HPSCI REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00297R000300590018-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 86-2520
25 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)
FROM: STAT
Deputy Director for Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: HPSCI Report on Intelligence Authorization Bill
1. Attached for your information please find a copy of House Report
No. 99-690, Part 1. This is the report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on intelligence (HPSCI) on H.R. 4759, their version of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.
2. Your attention is directed to the following pages: pp. 9-12 (benefits
for certain "former spouses"); pp 14-18 (FBI access to bank records of "agents
of a foreign power"); p. 21 (acceptance by military intelligence personnel of
DCI intelligence awards); p. 504 (extension of authority of Secretary of
Defense over military intelligence personnel); pp. 26-32 (NSA & CIA "critical
skills" personnel recruitment program); p. 33 (reporting requirements for
certain covert arms transfers) and, p. 33-34 (forfeiture of federal pension
for violation of Intelligence Identities Act).
3. H.R. 4759 has also been referred to the following House committees:
Post Office and Civil Service; Judiciary; and, Armed Services. They are all
expected to complete action in the very near future. It is not clear yet,
however, when House floor action on the bill will be scheduled. We will keep
you apprised of developments.
STAT
Attachment
as stated
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992d S Session S 1 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES I REpr. 991
2d Session J l Part 1
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1987
JULY 17, 1986.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. HAMILTON, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, submitted the following
REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
(To accompany H.R. 4759]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4759) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 1987 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the U.S. Government, for the Intelligence Community Staff, for the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon and recommend that the bill do pass with an amendment.
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, (b) the Intelligence Community Staff and (c) the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1987,
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government;
(3) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize
personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1987 for any intelligence ele-
ments up to 2 percent above the authorized levels;
(4) Provide restrictions on support for military or paramili-
tary operations in Nicaragua and Angola;
61-6860
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OVERALL COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The administration requested real growth for fiscal year 1987
over the amount Congress appropriated for intelligence in fiscal
year 1986. The committee is convinced that U.S. intelligence agen-
cies are performing a vital service for the national security. As in
the past years, the committee also finds certain shortcomings in
the management and conduct of certain of the nation's intelligence
activities. Recommendations for making improvements in these
areas are contained in the classified annex to this report and the
committee will be pursuing these and other related issues further
during the coming months.
The committee was not convinced that the total amount request-
ed for fiscal year 1987 was fully warranted. The committee sup-
ports a lower level of effort than that requested by the President in
his budget. Therefore, the committee has recommended deferral of
certain proposals and the deletion of others, while a few items were
increased. The overall impact of the recommendation is a signifi-
cant reduction in the request.
In the committee's view the recommended authorization for in-
telligence and intelligence-related activities in this bill represents a
reasonable balance between needed capabilities and prudent cost.
It should be understood that the intelligence budget is largely a
subset of the defense budget. Almost all of the intelligence budget
is contained within the defense budget both for reasons of security
and because the great majority of intelligence activities are con-
ducted by elements of the Department of Defense. Thus, increases
and decreases for intelligence are largely changes within the de-
fense budget and are not direct changes to the federal budget as a
whole. The committee has recommended reductions which are gen-
erally commensurate with those applied to defense as a whole and
which provide adequate funding for essential intelligence activities.
The comm?ttee recognizes that the budget submitted by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence grew considerably less this year com-
pared to some previous years. Additional demands for intelligence
will create pressure for greater growth. The committee believes
that little real growth can be expected for the next several years.
AMENDMENT
The Committee adopted by voice, vote the following amendment:
Add at the end of the bill the following new section:
COVERT AGENT DISCLOSURE FEDERAL PENSION FORFEITURE
SEC. 603. Section 8312(cXl)(C) of title 5, United States Code is
amended by striking the period at the end thereof and inserting in
lieu thereof "or section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 421) (relating to intelligence identities).".
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ance to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
only as authorized pursuant to Section 101 and as specified in the
classified schedule of authorizations referred to in Section 102, Sec-
tion 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or any provision of
law specifically providing such funds, materiel or assistance, such
as is contained in H.R. 5052, the Military Construction Appropria-
tions Act, 1987, passed by the House of Representatives on June 25,
1986.
Section 106 continues in force the provisions of Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1986 (P.L. 99-169). Its princi-
pal effect is to ensure that only funds specifically authorized by the
bill or those specifically authorized by separate legislation ap-
proved by the House and Senate may be provided to assist the mili-
tary or paramiliary operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resist-
ance. Section 106, in effect, preserves the position that any assist-
ance provided to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance must be
openly requested and approved by the Congress with certain very
specific exceptions, such as the provision of intelligence to the Nic-
araguan democratic resistance, explicitly authorized by the bill.
Section 106 would prohibit during fiscal year 1987, as does Sec-
tion 105 of P.L. 99-169 during FY 1986, the use of funds from the
CIA's Reserve for Contingencies for assistance to the military or
paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance
except to the extent approved by reprogramming or transfer ap-
proval action submitted to the appropriate committees of the Con-
gress, which would include the intelligence and appropriations
committees of the House and Senate. Of course, funds from any
other accounts appropriated to the CIA, the Department of De-
fense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activi-
ties could not be transferred. to assist the military or paramilitary
operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance without repro-
gramming or transfer approval by the same committees.
This result stems from the application of Section 502 of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 which provides that funds may not be
spent for an intelligence activity unless they have been specifically
authorized and, in the case of the Reserve, provides that funds may
be provided for a particular intelligence activity if the Director of
Central Intelligence has given appropriate notice to the intelli-
gence committees of the House and Senate. As noted above, funds
authorized during fiscal year 1987 for the CIA's Reserve for Contin-
gencies are not available for support to the military or paramili-
tary activities of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. (Funds re-
quested for the Reserve would ordinarily be available to fund any
intelligence activity, other than one for which Congress has denied
funds. The Committee has denied use of the Reserve in FY 1987 to
assist the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance.)
Further, since assistance to the military or paramilitary oper-
ations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is a matter of sig-
nificant Congressional interest, any transfer of funds from other
accounts for this purpose would.require a reprogramming or trans-
fer approval action. Finally, Subsection 502(b) of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 does not permit the funding of intelligence activi-
ties for which funds have been denied by Congress. Even if substan-
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ations of the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is
an important foreign policy decision because it raises serious and
substantive foreign policy issues concerning: U.S. relations with
black African nations; the future of U.S.-brokered negotiations to
secure the independence of Namibia; the role and interest of the
Soviet Union in southern Africa; relations between South Africa
and its black Africa neighbors; possible linkage of the United
States with South Africa by assistance to UNITA; the presence of
Cuban troops in Angola; U.S. economic interests in Angola; super-
power conflict in Angola; and many others.
The Committee has also determined that the question of assist-
ance to UNITA is a matter of significant public debate and some
disagreement. To this debate have contributed the President, the
Vice President, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
and a range of other important Administration officials, both on
and off the record. Pledges of assistance to UNITA by the Presi-
dent can be found in his November 22, 1985 statement to the New
York Times and in his State of the Union Address to the Congress
on February 4, 1986. Public statements by other Administration of-
ficials appear to confirm that assistance will be provided, as well as
the specifics of that aid. These statements contribute to the public
debate on the issue and have helped give rise, for example, to
public announcements of support or opposition to aid to UNITA by
nearly half the Members of the House of Representatives.
