NSSD 11-82: REVISED DRAFT IG STUDY AND NSDD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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i-. 17 V 823643 =t- _.Y(o'd76 _-
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET /SENSITIVE
Senior Interagency Group No. 30
OVP
NSC
ACDA
Agriculture
CIAL-
Commerce
Defense
JCS
Treasury
UNA
USIA
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
Donald P. Gregg
Michael O. Wheeler
Joseph Presel
Ravmond Lett
- Mrs.
Helen
Robbins
- COL
John Stanford
- LTC
Dennis
Stanley.
- Mr.
David
Pickford
- Amb.
Harvey Feldman
- Ms.
Teresa Collins
SUBJECT: NSSD 11-82: Revised Draft IG Study and NSDD
The IG on U.S.-Soviet Relations met on November 23 to
make final revisions to the IG study and proposed NSDD in
response to NSSD 11-82.
Attached are the revised versions of both documents.
Addressee agencies are requested to review the documents at
a senior policymaking level and to convey SIG-level concur-
rence or comments by COB Tuesday, November 30. The contact
in State is Mr. Tain Tompkins at 632-5804.
L. Paul Bremen-/, III
Executive Secretary
1. Draft NSDD
2. Draft IG Study
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Proposed National Security Decision
Directive Number
U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist.of three
elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal
pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism;
and. negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity,
outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:
1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by
competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet
Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the
overall military balance and in geographical regions of
priority concern to the United States. This will remain
the immediate focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the
process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more
pluralistic political and economic system in which the
power and privilege of the ruling elite is gradually
reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness
has deep roots in the internal system, and that all our
relations with the USSR should therefore take into account
whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its
capacity to engage in aggression.
3. To enyaye the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to
reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests
and which are consistent with the principle of strict
reciprocity and mutual interest. This is particularly
important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a
process of political succession.
In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must
convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs
that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make
clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would
create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring
important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly impor-
tant that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession
period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external
forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors.
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Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement
Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the
environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide
variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship.
A. Functional
1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military
forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders
perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place
or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible
war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so
unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet
leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military
capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances
must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/
dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened.
In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO.
Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible
enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contin-
gencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest
to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious
U.S. military countermeasures.
2. Economic Policy: U.S..policy on economic relations with
the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as
economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:
Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do
not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires
prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that
would make a substantial contribution directly or
indirectly to Soviet military power.
To induce the USSR to shift capital and resources from the
defense sector to capital investments and consumer goods.
To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing
the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as
not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet
system.
To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of
reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade,
energy supply, and financial relationships.
To refrain from assisting the Soviet Union with developing
natural resources with which to earn, at minimal cost to
itself, hard currency.
To permit mutually beneficial trade -- without Western
subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with
the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains.
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(b)
Alternative energy proposals so that the Europeans eschew
future
gas
projects with the USSR; (c) Restrictions on future exports
of
oil
and gas technology to the USSR; (d) Stricter limits on the
terms
and
volume of government supplied credits; and (e) strengthening of
the
role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy.
The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and
others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implica-
tions of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced
November 13, 1982. This approach should involve efforts to reach
agreements with our Allies on specific measures, such as: (a)
Enhanced COCOM controls on the flow of critical and certain
non-critical items used in the Soviet military, and critical
technology and equipment used in Soviet defense-priority industries;
In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an
invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures such
as a total trade boycott. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully
calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of
government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a
means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real
restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not,
however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy.
3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological
thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western
values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade
unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive
features of Soviet communism. We need to review and significantly
strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The
President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG
efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S.
radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:
-- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed
by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its
own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g.,
treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use
of chemical weapons, etc.).
Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the
semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the
appropriation of such terms as "peace," "socialism," etc.
Geopolitical
1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the
Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial
democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense
arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership and conduct
effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of
intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall
strategy is essential, we may on occasion be forced to act to protect
vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied
opposition; even in this event, however, we should consult to the
maximum extent possible with our Allies.
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2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of
its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and
those of our Allies and friends, and to support effectively those
Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or
are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third
World must involve an important role for security assistance and
foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military
forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support
endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve
diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises
vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of
economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for
Third World countries.
3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important
weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the
U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible
to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in
foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically.
(a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern
Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while
promoting the cause of human rights in individual East
European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective
by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show
relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy,
or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S.
policies must also make clear that East European countries
which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away
from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur
significant costs in their relations with the U.S.
(b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum
pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the
Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high
while the occupation continues.
(c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect
the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to
Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military
assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean
Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities.
Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence
and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership
of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from
Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's
role in southern Africa.
(d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to
limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World
allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken
and, where possible, undermine the existing links between
them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active
efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to
bring about political change inside these countries.
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4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to
strengthen the w.)rld's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The
U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation-
and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of
a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a
policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of
military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the
parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and
defined further in 1982.
5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence,
territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's
current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its
vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well
aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade depen-
dence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any
deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken
its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure.
1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control
negotiations when they serve our national security objectives. At
the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements
are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and
Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means
for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S.
should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that our
ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations
will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the
overall state of US-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in
defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often
seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be con-
sistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to
achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal
.levels of comparable armaments.
2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow
address our full range of concerns about Soviet internal behavior
and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet
efforts to return to a US-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms
control. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve
U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for
responsible behavior. Such contacts can also be useful in driving
home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that
the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional
problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns.
At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid
offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not
otherwise secure.
A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level
facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet
leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support
for our approach to East-West relations. A summit between President
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C. Bilateral Relationships
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Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial
results. Such a meeting would not necessarily involve signature of
major new US-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve
the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the
American public, while making clear to both audiences that improve-
ment in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet con-
duct. A gummit without such changes must not be understood to signal
such improvement.
3. US-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The U.S. should not
further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges
which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolu-
tionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the
same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage
our Allies to do so as well. U.S. policy on exchanges must also
take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive
U.S. technology to the Soviet Union.
Priorities in the U .S. Approach: Maximizing our Restraining Leverage
over Soviet Behavior.
The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet
expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union
itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will
be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may
test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international
behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable.
The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the
Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of
political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust
its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to
create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to
adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will
remain ready for improved US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union
makes significant changes in policies of concern to us; the burden
for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on
Moscow. We must not yield to pressures to 'take the first step."
The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and
the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it
essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use
of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restrain-
ing impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of
Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing
the expansion of Soviet power.
1. U.S. Priorities
Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be
a strong military, capable of action across the entire spectrum of
potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and
military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter
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attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or
other important countries, and to 9efeat such an attack should deter-
rence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in --
rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat,
the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S.
cooperation with allied and other states and greater utilization of
their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a
political strategy attaching high priority to the following
objectives:
-- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending
and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is
the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S.
resolve and political staying-power.
Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the
Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise
strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the
multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will
require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account,
and also that our allies take into equal account U.S.
concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing
the allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a
serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements con-
sistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force
modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced,
significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of
comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together
with the allies, a unified Western approach to East-West
economic relations, implementing the agreement announced
November 13, 1982.
Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, and
efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet
rapprochement.
Building and sustaining a major ideological/political
offensive which, together with other efforts, will be
designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet
system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program,
the nature of the Soviet system.
Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its
position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S.
continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context
of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same
time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal
and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical
Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require
both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with
moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense
commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
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Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional
Support
The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is
unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with
the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories
in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely
to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from
important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" US-Soviet
relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in
Moscow.
It is therefore essential that the American people understand
and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S.
statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations
for near-term progress in US-Soviet relations. At the same time,
the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint
for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious
search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet
relations.
out Eastern Europe. This will require tha
t th
e U.S. con-
tinue to impose costs on the Soviet Union
for
its behavior
in Poland. It will also require that
the
U.S.
maintain
a
U.S. policy of differentiation among
East
European
Ma-intenance of international -pressure - .. .on- .Moscow to permit
a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a
longer-term increase in diversity and independence through-
ctuntries.
Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national
security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.
This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instru-
ments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and
economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option
of using of American military forces to protect vital U.S.
security interests against threats which may arise from the
Soviet-Cuban connection.
Ronald Reagan
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Response to NSSD 11-82:
U.S. Relations With The USSR
INTRODUCTION
The record of US-Soviet relations since October, 1917, has been
one of tension and hostility, interrupted by short-lived periods of
cooperation. The Soviet challenge to U.S. interests has many roots,
including: (1) an imperial tradition; (2) threat perceptions rooted
in Russian history; and (3) the nature of the Communist regime, its
internal insecurity, its superpower ambitions, and its ideologically-
mandated animosity toward the United States as the "main bastion of
capitalism."
U.S. tensions with the Soviet Union have resulted in substantial
measure from the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power and
Moscow's readiness to use force in ways which threaten U.S. Allies
and pose a threat to the security of"the United States. The U.S.
has built up its military power vis-a-vis the Soviets, and has pur-
sued a policy of containment on the periphery of the Soviet Union.
Such responses are essential, and the United States must sustain the
resources and the will to compete effectively with the Soviet Union.
This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
Because Soviet aggressiveness has sources in the Soviet internal
system, an effective national strategy requires that U.S. policies
toward that country also take into account their impact on its
internal development. For example, it is inconsistent to raise the
defense budget to meet the Soviet threat and at the same time allow
Western economic relations with Moscow to contribute directly to the
growth of Soviet military power. There is also concern among
Americans about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and
the lack of individual freedom in Soviet society. This too requires
that the U.S. take into account the nature of the Soviet system in
formulation of policy toward the USSR.
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union proceeds on the assumption
that the maintenance of power by the Soviet regime rests ultimately
on force and that Soviet external aggressiveness stems in part from
the nature of the Soviet political system. Therefore, the U.S. must,
within the limits of its capabilities, design political, economic,
and other measures which advance the long-term objective of pro-
moting: (1) the decentralization and demilitarization of the Soviet
economy; (2) the weakening of the power and privileged position of
the ruling communist elite (nomenklatura); (3) gradual democratiza-
tion of the USSR.
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The U.S. almost certainly lacks the capability to bring about
major beneficial changes in the Soviet internal order over the near
to middle term. Indeed, there is a real possibility that increased
external pressure on the Soviet Union could, at least in the short
run, give the ruling communist elite greater incentive for internal
repression and external aggressiveness. However, it is also possible
that carefully designed and implemented U.S. policies could have an
important, if marginal, beneficial impact on Soviet internal develop-
ments. This impact could grow over time if there is a sustained
effort to see that U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union systemati-
cally take into account the potential impact on Soviet internal
developments.
Thus, the first two tracks of U.S. policy toward the Soviet
Union are:
-- To compete effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet
Union in the international arena, particularly in the
overall military balance and in geographical regions of
priority concern to the United States.
-- To undertake a coordinated, long-term effort to reduce the
threat that the Soviet system poses to our interests.
There is an important third track. The U.S. must engage the
Soviet Union in dialogue and negotiations to attempt to reach
agreements based on strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is
particularly important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a
process of political succession.
