.
Category I: Large coal and uranium mines) natural gas wells
and storage, petroleum wells and refineries, chemical plants, and cement
plants.
Category II: All light industries, bauxite mines, textile mills,
clothing factories, agricultural machinery factories, and quarries.
Category III: Industrial offices, small factories, collective
farms, and other civilian institutions which do not play an important
role in wartime.
B. BGS* Shelters.
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shelters or bunkers**
able to withstand atomic attack (usually called BGS shelters, but known
* Bombe, gas es szilankbiztos ovohely -- bomb-, gas-, and splinter-
proof shelter.
** The term bunker in this report refers to a free-standing shelter,
either above or below ground.
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as "ABC" shelters), were ordered to be constructed at Hungarian
Installations in the A-1 and I categories in 1951. It was also required
that each county seat (megye sekely) and each administrative district in
Budapest build at least one ABC bunker for air defense. (There are 19
counties in Hungary and 22 districts in Budapest.) It is believed that
some important communications installations were also ordered to build
heavy shelters under the A-1 or I category. Construction (in some cases,
reconstruction of World War II bunkers) commenced in 1951 and was still
going on at the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956.
The building of shelters was tied in specifically with new
construction. New factories could not be built or additions made to
existing factories unless the required shelters were first provided.
BGS
shelter specifications substantially as follows 114/ (see Figure 3*):
1. Minimum thickness of roof, walls, and base floor must be
2.6 meters (m) of concrete. It is required that the outside layer
of concrete, to a depth of 1 m, should be free of reinforcing rods.
The remaining 1.6 m should be reinforced with steel rods, ranging in
spacing from 25 centimeters (cm) on the outside to a screen mesh on
the inside. The steel reinforcing rods vary in diameter from 1.5 cm
on the outside to 5.0-millimeter (mm) wire on the inside.
2. Minimum strength of compression of the concrete must be
540 to 600 kilograms (kg) per square centimeter.
3. Minimum airspace per person must be 0.9 to 1.0 cubic
meter(Cu m).**
4. Minimum floorspace per person must be 0.40 to 1.35 square
meters (sq m).
5. Each BGS shelter must develop an independent water supply
and insure .a minimum storage capacity of 1 liter per person per day
for the maximum shelter capacity plus triple the same amount for
sewage disposal, decontamination, and the like.
6. Each shelter must be provided with an auxiliary power unit
capable of producing enough electricity to provide for the total needs
of the shelter, including radio, light, ventilation, and X-ray and
other electrical equipment installed in the shelter.
* Following p. 20.
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HUNGARY: BASIC CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS
FOR AN AIR-RAID BUNKER
I-1.5m. Explosion layer .(consisting of loose broken stone and earth)
BOMB PROOF BUNKER ENTRANCE
27098 12-58
4.5m.
Figura 3 50X1
Outside
Concrete
TOP VIEW
I Ern,?.1
WALL DETAIL
Inside
Reinforced Concrete
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7. Sewage disposal must be positive, with sewage being con-
ducted to the outside of the shelter.
8. Medical facilities, including a complete store of narcotics,
bone-setting materials, minor surgical supplies, and X-ray, must be
provided.
9. All shelters must be equipped with bombproof double steel
doors.
10. All shelters must be provided with both short-wave trans-
ceivers and VHF (very high frequency) equipment. .
11. The shelter. must be linked with the district or county '
civil defense headquarters to which it is subordinated as well as with
all other BGS shelters within the same district. Telephone cables
must be installed underground. '
12. The amount of preserved food required for the maximum
capacity of the shelter for a minimum of 2 days must be stored in the
shelter.
13. Equipment and furnishings must be installed in the shelter.:
In such a manner as not to cote in contact with any wall. Benches for
occupants of the shelter must be placed so that such.occupants can at
no time lean against a wall. - ? ,
14. A sufficient number of filter ventilating units must be -
Installed to provide air for each 50 occupantS Of the shelter. The
ventilating fans must be designed to be operated techanically (by
electricity) or by hand.
15. .The maximum capacity f6r any single room is 50 persons..
Under no circumstances will furnishings be provided for more than
this number. Thus no.room can be larger than:20'sq m.
16. All operating units of the BGS shelter must be iodated
on the bottom floor of the shelter (see Figure 4*). These units
include the followiag:
a. Control center.
b. Medical center and first aid-supplies.
.c. Police center.
d. Fire department.
e. Room for decontamination equipment and personnel.
f. First aid room.
* Following p. 22.
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g. Radio room.
h. Telephone exchange and message center.
i. Evaluation and screening room.
j. Decontamination shower.
17. Toilet facilities with running water must be provided.
18. Each BGS shelter must be constructed in such a manner as
to permit the entire unit to be hermetically sealed off from the
outside air.
training courses for civil defense specialists
in Hungary, which describes and gives a sketch of a nearly identical
structure called a bunker for protection against bombs, gas, and
splinters (BGS). Only very minor-variations occur in dimensions be-
tween the BGS and the so-called ABC bunker mentioned above. The roof
pad of the described BGS shelter consists of stone blocks between two
layers of sand instead of broken stone and earth.
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these shelters as being almost identical with the specifications 50X1
furnished by the air defense adviser and with those included in the
course for civil defense specialists. Minor differences include the
reported use of basalt blocks for the roof pad and the absence of food
supplies, although provision was made for stored water and portable
latrine8 in 1952 and 1953.
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a 500-person bunker with 3-m 50X1
walls and a 5-m roof of reinforced concrete. This type of bunker is
built aboveground and reportedly has a well to supply water. 117/
There appears to be some flexibility in the construction of
BGS bunkers. They mar be built aboveground, partly underground, or
completely underground. 118/ The aboveground type is reported to be
less costly but to require a firm rock foundation.
According to information imparted at the civil defense
specialists' course, the BGS category of shelters also includes a
variety of types of underground shelters, including those constructed
where mines or rocky slopes are "favorable" for tunnel and gallery
construction. 119/ Typical of these are the reported shelters at
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Figure 4 50X1
HUNGARY: FLOOR PLAN OF THE FIRST
FLOOR OF A TYPICAL AIR-RAID BUNKER
-11 LILL LJLJ HU
Entrance Decontamination Squad and Police
Decontamination Shower
Supply Room
Medical
Supply Room
V.H.F. Radio
Short Wave
Radio
=
Evaluation Center
Power Plant
Suction Filter
Water Pump
Sewage Disposal
Heating Plant
Message
Center
Telephone
Central
LI LI Li H UU
Telephone Booths
Telephone Exchange
In
Operations Center
C CI
Rest
Room
Entrance
27099 12-58
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locations of various munitions plants. Starting with two drifts or tun-
nels into a hillside) galleries are "laddered" between the tunnels to
rigk.rthe capacity desired (see Figure 5*).
a minimum earth cover of 164 feet is required for a shelter of this
type. 120/ (Similar shelters have been reported at Soviet installa-
tions. 120 Shelters such as these at industrial enterprises are some-
times reported: to be multiple-purpose -- for air-raid shelter, for stor-
age, and for alternate emergency operations in time of war.
C. Basement Shelters.
enterprise built air-raid shelters
"In the basements of new state-controlled buildings that were two
stories high or higher, such as apartment houses, hospitals, and
buildings occupied by government agencies." 122/
plans for the construction of apartment houses were based on
Soviet regulations, that Soviet construction experts at the Ministry
of the Interior supervised "over-all construction," and that it was
required that apartment houses have bomb Shelters in basements. 123/
1. Apartment Dwellings.
locating or des-
cribing basement air-raid shelters in apartment houses in Hungary,
but it cannot be demonstrated that the practice was universal. A
refugee who was a construction company engineer, however, refers to
an ordinance in effect since at least 1949 which requires the con-
struction of new dwellings to include basement shelters. EL/
dates the start of such construction as early as
1945 122/
the start, of the construction of basement shelters in 1951
4,000 to 5,000 of these shelters were built annually during
1952-56. 126/ A production order for 50,000 steel air-raid shelter
doors, 5 to 6 am thick, reportedly was placed early in 1952. 121/
At 4 doors per shelter (2 entrances with double doors), this order
would be sufficient for 12,500 shelters of the basement type. .
In addition to a program of construction of new,basement
shelters, there is a program of renovation of old basement shelters --
those remaining from World War II were surveyed, cleaned, 128/ and
repaired 129/ during the period 1951-56. Some basements in older
buildings were adapted for use as air-raid shelters 130/ -- American
Legation personnel witnessed construction activity and a steel door
being passed into a Budapest basement on 1 March 1956. 131/
* Following p. 24.
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Details of construction of basement shelters in new
dwelling units have been reported as follows 132/ (see Figure 6*):
a. Size: capacity of 150 to 300 persons.
b. Space: with forced ventilation, 0.6 sq m and 2.5 cu m
per person; without forced ventilation, 0.75 sq m and 2.5 cu m per person.
c. Components required: airtight gaslock, anteroom,
interior rooms, and lavatories.
d. An escape tunnel whose length-is more than one-half the
height of the building.
e. Ceilings: shelters in 2-story buildings have ceilings
7.9 inches (in) (20 cm) thick, with ,a strength of 2.84 psi (2,000 kg per
sq m).
