HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
FOR OFFIC:!L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION
(TITLE UNCLASSIFIED)
HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET
(Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota)
9
1959
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
s,
61
o
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
-.
Table of Contents
1
The Young Pilot 1
Editorial
Party-Political Work at Tactical Flight Exercises 6
K. G. Antonov
Initiative and Personal Responsibility. 3. Initiative Support it;
Conceit - Condemn it 13
P. P. Sadovnichenko
Act Creatively in Aerial Training Battles 21
Aerial Reconnaissance Under Adverse Weather Conditions 27
N. V. Suvorov
A Command from the Ground 32
V. A. Kuznetsov
The Relief Ground Controller 38
G. I. Makhorin, S. Ye. Rudak
Flight Evaluation 41
G. G. Semenko
Wind-Data Serviceable Periods 49
K. K. Garifulin
This is Very Good' 54
Complex Control Automation for Flight Vehicles 56
V. A. Bodner
Engine Surge 61
V. V. Lebedev
Bomber Hydraulic Brake System Maintenance 70
N. A. Medvedev
Automatic Devices on the Tu-104 75
Yu. G. Vladimirov
The Student 84
M. F. Rebrov
Over the Mongolian Steppes 89
A. V. Vorozheykin
AMONG OUR FRIENDS
The Combat Exploits of Chinese Pilots 102
We Are Continually Improving Our Combat Readiness 108
Jan Fr ey-Bielecki
FROM THE EDITOR'S MAIL
Closer to the Troops 111
V. N. Saginov
Summing up the Discussion 113
REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agressive Aims Against Peace-Loving Nations 114
B. L. Teplinskiy
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
a
ii Table of Contents
AVIATION ABROAD
The Combat Employment of Guided Rocket Missiles
V. K. Polyakov
120
SI
THE YOUNG PILOT
Almost every year the air regiments accept into their ranks new pilot replace-
ments. Young men who have completed school come to the units. They come to be-
gin the difficult but absorbing road to aviation, to guard vigilantly the peaceful labor
of the Soviet people, who are carrying out the majestic program of the septennium
outlined by the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU.
A young pilot! What enormous meaning and what profound content is hidden be-
hind these seemingly ordinary words. Here is youthful fervor and an already begin-
ning maturity. Here there still are youthful dreams about swift flights and flying
skill itself, growing and strengthening. Here are thoughts of the heroic and the hero-
ism of flying days itself. Everything stirs and fascinates the young officer. He is
full of desire to fly and to become just as fearless and skillful an aerial fighting man
as his elder comrades.
Spreading before the young officer -- a recent cadet at a flying school -- are
broad perspectives. First of all to rise to the level of the rest of the flight personnel
in the unit, to become a rated pilot and, finally, to obtain the first-class -- the highest
rating, i.e. , to master the most difficult flights -- at night under adverse weather
conditions; to learn to fire accurately at aerial and ground targets, to become a mas-
ter of aerial combat and sniper fire. To dare, to search constantly for new methods
of fighting an aerial enemy, to learn to fly higher, farther, and faster than anyone.
It is with just such thoughts and aspirations that fighter pilot V. G. Koshelev be-
gan his service in the X air regiment. After a brief interruption in flying that de-
veloped in connection with his transfer from school to the regiment, Koshelev quickly
became integrated. In a short time he was taught flying in the daytime under normal
weather conditions in a pair at all altitudes up to the plane's combat ceiling; then in
the daytime in the clouds and at night under ncrmal weather conditions; the last stage
of the training was at night under adverse conditions. Koshelev took upon himself
the socialist obligation to prepare himself to the level of first class and to master
persistently the art of intercepting aerial targets in the clouds and at night.
Soon the command nominated Koshelev for participation in aerial gunnery con-
tests. The young pilot justified the confidence placed in him and won first prize in
the Air Force.
Thus from success to success went one of the young pilots. And how many such
^
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
-
2 Editorial
NMI@
0
eXamples can be cited from the life of other air units! At one of the subunits, several
young pilots arrived at the same time. They set to work enthusiastically. In respect
to the program of flight training, they considerably outdistanced their compeers in
a n.3ighboring regiment. They all went through the evening Party school. They par-
ticipate actively and enthusiastically in sports contests and in the amateur activity of
the regiment. Both in training and in relaxation they are the () initiators of many use-
fill undertakings. Since the very first days of their stay in the line unit no one can
cast aspersions on them, because these young officers attend with spirit to their great
and responsible work.
0 0
What brought about the success of these young men? Of course, first of all are
their high personal moral qualities, inculcated by the Komsomol and the Party, by
the school, the plant, the kolkhoz, and the school where they began their independent
life. The second condition of success is the constant concern of the command to in-
tegrate the young pilots as rapidly as possible. Analyzing the factors that helped him
to become a first-class pilot in a short time, V. G. Koshelev speaks with love about
his squadron commander, who watches very attentively that the principle of consis-
tency be followed strictly in the training of the flight personnel and carefully checks
the preparation. of' each pilot for flight.
"I am already in my second year in the regiment," writes Koshelev, "and I have
never noticed that the squadron commander permitted even the slightest weakening
in the control over preparation for flights. I can say even more: the more perfect
become the skills of a pilot and the more difficult the assignment that he has to per-
form, the more the exactingness of the commander increases."
In the leading units, where great importance is attributed to the training of young
pilots, this work is being conducted according to a strict plan and Pxperienced
methodologists are brought in to do the teaching. The pilots are nurtured on glorious
combat traditions in a spirit of fidelity to the requirements of the military oath. Much
attention is devoted to Party-political work directed toward instilling in the young men
a high. Communist consciousness and patriotism. 0
In the Air Force, everything necessary is being done in order to improve the
training of cadets in flying schools, to give them more perfect skills in piloting and
in the combat application of modern aircraft.
l'hus, better trained pilots are coming into the line units now than a few years
ago. Here excellent living conditions are created for them, and considerable re-
sources are allocated for the organization of relaxation. The commanders, the politi-
cal wor1cer3, and the Party and Komsomol organizations are displaying 4 maximum
of initiative and persistence in working with the young flight personnel.
"It is necessary to give young people the opportunity to work more," announced
N. S. Khrushchev at the. June Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. This requirement per-
tains in equal degree to both the civilian and the military youth. It is being carried
out by our commanders and political workers. If the training and indoctrination work
of the leading units and subunits are analyzed attentively, much that is new and very
instructive for the others can be noted _there.
0
In one of the units the commander encountered certain difficulties in the training
of young pilots. Interfering were airfield conditions that were not entirely favorable;
the different level of training of the flight personnel, and several other things, How-
ever, because the commander understood well the importance of the task confronting
0
0
Editorial 3
him he found a way out of the situation. He gathered the young men. into one group
and sent them off to another airfield. He assigned the most experienced instructors
to them, and in a short time he gave them a full flying load. The young pilots, who
had just begun to master a jet plane neck,/ to them, returned to their own airfield at
night, each in his own combat plane, and demonstrated a high art in night flying.
Officer N. T. Shkola has proved to be a good methodologist and mentor of
young pilots. Practicing with the young pilots a new exercise -- flying at night under
normal weather conditions -- he was able to organize the matter in such a way that
the pilots mastered flying in an abbreviated period. Having no lengthy interruptions,
they flew as often as necessary to consoliate their skills firmly. As a result, they
did not require supplementary check flights.
In recent times, the air commanders and political workers have markedly im-
proved indoctrination work among young pilots. Following the decisions of the Twenty-
First Congress of the CPSU and the October Plenum of the C.c, of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, at the basis of this work they put the achievements of our
people, the success in fulfilling the seven-year plan for the development of the coun-
try's national economy, and the achievements in combat and political training in
their own and neighboring units. On the basis of special local features, our super-
visory offi...ers use very diverse forms of indoctrination work.
Unfortunately, not in all the air units do they treat the training of youth with pro-
eper diligence. There still are occasional subunits where the words "young pilot" are
uttered even with irony. And this is understandable. If a young pilot flies only on
occasion, if difficult exerci2es are not planned for him fox a long time, he will never
attain the level of the other pilots and will be included for a long time in the ranks of
the inexperienced. And morally he will feel not too good; while insofar as combat
training is concerned, where will it come from if he can only watch how others fly?
Analysis of the work of integrating young pilots into the unit shows that not yet
all commanders utilize all opportunities to the fullest degsee. Thus, in one of the
units, in connection with the fact that it was necessary to organize flying with three
categories of flight personnel with different levels of training, the proper significance
was not attached to integrating pilots in their first year of service. By the schedule
one flying day and one night per week were allotted to them. Naturally, with such
planning, interruptions in flying developed, and this in turn led to an increase in
check flight time. While in order to fulfill the approved plan, the commanders plan-
ned a maximum load for the pilot on the flying day, even exceeding the established
norms in some cases.
For some reason, occasional commanders still do not take into consideration
the fact that better trained pilots are now coming to the units, and in drawing up the
plan for their flight training they mechanically include in it all the exercises that
they had included formerly. As a result, the necessary total flying time for carry-
ing out the first task for pilots with different levels of training has changed practi-
cally not at all. There occurs a marking of time and a superfluous expenditure of
state resources.
It is even worse when such marking time is transformed into artificial restraint
of the young officers in their efforts to become first-class pilots as rapidly as pos-
sible. After all, it is no secret to anyone that we have young pilots who cannot raise
their class rating for long periods of time.
0
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
4 Editorial
It goes without saying that such an attitude toward the youth is beneath criticism.
Obviously, he who retards the training of youth is forgetting one simpletruth: young
pilots are the future of our aviation. They will have toosolve problems in the further
development of the Soviet Air Fleet -- the conquest of space and time. P...o.d in order
to successfully master flying at new and as yet unheard-of speeds and aliatudes,
young pilots must absorb all the experience of the older generations. The sooner
this is done the better. Hence the periods of integrating the young men into the units
must be made shorter, not longer; everything possible must be done so that yester-
day's young pilot be today a full-fledged air fighter. �
Analysis of the shortcomings in the training of young pilots permits making some
demands on aviation schools also. In a recently conducted interrogation of the in-
structor personnel of some units who teach pilots in their first year of service, a
desire was expressed that more attention be paid in the schools to the studj of equip-
ment, its operation, and the methodology of determining the condition of instrAlents-
and various assemblies. In studying aerodynamics and in the process of aerial gun- �
nery and navigational training, it is desirable that the cadets solve practical problems
that will be encountered in the process of combat training in the units. 0
Experience shows that in some aviation schools commander skills are too weak-
ly instilled in the cadets, and the skills of independent preparation for flights are in-
adequately developed. In the program of flight training it is necessary that the last
flights in practicing standard attacks be conducted at high spseds. The profile of
gliding in for a landing should be brought closer to the profile worked out in the line
units. 09 0 �
Inasmuch as in the training of young officers, including pilots also,othere
are serious shortcomings, commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol
organizations must intensify in every way their political and military indoctrination
of young flight cadres, must improve the quality of all their ideological work.
Our commanders and political workers have sufficient experience in organizing
the Marxist-Leninist education of officers. However, when it is a matter of in- ,0
�
doctrinatin.g young men, it must not be forgotten that they sometimes have too little
knowledge and skills, particularly in organizing independnnt work. oTherefore it is
necessary to help each young pilot to improve constantly his political and professioneal
knowledge.
