DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION BILL

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 25, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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s 61-r
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Policy and Plans Staff/OS
ATTENTION:
FROM:
Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
25 July 1989
OCA 2603-89
STAT SUBJECT: Department of State Authorization Bill
STAT
STAT
STAT
1. Attached for your information are relevant portions of
S. 1160, the Department of State Authorization Bill, which was
passed by the Senate on 20 July 1989. I have also attached a copy
of relevant portions of the Congressional Record for 20 July,
wherein, Senator Helms introduced a floor amendment to repeal
section 133 of S. 1160, which would maintain current law pertainin
to the Moscow Embassy. As you are aware, this amendment passed.
2. Since the House previously passed its version of the State
Authorization Bill, the next action will be for House and Senate
conferees to meet on this bill. No date has been announced.
Attachments
STAT
OCA/LEG
(25 July
89)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/atts)
STAT
1 - OCA Records (w/atts)
1 - D/OCA (w/o atts)
1 - OCA/LEG/Subject File: State Authorization (w/att)
1 - Signer (w/o att)
1 - OCARead Library
COFI
TIAL
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STAT
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? ?
as the Secre-
1
;de?
2
'or the estab-
3
' funding, ad-
s tandards for
;; and
the feasibility
a, fund,
counts, or
the program;
echanisms for
r direct corn-
,
y from crimi-
Lntry of that
_) of the enact-
iii submit the
ariate commit-
31
SEC. 132. UNITED STATES-SOVIET RECIPROCITY IN MATTERS
RELATING TO EMBASSIES.
Section 153(b) of Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
4 Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-204) is
5 amended by striking out "until the United States mission in
6 Kiev is able to occupy secure permanent facilities" and in-
7 serting in lieu thereof "except on the basis of reciprocity as to
8 the establishment by the United States of a consulate in
9 Kiev"
10 SEC. 133. UNITED STATES-SOVIET EMBASSY AGREEMENT.
11 Section 151 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
12 Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-204), is
13 amended to read as follows:
14 "SEC. 151. UNITED STATES-SOVIET EMBASSY AGREEMENT.
15 "(a) RESTRICTION.?The Soviet Union shall not be
16 permitted to occupy the new chancery building on Mount
17 Alto in Washington, District of Columbia, unless and until
18 the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House
19 of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on
20 Foreign Relations of the Senate that-
21 "(1) there is completed a new chancery building
22 for use by the United States Embassy in Moscow
23 which can be safely and securely used for its intended
24 purpose; and
25 "(2) all feasible steps have or will be taken to
26 eliminate the damage to the national security of the
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32
1 United States due to electronic surveillance from
2 Soviet facilities on Mount Alto.
3 "(b) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.?Not later than six
4 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Presi-
5 dent shall terminate the Agreement Between the Govern-
6 ment of the United States and the Government of the Union
7 of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reciprocal Allocation for
8 Use Free of Charge of Plots of Land in Moscow and Wash-
9 ington (signed at Moscow, May 16, 1969), and related agree-
10 ments, notes, and understandings unless he certifies to the
11 Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of
12 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the
13 Soviet use of the facility on Mount Alto does not pose a sig-
14 nificantly greater threat to the national security of the United
15 States than the potential or actual threat from Soviet use for
16 espionage of existing Soviet facilities in Washington, District
17 of Columbia.
18 "(c) WAWER.?The President may waive subsection (b)
19 if he determines that it is in the vital national security inter-
20 est of the United States to do so and reports in writing to the
21 Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of
22 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, together
23 with a detailed explanation, in suitably classified form, of the
24 reasons for making this waiver.".
OS 1160 PCS
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leillance from
later than six
tion, the Presi-
m the Govern-
nt of the Union
al Allocation for
,cow and Wash-
related agree-
certifies to the
the chairman of
Senate that the
?s not pose a sig-
rity of the United
pm Soviet use for
,nington, District
Live subsection (b)
nal security inter-
s in writing to the
nd the chairman of
e Senate, together
Lssified form, of the
33
1 SEC. 134. CHILD CARE FACILITIES AT CERTAIN POSTS
2 ABROAD.
3 Section 31 of the State Department Basic Authorities
4 Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2684) is amended by adding at the
5 end thereof the following new subsection:
6 "(e) The Secretary of State may make grants to child
7 care facilities, to offset in part the cost of such care, in
8 Moscow and at no more than five other posts abroad where
9 the Secretary determines that due to extraordinary circum-
10 stances such facilities are necessary to the efficient operation
11 of the post. In making that determination, the Secretary shall
12 take into account factors such as-
13 "(1) whether Foreign Service spouses are encour-
14 aged to work at the post because-
15 "(A) the number of members of the post is
16 subject to a ceiling imposed by the receiving
17 country; and
18 "(B) Foreign Service nationals are not em-
19 ployed at the post; and
20 "(2) whether local child care is available.".
21 SEC. 135. STATE DEPARTMENT CONTRACTOR EXEMPTION TO
22 POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT.
23 Section 7 of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
24 1988 (Public Law 100-347) is amended by-
25 (1) redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f), as
26 subsections (e), (f), and (g); and
S 1160 PCS---3
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1 (2) adding at the end thereof the following new
2 subparagraph:
3 "(d) DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTRACTORS EXEMP-
4 TION.?Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the
5 administration, by the Department of State, in the perform-
6 ance of any counterintelligence function, of any lie detector
7 test, administered under regulations implementing the De-
8 partment's polygraph program, to any individual under con-
9 tract to the Department of State or any employee of a con-
10 tractor or subcontractor of the Department of State, who is
11 engaged in the performance of any work under that contract
12 or subcontract.".
13 SEC. 136. USE OF CLEARED PERSONNEL TO ENSURE SECURE
14 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DIPLOMATIC
15 FACILITIES ABROAD.
16 (a) IN GENERAL.?Title IV of the Omnibus Diplomatic
17 Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 is amended by
18 adding at the end thereof the following new section:
19 "SEC. 415. USE OF CLEARED PERSONNEL TO ENSURE SECURE
20 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DIPLOMATIC
21 FACILITIES ABROAD.
22 "(a) POLICIES AND REGULATIONS.?The Secretary of
23 State shall develop and implement policies and regulations to
24 provide for the use of persons who have been granted an
25 appropriate United States security clearance to ensure that
OS 1160 PCS
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e following new
CTORS Exp-
3d to prohibit the
, in the perform-
any lie detector
nenting the De-
idual under con-
iployee of a con-
of State, who is
der that contract
ENSURE SECURE
OF DIPLOMATIC
nibus Diplomatic
is amended by
section:
ENSURE SECURE
OF DIPLOMATIC
The Secretary of
ind regulations to
been granted an
3e to ensure that
35
1 the security of areas intended for the storage of classified
2 materials or the conduct of classified activities in a United
3 States diplomatic mission or consular post abroad is no corn-
4 promised in the performance of maintenance and repair serv-
5 ices in those areas.
6 "(b) STUDY AND REPORT.?The Secretary of State
7 shall conduct a study of the feasibility and necessity of requir-
8 ing that, in the case of certain United States diplomatic facili-
9 ties abroad, no contractor shall be hired to perform mainte-
10 nance or repair services in an area intended for the storage of
11 classified materials or the conduct of classified activities
12 unless such contractor has been granted an appropriate
13 United States security clearance. Such study shall include
14 but is not limited to United States facilities located in Cairo,
15 New Delhi, Riyadh, and Tokyo. Not later than 180 days
16 after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary
17 of State shall report the results of such a study to the Com-
18 znittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
19 on Foreign Affairs of the House.".
20 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO TABLE OF CON-
21 TENTS.?The table of contents for the Omnibus Diplomatic
22 Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 is amended by insert-
23 ing after the item relating to section 414 the following new
24 item:
"Sec. 415. Use of cleared personnel to ensure secure maintenance and repair of
diplomatic facilities abroad.".