Shelters in 3- and 4-story buildings have ceiling thick-
nesses 5.9 in (15 cm) thick, with a strength of 1.42 psi (1,000 kg
per sq m).
Reinforcing consists of 0.3-in (8-mm) rods placed in a
7.9-in (20-cm) mesh pattern.
f. Outer walls: brick, 20 in (51 cm) thick; anchor rods
11.8 in (30 cm) deep into wall, spaced every 39 in (1 m) for anchoring
ceiling.
g. Floor: lightly reinforced concrete, 3.9 in (10 cm) thick.
the ceiling strength to be 3.4 psi
(2,400 kg per sq m rather than 2,000). 133/ (It is believed that, in the
case of air-raid shelters under substantial buildings, civil defense
officials in the Soviet Bloc rely on the overlying structure to reduce
blast pressure by half. This would be true only in the lower pressure
ranges, in which the building itself is not severely damaged.)
"Vital points" may be given heavier basement shelters. Such
structures are described as having walls of brick 25.2 in (64 cm) thick
or of poured concrete and ceilings of reinforced concrete 19.7 in
(50 cm) thick. It is indicated that this roof would sustain a stress
of 12.8 psi (9 metric tons per sq m). 134/ Such strengthened basement
shelters might be provided for low-level civil defense headquarters, for
first aid installations, and for apartments housing medium-level offi-
cials.
* Following p. 24.
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Figure 5 50X1
HUNGARY: TYPICAL AIR-RAID SHELTER IN A MUNITIONS PLANT
Entrance Steel Doors
27100 12-58
53
Additional shelter if needed
if
50m
Entrances
1:1:CA: ? ?e? A*.b>1.4.:915glie.Wii:V...F:t2F4
rt-t t f ih ufo ea?sa.og.t.
??? ett7.4"'
ZATIJW 1.
.1*
.129:1j ? .*
.1.,"?:SYLIF ?
.1.SVIC74.C15? 11.W ANTIOVI: XI
*71.1.1?6?AV ?
ITh-ft:
Connecting
Passage way
AY.0.V107
SIDE VIEW
TYPICAL ENTRANCE ARRANGEMENT
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HUNGARY: FLOOR PLAN
OF A BASEMENT AIR-RAID SHELTER
Up
Figure 6 50X1
(Door, cou d be
made gas tight
Gas-lock
I\ I
MR-Air-intake, with activated
charcoal filters
.-201n.?Brick wall ?10inrs-
Antechamber
spir?intake, with activated
charcoal filters
Rest Room
Exhaust vent
Rest Room
Air-intake
Room for ventilating equipment
Vents between rooms
to equalize pressure
Air-intake, with activated
charcoal filters
Shelter room
320 sq. ft. (30 sq.m.), for 50 persons
Shelter room
320 sq. ft. (30 sq.m.), for 50 persons
Shelter room
320 sq. ft. (30 sq.m.), for 50 persons
Emergency exit
'Escape tunnel
27101 12-58
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2. Industrial Shelters.
Some basement shelters in industrial buildings have existed
in Hungary since World War II. 135/ By 1952, however, a new order was
In effect requiring the construction of new basement shelters in indus-
try. 136/ For example, in Budapest existing shelters were cleaned, and
factories employing more than 500 people were ordered to construct base-
ment shelters. 137/ This order probably was part of the directives
Issued in 1951.*
Most probably, basement shelter is furnished those economic
enterprises which do' not qualify for heavy (BGS) bunkers under cate-
gories A-1 or I -- that is, enterprises in category II.
3.
Government Shelters.
Construction of basement shelters in public buildings in
Hungary was also ordered in 1951. Some basement shelters remain from
World War II, 138/ and others have been built since. 139/ Their strength
may vary from a level comparable with that of the BGS bunkers to that of
the apartment shelter basements already described.
4. Medical Shelters.
The degree of protection is speci-
fied as "debris-, gas-, and splinterproof" (tormelek, Raz es szilank-
biztos TGS), and the shelter is described as
having 23.6-in (60-cm) stone walls and a 5.9-in (15-cm) reinforced
concrete ceiling. 141/ Minimum requirements for a first aid station
are listed as (a) a gas trap covering 43 square feet (4 sq m); (b) a
distributing room covering 215 to 269 square feet (20 to 25 sq m);
(c) a bandaging room of the same area; and (d) a "TC" (probably port-
able latrine). Emergency exits, heat, and light must also be fur-
nished. 142/ Instructions in 1953 specified that if it was impos-
sible to set up this type of shelter "at once," another type (pre-
sumably weaker) would be satisfactory. More elaborate specifications
for first aid stations call for dressing rooms, showers, electrical
generators, an operating room, and a room for the use of medical per-
sonnel. 143/
* See Appendixes A and B.
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Hospitals are said to fall under the blanket order of 1951
for construction of basement shelters in newly constructed state-owned
buildingS. 144/
D. Special Plant Galleries.
Several industrial enterprises in Hungary, principally munitions
plants, have underground galleries 145/ (see Figure 7*) which are newly
built 1.11.Y or reconstructed from World War II installations.11E/ The
fact that galleries in a number of enterprises were constructed during
1948-53 148/ supports a belief that such-construction was carried out
under a nationwide program. It is possible that this type of under-
ground gallery has three purposes, as follows: (1) for protected stor-
age, lit2/ (2) for alternate production space, 150/ and (3) for the
shelter of personnel during air attack. 151/
E. Other Types of Shelters.
Other shelters in Hungary have been reported which are of tech-
nical interest, but the program for their construction is unknown.
1. Arched Tunnel Shelters.
Two refugees have identified an underground arched tunnel
used for an air-raid shelter, 152/ and one has described and sketched
details of its construction which were observed in 1954. Located 16
to 24 feet (ft) (5 to -7 m) underground, the shelter was of cast rein-
forced concrete parabolic segments (see Figure 8*). The shelter -
allegedly was for the use of industrial technicians.
2. Prefabricated Controllers' Shelters.
A Hungarian refugee architect states that he designed a
mobile air defense shelter for personnel required to remain on duty
at control stations during air attacks in such places as powerplants,
blast furnaces, and the like. The original plan called for a shelter
with vertical sides, but this was discarded in favor of an egg-shaped
shelter capable of holding three men. Observation slits and an antenna
opening for radio equipment were included in the original design. Blast-
pressure resistance was given as 8.5 psi (6,000 kg per sq m). Test
results of this shelter were sent to the USSR in 1955. 153/ Although
only two such shelters have been reported at Hungarian power station
control boards, 154/ the designer stated that approximately 1,000 of
them were built during late 1955 and 1956 (see figure 9*).
* Following p. 26.
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40m.
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25m.
60m
HUNGARY: UNDERGROUND DEPARTMENTS
IN AN AMMUNITION PLANT AT EGER
C) Entrances
0 Production Departments (Arched masonry ceilings)
O Halhvays
0 Shafts (50m. to 70m., presumed for ventilation
and emergency exits)
21102 12.58
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Figure 7
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Figure 8
HUNGARY: CONSTRUCTION DETAILS OF AN "ATOMIC' AIR-RAID SHELTER
Earth's surface
5.7m.
Reinforced concrete
Bituminous paper
shielding 2cm. thick
27103 12-58
2.4m. sj
Joint
Reinforced concrete base.
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Iron dowels
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HUNGARY: A THREE-MAN AIR-RAID SHELTER
Interior of shelter
Antenna opening
Wall 10cm. thick
Figure 9 50X
Observation slits, (have steel doors
for lowering in emergency)
Metal platform
Legs, reinforced concrete
Cable opening
See leg detail (Below)
Shelter base, has fins extending
over two meters into the ground
or comparable anchoring
27104 12.58
SHELTER LEG ANCHOR DETAIL
Shelter leg
Compression spring held
by retaining cap
Steel plate
Cushion, hard rubber
Interlocking pressed steel cups
J
Retainer plate
25cm.
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F. Possible Changes:in Plans.
,..,IThere may have been some alteration in the shelter construction
program in Hungary during 1956, but evidence of such change-is fragmen-
tary and inconclusive, the suspension in
1956 of the construction of basement shelters in new apartment houses in
Budapeet. 155/
V. Budapest Shelters.
Beyond any doubt, numerous air-raid shelters have been prepared in
Budapest, the capital city of Hungary. :Evidence includes a'1951 manual
givirig.instruction on the building of shelters 156/; the testimony of a
refugee architect familiar with plans 1E/ and another who supervised .
construction 158/; reports of particular installations from many '
refugees; and, in a few cases, corroborating external observation by:
American Legation personnel. 159/
A. 'Funnel and Gallery Shelters.
v-,-According ?to 'instructions in Hungarian civil defense manuals:,
the most economical types of "bombproof". shelters are those established
in either eXisting or new caves or galleries. The minimum recommended
earth Cover in 1951 was 59 ft (15 m) of earth. 160/ This recommendation
mayainve been doubled since that time. 161/
A number Of tunnel systems have been established for air defense
purposes under various hills in Budapest. These shelters aPparently are
not to be used for broad segments of the population but for the head-
wuarters of air defense, civil defense, and ground forces and for essen-
tial-elements of government. Although not available as refuges for the
general public; such shelters would contribute to maintaining continuity
of government and control.