All three tracks of U.S. policy must be implemented simultaneously
and sustained over the long term. It will be important that the West,
with firm U.S. leadership, create and sustain negative and positive
incentives powerful enough to influence Soviet behavior. Moscow must
know that irresponsible and aggressive behavior will incur costs that
would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear
to the Soviets that real restraint in their behavior would pave the
way for a an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits
for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message
be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a
particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies
of Brezhnev's successors.
The study which follows is not specifically an analysis of the
Soviet political transition, although its implications for U.S. policy
are addressed. This study is instead designed to outline a US-Soviet
policy for the near to medium term. The first part of the study
examines in detail the determinants of Soviet behavior, the strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet system, prospects for future developments
in Soviet foreign policy and within the Soviet Union itself, and the
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degree of vulnerability of the system to external leverage. The second
part sets forth in detail a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, with
emphasis on the role of the military balance, U.S. relationships with
Allies and developing countries, interaction with Soviet allies in
Eastern Europe and the Third World, and bilateral relations with the
Soviet Union itself. Within the latter, the study places particular
emphasis on how economic relations and expanded political action
programs can be structured and utilized to advance U.S. interests.
PART I - THE DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR
The Soviet challenge to U.S. security interests is rooted in
Moscow's conception of its relationship with the United States as
fundamentally adversarial. This concept, based on ideological anta-
gonism, geopolitical rivalry and an imperial tradition, governs
Soviet behavior and also shapes Soviet perceptions of U.S. policies
toward Moscow. Its most dramatic manifestation is growing Soviet
military power and capabilities which form the cutting edge of
Moscow's persistent efforts to extend its global presence and
influence at the expense of the United States and the West.
Communist ideology posits an inevitable struggle between
capitalism and socialism and thus views non-socialist states both as
potential targets for revolution and as potential threats. It sees
class antagonism as the driving force behind political and economic
change, and the policies of other nations as shaped by domestic eco-
nomic and social struggles. This view provides the intellectual
prism through which Soviet leaders perceive the outside world,
reinforces the expansionist tendencies inherited from the Russian
tradition, and assures them that history is on their side.
Most importantly, Communist ideology is the main source of the
regime's legitimacy. It explains why there is only one political
party, which controls the state administration and all spheres of
society, why the media are subject to censorship, and why the party
Politburo dominates political life. This ideology also serves to
buttress and rationalize the privileged position of the ruling elite
(nomenklatura) in Soviet society. For a variety of reasons--including
a deeply rooted fear of "anarchy" and the absence of any regularized
process for transferring power--questions of the regime's legitimacy
continue to be of basic concern to Soviet leaders.
But Soviet authorities also see their own international role in
terms of traditional great power interests. Their specific policies
and tactics are perforce often shaped by geopolitical considerations.
Thus ideology and the imperatives of great power interests are
mutually reinforcing.
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The insecurity and suspicion engendered by Russian history and
Marxist-Leninist ideology have been tempered somewhat by the USSR's.
emergence as a military superpower and the growth of its political
role in world affairs. Soviet leaders see'military power as the
essential foundation of an assertive foreign policy. The pattern
of their policies since the mid-1970's suggests increased confidence
in their global power position--expressed in Soviet parlance as "the
changing correlation of forces in favor of Socialism." The Soviet
leadership also sees continuing opportunities to exploit and foster
international tensions and instabilities to their own advantage and
the detriment of the United States. At the same time a new element
of insecurity probably has been added by the growing recognition
that serious domestic problems seem to defy solution.
A. SOVIET STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The political system that has evolved out of this historical and
ideological tradition has provided the means for a serious challenge
to U.S. interests. Its leaders have formidable military power, con-
siderable economic might and an impressive political action capa-
bility at their disposal. The highly centralized decision-making
apparatus enhances the Soviet leadership's ability to develop a
cohesive foreign and domestic policy and to move quickly to take
advantage of international opportunities. At the same time such
centralization often makes Soviet domestic policy rigid, and ideo-
logical orthodoxy inhibits adaptations to changing internal and
international conditions. These strengths and weaknesses will be
particularly evident as the Soviet Union deals with major global
challenges and opportunities in the 1980s.
Internal Factors
The Economy
The USSR has entered a period of slow economic growth that
confronts the leadership with tough policy choices. Shortfalls in
industrial production, and four consecutive harvest failures have
reduced the growth in Soviet GNP to less that 2 percent a year since
1978--its lowest rate since World War II.
This decline indicates that the formula Moscow has used to
stimulate growth over the past 25 years -- maximum inputs of labor
and investment -- no longer works. During the past few years, the
USSR has experienced:
-- a sharp slowdown in oil production growth and a decline
in coal production;
-- a major rise in raw material costs;
-- a fall-off in investment and labor-force growth; and
-- a sharp decline in labor productivity growth.
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To judge from 11th Five-Year Plan figures, the Soviet leadership
nevertheless expects GNP to grow 4 percent per year through the
mid-1980s. This goal, however, is based on highly unrealistic
assumptions about labor productivity growth. We estimate that GNP
will continue to grow at less than 2 percent through the mid-1980s.
These economic difficulties have not led the leadership to make
fundamental changes in policy. To maintain the military buildup, it
has lowered the rates of growth for consumption and capital invest-
ment. If these priorities continue, however, the living standard
will hold steady and may decline and investment will be squeezed
further. If overall economic growth remains at 2 percent or less,
and if defense spending continues its long-term growth rate of about
4 percent a year, the defense burden, as measured by share of GNP
going to defense spending, will approach 20 percent by the early
1990s compared to its current level of 13-14 percent. This would
sharply restrict the resources available to non-military claimants
and heighten political tensions over allocation decisions.
Despite these gloomy prospects, the USSR continues to possess
great economic strengths. It has:
a wealth of natural resources, leading the world in the
production of such key industrial commodities as oil,
steel, iron ore, and nickel;
the world's largest military-industrial complex; and
a highly centralized economy that has enabled the
leadership to command resources and set priorities between
regions and sectors.
Moreover, although keenly aware of their difficulties, Soviet leaders
apparently believe that the 1990s will bring some relief from at
least two of their major problems -- manpower shortages and energy
constraints. They also take comfort in the gloomy projections of
growth for most Western industrial nations and have expressed doubt
publicly and privately about the United States' ability to carry out
its defense buildup.
Social Issues
The sources of popular discontent in the Soviet Union -- a
perceived decline in the quality of life, continuing restrictions on
freedom of expression and belief, and rising national consciousness
among more than 20 major ethnic groups -- pose problems of varying
severity for the Soviet leadership. Discontent over the quality of
Soviet life probably represents the most immediate and important
challenge. The Soviet people no longer are confident that their
standard of living will continue to improve. Food shortages have
become more apparent and the availability of some consumer goods has
dropped. The sense of rising expectations, made possible by real
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consumer advances until the mid-1970s, has yielded to an apparent
growth of dissatisfaction and cynicism. This is manifesting itself
in declining growth in labor productivity -- a trend that will make
it more difficult to achieve the rates of economic growth that the
leaders plan. Recent regime actions -- such as massive imports of
grain and the creation of special food distribution systems -- indicate
that the Soviet leaders are aware of the problems, but their policies
are as yet inadequate to solve them.
The slowing of economic growth, and the consequent near
stagnation in per-capita consumption, has led to a growing malaise
in Soviet society -- manifested in growing consumption of alcohol,
declining life expectancy, increasing labor turnover, sporadic strike
activity, a flourishing black market, and widespread corruption.
Such phenomena are not only contributing to the reduction of labor
productivity, but also creating elite concern over the political
implications of this shift in popular attitudes.
The malaise in Soviet society is symptomatic of an underlying
loss of commitment to the system and to the political order.
Although impossible to quantify, the ideological underpinnings of
the system have clearly been eroding. Some erosion was probably
inevitable as the generation that made the revolution passed from
the scene. The post-war generation, which now comprises a majority
of the population, had no direct experience of the war and of the
purges and has come to expect more in the way of material comforts.
But a more fundamental problem has been the increasingly palpable
inconsistency between the communist ideal -- equality, community,
etc. -- and the reality of a bureaucratic state whose principal
purpose is maintaining in power the present elite. The threat this
loss of moral authority poses to the regime and its order is hard to
determine -- for the Soviet leaders as well as for ourselves. But
from the Soviet perspective the trends are not good, and it is hard
to see how the current set of leaders could lead or control a refor-
mation that would create a sense of shared belief in the rightness
of the present order. It seems likely that this problem will loom
larger in the concerns of Soviet leaders, and they will feel them-
selves increasingly defensive and vulnerable to efforts by the West
to give succor to the idea that beneficent change is possible in the
USSR, particularly in light of the disintegration of the Communist
Party in Poland.
The Soviet leadership thus far has been successful in isolating
and repressing political, religious, and cultural dissent through
widespread arrests and imprisonment of dissident leaders, confinement
in psychiatric hospitals, and exile. It has been far less. successful
in containing illicit economic activity that disrupts economic plans
and programs. In the long term, dissidence and non-conformity could
become more widespread -- because of dissatisfaction with living
standards, a continuing decline in ideological commitment, and an
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apparent resurgence of interest in religious faith -- and require
even more leadership attention. However, over the next 10 years
there is little prospect that such activity will get out of hand and
threaten party rule.
Discontent among the minority nationalities also represents a
latent vulnerability. There have been sporadic protests associated
with linguistic and cultural policies and perceived imbalances in
resource allocation. There is no widespread, disruptive protest
now, however, nor does any appear likely in the near or medium term.
Regime policies -- granting linguistic, territorial, and some cul-
tural autonomy; improving the standard of living; and expanding the
educational base -- combined with the use of repressive police
power, have thus far ensured the dominance of Great Russians over
other nationalities. A rising national consciousness among many of
these groups, however, suggests that discontent could eventually
become more serious. It has resulted in occasional work stoppages
and demonstrations -- particularly in the Baltic States, the
Ukraine, and Central Asia. It is impossible to predict the degree
of strain on the system which nationality problems might cause in
coming decades. There is, however, a possibility that these
tensions might eventually force the regime to reassess its basic
approach to the problem.
Political Process and Structure
Soviet leaders exercise pervasive control over political activity
in the USSR, and their determination to ensure the preeminence of
the party and implementation of its decisions is an important under-
pinning of all national policy objectives. The successful pursuit
of this aim, together with effective restrictions on public dissent,
has given unity and cohesiveness to both domestic and foreign policy.
This focus on the maintenance of party control, however, also
has introduced some rigidity and inefficiency that have been harmful
to the pursuit of national goals. This has been especially evident
in the economy. Party leaders, despite their interest in improving
the efficiency and technological base of the economy, have been
reluctant to back fully the kind of decentralization and economic
incentives that would contribute to this end, mainly for fear that
this would dilute their power. They have also been unwilling to
codify their powers and responsibilities within the political system.