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S 84IS CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE July 20, 1989
(1) Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica is
to be commended for his proposal and fur
his commitment to the war on drugs: and
(2) the United States should work if possi-
ble through multilateral organizations to
determine the feasibility of such force and
assist in the establishment of this force, lift
Is found to be feasible and consiAent with
the United States Constitution.
- (c) AUTHORIZATION OP FUNDING.?Funds
authorised to be appropriated under this
bill for any United Nations program, may be
reallocated for a program to establish an
international strike force for international
narcotics control under multilateral auspic-
es. Such reallocation may occur only if the
Committee on Foreign Aft airs and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Rouse of
Representatives, and the Committee on For-
eign Relations and the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the Senate, are notified at
least 15 days in advance of the obligation of
funds. in accordance with the procedures ap-
plicable to reprogramming notifications
under section 634A of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICLat. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President. I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICrag. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
4,1.ZENDICENT NO. 355
(Purpose: To strike the provision of the bill
A4iiiiincern1ng Moscow Embassy, thereby
-sigislintaining current law)
AW.r..-HELMS Mr. President, I call up
amendment No. 355, which is at the
desk.
The PRESIDING OFFI(.hH. The
clerk will-report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Carolina Udr.
Hums) proposed amendment No. 355.
On page 31, strike line 10 through line 24
on page 32. .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
This amendment strikes section 133
of S. 1160. It is still a pressing need for
the United States to have a secure,
safe Embassy in the capital of the
Soviet Union. The United States does
not have a safe and secure Embassy.
The fact remains that most of the ex-
perts believe that the new Moscow
Chancery is riddled with Soviet bug-
ging technology and ought to be bull-
dozed.
Unfortunately, an opposition opin-
ion is held by the State Department.
Mr. President, as I understand it, the
State Department is not contending
that the new U.S. Embassy complex in
Moscow is safe and secure.
What the State Department is con-
tending is that it does not matter
whether it is or not. The pending
amendment returns us to current law,
which was approved by the Senate in
an amendment offered by Senator
SYMMS during consideration of the
State Department authorization bill
back in 1987. The overwhelming will
of Congress at that time was not to
open or occupy the new but insecure
embassy. I believe that was also the
will of the overwhelming majority of
the American people.
Mr. President, there is no convincing
evidence that the situation has im-
proved in the past 2 years. In fact, ac-
cording to the New York Times on
July 16, 1989, a report of the Senate
Intelligence Committee strongly sup-
ports the concept of current law.
Namely, the Intelligence Committee
report says there is no hope to fix or
otherwise make the new embassy com-
plex in Moscow safe and secure.
The amendment strikes section 133
of the bill before us today. It calls for
the United States not to move into the
heavily bugged Moscow Embassy com-
pound. It also provides that the Sovi-
ets cannot use the extraordinarily de-
sirable facilities granted them by the
State Department on Mount Alto in
Washington, DC, until the United
States has a new and secure facility to
use in Moscow.
The situation has not improved to
allow us to rethink the 1987 position.
earlier this year the State Department
merely recommended another study of
the Embassy?bugs and all.
In the committee bill-, section 133
provides new language on the Moscow
Embassy that some Senators might
think is an improvement over just an-
other study. Unfortunately, the provi-
sions of S. 1160 do nothing that makes
this Senator believe it will solve the
Moscow Embassy-Mount Alto mess. -
Section 133, as reported, clsirns to
keep the Soviets from occupying
Mount Alto until the President, certi-
fies that there is a safe, secure Embas-
sy in Moscow. The certification also
requires that all feasible steps be
taken, now and in the future, to elimi-
nate damage to national security due
to electronic spying from Mount Alto.
Mr. President, the fact is that the
Soviets are already occupying Mount
Alto, and microwaves are bombarding
all of us at this very moment.
A second part of section 133 before
us today conditions the embassy agree-
ment between America and the Soviets
on whether Mount Alto poses a signifi-
cantly greater threat to United States
national security than the potential or
actual threat from the Soviets at their
old Embassy on 16th Street. It seems
to me that you would need a smart
lawyer or an astrologer to make such a
determination.
One final and puzzling element that
troubles this Senator is the provision
of section 133 that the President can
waive any of his findings about an in-
secure embassy or the Mount Alto
KGB headquarters if he determines it
is in the vital national security inter-
est of the United States to do so.
Let's consider that a moment, Mr.
President. Suppose President Bush
makes such a determination?agreeing
with the report sent to him by the
Senate's own Intelligence Committee?
that the Moscow Embassy is hopeless-
ly insecure.
He can still make a finding to permit
the United States to move into a
bugged embsssy in Moscow and if he
determines that Mount Alto is an ex-
cellent Soviet listening post, he can
still permit the Soviets to move into
Mount Alto. ?
Now I ask all Senators to consider
that provision of the law?which is
also in current law. The Congress
must give the President the ability to
be prudently responsible. Conditions
may change?although in this matter
it is hard to imagine how they would
change that would make a bugged em-
bassy or a new Soviet spy headquar-
ters acceptable.
Perhaps some Americans who are
swept up in the euphoria of Mr. Gor-
bachev's international propaganda
campaign believe that assuring a
secure Embassy in Moscow or limiting
Soviet spying in this country might
offend the Soviet President and his as-
sociates.
Decisions in the Senate?and
throughout representative govern-
ment?often involve hard choices. Mr.
President, I ask Senators whether?in
the short and the long run, the United
States is better off holding its anger
and doing nothing? I think not.
I think Senators will see the wisdom
of the amendment to strike section 133
and return to current law.
The language in section 133, as re-
ported, is practically as permeable as
the walls and ceilings of the new Em-
bassy compound in Moscow. It is
maybe slightly better than another
study, but it has the same result:
America might be stuck with an
unsafe, insecure embassy while Soviet
moving vans are permitted to roll into
Mount Alto.
Let's live in the real world. The
Senate was right to approve the cur-
rent law language in 1987, and the
Senate must act again to make sure
that a international security scandal is
stopped.
Mr. President, for reasons that are
not especially clear to this Senator,
the State Depatment is prepared to
move into the new Embassy site in
Moscow in spite of the bugs that are
crammed into every corner of the
building.
An article in the New York Times of
July 18, 1989, page 11, entitled. "Bush
Is Warned on Bugged Moscow Embas-
sy" should be enough to make all Sen-
ators share my worry about the State
Department's position.
The articles refers to "unusually
blunt language" in a report of the
Senate Intelligence Committee to
President Bush that "any decision
against tearing down the new Ameri-
can Embassy building in Moscow in-
vites 'security disaster' for which
President Bush would be responsible."
As all Senators know, S. 1160, the
State Department authorization bill,
contains language so vague and con-
fused that it would make it very diffi-
cult for President Bush to continue in
-
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zu, J.Yt5.Y CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 84.19
? .flo.
the tradition set by President Reagan,
who ordered the Embassy building to
be torn down.
It is for this rea.son that the best
course of action is to return to current
law, enacted in 1987 but suspended by
the Appropriations Committee at the
request of the State Department
before it could come into effect.
Returning briefly to the Intelli-
gence's Committee report, as cited in
the New York Times, it is quoted as
saying that to permit the United
States to move into the new Embassy
complex would "confirm signs that the
executive branch is incapable of effec-
tive action in this field."
Not surprisingly, Mr. President, the
Intelligence Committee report lashes
out at the State Department for its
failure to cooperate with the newly
created Security Evaluation Organiza-
tion to examine eavesdropping tech-
niques and correct them. The Times
article quotes an unnamed State De-
partment official as saying they are
not cooperating because it would cut
Into their turf.
In other words, Mr. President, the
State Department is still playing
games on diplomatic security ques-
tions?most especially regarding the
Embassy complex in Moscow.
