FBI BRIEFING ON COMPUTER CRIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 11, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
OS REGISTRY
15 SEP 1987
11 SEP 1887
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Technology, DA
Chief, Information Management Staff, DO
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, DO
Director o Security
STAT
SUBJECT: FBI Briefing on Computer Crime
1. I have made arrangements for Mr. George Lane, who is
an FBI agent, to brief us on gathering evidence in computer
crime. Bill Donnelly heard Mr. Lane's briefing at a recent
National Telecommunications Information Systems Security
Committee (NTISSC) meeting and suggested the message was one
that should be shared. Mr. Lane will be speaking to us on
22 September at 1000 hours You
and two or three members o your staff are invited to loin me.
2. Attached are two documents relevant to this topic.
STAT
Attachments
cc: DDA
STAT OS/ISG,
Retyped:0 D Sec:rjw (11 Sept 87
Distribution:
0 -
D/OIT/DA
0 -
C/IMS/DO
0 -
C/CI/DO
1
D/Sec Ewoeter}
OS Registry
1
- DD/PTS
1
- ISG Subj
1 - ISG Chrono (w/o atts)
1 - DDA
(9 Sept 87)
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
Next 21 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
dosja0 Mg @@4
Raiding the Computer Room
Fourth Amendment Considerations
(Part I)
"Computer-related crimes present new challenges in the
establishment of probable cause...."
For several decades, electronic
computing machines have been
changing the world. Businesses now
record their activities by computer, law
enforcement agencies maintain crimi-
nal records by computer, children are
entertained by computer-driven elec-
tronic games, and authors process
their words by computer. Even tasks
such as medical diagnoses are being
performed with the aid of computers.
In the last decade, the prolifera-
tion of low-cost "home computers" has
facilitated the spread of computer
power and knowledge to vast numbers
of citizens. Thus, it should be no sur-
prise that criminals have begun to use
computers to commit crimes and to
record the activities of their criminal
enterprises. Consequently, law en-
forcement officers are finding it in-
creasingly necessary to search for, ex-
amine, and seize computers and
computerized records in successfully
investigating and prosecuting many
criminal acts.
While conducting investigations of
computer-related crimes, officers must
comply with an 18th century prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and
seizures"' and contend with 20th cen-
tury electronic technology. For exam-
ple, investigators may at times find
themselves searching for intangibles
rather than familiar physical evidence,
such as guns or stolen stock certifi-
cates. As one court has noted, the tar-
get of a search may be "records [that)
exist as electronic impulses in the stor-
age banks of a computer.,2 This new
technology creates the possibility of a
criminal armed with a home computer
in Wisconsin contacting a computer in
New York by telephone and illegally
causing funds to be transferred
electronically to a bank account in
France. Regardless of these techno-
logical advances, search and seizure
by law enforcement officers continues
to be governed by the fourth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.3
This two-part article will examine
issues that arise when officers seek a
warrant to search and seize a com-
puter and the information it has proc-
essed. Part I will address the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment warrant
requirement to computer-related
searches, focusing on special prob-
lems officers may encounter in estab-
lishing probable cause to search and
particularly describing the computer
equipment to be seized. Part II will ad-
dress the description of computer-
processed information to satisfy the
particularity requirement and then
consider issues that may arise in the
execution of a warrant authorizing the
seizure of a computer and computer-
processed information.
By
JOHN GALES SAULS
Special Agent
FBI Academy
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Quantico, VA
Law enforcement officers of other than
Federal jurisdiction who are interested
in any legal issue discussed in this ar-
ticle should consult their legal adviser.
Some police procedures ruled permis-
sible under Federal constitutional law
are of questionable legality under
State law or are not permitted at all.
(Published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice)
Reprinted from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May, and June 1986.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment protects
the right of the people to be "secure in
their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects" against unreasonable Govern-
ment intrusion.4 This protection ex-
tends to computers, which are effects,
and to information processed by this
electronic technology, which can be
categorized as papers. The constitu-
tional demand upon the officer seeking
to seize a person's computer or com-
puterized information is that the sei-
zure be reasonable.' The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in establishing guidelines
for reasonable searches and seizures,
has stated a preference that they be
made pursuant to a judicially issued
search warrant. The "Constitution re-
quires that the deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer be inter-
posed between the citizen and the po-
lice ... searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."6 This require-
ment that a warrant be obtained prior
to a search or seizure is applied with
special strictness where business or
residential premises, the places com-
puters are most likely to be located,
must be entered to perform the
search
The fourth amendment sets forth
cer,a,n procedural requirements that
must r met if a valid warrant is to be
issued There must be a showing of
probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, and the warrant must par-
ticularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to
be seized.8 In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that the probable cause
determination must be made by a neu-
tral, detached magistrate.9 The re-
quirements of oath or affirmation and
of presentation to a neutral, detached
magistrate raise no special problems
where computer searches are con-
cerned; however, the probable cause
and particularity requirements pose
unique problems where computers are
the search target, and these issues
merit discussion.
Probable Cause To Search
Central to the protections provided
to citizens by the warrant requirement
is the command that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause.10 This
language has been interpreted to re-
quire that before a search warrant may
be issued, the Government must set
forth facts that would cause a reason-
able person to conclude that it is prob-
ably true that (1) a crime has been
committed, (2) that evidence of that
crime is in existence, and (3) that the
evidence presently exists at the place
to be searched." Obviously, satisfying
this requirement necessitates the col-
lection and presentation of information,
and law enforcement officers perform
this task daily in regard to numerous
crimes. Computer-related crimes pres-
ent new challenges in the establish-
ment of probable cause though, be-
cause of the unfamiliar technology
involved. Although a magistrate likely
already understands how a murder
may be committed with a gun, he may
require considerable explanation be-
fore finding that an embezzlement was
committed by means of a computer.
The problem is largely an educational
one.