Under such circumstances, the Committee opposes the use of
Presidential covert action authority to authorize a covert action
policy of support to UNITA because, in effect, such a program
would not be covert and because such use would effectively bypass
the role of Congress in debating significant foreign policy decisions.
The Committee is further of the view that, although the Presi-
dent must initiate and manage foreign policy, he cannot expect sus-
tained support for foreign policy initiatives, including covert action
operations, that are generally unpopular or where a covert action
mechanism can be viewed as having been chosen to avoid public
debate or a Congressional vote on the matter. The Committee is op-
posed to the use of covert action capabilities in such cases because
they undermine support for other covert action programs and be-
cause they virtually guarantee that such programs cannot remain
covert under any reasonable interpretation of that term.
The Committee, of course, is not opposed to covert actions. It has
supported both politically and financially a full covert action capa-
bility for the President. It supports in this bill a number of covert
action operations throughout the world. Nor does it conclude that
all paramilitary covert actions must be submitted to a vote or that
paramilitary covert actions cannot, under any circumstances,
remain covert or be successful. Yet, when advance planning for a
successful covert operation appears to have been conducted via po-
litical speeches and in the press. the Committee does not consider
that the possibilities for such a possible program remaining covert
are at all strong.
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(4) The increase in unfunded liability resulting from liberal-
ized benefits and Federal pay raises.
The benefits structure of CURDS is essentially the same as for
the Civil Service Retirement System with only minor exceptions.
These exceptions are: (a) annuities are based upon a straight 2 per-
cent of high 3-year average salary for each year of service, not ex-
ceeding 35; (b) under stipulated conditions a participant may retire
with the consent of the Director, or at his direction be retired at
age 50 with 20 years service, or a participant with 25 years of serv-
ice may be retired by the Director regardless of age; and (c) retire.
ment is mandatory at age 65 for personnel receiving compensation
at the rate of GS-18 or above, and at age 60 for personnel receiving
compensation at a rate less than GS-18, except that the Director
may, in the public interest, extend service up to 5 years.
Annuities to beneficiaries are provided exclusively from the
CIARDS fund maintained through: (a) contributions, currently at
the rate of 7 percent, deducted from basic salaries of participants
designated by the Director, (b) matching Agency (employer) contri-
butions from the appropriation from which salaries are paid, based
on the actual rate of contributions received from participants; (c)
transfers from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
representing employee and matching employer contributions for
service of Agency employees prior to the.date of their participation
in CIARDS, and contributions for service of integrated Agency em-
ployees included in CIARDS following termination of integrated
status; (d) income on investments in U.S. Government securities;
and (e) beginning in 1977, direct appropriations consistent with the
provisions of Public Law 94-552.
Section 302: Survivor Benefits for Certain Former Spouses of CIA
Employees
Section 302 (a) of the bill provides survivor benefits for certain
former spouses of CIA employees who did not benefit from the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Spouses' Retirement Equity Act of 1982
(P.L. 97-269, Title VD because they were divorced prior to the effec-
tive date of that Act (November 15, 1982).
The CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act granted certain former
spouses of CIA employees a presumptive entitlement, subject to re-
vision by spousal agreement or by State courts in divorce proceed-
ings, to a pro rata share of the employees' retirement annuities,
survivor benefits, and lump-sum disbursements paid from the re-
tirement fund. Former spouses qualified for the presumptive enti-
tlement were those married to a CIA employee during at least ten
years of the employee's creditable government service, at least five
years of which they spent outside the United States. The Congress
provided the benefits to these spouses in recognition of their years
of support of the unusual professional activities abroad of their CIA
employee spouses and their own direct contributions to fulfillment
of the mission of the CIA. Both the requirements of their support
to their CIA employee spouses and their direct contributions often
prevented the former spouse from acquiring marketable job skills
and pension rights and imposed familial pressures and tensions
which often contributed to the breakdown of their marriages.
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tees of the Congress before they take effect, as required by Section
201(a) of the CIA Retirement Act.
Section 302(b) of the bill makes a conforming amendment to Sec-
tion 14(a) of the CIA Act of 1949 to ensure that former spouses of
CIA employees who participated in. a federal retirement system
other than the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS),
receive the same benefits as former spouses of CIA employees who
participated in the CIARDS on the same basis. The same benefit
eligibility requirements regarding years of marriage and overseas
service that applied under the CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act
of 1982 apply to benefits for former spouses of both CIARDS and
non-CIARDS employees under the amendments made by Section
302.
Section 302(c) provides for funding the survivor benefits granted
by the amendments to the CIA Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain
Employees and the CIA Act of 1949 by subsections 302 (a) and (b).
Section 302(d) provides an effective date of October 1, 1986 for
the amendments made by section 302 to the CIA Retirement Act of
1964 for Certain Employees and the CIA Act of 1949.
Section 303: Health Benefits for Certain Former Spouses of CIA
Employees
Section 303 of the bill adds a new Section 16 to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Act of 1949 permitting a former spouse of a CIA
employee to enroll in a federal employee health benefits plan (see
chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code) if they were divorced
prior to May 7, 1985. To qualify, the former spouse must have been
married to the CIA employee during at least 10 years of his credit-
able service, at least 5 years of which were spent together outside
the United States, and must have been covered under a federal
health benefits plan as a member of the family of the CIA employ-
ee at some time during the 18-month period before the divorce or
annulment became final. The eligible former spouse need not
enroll in the same plan as that which covered the spouse at some
time during that 18-month period.
The eligible former spouse may enroll for self alone or self and
family during a special enrollment period beginning on the date of
enactment of this legislation and ending ' 6 months thereafter,
except that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management
shall waive the 6-month limitation when the Director of Central In-
telligence notifies him that circumstances so warrant.
The legislation disqualifies an otherwise eligible former spouse
from enrolling in a health plan if (1) the spouse remarries before
age 55 or (2) the spouse already is enrolled in a federal health bene-
fits plan.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management prescribes
the regulations for enrollment and payment by eligible former
spouses. The Director of Central Intelligence determines the identi-
ties and addresses of eligible former spouses and notifies them of
their health plan benefit rights.
The Committee limited the eligibility for health plan enrollment
under this section to former spouses divorced prior to May 7, 1985
because similarly situated former spouses divorced after that date
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would facilitate the logistical arrangements for such visits and
,avoid embarassment to the U.S. Government resulting from foreign
countries' extending hospitality to U.S. officials that the U.S. Gov-
ernment does not reciprocate. Accordingly, Section 401 of the bill
amends chapter 33 of title 28, United States Code and chapter 4 of
title 10 to grant the FBI and the DOD the authority to pay such
expenses.
The FBI and the DOD may use the authority to pay official re-
ception and representation expenses strictly for liaison with foreign
counterintelligence officials on counterintelligence matters, includ-
ing international terrorism matters. The FBI and the DOD may
not use the authority to pay such expenses for liaison related to
FBI or DOD functions other than counterintelligence functions, nor
should it be. used to pay expenses for foreign officials for whom the
Department of State or another government agency would as a
matter of practice have paid the expenses, in the absence of this
new authority for the FBI and the DOD. The Committee expects
that use of the authority granted by Section 401 of the bill will not
result in large expenditures.