The Senate can choose one of two
courses of action: Either we go along
with the vague and contradictory lan-
guage in S. 1160?which is described
clearly and well in the Additional
Views filed with this bill?or we return
to current law enacted in 1987.
WHAT CDRRENT LAW PROVIDES
Section 151 of the State Department
authorization bill, enacted 2 years ago,
has eight findings which I think the
Senate must consider today. Have con-
ditions improved? Here are the find-
ings, in a brief form, and I ask Sena-
tors to consider this question for
themselves.
First, that the Soviet regime ''has in-
tentionally and substantially violated
international agreements ? ? ' con-
cerning the establishment and oper-
ation of a new United States Embas-
sy." Mr. President, that situation re-
mains the same.
Second, Mr. President, "the Soviet
Government's actions constitute a ma-
terial violation of international law
and a substantial default in perform-
ar.ce under the contract for construc-
tion" for the new Embassy, and that
the United States "is entitled to claim
appropriate compensation." This is
the same too.
Third, that because of Soviet ac-
tions, United States personnel "cannot
pursue their official duties in confi-
dence." And this is certainly the mean-
:jug of the Intelligence Committee's
rt to President Bush.
ourth, that the Soviet regime has
7taken steps to impair the full and
Vroper use of the present United
tes Embassy in Moscow."
Fifth, that because of Soviet viola-
, "the United States Is entitled to
te, in whole or in part," the
United States-Soviet Embassy Agree-
ment. I believe this is still the case.
Sixth, that termination of these
agreements may affect "rights and
privileges [regarding] I ? ' a new
Soviet Embassy" in Washington.
Seventh, that the new Soviet Embas-
sy complex on Mount Alto in Wash-
ington, DC, "creates serious concerns
with respect to electronic surveillance
and potential damage to the damage
to the national security of the United
States." Mr. President, I am sure that
few Senators would deny this.
And lastly, the current law found
that it was essential to protect vital
national security interests by termi-
nating "Embassy agreements in view
of substantial and international Soviet
breaches thereof, unless the threat to
the national security posed by adher-
ence to those agreements can be over-
come."
Mr. President, let me put it clearly,
the American people, based on its
? track record on this topic, cannot trust
the State Department on this score?
and that is the message of the Intelli-
gence Committee report.
And so, Mr. President, current law
directs the President to withdraw from
the Soviet-American Embassy Agree-
ment unless he can certify to the fol-
lowing conditions.
Once again, let me tick off the condi-
tions that the President must certify
In order to waive current law.
No. 1 is that the President must de-
termine that "it is vital to the national
security of the United States not to
withdraw from the agreement."
Next, that "steps have been or will
be taken that will ensure that the new
chancery building ? ? in Moscow can
be safely and securely used ? ?
Finally, that steps "have been or will
be taken to eliminate" within 2 years
after enactment?in other words,
now?"damage to the national security
of the United States due to electronic
surveillance from Soviet facilities on
Mount Alto."
Mr. President, the issue could not be
clearer. In the light of our experience
regarding the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, and in light of the Intelligence
Committee report, I ask all Senators
to look carefully at section 133 of S.
1160, found on pages 31 and 32 of the
legislation before us.
I would be tempted to say this word-
ing is silly, except that the topic of the
Moscow Embassy and Mount Alto is
deadly serious.
As we did with current law, Mr.
President, let us examine what S. 1160
would have us do unless it is stricken.
First, it says the Soviets cannot
move into Mount Alto unless and until
the President certifies to two things:
That there is a safe and secure chan-
cery in Moscow and that all feasible
steps have been or will be taken to
eliminate the damage to the national
security of the United States due to
spying from Mount Alto.
This is pretty neutral language, Mr.
President, not nearly as tough as cur-
rent law. But then part (b) of section
133 adds that the President may
permit the Soviets to use Mount Alto
that, "Soviet use of the facility on
Mount Alto does not pose a signifi-
cantly greater threat to the national
security of the United States than the
actual or potential threat from Soviet
use for espionage of existing Soviet fa-
cilities in Washington, DC."
I have tried and tried to figure out
what this qualification means, Mr.
President. For the life of me, it looks
as if this provision of S. 1160 is saying
that unless there is a hugh difference
In the spying the Soviets can conduct
from Mount Alto, the President may
permit them to move in. ?
How do you measure this capacity
and how would the President deter-
mine this? It is confusing and vague?
and current law is much more solid.
Then we get to the most bizarre pro-
vision of section 133, at the bottom of
page 32, Mr. President.
It states, as this Senator reads it,
that even if the President finds the
Moscow Embassy complex is insecure
and even if Mount Alto's spying is ex-
tremely dangerous, he can determine
that it is in the "vital national security
interests of the United States" to
move in anyway, or to let the Soviets
use Mount Alto.
Mr. President, there is no sensible al-
ternative to current law. Section 133
of S. 1160 must be striken from this
legislation so that we can turn back to
It. We may not be able to control what
the Appropriations Committee wants
to do on the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, but the Senate must be clear and
firm?Moscow is not secure, Mount
Alto is a threat and the time for action
was 2 years ago, not now.
Think what benefits there would
have been if current law had been car-
ried out. But thanks to the State De-
partment's evasion and a weak posi-
tion by some members of the Appro-
priations Committee, there is no alter-
native.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article from the New
York Times of July 16, 1989, be print-
ed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[Prom The New York Times. July 16, 1989)
BUSH IS WARNED ON BUGGED MOSCOW
EMBASSY
By Stephen Engelberg)
WASHINGTON. July I5.?In unusually blunt
language, the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee has warned the Bush Administration
that any decision against tearing down the
new American Embassy building in Moscow
invites a "security disaster" for which Presi-
dent Bush would be responsible.
President Reagan ordered the demolition
of the building last year after concluding
that American intelligence could not be cer-
tain of neutralizing the eavesdropping
system implanted during its construction.
Secretary of States James A. Baker 3d has
told Congress that the Bush Administration
Is reassessing the Issue. State Department
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE July 20, 1989
officials have said that options under study
Include rebuilding the top stories of the
building or limiting the nearly completed
structure to unclassified activities.
IMPACT ON RUSH DELIBMAT/ONS
The Intelligence Committee's views, in a
report accompanying the 1990 intelligence
budget authorization, add a significant ele-
ment to the Administration's deliberations.
Under a law enacted last year. no money
can be spent on Moscow embassy construc-
tion without permission from House and
Senate appropriations committees. While
the Senate intelligence panel Is adamant
that the building be torn down, Representa-
tive Neal Smith, the Iowa Democrat who is
chairman of the House appropriations sub-
committee, opposes demolition.
State Department officials said they could
not comment on the report because they
had not read it.
The committee's report said a reversal of
President Reagan's decision would "confirm
signs that the executive branch is incapable
of effective action in this field.
?The President and the National Security
Council. as well as the Secretary of State,
would share responsibi1it3s"
Oa a separate issue, the committee's
report includes legislation requiring that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation handle
espionage investigations involving American
?Menai assigned to embassies abroad. The
provision appears in part to be a reaction to
the widely assailed inquiry by the Naval In-
vestigative Service into espionage by Marine
guards in Moscow.
CONCERN ON EMBASSY SECURITY
The committee's report is also sharply
critical of the State Department's efforts to
Improve embassy security, disclosing that
the department has failed to implement any
of the measures proposed by the Reagan
Administration in 1987.
A panel headed by former Defense Secre-
tary James R. Schlesinger issued a report on
the new Moscow embassy that said the lis-
tening devices could be combatted if the top
floors were destroyed and a six-story annex
was constructed at a cost of $35 million.
The Senate Intelligence Committee's
report says these reviews produced a con-
sensus within the Reagan Administration in
1987 for reforms, none of which have yet
been implemented.
The report was most critical of the State
Department's response to the newly created
Security Evaluation Organization, which re-
ports directly to the Director of Central In-
telligence on embassy matters.