Inasmuch as computers may be
used in a wide variety of criminal en-
deavors, ranging from fraud to espio-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
"... an officer seeking to convince a magistrate that a novel
crime has been committed should use care to ensure that the
explanation of the mechanics of the crime is clear and easily
understood."
nage, it is difficult to state concisely An example of an officer success- Obviously, an officer seeking to
what is required to satisfy the probable fully obtaining a search warrant in a convince a magistrate that a novel
cause requirement in a computer- case where new technology was being crime has been committed should use
related crime. In general, probable employed to commit the crime of fraud care to ensure that the explanation of
cause will be established just as it is found in the case of Ottensmeyer v. the mechanics of the crime is clear
would in a case where no computer Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone and easily understood. If the officer
was involved, except that additional Co. 14 Ottensmeyer, who ran a tele- wishes the magistrate to consider the
facts will have to be presented regard- phone answering service, decided to officer's interpretations of the facts he
ing the role of the computer in the provide an alternative to his customers has observed, he must inform the
criminal activity. to normal, commercial long-distance magistrate in his affidavit of the experi-
telephone service. He found a ence and training that accredit these
That a Crime Has Been strategically located town that enjoyed interpretations. Consideration of such
Committed nontoll calling service to a larger city inferences by a magistrate determining
The first hurdle in establishing on either side, despite the fact that a probable cause has been approved so
probable cause to search is call from one of the larger cities to the long as the officer sets forth the train-
articulating facts to indicate that a other was a toll call. Ottensmeyer in- ing and experience upon which they
crime probably has been committed. In stalled an electronic device in the are based."
determining what additional facts a small town that allowed a customer in An officer seeking to establish
magistrate will need to make such a one of the large cities to "patch" a call probable cause where the crime is un-
finding where a computer is involved in to the other large city through the de- usual or unfamiliar may also elect to
the crime, it is helpful to examine the vice, thereby avoiding a toll call and use the services of an expert. An ex-
role played by the computer in the defrauding the phone company of rev- ample of using information provided by
criminal activity. For example, where a enues to which it was entitled. experts in affidavits for search war-
computer is stolen, the crime is the The investigator, a police officer rants is found in United States v.
same as any other theft, and the re- who had special training in electronic Steerwell Leisure Corp., Inc.18
quired factual showing, describing the technology and telecommunications, Steerwell was charged with infringing
computer as the object of the crime, sought a warrant to search the prem- upon the copyrights of a number of
would likewise be the same. Where a ises where the "patching" device was electronic video games, and the ques-
computer is used as a tool to commit a located. In his affidavit, the officer "in- tion of whether a crime had been
crime, facts must be presented to formed the judge of his experience in committed turned on whether the
show the crime was committed and to the electronic field and of his inde- games Steerwell was distributing were
explain how the computer was used in pendent investigation and con- sufficiently similar to the copyrighted
the commission. Because. computer clusions."15 The officer articulated facts games to violate the copyright statute.
systems are commonly installed so that explained how the scheme to de- The affidavits to support search war-
they may be used from distant loca- fraud functioned, and drawing on his rants presented the magistrate with re-
tions by means of electronic communi- expertise, cited inferences he had sults of expert analysis in comparing
cation over telephone lines, novel drawn from the facts he had observed. the games distributed by the defend-
criminal opportunities have been The warrant was issued and the ants with the copyright-protected
created.12 Valuable data may be search performed.16
transferred from one computer to an- games. In determining the validity of
other or modified to achieve advantage the warrants issued on those affidavits,
the court concluded that the magistrate
for the computer criminal." Inasmuch was entitled to accept the conclusions
as the means used to commit these of the experts, but noted the "magis-
crimes are unfamiliar, the officer must trate's determination of probable cause
convince the magistrate that such a would be facilitated if the agents' affi-
crime has been committed by detailing davits contained more details concern-
how it was committed. ing the comparisons between pro-
tected games and infringing games."19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
"The primary rule of particularity should be to make the
description of the items to be seized as precise as the facts will
allow."
The court also made reference to the
importance of explaining to the magis-
trate how the crime was committed, in
this case by duplication of the circuit
boards that control the action of elec-
tronic games.20 Again, the task of the
officer includes providing sufficient
technical details in layman's terms to
familiarize the magistrate with the me-
chanics of an unusual crime.
That Evidence of the Crime Exists
The second hurdle for an officer
seeking to establish probable cause to
search is setting forth facts to convince
a magistrate of the probability that evi-
dence of the crime exists. Where a
computer is stolen, the stolen com-
puter is evidence of the crime. If the
theft is established factually, then the
existence of the computer as evidence
is likewise established. Similarly,
where facts establish that a computer
was used to commit a crime, the same
facts establish that the computer used
was an instrumentality of the crime.
This was demonstrated in the
Steerwell Leisure Corp. case where if
the magistrate found that the circuit
boards in question violated the copy-
right laws then the boards would also
constitute evidence of that violation.21
Where an investigator seeks to
establish that computerized records of
criminal activity are in existence, his
task is essentially the same as estab-
lishing the existence of noncomputer-
ized records. He must factually estab-
lish that records of the criminal activity
have probably been created and re-
tained. There is authority for the posi-
tion that it is unnecessary to establish
factually in the affidavit the physical
form in which the records sought are
expected to be found.22 If the officer
can establish factually the creation and
retention of the records, he need not
specify (or know) whether they are be-
ing maintained in written, magnetic, or
some other form. In United States v.
Truglio, audio cassettes were seized
during the execution of a search war-
rant authorizing the seizure of "...
books, records, indices, movies re-
garding the interstate prostitution oper-
ation located at the King of the Road
Health Club... .,,23 in approving seizure
of the audio cassettes, the court noted
that "it would have been more precise
for the warrant to have specified 'writ-
ten or electronic records,' " but then
stated that "[sjtandards of pragmatism
and commonsense must necessarily
be adaptable to changing times and
technological advances."24 The court
concluded by saying that "[w]hile dec-
ades ago it might have been difficult
reasonably to infer that records existed
in some form other than written, in the
mid-1980's commonsense demands
that we refrain from remaining so
inflexible. ,25
That Evidence of the Crime Pres-
ently Exists at the Place to be
Searched
Finally, the investigator seeking to
establish probable cause to search
must factually establish the probability
that the evidence sought is presently
located at the place he is seeking au-
thorization to search. Whether this re-
quirement of recent information has
been met is "... determined by the cir-
cumstances of each case."26 As stated
by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]he task
of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, commonsense deci-
sion whether, given all the circum-
stances set forth in the affidavit before
him ... there is a fair probability that
... evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place."27
The requirement for recent infor-
mation is easily satisfied where the in-
vestigator can set forth reliable infor-
mation that the object sought has been
recently observed at the proposed
search site. Where such facts are not
available, other facts must be used to
infer that the items to be seized are
presently at the place to be searched.