.The underground active military air defense headquarters under.
Kis Gellert Hill in Budapest is well known. 162/ In addition to this
military air defense headquarters, the hill contains an underground .
telephone exchange 163/ and the principal emergency civil defense
center-for Hungary. 164/ The latter consists of etergency operation
quarters for both the national and the Budapest civil defense command's.
the underground system under Kis
Gellert Hill is enormous. There are dozens of rooins interconnected by
tunnels built on 3.or 4 levels. 165/ The highest level of the system
Is reported to be under 164 feet750 m) of sandstone. 166/
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Another underground installation in Budapest Is under the
nearby Gellert Hill. This installation is alleged to be an emergency
military headquarters and an alternate government center. The hill
contains an underground water reservoir. 1L/ Hillside entrances have
been observed by American Legation personnel. 168/
A third underground complex in Budapest is located under Var
Hill (see Figure 10*). 169/ This complex is reported to contain shel-
ter for government and Communist Party offices 170/ as well as an under-
ground hospital. 171/ Two entrances to this hill have been seen by
American Legation personnel. 172/
. . Other underground complexes have been reported prepared in
Budapest at such locations as Sas Hill 173/ and Svab Hill 174/ and in
the.Kobanya District. 175/ It is believed that most, if not all,
of these underground systems repiesent remodeled and enlarged instal-
lations remaining from World War.II.
B. Subway Shelters.
The new Budapest subway was built with air defense considera-
tions in mind, although it was publicized as having been constructed to
satisfy transportation requirements. Engineers associated with the
construction, which was started in 1950, state that in addition to its
normal function the subway was designed to serve as a mass air-raid?
shelter and to provide an emergency railroad link under the Danube for
use in case the Budapest bridges were destroyed. 176/ Soviet advisers
evidently forced a revision of the Hungarian plan to build the subway
at a depth of 49 ft (12 m) and required it to be built at a depth of
105 ft (32 m). 177/ I
50X1
The new subway was being built at 12 shaft locations in 1951
(see Figure 11*). In 1953, however, financial and material diffi-
culties led to a gradual suspension of work. 179/ Maintenance work
has been carried on, since 1954.,
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some sections of the unfinished subway were ordered
to be converted for use as air-raid shelters. 180/
. It is difficult to determine how much of the unfinished subway
could serve as shelter at the present time
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tunneling was started in one or both directions at most construction 50X1
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cn
X
cn
X
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Figure 11 50X1
HUNGARY
SUBWAY SYSTEMS
Old Subway
New Subway
(incomplete/approximnte
alignment)
IN BUDAPEST
? Suburban Railroad
? Old Subway Station
? New Subway Shaft
Locations
Varosliget terminus
House of
Parliment
To Godolo
Deak Fereng ter
Vardsmar y ter
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sites. 181/ Two of five underground stations are reported to be struc-
turally complete or nearly so. 182/
An underground tunnel system) linked to the subway, is
to connect Communist Party and government buildings
in downtown Budapest. 183/
C. Government and Communist Party Shelters.
In addition to emergency government control centers in various
hillside galleries, the principal government and Communist Party build-
ings in Budapest have been provided with either basement or nearby air-
raid shelters.
1. Ministry of Defense.
There is a rbasement shelter under the
Ministry of Defense building in Budapest. 184/ The strength of the
shelter (ceiling specifications and so on) is not known.
this basement contains an armory; 2 refrigerator
chambers; an emergency kitchen; more than 40 offices, including a
large one for the chief of staff; and 2 rooms for medical personnel.
Offices are furnished with desks, chairs, and beds, and each room in
the shelter contains a telephone. An emergency tunnel exit is pro-
vided. Medical instruments and small arms are kept in the shelter, and
food sufficient for 150 men for a week is
kept in the refrigerator chambers. 185/
such shelters would be equipped normally with filtered venti-
lation, an emergency generator, and lavatory facilities.
an additional under-
ground bunker was constructed in the -courtyard of the Ministry of De-
fense building during 1955 and 1956. This bunker is
1a concrete box, poured in one operation, with reinforcing rods in the
floor and ceiling welded to rods in the side walls. Over the ceiling
an airspace has been left, above which is a second reinforced concrete
slab, 1.8 m thick. This installation has only one floor, with a re-
ported area of about 28 sq m. this bunker
was to be a repository for documents. It was) however, air conditioned
and probably was connected with the known basement shelter under the
main building. 187/
2. Communist Party Headquarters.
A massive bunker which probably was an air-raid shelter was
found at the time of the Hungarian uprising beneath the Communist Party
headquarters building in Budapest. 188/ Believed by the insurgents to
be an underground jail, the structure was attacked with pneumatic drills,
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but it withstood efforts at penetration until the Soviet forces re-
gained control of the area. 189/ Reportedly this underground strong-
hold reaches 18 to 20 m underground and contains 2 or 3 stories.
There are rumors of tunnel connections to the National Theater and to
the unfinished Budapest subway.
According to a news story at the time of the uprising,
the Communist Party headquarters had been closed for nearly 12 months
for "reconstruction." The nattire of the work, however, became known
generally only when insurgents gained access to the building, illus-
trating the success of security measures in obscuring special construc-
tion.
3. Hungarian News Service Building.
Constructed during 1951-53, the Hungarian News Service
building in Budapest is described as having 5 floors aboveground and
4 underground, with the first 2 underground floors containing offices,
laboratories, and communications equipment. The third underground
floor contains an air-raid shelter and food storage space, and the
fourth houses heating and ventilating facilities, including an emer-
gency generator. The shelter allegedly has a capacity for 800 to
1,000 persons. 190/
U. Hungarian State Railroads.
The headquarters of the Hungarian State Railroads in
Budapest were provided with a heavy 5- or 6-story bunker of the BGS
type in 1953. 191/ This bunker is reported to contain an emergency
railroad office and archives and a civil defense headquarters. In
addition to heating and ventilating'systems, it contains emergency
generating equipment and switchboards. The command center is said to
be connected with military and government headquarters and with
important railroad junctions.
5. Police Buildings.
Several police buildings in Budapest are reported to have
underground prisons or air-raid shelters. 192/ In view of the-role of
the police in civil defense, it is probable that important police
headquarters have such dual-purpose installations, which furnish a
high degree of protection.
6. Other.
Other government or Communist Party shelters reported in
Budapest include installations at the National Archives Center, 193/
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the national ComMunist Party headquarters, 194/ and the Parliament
building. 195/ Still other shelters have been reported to be in the
vicinity of the villas of high government officials. 196/
D. Transport and Communications.
A 500-person, 3-story bunker at the Ferencvaros railroad
station in Budapest is as fol- 50X1
lows 197/:
... This bunker was being built from March to
November 1952. I last observed the bunker in March
1954. The bunker consisted of three floors and was
constructed of concrete composed of basalt, cement,
and gravel. Within the concrete outer walls of the
bunker a layer of steel mesh was vertically emplaced
at successive depths of 15 cm and 25 cm from the
Inner sides of the walls ... . The impact pressure
of the bunker's top was 450 kg per sq m. Space
within the bunker was sufficient to provide an esti-
mated 2 to 2-1/2 sq m per person and 2 cu m of air
per person. There were two toilets without running
water on each floor of the bunker. Buckets were
utilized to provide water. The bunker contained an
unknown number of first aid boxes but no food sup-
plies. During an emergency, people were to be
directed into the bunker by specially assigned per-
sonnel. The bunker's roof in its lowermost section
consisted of 2-1/2 m of reinforced concrete. Above
the ceilings of the rooms on the third floor were
horizontal iron bars, each 19 m long and 24 cm in
diameter. Basalt blocks, each measuring 30 cm in
height, width, and length were embedded in the roof
to a depth of 1 to 1-1/2 in to prevent damage to the
bunker ... . The entrances of the bunker had double
steel doors. Each door was 10 mm thick) had rubberi-
' zation around the edges to maintain an airtight
closure, and had special opening and closing handles.
Other doors within the bunker were of steel and were
5 mm thick. This bunker was to be used by railroad
employees from the Ferencvaros railroad station.
The bunker wat always closed but unguarded. There
was an air-conditioning system in the bunker. Per-
forated steel pipes with filters, each pipe 20 cm
in diameter, led from the outside into each room of
the bunker. Each pipe was connected with the air-
conditioning equipment located on the ground floor.
The air-conditioning equipment regulated both the
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air conditioning and the air pressure in the room.
The air-conditioning equipment was 3 by 5 in and
3-1/2 m high. Two generators were located on the
ground floor. The bunker was self-sustaining in
power.
A .general program for constructing shelters at railroad instal-
lations has been reported, 1984
In addition to the underground communications centers under
the Kis Gellert and the Gellert Hills,* two communications bunkers
are known to have been built in Budapest. The first of these is the
two-story bunker at Radio Budapest built in 1952 and 1953. It is of
typical heavy aboveground construction with walls 9.8 ft (3 m) thick
and roof 12 ft (3.5 m) thick. Its capacity for shelter purposes is
said to be negligible because of the amount of broadcasting and gener-
ating equipment installed. 200/ At the time of observation (1953)
the bunker contained first aid supplies and stored water but no food.