The organization was to be a place where
a select group of State Department officials
with the highest security clearances would
be given full access to American techniques
for eavesdropping and other black arts.
The report says the State Department has
refused to assign the necessary personnel to
the office or to coordinate its own security
work with it.
DISTRIBUTING THE BLAME
According to the report, the failure of the
office to achieve its objectives can also be
attributed to intelligence officals, who have
refused to meet "legitimate State Depart-
ment concerns on certain matters." A Gov-
ernment official said this included the State
Department officials' refusal to undergo the
C.I.A.'s polygraph, or lie detector, exam on
so-called life style questions.
State Department officials have said they
are not fully cooperating with the new
office because they think it encroaches on
the Secretary of State's authority to handle
embassy security.
Mr. SYMMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICE:. The
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. SYNists. I wish to praise the dis-
tinguished ranking Republican on the
committee, Senator HELMs. for this
amendment, I concur with what he is
trying to accomplish in the amend-
ment.
I might just say to my colleagues
that the Intelligence Committee, ac-
cording to the New York Times on
July 16, has urged that the bugged
Embassy in Moscow not be occupied,
and I do believe that all Senators here
are aware of what the security' risks at
the Moscow Embassy are to this coun-
try.
It seems that the prudent careful
course of action to take tonight would
be to accept the amendment of the
Senator. from North Carolina and see
where we are next year.
The articles refers to "unusually
blunt language" in a report of the
Senate intelligence Committee to
President Bush that "any decision
against tearing down the new Ameri-
can Embassy building in Moscow in-
vites 'security disaster' for which
President Bush would be responsible."
As all Senators know, S. 1160, the
State Department authorization bill,
contains language so vague and con-
fused that it would make it very diffi-
cult for President Bush to continue in
the tradition set by President Reagan,
who ordered the embassy building to
be torn down.
It is for this reason that the best
course of action is to return to current
law, enacted in 1987 but suspended by
the Appropriations Committee at the
request of the State Department
before it could come into effect.
Returning briefly to the Intelli-
gence's Committee report, as cited in
the New York Times, it is quoted as
saying that to permit the United
States to move into the new embassy
complex would "confirm signs that the
executive branch is incapable of effec-
tive action in this field."
Not surprisingly, Mr. President, the
Intelligence Committee report lashes
out at the State Department for its
failure to cooperate with the newly
created Security Evaluation Organiza-
tion to examine eavesdropping tech-
niques and correct them. The Times
article quotes an unnamed State De-
partment official as saying they are
not cooperating because it would cut
into their turf.
In other words, Mr. President, the
State Department is still playing
games on diplomatic security ques-
tions?most especially regarding the
Embassy complex in Moscow.
The Senate can choose one or two
courses of action: Either we go along
with the vague and contradictory lan-
guage in S. 1160?which is described
clearly and well in the additional views
filed with this bill?or we return to
current law enacted in 1987.
WHAT CURRENT LAW risovitaai
Section 151 of the State Department
authorization bill, enacted 2 years ago,
has eight findings which I think the
Senate must consider today. Have con-
ditions improved? Here are the find-
ings, in a brief form, and I ask Sena-
tors to consider this question for
themselves.
First, that the Soviet regime "has in-
tentionally and substantially violated
international agreements ? ? ? con-
cerning the establishment and oper-
ation of a new United States Embas-
sy." Mr. President, that situation re-
mains the same.
Second, Mr. President, "the Soviet
Government's actions constitute a ma-
terial violation of international law
and a substantial default in perform-
ance under contract for construction"
for the new Embassy, and that the
United States is entitled to claim ap-
propriate compensation." This is the
same too.
Third, that because of Soviet ac-
tions, United States personnel "cannot
pursue their official duties in confi-
dence." And this is certainly the mean-
ing of the Intelligence Committee's
report to President Bush.
Fourth, that the Soviet regime has
"taken steps to impair the full and
proper use of the present United
States Embassy in Moscow." This con-
tinues to be the case, so far as this
Senator can determine.
Fifth, that because of Soviet viola-
tions, "the United States is entitled to
terminate, in whole or in part," the
United States-Soviet Embassy Agree-
ment. I believe this is still the case.
Sixth, that termination of these
agreements may affect "rights and
privileges [regarding] * ? ? a new
Soviet Embassy" in Washington.
Seventh, that the new Soviet Embas-
sy complex on Mount Alto in Wash-
ington, DC "creates serious concerns
with respect to electronic surveillance
and potential damage to the national
security of the United States." Mr.
President, I am sure that few Senators
would deny this.
And lastly, the current law found
that it was essential to protect vital
national security interests by termi-
nating "embassy agreements in view of
substantial and intentional Soviet
breaches thereof, unless the threat to
the national security posed by adher-
ence to those agreements can be over-
come."
Mr. President, let me put it clearly,
the American people, based on its
track record on this topic, cannot trust
the State Department on this score?
and that is the message of the Intelli-
gence Committee report.
And so, Mr. President, current law
directs the President to withdraw from
the Soviet-American Embassy Agree-
ment unless he can certify to the fol-
lowing conditions.
Once again, let me tick off the condi-
tions that the President must certify
in order to waive current law,
No. 1 is that the President must de-
termine that "it is vital to the national
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AidAS f nr,00 iv IN rt L KLLUIW ? SENATE S 8451
of the United States not to
trom the agreement."
omit "steps have been or will
that will ensure that the new
Wilding ? ? ? in Moscow can
And securely used ? ? ?".
, that steps "have been or will
? to eliminate" within 2 years
:enactment?in other words,
e to the national security
anted States due to electronic
from Soviet facilities on
Alto."
dent, the issue could not be
In the light of our experience
the Moscow Embassy ques-
and in light of the Intelligence
ttee report, I ask all Senators
carefully at section 133 of S.
found on pages 31 and 32 of the
n before us.
_would be tempted to say this word-
silly, except that the topic of the
iv Embassy and Mount Alto is
y serious.
soettgaAa,we did with current law, Mr.
let us examine what S. 1160
? have us do unless it is stricken.
? 'First, it says the Soviets cannot
0,1 e into Mount Alto unless and until
grAb-e.President certifies to two things:
Zig there is a safe and secure chan-
'' jay in Moscow and that all feasible
have been or will be taken to
the damage to the national
y of the United States due to
from Mount Alto.
is pretty neutral language, Mr.
7,stesident, not nearly as tough as cur-
? t law. But then part (b) of section
adds that the President may
t the Soviets to use Mount Alto
"?7?"Soviet use of the facility on
tint Alto does not pose a signifi-
..eantly greater threat to the national
.:security of the United States than the
. actual or potential threat from Soviet
.:7.11se for espionage of existing Soviet fa-
cilities in Washington, DC."
I have tried and tried to figure out
what this qualification means, Mr.
President. For the life of me, it looks
as if this provision of S. 1160 is saying
that unless there is a huge difference
in the spying the Soviets can conduct
from Mount Alto, the President may
? Permit them to move in.
How do you measure this capacity
and how would the President deter-
mine this? It is confusing and vague?
and current law is much more solid.
? Then we get to the most bizarre pro-
vision of section 133, at the bottom of
page 32, Mr. President.
, It states, as this Senator reads it,
that even if the President finds the
Moscow Embassy complex is insecure
and even if Mount Alto's spying is ex-
tremely dangerous, he can determine
- that it is in the "vital national security
:,Interests of the United States" to
Jmove in anyway, or to let the Soviets
use Mount Alto.
Mr. President, there is no sensible al-
ternative to current law. Section 133
f ,
of S. 1160 must be stricken from this
*o? legislation so that we can turn back to
It. We may not be able to control what
:?r4.
the Appropriations Committee wants
to do on the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, but the Senate must be clear and
firm?Moscow is not secure, Mount
Alto is a threat and the time for action
was 2 years ago, not now.