At times, having a computer or its rec-
ords as the target of the search may
simplify meeting this requirement. If a
computer has been used to commit a
crime telephonically, it is possible that
it has also been set up to "answer" in-
coming calls, to allow other computer
operators to call it using their computer
terminals and a telephone. If such an
operation exists, an incoming call will
be answered with a tone called a
"carrier."28 When a particular phone is
answered with a "carrier," it seems
reasonable for a magistrate who has
been informed of the significance of
the "carrier" to find that a computer
and related equipment are probably
present at the location of the
telephone.
A somewhat analogous case in-
volved a search warrant issued for the
seizure of a "blue box," an electronic
device used to create tones on the tel-
ephone system to facilitate the making
of long-distance calls without being
billed for the toll charges.29 In this
case, tones such as those produced
by a "blue box" had been monitored by
the telephone company on a particular
telephone for a period of weeks, end-
ing the day prior to the issuance of the
warrant. This information was related
to the magistrate in the affidavit. In
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
upholding the validity of the resulting
search warrant, the court concluded
that "[t]he affidavit set forth substantial
information establishing clear probable
cause to believe that a device emitting
a 2600 cycle tone and Southwestern
Bell multifrequency tones was being
utilized ... at [the] residence. ,30
Where computerized records are
sought, the magistrate should consider
that records by their nature are created
to be kept for at least a minimum pe-
riod of time, along with the other facts
presented, in determining whether the
records are presently at the place to
be searched .$1 Although each case
must be evaluated on its own facts, the
U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts
have held that under certain circum-
stances, it is reasonable to expect that
records seen 3 months previously will
still be present at that same location.32
Particularity
The fourth amendment commands
that "no warrants shall issue except
[those] ... particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."33 This provi-
sion requires that a warrant authorize
only a search of a specific place for
specific named items. Coupled with
the probable cause requirement, this
provision prevents general searches
by ensuring that the warrant describes
a discrete, defined place to be
searched, describes only items con-
nected with criminal activity for which
probable cause has been established,
and describes the items so definitely
that it removes from an officer
executing the warrant the discretion of
determining which items are covered
by the warrant and which are not.34 It
also provides a signal of when a
search is at an end, that is, when all
items named in the warrant have been
located and seized or when all possi-
ble hiding places for items not located
have been explored.35 Since the "place
to be searched" portion of the particu-
larity requirement has no special im-
pact on computer searches, it will not
be discussed. However, the "things to
be seized" portion of the requirement
has a marked impact in seeking a war-
rant to authorize the seizure of a com-
puter or information processed by a
computer. This portion will be exam-
ined in regard to both the computer
and the processed information.
Describing the Computer
The primary rule of particularity
should be to make the description of
the items to be seized as precise as
the facts will allow. A court measuring
the particularity of a description in a
search warrant may consider what
facts could reasonably be known by
the investigator at the time application
for the warrant was made, so long as
the investigator includes all the facts
known to him in the affidavit.36 Conse-
quently, the circumstances of each
case can help determine whether a de-
scription is sufficiently particular. The
nature of the item sought also is con-
sidered in determining the degree of
particularity required. A less precise
description is required of items which
are contraband, such as controlled
substances.31 Conversely, greater par-
ticularity is demanded when the item
sought is of a type in lawful use in sub-
stantial quantities.38 Generally, where
computer equipment is sought for sei-
zure pursuant to a search warrant, a
quite particular description will be
required.
Where a computer has been re-
ported stolen, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that the owner will provide a de-
tailed description of the stolen item.
Therefore, if the object of the search is
a stolen computer, a detailed descrip-
tion, including manufacturer, model
number, and serial number if known,
will probably be required. This is espe-
cially true if the computer sought is a
type commonly in lawful use. Care
should be taken to ensure all available
descriptive information is included.
Where computer equipment is
sought because it was used as an in-
strumentality to commit a crime, the
most precise description the facts will
allow may be a more general one.39
Where a victim complains that his
computer system has been accessed
telephonically by an unknown person
and a loss has resulted, it is likely that
the investigator will only be able to de-
termine generally what types of de-
vices were used to accomplish the
crime. He may, for example, learn that
a computer terminal (a keyboard and
display monitor) and a modem (a de-
vice that allows digitally encoded com-
puter information to be transmitted
over telephone lines) were necessary
to perform the acts accomplished, but
will have no information regarding the
manufacturers of the equipment,
model numbers, or serial numbers. If a
telephone trace reveals the location
from which the intruding call origi-
nated, the investigator may have prob-
able cause to search. Under these cir-
cumstances, the general description of
"a computer terminal and a modem of
unknown make or model" may suffice.
An analogous case is State v. Van
Wert,40 where police had probable
cause to believe Van Wert was using
equipment to forge checks. A search
warrant was issued authorizing the sei-
zure of "check protectors and typewrit-
ers used in preparation of forged
checks." The court approved use of
this general language based upon the
nature and information known con-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
"Where a computer is used as a tool to commit a crime, facts
must be presented to show the crime was committed and to
explain how the computer was used in the commission."
cerning the crime, stating that greater
particularity "... was not needed in this
case where defendant was under in-
vestigation for forgery rather than theft
of a certain item .,,41
Similarly, the warrant in United
States v. Harvey authorized the sei-
zure of "a 'blue box,' an electronic de-
vice that allows a caller to make long
distance calls without them being re-
corded for billing by the telephone
company."42 The Agents executing
this warrant ultimately seized audio
cassette tapes that had tones such as
those produced by a "blue box" re-
corded on them. The court noted that
the affidavit clearly established that a
device emitting "blue box" type tones
was being used at the place to be
searched and then addressed the par-
ticularity question, observing that
"[n]either the Southwestern Bell offi-
cials nor the FBI Agents knew the ac-
tual physical form which the device
would take, and they assumed it would
be in the form familiar to their research
and experience...."43 The court, in ap-
proving the seizure, said, "[t]he cas-
sette tapes constituted 'an electronic
device that allows a caller to make
long distance phone calls without them
being recorded for billing by the tele-
phone company' and were thus prop-
erly seized as within the limitations of
the warrant. "40
Since computer systems are often
comprised of a number of component
parts,45 an investigator applying for a
warrant to seize a computer should en-
sure that the warrant describes all
parts of the computer system that are
probably present, as well as the vari-
ous types of storage devices upon
which the machine's operating instruc-
tions (computer programs) are main-
tained. It is prudent to consult an ex-
pert concerning the items to be listed.