American Legation personnel have observed and confirmed the existence
of this structure. 201/
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A second communications bunker in Budapest is located at the
Joszef Telephone Exchange. _222/ Under construction from 1953 to 1956,
this bunker is described as a windowless 2-story air-raid shelter 65 to
72 ft (20 to 25 m) square containing "special" telephone switchboards
and equipment. 203/ the Joszef exchange 50X1
and the underground exchange in Kis Gellert Hill* had "mutual" use of
the long-distance telehpone cables. 204/ If these two installations are
the principal long-distance telephone terminals in Budapest, the special
defensive construction is explained.
E. Industrial Enterprises.
The Csepel Steel and Metal Works (formerly called the Mannfred
Weiss and later the Rakosi Metal Plant) in Budapest has within its
area approximately 17 heavy, above-grade air-raid bunkers. Built dur-
ing World War II, 2(/ these bunkers are reported to have been
strengthened in 1954, 206/ and they are now described as having rein-
forced concrete walls 9.8 ft (3 m) thick and roof cover 16.4 ft (5 m)
thick. 207/ The average capacity of each bunker is reported to be as
high as 2,000 occupants. 22?1/ The work force at the plant is esti-
mated to be 30,000. 209/
The Standard Communications Equipment Plant (Beloiannisz) in
Budapest has two air-raid shelters with adequate capacity for the
* See V, A, pp. 27-28, above.
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4,000 persons employed there. 210/ One shelter is of the basement
type and is of unknown strength. The other is a 4-story bunker built,
of reinforced concrete; its wall thicknesses are reported to be 4.9 to
6.6 ft (1-1/2 to 2 m) thick. Refugees have estimated its outside di-
mensions to be 25 to 50 m square. 211/ As a minimum, the bunker should
be able to accommodate 2,400 persons. Both shelters reportedly are
ventilated and have radio and telephone and first aid supplies.
l'iand tools,
stretchers, helmets, gas masks, and 300 sets of gas-protective cloth-
ing were bought by the plant in i954 and 1955.
At the Red. Star Tractor Plant (also known as Hoffer-Albert
Gepyar) in Budapest an aboveground bunker was constructed during
1954-55. 212/ Specifications of wall and ceiling thicknesses are un- ?
known, but it is said to be built of "extremely heavy" reinforced con-
crete 213/ and to be of "standard" construction. 214/ Considering the
estimated number .of employees (4,000 to 5,000), it is believed that
the dimensions given as 98 ft square and 98 ft high (30 by 30 by 30 m)
are ctedible. A bunker of this size would provide shelter
space for more than 3,000 persons.
Adjoining the Tokol Airfield on Csepel Island in Budapest is
an aircraft repair plant known as Pestvideki Gepyar. This plant area
contains a reinforced concrete bunker 82 ft square and 66 ft high
(25 m square and 20 m high). 215/ Four stories high, it reportedly
was built during World War II 216/ and is equipped with steel doors. ,217/
Its capacity should be around 1,500 persons.
At the Gamma Optical Works in Budapest, a 1,000-person bunker
was constructed in about 1952. This shelter reportedly is equtpped
with an emergency generator and with medical and oxygen supplies.,L.f/
a standard 1,000-person bunker at the Gamma
Works which was typical of the construction (see Figure 12*). 219/
The Ganz Railroad Car and Machinery Plant in Budapest has at
least one air-raid bunker. 222/ Still under construction at the time
of the uprising, it is described by one refugee as being cylindrical
in shape, 15 m high and 15 m in diameter.
its outer walls are 3.28 ft (1 m) thick, and the itructure is entirely
built of reinforced concrete. The shelter is said to accommodate be-
tween 400 and 800 persons and to have direct telephone connection to
the "air defense and warning command." 222/
The Csepel Automobile Plant in Budapest allegedly has two con-
crete shelters of the bunker type built after World War II. 222/ Their
* Following p. 34.
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dimensions indicate that these shelters have a capacity for nearly
3,000 persons.
The Obudai Shipyard in Budapest has two reported air-raid shel-
ters, one a basement under the administration building and the other a
detached shelter of unknown type. Their capacities are estimated to be
1,000 and 1,200 persons, respectively. gal/
At
the Budapest Tube and Radio Plant (Orion Tungsram),
an underground complex consisting of
an unknown number of rooms 40 m). some of which were 328 by 131 ft (100 hy
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The center was to con- 50X1
tam n a small hospital, a decontamination unit, a communications center,
a water supply, and an air filtration unit. 22/2/
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bUAl
At the Budapest Cable Plant (Felten-Guilleaume) a 2-story
bunker is located which is capable of sheltering 1,200 people. 225/
Bunkers, World War II shelters, and air-raid shelters of un-
defined types are reported in other Budapest factories, but limited
information makes description or evaluation difficult.
Plants with lower priorities probably have been furnished with
basement shelters in new or existing buildings or with detached shel-
ters of comparable strength. Many of these have been reported in
Budapest industry. In some cases they represent reconditioned World
War II installations, .22./ but in others they are of new construc-
tion. 227/
F. Public Buildings and Apartment Basements.
It is certain that basement shelters were built in Budapest
during 1950-56. 'The 1951 decree of the Minister of the Interior* re-
quired their installation in new fire-resistant buildings larger than a
specified minimum size. Construction workers among the Hungarian refu-
gees report having worked on shelters in both new and old buildings.
One Budapest refugee states, "We built air-raid shelters in
the basements of state-controlled buildings that were two or more
stories high, such as apartment houses, ho4ita1s, and buildings oc-
cupied by governmental agencies." This informant also reported that
during 1955-56 there were built in existing buildings RH (regihazi --
old-house) shelters, which are also mentioned in the 1951 ministerial
decree.*
* See Appendix B.
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Figure 12
HUNGARY: AIR-RAID BUNKER FOR 1,000 PERSONS
END VIEW OF THE AIR RAID BUNKER;
16 METERS HIGH.
1. Shelter areas, 3 meters high.
2. Shelter areas, 3 meters high and 6
meters by 4 meters; same areas as in-
dicated by Point 6 of Part B below and
shown in cutaway view, which partly
outlines the interior staircase shown
as Point 4 of Part B, below.
3. Staircase. Shown here in cutaway
view which does not reveal the full
extent of the stairwell and Point 2,
above, as they are outlined by Points
4 and 6, respectively, of Part B, below.
4. Concrete walls, 20 centimeters thick.
5. Concrete walls, 50 centimeters thick.
6. Iron bars for reinforcement, each 19
meters long and 24 centimeters in
diameter.
7. Concrete walls and foundation, 21/2
meters thick.
8. Air pipes, each 20 centimeters in
diameter.
9. Reinforcement consisting of basalt
blocks; the basalt reinforcement layer
extended to a depth of 1 to 11/2 meters;
each basalt block measures 30 centi-
meters in width, length, and height.
10. Ground level.
11. Concrete roof, 21/2 meters thick.
TOP VIEW OF THE AIR RAID BUNKER;
DIMENSIONS 24 BY 25 METERS.
1. Shelter areas, 6 by 10 meters.
2. Toilets, two on each floor.
3. Air-conditioning control room; 3 by 5
meters and 31/2 meters high; on the
ground floor.
4. Staircases and hallways. This section
occupied the same column of space
dovmward thru each story.
5. Power generators; on the ground
floor.
6. Shelter areas and hallways: 6 meters
by 4 meters and 3 meters high.
7. Entranceways, 6 meters wide and 21/2
meters high.
8. Protruding protective entrances of
concrete, 3 meters high; protective
entrance protruded 3 meters from
bunker.
9. Concrete walls, 21/2 meters thick.
27107 12-58
A
24m.
//// ///// //// NB MN ////
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
7
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9
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4
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1
3
4
4
5
1
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2
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4
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In March 1956 a member of the American Legation observed a site
In downtown Budapest where construction of air-raid shelters under two
adjoining buildings was in progress. 222/
air-raid shelters were being
constructed under, various Budapest buildings, 222/ and numerous refugees
were familiar with the practice. all/
VI. Shelters in Other Areas.
The air-raid shelters constructed or reconstructed and improved in
the remainder of Hungary show a pattern similar to that evident in the
metropolitan area of Budapest.
Certainly, some major industrial
Installations have been provided with heavy shelters, and it would be
dangerous to assume that other shelters have not been provided merely
on the ground that they have not been reported.
A. Tunnel and Gallery Systems.
.Information concerning an alternate
Hungarian government is inconclusive.
an underground system at Lillafured (48?05' N - 20?37' E) 232/
which was redeveloped from existing caverns and shelter during 1950-
54. 233/ This location is also frequently reported to be an under-
ground air defense center, 3])1/ and it may be a joint installation.
Excavations or shelters of the gallery type in cities have
been reported in Miskolc, 235/ Baja, 236/ Papa, ill/ and Veszprem. 238/
These, however, may be special installations for military or control
purposes. galleries in the Avas Hills
(formerly wine cellars) 239/ are air defense locations for an emergency
hospital and the police. 12112/
dispersal site for the
B. .Government and Communist Party Shelters.
diffi-
cult to determine the Characteristics and purposes of air-raid shel-
ters in Hungarian cities outside Budapest. Heavy bunker (BGS) shel-
ters are not usually associated with Communist Party and government
Installations. Basement shelters under administrative buildings are
reported most often.