Even a superficially smooth political succession creates potentially
disruptive personal and policy conflict. The lack of any mechanism
to ensure rejuvenation of the administrative elite has reduced the
flow of fresh ideas. A continuation of this situation could
challenge the self-confidence and cohesion of the party and weaken
its ability to cope with growing problems and pressures.
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Foreign Policy
Instruments of Policy
To judge from the USSR's sustained heavy investment in military
forces and weapons research and development, the Soviet leaders
believe that military power is the principal basis of their influence
and status in international relations, and in controlling their own
population. In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets probably now
credit themselves with aggregate nuclear capabilities at least equal
to those of the United States and in some respects, such as the
ability to threaten land-based missile silos, with superiority. The
Soviets have also significantly improved theater nuclear and
conventional forces, thus reinforcing Moscow's regional superiority
vis-a-vis China and Western Europe.
In the Third World, arms sales, training, and advisors also are
effective instruments of Soviet policy. While such aid does not
necessarily translate directly into political leverage, it usually
is the keystone of Soviet relations with less developed countries
and with revolutionary and insurgent groups. Despite Soviet interest
in garnering hard currency from arms sales, Moscow has been willing,
where it perceives political advantage, to make major concessions,
such as extended repayment periods and payment in soft currency.
This, combined with their apparent responsiveness, allows the Soviets
to depict their actions as manifestations of solidarity with the
Third World.
Another trend in Soviet Third World involvement is the
continuing use of proxies and other intermediaries, together with
covert Soviet involvement in supporting insurgent groups and in
aiding the military ventures of client or dependent regimes. For
the Soviets, the proxy relationship -- one that has proven most
successful in Angola and Ethiopia -- minimizes the level of direct
Soviet involvement while achieving Soviet aims and projecting the
image of "socialist solidarity" with the recipient regimes.
Foreign debt obligations and hard currency shortages, however,
affect the overall level of Moscow's commitment to client regimes.
The hard currency crunch has made the Soviets reluctant to provide
other clients with economic aid as extensive as that provided to
Cuba or Vietnam. The net result is that Moscow is more dependent
on military aid as an entree of influence in the Third World.
In recent years the Soviets also have strengthened their
traditional diplomatic activities, supplementing them with-increased
usage of a broad range of pseudo-official and covert activities that
the Soviets themselves refer to as 'active measures.' These include
political training, covert support to insurgencies, grooming of
agents of influence and propaganda activities. The increased use of
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such measures is in part a reflection of the importance Moscow
attributes to the "ideological struggle," which is waged not only
through propaganda, but also with psychological warfare and
subversion..
The Soviet Union and International Communism
The international Communist movement is no longer the unambiguous
asset to the USSR that it once was. Soviet leadership and control
of both ruling and non-ruling Communist parties is under increasing
challenge. The turmoil in Poland and problems in Romania underscore
the limited effectiveness of Moscow's costly policy of buying
stability and loyalty in Eastern Europe through economic subsidies.
East European countries, beset by economic problems, are being
pressed to forge closer economic links to the USSR. The objective
possibilities for the USSR to continue to pursue a policy of buying
political stability there, however, are fading quickly due to Soviet
economic problems and Western resistance to deeper economic
involvement in Eastern Europe. In the coming decade slow economic
growth in Eastern Europe will threaten regime stability in bloc
countries. The downfall of a corrupt and incompetent party
leadership in Poland, precipitated by the protests of a popular
workers' movement, and the use of the military to fill the gap, also
raise disquieting questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness
of Communist party rule throughout the bloc.
In dealing with these problems, Moscow's options are limited.
An economic bailout would be too costly. Economic reform and
greater Western involvement would diminish central control and could
stimulate pressures for political reform. A resort to greater
repression, on the other hand, would further complicate Moscow's
relations in the West and the Third World.
Beyond Eastern Europe, another serious challenge to Soviet
control and orthodoxy in the world Communist movement comes from
Eurocommunism. The West European parties are trying to balance
their ties to the Soviet Communist Party with their own national
and political interests. They resist Soviet efforts to subordinate
national parties to Soviet control. Criticism of Soviet policies
has now become common and probably will increase if the Soviets
increase repression at home and political and military expansion
abroad.
The return of the Chinese Communist Party to active involvement
in the international movement and its opposition to Soviet. hegemony
also are potentially severe challenges facing the Soviet leadership.
The Chinese are in the process of forming a tacit alliance with
several of the leading West European parties. The Chinese, in
addition, have indicated their intention to compete with the Soviets
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for influence with "progressive forces" in the Third World, including
such pro-Soviet radical regimes as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
Moscow's concern over these developments and over U.S.-Chinese
relations animated their long-standing desire to work out their
problems with Beijing. The recent talks in China have come at
Beijing's initiative, and so far the Chinese have made demands
regarding Soviet border troops, support for Vietnam, and the
invasion of Afghanistan which Moscow will not be willing to
satisfy. Still it is very much in the USSR's interest to get a
closer relationship with the Chinese, and it is possible that the
Soviets will make, at some future time, further gestures to move the
relationship into a less antagonistic phase.
The Economic Burdens of Empire
The Soviets almost certainly believe that their economic support
of other Communist countries and clients brings substantial strategic
and political benefits, but rising costs and economic stringencies
are prompting a tougher aid posture. Assistance to East European and
Third World clients rose dramatically from $1.7 billion in 1971 to
$23 billion in 1980 -- some 1.5 percent of GNP. Moscow is prepared
to shoulder a large aid burden for its Communist clients; their eco-
nomies are generally in trouble, and their stability is important to
Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Soviet leadership is attempt-
ing to slow the rise in aid costs, however, by cutting subsidized
oil deliveries to some East European allies, refusing increased
deliveries of fuel to Vietnam and demanding that allies end their
trade deficits with the USSR.
Moscow's tight-fisted aid policy toward non-Communist LDCs will
almost certainly continue as well. Moscow's present hard currency
problems will make it even more reluctant to extend substantial hard
currency aid to such countries as Nicaragua, despite repeated
requests for it. Several radical clients, such as Ethiopia and
South Yemen, are increasingly unhappy with their inability to
augment Soviet military support with extensive economic cooperation.
Opportunities and Challenges
Through careful and calculating use of their assets, the Soviets
have made important international gains, most prominently in the
Third World where they now have a significant larger number of
clients and better access than at the beginning of the Brezhnev
era. The Soviets are now faced with both opportunities and chal-
lenges abroad. Their international strengths derive for the most
part from their huge military investments and their willingness and
ability to exploit instability in countries and regions important to
U.S. interests; their vulnerabilities stem principally from changes
in the international environment that could threaten past gains.
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The Soviet Union's growing military power has strengthened its
ability to pursue political goals in Western Europe. By threatening
additional nuclear deployments if NATO's INF decision is implemented,
the Soviets are in effect attempting to force the West Europeans to
accept de facto Soviet military superiority on the continent.
The Soviets also believe Washington's ability to raise the
economic and military costs of the East-West competition is subject
to competing U.S. economic priorities and to reluctance on the part
of U.S. allies to follow our lead. The Soviets think that conflict
between Western Europe and the United States over arms control and
East-West economic relations presents opportunities to provoke divi-
sions within the alliance. In particular, the failure thus far of
U.S. efforts to dissuade its West European allies from participation
in the Yamal gas pipeline project has probably encouraged the Soviets
in their assumption that differences in the western alliance can be
exploited to Soviet advantage. Moscow also remains hopeful that
NATO's consensus in favor of new intermediate-range missile deploy-
ments can be broken, perhaps leading to a serious rupture in the
alliance.
In the Far East, Moscow's military buildup opposite China remains
not only a lever on the PRC but a potential bargaining chip should
Beijing wish to move seriously in the dialogue now underway and to
ameliorate Sino-Soviet tensions. Opportunities in the Far East are
also afforded by the frictions in U.S.-Chinese relations and poten-
tial divergences between the United States and Japan stemming from
trade problems, disagreements over economic sanctions against the
USSR, and Japanese reluctance to accelerate defense spending.
Moscow believes that its military investment also has improved
somewhat its capabilities for projection of its military power into
more distant regions. Although the Soviets recognize the limitations
of that capability against a major military power, they hope that
their increased capacity will deter U.S. military action against
Soviet proxies or clients and promote trends in regional conflicts
favorable to themselves. Moscow's increased involvement in the
Third World also reflects a belief that the United States has been
constrained from direct military intervention there by the trauma of
Vietnam and the difficulty of reaching a domestic political consensus
on foreign policy in general. Indeed, political and economic insta-
bility throughout the Third World, together with the radicalization
of postcolonial elites, have been viewed by the Soviets as major U.S.
and Western vulnerabilities and, conversely, relatively low-risk
opportunities for the Soviet Union to insinuate itself through pro-
grams of military and technical aid, political training and 'active
measures."
An overriding issue is the extent to which Moscow's international
posture will be affected by a growing preoccupation with the country's
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great, and growing, domestic problems. Economic problems, the loss
of ideological commitment, a growing malaise in society and the suc-
cession process now underway should impinge more on the consciousness
of the leaders in the Kremlin in the coming decade than they did in
the past. It is possible that the post-Brezhnev leadership might
wish to turn its attention to sorting out its own internal political
squabbles as it has in previous successions and try to avoid foreign
policy actions that they perceive as risky and deliberately
provocative. They may, in fact, propose initiatives designed to give
them a respite to deal with internal problems. They also may try to
reduce external economic commitments in order to devote more
resources to domestic economic problems. This would be especially
likely if there is growing domestic unrest, in the form of strikes
and demonstrations, over declining economic conditions. At this
juncture all of these domestic problems seem manageable, but neither
the West nor the Soviets can be confident about what the future may
bring.
The deteriorating US-Soviet relationship is a major source of
concern, potentially eroding Soviet military and foreign policy gains
of the past decade. Planned U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear
programs also are seen by the Soviets as an attempt to negate the
USSR's strategic advantages and to create a credible "first strike"
capability.
In the Far East, the Soviets view China's improved relations with
both the United States and Japan as a serious security problem,
raising the possibility that the USSR might be opposed by all three
countries in a conflict in the Far East. More immediately, the USSR
suspects that this trilateral rapprochement portends active U.S. and
Japanese aid in the modernization of Chinese armed forces. Moscow's
territorial disputes with both China and Japan, moreover, are major
obstacles to any dramatic improvement in its relations with either
country.
In the Third World, the Soviets recognize that even where they
have substantial political and military investments their continued
influence is not guaranteed. The defeat of Soviet clients in Lebanon
and Soviet inability to intervene effectively was the most recent
demonstration. Similarly, the Soviets see current U.S. efforts to
broker a more comprehensive peace settlement in the middle East and
to achieve a settlement in Namibia as potentially leading to a
further erosion of Soviet influence in the Third World.
Soviet economic and social problems will provide the strongest
impetus for systemic or policy change over the next 10 years. Unless
major changes are forthcoming, economic growth rates will remain at
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historically low levels, popular dissatisfaction with a perceived
decline in the quality of life will grow, and resource allocation
decisions will become more difficult for the leadership. The gravity
of these problems for the Soviet system, however, remains difficult
to measure, and there are important uncertainties in our judgments
about the possibility that they could cause major system or policy
changes.