Equipment components will probably
include a central processing unit, print-
ers, terminals (keyboards and display
screens), magnetic tape drives, and
magnetic disc drives. Storage media
will include magnetic tapes, magnetic
discs, punched cards, and paper
tapes. Computer printouts will also
likely be present.46 If information that
has been processed is being sought, it
is especially important to particularly
describe the storage media. Consulta-
tion with an expert will increase the
likelihood of a thorough listing of the
items of evidence probably present,
and provided the expert's education
and experience are set forth in the affi-
davit, will give the magistrate a sound
basis for concluding that the items
sought are probably located at the
place to be searched.
Part II of this article will conclude
the particularity analysis and discuss
problems with executing this type of
search warrant.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
"... the legal standard by which ... searches and seizures [of
computers and computerized information] will be measured is
the same as is applied to searches less concerned with modern
technology."
Part I of this article examined the
fourth amendment's requirements of
establishing probable cause and par-
ticularly describing the items to be
seized in affidavits which support war-
rants to search and seize computers
and computer-processed information.
Part I concluded with the particular de-
scription of computer equipment. Part
II continues with a consideration of the
particularity requirement as applied to
computerized information and a dis-
cussion of fourth amendment stand-
ards regarding execution of search
warrants on computer facilities.
Describing Computer-Processed
Information
Officers seeking to describe par-
ticularly information that has been
processed by a computer face two sig-
nificant obstacles. The first obstacle is
explaining in an affidavit for a search
warrant that records being sought may
be contained in sophisticated techno-
logical equipment. For example, digital
computer systems store and process
information in the form of electronic
impulses." For these purposes, this
information is encoded into the binary
number system, a "language" com-
prised only of the characters zero and
one.48 Since, for the officer seeking
authority to search and seize and the
court reviewing his application, "infor-
mation (either numbers or text) in bi-
nary form is useless unless it can be
decoded,"?9 describing computerized
information in its encoded form is not
meaningful. Fortunately, therefore, for
officers drafting search warrant appli-
cations, this first obstacle is easily
overcome, since officers are not re-
quired to confront the technological re-
alities of what occurs when information
is transformed into an electronic rec-
ord. They can simply state that the in-
formation sought may be in electronic
or written form.
It is the information itself that must
be described with particularity, rather
than the form in which the information
may be found. Thus, if what is sought
is "a letter from John Jones to Bill
Smith dated November 9, 1985, and
concerning the ownership of 200
shares of IBM stock," the letter should
be described in those specific terms.
The descriptive problem regarding
whether the letter should be found in
the form of paper with writing on it or
magnetic tape electronically inscribed
with binary code is solved by using
more general terms. Concluding the
description of the letter and similar
items with the statement that "the rec-
ords sought are 'written or electronic' "
should be sufficient to permit lawful
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
seizures of the documents in either for segregating the 'innocent' from the
form, if the information sought is itself 'culpable' in the form of requiring a
(as in the letter example) described connection with [the] specific, identifia-
with sufficient detail.50 As previously ble crime [of loansharkingj."56 Approv-
noted, the storage media (magnetic ing the particularity of the warrant, the
discs, etc.) which could contain the in- court stated, "... most important, it i9
formation in electronic form should difficult to see how the search warrant
also be described as concisely as the could have been made more
facts known will allow. precise."57
The more-difficult obstacle then is The task of the officer is to de-
particularly describing the information scribe the information sought with suf-
which is the object of the search. Infor- ficient particularity to avoid a forbidden
mation, whether recorded in written or "general" warrant. If he is aware of
electronic form, is generally collected specific documents sought, he should
into documents. Documents are what designate them by type (letter, memo,
officers usually describe in warrants etc.), date, subject, author, addressee,
authorizing the seizure of information. providing as much detail as possible.
Because the particularity requirement The earlier description of the letter re-
is strictly applied where documents are garding ownership of IBM stock is an
concerned,51 the descriptive task is of- example of this technique.
ten a demanding one. Nonetheless, Where only the general nature of
courts reviewing applications for the information sought is known, a
search warrants evaluate the particu- highly detailed description is impossi-
larity of the description of a document ble. In such cases, officers must use
in light of the degree of precision the gYeat care to give a description that in-
facts of a case will allow.52 The officer cludes the information sought but limits
must be as precise as possible in the search as narrowly as possible.
describing a document, consistent with This is accomplished by use of a gen-
the facts that are available to him. The eral description that is qualified by
detailed description is required some standard that will enable the
whether the information is computer- executing officers to separate the infor-
ized or not. mation to be seized from innocent in-
For example, in the United States formation that may also be present.
v. Timpani,53 a search warrant This qualifying standard is known as a
authorizing the seizure of "... any and limiting phrase.
all records relating to extortionate The limiting phrase must be
credit transactions (loansharking) crafted based on the facts establishing
..."54 was challenged as being insuffi- probable cause to search. If the facts
ciently particular. In reviewing the war- establish that the information sought
rant, the- court noted that the warrant comes from a particular time period,
included a lengthy list of types of rec- the phrase should limit the warrant to
ords (including "... lists of loan cus- information of that time period. If the
tomers, loan accounts, telephone num- information sought is known to have
bers, address books ..."B5) and that been produced by a particular individ-
the warrant "... provide[d] a standard ual, the phrase should limit the de-
scription to material authored by that
person. If the phrase combines sev-
eral such factors, it is even more ef-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
" .. it is often desirable to incorporate the affidavit into the
warrant by appropriate language and to'attach the affidavit to the
warrant."
fective. As in United States v. Tim- layouts, computer tape printouts, Of- for the premises of Lloyd, Carr & Com-
pani, the phrase may restrict the de- fice of Education (HEW) documents pany, a commodities brokerage firm.