At the basis of Marxist-Leninist education, it is necessary to place the heroic
history of the CPSU, to nurture the pilots on the revolutionary traditions of the Party
and the labor class. The study of Marxist-Leninist theory must be organically tiedo .0
in with the experience of building Communism in our country. with the tasks of the
Armed Forces, and the specific practical tafirks of each unit and subunit, and it
should be directed toward achieving ever new successes in combat training. Ifois
necessary to help the young pilots to understand the essence and the requirements of
the military oath and the military relulations, and on this basis to instill in them ir-
reproachable performance and discipline.
Apparently, it is necessary to restore everywhere an excellent old tradition where
the unit commander presents the newly arrived young pilots at 2. genepl assembly
of the officers. The commander and his deputy for the political section must with-
out fail acquaint the arrivals with the heroic history of the unit � tell them about the
successes achieved by the unit in the postwar years, and show by specific examples
0
�
0
0
�
�
0
�
Go
0
�
Editorial 5
the men who are leaders in socialist competition and outstanding men in combat and
political training. Such talks are of very great indoctrinational importance, because
they immediately introduce the young pilots into the combat family in which they will
have to work and perfect their flying skill.
Entry into a unit is an important moment in the lives of young pilots. And right
here it is extremely important that the officer fraternity, the entire community,
help them to become established, to get on their feet, as they say.
In the process of training and indoctrination work, the commander and the politi-
cal supervisor working with the young pilots will surely encounter difficulties. For
one officer everything may not be just right with discipline, for another with training,
for a third with his family. All of this may happen. The commander and the politi-
cal worker must be able to come to the right decision, and for this they need to know
their subordinates well.
O Without a doubt, in training young pilots the commander must devote more atten-
tion than at any other time to flight safety, both from the viewpoint of the best organi-
0
zation of flights and from the position of impressing on the young men the importance
� �
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
PARTY. POLITICAL WORK
AT TACTICAL
FLIGHT EXERCISES
Lt. Col. K. G. ANTONOV
After the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, Party-political work in the units
was considerably activated. The increasing political activity of all the personnel
called forth by the historic decisions of the Congress, patriotic enthusiasm among
the fighting men -- all this has a tremendous effect on improving all combat training.
Recently a task was placed before us -- to prepare for and conduct a tactical
flight exercise.
The personnel of the aibunits increased even more their exactingness toward
themselves during the period of preparation for the exercise. The political workers
and the Party and Komsomol aktivs took a very effective part in this preparatory
work, mobilizing the personnel for outstanding performance of the tasks set, genera-
lizing and disseminating advanced experience, actively helping the commanders to
eradicate shortcomings quickly.
In order to mobilize the Communists and Komsomol members and to bring the
purposes and tasks of the exercise to the attention of every serviceman, we held a
conference of the Party and Komsomol aktivs, Party assemblies, and talks with the
servicemen.
The supervisory personnel took an active part in explaining the tasks of the ex-
ercise to the personnel. The deputy commander addressed a Party assembly with a
report "On the Tasks of Communists at Exercises".
The participation of the supervisory command personnel in explaining the tasks
of the tactical flight exercise helped the pilots, technicians, and specialists to deter-
mine correctly their place in the work of the large collective. Addressing the assem-
blies were many pilots and technicians, who shared their experience of past years,
noted shortcomings that had interfered with preparing the personnel and equipment
well, and told how they were eradicated.
The commanders of the subunits held political information sessions and explain-
ed to their subordinates the tasks confronting them.
In the elements where the commanders are M. I. Zheltobryukhov and A. F.
Lysukhin, the pilots gave their pledge to perform intercepts of aerial targets only
with outstanding evaluations. Technicians Yu. S. Nepogodin and N. Ye. Buravtsev
pledged themselves to service the planes for a repeat sortie within abbreviated
periods and with high quality. Drivers, radiomen, and other specialists also under-
1
e,
Party-Political Work
7
Maj. S. N. Chervyakov is a military pilot first class. He has trained scores
of young pilots.
This officer commands a squadron, and he has done much to put his subunit
among the leading ones. The effort of the commander, who knows how to rely on
the help of the Communists, produced results: the squadron has become Outstanding.
In the photo: Officer S. N. Chervyakov.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV.
took socialist obligations. The deputies for the political section and the secretaries
of the Party and Komsomol organizations took an active part in the preliminary pre-
paration for the flights. Rated pilots N. I. Gerasimenko and A. Ya. Mel'nikov helped
the young pilots to study the flight mission.
The extensive Party and Komsomol aktiv was brought into the work of preparing
the flight and technical personnel for the exercises. Military Pilot First Class,
Communist F. A. Morozkin held a talk with the flight personnel on the actions of
pilots in special flight cases. The secretary of the Party organization of a subunit,
pilot B. I. Skudin, talked with the pilots and technicians on the subject "The Tasks of
the Personnel in Preparing For and Conducting a Tactical Flight Exercise". Subunit
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
elf
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
K. G. Antonov
engineer A. I. Korniyenko told the technical personnel and the aircraft specialists
about the peculiarities of preparing and servicing aviation equipment during a period
of intensive flight work., On the example of the best technicians, V. P. Ogloblin and
P. V. Migunov, he showed how it is possible to service a plane for a sortie in a short
time and with high quality.
As part of the preparation for the exercises, the workers of the club recorded on
a tape-recorder addresses by experienced pilots on the special features of inter-
cepting targets at low altitudes and in the stratosphere and addresses by engineers
and technicians on the duties of the technician and the junior aircraft specialist in
the three-zone system of servicing flights. All of these addresses were broadcast
through the radio center of the propaganda machine.
The officers of the political section conducted active organizational work. They
helped the commanders and the political workers in preparing the exercise, explained
the tasks, and organized Party information sessions on the measures undertaken and
on the exchange of experience among the subunits.
The exercises began with a combat training alert. The political workers went to
the airfield together with everyone else. First of all, they helped the commanders
check whether all the servicemen were ready for combat training work, talked with
the pilots, technicians, and specialists, and pointed out shortcomings, which they
eradicated right there if possible. In addition, the deputy commander for the politi-
cal section held a talk with the truck drivers on the safety rules of traffic on the air-
field, made the rounds of the places where the airfield guard was posted, checked
how well the flight-line crew knew its tasks. The secretaries of the Party and the
Komsomol organizations, staying with the subunits, continued explaining to the men
the task assigned and the tactical situation.
Political workers Mel'nikov and Gerasimenko participated in the first sorties
for interception of aerial targets. Through agitators they immediately reported on
the sorties of groups of planes to intercept targets. And after the data on the target
were received, placards and diagrams were posted showing the characteristics of the
target and depicting the peculiar features of the intercept. The last names of the
pilots who flew out were entered on "flash" bulletins prepared in advance, so that
after their landing the personnel could be informed of the execution of the task assign-
ed.
The very fact that the political workers participated in the first intercept flights
is of very great significance. In the first place, the personal example of a Party
leader is a mobilizing factor of no little importance, lifting all the personnel to out-
standing execution of the mission. In the second place, after returning from a respon-
sible flight it is much easier for the political workers to conduct further Party-politi-
cal work on a business-like level. They themselves sensed the special features of
the combat training tasks assigned and experienced certain difficulties in carrying
them out. Their personal observations helped to make the necessary corrections in
the explanatory work conducted by the Communists. The talks held with the person-
nel became more specific. T he problems of combat training found more vivid ex-
pression in the oral broadcasts and the wall press.
During the course of the exercises, more than 15 radio newscasts were broad-
cast, devoted to the advanced experience of the aviators; addresses by the best
pilots were broadcast.
I
I I
I I
I I
I
Party-Political Work 9
In connection with an increase in intercept sorties, the pilots were barely able
to report on the execution of the mission and discuss the results of the "battle" with
their comrades, when the command to get ready was given again. The engineers,
technicians, and aircraft specialists strove to inspect the planes as thoroughly as
possible and service them for a repeat sortie as quickly as possible. Under these
conditions, the principal method was individual work with the men.
For example, as soon as the camera gun film was developed after the first
sortie, the agitators told about its results to every pilot who participated in the exer-
cises. Those who received outstanding evaluations -- Meltnikov, Gerasirnenko, and
others -- gave talks by radio and shared their experience in intercepting high-alti-
tude targets. Then a photographic display with the results of the "firing" at targets
was put together and mounted on the club truck.
The agitators also told about a mistake made by pilot S. M. Gubin, who opened
fire at the target at great range. The Party aktiv also reacted in time to the mistake
of pilot V. S. Val'kov. He had not mastered precisely the procedure for emptying
the tanks and, having an adequate reserve of fuel and being located within 25 minutes
of flying time from his home airfield, he reported by radio that his fuel was ex-
hausted. The flight controller ordered him to cease carrying out the mission and to
land his plane at the maneuver airfield. Val'kov's mistake was thoroughly analyzed,
and the procedure for emptying the fuel tanks on the plane and the methods of checking
it were studied once again with each pilot. The subunit engineer made a radio address,
explaining how the range and duration of the flight is calculated and noting the docu-
ments that regulate the actions of the pilot in checking the expenditure of fuel.
The agitators of the technical air units told all the personnel of the successful
actions of the drivers of fuel trucks, tractors, and special purpose vehicles.
A combat leaflet was issued devoted to the resourcefulness and initiative of start-
er Pfc. N. I. Kitov, who noticed fuel leaking from a plane that had taxied out for
takeoff. With flags he signalled the pilot that takeoff was prohibited, but the latter
did not notice his signals and the plane began to gather speed. Continuing to run be-
side the plane, the starter snatched a loaded flare pistol from his holster and fired
it ahead in the direction of takeoff. The pilot noticed the flare, stopped the takeoff,
and,at the command of the flight controller, taxied to the parking area. The leak
was eliminated, and the plane took off to carry out the mission. For initiative
in performing his service duties, Kitov was cited by the commander.
At the end of the first day of flying, late in the evening, the Party and Komsomol
aktiv got together. The deputy commander for the political unit summed up the re-
sults. The political section determined that political workers N. I. Gerasirnenlc.o and
I. Kb.. Novik organized Party-political work in the exercises better than anyone else.
Ordinarily, the experience of Party-political work accumulated during a day of
exercises becomes the property of only a small group of Communists and political
workers, since under the conditions of dispersed basing it is often very difficult to
get together in large groups. This was taken into consideration at the exercises des-
cribed here. So as to disseminate somehow all the new and good undertakings, we
proceeded in the following manner. From the experience accumulated we selected
what was most interesting and instructive that was not done among our neighbors.
We transmitted this experience briefly and clearly by telephone to the other units.
Thanks to such efficient action by the political workers, many pilots and technicians
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
r"-�
�
10 K. G. Antonov
The aircraft pool of Soviet aviation has been augmented by the gigantic new Tu-
114 turboprop plane developed by the design bureal, of Academician A. N. Tupolev.
This plane has already shown its remarkable flying qualities in flights to Paris for
the 23rd International Air Exposition and to New York.
"This is splendid!", "Amazing!", "Colossal!" -- such was the evaluation given
it by foreign aviation specialists and visitors to the exposition.