Think what benefits there would
have been if current law had been car-
ried out. But thanks to the State De-
partment's evasion and a weak posi-
tion by some members of the Appro-
priations Committee, there is no alter-
native.
Mr. President, the Senate must
strike section 133.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield
a moment? There is a time limitation
on this amendment. Would the Chair
state it?
The PRESIDING OFFICEIL. Sixty
minutes equally divided.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island. .
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, bear in
mind that this administration very
strongly opposes the Helms amend-
ment. I think the administration,
while opDosing the Helms amendment
vigorously, considers the committee
position too tough but preferable still
to the Helms position.
The committee bill imposes tough
conditions that must be met before
the Soviets may use their facility on
Mount Alto. First, the United States
must have a secure chancery in
Moscow. Second, the President must
take all feasible steps to eliminate the
Soviet espionage threat from Mount
Alto. Third, the committee bill re-
quires the President to remove the So-
viets from Mount Alto unless the
President certifies their presence does
not pose a significantly greater espio-
nage threat than that which exists
from their current facilities.
The Helms amendment would repeal
these tough conditions.
The Helms amendment would force
the Soviets off Mount Alto. Because of
the principles of reciprocity the
United States would have to give up
its new facility in Moscow. While our
chancery is not usable, the new facili-
ty houses several hundred U.S. fami-
lies.
Given the housing situation in
Moscow, these diplomatic families
would either be forced into substand-
ard, KGB-accessible Soviet housing or,
more likely, forced to come home. The
result would be a major reduction in
our ability to do business in Moscow.
With all that is going on in the
Soviet Union, there is a desperate need
for more, not fewer, American person-
nel. To cite one example, most Sena-
tors believe we should take advantage
of loosened Soviet emigration require-
ments to facilitate the exit of Soviet
Jews, dissidents, and evangelical Chris-
tians.
Adoption of this amendment would
make it impossible for the United
States to process visas and thus bring
the emigration to a halt just at the
time we have succeeded in changing
Soviet policy on emigration. It would
be a grotesque tragedy for those who
have suffered so much for the oppor-
tunity to move to a free country.
The administration shares those
thoughts and strongly opposes this
Helms amendment.
The Moscow Embassy mess was cre-
ated by sloppily-crafted agreements by
the Nixon administration and the lax
attitude toward security by the State
Department. President Bush is now
working to resolve this mess. He de-
serves our support.
I yield the floor.
the PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The
Senator from North Carolina is recog-
nized.
Mr. 11F-LMS. Mr. President, if no
other Senator wishes to speak I am
willing to yield back the remainder of
my time, if the distinguished chairman
is willing to yield back his.
Mr. PELL. Looking around I am
trying to see if there is anyone. The
Senator from Indiana I would like to
recognize.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, how
much time does the Senator from
Rhode Island have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER.
Twenty-seven minutes and sixteen sec-
onds.
Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield
10 minutes.
Mr. PF,LL. I am glad to yield 10 min-
utes to the Senator from Indiana and
also 3 minutes to the Senator from Il-
linois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as Sen-
tors know, the problems with regard
to our Embassy in Moscow and prob-
lems with the Soviet Embassy at
Mount Alto present a huge number of
difficulties for all of us. That point is
very clear.
No one here would praise the way in
which our Government went about
the construction of the chancery
building in Moscow. It was obviously
bugged. That problem has been with
us now for several years. The State
Department and the administration
tried to deal with it.
Let me just say as opposed to re-
hashing those mistakes, we really
ought not to make another one and, in
my judgment, the striking of section
133 of the act Clis year would be a
very bad mistake.
The administration has been very
clear on this point. The President of
the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Under Secretary of
State have all indicated that in the
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S 8452 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
event the Senate tonight strikc.s sec-
tion 133 and we go back to the existing
, law of 1987, that there will be no flexi-
bility left to the administration with
regard to this.
The House bill does not mention this
subject. Therefore, it is not conferen-
ceable and in the event that section
133 is struck, we are back to a certifi-
cation that no President of the United
States will find it easy to make, and in
my judgment this President might
Prid it impossible to make: namely, no
building is of necessary vital security
to the United States of America and
no building can be secured with regard
to bugging or interference completely
with absolute assurance.
The President of the United States
does not want to be in the position of
having to make a statement which is
either manifestly false or very likely
to be interpreted that way.
But, Mr. President, if the President
of the United States did not make
such a dubious statement, it is very
probable that the agreement with the
Soviets would be abrogated, which
means we would not be able to build
our Embassy in Moscow, to be relegat-
ed to the ancient Embassy that we
have with all of its faults and difficul-
ties for Americans who have to serve
In that situation. Other buildings that
are now being utilized in Moscow by
our people could no longer be utilized.
Mr. President, I have no doubt, and I
think Senators make judgments for
themselves, that our relationships
with the Soviet Union would be rather
severely damaged by this situation.
Senators may not realize the impli-
cations of the simple striking of sec-
tion 133, but I hope my colleagues
even at this late hour will understand
the very grave problem of American
foreign policy that is at stake at this
point.
The President of the United States,
the Secretary of State, and others are
not ambiguous about the fact that
they need latitude to deal with this
problem. The current bill that came
out of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee gives that kind of latitude. It is a
very tough section in my judgment.
The Senator from North Carolina
has sought to strike that, to move to
what I believe is inflexible language
that the President really cannot deal
with satisfactorily.
So, Mr. President, I am hopeful this
amendment will not be adopted. It is a
serious item. There is really no more
that can be said, it seems to me, that
will lead to any other conclusion than
that the adoption of this amendment
will be a very severe setback for the
foreign policy of our country.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
The Senator from Rhode Island is
recognized.
Mr. PELL. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Illinois, Mr. SIMON, is
recognized.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I say to
my colleagues here in the Senate, back
when I was in the State legislature in
Illinois I observed the closer we got to
midnight, the more foolish we became
In what passed that legislative body,
and what was true of the State legisla-
ture in Illinois, I have observed is also
too frequently true in the United
States Senate.
Here we are talking about something
that could have all kinds of conse-
quences, and I do not know that we
are ready to move in this direction.
I would simply underscore what Sen-
ator PELL and Senator LUGAR have
said. The administration strongly op-
poses this amendment.
In all of human history there are
only two nations who have the ability
to destory the world, and that is the
Soviet Union and the United States.
When we deal with relations be-
tween these two countries, let us deal
with a scalpel, not with a meat ax.
With all due respect to my friend from
North Carolina, this is a meat ax ap-
proach. This is not wise.
Now, if you take a look at the bill
Itself, and it is on page 31, you will see
that the Foreign Relations Committee
came out with a bill that really is
tough.
The Soviets are doing things that we
applaud, having elections, though
they are not like ours, but they are
having elections, people are getting up
In their Congress and denouncing the
KGB. They are printing things in the
Soviet Union that we used to have to
sneak in. They are permitting more
emigration of Jews, of Germans, Pen-
tecostals. They- are doing the things
that we have said you ought to do.
For us now to pass this. kind of an
amendment, I say to my friends, just
does not make sense.
Let us not do something imprudent-
ly at 11:50 at night here on the floor
that can cause major problems for this
administration, major problems be-
tween our two countries.
I hope we will use common sense and
not hold our finger to the wind and
say what might be most popular back
home immediately. Let us reject this
amendment. Let us support the Presi-
dent of the United States in this par-
ticular amendment and defeat the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Let me tell you, Mr.
President, what is really at stake here.
The Soviet Embassy is still bugged.
Everybody agrees that nothing has im-
proved and only this pending amend-
ment can protect the national security
of the United States.
The Senate has spoken time and
time again on this issue. It has ap-
proved an amendment even tougher
than current law by an overwhelming
vote of 71 to 26. That was in July of
1987, a couple years ago.