Section 402.? FBI Access to State and Local Criminal Records for
Security Clearances
Section 402 amends Section 9101 of Title 5 of the United States-
Code to grant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the same
mandatory access to State and local criminal records as the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, and the
Central Intelligence Agency enjoy under Section 9101. Section 9101
of Title 5 provides for access to criminal history record information
in investigations for determining eligibility for access to classified
information or assignment to or retention in sensitive national se-
curity duties. The FBI conducts such investigations for FBI person-
nel, certain other executive branch personnel, and certain legisla-
tive branch staff personnel.
The Committee's intent with Section 402 of this bill is identical
in.all respects with the legislative history of Section 9101 contained
in the joint explanatory statement of managers to accompany the
conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1986 (H. Rept. 99-373, pp. 24-30) and that joint explanatory
statement is incorporated here by this reference.
Section 402(a) amends section 9101 of Title 5 to add the FBI at
the end of the list each time DOD, OPM, and CIA appear in the
section, with the effect of giving the FBI authority identical to that
section 9101 gives to DOD, OPM, and CIA.
Section 402(b) amends Section 803(a) of the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-169) to include the FBI,
with the result that the Department of Justice must consult the
FBI, along with DOD, OPM, and CIA, in preparing the report on
section 9101 required by section 803(a) of that Act.
Section 402(c) provides that the amendments to section 9101
made by section 402 are effective only with respect to FBI inquiries
made after the date of enactment of the FY 1987 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act.
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tory authority for access to the financial records of foreign powers .
and their agents under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
(12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.), which governs access to customers' records
held by financial institutions. Section 404 of the bill provides such
mandatory access to aid the FBI in performing its counterintelli-.
gence functions effectively.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
does not confer upon a bank's customers a constitutional right to
the privacy of their financial records possessed by the bank (United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). In response to the Supreme
Court's decision, the Congress enacted the Right to Financial Priva-
cy Act (RFPA) of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.). That Act generally
provides that, when the Government seeks the records of a custom-
er of a financial institution which-are relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry, it must employ a subpoena or formal written
request reviewable in court, or obtain a search warrant. Unless a
judicial officer enters an order to the contrary delaying notice, the
customer receives notice of the Government's request for the
records and an opportunity to contest the Government's request in
court.
In contrast to the general provisions of the RFPA which require
notice to the customer of a governmental request for records and
an opportunity to litigate, Section 1114(a) of the RFPA governing
intelligence and. counterintelligence agencies' requests for financial
records does not provide -for notice and an opportunity to litigate
and, indeed, prohibits financial institutions from giving notice to
the customers whose records are requested. The FBI could not ef-
fectively monitor and counter the clandestine activities of hostile
espionage agents and terrorists if they had to be notified that the
FBI sought their financial records for a counterintelligence investi-
gation.
Currently under Section 1114(a) of the RFPA, to gain access to
financial records for counterintelligence investigations, the FBI
issues a letter, called a "national security letter," signed by an ap-
propriate supervisory official and certifying compliance with the
applicable provisions of the RFPA, seeking financial records rele-
vant to FBI counterintelligence activities. Section 1114 currently
does not, however, mandate that financial institutions comply with
FBI requests for access to the financial records under the intelli-
gence provisions of the RFPA; it merely permits the banks to do so
if they so choose, without regard to other provisions of the RFPA.
The FBI has stated that most financial institutions cooperate
with the FBI in making financial records available in accordance
with Section 1114(a) of the RFPA. However, the FBI has advised
the Committee that in certain significant instances, financial insti-
tutions have declined to grant the FBI access to financial records
in response - to requests under Section 1114(a). The FBI informed
the Committee that the problem occurs particularly in States
which have State constitutional privacy protection provisions or
State banking privacy laws. In those States, financial institutions
decline to grant the FBI access because State law prohibits them
from granting such access and the RFPA, since it permits but does
not mandate such access, does not override State law. In such a sit-
uation, the concerned financial institutions which might otherwise
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foreign powers and their agents and the purpose of countering
international terrorism activities.
The Committee urges that, if the Director of the FBI delegates
his function under this provision for mandatory access, he will del-
egate it no further down the FBI chain of command than the level
of Assistant Director.
The new mandatory FBI authority for counterintelligence access
to records is in addition to, and leaves in place, the existing non-
mandatory scheme for FBI access under Section 1114(a)(1). Al-
though the existing FBI non-mandatory authority under Section
1114(a) to request a customer's financial records for counterintelli-
gence activities apparently implicitly requires only that such
records be relevant to such activities regardless of the status or ac-
tivities of the customer, the Committee believes it important in es-
tablishing the additional authority for mandatory FBI access to
limit that mandatory authority to use only to obtain a customer's
or entity's records when there are specific and articulate facts
giving reason to believe that the customer is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power. The Committee notes that the require-
ment of "reason to believe" that the customer is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power is less stringent than the requirement
of "probable cause" to believe that the customer is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power. Statutes and executive orders gov-
erning intelligence activities have used the "probable cause" stand-
ard when intelligence methods or techniques the government pro-
poses to use intrude into zones of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment. Since, as the Miller case held, governmental access to
a customer's financial records held by a bank does not implicate a
constitutionally protected rifht of privacy, the Committee conclud-
ed that the "probable cause' standard was not warranted. Never-
theless, the Committee believed that satisfaction of an elevated
standard should be a predicate for mandatory FBI access to finan-
cial records, in light of the judgment of the Congress embodied in
the RFPA that financial records should be afforded a measure of
privacy against governmental inquiry and because the federal gov-
ernment would be preempting State laws that go beyond federal
law in affording privacy protections to a class of records. Accord-
ingly, the Committee agreed to require a determination that there
are specific and articulable facts giving "reason to believe" that the
customer or entity whose records the FBI seeks is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power.
In formulating paragraph 1114(aX5), the Committee carefully
considered whether to grant the FBI mandatory access to financial
records for foreign counterintelligence purposes upon a determina-
tion that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that an individual is or may be a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power. The Committee decided, however, to require a
determination that there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that an individual is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power. The broader formulation provides an unwar-
ranted degree of latitude, given the evidentiary latitude which al-
ready inheres in the "reason to believe" standard itself. The Com-
mittee was also concerned that. if the phrase "or may be" were in-
cluded in the provision, the FBI might be able to request mandato-
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TITLE V-ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL
Section 501: DIA Civilian Medical Evacuation Benefit
Section 501 of the bill extends to DOD civilian personnel as-
signed to Defense Attache Offices and DIA Liaison Offices abroad a
. medical evacuation travel expenses benefit currently available to
t United States Foreign Service personnel, CIA personnel, and cer-
tain DOD special cryptologic activities personnel. Under Section
901(5) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4081(5)), the
Secretary of State may pay the travel and related expenses of
members of the Foreign Service and their families, including costs
or expenses incurred for.
(5) obtaining necessary medical care for an illness,
injury, or medical condition while abroad in a locality
where there is no suitable person or facility to provide
such care (without regard to those laws and regula-
tions limiting or restricting the furnishing or payment
of transportation and traveling expenses), as well as
expenses for-
(A) an attendant or attendants for a member of
the Service or a family member who is too ill to
travel unattended or a family member who is too
young to travel alone, and
(B) a family member incapable of caring for
himself or herself if he or she remained at the
post at which the member of the Service is serv-
ing....