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in Szeged new shelters were 50X1
under construction before 1954 beneath the post office, city hall,
and police headquarters and that old shelters were being cleared. 243/
a shelter under the police building 50X1
In Szentgotthard in 1953. 244 unidentified 50X1
shelters from Sopron, 24 and others are reported in Esztergom, 246/
Gyor, 247/ Miskolc, 24
and Galambok. 249/ 50X1
civil air
defense headquarters under the following buildings: the city hall, a
county building, the "finance ministry," and military barracks.
C. Transport and Communications.
at least three types of air-raid shel-
ters have been constructed in Hungary in connection with railroad in-
stallations. These shelters include the heavy BGS bunkers; some
smaller bunkers for limited numbers of operational personnel; and
"splinterproof" shelters, probably shelters of the basement type or
detached shelters of comparable strength. It is probable that shel-
ters for operating railroad personnel and for essential communications
have been given high priority.
Heavy concrete bunkers 2 to 4 stories high are reported by one
refugee as being built or under construction in 1956 at railroad sta-
tions and terminals in Szekesfehervar, Hatvan, Szolnok, Debrecen, and
Gyor./
Small bunkers with capacities estimated to be from 3 to 30 per-
sons, probably for railroad operating personnel) are reported from at
least 6 locations. E21/ all
railroad stations had this type of shelter. 258/
some railroad stations have been provided
with basement air-raid shelters.) possibly of earlier construction. 222/
D. Industrial Shelters.
shelters of the BGS
bunker type at the Sztalinvaros Iron and Steel Plant. 260/
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one completed 50X1
bunker, one nearly complete (1956), and another building under construc-
tion (1956) which might be a third bunker. .1./ 50X1
in 1954 one bunker had been built and a second was under 50X1
construction in the plant area. 262/ Estimated sizes of bunkers in this
plaht vary from 98 to 130 ft (30 to ho m) square, with 33 ft of the struc-
ture aboveground and 33 ft beneath the surface. 263/ 50X1
"atomproof" bunkers with capacities of 50X1
1,000 persons each. 264/ The capacities of the plant shelters should be
well over this figure.
The Gyor Machinery and Railroad Equipment Plant has at least
one large bunker. the bunker as 50X1
follows 2a5/:
Air-raid shelter: Square, 30 by 30 m 38 by
98 ft7, 15 m 59 f17 high to the eaves, vertical
walls and dome-shaped roof; construction completed
in 1954. Reinforced concrete walls 2.5 m (8.2 ft)
thick, dome solid reinforced concrete 8 to 10 m
(26.2 to 33 ft) thick at highest point. The parti-
tion walls, also of reinforced concrete, were 1 m
(3.3 ft) thick. The bunker had 6 floors, each with
16 rooms) each room was fitted with rows of wooden
benches and could hold 12 to 16 people ... four
entrances ... .
a telephone
a bunker at this plant
contains an electric powerplant, 266/ small arms storage,
exchange, EL/ and ventilating equipment. 268/
Two refugees report heavy shelters at the Diosgyor Steel and
Engineering Works, one identifying a single bunker 269/ and the other
identifying two bunkers. 222/
Unconfirmed industrial bunkers include those described as being
of recent construction at two aluminum plants -- Inota 272/ and
Almasfuzito. 273/ The former is stated to contain communications and
emergency supplies. Several other bunkers have been reported in addi-
tional Hungarian plants. 21.11/
Underground or hillside galleries, a variation of heavy shelters
of the BUS type, are located principally at ammunition factories such as
those at Fuzfo, 275/ Jobbagyi, Sirok, and Felnemet. 276/ A chemical
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plant At Kazincbarcika also has shelters built into hillsides which bor-
der the plant area. 277/
Two underground shelters at mining locations are thus far un-
confirmed. One is reported at a uranium mine in Pecs 278/ and the
other near a coal mine at Izsofalva. 279/
As in Budapest, basement shelters of either World War II or
more recent construction are reported in industrial enterprises in
various communities of Hungary. 50X1
an enterprise built air-raid shelters "in the course of its 50X1
routine work in accordance with the general regulations governing
the construction of factory buildings" 280/, 50X1
"Factories and military barracks in Miskolc all had concrete base?
-
ments for air-raid defense" 281j;
World War LI air-raid shelters have been 50X1
cleaned and that all new construction includes basements which could
serve the same purpose. 282j
E. Apartment Basements.
Reports on basement shelters in Hungary include such general
statements as those which follow. "The principal civil defense mea-
ure in Komlo was construction of air-raid shelters in all new build-
ings." 284/ "Every apartment house built in Hungary since 1945 has
.had an air-raid shelter included in the basement." 285/ "An ordinance
has been in effect, since at least 1949 which directs that the construc-
tion of all new houses is to include a civil defense shelter. In the
case of apartment houses, practically all such Shelters consist of
reinforced concrete areas located in the basements of the buildings.
By ordinance these shelters must be large enough to hold all the occu-
pants of the apartment house... ." 286/
apartment basem'ent shelters in
the cities or towns of Veszprem, Nagylengyel, Almasfuzito, 2?.1/ Sopron,
Nagykanizsa, Zalaegerszeg, 288/ and Sztalinvaros.
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APPENDIX A
DECREE NO. 01/67-1951 VI OF THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR*
' Decree No. 01/67-1951 VI of the Minister of the Interior concerning
the construction Of TGS (tormelek, gaz es szilankbiztos debris-,
gas-, and splinterprool7) shelters in residences and public buildings.
1. Establishment of Shelters.
a. TGS shelters must be established in all newly constructed resi-
dences and public buildings, or in those to be reconstructed or remod-
eled, for which the civil defense group exceeds 30 persons, based on 2,
d,** and which are suitable technically for the installation of shel-
ters as set forth in 6, a.***
b. Decree No. 01/20-1951 VI of the Minister of the Interior, gov-
erning the civil defense of industrial plants, deals with industrial
plant shelters- separately. However, the technical requirements of TGS
shelters as set forth here will also refer to TGS shelters in indus-
trial plants.
2. The Parts of the Shelter and the Civil Defense Group.
a. The shelter consists of an antechamber and an interior area.
One antechamber and 3 interior areas, each with a capacity of 50 per-
sons at most, comprise a shelter unit. In 1 shelter unit, therefore,
a maximum of 150 persons can be accommodated.
If the antechamber opens directly onto the stair well, an open
corridor, or the outside, a gaslock should be installed behind the en-
trance door of the antechamber. The area of the gaslock should be at
least 2 sq m, and it should be set off from the antechamber by a gas-
proof door placed in a wall 25 cm thick.
b. At least 30, and at most 50, people may be placed in one inte-
rior area. If the ground plan of the shelter cannot be arranged with
openings frOm the antechamber into all the interior areas to insure
peacetime use and economic utilization of space, then the interior
areas may open onto each other. However, only one interior area may be
reached from another. If several shelter units are built within the
basement of one building, they should be as far apart as possible. To
make sure that they are some distance apart, there should be a layer-of
* For the sake of clarity, minor changes have been made in the
translation of the original document.
** P. 40, below.
*** P. 44, below.
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dirt or a room, at least 2.5 m wide, not being used for shelter pur-
poses, between each shelter unit and the next. The walls of the rooms
dividing the shelter units should be of reinforced concrete, 25 cm
thick, reinforced with No. 8, 10-cm mesh reinforcing on both sides and
tied into the main walls of the building by inserting the rounds into
the gaps of the brick wall. One of these rooms may also serve as the
shelter antechamber if sufficient space is not available. If more than
two shelter units are set up next to each other in this way, a central
area in the basement, not touching the exterior walls, must be formed
if possible Lfor the shelter unit27, and the basement pipes must be run
in the outer area. This latter arrangement is preferable in establish-
ing 1 or 2 shelter units, if peacetime use and economy will permit it.
c. Centrally located public shelters must be available for blocks
of houses, for groups of smaller residences, or for other groups of
buildings (settlements) if separate shelters in each building are either
impossible for technical reasons or impractical for reasons of economy.
These must be built only for the Lcivil defens27 staff Lwherl" ordered
by the separate decree of the Ministry of the Interior.
d. The civil defense group of a building is determined by the
following method:
(1) In residence buildings it is necessary to count on 1 person
per 8 sq in of area in residences of 2 rooms or smaller and on 1 person
per 10 sq m of area in residences of 3 or more rooms. It is not neces-
sary to include the areas of secondary rooms (receiving hall, toilet,
kitchen, and bath) in the area of the rooms. Base areas are computed by
measuring between the plastered wall surfaces.
(2) In residence buildings where there are rooms used for
business, as workshops, or for similar purposes, 1 person per 20 sq m
of used area must be counted.