scription to particular criminal conduct. and forms ... which constitute evi- The warrant authorized the seizure of
In that case, the limiting phrase was dence of the commission of violations "Lloyd, Carr's bank statements, casks
"... records relating to extortionate of the laws of the United States, that is receipt books, option purchase rec-
credit transactions (loanshark- violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 286, ords, sales material distributed to cus-
ing).... "S8 It is most important that the 287, 371, 1001, and 1014...."61 The tomers, employee compensation rec-
limiting phrase restrict the scope of the probable cause in this case related to ords, customer account records, sales
search so that it remains within the frauds pertaining to the FISLP. The training material and customer lists."65
bounds of the probable cause set out court, in invalidating the search war- Noting that the described items consti-
in the affidavit. The warrant may not rant, criticized the limiting phrase be- tuted most of the business records of
authorize the seizure of items for cause it allowed seizure of items for the company, the court nonetheless
which probable cause to search has crimes beyond the scope of the proba- upheld the warrant's particularity, since
not been established. In upholding the ble cause established. The court the affidavit's facts "... warranted a
description of items in the warrant in stated, "[tihe warrant is framed to allow 'strong belief that Lloyd, Carr's opera-
the Timpani case, the court noted that seizure of most every sort of book or tion was, solely and entirely, a scheme
"[ejach item is plausibly related to the paper at the -described premises, lim- to defraud...."86 Since the facts in the
crime-loansharking or gambling-that ited only by the qualification that the affidavit established that all of the rec-
is specifically set out [in the affida- seized item by evidence of violations ords of the business probably were ev-
vitj."59 The description, even though of the laws of the United States, that is idence of the crime being investigated,
the items to be seized were described violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 286, the scope of the description was suffi-
in generic terms, did not exceed the 287, 371, 1001, and 1014.' The cited ciently particular. In upholding the va-
probable cause because of the use of statutes, however, penalize a very lidity of the warrant, the court stated,
an appropriately narrow limiting phrase. wide range of frauds and conspiracies. " .. where there is probable cause to
In Application of Lafayette Acad- They are not limited to frauds per- find that there exists a pervasive
emy, Inc.,60 a case involving a search taining to FISLP, and there is no indi- scheme to defraud, all the business
for computerized information, the infor- cation from the warrant that the viola- records of an enterprise may be
mation sought was described in gen- tions of federal law as to which seized, if they are, as here, accurately
eral terms with the inclusion of a limit- evidence is being sought stem only or described so that the executing offi-
ing phrase, but the phrase was not indeed at all from Lafayette's participa- cers have no need to exercise their
made sufficiently narrow. Lafayette tion in FISLP. Thus, the warrant pur- own judgment as to what should be
Academy, Inc., was being investigated ports to authorize not just a search and seized."67
for fraudulent activities in connection seizure of FISLP-related records as The items to be seized should be
with their participation in the Federally the government contends but a gen- described as precisely as the facts will
Insured Student Loan Program eral rummaging for evidence of any allow, and items for which probable
(FISLP). The warrant authorized sei- type of federal conspiracy or fraud."62 cause to search has not been estab-
zure of "books, papers, rosters of stu- The court continued that "... the pre- lished should not be included. An inno-
dents, letters, correspondence, docu- cise nature of the fraud and conspiracy vative means of limiting the items de-
ments, memoranda, contracts, offenses for evidence of which the scribed to those for which probable
agreements, ledgers, worksheets, search was authorized-fraud and cause to search has been established
books of account, student files, file conspiracy in the FISLP-needed to is found in the case In Re Search War-
jackets and contents, computer tapes/ be stated in order to delimit the broad rant Dated July 4, 1977, Etc-68 Here,
discs, computer operation manuals, categories of documentary material the scope of the description of items to
computer tape logs, computer tape and thus meet the particularity be seized was limited to documents re-
requirement...."63 lated to "the crimes ... which facts re-
Occasionally, the nature of the cited in the accompanying affidavit
probable cause will allow a very broad
description. In United States v.
Brien,64 a search warrant was issued
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
make ."69 The court, in
upholding the warrant, noted with ap-
proval the limiting phrase. As was
done in this case, it is often desirable
to incorporate the affidavit into the war-
rant by appropriate language and to at-
tach the affidavit to the warrant. Offi-
cers preparing search warrants for
computerized information should con-
sider the use of this procedure.
EXECUTING THE SEARCH
WARRANT
The protection of the fourth
amendment does not end when an of-
ficer obtains a valid search warrant.
The right of citizens to be free of "un-
reasonable searches and seizures" ex-
tends to the manner in which a search
warrant is executed.70 For the search
to be lawful, it must be done in a rea-
sonable manner .71 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized the flexibility of
this standard, stating "[t]here is no for-
mula for the determination of reasona-
bleness. Each case is to be decided
on its own facts and circumstances."72
Perhaps because of the vagueness of
this standard, certain statutes also reg-
ulate the action of officers executing
search warrants.73
Generally, officers must give no-
tice of their authority and purpose prior
to entering premises to execute a
search warrant.74 Once inside, the ac-
tions taken to secure control of the
premises and prevent destruction of
evidence must be reasonable under
the circumstances.75 The search itself
must be performed within the scope of
the warrant,76 and care must be taken
to cause no unnecessary damage dur-
ing the search.77 Finally, only items
named in the search warrant may be
seized, subject to a limited exception,
the "plain view" doctrine.78 These as-
pects of execution will be examined as
they relate to computer searches.
The Announcement Requirement
To protect the privacy interests of
citizens and the safety of both occu-
pants of premises and the officers
making entry to execute a warrant, offi-
cers are generally required to knock
and announce their identity and pur-
pose before forcibly entering premises
to perform a search.79 This require-
ment is subject to certain exceptions
which allow entry without notice under
some circumstances.80 The exceptions
include situations where the an-
nouncement would jeopardize the
safety of the officers or others and
where it would likely result in the de-
struction of evidence.81 This latter ex-
ception, destruction of evidence, be-
comes relevant in searching for
computer-processed information.
Due to the manner in which it is
processed and stored, computerized
information is easily and quickly de-
stroyed. As previously discussed, in-
formation is encoded into the binary
number system for processing pur-
poses. This encoded information may
then be stored in the computer's inter-
nal memory or on magnetic or other
external storage media.82 Generally,
the internal memory is used to store
data that must be immediately accessi-
ble to perform the tasks for which the
computer is presently being used. Be-
cause any power interruption will result
in the loss of information stored in the
computer's internal memory. important
information is usually duplicated and
stored on an external storage device,
such as a magnetic tape or disc. Infor-
mation that is in the computer's inter-
nal memory that has not been
"backed-up" by more permanent exter-
nal storage may be destroyed in the in-
stant it takes to flip a power interrup-
tion switch. Depending on the memory
capacity of the computer, a considera-
ble amount of information may be lost
in this manner. Personal computers
with internal storage capacities equal
to 200 double-spaced typewritten
pages are now common, and larger
computers have much greater internal
memory capacity. Information stored
externally, especially if a magnetic
storage medium is used, is likewise
subject to rapid destruction. A device
known as a degausser can instantly
erase millions of data characters from
a tape or disc.83
A pre-entry announcement is not
required where officers know facts that
cause them to reasonably believe that
the making of an announcement will
result in the destruction of evidence.84
The ease and rapidity of destruction of
the evidence sought is a factor courts
will consider in determining whether a
"no-knock" entry was reasonable.85
Consequently, where officers know
prior to execution of a warrant that in-
formation sought has been stored by
computer and that persons with a mo-
tive to destroy the information are
likely present at the place to be
searched, an unannounced entry is
likely reasonable.86
The announcement requirement is
less stringently applied where warrants
are executed against business
premises.87 Since computers are often
located at businesses, this fact should
also be considered in determining
whether a pre-entry announcement is
required.