While the rhetoric of the Soviet leadership reflects concern,
there is no sense of mortal danger to the Soviet state. The gloomier
projections of foreign observers and dissident Soviet citizens, on
the other hand, reflect a perception that Soviet problems are intrac-
table and less optimism that the added manpower and energy resources
the Soviets are counting on in the 1990s will reverse adverse
economic trends.
Even with a more negative assessment of Soviet economic and
social difficulties, however, we believe that in the next decade the
strengths of the system -- its control mechanisms, its economic power,
and (despite growing restiveness) the patriotism and passivity of its
populace -- will almost certainly allow Soviet leaders to contain
internal pressures that might result in changes of basic philosophy
or the nature of Communist party rule. While the leadership will
have to cope with important long-term vulnerabilities, it does not,
in our judgment, appear to be faced with an imminent challenge to the
stability of its rule. Preserving this stability, however, may
ultimately require the regime to devote more attention and resources
to its economic problems and to maintaining an acceptable standard of
living rather than to foreign adventures or to continuing an
expanding rate of military growth.
While this assessment leads us to believe that the prospect for
major systemic change in the next few years is relatively low, the
likelihood of policy shifts is much higher, and some of these could
set the scene for broader changes in the system over the long run.
The immediate post-Brezhnev leadership will almost certainly make a
more vigorous effort in the next 3-5 years to reverse the economic
slowdown, and in the process alter sectoral and regional resource
allocations, administrative structures, prices and incentives, and
even tighten administrative controls. Toward the end of the decade
and with the emergence of a new generation of leaders, more
far-reaching solutions to this fundamental problem could emerge,
involving perhaps much greater use of market forces, cuts in the
growth rate for military spending or more repression. At the same
time, any group of leaders almost certainly will continue to rely on
military power as a key instrument of foreign policy and will seek to
maintain its competitive strength vis-a-vis the United States. They
are likely.to count on Third World developments to provide new
political and diplomatic opportunities as well as openings for
subversion.
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Changes in the Political System
Despite internal weaknesses, the institutions of political
control remain strong and firmly entrenched in the USSR. Popular
discontent -- although threatening to economic goals -- does not as
yet challenge the party's authority. Revolutionary collapse or major
alterations in the system are highly unlikely in the next three to
five years. It is much more likely that the current system, based on
the privilege and power of the ruling elite and the bureaucratic
police and military power of the state will remain in place, perhaps
buttressed by increased appeals to and reliance upon Great Russian
nationalism.
A military coup?
A military takeover within the next 10 years is highly unlikely.
Although the military has the organizational skills and certainly the
muscle to take charge, it has been indoctrinated from the regime's
beginnings to stand aside from higher politics and historically has
rarely been a major political actor. Moreover, its interests have
been well served by the current party leadership. It has, for
example, been given a large role in defining the security threat and
in determining the programs required to deal with it -- its two main
political interests. The party, in addition, has developed a wide
array of checks and controls to forestall a military coup. The
military probably would attempt to assume power only in the event
that it perceived a serious undermining of social discipline and
threat to the military's priority claim to resources or under
conditions of political and economic chaos similar to that in the
Polish crisis.
Return to One-Man Rule
Within the framework of the existing system of party rule,
however, a variety of changes are possible. Although Andropov will
not initially have Brezhnev's authority, the time required for his
consolidation of power could be far shortened by a shared sense of
urgent national tasks. During the next decade, Andropov or another
leader could come to exercise power far in excess of that wielded by
Brezhnev or Khrushchev. Such a development could result from
frustration with the lack of clear national direction, a perception
that more discipline is needed in the party and society, and a
confluence of serious domestic and international problems. The
emergence of such a leader, less constricted by the need for
consensus, would make major policy shifts and changes much more
likely. Domestic policies probably would take an authoritarian turn,
but external policies would depend as well on other internal and
external factors and thus could range from highly aggressive to
pragmatic.
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"Liberalization" of the System
Another possibility would be some liberalizing reform that would
allow for much greater personal freedom and decentralization of poli-
tical and economic authority. This seems a less likely prospect,
considering the absence of effective popular pressure for such
change, the strength of the regime's control mechanisms, and the
apparent lack of significant sentiment in that direction within the
Soviet establishment. It is possible that a Soviet Government, while
preoccupied with internal reform, would seek to stabilize the
international environment and thus be somewhat less prone to external
adventures. Given the nature of the great power rivalry, however, a
"liberal" Soviet regime would not necessarily be more accommodating
to U.S. interests. Indeed, such a regime might be more effective at
overcoming some of the Soviet Union's systemic and policy weaknesses,
making it an even more formidable adversary.
Changes in Policies through the Mid-1980s
More likely than systemic change are changes in specific
policies, some probably following shortly on Brezhnev's death and the
beginning of a long-term political transition in the Soviet Union.
Although our knowledge of Soviet internal debate is limited, there
have been discernible differences among Politburo members on several
key issues. Conflict over these and other issues, heightened by
political jockeying and the complexity of the country's problems,
could lead to major policy shifts in the next three to five years.
Economic Policy
The most immediate changes are likely in economic policy, where
the current investment strategy has prompted considerable debate.
Differences in priorities already have emerged between the pronounce-
ments of one group (represented by former Brezhnev deputy Kirilenko,
Shcherbitskiy, and others) that has advocated the priority development
of heavy industry, and another (represented mainly by Chernenko) that
has emphasized the need to increase the availability of consumer
goods. Since Andropov made few public comments on this subject
before Brezhnev's death, we have little hard information concerning
his stance on these issues. Whatever the outcome of this debate,
some reallocation of resources almost certainly will be advocated in
the immediate post-Brezhnev era, with agriculture -- in the absence
of its principal patron -- becoming a likely target. Other sectors
also will be affected by the political fortunes of their sponsors,
however, making the eventual economic beneficiaries largely uncertain.
In addition to investment disputes, succession politics may bring
forth new proposals to improve the economy's efficiency. Concern
over declining growth already has led some leaders to reevaluate
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economic and administrative reforms they earlier found unacceptable.-,
Since 1978 several Soviet leaders, reportedly including Andropov,
have publicly endorsed Hungary's "New Economic Mechanism" -- a system
based on centrally formulated plans and economic goals but using some
market forces to guide the economy at the micro-level.
Although there is little prospect that the Soviet Union will adopt
changes so sweeping, some administrative reforms will almost certainly
be enacted. The multitude of functionally related and overlapping
ministries might be placed under more centralized management. This
could be accompanied by some decentralization of operational
authority -- a move that already has been at least started in the
agricultural sector. (It is in this area that the Hungarian model
has been most closely studied and emulated.) Changes that are
politically feasible, however, probably will not significantly
improve the economic situation.
Military Spending
Concern about the domestic economy also could eventually impel
one or another leader to propose in the mid-1980s some reduction in
the rate of growth of military spending, if not an absolute cut as
Khrushchev did in the mid-1950s. A number of additional factors,
however, make significant reductions in the growth of the defense
budget unlikely in the near term, including
-- the political commitment of most Soviet leaders to a strong
military posture;
-- the momentum of weapon development and production programs
that are underway; and
-- the challenge of planned U.S. defense programs.
In the succession environment, contestants for power will, in the
absence of an existing consensus, be unlikely to risk antagonizing
the military establishment and conservative forces in the party by
proposing cuts in defense spending. Indeed, the military could even
come away from the present power struggle with some increase in the
rate of growth of defense spending for a few years.
Over time, as the post-Brezhnev leadership struggles with
declining economic growth, there will likely be greater pressure to
reduce the growth in military spending in order to free up the labor
and capital resources urgently needed in key civilian sectors. In
this connection, the cost-avoidance benefits of arms control
agreements could assume greater importance. Even in the mid-1980s,
however, absolute reductions in the defense effort seem unlikely,
barring economic catastrophe, but some reduction in its rate of
growth seems a more likely possibility. Moreover, Soviet military
investment is now so large that even with reduced growth -- or indeed
with no growth at all -- military capabilities would continue to
increase well into the 1990s.
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Foreign Policy
The existing consensus on foreign policy is stronger than that on
domestic issues, and major changes are less likely in that area in the
next few years. Some issues, nonetheless, could become a bone of con-
tention in the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although these issues will be
determined largely by the international situation at the time, a suc-
cessor regime will have to deal with both the challenges and oppor-
tunities outlined above.
Claimants to leadership in the immediate post-Brezhnev era are
likely to share a commitment to sustain the global dimensions of
Soviet policy. This commitment could be reinforced by a possible
tendency on the part of a younger generation of Soviet leaders to
equate the growth of military power with the growth of global power
and influence. Supporting such thinking, moreover, are factors that
go beyond tangible or measurable indexes -- ideological conviction, a
sense of insecurity and of hostile encirclement, and a contrasting
confidence and sense of achievement in the USSR's emergence as a
global superpower.
Soviet leaders probably will wish to continue arms control
negotiations with the United States for at least the next few years,
seeking new agreements that will slow U.S. weapons programs, thereby
facilitating Soviet planning, reducing weapons costs, and lessening
the possibility of technological surprise. In the past some leaders
(including both Andropov and Chernenko) have seemed more enthusiastic
about pursuing this goal than others. The price the Soviet leadership
is willing to pay for an arms limitation agreement, therefore, may
depend in part on the outcome of the succession.
The new Soviet leadership may, in addition, undertake new
initiatives designed to alter the geopolitical environment. They
may, for instance, attempt a breakthrough in relations toward West-
ern Europe or China. Moscow's principal assets in these instances
would be the ability to offer greater intercourse between East and
West Germany and to offer China significant concessions on conten-
tious military and border issues.
The Soviet Union's other future policy options will depend on
events beyond its control. A collapse of the Saudi monarchy, for
example, could usher in an anti-Western regime, presenting the
Soviets with major new opportunities for expanding its influence in
the area. Opportunities in Central America may beckon or the out-
come of the Iran-Iraq war might create significant opportunities or
dangers from Moscow's perspective that could lead to policy. shifts.
The Soviets' potential options will also be shaped importantly by
the extent to which the United States might preempt such opportu-
nities and exploit the vulnerabilities in Moscow's global situation.
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Longer-Range Uncertainties
For the next 3 to 5 years, Soviet policies will continue to be
shaped by, leaders who provided the consensus that supported
Brezhnev's policies, and they may be less willing than their younger
colleagues waiting in the wings to push for major policy or systemic
change. The departure within the past year of three kingpins of the
topmost leadership level (Suslov, Brezhnev, Kirilenko), however,
makes it possible that Andropov could move Soviet policies in new
directions should he be so inclined.
Soviet policies will become less predictable in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, however, as the gap between economic performance
and leadership expectations widens, as the basis for optimism about
future economic performance erodes, and as the generational change
in the Soviet leadership takes hold. The policy preferences of this
younger generation are largely unknown. Although they have discre-
tionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies,
these officials now hold positions -- in the Central Committee
apparatus, regional party organizations, and the government
bureaucracy -- that provide little involvement in foreign policy.