(3) Shelter for industrial plants and for other buildings in
which the establishment of TGS shelters is obligatory must be planned
for the maximum force present in the building or in the plant area
during an alert. In establishing the civil defense staff for indus-
trial plants, a pos'sible regrouping of the shifts must be considered to
reduce the staff. The civil defense staff for offices located in resi-
dence buildings must be determined in the same manner.
e. The shelters must be constructed and completely outfitted con-
currently with the construction of the building, but they may also be
used for peacetime purposes. Only such peacetime usages are permitted
which can be halted immediately if necessary and which will allow the
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return of the shelter to its primary purpose within 24 hours. Those
peacetime uses of the shelter which do not impede its original purpose
and which can be continued during an alert are especially desirable.
3. Shelter Size.
a. The base area of the antechamber should be 0.1 sq in times the
number of persons which can be accommodated by the interior areas of a
shelter unit where there are 2 interior areas and 0.13 sq m where there
are 3. In any case, the base area should be at least 4 sq in. The
narrowest part of the antechamber should be 1.5 in. The height of the
antechamber and of the interior area should be at least 2.2 in. Where
there is a ceiling ribbed on the underside, the lower plane of the ribs
should be at least 1.9 in from the basement floor. The route leading to
the shelter and to the antechamber should be so laid out that a stretcher,
0.51 x 2.26 m, can be carried into any interior area.
- b. The interior.base area should be 0.75 sq m per person and the
airspace 2.5 Cu in per person. If the responsible officials permit the
use of air filter equipment and if it Is installed when the shelter is
built, the base area per person may be reduced to-0.6 sq m and the air-
space to 1.6 cu in.
c. If the airspace of the interior areas is smaller than that com-
puted to be necessary) an auxiliary airspace of the size necessary to
make up the deficit must be connected to the airspace of the interior
areas from the basement sections outside the shelter. Openings in the
auxiliary airspace which open onto the outside must be closed with gas-
proof securing devices or walled up. The connecting of the interior
areas with the auxiliary airspace is to be done with 25 x 25-cm or
30 x 30-cm openings placed one above the other. These should be cap-
able of being secured with gasproof locks from within the interior area.
These openings should be at the point farthest from the entrance.
d. The area of an internal space should be at least 24 sq in; the
height) 2.20 m; and the narrowest width, 2.20 m.
e. One square meter_per 30 persons must be set off in the interior
areas for pit Zportablel/ latrines, closed off by a single curtain. In
setting up the interior area airspace it is not necessary to subtract
the cubic area of the latrines.
f. An open area of at least 2 sq m must be left in the antechamber
for the placement of equipment.
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4. Entrances and Emergency Exits.
a. A basement containing a shelter must open onto a stair well or
other closed area. These closed areas along with the door openings
can serve as entrances to the shelter.
b. The entrance door of the antechamber should be one door, opening
outward, per 150 persons. The door should be placed in a corner in such
a way that it will be flat against the wall when open; it should be
capable of being unhinged from inside. The interior area doors should
also be placed in corners if possible, and they should open /outwarg
from interior areas into the antechamber.
c. Each independent shelter unit should have at least two emergency
exits. One of these may be the emergency passage treated in g, below.
Where shelter units are built next to each other, fewer emergency exits
may be made if they still afford possibilities for escape from all in-
terior areas in the event that some parts of the building are destroyed.
To insure this, neighboring shelter units must be connected by emergency
passages. Emergency exits should be relatively far apart and on opposite
sides of the building.
d. The shelters of row buildings must be equipped with vertical
emergency exits if emergency exits cannot open onto the outside from the
shelters. For reasons of material economy, vertical emergency exits may
be built only in inportant buildings.
The vertical emergency exit is a reinforced concrete cylinder
with walls 25 cm thick and with an interior diameter of 0.90 m. It ex-
tends to the ceiling of the second floor, and it has openings at the
ground level and at the top. The exits should be two-thirds the height
of the interior areas. The reinforced concrete cylinder must be built
with exterior and interior reticular reinforcing with a mesh of 20 x 20 cm.
It must have an angle brace connection at the basement ceiling level and
a hinged connection at the level of the second floor ceiling. The ex-
terior lengthwise reinforcing is number 10 steel rounds; the interior,
number 8 rounds; and the exterior and interior circular reinforcing, num-
ber 6 rounds. The reinforced concrete cylinder must be equipped with
built-in steel ladders, inside and out.
e. The openings of the emergency exits should be beyond the ranges
of destruction which can be expected in the building or neighboring
structures. For important buildings, emergency tunnels 0.8 in wide and
1 in high, or tubular tunnels with an interior diameter of 0.9 m, must be
built to lead to open areas.
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f. If splinters) coming in a straight line, can reach the interior
area through the emergency exit openings, regardless of the fact that the
openings are covered, then exterior or interior splinterproof walls must
be built to cover the openings. The splinter wall should afford protec-
tion against the imact of splinters flying in a horizontal direction.
The distance between the splinter wall and the emergency exit should be
0.80 to 1 m. Brick walls laid with improved mortar 51 cm thick, or vib-
rated reinforced concrete walls 35 cm thick containing at least 200 kg of
cement per cubic meter) can be considered splinterproof.
g. Adjacent basement areas of neighboring buildings must be connected
by emergency passages. These passages are vaulted openingsmeasuring
0.7 to 0.8 m) walled with bricks. To insure easy removal of the walling,
they must not be tied to the existing walls. The plane of the walling on
one side should not coincide with the plane of the main wall.
5. Devices to Secure Openings.
a. The following are the devices which secure the shelter openings:
(1) The entrance door leading into the antechamber (antechamber
door)) with interior dimensions of 0.85 x 1.85 m.
(2) The door leading from the antechamber into the interior area
(interior area door), with interior dimensions of 0.85 x 1.85 m.
(3) The windows which close the openings serving as emergency
exits (emergency exit windows). The dimensions of the small emergency
exit windows are 70 x 50 cm and of the large, 70 x 85 cm. The emer-
gency exit windows fit against the outer surface of the wall and open
outward.
b. From the point of view of protection, the devices which secure
the openings protect against gas and air pressure (GL) iiaz es legnyo-
Eag or only against gas (G) iiitz7. Openings in the outer walls of a
shelter unit must always be closed off with GL devices which open out-
ward, and within the shelter unit G doors must be used. Doors between
interior areas and the antechamber should open outward into the ante-
chamber.
c. If,' in addition to the emergency exit windows and the antecham-
ber door, more openings in the outer walls of the shelter are necessary
for its peacetime usage, either they must be equipped with GL devices or
they must be so formed that, if necessary, they can be walled up by bond-
ing into the grooves cut previously in the wall. Basement sections which
serve as shelters may be prepared without windows. Shelters should be
equipped with only the absolutely necessary openings.
d. To ventilate the shelter, at least one Z-shaped ventilation
opening may be cut in the interior area wall which borders on the outer
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airspace. This opening should have a cross section of 7 x 14 cm and
should be fitted with a grill on the outside and a small gasproof door
on the inside. ?
e. The devices which secure the shelter openings are to be of steel
or prefabricated reinforced concrete. Both types are equipped with
angle iron frames placed in the wall. Regulation No. MOSZ 800 iMagyar
Orszagos Szabvany -- Hungarian National Regulation/ prescribes the dimen-
sions and structure of the frame. Reinforced concrete shelter doors
and emergency exit windows cannot be considered splinterproof.
6. Shelter Roof and the Building Above the Shelter.
a. TGS shelters may only be built-in the basements of buildings where
there are at least three covers /floors and roof/ of noncombustible mate-
rials above the shelter ceiling.
b. In buildings with brick walls a cornice beam must be used with
the shelter roof as well as with the uppermost roof.
c. The floor level of the roof over the 5asemeng'she1ter may not
be more than 1.20 in above the lowest ground level. If this requirement
cannot be met because of the subterranean water level, a fill with a
height corresponding to a crown width of at least 3 m must be made at
the outer wall of the shelter. The upper plane of the fill must be re-
garded as the exterior ground level.
d. If the stairs in a building housing a shelter are built of
prefabricated units, either the extended rounds must be cemented into
the supporting structure or the individual units must be connected to
each other and to the supporting structure by screws and other connecting
devices.
e. A so-called "civil defense roof" with an increased load-bearing
capability must be built over the shelter and the access route leading
to it. The civil defense roof is made of reinforced concrete at least
15 cm thick, with a 20 x 20-cm reticular mesh reinforcing of 8-mm steel
rounds cemented in at the place of use (not prefabricated). It may be
either a reinforced concrete sheet [slag or underribbed reinforced con-
crete, in either case made to support a doubly directed load of the amount
prescribed by civil defense regulations. The lower mesh reinforcing &text
to the ceiling] may be counted in with the structural reinforcing, but it
may not be substituted for by a wider mesh reinforcing of rounds of the
same size.
f. In addition to its own weight, the roof over the shelter and its
access route must be planned to carry the following evenly distributed
loads:
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(1) In nonsteel structures, a load totaling 1,000 kg per sq m
for the ground and second stories and 250 kg per sq m for each addi-
tional story.