July 20, 1989
The commitee language which I pro-
pose to strike does nothing to solve
the problem because it may force the
United States to occupy an unsafe, in-
secure Embassy in the Soviet Union.
If that is playing to the folks back
home, so be it.
I do not mind disagreement when
you start talking about stupidity and
cynicism at some time.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, can we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will come to order.
The Senator may proceed.
Mr. HELMS. Let us be sure we know
what the facts are. This Senate has
passed judgment several times on this.
The Foreign Relations Committee was
wrong in its provision and it ought to
be struck, and that is whatAhe amend-
ment does.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. HELMS. Any time the Senator
wants.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Idaho is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I appre-
ciate the Senator yielding. I would like
to just share with my colleagues an ar-
ticle and then I will ask unanimous
consent that it be printed in the
RECORD.
The article was published by one of
our distinguished colleagues who car-
ries the rank of Ambassador. He was
Ambassador to the United Nations and
Ambassador to India. He has worked
in several administrations. He is the
distinguished senior Senator from New
York.
The article was about how the Sovi-
ets are bugging America, and I just
give you the punchline of what our
distinguished colleague said. He said:
My solution: Throw the bastards out if
they are listening to our microwave signals.
Nothing technical about it. On three occa-
sions I have introduced legislation requiring
the President to do Just that, unless in
doing so, he might compromise an intelli-
gence source.
Nothing has changed, as the Senator
has said.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle printed in the April 1987 Popular
Mechanics, by Senator DANIEL PAT-
RICK MOYNIHAN which I just quoted
from be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
HOW THE &WITTE ARE BUGGING AMERICA
(By Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan)
Soviet agents may be listening to your
personal telephone conversations. If you're
involved in the government, in the defense
Industry or in sensitive scientific activity,
there is a good chance they are.
In fact, a recent unclassified Senate Intel-
ligence Committee report on counterintelli-
gence indicates more than half of all tele-
phone calls in the United States made over
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St; 1.989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
are vulnerable to interception.
has a right to know this.
also know that the Regan ad-
bar recognised this threat for a
?bed so far, the bureaucratic
leie been piecemeal, arid at times
this as background: In 1975,
Ilea named permanent U.S. repre-
lie the United Nations, Vice Presi-
litoetrefeller summoned me to
the Old Executive Office Build.
something urgent he had to
first thing I must know about
Nations, he said, is that the Sovi-
be listening to every telephone
from our mission and from the
s suite in the Waldorf Towers. I
Mkt a very deep secret, and treated
Only later did I learn that Rocke-
esindiely reported this intelligence
In the president in June 1975. The
"Report to the President on CIA
Within the United States" notes:
)eve these countries (communist
isn monitor and record thousands of
telephone conversations. Americans
glint to be uneasy if not seriously
at the real possibility that their
d business activities, which they
freely over the telephone, could be
and analyzed by agents of foreign
-Sevlets conduct this eavesdropping
Um& -diplomatic" facilities in New
City; Glen Cove, Long Island; San
and Washington. By some esti-
Alley have been doing so since 1958.
Reagan knows this well. He sat on
eller Commission and signed its
concluding that such covert ac-
bad any doubts about this eaves-
'Effort. Arkady Schevchenko
Man when he came over in 1975 and
defected in 1978. As you will
achevchenko was, at the time, the
Soviet at the United Nations
tap-and-comer in the Soviet hierar-
describes the listening operation in
Mt City in his book "Breaking With
".? "The rooftops at Glen Cove, the
building in Riverdale, and the
all bristled with antennas for listen-
American conversations."
'en have to worry about more than
Darabolic dish antennas tucked behind
in the Soviet "apartment"
in Riverdale, New York.
are also those Russian trawlers
Inset up and down our coast. They are
but fishing for what? Communica-
And now the Soviets have taken their
ing a step further and have built
Classes of AGI, or Auxiliary Oath-
iineUigence vessels. From the hull up,
new vessels are floating antennas, I
dangerous of all, perhaps, is the
listening complex in Lourdes, Cuba,
Havana. This facility is the
Soviet listening facility outside
territory. According to the
it "has grown by more than GO
he size and capability during the
allows instant communication
and is manned by 2100 Soviet
2100!
o. our Department of State
"erne 4400 Foreign Service Offi-
4
ta cite the recent Senate Intelli-
ttee report: The massive
liance efforts from Cuba and
demonstrate ? ? ? that the Soviet
Payoff from interception of un-
unications is Immense." Intel-
ligence specialists are not prone to exag-
geration, they do not last long that way.
You can be assured that "massive" and "im-
mense" are not subtle words as used in this
context.
There are, however, two things you should
know.
First, our most secret government mes-
sages are now protected from interception
or are scrambled, and all classified message
and data communications are secure. In ad-
dition, protected communications zones are
being established in Washington, San Fran-
cisco and New York by rerouting most gov-
ernment circuits and by encrypting micro-
wave links which continue to be vulnerable
to intercept. But there are still communica-
tions links which carry unclassified, but sen-
sitive, information that we need to protect.
Second, it is a truism in the intelligence
field that while bits of information may be
unclassified, in aggregate they can present a
classified whole. The Senate Intelligence
Committee informs us, "Due to inherent
human weakness, government and contrac-
tor officials, at all levels, inevitably fall to
follow. strict security rules. ? ? Security
briefings and penalties were simply not ade-
quate to prevent discussion of classified in-
formation on open lines." If the Soviets can
piece it together, you must assume that
they will, given the resources they invest
toward this effort.
But the Intelligence community needs no
reminder that we are up against a deter-
mined and crafty opponent. In 1983. for ex-
ample, a delegation of Soviet scientists were
Invited to tour a Grumman plant on Long
Island. No cameras. No notes. All secure.
right? Wrong. The delegation had attached
adhesive tape to the soles of their shoes to
gather metal fragments from the plant floor
for further study at home. The Soviets are
pretty good at metallurgy?probably the
best in the world?and we don't need to help
them any further.
But concern is not always translated into
budgetary action, at least not in the realm
of communications security. Let us take a
look at the technical problem confronting
As you know, there are two basic ways
voice can be transmitted over telephone
media: digital and analog. Analog refers to
voice waves which are modulated (ampli-
fied) up to a very high frequency (fin.
That is, they are increased in speed from
hundreds of cycles per second to thousands
of cycles per second. This facilitates their
passage over distance.
Nevertheless, because analog radio waves
diminish rapidly over distance; it's necessary
to periodically amplify, or boost, the signal
either at a microwave relay tower repeater
or satellite transponder. (Actually, the sig-
nals are diminished in frequency to voice
quality and then brought back up to high
frequency.)
Digital transmissions are voice or data vi-
bration signals which are converted into a
series of on-and-off pulses, zeros and ones,
as in a computer. Like analog telephone
calls, digital calls go through a process of
modulation and demodulation.
For the purposes of this discussion, we
need only remember two things about
analog and digital telephony.
First, analog telephony is fast being re-
placed by digital telephony because it better
translates computer language. But, more
Importantly, after a high initial overhaul
cost, it's possible to send thousands of digi-
tal calls (bundles) over a single conduit.
Therefore, as we expand our digital capac-
ity, we must ensure that both our analog
and digital communications are protected
from Soviet eavesdropping.
S 8453
Second, sending bundles over a single con-
duit is the base block at which we introduce
the encryption I am talking about.
When you plate ? long-distance telephone
call from point A to point B, there are three
communications paths, or circuits, over
which your call might travel: microwave,
satellite or cable.
Cable is the most secure. However, it is
the least practical and enconomical method
for bulk transmission over long distances.
As a result, 90 percent of our long-distance
telephone traffic is sent by microwave or
satellite, and that which is in the air can be
readily intercepted.
As your signal travels along the cable
from your home to the local switching sta-
tion and then on to a long-haul switching
station, it is combined (stacked and bundled
might better describe the process) with as
many as 1200 other signals trying to get to
the same region of the country.