What little evidence we have of this younger group's views
reveals no clearly dominant orientation and no apparent consensus
regarding the direction of future policies. Their eventual domestic
course will probably reflect elements of both orthodox and reformist
views, perhaps undertaking some decentralization of economic manage-
ment, while at the same time tightening labor discipline.
Their foreign policy course is even more difficult to predict.
Conceivably, some members of this group might favor a more accom-
modating foreign policy stance in order to increase trade with the
West and ease domestic economic problems. The same pressures,
however, might lead others to urge the adoption of economic
self-sufficiency (autarky) at home and a more adventurist policy
abroad, increasing the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Changes in the Soviet system or policies over the next decade
could affect Soviet behavior in areas that the United States con-
siders important. The succession and difficult internal problems
could lead the new leadership to be more circumspect in using Soviet
power and resources abroad and even cause it eventually to restrain
the rate of growth of its military machine. Limited accommodations
in the areas of arms control or other bilateral issues may be pos-
sible, but a more encompassing accord on bilateral relations or geo-
political behavior is precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes
regarding desirable political or social change in the international
order.
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- IBS -
Although the Soviets will not wish a major confrontation with
the United States, their belief that they now enjoy strategic
equality and some advantages enhances the prospects for an even more
assertive foreign policy. Soviet leaders probably also can be
expected to seize new opportunities offered by instability in the
Third World to enhance Soviet geopolitical influence and divert U.S.
attention from areas of direct US-Soviet interaction, even in
situations where the USSR has little prospect of making significant
gains for itself. If the Soviets are able to ameliorate some of
their current internal and external weaknesses -- for example, by
stemming the decline of economic growth -- this also would improve
their ability to compete with the United States for global influence.
It is doubtful, however, that Soviet leaders perceive a 'window
of opportunity" stemming from an overweening confidence in present
Soviet nuclear forces relative to future prospects. From the per-
spective of the Soviet leadership, there will remain important deter-
rents to major military actions that directly threaten vital U.S.
national interests. These include the dangers of a direct conflict
with the United States that could escalate to global proportions,
doubts about the reliability of some of their East European allies,
and an awareness of the greater Western capacity to support an ex-
panded defense effort. These concerns do not preclude action abroad,
but they act as constraints on military actions in which the risk of
a direct US-Soviet confrontation is clear.
U.S. Influence on Soviet Behavior
The future of the Soviet political system and its basic values
will be determined primarily by internal political forces that the
United States has only marginal ability to influence. Over at least
the next decade, as noted above, the fundamentals of the Soviet
system are likely to persist, regardless of U.S. actions. Over the
longer term, U.S. policies can help to shape -- through diplomatic,
military, economic and political actions -- the environment for
further evolution of the system, but how that evolution will proceed
is difficult to predict. Although also limited, we have greater
ability to affect Soviet behavior and specified policies in the
international arena, even in the near term, by requiring the ruling
elite to face up to the costs and risks of its policy choices.
Impact on the Political System
U.S. and Western influence over the ongoing Soviet political
succession process is highly limited. Even if this were not the
case, a contender whose stance appears more favorable to Western
interests today may alter his position when he becomes party chief.
In the initial stages of the Lenin succession, for example, Stalin
appeared to be one of the more moderate Soviet leaders.-During the
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2U--
Stalin succession, Khrushchev at'first adopted a hardline internal
position and later shifted to a more moderate course.
The Nest's ability to influence the nature and evolution of the
Soviet system is limited as well. The degree of vulnerability of
the USSR is difficult to judge, for the Soviet system has never
undergone the kind of passage it will be taking in the 1980s and the
West has not in the post-war period made change in the Soviet Union
an explicit objective of its dealings with the USSR, and taken steps
to give practical meaning to that objective. Clearly, the Soviet
system is extremely formidable in its ability to control its popu-
lation. And it would be very difficult for the West to be confident
that its actions, even if affecting change in the USSR, would affect
change that was democratic or otherwise positive for the Soviet
people and the USSR's dealings with the West. Indeed, in the short
term, a Soviet regime that felt itself genuinely threatened by
Western policies would likely make life even tougher for the Soviet
people and those within Soviet society who had the temerity to
suggest far-reaching changes in the internal order.
Leverage over Policy
U.S. policies, however, may be able to exacerbate weaknesses in
Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy actions which
the Soviets perceive as necessary to preserve existing equities --
such as repressive measures in Eastern Europe -- tend to isolate
them in the world and complicate achievement of other goals.
Moreover, the increasing attraction that some Western values hold
for the Soviet people will cause the regime to expend considerable
effort to protect them from foreign contagion and to prevent the
development of a stronger dissident movement. The Soviet economy
also will be hard pressed to keep pace with rising consumer
expectations, probably resulting in more leadership attention to
work stoppages, strikes, and other manifestations of social unrest.
Past U.S. efforts to use trade leverage to influence specific
Soviet policies have had some limited success. The prospect of
improved trade relations was one of the factors behind the increase
in Jewish emigration in the early 1970s. Moscow has circumvented
most economic restrictions and refused to modify its policies
substantially in return for increased trade, however, and it almost
certainly will remain resistant to attempts at trade leverage.
Western goods and technology, however, are becoming more
important to the USSR's strained economy; the volume of imports
tripled in the 1970s and imports have been crucial to completion of
several major production projects and to overcoming production short-
falls. Unilateral U.S. trade restrictions could create short-run
difficulties for the Soviets in some sectors -- such as the oil and
gas and chemical industries -- but would probably not persuade Moscow
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to alter major domestic or foreign policies. Similarly, the Soviets
also certainly would view renewed U.S. offers of increased trade for
certain political concessions with considerable suspicion. Unified
and sustained Western trade restrictions, particularly in such areas
as energy equipment and agricultural products, however, could impose
substantial costs on the Soviets and cause them to reassess important
aspects of their foreign and defense policies. They probably would
not change basic policies, particularly if international tensions
were high, but they would affect the Soviet calculation of costs and
benefits in particular situations.
Moreover, the United States can affect the USSR's behavior in
other ways, chiefly by conditioning the leaders' perceptions of the
costs and risks involved in Soviet expansionism. It is the Soviet
leadership's respect for U.S. military capabilities, for example,
that has prevented it from becoming involved in military hostilities
in the Middle East over the years. The Soviets recognize, moreover,
that if the U.S. has the political will, it is better positioned to
use its military, economic, and political power on a global scale
than they are.
Soviet perceptions of Western vulnerabilities and weaknesses, on
the other hand, serve to enhance their confidence in their ability
to compete with the U.S. The Soviets currently view Washington's
ability to heighten the economic and military costs to Moscow as
subject to competing U.S. domestic priorities, the ability to rally
popular support, and reluctance on the part of U.S. allies to incur
the costs of increased defense expenditures or increased tensions
with Moscow. The Soviets recognize, moreover, that divergent views
within NATO present opportunities to provoke major divisions betwen
the United States and its principal allies. Strengthened Western
unity and continued U.S. resolve, therefore, could have a
significant impact on future Soviet calculations and behavior.
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PART II - MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
The foregoing analysis indicates clearly that the West faces a
sustained.Sovietchallenge which requires a firm and measured
long-term Western effort. This will be forthcoming only if the
United States exercises fully its capacity for leadership. U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union must therefore address both the
requirement to contain and reverse Soviet expansion and the need to
strengthen and sustain a process of promoting change within the USSR
itself that will reduce the Soviet threat to U.S. interests and
those of our allies. This second track of U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union is not designed to preserve the status quo, but to
assist internal forces that might lead to constructive change.
In addition to these two tracks of U.S. policy -- effective and
sustained competition with the Soviet Union and promotion of internal
change -- there is an important third track. We need to engage the
Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements based on
strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This aspect of U.S. policy
will be particularly important when the Soviet Union is in the midst
of a process of political succession.
All three tracks of U.S. policy must be implemented simul-
taneously and sustained over the long term. The West, with firm
U.S. leadership, must create and sustain negative and positive
incentives powerful enough to influence Soviet behavior. Moscow
must know that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would
outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to
the Soviets that real restraint in their behavior could pave the way
for an East-West relationship that would have important benefits for
the Soviet Union.
This approach to US-Soviet relations could involve important
opportunities and benefits for the United States. It assigns appro-
priate priority to the task of meeting the Soviet military threat
with a credible deterrent and Soviet aggression in third areas with
effective countermeasures. By identifying the promotion of evolu-
tionary change within the Soviet Union itself as an objective of
U.S. policy, the United States takes the long-term strategic
offensive. This approach therefore contrasts with the essentially
reactive and defensive strategy of containment, which concedes the
initiative to the Soviet Union and'its allies and surrogates. While
entertaining no illusions that this kind of change can be affected
easily or quickly, this strategic approach does hold out the
possibility of an ultimate reduction of the Soviet threat to U.S.
interests and the level of U.S. resources that must be devoted to
countering that threat.
The strategic approach outlined above also has potential risks
and costs which must be minimized if the strategy is to succeed:
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1. Some opponents of an activist American strategy believe
that such an effort would involve the abandonment or downgrading of
US-Soviet negotiating efforts, especially in the arms control area.
The U.S. can, to some extent, address and minimize Congressional and
Allied concerns on this score by emphasizing that the U.S. approach
is gradual and peaceful and that our ultimate objective is not
confrontation, but a stable and constructive basis for East-West
relations. At the same time, it is unlikely that this strand of
U.S. policy will gain universal acceptance in the West. Indeed,
energetic American leadership to implement it may at times be
divisive domestically and within the Alliance.
2. There is also the danger that our policy might provoke a
more militant Soviet response designed to further increase internal
repression and utilize the USSR's current military advantage to
maximum effect -- before our efforts to redress the military balance
and exploit Soviet internal vulnerabilities have time to succeed.
While recognizing that this is not a negligible risk, we nevertheless
believe that the combination of our increased confidence and assert-
iveness, our military buildup, and our diplomatic offensive in areas
such as the Middle East, will limit Soviet options, particularly
during a period of leadership succession.
3. As noted above, our knowledge of the structure and dynamics
of the Soviet regime is at best imperfect, and we cannot be certain
what kinds of U.S. policies would be effective in promoting evolu-
tionary change within the Soviet system. Indeed, U.S. policies which
forced the USSR to undertake economic reform or otherwise modify in-
ternal practices mandated by communist ideology might actually enable
the Soviet Union to compete more effectively with the West, albeit
in different ways. Nevertheless, we believe that, with appropriate
recognition of the necessity for flexibility and a pragmatic
approach, an effective strategy for promoting evolutionary change
within the Soviet Union is possible.
A. Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement
Implementation of our strategy must focus on shaping the
environment in which Soviet decisions are made -- both in the wide
variety of functional and geopolitical arenas in which our interests
are engaged, and in the US-Soviet bilateral relationship.