In the flights, the crew of the plane under the command of A. Yakim.ov displayed
a high flying skill. The Tu-114 traversed the course from Moscow to New York,
a distance of over 8000 km, without landing in record time -- 11 hours and 6 minutes,
and the return course in 9 hours and 48 minutes.
In the photo: Academician A. N. Tupolev among the members of the crew of
the Tu-114.
knew about N. I. Kitov's resourcefulness and initiative on that very same day.
On the second day of the exercises an alert was sounded. Prepared in advance
for action under conditions of atomic and chemical attack, the personnel displayed
a high degree of organization in performing their service duties. By personal ex-
ample, the Party aktiv mobilized the pilots, technicians, and other specialists for
rapid and high-quality servicing of the materiel for the next flight and for doing away
with the consequences of atomic and chemical attack.
Political workers S. V. Vasil'yey and M. I. Burochkin and the staff officers dur-
ing this period intensified their control over observance of precautionary measures
in motor transport traffic on the airfield. They personally checked the movements
of motor vehicle columns to the dispersal points, helped platoon and squad comman-
Party-Political Work
11
ders to evacuate the free personnel to covered positions, and took part in the de-
gassing and decontamination of planes and motor vehicles. On the second day of the
exercises, individual work was intensified even more. Combat leaflets continued to
be issued even where there were 4-6 servicemen. For example, combat leaflets
were issued at the points of dispersal of aircraft and motor vehicles, in the covered
positions, and at degassing and decontamination points.
The exercises ended an hour before the advent of darkness. But the work on the
airfield still continued.
And the political workers remained at the airfield for a long time yet. They
told about the results of the exercises, about the work of the flight and technical
personnel, and they listened attentively to remarks on the organization of Party-
political work.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
1.01-
� t.
12,
K. G. Antonov
In the conquest of air space, Soviet pilots have achieved notable successes, es-
tablishing new world records in flight altitude and bringing fame to Soviet aviation
throughout the entire world. On 13 July, in an RV [high-altitude jet] aircraft with
two turbojet engines, Lt. Col. V. P. Smirnov attained in flight an altitude of 20,456
m, with a payload of one ton on the plane. A few days later, pilot Smirnov went up
to an altitude of 20,200 m, but this time with a load of two tons. On 14 July, in a
T-431 aircraft with one turbojet engine, engineer pilot Maj. V. S. Il'yushin went up
to an altitude of 28,852 m.
In the photos: Communists Lt. Col. V. P. Smirnov [preceding page] and
engineer pilot Maj. V. S. Il'yshin (above).
INITIATIVE AND
PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
3. INITIATIVE -- SUPPORT IT;
CONCEIT -- CONDEMN IT
Lt. Col. P. P. SADOVNICHENKO,
Military Pilot First Class
Col. Ye. V. Sukhorukov's article, "Initiative and Personal Responsibility", pub-
lished in the sixth issue of the journal, I have read attentively. I agree with him fully
in that where there is no initiative, progress ceases and the activity of the flight and
technical personnel becomes limited. This gives rise to routine and indifference in
the work.
Without initiative, without the creativeness of the mass of airmen, we could not
have accumulated a wealth of experience and drawn up guiding documents on the basis
of it. But even the very best manual cannot give ready-made decisions for all cases
in life. In the flight experience of our units and subunits there is hidden so much
that is unforeseen that scarcely anyone can be so bold as to assert that he has learned
and knows everything and can now foresee everything.
My comrades and I have been serving in the Air Force for a long time. We fly
much and we frequently direct flights; but before each flying day, before each flight,
we invariably ask ourselves the questions: Has everything been done in the manner
required by the guiding documents? Has everything been thought through to the end,
to the smallest detail? It seems that everything has been weighed and provided for in
advance, and yet once in a while a case will arise when it is necessary to display
initiative, to make an immediate decision that is sometimes associated with risk.
For example, here is how the situation developed one time at night when I was
directing flights: In the second half of the flight shift the humidity of the air began to
increase rapidly. Knowing that in our area this is associated with the appearance of
fog that envelops the airfield, I gave the crews the command to land immediately.
Unfortunately, not all of them were in the area of the airfield and could touch down im-
mediately. The crew of pilot A. P. Perfilov was making a route flight. Receiving my
command, Perfilov came out on the homing radio station by the shortest route, but by
that time the airfield was already covered by the fog. The alternate airfields were in
the same predicament. A difficult situation developed.
Knowing Perfilov to be an outstanding pilot and having a complete idea of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
14 P. P. Sadovnichenko
capabilities of the landing system and the airfield equipment, I gave the command to
turn on all the floodlights and the system to full capacity. Then I asked Perillov
whether he could see the airfield and how much fuel he had left. I received the re-
ply: "Fuel 600, the floodlights are visible, I can land." I authorized the landing and
ordered my assistant at the homing station to watch for the passage of the plane and
to report the direction and altitude of the approach on time.
But what was still to be done in order to make certain of a safe landing? To im-
prove the illumination of the runway and the designation of the flight line, I decided
to make use of a flare pistol, especially at the moment of roundout and touch-
down. All this brought the desired results. Perfilov landed the plane outstandingly
in an even thicker fog.
I shall present yet another incident. In the daytime under adverse weather con-
ditions, an element of fighters was making a route flight above the clouds. At the
moment of its return, a fog spreading out from the sea unexpectedly covered the air-
field. This happened so quickly that the third pilot managed with difficulty to land
his craft to the right of the runway on the dirt (with the permission of the flight con-
troller). The fourth plane, piloted by element commander N. Belash, passed over
the flight line in a solid fog. The flight controller ordered the pilot to penetrate the
clouds upward and come out on the DPRM [ outer homing radio beacon].
ADVICE TO THE ELEMENT COMMANDER
BEFORE PRELIMINARY PREPARATION FOR A FLIGHT
One of the duties of an element commander is to conduct preliminary prepara-
tion with his pilots. This and other preflight duties compel him to prepare himself
seriously and comprehensively for every new flying day.
First of all the element commander draws up the pilots' assignments for the
forthcoming flights. Here, the sequence of carrying out the planned exercises is
studied attentively and determined rigidly. When you do this, take into considera-
tion the individual characteristics of your subordinates. After all, the sequence
and especially the methodology of carrying out a flight may be different, depending on
the personal qualities of the pilots.
The element commander must draw up in advance the plan of the flight from take-
off to landing. In this, it is necessary to picture very clearly the objective of the
flight, the conditions ,of carrying out the exercises, the sequence and the technique
of carrying it out, and safety measures. It is also necessary to make the necessary
calculations.
Inasmuch as during the preliminary preparation it will be necessary to reply to
questions that bother the pilots, it is necessary to comprehend theoretically the ele-
ments of the flight, the mistakes that may be made during the flight, and the ways of
correcting them. For this, you will have great need for a knowledge of practical
aerodynamics, which should always be high in a commander.
The next stage of the preparation is drawing up the plan of conducting trainer
sessions and determining the exercises that are to be practiced. The element com-
mander comes to an agreement with the squadron commander on matters of how,
when, and on what the planned trainer sessions will be conducted: on the STL
Initiative and Personal Responsibility 15
[aerial gunnery trainer], on the TL [pilot trainer], or in the cockpit of the plane, or
perhaps here and there both. In this event, the time for conducting the trainer ses-
sions on the apparatus is strictly determined.
The element commander selects the literature and the visual aids for conducting
independent preparation for the flight (diagrams, models, methodological devices,
and other aids), or assigns this work to one of the pilots.
In conclusion, the element commander devises and proposes in arbitrary form
a plan for independent preparation and gives instructions to the element technician
on preparing the materials for the flights and for conducting the trainer sessions.
Col. G. P. YEVSIKOV,
Military Pilot First Class.
During this time a report was received to the effect that the alternate airfield
could not provide a landing, and there was not enough fuel to fly to the nearest
neighboring airfield. Again a very difficult situation had developed. Both the flight
controller and the pilot understood this very well. However, Belash did not lose his
head. Having evaluated the situation, he requested permission to go to an area where
the ground had recently been visible through breaks in the clouds.
Knowing this area and the capabilities of the pilot well, the flight controller gave
this permission and suggested that he try to come out below the clouds if the condi-
tions were favorable, select a spot, and land the plane. All this Belash executed
brilliantly.
In both the first and the second case it was necessary, without a doubt, to take a
risk, but this was justified by the fact that the flight controllers knew their subordin-
ates well and had faith in their capabilities.
It seems to me that it is necessary to support in every way pilots who display
initiative in a difficult situation and to popularize their deeds. This will be of great
educational importance and will help other pilots to make the correct decision in a
similar situation.
Generalization of the experience of flight controllers and flight personnel who are
able to make the proper decision in a difficult situation and to act wisely and with ini-
tiative will make it possible to enrich our guiding documents in good time.
However, it is necessary to be very cautious in selecting such facts. Sometimes
there are in them, like underwater rocks, hidden and undesirable features in the
characters of individual pilots such as, for example, recklessness and conceit. And
these must not be supported, but rather condemned.
At a subunit there appeared a new pilot. At first acquaintance he seemed capa-
ble and experienced; in conversations about flying he gave the impression of a fully
mature, capable, wordly-wise airman. However, the very first check flights warned
the element commander who was assigned to training him, and the latter announced
frankly that the skills of the new pilot in piloting a fighter were very weak. After a
flight in a two-place plane, I became convinced of the correctness of the element
commander's conclusion. For training this pilot a special program was drawn up,
in which we included the simplest elements of combat training. The main attention
in it was devoted to practicing takeoff, initial approach, final approach, and landing.
We studied his logbook carefully. We found nothing inauspicious. There was a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
16 P. P. Sadovnichenko
Initiative and Personal Responsibility 17
The pilot mastered the individual program with considerable delay, which re-
tarded all the work of the squadron. He reacted sensitively to remarks, with dis-
satisfaction, expressing the opinion that he was "given no chance", that no confidence
was put in him, and so on.
He gained sympathizers; especially zealous was officer Solodovnikov. Although
I had warned him that the pilot was not ready for solo flight, Solodovnikov did not
take my conclusions into consideration and, being flight controller, at the persistent
request of the novice let him go on a solo flight. This was a clear violation, because
Solodovnikov took a completely unjustifiable risk. Having taken off with consider-
able deviation, after the sixth approach and obviously overshooting, the pilot did
not land the plane but hit the ground hard. However, even after such a "flight", if
one may call it so, he continued to maintain that he saw everything and did every-
thing properly, and it was only the disconnection of the radio cord jack that prevent-
ed him from executing the assignment outstandingly.
After that the pilot was checked by the unit commander, who suspended him
from further training in a fighter of this type. But the latter continued to complain
as before and to maintain that he was being given "no chance".
The plane piloted by Senior Lt. Yerygin was returning from a flight mission at
night. The airfield was already in sight. The pilot was putting the craft into the
third turn. And suddenly the unforeseen happened.
"The right generator has gone out," reported the copilot, officer Osadchiy.
In the very next second, the situation in the air deteriorated sharply. A
threat to the safety of the flight developed. Now everything depended on the endur-
ance, the coolness, the resourcefulness, and the skillful actions of the crew.