Another alternative to the an-
nounced entry may exist when search-
ing for processed data. Where compu-
terized information is the target of the
search, technology may allow the exe-
cution of the search without any physi-
cal entry. If the computer is one where
access is available to persons with re-
mote terminals via telephone lines, it is
possible that the information sought
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
"Investigators executing a search warrant must use care to insure
that the search is restricted to places where the items to be
seized may be concealed."
may be obtained by an expert who
"breaks in" the system remotely, using
his own terminal and telephone.88
Also, the electronic operations of some
computer systems may be observed
from as far away as one-half mile if the
proper equipment is used.89 Presuma-
bly, where no physical entry takes
place, no announcement is required.
Such searches do, however, fall within
the application of the fourth amend-
ment and its attendant requirements,90
and in most cases, a search warrant
will be required for performing such a
search.9' Additionally, some sort of no-
tice to the operator of the computer
that a search has been performed is
likely required.92
Controlling The Premises
The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted the utility of officers who are
executing a search warrant exercising
"unquestioned command of the
situation."93 Consequently, officers
executing a search warrant have the
power to control access to the prem-
ises being searched and to control the
movements of persons present to facil-
itate the search and to prevent the re-
moval or destruction of evidence. Due
to the previously noted ease of de-
struction of computerized information
and the size and complexity of some
computer facilities, the need likely will
exist to quickly take control of a com-
puter facility being searched. Actions
taken to control the premises and pre-
vent the destruction of evidence will be
evaluated based upon the reasonable-
ness of the actions under the
circumstances.
An example of this analysis is
found in United States v. Offices
Known as 50 State Distrib.,94 where a
search warrant was executed on a
building housing a large "boiler room"
sales operation that was engaged in
fraud and misrepresentation in selling
its promotional merchandise. About 50
local and Federal officers entered the
premises to perform the search. At
least 300 employees were present.
The warrant authorized the seizure of
almost all business records present.
Upon entry, the officers required all
persons present to remain at desks or
in their assigned work areas. No one
was permitted to go to the restroom
without an escort. The court, in
upholding the validity of the execution
of the warrant, noted, "[t]he breadth of
the warrant ... rendered the execution
of the warrant a most difficult task at
best. Some control over the 300.. .
employees was necessary for an or-
derly search.,95
Searching Within The Scope Of The
Warrant
The requirement of a particular
description of the items to be seized
limits the allowable scope of a search
in two ways. First, it restricts the
places where an officer may look. An
officer may look only in places where
the item sought might reasonably be
concealed.96 Second, it restricts the
time of execution. An officer may only
search under the authority of the war-
rant until all named items have been
located or seized or until all possible
places of concealment have been
explored.97 Failure to comply with ei-
ther of these restrictions can result in
an illegal, general search that violates
the fourth amendment.
Investigators executing a search
warrant must use care to insure that
the search is restricted to places
where the items to be seized may be
concealed. This can be quite difficult
where records are sought and a great
number of files are present. Regard-
less of the difficulty, reasonable steps
must be taken to ensure that the
search is no broader than authorized
by the warrant.
A sensible first step is to make
sure that all searching officers are
aware of what items are listed in the
warrant. In upholding the execution of
the warrant in In Re Search Warrant
dated July 4, 1977 Etc., the court
noted the procedure followed in that
case, saying, "[i]n preparation for the
search the agents attended several
meetings to discuss and familiarize
themselves with the areas and docu-
ments described in the search warrant
and accompanying affidavit. They
were instructed to confine themselves
to these areas and documents in their
search. During the search each agent
carried with him a copy of the search
warrant and its 'Description of Prop-
erty' and could contact one of three
persons on the scene who carried the
supporting affidavit."98 In upholding a
warrant execution in United States v.
Slocum,99 the court also noted a pre-
execution meeting.100 Familiarizing the
search team with the language of the
warrant will increase the likelihood that
a search will be performed in a manner
a court will deem reasonable.
Once on the scene, the officers
should continue to use care to restrict
the search to the items listed in the
warrant. A problem that frequently
arises is that of sorting the items sub-
ject to seizure from those that are in-
nocently possessed. This problem is
especially common in cases where
business records are the target of the
search. In all cases, officers must re-
strict their search to places where the
items named in the warrant are likely
to be found and to limit the examina-
tion of innocent items to an extent no
greater than that necessary to deter-
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
mine whether the item being examined
is one of the items named in the
warrant.101 Again, the yardstick is
reasonableness.
In many cases, a simple sorting
process will be upheld as
reasonable. 102 In United States v.
Slocum, a warrant authorizing the sei-
zure of business records related to ille-
gal importation of tropical birds was
executed. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 11th Circuit described the exe-
cution process as follows: "... [T]he of-
fices were a shambles and ... there
was no apparent filing system: it was
therefore concluded that it would be
necessary to view each document to
determine if it fell within the warrant.