Similarly, under Section 4(bX1) of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403e(4XbX1)), which authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
to pay to CIA personnel allowances and benefits comparable to
those paid to Foreign Service personnel, the CIA may pay travel
and related expenses for medical evacuation of CIA personnel
abroad. In addition, under Section 9(bX1) of the National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), which authorizes the Di-
rector, NSA to pay to DOD special cryptologic activities personnel
abroad allowances and benefits comparable to those paid to For-
eign Service personnel, the Director, NSA may pay travel and re-
lated expenses for medical evacuation of such DOD personnel.
Subsection 1605(a) of title 10, United States Code currently au-
thorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay to DOD civilian personnel
assigned abroad in Defense Attache Offices and Defense Intelli-
gence Agency Liaison Offices allowances and benefits comparable
to those paid to Foreign Service personnel under specified sections
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, not including subsection 901(5)
of that Act (22 U.S.C. 4081(5)), which authorizes the Secretary of
State to pay medical evacuation travel expenses of Foreign Service
personnel. Accordingly, unlike Foreign Service, CIA and DOD spe-
cial cryptologic activities personnel serving abroad, DOD civilian
personnel serving in Defense Attache Offices and DLA Liaison Of-
fices must pay their own medical evacuation travel expenses.
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1985 and 1986 test period indicates to the Committee that there
may not have been any real need, and certainly was no urgent
need, for the Department of Defense to possess extraordinary au-
thority to terminate DIA civilian employees. Nevertheless, in an
effort to provide the "opportunity to assess the use made of the au-
thority ' ' ' in order that an informed decision can be made as to
whether the authority should be made permanent," the Committee
has decided to extend the authority for fiscal year 1987.
The Committee notes that failure in the future of intelligence
agencies to implement in a timely and effective fashion the special
authorities they request from Congress from time to time will un-
doubtedly result in increased Congressional skepticism of the need
for such new authorities.
Section 503? Acceptance of Director of Central Intelligence Awards
by Military Intelligence Personnel
Section 503 of the bill ensures that military intelligence person-
nel may accept Director of Central Intelligence performance
awards on the same basis as civilian personnel of intelligence agen-
cies may accept such awards.
Section 4503(2) of Title 5 of the United States Code provides that
the head of an agency "may pay a cash award to, and incur neces-
sary expense for the honorary recognition of, an employee who-
* * * (2) performs a special act or service in the public interest in
connection with or related to his official employment." Section
4503 provides for awards only to an "employee," which as defined
in Section 4501 of Title 5, includes only civilian federal employees.
Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1984 authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to exercise the
authority provided in Section 4503 of Title 5 with respect to mili-
tary personnel detailed or assigned to the CIA or the Intelligence
Community Staff.
Section 503 of the bill amends Section 402 of the FY 1984 Intelli-
gence Authorization Act to extend the Director's awards authority
applicable to civilian federal employees, and military personnel as-
signed or detailed to the CIA or the Intelligence Community Staff,
to include military personnel assigned to foreign intelligence duties
outside the CIA or the Intelligence Community Staff. The term
"foreign intelligence" as used in Section 402(c) in referring to mili-
tary personnel assigned to foreign intelligence duties is used in its
generic sense to include all types of foreign intelligence duties,
such as positive intelligence collection, counterintelligence collec-
tion and activities, and analysis.
The extension of the Director's authority under the amendment
made by Section 503 of the bill will, among other things, allow
military personnel assigned to the intelligence elements of the De-
partment of Defense to participate in the Intelligence Community
Exceptional Collector National HUMINT Award Program, estab-
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence under Section 4503(2)
of Title 5, on an equal footing with civilian personnel performing
the same duties. ?
The amendment to Section 402 of the FY 1984 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act made by Section 503 of the bill also provides that
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timated personnel affected Army-2692; Navy-1377; Air Force-
1671). Although the affected population is small, it performs vital
national and departmental intelligence functions.
Granting the Secretary of Defense authority for personnel man-
agement of Army, Navy, and Air Force civilian intelligence person-
nel will improve the quality of intelligence collection and produc-
tion within the military departments by improving the ability of
their intelligence elements to attract and retain skilled civilian in-
telligence personnel. The military departments have advised the
Committee that, due to civil service regulations and policies pro-
mulgated by the Office of Personnel Management which do not suf-
ficiently take account of the special needs for management of their
civilian intelligence personnel, the military departments often
cannot retain intelligence professionals within their specialties or
promote* them to higher-grade General Schedule positions. The
Committee notes that the Office of Personnel Management General
Schedule 132 intelligence position classification standards series
(GS-132-0), which currently applies to positions for civilian intelli-
gence personnel in the military departments, was issued by the
Civil Service Commission (OPM's predecessor) in April 1960.
According to the military departments, to promote an intelli-
gence specialist to a higher-grade position, they often must make
the specialist a manager with supervisory responsibility. The mili-
tary departments find that their inability to keep civilian intelli-
gence specialists within their specialties and offer them the possi-
bility of promotion creates substantial management difficulties and
discourages specialists from remaining with the military depart-
ments in their specialties. The military departments find this
shortcoming particularly damaging with respect to their intelli-
gence analysts and their human intelligence (HUMINT) collection
case officers, specialties in which longevity and experience are es-
sent-'al to superior performance.
The military departments have advised the Committee that,
under current civilian personnel management constraints, they
have difficulty retaining their skilled civilian intelligence person-
nel in light of opportunities elsewhere in government. The military
departments state that they have experienced a significant outflow
of their trained civilian personnel to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency in part because those agencies already enjoy the ci-
vilian personnel management flexibility the military departments
seek and can therefore offer more attractive career development
opportunities. Thus, the military departments spend significant
time and fiscal resources to recruit, clear, and train civilian intelli-
gence personnel, only to lose them to other intelligence agencies.
The military departments expect to avoid significant recruitment,
clearance and training costs as a result of increased civilian per-
sonnel retention under the new personnel management systems
permitted by Section 504 of the bill.
The Department of the Navy's recent difficulties in recruiting
and retaining civilian intelligence personnel illustrates the difficul-
ties the military departments face. The Department of the Navy in-
formed the Committee that, during the past two years, the Naval
Intelligence Command has had difficulty recruiting qualified appli-
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sonnel occupying such positions, from the civil service laws relating
to numbers, classification and compensation of employees.
Subsection 1590(b) requires the Secretary of Defense, in exercis-
ing his authority under subsection 1590(a), to fix the rates of basic
pay for military department civilian intelligence personnel posi-
tions in relation to the civil service General Schedule rates for posi-
tions with corresponding levels of duties and responsibilities. Sub-
section 1590(b) also sets a ceiling, equal to the highest General
Schedule basic pay rate, on the basic compensation of non-Senior
Executive Service military department civilian intelligence person-
nel.
Subsection 1590(c) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to employ
prevailing rates systems of basic pay, similar to those prescribed in
Subchapter N of Chapter 53 of Title 5 of the United States Code,
for civilian intelligence personnel meeting the description of "pre-
vailing rate employee" contained in Section 5342(aX2XA) of Title 5.
Section 5342(aX2XA) defines as a prevailing rate employee "an indi-
vidual employed in or under an agency in a recognized trade or
craft, or other skilled mechanical craft, or in an unskilled, semi-
skilled or skilled manual labor occupation, and any other individ-
ual, including a foreman and a supervisor, in a position having
trade, craft, or laboring experience and knowledge as the para-
mount requirement."