But Yerygin did everything that was necessary. This first-class pilot knew
very well how to act in special cases. This time he was able to make a precise
final approach and land the plane on the runway. The craft was saved.
In this exceptionally difficult situation the crew commander, Communist Senior
Lt. K. V. Yerygin and pilot V. A. Osadchiy acted competently and confidently. They
were cited by the senior air chief.
In the photo: Pilot officers K. V. Yerygin (right) and V. A. Osadchiy.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV.
lot of flying time and outstanding and good evaluations by the check pilots . It should
be noted that the logbook was a new one; in it there were only two check flights (in
the pattern and in the zone).
ADVICE TO THE ELEMENT COMMANDER
DEMONSTRATION IN FLIGHT
The element commander who is teaching a pilot must often resort to this lif e-
tested method. Whether an exercise new to the pilot is being performed or whether
lost skills in the technique of piloting are being restored -- in both the one case and
the other the element commander first shows the pilot how to execute properly this or
that element of flight.
Like other methods of teaching, demonstration requires of the element commander
instructor certain methodological skills. Would it be right, for example, if, having
told the pilot that you will show him a combat turn, you execute it and that is all?
Obviously, this will not achieve the purpose. Apparently it is necessary not only to
show the pilot but also to explain why the given maneuver is performed just so and
not some other way. And it is necessary to describe this, not just before executing
the maneuver, but ahead of time, on the ground, in the preparation for the flight.
Thus, demonstration in flight makes a whole series of fully defined methodological
demands on both the teacher and the pupil.
Experienced methodologists point to such a requirement, for example, as the
pilot's readiness to grasp the demonstration. To this end, during the preliminary
and preflight preparation the element commander explains in detail to the pilot the
procedure for carrying out the given element of flight and demonstrates it on aircraft
models. In the flight, just before the demonstration the instructor makes certain that
the trainee has performed all the necessary preliminary actions and that nothing will
distract him. In general, an experienced element commander strives to create in
the flight the most favorable situation, in which the maximum of the trainee's atten-
tion is concentrated on grasping the element of flight being demonstrated.
Together with the proper position of the plane, in some cases it is desirable to
show also the deviations from the norm in one direction or another, explaining along
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
18 P. P. Sadovnichenko
the way the reasons giving rise to such deviations. And if the proper actions are
repeated, the element commander strives to make them exactly uniform, because
only under this condition will it be easier for the pilot to remember what is being
demonstrated.
The main thing in demonstration is the ability of the instructor to execute the
given element of flight precisely, without the slightest mistake. High quality in
piloting technique on the part of the element commander calls forth in the pilot a
desire to achieve the same degree of skill.
Col. I. I. TELKOV,
Military Pilot First Class.
Hanging in a prominent place in the club-
house is a colorful leaflet "An Outstanding
Pilot -- an Able Commander". It tells about
Military Pilot First Class Capt. Petr Grigor'-
yevich Iovlev. The remarks written by his
colleagues tell warmly of the selfless soldier-
ly work of this Communist pilot, of the ex-
actingness and methodological skill of this
commander mentor.
Capt. Iovlev is a veteran of the Great
Patriotic War. He made dozens of combat
sorties. His courage, steadfastness, and
skill were tempered in aerial battles. His
combat experience helps officer Iovlev to
perform difficult new tasks successfully.
In the photo: Outstanding Man in combat
and political training, Military Pilot First
Class P. G. Iovlev.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV.
Initiative and Personal Responsibility
19
To an unversed person it might appear at first glance that the pilot was in reali-
ty honestly eager to fly, displaying initiative and putting great responsibility on him-
self. In actuality, however, everything appeared entirely different.
This is the kind of "initiative" to which we object. It is necessary to support and
develop initiative and responsibility that are based primarily on a high degree of
awareness, honesty, devotion, outstanding knowledge of the equipment, a high de-
gree of flying and combat skill, and a sound evaluation of one's capabilities. An in-
dividual approach to the training and an objective evaluation of the actions of subordin -
ates in combination with specific and purposeful Party-political work in indoctrinating
high moral and combat qualities in them are the most important conditions of success-
ful mastery of combat skill and accident-free flying.
In his article Col. Sukhorukov touched casually on preliminary preparation. As
a matter of fact, many of our commanders have come to the conclusion that the
methods of conducting preliminary preparation do not correspond to modern equip-
ment.
Wherein then is the root of the evil?
A major shortcoming of the existing method of preliminary preparation, in our
opinion, consists in that all the work of conducting it is not done by those commanders
who should do this, in the first place, and in the second place, an excessive amount of
time is spent in studying the exercises, and by far not enough on trainer sessions.
Preliminary preparation is usually conducted by squadron commanders and high-
er ranking supervisory personnel. The element commander, however -- the princi-
pal mentor and teacher of the pilots -- is crowded to the background as before. And
why not entrust the bulk of the work to him? After all, in the process of preliminary
preparation the element commander is required to learn comprehensively the content
and procedure of carrying out the forthcoming mission, to conduct purposeful trainer
sessions with ev ery pilot in his element, to determine how he has independently pre-
pared for the flight, to check the necessary calculations, and to report to the squad-
ron commander on the readiness of the element. The squadron (unit) commanders
and the service chiefs are only required to check the readiness of the pilots by posing
problems and to prepare the element commanders.
To what is it necessary to devote most cf the time in the process of preliminary
preparation? For example, if 4 hours are allotted for it, in our view it is desirable
to allot no more than 1 hour for studying the exercises, no more than 1 hour and 30
minutes for independent preparation, and no less than an hour and a half for trainer
sessions.
Why do we propose so much time for trainer sessions?
The thing is that at the present time the units are equipped with fighters of dif-
ferent types that have their own peculiarities both in piloting technique and in the
disposition and arrangement of assemblies, instruments, and other equipment in the
cockpit. Sometimes even in planes of the same series there are essential differen-
ces in the location of the equipment in the pilot's cockpit.
In the process of trainer sessions, control will also be perhaps the most effec-
tive. In order that the trainer sessions be purposeful, they must be prepared in ad-
vance, not only by the element commander but also by the service chiefs and the en-
gineers of all profiles. All those who organize, support, and direct flying should
participate in conducting trainer sessions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
20
P. P. Sadovnichenko
A GIFT FROM THE SPONSORS
Ties of great friendship bind the men of X unit to the Pioneers of the
ently the Komsomol members of the unit conceived the idea of presenting
the school children. They did not decide immediately what it should be.
one wanted the gift to be interesting and useful.
On a beautifully curved pedestal they set a large hemisphere, and on
traced the boundaries of our Motherland.
Throughout the entire territory of the USSR, there are models of the new con-
struction jobs of the septennium in-the chemical industry and metallurgy, hydro and
thermal power stations, new railroads, and many other things.
There appeared models of the first artificial satellite, of the second and the
third, a model of a cosmic rocket, a plane...
You press a button, and varicolored lights of the new construction jobs go on,
the model of the cosmic rocket begins to turn, sending out signals familiar to every-
city. Re-
a gift to
But every-
it they
one
Many of our Komsomol members took an active part in building the model.
In the photo: technician Lt. Mikhail Luk'yanenko at the working model "Construc-
tion Jobs of the Septennium".
Photo by N. N. YEMSHANOV.
I .2
ACT CREATIVELY IN
AERIAL TRAINING
BATTLES
(On the results of the discussion of the article on the special features of present-
day aerial combat)
A fighter plane was rapidly closing in on an aerial target. Military Pilot First
Class Maj. P. V. Novikov searched attentively for the "enemy" and spotted him at
a considerable range. But the fighter interceptor had been vectored by the command
post to such a position that he could not attack straight in and first had to execute a
vigorous maneuver. The pilot put the plane into a turn, but he soon saw that the
flight speed was declining rapidly and he was beginning to fall behind the target. In
order not to lose the "enemy" from view (since in this case a repeat vectoring would
have been necessary), Maj. Novikov began making a descending turn. The speed
was restored but altitude was lost. It became necessary to pursue the target and
attack it far from the assigned line.
Maj. Novikov told about this incident at a conference devoted to a discussion of
the articles on the special features of present-day aerial combat published in the
journal "Herald of the Air Fleet".
The pilots and air commanders who participated in the conference discussed the
contents of the articles and cited the most interesting examples from their own ex-
perience.
As a matter of fact, why was the fighter unable to attack the plane at the assign-
ed line?
The pilot executed the commands and maintained the assigned regime precisely.
He spotted the target in good time, insofar as the conditions and the visibility per-
mitted, and subsequently acted vigorously and piloted the plane skillfully; and yet
the interception line shifted.
Analysis of this flight showed that the special features of aerial combat at pre-
sent-day flight speeds were not taken into consideration in vectoring the fighter. If
the target and the fighter plane were flying at speeds of, let us say, 600-700 km/hr,
then under the conditions that developed the fighter pilot would have successfully ex-
ecuted a maneuver for coming out in a position suitable for attack. In this the target
would not have been able to get far away and the mission would have been accomplish-
ed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
22 Act Creatively
It is another matter at present-day flight speeds. It is much more difficult for
the fighter to execute a vigorous maneuver; in order to gain a position advantageous
for attack, he needs considerable air space. In turning with a small bank the pilot
may get far away from the target and lose it, while with a large bank he will lose
speed. Furthermore, the rapidity of the maneuver is regulated by the magnitudes of
ultimate load. These special features were not taken into consideration in the vec-
toring.
And so, there is no doubt that qualitative changes in aviation equipment and arma-
ment have led to a change in the nature of present-day aerial combat. Pilots encoun-
ter these changes in conducting aerial training battles. And it is quite natural that
he who does not know them and does not take them into consideration cannot hit aerial
targets successfully, act creatively, apply the most effective tactical methods and
rational combat procedures.
The editors of the journal published Col. S. A. Savo sin's article "Special Features
of Present-Day Aerial Combat" (No. 12, 1958) and began a discussion of it. In sub-
sequent articles, pilots expressed their opinions on the problems touched upon.
Naturally, the opinions of the authors of the articles did not always coincide.
But during the discussion some of the special features of present-day aerial combat
were subjected to debate. Of course, these views cannot become some sort of dogma.
With the development of aviation equipment and weapons they become more profound
and change as experience is accumulated. However, a proper understanding of the
special features of present-day aerial combat will help our pilots to conduct aerial
training battles creatively, to search for new methods of action and tactical moves.
In the opinion of the majority of the authors of the articles and the pilots who
spoke at the conference , these special features are due primarily to increased
flight speeds and altitudes.
It is known that fighter planes are intended to hit aerial targets, whose flight
speed has increased considerably. What has this led to? First of all, there has
arisen a need to spot the targets at great ranges, and the development of radar
technology has made it possible to do this within certain limits.
As stated by A. F. Petrov in his article "Find New Tactical Methods", the plan
of battle has also changed.
The actions of fighters are now continuously controlled by command posts, which
vector them to the target, help them to conduct the search and to gain an advantage-
ous position for attack, and, in the case of failure, to attack again.