When an agent discovered a docu-
ment that he or she believed covered
by the warrant, the document was
taken to one of four supervising agents
who made the ultimate decision
whether to seize the document. "l 03
The court approved use of "a common
sense standard"104 in evaluating the
reasonableness of the search method
and noted that where a warrant author-
izes the seizure of documents, "some
perusal, generally fairly brief, was nec-
essary in order for police to perceive
the relevance of the documents to the
crime.?t05 The court cautioned, how-
ever, that "the perusal must cease at
the point of which the warrant's inappli-
cability to each document is clear."'06
In Re Search Warrant Dated July
4, 1977, Etc. also concerned the exe-
cution of a search warrant requiring
the examination of a multitude of docu-
ments. Fifteen agents conducted a
search which lasted 91h hours, during
which they examined the contents of
93 file drawers, 14 desks, 3
bookshelves, and numerous boxes
and piles of loose documents. The
court described a systematic search
where each document encountered
was evaluated by search personnel to
determine whether it fell within the de-
scription of items to be seized con-
tained in the warrant. The U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, in upholding the rea-
sonableness of the search, noted that
nothing in the record indicated a "gen-
eral rummaging operation"107 had
taken place and that the agents in-
volved in the search had been "... ex-
tensively briefed, instructed and
supervised."'O'
Search for documents stored in
electronic form by a computer will re-
quire use of the computer to view doc-
uments on a display screen or to print
them by means of a printer. A sorting
process similar to that employed in a
search for "ink on paper" documents
would seem reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. Such a sorting process
was employed in United States v.
Harvey.i09 There, an agent seeking,
pursuant to a search warrant, an elec-
tronic device that produced telephone
switching tones discovered some cas-
sette audio tapes. He played about 12
of the tapes on a cassette player on
the scene and determined that 2 con-
tained recorded telephone switching
tones. These tapes were seized. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held these tapes were "properly
seized as within the limitations of the
warrart "' Use of computer equip-
ment !o r'x?9rr,ne computerized records
should -owise be reasonable, since
the records are otherwise incompre-
hensible to the searchers. Obviously,
certain operational knowledge regard-
ing the computer equipment will be re-
quired to perform this type of search.
Under these circumstances, expert as-
sistance during the search may be
essential."'
The sorting process, performed at
the scene of the search, serves to pre-
vent the seizure, and thus the denial of
access and use by the owner, of inno-
cent records. The mere fact that the
sorting process is time consuming will
not make a wholesale seizure of rec-
ords reasonable. Obviously, where a
valid warrant authorizes the seizure of
all business records, no sorting is re-
quired other than the elimination of
nonbusiness records. 112 Otherwise,
the reasonableness standard may re-
quire an arduous sorting process.
Thus, where agents seized 11 card-
board boxes of computer printouts
which were bound in 2000-page
volumes. 34 file drawers of vouchers
bound in 2000-page volumes. and 17
drawers of cancelled checks and
hauled these records to another loca-
tion where they sifted through them to
extract the relevant documents (that
were described in the search warrant)
as a consequence of their determina-
tion that sorting at the site of the
search would take a very long time,
the seizure was held to be an unrea-
sonable one.' 13 Sorting at the scene of
the search is generally required.
Certain characteristics of compu-
terized recordkeeping may result in dif-
ferent treatment for computerized
records.10 First, the storage capacity
of some computerized systems is such
that review of all documents stored in
the system could take a very long time.
Second, unlike with paper files, the
number of investigators who may as-
sist in the search is limited by the num-
ber of computer terminals available for
document display. Finally, where the
records are stored magnetically, they
may be quickly duplicated in their com-
puterized form. Based on these con-
siderations, it may be reasonable in
some cases to duplicate the records
quickly, leave copies for the use of the
owner of the records, and seize the
original records for later examination.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
The likely legal concern in this situa-
tion is that the innocent documents in-
cluded in the records would be avail-
able for unrestrained viewing by
investigators resulting in a postponed
"general search." A potential control for
this problem would be continuing judi-
cial supervision of the sorting
process.' 15
Finally, when all items named in a
warrant have been located and seized,
the warrant provides no authority to
continue the search. 116 Absent other
legal justification, the search must
terminate.
Avoiding Damage During a Search
A further. requirement for the rea-
sonable execution of a warrant is that
the officers take care to avoid unnec-
essary damage to the property being
searched and seized. Since computers
are complex and fragile,17 considera-
ble care must be exercised where one
is seized. Expert assistance may be
necessary to ensure a damage-free
seizure.
The "Plain View" Doctrine
As previously noted, an officer
executing a search warrant will fre-
quently need to sort through informa-
tion to determine what portion of it may
be seized pursuant to the warrant. If,
during the course of the process, the
allowed limited perusal of information
is sufficient to cause the officer to con-
clude that the information is probable
evidence of a crime, he is not required
to leave the document behind, even
through it is not described in the war-
rant. He may seize it under the "plain
view" exception to the warrant require-
ment provided that he is lawfully pres-
ent (searching reasonably within the
scope of the warrant), it is readily ap-
parent that the document is evidence,
and the discovery of the document is
"inadvertent" (that is, the officer did not
possess probable cause to search for
the document prior to beginning the
search he is presently engaged in).18
CONCLUSION
Since judicial guidance is still lim-
ited in the area, investigators seeking
and executing search warrants
authorizing the seizure of computers
and computerized information are on
untested ground. However, the legal
standard by which such searches and
seizures will be measured is the same
as is applied to searches less con-
cerned with modern technology. Care-
ful adherence to established fourth
amendment principles, coupled with
the use of expert assistance where
needed, will enhance the likelihood of
obtaining computerized evidence that
is judicially admissible.
Footnotes
'U S. Const amend IV
2Unteed States v. Hall. 583
Va. 1984).
U E0
ISee Katz v United States. 389 U S. 347 (1967).
'U.S. Cons) amend. IV
SSee Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61d. at 357.
'See Michigan v Tyler 436 U.S 499 (1978)
8U.S. Coast amend IV.
9Cookdge v New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
'0U S. Const amend. IV
"Zurcher v Stanford Daily. 436 U S. 547. 556-557
n 6 )1978). Quoting Comment. 28 U. Chi L. Rev. 664. 687
(1961).
For a discussion of computer telecommunication
cr;me. see Marbach. 'Beware Hackers at Play.-
Newsweek. September 5. 1983, p. 42.
"For an interesting discussion of computer crimes.
see T. Whiteside. Computer Capers (Thomas Y Crowell
Co. 1978).
1'7S6 F 2d 986 loth Or 1985).
"Id. at 990.
'6ld. at 990. 991
'See. e g. United States v Ortiz. 422 U.S 891
(1975) See also Johnson v, United States, 333 U.S. 10
It 9481
'6598 F Supp 171 IW.D.N.Y 1984)
'91d. at 176
20Id at 177.
21 Id,
22 United States v Truglio. 731 F.2d 1123 )4th Cir.
19841, cert. denied. 83 L. Ed.2d. 130 (1984)
Id, at 1126.
"Id. at 1128
2sid.
26Sgro v. United States. 287 US. 206 (1932).