Subsection 1590(d) authorizes payment of allowances based on
living costs and conditions of environment to civilian intelligence
personnel of the military departments assigned outside the conti-
nental United States or assigned in Alaska. Such compensation is
in addition to basic compensation and is based upon living costs
substantially higher than those in the District of Columbia and/or
upon environmental conditions substantially different from those
of the lower-48 continental United States if such conditions war-
rant the additional compensation as a recruitment incentive.
Subsection 1590(eXl) grants the Secretary of Defense special au-
thority during fiscal year 1987 to terminate a military department
civilian intelligence officer or employee whenever he considers it
advisable in the interests of the United States and he determines
that procedures prescribed in other termination statutes cannot be
invoked in a manner consistent with national security. Such deci-
sions by the Secretary are final and not subject to appeal or review
outside the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense must
notify the intelligence committees of the Congress promptly when
the special termination authority is exercised. The requirement for
notification to the intelligence committees facilitates oversight of
the use of the special termination authority and may provide infor-
mation useful in determining whether to place in permanent law
this authority granted for a single fiscal year.
Subsection 1590(eX2) provides that an officer or employee's termi-
nation by the exercise of the special termination authority does not
affect his right to seek or accept employment with a federal depart-
ment or agency (other than that from which he was terminated) if
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management declares him
eligible for such employment.
Subsection 1590(e)(3) permits the Secretary of Defense to delegate
tha cnaeinl termination authority only to the Deputy Secretary of
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dents, with a demonstrated capability to develop skills critical to
NSA's mission.
Subsection 16(b) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish
the undergraduate training program for NSA civilian personnel.
The Committee expects the Secretary to implement this section ex-
peditiously by delegating his authority under this section to the Di-
rector, NSA pursuant to Section 133(d) of Title 10 of the United
States Code. The NSA will send employees participating in the pro-
gram to be students at institutions of higher learning with superior
programs in disciplines critical to NSA functions. Such assign-
ments normally will contemplate completion of an educational pro-
gram leading to the institution's awarding the NSA employee a
baccalaureate degree. During periods, such as summer vacations, in
which the employee's attendance at the institution is not required,
the employee will work at NSA installations to gain basic intelli-
gence training and familiarity with the functions of the Agency.
Because of the unusual national security functions of the NSA, and
the Committee's trust that -NSA will administer the training pro-
gram in a manner faithful to Congressional intent, subsection
505(a) commits the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense to
his discretion, which insulates his use of the authority from review
under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the United States Code).
Subsection 16(c) authorizes the National Security Agency to pay
expenses incident to employee assignments to institutions under
the program. Such expenses include, but are not necessarily limit-
ed to, matriculation fees, tuition, library and laboratory fees, and
purchase or rental of books, materials and supplies. The Committee
notes that, under separate existing statutory authority, the Agency
will pay employees participating in the program authorized sala-
ries and allowances, including any applicable travel and transpor-
tation allowances. The Agency may pay the authorized expenses in-
cident to an employee assignment under the program directly to
the institution to which the employee is sent, or to the employee as
reimbursement if the employee has already, with authority to do
so, paid the institution. The Agency may only pay expenses inci-
dent to employee assignments under the program in any fiscal year
to the extent that appropriated funds are available for such pur-
poses, which ensures that Congress will decide the level of re-
sources devoted to the program through the annual authorization
and appropriations cycle.
Subsection 16(d)(1) establishes the conditions under which an
Agency employee may participate in the NSA undergraduate train-
ing program. To be eligible under the program, the employee must
sign an agreement including the following four conditions:
(A) The employee must agree to continue to be an Agency em-
ployee during the period of his assignment and to complete the
educational course of training for which he is assigned.
(B) The employee must agree to continue, after completion of the
assignment, to serve as an Agency employee for one-and-a-half
years for each partial or whole year of his assignment under the
program-
(C) The employee must agree to reimburse the United States for
the total cost to date of his education (excluding pay and allow-
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29
an individual lacks control, such as mental disorder) described in
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14 (effective April 14,
1986) entitled "Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Proce-
dures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information."
Subsection 16(dX2) provides that a reimbursement obligation, and
interest on the obligation provided for by Section 3717 of Title 31 of
the United States Code, constitute for all purposes a debt owing the
United States. The United States may enforce that debt obligation
as provided by law, which includes action in accordance with Sub-
chapter II of Chapter 37 of Title 31 of the United States Code. In
any administrative or judicial proceeding brought by the United
States to enforce a debt obligation of an employee or former em-
ployee who participated in the program, the employee will be enti-
tled to raise any legal defense he may have. Thus, for example, if
NSA determined that an employee participating in the program
engaged in misconduct and terminated his employment for that
reason, and thereafter brought a civil action in federal court to re-
cover from the employee the reimbursement due for educational
costs, the employee could raise in his defense in the civil action
that he did not in fact engage in the alleged misconduct and there-
fore does not owe reimbursement. If the court found that no mis-
conduct occurred, then the result would be.that the employee had
no reimbursement obligation, ending the matter. The court would
have no authority to review the decision to terminate the NSA em-
ployee, nor could the court provide any relief, such as reinstate-
ment of the employee; the court would simply dismiss the civil
action brought by the United States. Nothing in Section 16 in any
way impairs or affects the special authority of the Secretary of De-
fense to terminate NSA employees under Section 303 of the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950.
The National Security Agency will deposit in the Treasury any
amounts received as reimbursement of educational costs in accord-
ance with Section 3302(b) of Title 31 of the United States Code.
Subsection 16(d)(3XA) provides that a discharge in bankruptcy
does not release a present or former Agency employee who partici-
pated in the program from his reimbursement obligation if the dis-
charge decree is issued before five years after the completion of the
combined periods for which the employee had agreed to be assigned
under the program and had agreed to continue in the service of
NSA. In the absence of this provision overriding the bankruptcy
laws, an employee might intentionally take advantage of the NSA
program with the intention of receiving a free education and then
evading his service obligation at no cost to himself by seeking dis-
charge of his reimbursement obligation in bankruptcy proceedings.
The likelihood of such an abuse occurring diminishes substantially
with the elimination of the possibility of the employee's reimburse-
ment obligation being discharged in bankruptcy before five years
after the end of the combined education and service periods to
which he agreed.
Subsection 16(d)(3)(B) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to re-
lease an employee or former employee who participated in the pro-
gram from his reimbursement of the United States whole or in
require. part, Com-
eququity or the interests
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Notwithstanding any other provision of s
available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may
be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its func-
tions, including-(1) personal services, including personal
services without regard to limitations on types of persons
to be employed ?
31
institution under the program will have no intelligence function
whatever to perform at that institution.
Subsection 16(f) provides that Chapter 41 of Title 5 and subsec-States
tions (a) and (b) of Section 3324 of Title 31 of th aduate training
Code do not apply with respect to the NSA undergr an 5 program and its administration. Chapter o41 of Tfor feder canal civilian v
?
ous restrictions concerning training programs
employees which would be inconsistent with eff and aadmministr -
tion of the NSA undergraduate training program
of the associated legislative goals. Subsections (a) and (b) of Section
3324 of Title 31 limit the circumstances in which an agency may
pay for a service or good in advance of delivery i ay advance
funds to an employee. These limitations also
with effective administration of the program.
of Defense to issue such
Subsection be necess~ ~oe implement Section 16. The
Committee as s may y to hew closely to the legislative
Committee expects the Secretary and issuing
purpose embodied in subsection 16(a) in developing
such regulations.