This system of stacking and bundling sig-
nals is called multiplexing and it's how the
telecommunications industry gets around
the problem of 7 million New Yorkers all
trying to call their senator at the same time
on the same copper wire or radio frequency.
If you use a common carrier, that is, if
you have not rented a dedicated channel
from a telecommunications company, a com-
puter at the long-haul switching station will
select the first available route to establish a
circuit over which your call signals may
travel.
Therefore, calls that the caller believes to
be on less vulnerable circuits may be auto-
matically switched to more vulnerable ones.
All this takes place in 1 to 3 seconds.
So let's follow your call as it goes by
either microwave or satellite.
If your call goes via microwave, it will be
relayed across the country as a radio wave
in about 25-mile intervals from tower to
tower (watch for the towers the next time
you drive on an interstate route) until it
eventually reaches a distant switching sta-
tion where it is unlinked from the other sig-
nals, passed over cable to your friend's tele-
phone, and converted back into voice..
The problem with this system: Along
these microwave paths there is what we 01111
"spill." This measures about 12.5 meters in
width and the full 25 miles between towers.
This is where the microwave signal is most
at risk:Using a well-aimed parabolic dish
antenna (located, let's say, on the top of
Mount Alto, one of the highest hills in the
District of Columbia, and site of the new
Soviet embassy) you can intercept this
signal and pull it in. And that is just what
the Soviets are doing.
My solution: Throw the bastards out if
they are listening to our microwave signals.
Nothing technical about it. On three occa-
sions I have introduced legislation requiring
the president to do just that, unless in doing
so, he might compromise an intelligence
source. On June 7, 1985, this measure was
adopted by the Senate as Title VII to the
Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, but it
was dropped in conference with the House
of Representatives at the urging of the ad-
ministration.
Nevertheless, I think the administration
accepted the simple logic behind the propos-
al when at the end of October, 55 Soviet
diplomats were ordered to leave the coun-
try, including. The New York Times tells us,
"operatives for intercepting communica-
tions." Now, let's not let the Soviets just re-
place one agent with another.
The process is much the same for a satel-
lite telephone call. Today, approximately
eight telecommunications carriers offer sat-
ellite service using something like 25 satel-
lites. Let's suppose your signal has traveled
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S.8454 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE July 20, 198.9
to a long-haul switching station and all
microwave paths are filled. The carrier's
computer searches for an alternative path
to send the signal and picks out a satellite
connection. At the ground station, your call
is sent by a transponder up to a satellite and
then down again to a distant ground station.
Using an array of satellite dishes at
Lourdes, the Soviets can seize these signals
from the sky just as a backyard satellite
dish can pull in television (and telephone)
signals. High-speed computers then sort
through the calls and identify topics and
numbers of particular interest. And if the
Information provided is real time intelli-
gence. the Soviets have the ability to trans-
mit it instantaneously to Moscow. And yes,
the Soviets have the range at Lourdes to
grasp our satellite transmissions as they
travel from New York to Los Angeles or
Washington to Omaha.
' Here, too, there is a solution: Develop and
Procure cryptographic hardware for use at
the common-carrier long-haul switching sta-
tions. This hardware will encrypt the multi-
plexed telephonic signals (that is, approxi-
mately 1200 calls at a time) before they are
transmitted as radio waves from ground sta-
tion to ground station, a technique analo-
gous to the cable networks scrambling their
signals. This can be done for under $1 bil-
lion. If we start by encrypting Just those un-
classified signals we categorize as sensitive,
those having greatest impact on the nation-
al defense or foreign relations of the U.S.
government, it would cost us about half as
much. It would cost us so much more not to
do so.
Communications security has no constitu-
ency. There is no tangible product and the
public can never really be sure that we have
done anything. But National Security Deci-
sion Directive 145 says it is a national policy
and national responsibility to offer assist-
ance to the private sector in protecting com-
munications. It's time to make communica-
tions security (ComSec is the lingo) a true
national security priority supported with re-
sources as well as rhetoric. This was certain-
ly the conclusion of the comprehensive In-
telligence Committee report.
I agree, and have suggested a way to get
on with it. If someone has a better idea?if
you have another idea?I would be happy to
know it. The important thing is that we
stop this massive leak of sensitive informa-
tion and protect your privacy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina is recog-
nized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I would
like to yield as much time as the dis-
tinguished Senator from Oklahoma
[Mr. Bolan] may desire. Mr. BOREN, as
all Senators know, is chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Subcommittee.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from North Carolina for
yielding to me. I am in support of the
amendment of the Senator from
North Carolina, as I understand it, be-
cause I think that the language adopt-
ed by the Foreign Relations Commit,-
tee would allow Presidential certifica-
tion which would make it possible for
the Soviets to occupy the Mount Alto
site prior to us having a satisfactory
conclusion of a new site or a new loca-
tion, new facilities provided for us in
Moscow.
We all know this is a matter that
has been thoroughly gone into by
many Members of the Senate, certain-
ly by the members of the Intelligence
Committee, that the site that we now
have, the Moscow Embassy facility,
the new facility which has been built,
creates a grave security risk. The In-
telligence Committee has publicly
stated that we should never occupy
that facility.
For us to allow the possibility of the
Soviets to occupying the Mount Alto
site prior to a satisfactory conclusion
or decision about a new site for us in
Moscow would, in my opinion, be a
grave security risk for the United
States.
I will not go into all the details, but
let me say administrations of both par-
ties over the last 20 or 30 years bear
joint responsibility for a series of seri-
ous mistakes that have been made
which allowed the Soviets to, in es-
sence, build, under their own terms,
facilities here in which they inspected
everything as small as a grain of sand
which was brought on location here
when they constructed the Mount
Alto site, while, at the same time, we
foolishly allowed them to bring large
prefabricated sections of the building
for us in Moscow on to location, con-
structed where we had no opportunity
to observe what kind of construction
techniques or let me say what kind of
eavesdropping techniques would have
been applied during the time that the
Embassy was being constructed.
So I think it would be wrong for us
to open the door to the possibility, as
this language would do, that would
allow the President to certify that he
was now satisfied with the Moscow
Embassy location, without a decision
for a new location and a new facility
there and which would allow them.
the Soviets, the advantage of moving
into the Mount Alto site. I simply do
not think we should open the door to
the possibility and I am afraid that
the language that is now in the com-
mittee bill would open the door to that
possibility.
Mr. SIMON. Will my colleague
yield? --
Mr. BOREN. I am happy to yield.
Mr. SIMON. Let me just say I have
great respect for my colleague from
Oklahoma who is doing a superb Job
as the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. But the language in the
bill right now says: "The Soviet Union
shall not be permitted to occupy the
new chancery building on Mount Alto
in Washington, District of Columbia,
unless and until the President certifies
in writing to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate that, No. 1"?and I
will just go over the first step here?
"that there is completed a new chan-
cery building for use by the United
States Embassy in Moscow which can
be safely and securely used for its in-
tended purpose."
I think that does precisely what the
Senator from Oklahoma wants.
Mr. BOREN. Well, I would answer
my good friend, I understand how he
is interpreting that. I am simply fear-
ful?and I do not aim this comment at
this President as an individual. There
have been those who avoided a deci-
sion about tearing down the current
facility in Moscow, which I clearly be-
lieve should be torn down. We must
start all over again to try to come up
with some kind of plan to say that
that facility could somehow be made
secure.
I am fearful this language would
open the door to a President in the
future to say that he is now satisfied
that we could occupy that facility,
which we have built there under less
than rigorous conditions as far as pro-
tecting our own security, and then
allow the Soviets the right to go ahead
and move into Mount Alto.
Mr. SIMON. If my colleague will
yield again, the language in the bill is
that "there is completed a new chan-
cery building," not the present one.