(2) In steel structures, a load totaling 1,000 kg per sq m for
the ground, second, third, and fourth stories and 100 kg per sq m for
each additional story.
g. Beyond the loads given above, the useful load of the roof must
be considered only if there is a large concentrated load (heavy ma-
chines) operative on it.
h. The low cost of the civil defense roof must be insured by the
use of heavy braces or small spans.
i. The concrete used in a civil defense roof should be at least of
B 200 quality, and the steel rounds used should be of at least 36.223
or 36.24B quality.
j. In planning the civil defense roof, the load must be calculated
with a safety factor of 1.1, and it must allow for the extreme tensions
stated in the regulation covering reinforced concrete.
k. In special cases, for which the Ministry of the Interior will
make separate arrangements, a dirt fill 1 m thick must cover the shel-
ter roof. In this case, the height of the first-story floor level
should not be more than 1.2 m above ground level. If the basement
cannot be built at the necessary depth because of a high water level,
refer to 6, c.* In planning the roof, the weight of the dirt on the
roof must be considered independently of the civil defense load.
7. Shelter Walls.
a. If the height of the ground mass placing ground pressure on the
walls of the shelter and access routes is more than 3 m, the shelter
walls (without the load-discharging effect of the walls and ceiling)
must be planned for a ground pressure computed by assuming a ground
level burdened with the same load as the civil defense load of the shel-
ter roof.
b. If the height of the ground mass placing ground pressure on the
exterior walls of the shelter and its access route is less than 3 m, it
Is not necessary to plan for the ground pressure, but the following re-
quirements must be met:
The thickness of walls of stone or of mixed materials should be
at least 6o cm, with mortar containing 250 kg of cement per cu m.
* P. 44, above.
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The thickness of walls of fired clay brick should be 51' cm, with
a mortar containing 250 kg per cu m.
Where vibrated concrete containing 180 kg of cement per cu in is
used, the wath should be at least 40 cm thick.
Reinforced concrete walls without bracing pillars should be 30 cm
thick, and those with pillars should be 20 cm thick.
c. The shelter roof must be cemented in with a cornice beam, rein-
forced according to regulations, extending the full width of the basement.
If the building is of reinforced construction, the shelter walls should
be vibrated concrete walls tied into the reinforcing with cemented-in
straps, or brick walls 51 cm thick.
? d. The walls between interior areas of a.shelter should be at least
25 cm thick if they are walls of fired clay brick laid with portland ce-
ment mortar. They should be at least 20 cm thick if they are vibrated
concrete walls containing 200 kg of cement per cu m.
e. The interior walls of shelter units should be either walls of
fired clay brick laid with a mortar containing 100 kg of cement per cu m
or reinforced concrete walls as described in 2, b.*
f. The shelter ceiling must not be plastered. The shelter walls must
be plastered. The ceilings and walls should receive three coats of white-
wash.
8. Shelter Floor.
The antechamber and interior areas of the shelter should have a smoothed
concrete floor or paying placed into cushion concrete. The cushion concrete
must be poured at least 10 cm thick and, for support, must be tied into the
walls.
9. Pipes Running Through the Shelter.
a. If possible, pipes of various types (central steam and hot water
heat, water, and sewer) should not run through the shelter. Sometimes
this requirement Cannot be met, however, so only thick-walled mild steel
pipes will cross in the shortest route. Brittle pipes must be fitted with
a reinforced concrete protective covering, with both ends terminating out-
side. To close pressure branches, main locks must be built which are easily
manipulated from the shelter. Valves to prevent infiltration of gas must
be built in sewer pipes.
* pp. 39-40, above.
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.b. The passing of gas pipes through a shelter is forbidden. If gas
pipes pass through a shelter already built) or if there are gas meters
there, these must be completely isolated from the shelter by walls around
them.
c. At least one chimney terminus outside the shelter area should be
in a basement housing a shelter. A chimney soot-door and other openings
extending into the shelter must be gasproof.
10. Shelter Lighting.
If there is electric lighting in the building housing a shelter, it
must be run into the shelter.
11. Closing Instructions.
a. The instructions herein shall be used for all residences and
public buildings built in municipal or industrial areas except that
where there is a ground water level-above 1.5 in, when 6, c,* will not
satisfactorily meet the problem, shelters must be built only under cer-
tain buildings after permission of the Ministry of the Interior has been
obtained. This must be done in such a way that the buildings without
shelters will also aid in supplying the civil defense group.
b. The Ministry of the Interior may permit deviations from the
statements of this decree, where justified.
c. This decree goes into effect on 31 December 1951. The follow-
ing decrees are herewith void:
B.M.A.-4374-5/9. 1950
Biz. 4374-84/1950. VI/4
Biz. 4374-136/1950. VI
* P. 44, above.
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APPENDIX B
DECREE NO. 0138-952 VI OF THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR*
Decree No. 0138-952 VI 5o datgof the Minister of the Interior
concerning the establishment of emergency shelters.
1. General Instructions.
a. Emergency shelters are old-house Fegihazi7 (RH) shelters es-
tablished in the basements of existing buildings and trench shelters
built underground in open areas.
b. RH shelters are differentiated from TGS /tormelek, gaz es
szilankbiztos -- debris-, gas-, and splinterproof/ shelters in order
that certain relaxations of principles of Decree No. 01/67-1951 VI
of the Minister of the Interior may be permitted.
2. Determining the Site of an RH Shelter.
a. If possible, the RH shelter should be located in an interior
section of the basement not bordered by outside walls. It should be
in that part of the basement over which there are the most floors.
b. If it is impossible, because of the structural layout of the
building, to establish the shelter as prescribed in a, above, then it
must be located along the firewall bordering the next building at a
point where it may be easily reached from the stairs, doorway, or
courtyard.
c. If possible, the shelter should be in a part of the basement
where there are no gas and water pipes.
d. The shelter must be located in an extended arrangement /Fulti-
ple compartments17 with its components divided by the existing struc-
tural walls. Connections between shelter units, by way of the basement
sections outside the shelter, and between the shelter and emergency
exits or emergency passages must be assured. If there are several
shelter units located within the basement of a single building, they
should be as far apart as possible, with a space between them at least
2.5 m wide which is not being used for shelter purposes.
* 291/. For the sake of clarity, minor changes have been made in the
translation of the original document.
** See Appendix A.
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e. Where possible and where permissible under the requirements of
this decree, the shelter must be built in basement areas used as RH
shelters during the last war.
3. Shelter Components and the Civil Defense Group.
a. The shelter conSists of an antechamber and interior areas. One
antechamber and a group of interior areas, each accommodating a maximum
of 70 people, make up a shelter unit. One shelter unit may accommo-
date a maximum of 210 people.
b. The interior areas should if possible open onto the antechamber,
but if this is not feasible because of the structural layout, they may
open onto each other.
c. If the shelter has only one interior area and the entrance
opens into the shelter from the building interior, the entrance may
open directly onto the shelter interior area, omitting the antechamber.
However, in such cases, gaslopks must be installed as necessary to re-
place the antechamber.
d. The shelter must be set Up for a civil defense group, the size
of which is determined in the following way:
(1) In residences of 2 or fewer rooms) 1 person must be esti-
mated per 8 sq in of living area. Where there are 3 or more rooms, 1
person must be estimated per 10 sq m of living area. It is not neces-
sary to include the area of auxiliary rooms (receiving hall, toilet,
kitchen, and bath). If there is a hall in the residence, it is to be
counted as a room. The base areas are computed by measurements between
the plastered wall surfaces.
(2) Shelters in industrial plants, public buildings, and other
Institutional buildings requiring the installation of TGS shelters must
be planned for the maximum staff working in the building or in the plant
area during the period of a civil defense alert. In determining the
size of the civil defense group, the possible regrouping of shifts must
be considered in order to reduce the civil defense group. The civil
defense group for offices Lar thos27 located in residences must be de-
termined in the same way. .
e. Shelters should be set up in such a way as to permit peacetime
use; however, only those peacetime usages which can be terminated im-
mediately, returning the shelter to its primary purpose within 24 hours.,
may be allowed. An ideal peacetime use is one which does not hamper
the intended shelter use and which can continue during civil defense
preparations.
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4. Shelter Size.
a. The smallest width of the antechamber should be 1.20 m and the
smallest area, 4 sq in. The lowest permissible height of the antechamber
and the interior area is 1.80 m. There may be an antechamber passage
section which can be closed off by doors.
b. The base area per person of the interior area is 0.75 sq m and
the airspace, 2.50 cu m. If the authorities permit the use of air-filter
equipment and if it is installed at the same time the shelter is con-
structed, the base area per person may be reduced to 0.6 sq in and the
airspace to 1.6 cu m.
c. If, after computations are made, the airspace required is greater
than the existing airspace of the interior areas, then an auxiliary space
of the proper size must be connected to the airspace of the interior areas
from a basement area outside the shelter. Openings onto the outside in
the auxiliary airspace must be either walled up or fitted with gasproof
securing devices like those on the shelter openings. The auxiliary air-
space is connected with the interior areas by means of gasproof openings
which can be secured from inside the shelter. These openings should be
at least 25 x 25 cm, one placed higher than the other.
d. One square meter for each 5 persons housed in an interior area
must be set off for pit 5ortab1e? latrines, closed off by a curtain and
possibly located in a wooden compartment. In computing the airspace of
the interior areas, it is not necessary to subtract the cubic area of the
section closed off by the curtain.
e. An open space of at least 2 sq in must be left in the antechamber
for the placement of equipment. If this cannot be done because of the
structural layout, then the space may be set aside in the interior area.