Section 506: CIA Acquisition of Critical Skills
Section 506 of the bill requires the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, exercising the authority granted by Section 8 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j), to establish a pro-
gram to send CIA civilian employees to be students at accredited
professional, technical and other institutions of higher learn rig is 506
training at the undergraduate level. The purpose
rtioulSrly minority
to facilitate the recruitment of individuals, p develoy
high school students, with a demonstrated capability to the develop
skills critical to CIA's mission. The conditions, established
content, and the Di-
rector will have the same purpose, of Defense is author-
ized as the program which the Secretary Act of
ized to establish under Section 16 of the National Security
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by Section 505 of the bill, for
civilian employees of the National Security Agency. tional Security
The Central Intelligence Agencyin attracting to CIA employ-
Agency, has experienced difficulty ad at graduates, and particularly employ-
mi-
ment sufficient numbers of college gr
nority graduates, qualified in skills essential to effective perform-science ance of the CIA- mission, such as mathematics, co esuabrished by
engineering, and foreign languages. The program
the DO will address this difficulty in the same manner as the NSA
program.
Unlike the National Security Agency, the CIA currently possess-
es the statutory authority 8necessary to a) of the CIA Act p= vides in part that:
training program. Section ums made
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The Committee notes that the requirements contained in Section
112b of Title 1 of the United States Code (relating the to~~ titg
international agreements to Congress) apply
under which DMA cooperation with foreign countries and interna-
tional organizations takes place, in the same manner and to oche
same extent to which Section 112b applies
agreements.
Section 602: Notice to ogress f Certain ain Transfers nsfers of Defense
Articles and Defense Services
Section 602 adds a new Section 503 to the National Security Act
of 1947 to specify that a covert arms transfer involving a single ar-
ticle or service of a value exceeding $1 million is a "significant an-
ticipated intelligence activity" for purposes of section 501 of that
Act, thus making explicit the requirement for the executive branch
to give prior notice to the intelligence committees of the Congress
of such a transfer. Section 602 makes permanent the provision of
the FY 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 99-169) concern-
ing arms transfers which applied during fiscal year 1986. The Com-
mittee's report accompanying the FY 1986 bill explains the provi-
sions of, and the need for, the covert arms transfer notification leg-
islation in detail (H. Rept. 99-106, part 1, pp. 9-12).
As noted in the joint explanatory statement of managers accom-
panying the conference report on the FY 1986 Intelligence Authori-
zation Act (H. Rept. 99-373, p. 20), the Committee and its counter-
part in the other body had been engaged for a long time with the
executive branch in a cooperative process designed to produce
mutual understandings of the term "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity" as used in Section 501 of the National Security Act
of 1947 as it concerns covert action, and in particular covert arms
transfers. At the time of the conference on the FY 1986 Intelli-
gence Authorization Act, the intelligence committees anticipated
expeditious completion of the process and noted that they expected
fulfillment of the understandings reached through that process to
obviate any future need to define further in statute the term "sig-
nificant anticipated intelligence activity."
The anticipated completion of the process did not materialize. Al-
though Committee representatives and executive branch represent-
atives reached agreement on a document expressing mutual under-
standings, the executive branch never completed its consideration
of the document for final approval. The Committee has awaited pa-
tiently an executive branch response for months. The Comm t t
in-
can only conclude that the executive branch apparently
terest in the cooperative process.
Accordingly, the Committee believes that, in the absence of a
permanent mutual understanding, it is necessary to place the un-
derstanding relating to covert arms transfers, established in stat-
ute last year for fiscal year 1986, in permanent law.
Section 603: Covert Agent Disclosure Federal Pension Forfeiture
Section 603 of the bill amends Section 8312 of title 5, United
States Code, to provide that an individual convicted of the offense
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35
years following if these amounts are appropriated. These estimates
are contained in the classified annex and are in accordance with
those of the executive branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
With respect to clause 2(1X3)(C) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the committee has received no report from the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
With respect to clause 2(l)(3XD) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the committee has not received a report from the Com-
mittee on Government Operations pertaining to the subject of this
bill.
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1X4) of Rule XI of the House of Representa-
tives, the committee has attempted to determine the inflationary
impact of the bill.
The committee finds no adequate method to identify the infla-
tionary impact of the present legislation. Further, the bill does not
provide specific budget authority but rather authorizations for ap-
propriation. Hence, any inflationary impact would depend on the
amounts actually appropriated and the strain that short supplies of
materials, production capacity or other economic resources would
place on industrial capacity.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAw MADE BY THE BILL, As REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported. are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic,
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT OF 1964 FOR
CERTAIN EMPLOYEES
TITLE H-THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
PART C-COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES
SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN OTHER FORMER SPOUSES
SEC. 224. (aX1) Any individual who was a former spouse of a par-
ticipant or former participant on November 15, 1982, shall be enti-
tled to the extent of available appropriations, and except to the
extent such former spouse is disqualified under subsection (b), to a
survivor annuity equal to 55 percent of the greater of-
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37
ticipant or former participant on November
982, of any
der this section.
rights which such individual may have un
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
RETIREMENT EQUITY FOR SPOUSES OF CERTAIN EMPLOYEES
SEC. 14. (a) The provisions of sections 204, 221(b) 224, 234((3), 2 221(f),
221(gX2), 221(1), 221(m), 221(n), 221(o), 222, 223,
234(e), and 263(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) establishing
certain requirements, limitations, rights, entitlements, and benefits
relating to retirement annuities, survivor benefits, and lump-sum
payments for a spouse or former spouse of an Agency employee
who is a participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System shall apply in the same manner and to the
same extent in the case of an Agency employee who is a partici-
pant in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability System.
HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSES OF CIA EMPLOYEES
SEC. 16. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c)(1), any individ-
ual-
(1) formerly married to an employee or former employee of the
Agency, whose marriage was dissolved by divorce or annulment
before May 7, 1985;
(2) who, at any time during the 18-month period before the
divorce or annulment became final, was covered under a health
benefits plan as a member of the family of such employee or
former employee; and
(3) who was married to such employee for not less than 10
years during periods of service by such employee with the
Agency, at least five years of which were spent outside the
United States by both the employee and the former spouse,
is eligible for coverage under a health benefits plan in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Any individual eligible for coverage under subsection (a)
may enroll in a health benefits plan for self alone or for self and
family if before the expiration of the 6-month period beginning on
the effective date of this section. and in accordance with such proce-
dures as the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall
by regulation prescribe, such individual-
(A) files an election for such enrollment; and
(B) arranges to pay currently into the Employees Health Bene-
fits Fund under section 8909 of title 5, United States Code an
amount equal to the sum othe employee and agency contribu-
tions payable in the case of an employee enrolled under chapter
89 of such title in the same health benefits plan and with the
same level of benefits.
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in the United States under the auspices of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for consultation on counterintelligence matters0
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Subtitle A-General Military Law
PART I-ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
? OF DEFENSE
CHAPTER 4-DEPARTMENT
See.