I think the bill itself is very, very
clear. I think it does what the Senator
from Oklahoma intends without caus-
ing harm to the ability fo the Presi-
dent of the United States to do what
he should do for our country.
Mr. BOREN. I think. unfortunately,
Presidents have avoided a decision on
this matter, Presidents of both parties,
because they have not wanted to
admit the serious security mistakes
that have been made by their adminis-
trations. I am simply fearful that they
would decide to add a few stories on to
the existing building and attempt to
seal it off and Say it could be made
secure when many of us are convinced
It could not be made secure and de-
clare that sufficiently a new chancery
building that would allow the Soviets
to move into Mount Alto.
I think I understand what the Sena-
tor is saying. If I felt the language had
the import of saying exactly what he
Li interpreting it to mean, I would not
be alarmed. Perhaps we are being
alarmed at a possibility that would
never arise. I find it difficult to believe
that this President would ever make
such a certification, but I do not think
we ought to open the door to that pos-
sibility.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. I yield the Senator froin
Massachusetts 5 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, how
much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time for Senator lirams is 21 minutes
and 31 seconds and for Senator FELL.
19 minutes and 16 seconds.
The Senator from Massachusetts is
recognized.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am
struck by the inconsistency of the po-
sition of the distinguished Senator
from Oklahoma who this afternoon at-
tached an amendment to this bill,
along with Senator DANFORTH, in
which he criticized the micromanage-
ment of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and indeed the Senate in its ef-
forts to dictate to a President what he
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fuly 20, 108.9 CONGRESSIONAL RECOilD ? SENATE S 8455
'9
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he
ought to and ought not to do sx All re-
spect to foreign policy. In fact, he
spoke eloquently about the need for
(tie Senate to step back from that mi-
cromanagement, requiring that the
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, upon consultation with the Sec-
retary of State on the appropriate re-
lationship between the legislative and
executive branches with respect to for-
eign policy.
Now, here is a situation where the
President of the United States and the
Secretary of State have clearly said
that, in the interest of this new rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union, they
feel this would be adverse to the for-
eign policy of our country.
What is more, the administration
does not like the language of the For-
eign Relations Committee. They think
it is too tough, but they find it far
preferable to the disruption which will
occur as a consequence of the lan-
guage which the Senator from North
Carolina is proposing.
There is nothing discretionary in the
language that the Foreign Relations
Committee has inserted here. The dis-
tinguished chairman- of- the Intelli-
gence Committee is wrong on the facts
With respect to what the President can
and cannot do.
The Soviet Union cannot, cannot, be
permitted to occupy the new chancery
building unless the President has cer-
tified to the Speaker and the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations of the Senate that there is
completed, that is, finished and avail-
able to move into, a new chancery
building in Moscow which can safely
and securely be used for its intended
purpose. In other words, a condition
precedent to their proceeding to the
Mount Alto position is the completion
of a new chancery. And there is no
waiver as to that, Mr. President, none
whatsoever.
In addition, all feasible steps have to
be taken to eliminate damage to the
United States national security due to
electronic surveillance facilities on
Mount Alto.
If that does not require the Soviet
Union to adhere to a tough standard
and give the President the ability to
make the determination which he is
entrusted with, I really do not know
what does. There is no discretion
there. There is no waiver. There is no
ability to vary.
And the chairman of the Intelli-
gence Committee has adequate capac-
ity and he has often spoken of his
faith in the President to be able to
make these kinds of determinations.
So I would suggest that at this late
hour a Senate that has more often
than not supported the President of
the United States on those requests,
ought to do so once again.
Mr. BOREN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. KERRY, The Senator will
gladly yield.
Mr. BOREN. Is my colleague aware
of the fact that the amendment of the
Senator from North Carolina does not
add any language, it does not place
any restrictive language in the bill? It
is striking language adopted by the
Committee on Foreign Relations?
Mr. KERRY. I am aware of that, but
what it does is have the effect thereby
to take us back to the old section 151.
Mr. BOREN. Which has been adopt-
ed by the Senate. Is my colleague fur-
ther aware that in spite of the fact
that the Senate has over and over
again expressed itself about Mount
Alto and the demolition of the exist-
ing embassy, that the State Depart-
ment which has been delaying a deci-
sion on this matter for years under
both administrations, is once again de-
laying a decision about what to do?
Mr. KERRY. The Senator is well
aware of the problem and in fact I
have voted along with both Senators, I
believe, to voice our concern about
what has happened in Mount Alto.
This is not the issue here.
The question is: Does what the For-
eign Relations Committee put in the
legislation, and does the President's
desire and the Secretary of State's
desire to have that. language in their
Interests in the carrying out of our
foreign policy, supersede v.thateVer
Impact the changes that the Senator
from North Carolina seeks?
That is really the decision we have
to make. Is the Senate of the United
States, in the interests that we have
expressed with respect to security,
adequately protected by the language
of the Foreign Relations Committee?
And I would respectfully suggest that
the President having found yes, the
Secretary of State having found yes,
and I think the Foreign Relations
Committee in its judgment having
found yes, that there is no compelling
showing as to why we should vary
from that.
The final comment I would make is
that, No. 1, the Secretary of State and
the President find that if we revert to
the original language of section 515,
that will impose constraints on their
ability to further the relationship with
the Soviet Union at this point in time;
No. 2, it will require dislocation of
families that are currently housed in
the facilities in Moscow; and, No. 3, it
will greatly interrupt the processing of
visas and of the normal course of busi-
ness where they have already lost per-
sonnel.
I think we ought to lead the Presi-
dent on this as the distinguished
chairman so eloquently suggested we
ought to do this afternoon by amend-
ing this legislation.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina [Mr.
Hams] is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are
going to shut this off in just a minute
if Senators are willing.
Let me say that DAVE BOREN, in my
judgment, knows more about the
Moscow Embassy than, I think, prob-
ably any other Senator; certainly more
than I do. I thank him for his com-
ment.
Of course, he cannot tell us on this
floor tonight all he knows because it is
classified. But I think Senators in
their heart of hearts know exactly
what is going on. I thank the Senator
again for his comments and contribu-
tion, and I yield 1 minute to the Sena-
tor from Wyoming.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
Mr. WALLOP. I thank the Senator
from North Carolina and thank the
Senator from Oklahoma, and I will
not belabor this issue much farther
except to say that from the very be-
ginning, State Departments and Presi-
dents have opposed the responsibility
that this body has undertaken to bring
them to. Were it not for the actions of
previous Senates, we would not have
ever found the nature of the security
risks that exist in th building that
has been constructed in Moscow today.
I would respectfully say to those
who think that the language on pages
31 and 32 is complete, that it rests
only on the opinion that can be stated,
that it can be safely and securely used
for its intended purpose; they would
have certified that a long time ago.
And, in fact did, and tried, continually,
to make us yield to that proposition.
Second, I suggest to my colleagues
that the end of it contains a waiver
proposition that, were it to be factual
that this was binding upon the Presi-
dent of the United States, he could
still waive it. And would. Because the
State Department views it as our re-
sponsibility to buy Soviet-elections
with the lack of our security.
I do not think that is a wise position
for the Senate of the United Statesto
take, and I compliment the Said*
from North Carolina on his amend-
ment which returns us to current law,
which this Senate has voted for in the
past with real good reason.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. I
am perfectly willing to yield back the
remainder of my time if the chairman
will yield his.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
offer has been tendered by the Sena-
tor from North Carolina to yield his
time back if the Senator will.
Senator PELL.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Mr. HELMS. I yield the remainder
of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am
about to propound a unanimous-con-
sent request regarding the disposition
of Senator Sezerza's death penalty
amendment.
After I complete the reading of the
request, and before I present it to the
Chair, I am going to ask Senator
Bums to address the Senate and spe-
cifically Senator Tntritmorm on the
subject of Senator Tnintssoso's death
penalty legislation.
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