All of this has also caused changes in the concept of surprise and in the views
on ways of achieving it. The majority of the authors agree that the importance of
surprise in aerial combat has not declined. But in connection with the use of techni-
cal spotting facilities, it is more difficult to achieve concealed closure. However,
it is possible to take the enemy unawares and to deceive him, for which it is neces-
sary to make skillful use of various technical facilities in combination with diverse
tactical methods. Furthermore, the sphere of activity for creative initiative on the
part of the flight personnel and command posts has now expanded considerably.
As a matter of fact, quite limited facilities were used formerly to achieve sur-
prise: the cloud cover, the sun, haze, etc. Added to them now are radio technical
facilities and other technical equipment, which have moved to the foreground.
Naturally, the demands on pilots have increased, but at the same time there has
e
�
..
Act Creatively 23
been an extension of their possibilities for creativemess with the aim of achieving
surprise and, consequently, success in attack and in aerial combat as a whole.
In regard to problems associated with intensification of the role of technical
facilities for supporting the search for the target and success in the attack, Col.
A. A. Gubanov appeared in the third issue (for 1959) with an article "We Must Not
Measure Everything by Speed Alone", in which he drew a conclusion on the need
for including in the concept of "aerial combat" the process of vectoring and directing
the actions of fighter pilots. If we agree with this, then another conclusion suggests
itself to the effect that victory in present-day aerial combat is achieved by the joint
and coordinated efforts of the pilots and the personnel who directly support their
operations in the air. Consequently, development of coordination of the actions of
vectoring officers, operators, and pilots is the most important requirement flowing
out of the special features of present-day aerial combat.
In the article "The First Attack" (No. 4, 1959), Lt. Col. D. F. Goldyrev notes
quite correctly that the role of the first attack grows with the increase in flight
speeds. As is known, under present-day conditions vectoring is performed by
means of ground radio technical facilities. Therefore, a repeat attack has become
much more difficult and its effectiveness has declined. During the attack the
aerial target, having great speed, traverses a considerable distance and approach-
es the objective of the strike. In addition, surprise is lost, and the "enemy"
bomber may take steps to disrupt the attack.
That is why it is very important to teach fighters to hit aerial targets in the
first attack. To this end it is necessary to act creatively, to search for new tacti-
cal methods that satisfy most completely the conditions of aerial combat using
modern aviation equipment and weapons.
Improvement of aviation equipment and strike facilities, as the majority of the
authors say, has also led to other changes. Formerly, at subsonic flight speeds,
the fighter pilot waged battle, as a rule, in a group and his actions were directed by
the commander who was in the combat formation. He saw all the pilots, observed
their conduct, and, when necessary, gave instructions as to how to act , and finally
directed by personal example.
It is another matter with present-day aerial combat. Combat now may spread
out over a tremendous expanse of air, and during the course of it visual contact
among the pilots of the group may be disrupted. Under these conditions can a
pilot be passive and await commands? Indubitably, he cannot. He must know the
order of the battle and must make decisions independently, must act with initiative,
in the interests of carrying out the common task. This means that he must know
the nature of present-day combat and its special features and must take them into
consideration in his training.
The increase in speeds, without a doubt, will affect the nature of maneuvering
by fighters in present-day combat. Col. Savosin expresses his opinion to the ef-
fect that maneuverability in combat is gradually declining, the lines of the planes'
tracks are straightening out , and enormous space is required to execute maneuvers.
Many comrades agreed with this opinion. At the conference, for example, they
spoke about the fact that maneuverability has not lost its significance in present-day
combat. It is known that the main combat qualities of fightets that distinguish them
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
24
Act Creatively
from other types of planes were: speed, maneuverability, and fire power. Viewing
it from this aspect, it can be said that the greatest advantage of modern fighters has
remained with maneuverability. The flight speed of other types of planes is some-
times close to the speed of fighters. On a heavy plane, for example, more powerful
armament can be installed than on a fighter.
Consequently, the principal quality of fighters is maneuverability - in combina-
tion, of course, with high speed and powerful armament.
Where then can this advantage be manifested? Indubitably, only in maneuvering
aerial combat.
Nevertheless, combat at supersonic speeds is sometimes considered as separate
attacks, i. e., maneuvering aerial combat is essentially rejected. From this comes
the conclusion that there is no sense in teaching free aerial combat to fitters.
Is this correct?
If fighter planes are used as equipment and their principal advantage is maneu-
verability, then to reject maneuvering combat means to reject the need for the ex-
istence of fighter planes in general. The unsoundness of such an assertion is obvious.
Of course, the increase in speeds leads to a reduction in the maneuverability of
aerial combat. However, as officer V. D. Romanyuk correctly concludes in his
article "This is What We Think" ("Herald of the Air Fleet", No. 6, 1959), aerial
combat will remain maneuverable as long as pilots strive to come out to an advan-
tageous position for attack while maintaining visual contact, as long as interaction
among the pilots of a group, and fire cooperation in particular, will retain some
significance in combat.
With the present-day level of development in aviation equipment and armament,
the concept "initial position for attack", in the opinion of some of the pilots who
spoke at the conference, loses its meaning, and the range for beginning the attack
and for pulling out of it increases. The significance of visual and fire cooperation
declines, and in connection with this the tendency for reduction in the maneuver-
ability of aerial combat becomes ever more pronounced.
Perhaps waging free aerial training battles is not justified from the viewpoint
of usefulness in improving combat skill? Let us see if this is so.
In order to triumph under present-day conditions, a pilot needs high moral and
combat qualities and firm skills, which can be developed most successfully in free
aerial combat. During the course of it, the fighter pilot develops boldness, de-
cisiveness, quickness of reaction, persistence in achieving victory, and skills of
waging battle. To reject aerial training battles means to deprive the'pilots of this
opportunity.
Furthermore, it is known that a guarantee of victory in battle is the pilot's
ability to handle his plane and to make full use of its combat capabilities. Without
a doubt, the pilot can learn this only in free aerial combat. Here he will, as they
say, feel his plane and learn what it is capable of. At the same time, the pilot
polishes his piloting technique and learns to handle the plane skillfully.
Thus, free aerial training combat is reflected most productively in developing
the necessary combat qualities in fighter pilots. During the course of it, condi-
tions are developed for creativeness and for searching for new and more effective
tactical methods of operation (this is the conclusion that the participants at the con-
ference came to).
0
�
S.
Act Creatively 25
Senior Lt. Al'bert Nikolayevich Belinskiy is a young pilot. But he is success-
fully mastering the difficult art of flying a fighter and is a leading airman of the
unit. Perfecting his personal combat training, Belinskiy helps his comrades in
every way.
In the photo: Senior Lt. A. N. Belinskiy
Photo by V. P. MALEVANCHENKO.
In his article "Maneuverability, Tempo, Rapidity" ("Herald of the Air Fleet",
No. 5, 1959), Maj. G. Kh. D'yachenko writes correctly that in connection with the
increase in speeds the rapidity of aerial combat has increased. And this means
that the situation in the battle changes more rapidly and, consequently, the pilot
must react to it more quickly. This means that he is compelled to act more inten-
sively, which in turn makes greater demands on his training. Quickness in evalua-
ting the situation and in reacting to changes in it must be very high. And these
qualities can be developed most successfully in the course of aerial battles, in a
difficult situation.
In connection with the change in the nature of aerial combat, many comrades
quite correctly pose the problem of combat formations. Without a doubt, they
must correspond to the level of development of equipment and to the nature of
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
26
Act Creatively
aerial combat. If both the one and the other have changed to some degree, this
cannot but reflect on the arrangement of the planes in a group.
Consequently, an explanation of the special features of present-day aerial com-
bat and comprehensive consideration of them will help to find the most effective
combat for mations. However, this does not mean that it is possible to devise some
kinds of formations suitable for all occasions. At certain stages of the battle, under
different conditions of the aerial situation, they will have their own peculiarities.
At the same time, it is important to clarify the general tendencies in the develop-
ment of combat formations in connection with the increase in flight speeds and im-
provements in the armament of fighters. This can be done by the common efforts
of the flight personnel on the basis of experience in aerial training battles.
In the course of the discussion on Savosin's article, the idea was expressed
about changes in the significance of individual factors affecting the course and out-
come of aerial combat. Thus, for ex3.mple, Military Pilot First Class Maj. B. I.
Polyakov in the article "Know How to Utilize the Advantages of Your Plane" ("Herald
of the Air Fleet", No. 7, 1959), analyzing the relationship of altitude and speed,
came to the conclusion that for modern aircraft in b3ttle an advantage in speed is
more important than in altitude. Consequently, at supersonic flight speeds, the
well-known tactical formula for aerial combat acquires a somewhat different appear-
ance: speed -- altitude -- maneuver -- fire.
Knowing the special features of aerial combat, a pilot will undoubtedly make
fuller use of the combat qualities of his plane for achieving victory. Fighter pilots
of the X unit, participants in a conference of readers, talked about all this. Speak-
ing at the conference were pilots Comrades A. L. Kozhevnikov, Ye. G. Pepelya-
yev, D. S. Nikolayev, V. F. Perepletchikov, L. M. Dymchenko, I. Kh. Mikhay-
lichenko, V. D. Gusakov, P. V. Novikov, A. T. Mikhalev, and others.
Thus, the discussion of Savosin's article in the journal has helped to present
the special features of present-day aerial combat more clearly, and to explain the
tendencies in the change in its nature. Consideration of them in teaching practice
will, without a doubt, help air commanders to improve the combat skill of the
flight personnel.
4
Cl
c-
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
UNDER ADVERSE
WEATHER COMDITIONS
Col. N. V. SUVOROV
Air exercises were in progress. The ground and aerial situation was changing
rapidly. In order to react in time to these changes and to make the proper de-
cisions, the command required information on the "enemy". The reconnaissance
crews provided it, despite adverse weather conditions. At the end of the day, an
order was received in the reconnaissance subunit -- follow the advance of "enemy"
reserves, which could be expected with the advent of darkness.
Taking off at twilight, the crews reported on the beginning of movement of the
reserves. But the command was interested in the direction of their movement. By
this time the weather had deteriorated; the reconnaissance area was covered by a
low overcast.
Evaluating the situation, the commander entrusted this responsible mission to
Maj. P. F. Chelombittko.
The major sized up the task, the special features of a reconnaissance flight in
darkness under adverse weather conditions and the character of the terrain along
the route and in the assigned area, analyzed the latest reconnaissance data, and de-
termined the possible further direction of the movement of the reserves.
The preparation was completed, and then the plane was already in the air.
Crossing the "front line", the crew followed the proposed route below the clouds
at an altitude of 1000 meters. But soon they began to encounter cloud masses at a
lower altitude also. By time calculations, the navigator determined that the plane
was approaching the reconnaissance area. The pilot decided to reduce altitude. Ob-
serving the rules of flight safety, he brought the plane out below the clouds and recog-
nized the assigned area. By various signs, the crew detected that an "enemy"
column was moving toward the "front line". Having completed its mission, the re-
connaissance plane returned to the airfield.
This example shows that a reconnaissance crew can carry out a difficult task
successfully even under adverse weather conditions, if it is well prepared and has or-
ganized the sortie efficiently and properly, and if the actions of the crew are con-
stantly checked by the command post and it is informed of the weather situation in
the flight area.