1. Functional
(a) Military Strategy
Foremost in shaping the military environment Moscow faces is the
US-Soviet military balance. The U.S. must modernize its military
forces so that several goals are achieved:
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- 2-4-
Soviet leaders must perceive that the U.S. is determined
never to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic
posture. We must act to minimize doubts about the military
capabilities of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces, and
about the U.S. will to use them if necessary;
Soviet calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under
any contingency, must always result in outcomes so
unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for
the Soviet leaders to initiate a nuclear attack;
Leaders and the publics in all states must be able to observe
that this indicator of U.S. strength remains equal to or
greater than that of the USSR. They will then understand
that U.S. capacity for pursuing the broader US-Soviet
competition shall not be encumbered by direct Soviet
coercion of the United States;
-- The future of U.S. military strength must also appear to
friend and foe to be assured: technological advances must
be exploited, research and development vigorously pursued,
and sensible follow-on programs undertaken so that the
viability of U.S. deterrent policy is not placed in question.
-- We must tighten our controls over transfer of military
related/dual-use technology, products, services and know-how
in order to protect the lead-time on which the qualitative
advantage of our military strength depends.
In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced with a reinvigorated
NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of conventional
forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and
improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units assigned rapid
deployment and other reinforcing missions to the NATO area and
Southwest Asia. Worldwide, U.S. general-purpose forces must be
ready to move quickly from peacetime to wartime roles, and must be
flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide range of
contingencies.
The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant
shaping Third World perceptions of the relative positions and
influence of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty
that, in addition to North American defense, other areas of interest
to the U.S. will be defended against Soviet attacks or threats. But
it must know also that areas less critical to U.S. interests cannot
be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military
countermeasures.
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b. Economic Policy
U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve our
strategic and foreign policy goals as well as our economic interests.
Economic policy should therefore be seen in the context of our
larger, long-term effort to encourage evolutionary change in the
Soviet Union and to moderate Soviet external policies. Economic
measures alone cannot realize these goals, but economic diplomacy
can be a critical component in a larger strategy to meet the Soviet
military, political and economic challenge to the United States and
our Allies. To be effective, such an economic policy must be
sustainable over the long-term; hence, we must be realistic about
what we can or cannot achieve and specific in our aims.
Within this overall framework, our economic objectives should
Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do
not facilitate the Soviet military build-up or contribute
to their strategic advantage or capability. This requires
that we prevent the transfer of critical technology and
equipment which would make a substantial contribution,
directly or indirectly, to Soviet military power.
To restrict Soviet military and foreign policy
options through appropriate long-term measures of
economic diplomacy.
To minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse
leverage on western countries based on trade, energy
supply, and financial relationships.
To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing
the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as
not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet
system.
To permit mutually beneficial trade -- without Western
subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with
the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains.
A strategy of sustained, disciplined economic diplomacy must
flow from these objectives. While uncertainties remain about the
exact effects on Soviet policy of the economic constraints analyzed
in Section I, it is clear that the Soviets -- faced with grim eco-
nomic prospects in the 1980s -- look to inputs of Western equipment,
technology, and products to ease the increasingly difficult choices
they face between military spending on the one hand, and consumption
and investment on the other. Diminished Soviet prospects for growth
in hard-currency exports make the availability of western credit
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important to maintain current import levels. As Section I points
out, unilateral U.S. trade restrictions could create short-run dif-
ficulties for the Soviets in some sectors, but would probably not
persuade Moscow to alter major domestic or foreign policies. Unified
and sustained Western trade restrictions on credits, militarily cri-
tical technology, and other selected controls on exports or imports,
however, could impose substantial costs on the Soviets by forcing
them to face hard choices over the next decade, increase their
preoccupation with domestic problems, and thereby perhaps decrease
their expansionist tendencies. The possibility of foreign policy
sanctions on some or all non-strategic items remains for extreme
situations where, on a unified basis, the West can affect Soviet
calculations of costs and benefits for particular decisions.
The U.S. can and should seek to restrict Soviet military and
foreign policy options through economic policies. Because US-Soviet
trade is only a fraction of total Western trade with the USSR, the
U.S. needs the support of its European Allies and other key trading
partners. Indeed, the USSR's best hope of improving its strained
hard currency position in the longer run is to secure the cooperation
of Western Europe in building new large pipelines for the delivery
of additional natural gas in the late 1980s and 1990s. At the same
time, our policies should be based on our special responsibilities
within the Alliance and not on the lowest common denominator.
The United States must therefore exercise strong leadership with
its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the
strategic implications of East-West trade. West European reluctance
to accept restrictions on trade and credits to the USSR to the extent
we believe to be strategically and economically justified stems from
economic as well as political considerations. Although trade with
the Soviet Union and its CEMA partners is not of critical importance
to any Western country, it is more significant economically to the
West European Allies than to the U.S., especially in some sub-sectors
(e.g., steel pipe). They are reluctant to restrict export credits
which might enhance their ability to export to the East. They
oppose stopping construction of the Yamal pipeline, in part because
it will enhance Soviet hard-currency earnings and hence Soviet
ability to purchase more goods from them. They perceive not only
such short-term economic self interests but also a contribution to
long-term improvement in East-West political relations resulting
from increased trade with the Soviets.
The U.S. task is to shift their emphasis to a more realistic
appreciation of strategic realities in order to forge a common
approach to East-West economic relations. Substantial progress
in this regard has already been made by virtue of the agreement
announced November 13, 1982. At the same time we must take into
account the interests of specific domestic constituencies, e.g.,
grain, to avoid constant policy oscillations because of domestic
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pressures. At the same time, while we must argue our case with
respect to U.S. agricultural exports, we must also recognize that
the Allies have groups whose interests are analagous to those of
U.S. grain.farmers.
if there is general agreement with the Allies on the need for
control of military-related equipment and technology exports to the
Soviets, there has been no consensus on which of three basic
approaches to the management of East-West economic relations we
should take:
-- The detente policy of the 1970s, postulated that growth in
East-West trade would, over the long term, induce more
responsible Soviet behavior. A condition of this policy
was that Soviet failure to respond as expected could lead
to the withdrawal of benefits. However, the resultant
Soviet appetite for Western equipment, technology and
credits has been turned to Western political and strategic
advantage in only limited ways. Producer pressures and
concern about the ripple effects of a financial squeeze
prevented the West from using trade as political leverage
except for relatively modest measures. Moreover, the
detente policy did not constrain Soviet activities in
Poland and Afghanistan.
-- A second approach starts from the premise that a sustained
strategy of economic diplomacy can limit Soviet options
over the short term and move toward long-term structural
change. This approach recognizes that trade is beneficial
to both sides but must be conducted in a larger strategic
context. It must also be managed so as to minimize Soviet
reverse leverage, and ensure that the West is the net
economic beneficiary.
-- The third approach, would be a virtually total denial of
Western trade and finance with the USSR to force
fundamental changes in the USSR by accelerating a collapse
of the Soviet economy. Such "economic warfare" would most
closely resemble the measures taken by the UK against
Argentina during the Falklands war and is a measure usually
conceived of as one step short of full-scale war. It is
unreasonable and unacceptable to the Allies and unnecessary
to further U.S. objectives.
For now, U.S. policy should be the second approach, building on
the agreement announced November 13, 1982. Such an approach,
although it cannot significantly reduce Soviet freedom of action in
the short term, could affect the Soviet calculation of costs and
benefits of fundamental policy approaches over time. Implementing
such a policy will require extensive consultations with the Allies
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on the relative priority of objectives toward the USSR and on
clarifying common assumptions and approaches. The more emphasis the
U.S. places publicly on internal change in the USSR and on linkage
to Soviet external behavior, the harder it will be to obtain allied
consent. 'Nevertheless, this approach offers the best chance for
building a common understanding with the Allies on the strategic
implications of East-West trade, and a set of basic ground rules and
mechanisms to safeguard Western interests and take long-term
advantage of Soviet economic vulnerabilities.
The longer-term U.S. objective of limiting Soviet options and
encouraging systemic change in the USSR must be pursued even if the
situation in Poland should improve. Building on the foundation
established, the U.S. must continue to engage the Allies in extended
discussions and negotiations to implement common understandings of
the strategic implications of East-West trade. To succeed, our
objectives must be precise, realistic and sustainable, and we must
assure our Allies that we are seeking a balance of benefits and
sacrifices. Agreement has already been reached on some basic
considerations of East-West economic policy: that it does not make
sense to provide the USSR with technology it can use to enhance its
military potential; that it makes no sense to subsidize the Soviet
economy, that the West must not contribute to Soviet strategic
advantage, and that trade must proceed on the basis of a strict
balance of advantages.
These basic understandings create the framework in which the
West can study energy, credits, and technology transfer in the
appropriate fora to set the stage for agreement on a common
approach. The program which would flow from this common approach
should aim at elements, within the Western purview of influence,
currently assisting the Soviet military buildup. These include
principally Western military-related technology, European markets
for Soviet gas and Western subsidized credit. The following
specific measures would make more difficult the decisions the USSR
must make among key priorities in the 1980's:
Enhanced controls through COCOM on the flow of critical
and certain non-critical military items used in the Soviet
military, and critical technology and equipment used in
Soviet defense-priority industries. In the long run,
tighter COCOM restrictions on militarily sensitive
technology would perhaps be the most valuable action
for the West.
-- Developing alternative energy proposals so that the
Europeans eschew additional gas projects and increased
levels of dependency on Soviet energy resources. This
could cause the USSR to lose up to an estimated ten billion
dollars a year in hard-currency earnings in the 1990s.
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Steps to restrict the strategic capabilities of the USSR,
for example, restriction of the export of oil and gas
technology in any future contracts with the USSR. The USSR
depends on the West for specialized oil exploration,
drilling, pumping and processing equipment. Denying all
Western oil equipment and technology would cost the USSR an
estimated ten billion dollars annually for several years,
but a decreasing amount thereafter.
Stricter limits on the terms and volume of government-
supported credits. Eliminating interest subsidies could
cost the Soviets some five hundred million dollars a year.
European acceptance of credit restraints and the need to
end credit subsidies may be a realistic goal over time, and
we may be able to construct a common regime.
Enhance the stature and scope of activities of the OECD and
the NATO Economic Committee in East-West trade analysis and
policy consideration.
Looking to the longer term, we can go either of two ways. If
Soviet behavior should worsen (e.g., an invasion of Poland), we
would need to consider extreme measures such as a total trade
boycott, including grain, in which allied cohesion would be
essential. Should Soviet behavior improve, there is room for
carefully calibrated positive economic signals. These might include
a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts. Such
steps could not alter the direction of U.S. policy or dilute its
objective of making the Soviets pay the price of the defects of
their economic system.
Political Action
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must have an ideological
thrust which clearly demonstrates the superiority of U.S. and Western
values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade
unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive
character of Soviet communism. We should state openly -- as the
President did in the British Parliament -- our belief that people in
communist countries have the right to democratic systems.
In pursuing a more effective strategy of political action, we
must counter the frame of mind that has been cultivated in the West
by years of Communist propaganda -- a frame of mind under whose
logic: opposition to Soviet actions is tantamount to a return to
the "cold war;" any country that has been taken over by a Communist
regime must never be allowed to change its social or political
institutions, whereas the "ideological struggle" must be allowed to
proceed unfettered in all other societies; non-Communist governments
have no choice but to cooperate with the Soviet Union and follow its
initiatives, or face the prospect of a nuclear war that will
terminate human existence.