131. Executive department
? uial Reception and Re resentation F*zPe se the Military
140d- Counterintelligence Off
140e. Authorgty to Use Proceeds from Counterintel igenee Operations
Departments.
? Official Reception and Representation
1404 Counterintelligence
Expenses funds available to the Depart
The Secretary of Defense may use to pay the expenses
unterintelligence programs
inept of Defense
foreign for officials in the United States under the auspices
of hosting o f Defense for consultation on counterintelligence
of the Department
matters.
? 140e. Authority to Use Proceeds from Counterintelligence Oper-
ations of the military Departments
o Defense authorize, without regard of pro-
United (a) The Secretary f Def title may 31, States Code,euse o components
provisions of section 3302 of tions conducted by
ceeds from counterintelligence opera necessary and reasonable ex-
of the military departments to offset rations,
penses, not otherwise prohibited by law, incurred such in operations, if use
and to make awards to personnel involved in
funds to meet such expenses or to make such awards
of appropriated f
would not be practicable. proceeds from such counterintelligence vPer
(b) As soon as the net p for the conduct of those operations,
ations are no longer necessary f into miscellaneous
such proceeds shall be deposited nto the Treasury
receipts. shall establish policies and proce-
(c) The Secretary of fee management and disposition of
dures to overn acquisition, use, erations conducted by compo-
proceeds from counterintelligence op effective internal sys-
nents of the military departments, including
ls. ?
tems of accounting and administrative contro
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(3) both of the factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of
Defense may, during fiscal year 1987, terminate the employment of
any civilian intelligence officer or employee of a military depart-
ment whenever he considers that action to be in the interests of the
United States and he determines that the procedures prescribed in
other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the em-
ployment of such officer or employee cannot be invoked in a manner
consistent with the national security. The decisions of the Secretary
under this paragraph are final and may not be appealed or re-
viewed outside the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever this termination authority is ex-
ercised.
(2) Any termination of employment under this subsection shall
not affect the right of the officer of employee involved to seek or
accept employment with any other department or agency of the
United States if he is declared eligible for such employment by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
(3) The Secretary of Defense may delegate authority under this
subsection only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Secretary
concerned or both. An action to terminate any civilian intelligence
officer or employee of a military department by either such officer
shall be appealable to the Secretary of Defense.
CHAPTER 83-DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
? 1604. Civilian personnel management
(a)...
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary
of Defense may, during fiscal years [1985 and 1986,] 1986 and
1987, terminate the employment of any civilian officer or employee
of the Defense Intelligence Agency whenever he considers that
action to be in the interests of the United States and he determines
that the procedures prescribed in other porvisions of law that au-
thorize the termination of the employment of such officer or em-
ployee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national
security. The decisions of the Secretary under this paragraph are
final and may not be appealed or reviewed outside the Department
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
whenever this termination authority is exercised.
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Subchapter II-Forfeiture of Annuities and Retired
Pay
? 8312. Conviction of certain offenses
(a)...
(c) The following are the offenses to which subsection (a) of this
section applies if the individual was convicted before, on, or after
September 26, 1961:
(1) An offense within the purview of-
(A) section 2272 (violation of specific sections) or 2273
(violation of sections generally of chapter 23 of title 42) of
title 42 insofar as the offense is committed with intent to
injure the United States or with intent to secure an advan-
tage to a foreign nation;
(B) section 2274 (communication of restricted data), 22755
re-
(receipt of restricted data), or 2276 (tampering
stricted data) of title 42; or
(C) section 783 (conspiracy and communication of receipt
of classified information) of title 50 [.] or section 601 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) (relating to
intelligence identities).
Subpart H-Access to Criminal History Record Information
CHAPTER 91-ACCESS TO CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES
? 9101. Criminal history record information for national security
purposes
(a)...
(b)(1) Upon request by the Department of Defense, the Office of
Personnel Management, [or] the Central Intelligence Agency, or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, criminal justice agencies shall
make available criminal history record information regarding indi-
viduals under investigation by such department, office [or
agency], agency, or bureau for the purpose of determining eligibil-
ity for (A) access to classified information or (B) assignment to or
retention in sensitive national security duties. Such a request to a
State central criminal history record repository shall be accompa-
nied by the fingerprints of the individual who is the subject of the
request if required by State law and if the repository uses the fin-
gerprints in an automated fingerprint identification system. Fees,
if any, charged for providing criminal history record information reasonable cost of
any event exceed
pursuant to informations nor shall they the
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SECTION 1114 OF THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF 1978
SPECIAL PROCEDURES
SEC. 1114. (aX1)
(5)(A) Financial institutions, and officers, employees, and agents
thereof, shall comply with a request for a customer's or entity's fi-
nancial records made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation when the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (or the Director's designee) certifies in writing to the
financial institution that such records are sought for foreign coun-
terintelligence purposes and that there are specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose
records are sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
as defined in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
(B) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate infor-
mation obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided in
guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence
collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and, with respect to dissemi-
nation to an agency of the United States, only if such information is
clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.
(C) On a semiannual basis the Attorney General shall fully
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to this paragraph.
(D) No financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent of such
institution, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained access to a customer's or enti-
ty's financial records under this paragraph.
SECTION 402 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1984
ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS
SEC. 402. (a) * ' '
(c) The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise the authority
granted in section 4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect
to members of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelli-
gence duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the exer-
cise of such authority.
(d) An award made by the Director of Central Intelligence to an
employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority of Sec-
tion 4503 of title 5, United States Code or this section may be paid
and accepted notwithstanding-
(1) section 55,36 of title 5, United States Code: and
(2) the death. separation, or retirement of the employee or the
member of the Armed Forces whose conduct gave rise to the
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(3)(A) A discharge in bankruptcy under title 11, United States
Code, shall not release a person from an obligation to reimburse the
United States required under an agreement described in paragraph
(1) if the final decree of the discharge in bankruptcy is issued
within five years after the last day of the combined period of service
obligation described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
(B) The Secretary of Defense may release a person, in whole or in
part, from the obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) when, in his discretion, the
Secretary determines that equity or the interests of the United States
so require.
(C) The Secretary of Defense shall permit an employee assigned
under this section who, prior to commencing a second academic year
of such assignment, voluntarily terminates the assignment or the
employee's employment with the Agency, to satisfy his obligation
under an agreement described in paragraph (1) to reimburse the
United States by reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly
payments which results in completion reimbursement by a date
five years after the date of termination of the assignment or employ-
ment or earlier at the option of the employee.
(e) When an employee is assigned under this section to an institu-
tion, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to which the em-
ployee is assigned that the Agency employs the employee and that
the Agency funds the employee's education.
(fi Chapter 41 of title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of Section 3324
of title 31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to this
section.
(g) The Secretary of Defense may issue such regulations as may be
necessary to implement this section.
NATIONAL SECURITY Acr OF 1947
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
TITLE V-Accou rrABILrra FOR INTELLIGENCE AcrtvrrxPs
Sec. 501. Congressional oversight.
Sec. 503. Notice to Congress of Certain Transfers of Defense Articles and Defense
Services.