5. Entrances and Emergency Exits.
a. If there are openings from a basement to the outside, the shelter
must be situated so that it is accessible from the stairs or from another
closed area. If the basement is reached from a closed area, its entrance
may open directly onto the antechamber of the shelter.
- b. Preferably, there should be at least one door opening outward in
the antechamber for each 150 persons. The doors should be placed in corners
and should be hung in such a way that they will lie flat against the wall
when open and can be unhinged from inside. Doors of the interior areas
should also be placed in corners if possible and should open outward from
the interior area into the antechamber.
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c. Each separate shelter unit should have at least two emergency
exits. These may be the emergency passages discussed in g.* Where
shelter units are located next to each other, there may be less than
two exits per shelter if the exits are placed so that there will be
opportunity for egress from any interior area in case of destruction
of some sections of the building. To insure egress, shelters next to
each other must be interconnected. Emergency exits should be located
fairly far apart and on opposite sides of the building. If possible,
they should be beyond the limits of possible debris from nearby build-
ings.
Emergency exits should be in basement areas removed from the
shelter entrance. The emergency exit should be a basement window,
70 x 50 cm, which can be secured with a GL (.az- es legnyomasbiztos
-- gas- and air-pressure-proof7) door, which is so placed that
splinters coming from any direction will strike a brick wall at least
1-1/2 bricks thick. If this is impossible because of the layout of
the building, then a splinter wall must be built in front of or behind
the emergency exit.
d. All shelter openings, as well as those of the auxiliary airspace
connected to the shelter, which open on the outside must be secured with
gas- and splinterproof devices. Any cracks through which there is direct
contact with outer air must be sealed with gasproof sealing. Securing
of openings is done by walling them up or by fitting them with covers.
e. Basement windows used for peacetime purposes and not used for
emergency exits may be walled up with walls built in front of or behind
them, or in the wall. Walls in front of and behind openings should be
anchored into the main wall with straps made from steel rounds. The
walling up of the openings must be done with indented tie-ins on both
sides of the existing wall. For ventilation, a Z-shaped shaft must be
cut in a walled-up opening.
f. If necessary, the following devices will serve for gas- and
splinterproofing:
(1) A layer of dirt 70 cm thick or a layer of sand at least 50 cm
thick supported by round timbers, 10 cm in diameter, between planks.
(2) A stack of logs 4o cm thick made up of timbers at least 10 cm
In diameter, supported between piles driven outside the opening to be
protected.
These solutions will be used only in exceptional cases, be-
cause they are easily damaged and require constant maintenance.
* P. 53, below.
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g. The shelter should connect with all parts of the basement.
Emergency passages must be made between the basements of buildings
containing shelters and the basements of neighboring buildings. These
emergency passages are 70 x 80 cm in size, walled with brick laid with
lime-mortar. To insure easy removal, the walls may not be tied into
the existing structure walls. The plane of the "walling-in" Lknock-ouI7
on one side should not coincide with the structure walls.
6. Devices to Secure Openings.
a. The following devices are used to secure the shelter openings:
(1) The entrance leading into the antechamber (antechamber door).
(2) The door leading from the antechamberinto the interior area
or areas. The inner dimensions of both doors are 0.85 x 1.85 in.
(3) The windows used to secure the emergency exit openings. The
dimensions of the small window are 70 x 50 cm and of the large window,
70 x 85 cm. These windows fit against the outer surface of the wall and
open outward.
b. The securing devices, which offer protection against gas and air
pressure (GL) or only against gas (G). All openings on the outer walls
of shelter units must be fitted with GL devices opening dutward, and,
within the shelter units, G doors must be used. Doors between the in-
terior areas and the antechamber should open outward.
c. The securing devices, which are of steel or prefabricated rein-
forced concrete. Both types are hung in angle iron frames placed in the
wall. The dimensions and execution of the securing devices are prescribed
by Regulation No. MOSZ 800 /Magyar Orszagos Szabvany -- Hungarian National
Regulation]. The claws used in walling in the angle iron frames must be
carefully cemented into grooved holes.
7. Shelter Roof and Its Dimensions.
a. The level of the roof over the shelter may be 1.5 in above the
level of the ground at most. Ifeits elevation is 1.2 m or less, the
shelter wall should be at least 51 cm thick, and if it is between 1.2 and
1.5 m, the wall should be at least 63 cm thick. If the walls are thinner
than these requirements, they must be strengthened with interior or ex-
terior buttressing. The strengthening wall, regardless of the thickness
of the wall which it braces, should be at least 38 cm thick and laid in
cement mortar.
b. If the elevation of the shelter roof is between 0.5 and 1.5 in
above ground level, the roof over the shelter should be made of at least
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two noncombustible materials. If the elevation is 0.5 m or less, the
roof should be of at least one such material.
c. The roof over the shelter, its access route, and the routes to
the emergency exits and passages must be planned for the following evenly
distributed loads of debris in addition to the roof's own weight:
(1) In nonsteel structures, a total of 1,000 kg per sq m for the
ground and second floor and 250 kg per sq in for each floor above these.
(2) In steel structures, a total load of 1,000 kg per sq in for
the ground, second, third, and fourth floors and 100 kg per sq m for each
additional floor. I
d. It is necessary to consider the useful load capacity of the base-
ment roof in addition to that of the loads above only when there are heavy
machines or concentrated loads on upper floors.
e. Flat roofs are strengthened by bracing the roof ribs or roof girders.
When possible, the bracing must be done by brick pillars or interior divid-
ing walls. In special cases the roof girders can be braced by wooden beams
held in place by wooden supports.
In determining the size of the bracing devices, except for arched
bracing, the permissible tensions must be increased by 50 percent. Base-
ment ceilings having multiple spans must be_planned for the most dangerous
load produced by shifting debris and dead Lstatis7 loads.
f. Reinforced concrete girders and sheets may be braced at the center
of the open span or at some other point if there is no reinforcing over
the bracing sufficient to absorb negative pressures. It is only necessary
to consider whether the lower reinforcing of the doubly supported beam thus
formed is suitable to absorb the positive flexing pressures which arise.
g. Most barrel vaults of the usual dimensions will satisfy the civil
defense load without strengthening. It is only necessary to support the
side walls against the lateral pressure of the vault. The load capacity
of a vault cannot be increased by bracing it, nor can the lateral pres-
sures be significantly reduced in this way. Therefore, vaults are not
to be braced.
Ii. All existing walls within the area in which the shelter is to be
placed that are at least one brick thick can be used as dividing walls
within the shelter. The outer walls of the shelter should be at least
51 cm thick.
i. The old plaster on the ceiling over the shelter must be removed,
and the lower surfade of the ceiling must be whitewashed. Plaster on the
walls must be left intact.
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8. Pipes Running Through the Shelter.
a. If at all possible, central steam and hot water heating pipes
or water or gas pipes should not run through the shelter. This re-
quirement cannot always be met, however, and when it cannot, then thick-
walled mild steel pipes will cross by the shortest route. Brittle pipes
must be covered with a reinforced concrete protective covering, with both
ends of this covering terminating outside. Main locks for closing the
pressure branches, easily manipulated from the shelter, must be built in.
Valves to prevent infiltration of gas must be built into the sewer pipes.
b. The running of gas pipes through the shelter is forbidden. If
gas pipes cross an already-existing shelter, however, then the pipes and
the meters also, if they are within the shelter, must be completely set
off from the shelter by walls.
c. In basements containing shelters, there should be at least one
chimney terminus in the shelter area. Chimney soot doors or other open-
ings must be made gasproof with securing devices.
9. Construction of Trench Shelters.
a. The complete trench shelter is 547 at least 2 m below the ground
surface. A trench shelter may be an open or covered trench, flaring out
at the top to a width of 1.2 m.
b. When possible, the trench shelter should be gas- and splinter-
proof. For this reason, the roof must be covered with a layer of dirt at
least 50 cm thick, and gasproof antechambers must be set up at the en-
trances. Open trench shelters should not be used if they can be avoided.
c. The trench shelter consists of a number of sections, each at most
8 in long, arranged symmetrically in a zigzag pattern along a straight axis.
The individual sections must be separated by gasproof doors if possible.
The distance between the axes of several parallel trench shelters must be
at least 10 m and preferably 4o in.
d. One trench shelter may consist of 5 straight sections at most,
with a maximum capacity of 150 people.
e. If the capacity of the shelter is more than 50 people, entrances
.at both ends must be set up, and if it is less than 50 people, an emer-
gency exit may be substituted for one entrance.
f. The structure of a trench shelter may be reinforced concrete poured
at the site, prefabricated concrete units, brick circular vaulting, or
wooden bracing similar to mine shafts.
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g. Trench shelter benches must be arranged so that their backs are
independent of the shelter structure.
h. The execution of trench shelters as described above should be
undertaken only if the Ministry of the Interior hands down a separate
ruling for it.
10. Closing Instructions.
The Ministry of the Interior, in special cases, may permit devia-
tions from the standards contained in this order.
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