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To break the mental habits these ideas have fostered, it is
essential that the United States take the offensive in exposing the
bankruptcy of the Communist system, its failure to provide
adequately for the basic needs of its peoples, and its dependence on
the force'of arms for the seizure and retention of political power.
We need to stress that, 65 years after the October Revolution, the
Soviet regime continues to deny its people fundamental human rights
and to pour enormous economic resources into the military sector at
the cost of continuing to fall behind the U.S., the Western
democracies and Japan in agricultural and industrial productivity
and in the provisions of basic economic benefits. In short, the
U.S. must make clear to the world that democracy, not Communism, is
mankind's future.
We must also expose the illegitimate concepts which underlie
Soviet foreign policy. For example, the so-called "Brezhnev
Doctrine" has no basis in international law and violates every
international statement of principles signed by the USSR (including
the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act). The U.S.
must insist as a matter of principle that every country in the
world, Communist and non-Communist alike, be free to change its
system at any time in accord with the desires of its people.
Similarly, we should, in condemning Soviet human rights violations,
reject Soviet attempts to seek refuge behind the principle of
non-interference in other states' internal affiars. Soviet
treatment of political dissidents and "refuseniks," as well as
Moscow's arbitrarily applied restrictions on emigration, contravene
basic moral principles as well as the USSR's own international
obligations, and must be challenged both in public and private fora.
The U.S. must accordingly review and significantly strengthen
its instruments of political action to encourage democratization.
These should include:
The President's London initiative to support democratic
forces: This initiative seeks concrete support for
building democratic institutions such as a free press,
labor unions, political parties, an independent judiciary,
and churches. This will include support for regional
institutes that promote democratic values, and support for
organizations that promote democratic procedures and
principles.
Focus on Soviet human rights violations: The U.S. should
emphasize Soviet responsibility for human rights violations
in Afghanistan and Poland. It should also be a U.S.
objective to emphasize Soviet responsibility for violations
of the human rights of their own population and to improve
means of publicizing these violations.
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U.S. policy should recognize the diversity of Soviet
nationalities and, to the extent of our capabilities,
promote the emergence of a relationship between the ruling
Great Russian nation and non-Russian nationalities that
will impede Soviet imperial expansion and that may force
Moscow to turn its energies inward. This emphasis of our
policy is reflected in formation of an interagency
committee on our policy toward the nationality question in
the USSR.
Broadcasting Policy: Additional resources should be
devoted to the USG's international radio broadcasters --
VOA and FFE/RL -- for broadcasting into the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The U.S. should continue to devote
high priority to finding ways to penetrate and overcome
Soviet jamming of VOA and RFE/RL to a greater extent than
at present. An international technical task force consist-
ing of technical experts from VOA, RFE/RL, BBC and Deutsche
Welle should be established to work together to find
additional ways of dealing with Soviet jamming techniques.
BBC has responded positively to VOA's proposal for such a
task force. RFE/RL should be given access .to USG infor-
mation on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Other Measures: Political action is the least developed of
U.S. tools to influence Soviet policy. The U.S. has done
and is doing much more in the defense and economic areas.
But the potential impact of political measures is so
substantial that much more thought needs to be given to how
to develop them.
2. Geopolitical
a. The Industrial Democracies:
One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy throughout
the post-war period has been and continues to be that an effective
response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among
the industrial democracies. To meet successfully the challenges to
our interests, the U.S. will require stronger and more effective
collective defense arrangements. It will also be important to seek
increased allied support for U.S. efforts to counter security
threats beyond the NATO area. There will continue to be inevitable
tensions between our determination to exercise leadership and our
need for allied support in making policies work. More effective
procedures for consultation with our allies can contribute.to the
building of consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance
disagreements. We must recognize, however, that the U.S. may on
occasion be forced to act to protect its vital interests without
allied support and even in the face of allied opposition; even in
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this event, we should consult to the maximum extent possible with
our allies.
The allies have been slow to support-in concrete ways our overall
approach to East-West relations. In part because of an intensive
program of consultation, allied governments have expressed rhetorical
support for the U.S. assessment of the Soviet military challenge,
the U.S. rearmament program, and U.S. negotiating positions in START
and INF. Less progress has been made in obtaining allied action in
the vital areas of upgrading conventional defense and in gaining
Allied support for military planning to protect vital Western
interests in the developing world, particularly the Persian Gulf.
With INF deployments scheduled to begin in 1983, West European
governments will come under increasing domestic pressure to press
the U.S. for progress in START and INF. If the U.S. cannot obtain
an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow, it may be necessary during
1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives with the allies to
the overriding objective of obtaining allied action to move forward
on INF deployments. Improving conventional defense, however, should
remain a high priority goal.
b. The Third World
As in the 1970s, the Soviet challenge to U.S. interests in the
Third World will continue. Thus, the U.S. must continue efforts to
rebuild the credibility of the U.S. commitment to resist Soviet
encroachment on U.S. interests and those of allies and friends, and
to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to
resist Soviet pressures. The U.S. must where possible erode the
advances of Soviet influence in the developing world made during the
1970s.
Given the continued improvement of Moscow's force projection
capabilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet Third
World clients, any effective U.S. response must involve a military
dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales play
an important role in shaping the security environment around the
periphery of the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security assistance
will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets and to our
friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own military forces
where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and support
endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able to
demonstrate the capability and the will for timely action to bring
U.S. resources to bear in response to fast-moving events in Third
World trouble spots.
An effective U.S. policy in the Third World also depends
critically upon diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the President's
Middle-East proposal, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the
Namibia/Angola initiative) to promote the resolution of regional
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crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. The U.S. should counter,
and if possible weaken or displace, Soviet aid relationships, par-
ticularly those involving states that host a Soviet military presence
or act as Soviet proxies. The U.S. must also develop an appropriate
mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initia-
tives to demonstrate the relevance of the free economies to the eco-
nomic problems of the developing world, while exposing the bankruptcy
of the Soviet economic and political model.
Possibly the greatest obstacle the U.S. faces in carrying out
this approach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining
adequate budgetary resources. As in the case of the rearmament
program, pressures for budgetary restraint are certain to generate
calls for reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet
challenge in the developing world. These pressures must be resisted
if the U.S. is to meet its commitments and secure its vital
interests.
c. Weakening the Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe,
Cuba, Third World Alliances)
As noted above, there are a number of important vulnerabilities
and weaknesses within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek
to exacerbate and exploit. This will involve differentiated
policies that recognize the need for a different mix of tools for
each problem. The U.S. should not accept the notion that, once a
communist or pro-Soviet regime has come to power in a state, this
situation is irreversible. Indeed, U.S. policy should seek wherever
possible both to encourage such states to distance themselves from
the Soviet Union in foreign policy and to move toward democra-
tization domestically.
Eastern Europe: Although the crackdown in Poland cut short a
process of peaceful change there, the continuing instability in that
country is certain to have far-reaching repercussions throughout
Eastern Europe. In addition, the deteriorating economic position
of East European countries and the possible long-term drying up of
Western resources flowing to the region will force them to face some
difficult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative
stagnation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.
The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen
Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of individual
human rights in all countries of the region. The U.S. can advance
these objectives by carefully discriminating in favor of countries
that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign
policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. Our
policies must also make clear that East European countries which
reverse movments of liberalization, or drift away from an
independent stance in foreign policy will incur significant costs in
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their relations with the U.S. Western influence in the region is
limited by Moscow's willingness to use force against developments
which threaten what it perceives as its vital interests. The United
States, however, can have an important impact on the region, provided
it continues to differentiate in its policies toward the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, and among the countries of
Eastern Europe, so as to encourage diversity through political and
economic policies tailored to individual countries. While the
impact of differentiation in some cases may be marginal, it offers
the best vehicle for achieving the primary U.S. goal of weakening
overall Soviet control. This policy of differentiation in Eastern
Europe is the subject of NSDD 54.
Afghanistan: A significant vulnerability in the Soviet empire
is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach has bogged Soviet
forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress the Afghan resis-
tance. A real exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people
and a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan would be perceived
as a major foreign policy defeat for the Soviet Union and thus might
well increase the likelihood that other Third World countries would
resist Soviet pressures. Thus, our objective should be to keep
maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the
Soviets' political, military, and other costs are high while the
occupation continues. In this connection we should redouble our
efforts to focus world attention on Soviet atrocities in
Afghanistan, including the use of chemical weapons.
Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's
alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The
Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as
numerous other problems):
-- Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to Havana: The flow
of advanced Soviet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to
represent a growing threat to the security of other Latin
American countries, U.S. sea lines of communication and, in
the case of potentially nuclear-capable systems, the U.S.
itself. The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to
offset the political/military impact of these deliveries.
-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central
America and the Caribbean Basin: The U.S. response must
involve bilateral economic and military assistance to
friendly governments in the region, as well as multilateral
initiatives to deal with the political, economic, and social
sources of instability. The U.S. should retain the option
of direct action against Cuba, while making clear U.S.
willingness seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana
is willing to reduce its dependence on and cooperation with
the Soviet Union. The U.S. should also take steps to
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prevent or neutralize the impact of transfers of advanced
Soviet weapons to Nicaragua, as well as other arms supplies
being provided to insurgents in the area. Finally, the
U.S. must take steps to counter increasing Cuban activities
and influence in Grenada, Suriname, and Guyana.
-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in southern Africa: The U.S.
should counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by
strengthening relations with friendly African states, and
by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to bring
about a Cuban withdrawal from Angola or, failing that, by
increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa.
Soviet Third World Alliances: The U.S. should seek to weaken
and, where possible, undermine the existing links between the Soviet
Union and its Third World allies and clients. In implementing this
policy, the U.S. will need to take into account the individual
vulnerabilities of Soviet Third World allies and the unique
circumstances which influence the degree of cohesion between them
and the Soviet Union. In some cases, these ties are so strong as to
make the Third World state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the
Soviet Union. The U.S. should be prepared to work with allies and
Third World friends to neutralize the activities of these Soviet
proxies. In other cases, ties between the Soviet Union and a Third
World client may be tenuous or subject to strains which a nuanced
U.S. policy can exploit to move the Third World state away from the
Soviet orbit. U.S. policy should be flexible enough to take
advantage of these opportunities.
Finally, the U.S. should seek where possible and prudent to
encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political
change inside these countries. In this connection, the U.S. must
develop the means to extend U.S. support to individuals and
movements in the developing world that share the U.S. commitment to
political democracy and individual freedom. Long-term political
cadre and organization building programs, long a strongly emphasized
instrument of Soviet policy, must become a regular, and more
developed, part of U.S. policy.
d. China
The United States views China as a country with which we are not
allied, but with which we share common interests. China continues
to support our efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against
Soviet expansionism, and its perception of the Soviets as the number
one threat to world peace influences its policies in various areas.