TITLE V-ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF CERTAIN TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES
AND DEFENSE SERVICES
SEC. 503. (a)(1) The transfer of a defense article or defense service
exceeding $1,000,000 in value by an intelligence agency to a recipient
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DISSENTING HYDE, VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES STUMP,
CHENEY, LIVINGS ON, AND M WEN -
IRELAND, HYDE, provisions con
and consistently opposed the p aid t -
We have strongly of the President to provide. military
straining the authority an democatic rest he
the freedom fighters of the Nan rOpposition (UNO), known
known as the United Nicazogu Angola (UNIT as
freedom fighters of the Angolan democratic resistance,
-
the lt National Union of the bill rel Ling to to of Nicaragua is 19 unneces87
A
Although 5052) to the FY 87
nary in light of the June 21Svote A?cthH~ House on the rt the suppo
Military Construction Appropriations ort to the Nicaraguan
President's program to provide effective support 106 is incon-
we note that nothing in Sect m in H.R. 5052. In
democratic
stint re enactment the President's in restoring
the
contrast content with to en the wise actme action 's a H R the Commit-
ect to Nicaragu
the President's flexibility y with provision (Sec. 107) elimiinn House use the
e
tee has included in H.R. 4759 a p loa. We urge
president's flexibility with respect to Ang
prohibition concerning Angola with a statement of The
replace the p ss in support of appropriate aid to UNITA.
of the thngre protect and advance Ameri-
President of the United States cannot Afnca if the Con-
can interests in Central America and southern
gress; shackles his conduct of foreign Policy-
NICARAGUA AND ANGOLA FORM PART OF A BROADER SOVIET
CHALLENGE
Soviet t adventurism
,
faced in recent years ghanstan. Angola,
The United States hhe globe, including and South Yemea Cambodia, locations Ethiopia, spanning Mozambique, Nicaragua.
Cambodtermination to
President Reagan has made clear for years his deter issue of the
resist Communist expansion. The central foreign policy America will
-
post-war era remains whether the United States o protect andad-
,
expansion.
for of Communist licy b
meet c the Soviet union's test i America's will ursuit of policy based
van
ded face
vance the interests oon freedom ar the
If the Soviets are to resist Com-
on the concept that the United States lacks the will munist expansion, America will find its in globe. under even more
aggressive Communist assault effective around the support for democratic resist-
The President's policy for democrat the policy
ass will allow him to pue important
ance forces-if with stead es the ,determination-will
with s,r egic f and liy objectives. First, the President's pro-
U.S. strategic foreign policy
grans will bring about successful resistance to ternof 1Commu-
and expansion of Communism in areas previously will avoid in-
of the U S nArmed President s program
nist Forces in wars which sap our domination. Secod, the
(49)
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51
ments representing a broad political spectrum rose against former
t
Nicaraguan leader Somoza, has no claim toollegthe itima y and has losthe
the support of the Nicaraguan people.
United States has declared:
? ? ? the Government of Nicaragua has lost the support
of virtually all independent sectors of Nicaraguan society
who initially supported the removal of the Somoza regime
(including democratic political parties of the left, center,
and right; the leadership of the Church; free unions; and
the business, farmer, and professional sectors) and who
still seek democracy, reject the rule of the Frente Sandi-
nista. and seek the free elections promised in 1979. ' ' '
(Section 722(cX3), International Security andDevelopment
Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) (August 8,
The Sandinista regime represents a Communist future for Nica-
ragua, which will bring increased repression of the Nicaraguan
people and increased subversion of governments of neighboring
?countries. The Sandinistas have become masters of despotic state
centralism, suppression of dissent, and Communist expansion
of
through wars of national enslavement masquerading as "wars national liberation." The only chance for a free and democratic
demo-
for the Nicaraguan people lies with the Nicaragua
cratic resistance.
The objectives of the United States have remained constant and
the President has made them eminently clear. For the past five
years, the United States has sought to convince the Sandinista.
regime in Nicaragua to:
End its military and security ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union,
and other Warsaw Pact countries, including the presence in
Nicaragua of military and security personnel of those coun-
tries;
Reduce its military and security forces to a level consistent
with its defensive needs;
End its support for armed subversion and terrorism directed
against other countries; le;
End internal repression of the Nicaraguan people;
Begin negotiation in good faith for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict in Central
plementat on of the September 1983 Contadora Document) of
Objectives;
Begin the process of national reconciliation by entering into
a Church-mediated dialogue with the opposition; and
Observe basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, in-
cluding the right of free election of democratic government.
To achieve these objectives, the United States for five years has en-
gaged in and supported extensive diplomatic efforts to resolve the
problems of the region. That the diplomatic process has not yet
re-
produced a favorable outcome stems in partto the v criou~an
strictions the Congress has placed on support democratic resistance, which had the effect of relieving the pres-
sure on the Sandinistas to negotiate in good faith toward an early
resolution of the conflict. The recent action on the Military Con-
struction Appropriations Act for FY 1987 in support
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knowledged openly; perhaps countries willing to help the U.S. in a
quiet action to aid UNITA would not be willing to help in an action
the U.S. announced to the - worlds and perhaps the Soviet and
Cuban governments which have deployed armed forces in Angola
would feel compelled to respond directly and aggressively to an
action the U.S. announced to the world. In such a situation, the
publicity required by the Angola prohibition would decrease sub-
stantially the chances for U.S. success in meeting the Communist
challenge in Angola. Such a congressional restriction damages U.S.
foreign policy interests.
The history of Angola in the past decade demonstrates the
danger of congressionally imposed prohibitions on covert action to
support those fighting for freedom against a Communist regime.
In 1975, Portugal announced that it would grant independence to
Angola. Portugal and three groups which had for years sought An-
golan independence (the Marxist Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA), UNITA, and the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FNLA)) reached an accord, known as the
Alvor Agreement, to establish an interim government, in which all
three groups would participate, to draft a constitution and to pre-
pare and hold elections. The interim governing. arrangements
broke down.
The MPLA sought and received substantial military aid from the
Soviet Union and Cuba. In the latter part of 1975, Cuba sent
combat troops to Angola to support the MPLA. According to press
reports at the time, the United States provided support covertly to
Angolan groups opposing the MPLA. The MPLA achieved a
number of military successes and controlled the Angolan capital,
Luanda, when the Portuguese departed Angola in November, 1975.
The MPLA proclaimed itself the government of a new People's
Republic of Angola and welcomed approximately 400 Soviet advi-
sors and an estimated 4,000 Cuban combat personnel before the
year was out. As press reports in the United States spoke of a
covert program to support anti-Communist groups in Angola, the
Congress-in a fit of post-Vietnam, post-Watergate pique-attached
to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1976 (P.L. 94-
212) a provision prohibiting any such U.S. support during Fiscal
Year 1976 (the "Tunney Amendment"). Thereafter, Congress en-
acted a permanent prohibition against U.S. support for groups in
Angola as Section 118 of the International Security and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) (the "Clark Amendment").
While Congress spent its time hobbling President Ford's ability to
meet the Communist challenge in Angola, the MPLA set about con-
solidating its hold on power.
The Carter Administration attempted rather naively to reconcile
with the MPLA. citing as its objective exploitation of commercial
opportunities for U.S. business and use of positive incentives for
the MPLA to decrease its reliance on the Soviet Union and Cuba.
While the Carter Administration attempted to use persuasive skills
on the MPLA, the number of Cuban combat troops in Angola grew
to approximately 20,000. In 1980, Congress made minor procedural
adjustments in the Clark Amendment, but left in force the prohibi-
tion on U.S. aid to Angola opposition groups.
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