It is known that present-day combined-arms combat is waged continuously, ir-
respective of the time of year or day and the weather. Therefore aerial reconnais-
sance must also be incessant.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
28 N. V. Suvorov
Under adverse weather conditions, various methods of reconnaissance are used.
With a solid overcast, the crew may fly in the clouds or above them, coming out be-
low them in the reconnaissance area.
If the plane is flying below the cloud base at low altitudes, periodically entering
the clouds and coming out of them, then it is very difficult to spot it by means of
radar facilities. Such a flight is not difficult, especially in the daytime; however,
its range and duration are reduced. In addition, the possibilities of aerial recon-
naissance are also reduced, since the base of the overcast is usually located at low '
altitudes. Therefore, such a method is applicable under certain conditions in re-
connoitering the field of battle and the tactical and nearest operational depth of the
enemy's defense.
As a rule, adverse weather conditions make aerial reconnaissance more diffi-
cult. At the same time, they make for a surprise appearance in the assigned area
and help to reduce the probability of fighter attack.
However, in order to conduct aerial reconnaissance under such conditions, the
members of the crew must have good flight and tactical training, must possess high
moral and combat qualities -- boldness, decisiveness, creative initiative, and must
be able to evaluate correctly the weather along the flight route and in the reconnais-
sance area and to foresee changes in it.
The success of a reconnaissance flight is determined by thorough and reasoned
preparation. No matter how limited the time for preparation for the flight, the crew
of a reconnaissance plane is required to study comprehensively the task assigned and
the nature of the reconnaissance objective, to reason out the methods of finding it
quickly, especially after coming out of the cloud cover, and to evaluate the weather
situation on the flight route and in the area of the target.
Let us return to the actions of Maj. P. F. Chelombit'ko. In preparing for the
flight, the pilot familiarized himself with the procedure of operating the ground radio
technical facilities. Before taking off, he determined the higher (lower) elevation of
the terrain in the reconnaissance area relative to his own airfield, devoting special
attention to the characteristic check points by which it was possible to recognize the
reconnaissance area quickly after coming out below the overcast.
The skills and knowledge needed by the crew members for reconnaissance under
adverse weather conditions are acquired in the process of daily flying.
Teaching reconnaissance men to penetrate the clouds and trainer sessions can,
in our view, consist of several stages. In the first stage, flights are conducted un-
der normal weather conditions. The crews learn to come out precisely at the point
of beginning cloud penetration by time calculation and to select the flight regime at
the moment of descent and cloud penetration. The pilot (crew) is given the following
task: to come out at a specified point at some altitude by time calculation. He also
begins to descend and to come out conventionally below the overcast at minimum al-
titude and in the reconnaissance area. Then he finds the objective and, having com-
pleted the mission, "penetrates" the clouds upward to the assigned flight altitude.
Here the pilot practices maintaining the assigned flight regime and accuracy in
coming out in the reconnaissance area.
The next stage in the training may also proceed under normal weather conditions,
but the pilot performs the flight in an enclosed cockpit.
Later on, it is best to practice methods of penetrating the ov,-rcast without the
,
Aerial Reconnaissance
29
aid of ground radio technical facilities in the area of one's own airfield. Then the
flight controller, utilizing all facilities and methods available at the airfield, will
be able to control the actions of the pilot.
In a radius of 50-60 km from the airfield or in a specially designated area, the
crew is given an objective which it is required to find and reconnoiter, and also the
minimum altitude of coming out below the clouds. After taking off, having come out
above the clouds, the pilot flies the plane along the assigned route, and then by time
calculations brings it out at the point of beginning the penetration of the overcast.
This point is assigned to the pilot or is computed by him on the ground. In approach-
ing it, the reconnaissance man requests of the flight controller permission for a
maneuver and then, having established the flight regime for descent, penetrates the
overcast. He continues the flight to the assigned area below the clouds.
In assigning the task to the crew, the commander points out the objective of the
reconnaissance, the type and scale of the photography, the direction of approach,
the procedure and regime of flight and of penetrating the overcast, and gives the
minimum altitude for coming out below the clouds. In the process of preparation
for the flight, in addition to studying the mission and the reconnaissance objective
and performing the necessary calculations for photography, the crew determines
the line of beginning cloud penetration in relation to the flight altitude, lays out the
flight course from some radio navigation point (usually from the airfield DPRM
[ outer homing radio beacon]) or check point, and computes the flying time from it
to the line of beginning cloud penetration, as well as the route of the return flight.
After takeoff, the reconnaissance plane penetrates the clouds upward, comes
out above the clouds at the airfield DPRM or at a radar check point, and, flying for
the calculated time, follows the route laid out to the line of cloud penetration down-
ward in the assigned area. The controller on duty at the SKP [flight-line command
post] checks the flight according to the data of radar station observations, gives
corrections, and vectors the plane to the line of beginning cloud penetration down-
ward.
Control by the controller on duty at the SKP is especially important in flights of
single-place reconnaissance planes. Coming up to the proposed line, the pilot puts
the plane into a descent in the assigned flight regime and penetrates the clouds.
After coming out below the overcast, the crew reestablishes orientation and proceeds
to the reconnaissance objective. Having completed the mission, it finds a character-
istic check point, enters the clouds (above the clouds) on the calculated course, and
continues the flight. If after having begun to penetrate the clouds downward and
having attained the assigned altitude the reconnaissance plane does not come out be-
low the clouds, it must discontinue cloud pentration downward, gain altitude, and
continue the flight in accordance with instructions received before takeoff.
Pilots who have undergone education and trainer sessions in specially assigned
areas and who have good flight training are authorized to come out below the clouds
in other areas along the route also, on condition that all safety measures are ob-
served. During the course of aerial reconnaissance in the daytime under adverse
weather conditions, the crew of a multi-place reconnaissance plane can use various
methods and tactical moves. The following is one of them.
At tactical flight exercises it was necessary to reconnoiter an important "enemy"
�-.0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release . 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
30 N. V. Suvorov
Senior Lt. A. I. Gruntenko and Lt. G. I. Lenyushkin have a reputation in the
unit as masters of aerial combat. Not only do they carry out every flight mission
outstandingly themselves, but they also successfully transmit their experience to
young pilots.
In the photo: A. I. Gruntenko (right) and G. I. Lenyushkin definitizing the
route of a forthcoming flight.
Photo by P. K. DYUZHIN.
objective far from the "front line". There was a multi-layer cloud cover along the
route.
Capt. A. K. Andrianov's crew began to prepare for it in accordance with the
mission assigned and with consideration of the rules regulating the procedure, and
consequently, also the safety of the operation. Having evaluated the weather condi-
tions, the members of the crew determined the possible altitude of the cloud base.
After their readiness to carry out the mission was checked, the reconnaissance crew
was permitted to take off.
It penetrated the clouds upward and continued the flight above the clouds. The
navigator conducted orientation by dead reckoning and with the aid of the radar sight.
Approaching the reconnaissance area, he reported to the crew commander: "We are
approaching the assigned area; penetration of the overcast can be begun."
Having established the flight regime, the pilot began to penetrate the overcast
downward. Below the clouds, having reestablished orientation and having discovered
�
Aerial Reconnaissance
31
that the reconnaissance objective was somewhat to one side of the track, the navigator
gave the command for a turn. The plane flew over the objective at high speed. The
crew transmitted the observation data by radio to the command post. Having photo-
graphed the objective, the reconnaissance plane disappeared above the clouds with a
sharp turn and a climb.
Under adverse weather conditions, a reconnaissance crew operates alone, as a
rule. It has to evaluate the situation independently and make decisions. It there-
fore achieves success only when it displays wise initiative and creativeness. Much
depends on coordination, on how all the members of the crew help each other. In
order to come out on the target unexpectedly, reconnaissance men make use of the
cloud cover. That is why it is so important to evaluate correctly the weather situation
in the area of the flight. To this end, weather reconnaissance is conducted before
the beginning of the flight, additional reconnaissance of the weather is conducted per-
iodically during the flight, and the actual weather at different altitudes is established.
Special attention is devoted to reconnaissance in different directions, in order to de-
termine where deterioration in the weather may come from.
Reconnaissance under adverse weather conditions is a different type of combat
activity, which has its own peculiarities. Consideration of all the special features in
the process of preparation of tIE reconnaissance crews will give them the opportunity
of acting in a tactically competent manner of utilizing techniques and methods of opera-
tion that are the most effective and most unexpected fcr the enemy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
A COMMAND FROM
THE GROUND
Col. V. A. KUZNETSOV,
Military Pilot First Class
Nowadays it is difficult to imagine how pilots could formerly take off on a
flight without having communication with the ground. Yet there was such a time.
The plane breaks away from the runway, and the pilot is entirely on his own. Nobody
directs him, nobody prompts him how best to overcome difficulties. Of course, lack
of communication with the ground prevented more effective utilization of the capabili-
ties of aviation equipment, reflected negatively on flight safety, and in wartime made
it very difficult to carry out combat missions.
The following episode is recalled with vexation. A group of German Ju-87 bombers
crossed the front line, dropped bombs on the main line of resistance, and calmly (lit-
erally, calmly!) disappeared to the west. And above them an element of our fighters
was patrolling. They made turns, flew in a straight line, maneuvered, but ... did
not see the enemy. To prompt them, to give them some advice from the ground was
impossible. Facilities for vectoring and control were far from perfect at that time.
The pilots caught it from the infantry for such "blunders".
But all that is in the past. Look now.
... Heavy low clouds hang over the airfield. There is a drizzle. Formerly such
weather would have been considered non-flying. But now a pair of fighters makes a
swift run, lifts off the ground, and disappears in a minute in the murky shroud of
clouds.
Exercises are going on. Pilot V. M. Panov is taking off for an intercept in a
pair with officer A. N. Solomon.
"Course 2200, altitude... ", P. A. Rubtsov, vectoring officer at the command
post gives the order.
"Roger," replies the lead man.
The pilots attentively watch their instruments and maintain the climb regime pre-
cisely. They do not see each other, but the planes hurtle through the clouds on a par-
allel course.
The clouds are black -- a sign of great thickness and density; the planes ice over
lightly.
Ask the pilot where he is or whether he will encounter the target soon, and he
will not reply. After all, this is not the most important thing now. Penetrate the
clouds! Assemble the pair! That is the immediate task.
A Command from the Ground 33
These few tense minutes are trying. All the attention of the pilots is concen-
trated on the instruments. Altitude -- course; course -- gyrohorizon.
The altitude is six, eight, ten thousand... It is getting noticeably lighter! A
few seconds more, and the cloud cover suddenly breaks up.
Below is a blinding, white, undulating sea of clouds; overhead it is blue and a
bright sun that hinders observation.
The pair is above the clouds. A quick glance to the right -- the wingman is in
position.
"I have penetrated the clouds upward. Altitude..."
The pair is assembled. The first part of the flight has been carried out success-
fully. But now it is necessary to execute the assigned mission. But how? After all,
the pilots know nothing about the target. At this moment, commands come from the
ground:
"Course 2200, altitude... The target is two 'Eagles', altitude... Course 30�,
range 400."
The information from the ground is laconic and timely. The situation immediate-
ly becomes clear. And now, having received the necessary data, the pilot begins to
analyze the situation himself: the encounter should occur no less than 200-250 km
from the objective.