The PRC has supported the Khmer coalition effort and provided
supplies and equipment to the resistance forces, mainly'the 1-imer
Rouge, which is the most effective armed resistance to the Soviet-
supported Vietnam occupation of Kampuchea. It ties down at least
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half as many North Vietnamese (500,000) in northern Vietnam as it
ties down Soviet troops along the entire Soviet border and in
Mongolia. It openly stresses the importance of improved Japanese
defense efforts and close US-Japan relations, works hard to reduce
Soviet influence in North Korea and to restrain Kim Il-sung, and
provides military and economic aid to Pakistan. And it also
provides defense-related equipment to Egypt and some military
assistance to Syria, Iraq, the Yemens, and Somalia in an effort to
reduce Soviet influence.
US-China relations have cooled over the past year as both
countries have struggled with the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
In moving forward now to develop renewed dialogue, the U.S. aim
should be, over time, to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and
policy coordination. In this regard, the U.S. will continue to
pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer in
keeping with Presidentially approved policy, which states that, "Our
strategic interests dictate the preservation of China as an effective
counterweight to growing Soviet military power and the strengthening
of strategic cooperation with China." The U.S. will also be willing
to consider the sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case
basis within the carefully constructed parameters of the policy
approved by the President in 1981.
As the U.S. develops these policies, it will be essential to
take into account developments in Sino-Soviet relations. The
renewal of state-to-state dialogue between Beijing and Moscow may
indicate a desire on the part of both parties to moderate some
aspects of their competition, although it is not likely to result in
restoration of anything approaching the Sino-Soviet cooperation of
the 1950s. While the U.S. should not attempt directly to influence
the Sino-Soviet dialogue, it must conduct its policies toward Moscow
and Beijing in a way that will maintain and strengthen China's
posture as a counterweight to Soviet expansionism. In this
connection, it will be important that the Chinese perceive no
weakening of U.S. determination to resist Soviet aggression. We
must also continue to develop bilateral ties with China. US-China
trade has expanded fivefold since normalization in 1979. China is
now the United States' 14th largest trading partner and fourth
largest market for agricultural products. Bilateral exchanges in
the areas of culture, science, and technology have expanded
rapidly. Each year, for example, approximately 9,000 Chinese study
in the U.S. and some 100,000 Americans visit China.
e. Yugoslavia
Of all the countries in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia is the only
one in the post-war years that has been able to maintain its indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union. It is U.S. policy to support the
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia.
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Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have
increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The USSR has for
years been a major supplier of crude oil to Yugoslavia, and now
supplies. about half its needs. With Yugoslavia now desperately
short of hard currency needed to buy oil elsewhere, the Soviet Union
is clearly in a position to apply increased pressure on the GOY.
USSR now accounts for over one third of Yugoslavia's exports. The
Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to
reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our
interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic
situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure.
We are, therefore, addressing the possibility of putting together a
multinational financial assistance package to help Yugoslavia solve
its current foreign exchange difficulties and set the country on the
road to long-term structural economic reform.
3. Bilateral Relationships
Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of
US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral
relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort
to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.
a. Arms Control
Arms control negotiations and agreements, pursued soberly and
without illusions, are an important part of overall U.S. national
security policy. The U.S. should be willing to enter into arms
control negotiations and seek agreements when they serve national
security objectives. At the same time, arms control agreements are
not an end in themselves but are, in combination with continued
efforts by the U.S. and its Allies to maintain the military balance,
an important means for enhancing national security and global
stability. The U.S. must make clear to the allies as well as to the
USSR that our ability to reach satisfactory results will inevitably
be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of
US-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual
agrement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gain. It
should not be assumed that ongoing arms control negotiations will
give the U.S. leverage sufficient to produce Soviet restraint on
other international issues.
U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary
force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, sig-
nificant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable
armaments. The START and INF proposals the U.S. has tabled meet
these criteria and would, if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure
the survivability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the viability of
NATO's conventional defenses, and thus enhance the national security
of the U.S. and its Allies and reduce the risk of war. While the
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commencement of these negotiations served somewhat to reduce public
pressure on the U.S. and on Allied Governments for early arms control
agreements with Moscow, in the absence of progress in START and INF
such pressures can be expected to grow. This is particularly rele-
vant in INF as the deployment dates for Pershing II and GLCMs in
Europe draw nearer.
b. Official Dialogue
The Soviets will continue to press us for a return to a US-Soviet
agenda centered on arms control. The U.S. must continue to resist
this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S.
concerns about Soviet international behavior and internal humap
rights violations if our relations are to improve. US-Soviet
diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if
they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior
and to drive home that the U.S. will act to ensure that the costs of
irresponsibility are high. The U.S. can also use such contacts to
make clear that the way to pragmatic solutions of regional problems
is open if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At
the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid
offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions which it
would not otherwise secure.
Dialogue at Foreign Minister Level: A continuing dialogue with
the Soviets at the level of Foreign Minister facilitates necessary
diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to
maintain allied understanding and support for the U.S. approach to
East-West relations. Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three
occasions between September 1981 and June 1982, and Secretary Shultz
met with Gromyko in September 1982. This pattern of frequent
Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the future.
Summitry: The question of a possible US-Soviet summit will
continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and important
segments of domestic opinion. Every American President since
Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In some
cases, U.S. Presidents have attended summits for the purpose of
establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g., Kennedy
in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement in US-
Soviet relations would flow from the summit. In other cases, allied
pressures for East-West dialogue at the Head of State level have
played a major role in the Presidential decision to meet at the
summit (e.g., Eisenhower at Geneva and Paris).
The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout t_he 1970s
held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet
counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready to
serve as the centerpeice of the summit. However, these summits did
not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations, and
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sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by generating
expectations that could not be realized.
A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart
should be considered if beneficial results could be expected. Such
a meeting would not necessarily involve signature of major new US-
Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum
possible impact with Allies and the U.S. public, while making clear
to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations
depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes
must not be understood to signal such improvement.
The substance of a summit agenda would, of course, have to be
determined in light of circumstances at the time. However, among
the issues which should figure prominently would be those on which
we have already engaged the Soviets at lower levels, including:
-- Arms control issues (e.g., initiatives in START, INF, MBFR
or in other areas such as reduction of defense budgets).
-- Regional issues (e.g., Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Soviet willingness to permit or encourage relaxation of
repression in Poland, Soviet cooperation with Namibia/Angola
settlement involving Cuban withdrawal from Angola, reduction
or cessation of Soviet support for Vietnamese and Cuban
aggression).
-- Human Rights (e.g., significant increase in emigration,
reduction of repression Soviet dissidents, cessation of
jamming of foreign radios).
A summit might also play a critical role in shoring up Allied
support for a common East-West strategy. Therefore such a meeting
should be timed to achieve the maximum possible positive impact in
terms of U.S. interests with our Allies as well as the Soviets.
US-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of US-Soviet
cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges
should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong
ideological component in our relations with Moscow. The U.S. should
not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those
exchanges which have the potential for advancing our objective of
promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be
expanded. At the same time, a greater effort is needed to secure
full reciprocity and to encourage our allies to do so as well).
This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official
framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate
arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal
access to the Soviet Union. As we develop exchanges, U.S. policy
must also take into account the necessity to restrict transfers of
sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union.
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B. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our
Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior
The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion
and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself
cannot be accomplished quickly. Our success in managing US-Soviet
relations during the next five to ten years may well determine
whether we are able to attain our long-term objectives. Despite the
long-term vulnerabilities of the Soviet system, we can expect that
Soviet military power will continue to grow throughout the 1980s.
Moreover, the Soviet Union will have every incentive to prevent the
U.S. from reversing the trends of the last decade which have seen an
unprecedented growth of Soviet military power relative to that of
the U.S. Thus, the coming 5-10 years will be a period of consider-
able uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by
continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which this
Administration finds unacceptable.
These uncertainties, moreover, will be exacerbated by the fact
that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process
of political succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot pre-
dict with confidence what policies Brezhnev's successors will adopt.
Consequently, the U.S. should not seek to adjust policies to the
Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives
(positive and negative) for any new leadership to adopt policies
less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. posture should be one
of a willingness to deal, on the basis of the policy approach set
forth since the beginning of the Administration, with whichever
leadership group emerges. The U.S. should underscore that it
remains ready for improved US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union
makes significant changes in policies of concern to us; the burden
for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on
Moscow.
Throughout the coming decade, the U.S. rearmament program will
be subject to the uncertainties of the budget process and the U.S.
domestic debate on national security. In addition, U.S. reassertion
of leadership with allies, while necessary for the long-term
revitalization of U.S. alliances, is certain to create periodic
intra-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with oppor-
tunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the credi-
bility of U.S. commitments in the Third World will also depend upon
our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources, despite
budgetary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints on the
U.S. capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will be
accompanied by real limits on the U.S. capacity to use the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship as leverage to restrain Soviet behavior.
The existing and projected gap between finite resources and the
level of capabilities needed to implement strategy for US-Soviet
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relations makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm priorities
for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the
greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2) mobilize the
resources of allies and friends which are willing to join with the
U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power.
U.S. Priorities
Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a
strong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of
potential conflicts and guided by a well-conceived political and
military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter
attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or
other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should
deterrence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests, as in
the past, on a strong U.S. military capability. Strategic nuclear
forces remain a crucial element of that capability, but the
importance of other forces -- nuclear and conventional -- has risen
in the current era of strategic nuclear parity.
Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding
Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protec-
tion of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation
with allied and other states and greater utilization of their
resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated with
national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense programs
must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.
U.S. military strategy for successfully contending with peacetime,
crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a global
basis is detailed in NSSD 32. This military strategy must be com-
bined with a political strategy focused on the following objectives:
Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the
Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise
strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the
multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will
require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account and
also that U.S. allies take into equal account U.S. concerns.
In this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies
to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious
effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with
U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization
plans. The U.S. must also develop, together with the
allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic
relations consistent with the U.S. policy outlined in this
study.
Building and sustaining a major ideological/political
offensive which, together with other efforts, will be
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designed to bring about evolutionary change inside the
Soviet Union itself. This must be a long-term and
sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet
system.
Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its
position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S.
continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context
of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same
time, the U.S. should keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal
and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high..
Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical
Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require
both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with
moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense
commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit
a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a
longer term increase in diversity and independence
throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S.
continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its
behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S.
maintain a policy of differentiation among East European
countries.
Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and
efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet
rapprochement.
Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national
security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.
This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instru-
ments, including diplomatic efforts and security and
economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option
of use of its military forces to protect vital security
interests against threats which may arise from the
Soviet-Cuban connection.
C. Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public
and Congressional Support
The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is
unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with
the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in
our effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to.mount
for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important
segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" US-Soviet
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relationship, particularly in response to the ongoing political
transition in the Soviet Union. This is inevitable given the
historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in
foreign affairs.
It is therefore essential that the American people understand
and support U.S. policy. This will require that U.S. statements and
actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term
progress in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must
demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an
open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search
for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet
relations.
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