27lllinots v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213. 238 (1983).
26See Fitzgerald and Eason. Fundamentals of Data
Communication. pp. 42-43 (John Wiley & Sons. 1978)
svUnited States v Harvey. 540 F 2d 1345 (8th Or
1976)
-"to at 1354
"Umlod Sines v McM:unrs. 71,11 ?d 1395 11,11, Cn
1983)
3'Andresen v Maryland. 427 U S 463. 478 n 9
(19761
US Const amend IV
"See Marron v United States. 275 US 192 119271
For a thorough discussion, see 2 W LaFave, Search and
Seizure 95-101 (1978)
"See 2 W LaFave. Search and Seizure 162 (19781
MCI Andresen v Maryland. 427 U S 463 (1976)
77See. a g.. Steele v United States. 267 U S 498
(1925.
Supra note 35. at 99.
39ld. at 104 See. e g. Ouigg v Estelle. 492 F 2d 343
(9th Cv 1974).
'0199 NW2d 514 (Minn. 1972)
"ld. at 515-516
"Supra note 29. at 1353
q/d. at 1354
"Id.
'SFor a discussion of computer system components,
see T. Schabeck. Computer Crime Investigation Manuel.
see. 2.3-2.6 (Assets protection. 1980)
'An example of a detailed description of a computer
system is: -Otte Alpha (Brand) Micro computer central
processing unit. approximately tour Alpha (Brand) Micro
computer terminals. computer printers. and computer
manuals. logs. Printout files. operating instructions. mctud?
ing coded and handwritten notations. and computer Slor-
age materials. including magnetic tapes. magnetic discs.
floppy discs. programs. and computer source documenta-
tion." Quoted from Voss v. Bergsgaard. 774 F.2d 402. 407
(1985) (warrant invalidated on other grounds).
'214 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 183 (1977)
'aid. See also King v State ax Tel Murdock
Acceptance Corporation. 222 So.2d 393. 398 (1969).
afd. at 184.
50See United States v. Truglio. 731 F.2d 1123 (th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 83 L.Ed2d 130 (1984) See also
United States v Offices Known as 50 State Distnb.. 708
F.20 1371 (91h Cir. 19831. cert. denied. 79 LEd.2d 677
(1984).
"See Andresen v Maryland, 427 U S. 463 (1976)
52For a thorough discussion. see Rissler.
"Documentary Search Warrants." FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin. vol 49. No. 7. July 1980. pp 27-31
57665 F 2d I (1st Cir 1981)
5'Id. at 4
ss/d.
'6/d at 5
Srld.
Said. at 4.
Said. at 5.
60610 F2d 1 (1st Cir 1979)
6'Id. at 3
62 Id.
'Id. at 3. 4.
64617 F 2d 29911 st Or
919A11980)
'Id. at 306.
66ld. at 308.
"'Id. at 309. contra Voss v Bergsgaard. 774 F 20
402 (70th Cir. 1985).
6s 667 F.2d 117 (D C Cm. 1981). cart. denied. 102
S.Ct. 1971 (1982).
691d. at 141.
70Go?Bart Importing Company v. United States. 75
L.Ed. 374 (1931).
r'Id.
Said. at 382.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3
73An example is 18 U.S.C. ?3109.
"Cf. Kee v. California. 374 U.S. 23 11963)
(concerning an entry to arrest). For a thorough discussion.
see 2 W. LaFave. Search and Seizure. 122-140 (1978).
"See United Stares v. Offices Known as 50 State
Distrib.. supra note 50.
'Cl. 6Harris V. United States. 33' U.S 145 (1947)
For a thorough discussion. see 2 W. LaFave. Search and
Seizure 160-163 (1978)
"See 2 W. LaFave. Search and Seizure 161 (1978)
"See Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U S. 443
(1971). For a thorough discussion, see 2 W LaFave.
Search and Seizure 163-184 (1978)
"Supra note 74.
"Ord.
a lid.
a2See generally 16 Am Jur. Proof of Facts 285-291
(1965).
63D. Parker. Fighting Computer Crime. page 42
(Charles Scribner s Sons. 1983)
''Supra note 74.
bold.
6b1d.
''See United States v. Francis. 646 F.2d 251. 258
(6th Cie. 1981). can. denied, 70 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981).
6BFor a discussion of the ease with which an expert
can gain access to a supposedly secure system. see T.
Whiteside. Computer Capers. pp 117-121 (1978).
T. Schabeck. Computer Crime Investigation
Manual. section 9.2.9 (Assets Protection. 1980).
90See Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9'Id..
92See Berger v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
93Michigan v. Summers. 452 U.S 692. 703 (1981).
citing? W. LaFave. Search and Seizure 150-151 (1978).
See United States v. Offices Known as 50 State
Distrib.. supra note 50.
961d. at 1376.
"Supra note 76.
971d.
"Supra note 68. at 123.
"708 F.2d 587 (t tth Cir. 1983).
1001d. at 601.
'01See generally 2 W. LaFave. Search and Seizure
173-178 (1978).
102See. e.g.. In Re Search Warrant Dated July 4.
1977. Etc.. supra note 68. See also United States v.
Tamura, 694 F 2d 591 (9th Cu. 1982)
103708 F.2d 587. 602 (11th Cir. 1983).
'aid. at 604.
1061d.
1061d.
107Supre note 68. at 124.
10eId.
109United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345 (81h Cie.
1976).
"Old. at 1354.
"'An expert accompanied officers executing the
search warrant in Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co.. 756 F.2d 986 (4th CO. 1985). Another
case considering the role of an expert accompanying
officers executing a search warrant is Forro Precision. Inc.
v. International Business Machines Corp.. 673 F.2d 1045
(9th Cir. 1982).
112See United States v. Brien, supra note 64.
11 3United Stares Y. Tamura. supra note 102.
See e.g.. United States v Tamura, supra note 102.
"SId. See also DeMassa v. Nunez. 747 F.2d 1283
(9th Cir. 1984) (special master appointed to supervise
sorlmq of documents during search of attorney's office).
1 61n addition to suppression of evidence. civil liability
may result when a search continues after all items named
in warrant have been seized. See Creamer v. Porter. 754
F 2d 1311 (5th Cie. 1985).
"'For a discussion of the ways a computer may be
physically damaged. see Fighting Computer Crime. supra
note 82. pages 41-42.
"'Supra note 78
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100140029-3