But here, as frequently happens, an unexpected difficulty arises.
"Course 180! The target has turned to the right!" Rubtsov's sharp voice is
heard in the headset.
"Roger. Course 180." And the silvery fighters turn smoothly to the left.
Planov continues to analyze the situation.
"The range of interception is increasing, and the weather is unstable. We must
be ready to land at the maneuver airfield."
From the CP comes a new command:
"20 more to the left! Turn on the afterburner, maximum 'acceleration'!"
And, as though having guessed the commander's thoughts, Panov takes in the
concluding words of the command: "Be ready to land at X airfield..."
The commander on the ground is proud of his subordinates. There has not yet
been a case that Rubtsov missed the target and Panov did not intercept it. And this
is no happenstance. After all, the pilot executes every command in a considered
manner, ,and the vectoring officer, before transmitting it to the plane, weighs all the
"pros" and "cons". And now, too, it is a major risk to lead the fighters so far away.
But the target is very important, the commander has confidence in Panov, and the
training of the officers of the CP combat team does not give rise to any doubt of suc-
cess.
A brief radio exchange occurs between the ground and the plane.
"Make ready to turn to the left!"
"Turn to the left to course 90, bank 201"
"Roger. I do not see the target."
"T ke target is lower, to the left 2-3 km!"
"I see the target. Attacking."
The pilots attack the bomber and pick up the return course. But ahead lie new ob-
stacles. From the CP they report:
"The alternate airfields are not receiving! Go to your own point! Descend from
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
34 V. A. Kuznetsov
the line only at my command!"
The pilots understand that the weather at the "neighbors" has deteriorated con-
clusively. Anxiety creeps into their hearts. How is the weather at home? Will the
fuel last? But Rubtsov's firm voice again instills confidence.
The pair penetrates the clouds downward and executes the landing safely.
Now let us give some thought as to how it was possible to carry out such a diffi-
cult mission. Of course, helping, first of all, was the perfect radio technical appara-
tus with which the airfield and the plane are equipped. It made it possible to "see"
even through the clouds all that was occurring in the expanse of air, and to maintain
close communication between the plane and the ground.
But is it only this that assured success? Indubitably, no.
Much depended on the people, on their technical and tactical competency. It is
no accident that in organizing the vectoring under adverse weather conditions the com-
mander addressed himself in his mind to the work of his subordinates. He knew that
they would handle the task and he made decisions boldly, acted surely.
We are thinking of the tremendous importance of timely, clear, and precise com-
mands from the ground not only in vectoring. Takeoff, landing, as well as all flights
in the area of the airfield are regulated strictly by flight controllers who are located
at the flight-line command post or at the KDP [ control tower].
But does every flight controller give thought to the fact that the fate of the pilots
is in his hands, especially in flying under adverse weather conditions or at night?
Only he -- the flight controller (or the landing duty officer) -- can inform the pilot of
the precise course in the clouds. Only he can. warn him of a dangerous letdown. On
him alone depends the safety of flights over the airfield. And all this is again achieved
by means of clear and competent commands from the ground to the plane.
It is therefore necessary to be very scrupulous and exacting toward all of one's
decisions. And before it is transmitted to the plane, everything must be thought over
and weighed.
Every air commander has had occasion to be witness to how the proper actions of
a flight controller have saved a pilot and a plane, how confident and clear commands
from the ground have more than once prevented flight accidents. Following is a char-
acteristic example.
The overcast dropped sharply throughout the entire area. The alternate airfields
were closed. In the air were several planes. But visibility below the clouds re-
mained good.
The flight controller informed the pilots and ordered that they pass the outer hom-
ing station 100 m lower than usual.
It was night, dp.rkness. The runway lights were reflected on the low-hanging
clouds in white, green, and red light. Landing floodlights flashed on occasionally.
There were the planes landing one after another.
But here came pilot A. F. Biryukov in. for a landing. The commander knew that
this pilot reacts to commands with a delay; he needs more time than others to com-
prehend this or that order, to understand it, and to execute it.
Above the clouds Biryukov turned the plane to the homing station by the needle of
the automatic compass and radioed:
"On the landing course!"
Above the clouds there was a moon; visibility was excellent. The horizon line
A Command from the ground 35
41�11.1�16.
stood out distinctly. But then the plane entered the clouds. Around the cockpit it
grew dark immediately. The altitude declined sharply. The pilot began to get
worried: "Can I do it?" Around the cockpit was an impenetrable darkness.
The controller was also disturbed. But no one must notice this, especially the
pilot.
The pilot radioed the SKP [flight-line command post]:
"At 'safe' altitude; I have not penetrated the clouds downward."
And he receives the reply:
"Descend to two hundred meters!" the voice of the controller was calm and quiet.
"Roger. I have passed the outer; I do not see the runway."
"Your altitude?"
"Three hundred."
The flight controller is indignant. He could see the lights of the plane moving
over the flight line at the very base of the clouds.
"Biryukov again! He has learned that it is prohibited to descend below three hun-
dred meters in the clouds and he doubts the propriety of my command. But perhaps
he didn't hear it?"
From the plane comes a signal of alarm:
"Altitude one thousand. I am going through clouds. The red fuel light is flashing.
The flight controller analyzed the situation: "There is enough fuel left for 15-20
minutes. The pilot has gone off into the clouds again. He is obviously afraid to de-
scend. What to do?"
Quiet set in on the airfield. The flight controller's assistants stopped their work;
the flight-line crew and the floodlight men grew quiet. Everyone grasped the diffi-
culty of the situation.
Only the flight controller could change the situation for the better. He ordered:
"Execute my commands unquestioningly! Turn to the outer in the clouds! Re-
peat the approach!"
The worried Biryukov carried out the order and came out again at the homing
station on the landing course and again at an altitude of three hundred meters.
"I have passed the outer; I do not see the runway."
"Have you descended to two hundred?"
I have three hundred meters."
A critical minute began. It was neces sary to do something to compel the pilot to
descend at least a few meters.
The commander looked attentively out the window and saw the lights of the plane.
He was traveling at the very base of the clouds again and of course could see nothing.
ii
But he could not bring himself to descend -- below was the ground.
"I see you, descend!" ordered the commander. "Descend to two hundred meters!"
The plane came out smoothly below the clouds. But the pilot might enter the
clouds again. The commander knew Biryukov. And he brought the decision adopted
to a conclusion.
"Look to the left! Do you see the runway lights? Do not enter the clouds!"
The commander's voice became gentler, quieter.
"I see the lights, but I don't know in which direction to land."
"Listen to my commands! Turn left ninety! That's the boy! Go perpendicular
to the landing course!"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
36
V. A. Kuznetsov
"Roger."
"Make turns only at my command! Make the second one!"
"Complying."
The pilot made the third and fourth turns precisely at the controller's command
and set down safely. There was practically no fuel left in the tanks.
What does this example attest to? It shows the same thing as the preceding one:
a command from the ground is very important nowadays, and it must be executed
punctually.
However, turn your attention to the actions of the flight controller. They were
very well thought out a n d efficient. He confidently required the pilot to descend to
200 meters, since under the conditions that had developed only at this altitude was
it possible to see the runway. But some kind of paralysis had seized the pilot and
he was afraid to come out below the base of the clouds, although the lights of the
plane could be seen clearly from the ground. Then the controller made use of another
possibility. By the information that the plane could be seen from the ground, he in-
stilled confidence in the pilot and thereby compelled him to come down to the indi-
cated altitude. Then the pilot landed the plane by the flight controller's commands.
For the entire duration of a flight the pilot of a modern plane is reliably connect-
ed with the ground. From the command post he is vectored to aerial targets. Ground
navigation facilities help him to hold to the assigned flight route and at a difficult
moment bring him to his home airfield. Landing systems give him the opportunity of
.making a landing under weather minimum in the daytime and at night. The command
from the ground has become the guiding principle for the pilot of any type plane.
That is why the most important task of all air commanders at the present time is
instilling confidence and executiveness in the pilots. Confidence is necessary in order
that the pilot or navigator takes a command as the only correct instruction without
the slightest doubt, and executiveness is needed so that he executes this command
quickly and efficiently.
Another no less important task is to instill a sense of responsibility in those who
are entrusted with giving commands and constant improvement of their technical and
tactical skill. The officers who give the commands need a high sense of responsi-
bility. Under no conditions can they make bargains with their conscience. When the
matter pertains to carrying out a critical task, when it is a matter of the life or
death of a man, bargaining with one's conscience is just as dangerous as indifference
or carelessness. A high degree of technical and tactical knowledge is extremely
necessary for these officers because without it they will simply be nnAble to make the
correct decisions in a rapidly chAnging aerial situation.
During the Great Patriotic War, fighter pilot I. Kh. Mikhaylichenko success-
fully waged many aerial battles. For courage and heroism displayed in battles with
the Hitlerite invaders, he was awarded two gold Hero of the Soviet Union medals and
several orders. In the postwar years, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhaylichenko
has mastered jet planes to perfection and has taught the art of aerial combat and
sniper fire to manyyoung pilots.
A Command from the Ground 37
In the sketch: Military Pilot First Class, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union,
Lt. Col. I. Kh. Mikhaylichenko.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
THE RELIEF
GROUND CONTROLLER
Guards Col. G. I. MAKHORIN,
Lt. Col. S. Ye. RUDAK
At every airfield one can encounter a relief landing controller who helps the
flight controller perform a difficult and responsible job -- to ensure reliable landing
of aircraft in the daytime and at night under normal and adverse weather conditions.
The pilots know well their best landing controllers and have faith in thein, and this
serves as a worthy tribute to the officers who are responsible for the fate of the men.
In our unit officers V. S. Sekirskiy and G. S. Mosin have proved to be able relief
landing controllers.
They know that their main task is to ensure that the planes are brought out on the
V PP [ runway] accurately and safely. In order to perform this task outstandingly, of-
ficers Sekirskiy and Mosin prepare thoroughly for duty. They usually participate in
the preliminary preparation for flights, where they familiarize themselves in detail
with the nature of the forthcoming flights; they ascertain how the flight personnel
have prepared themselves for landing by the system, they study the planned schedule,
and they make the necessary excerpts from it. In addition, these officers acquaint
themselves with the pilots who will be landing by the system for the first time.
In preparing for flights each one of our landing controllers carefully studies the
guiding documents on making flights, the plan of cloud penetration and approach for
landing at the given airfield, the relief of the terrain and the nature of its representa-
tion on the radar display units, the instructions on applying one landing system in con-
junction with another, and familiarizes himself with the weather forecast for the fly-
ing day (night).
Right at the system he uses the operational documents and the reports of earlier
shifts after a check of the system under current, and reports to the flight controller
that the landing support facilities are ready for operation.
During the period of flying the relief controller is located at the mobile display
units of the landing radar or, if these go out of commission, at the display units of the
PRL [ landing radar].
A plane ha.:. intercepted the landing course. Having established two-way communi-
cation with the crew that is approaching for a landing and having spotted and identi-
The Relief Ground Controller 39
fled it on the scopes, the landing controller, if necessary, gives commands to change
the flight regime in respect to course or glidepath, giving consideration to bringing
the plane out smoothly on the course and letdown glidepath.
In directing a landing, G. S. Mosin, and the rest of our officers as well, strive
to avoid superfluous commands and requests to the plane. They understand that
this merely clutters up the air, distracts the pilot from piloting, and gives rise to
nervousness and loss of confidence in him.
Both Mosin and Sekirskiy hold strictly to the following rule: they give the pilot
commands only in the event the plane deviates from the course or letdown glidepath.
When the pilot makes mistakes simultaneously in both course and glidepath, then
they strive first to correct the worst and most dangerous mistake.
When the target blip appears below the letdown glidepath the pilot receives a
command to discontinue further letdown. LI the plane is deviating from the landing
course by more than the limits established by the instructions, the landing is pro-
hibited, as a rule, and the pilot makes a go-around. In all cases, the commands
given to the plane are of utmost brevity, clarity, and intelligibility and are given
always in a quiet voice. For example: 225, I am Oka, distance 15, turn right 10;
or 225, distance 2, regime.
When clutter appears on the radar scope or there is sharp deterioration in the
control of planes on the landing course (for any reason), the landing controller re-
ports this to the flight controller and acts according to his instructions.
During the course of flights, Mosin and Sekirskiy do everything necessary in
order to know the state of the weather at all times and how it might change in the area
of the airfield. They never allow telephone conversations to distract them and cate-
gorically forbid anyone to enter or leave the PDP [ mobile control-tower] truck in
order to avoid clutter on the scopes (especially if static is observed).
At the conclusion of flying, every one of our landing controllers discusses the
results of the flying with the personnel of the system's operating group and reports
shortcomings to the flight controller.
At the critique, Mosul always makes his remarks to the pilots who have not com-
pletely mastered the procedure of using the system in landing, explains how it
should be used, and thoroughly analyzes the most serious mistakes.
Such, in the main, is the work procedure of our best landing controllers. How-
ever, we also have some who sometimes do not carry out their functional duties and
violate the requirements of the instructions on operating landing systems and other
documents regulating flying. In such cases, flight safety is threatened.
Some landing controllers determine the position of a plane on the scopes "by
eye" without laying out computed letdown glidepaths for the given type of plane, and
do not record the most serious mistakes in the approach for landing. As a result,
pilots who are inadequately prepared repeat mistakes and the program of combat
training is carried out much more poorly.
It seems to us that for effective utilization of landing systems it is necessary to
take into account the conditions of their location at airfields. The point is that the
majority of our systems are situated at airfields that are bordered by terrain with
complex relief, and this restricts the field of vision of the radars. In such a locality,
in order to improve the visibility of the plane blips on the RLS [radar station] scopes,
the maneuver for the landing approach must be set up on the basis of the specific
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
40 G. I. Makhorin
zones of action of the radars. This principle must be taken into consideration every
time in compiling the instructions for conducting flights at a given airfield and the
other documents defining flight work.
In our unit, the zones of vision of the surveillance radar are given to all the
flight personnel so that they will know firmly the areas and altitudes where a flight
can or cannot be controlled.
How should sensible landing controllers with initiative be trained? Before begin-
ning work at a new airfield a landing controller takes an examination. Under the
direction of the instructor he lands 8-10 crews, half of them under adverse weather
conditions and at night. In addition, he must know the equipment of landing systems,
the location of the airfield radar facilities, the instructions on making flights at the
given airfield, its area (relief) and holding zones, the plans of cloud penetration, the
characteristic signs of the dep.iction of local, objects on the display units, the results
of a flight over the radars of the system, and the errors in their determination of
range, azimuth, and altitude. Only by knowing all this well is it possible to direct
a landing successfully.
At as serriblies we have subjected to extensive discussion the question of uniform
commands given by the landing controller to the pilct. In particular, various commands
were suggested for correcting the position of a plane relative to the landing course.
Some thought that the corrective turn of a plane to the right or left in respect to
the landing course should be given in degrees, others that it should be given in meters.
After detailed discussion, the participants at the assemblies came to the uniform
opinion that before the DPRM [outer homing radio beacon] is passed it should be in-
dicated in degrees and, after passage, in meters. They also concluded that it is
necessary to know well the linear dimensions of the course and glidepath scan on the
display units of the landing radar.
In order that the landing controllers perfect their knowledge and skills and be-
come outstanding specialists, trainer sessions are conducted with them systematical-
ly. During such trainer sessions they learn thoroughly where on the course and
glidepath display units (of the landing radar) the corner reflectors, the outer and inner
homing radio beacons, and the ground check points between the DPRM and the BPRM
[inner homing radio beacon] are located; they study the nature of the representation
of local objects. In addition, they memorize the letdown glidepaths of different types
of planes and the safe angle of the plane's deviation from course in approaching for
a landing, and they determine the brightness of the glow on the display units of the
corner reflectors, the DPRM, the BPRM, and the localizers (for an approximate
check of the sensitivity of the PRL [landing radar] receivers).
Constantly training themselves and training the crews of the RSP [ electronic
landing system] operating group in the use of the system for supporting landings
under adverse weather conditions, every one of our landing controllers requires that
the personnel know the equipment outstandingly and maintain it in constant readiness.
Thus we see how comprehensive must be the knowledge and the training of a
relief landing controller in order that he meet the requirements of his job.
-1
FLIGHT EVALUATION
Lt. Col. G. G. SEMENKO,
Military Pilot First Class
The flights for checking piloting technique were planned in two variants: if the
weather conditions were nounal, the check-out would be made in the practice zone;
if they were adverse, a check-out would be made of the pilots' technique in piloting
by instruments and in approaching for a straight-in landing using the landing system.
Among the pilots who were to be checked by the inspector were two officers
with considerable work experience.
The weather turned out to be unstable: at times a seven-to-eight-point overcast
developed, at times it was broken up. Having evaluated the situation, the comman-
der made a decision to carry out the flights according to the first variant.
Having checked out the first pilot, who displayed outstanding quality in executing
aerobatic maneuvers above the clouds and a high flying competency, the inspector
flew out with the second. For the takeoff, the flight into the practice zone, and
simple piloting maneuvers, the pilot received mainly excellent evaluations. In
executing tight turns with the maximum possible bank, loops in an inclined plane,
half-loops, rolls, and turns of the aircraft on ascending and descending verticals, he
made deviations that did not permit evaluating these maneuvers higher than "satis-
factory". For coming out at the airfield, approaching for the landing, and making
the final approach and touchdown, the inspector gave outstanding marks.
However, the flight was evaluated "satisfactory", and the inspector suggested
to the pilot's immediate superior that aerobatic maneuvers be practiced with him in
the practice zone in a combat training aircraft. This surprised the pilot very much.
After the flight an interesting conversation was held between the check pilot and the
student that merits attention. The pilot thought that the evaluation of the flight
should be made according to the principle of an arithmetic average of all the flight
elements evaluated on the basis of the five-point system. And in actuality, after
a simple arithmetic summation the general evaluation could have been higher than
"good". However, the arithmetic method of evaluating flight training is beneath
criticism.
Having been a witness to this conversation, I looked through the pilot's flight
log. It developed that in previous checks he had also made similar mistakes. Des-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
42 G. G. Semenko
pite this, his check flights had been evaluated by the commanders in general as
"excellent" and "good", and his training flights for aerobatics in the practice zone
only as "excellent". In our opinion, it is such fallacious practice that was the main
reason for shortcomings in this pilot's piloting technique.
In the given case, the inspector acted absolutely correctly. If he had made the
evaluation by the average of the points, then, just as before, behind it would be
hidden individual shortcomings in the piloting technique and nothing would have been
done to eliminate them.
Unfortunately, there still are occasional commanders who do not evaluate the
flight of a pilot being checked quite correctly. Making a general evaluation accord-
ing to the principle of the arithmetic average, these commanders do not see the
principal.evil: hidden behind the formal rating is not only a barely satisfactory
but in some cases even a poor training of the pilots. It is not difficult to compre-
hend what this leads to.
But why do they not notice what is hidden behind an average evaluation of a
flight? Apparently it is because they are not always guided by the fact that in flight
training there are no elements of little importance, that a deficiency in the training of
a pilot that appears very insignificant at first glance may lead to very serious conse-
quences. That is why we fight so that all the elements of flight training without ex-
ception be constantly considered by the commanders.
It is known that the basis of successful training of the flight personnel for combat
operations under various conditions is high quality in individual piloting technique in
the daytime and at night in the pattern, in the practice zone, and by instruments.
The acquisition of firm skills in piloting a plane by a pilot depends not only on the
training commander's art in a combat training plane but also on his ability to deter-
mine the degree to which the trainee is mastering the elements of flight and to evalu-
ate the flight objectively.
A commander develops his methodological evaluation skills both in flights in a
combat training plane in teaching the pilot and in checking him. Those people are
mistaken who believe that for the evaluation of a flight it is enough to know only the
norms and, guided by them, to give a mark for each element performed by the pilot
and then to make a general evaluation. The general evaluation should be made with
consideration of the observations and the general opinion developed by the check pilot
in regard to the pilot for the entire flight. Very important for the check pilot is the
ability to take into consideration how quickly the trainee (the one being checked)
determines deviations in piloting the plane and to what extent he corrects them in
time, at what stages of the flight and to what extent he had to give assistance, re-
sorting to prompting over the SPU [aircraft intercom system] or personal inter-
ference in the control.
Let us analyze, for example, a flight to teach a pilot the approach for a straight-
in landing from above the clouds by the system at the established weather minimum.
Let us assume that the takeoff, the penetration of the clouds upward, the entry to the
homing radio station, and the setting up of the maneuver for the landing approach
were performed by the pilot for grades of "good" and "excellent" according to the
evaluation norms. In the turn onto the landing course the pilot made a mistake of
15� in direction. After extending the landing gear and the flaps and establishing
the appropriate speed, he put the plane into the descent. In the process of descend-
Flight Evaluation
43
ing, he corrected the error in direction on instructions from the commander. To an
altitude of 1000 m he descended for an evaluation of "good"; from the altitude of 1000m
he did not maintain the vertical speed, and for this element of the flight he received
an evaluation of "satisfactory"; while from the altitude of 500 m to passage of the
DPRM [outer homing radio beacon] he piloted the plane jointly with the check pilot.
He executed the final approach and the landing for "excellent".
If this flight is evaluated as some commanders would evaluat e it, the pilot could
be given a good evaluation. But is this correct? Obviously, no. After all, the
pilot made serious mistakes when piloting the plane himself, and he performed the
main elements of the flight -- descent to the landing course and further piloting of
the plane to the moment of passing the DPRM and visual spotting of the VPP [ runway]
-- jointly with the commander.
Such examples are encountered most frequently in the practice of checking,
especially when the flight personnel are being taught under adverse weather conditions
by inadequately experienced instructors. Although rarely, it still happens that an
instructor with insufficient experience, checking how a pilot makes the landing appro-
ach at the established weather minimum, because of fear of not coming out on the
runway, pilots the plane unnoticed by the pilot until the DPRM is passed and gives
him a general evaluation of "good" or even "excellent". And yet on this basis the
pilot is permitted to go on training flights in a combat plane. He is sent on such a
flight without having firmly developed skills in the most difficult elements of flight
that is what an improper flight evaluation sometimes leads to.
We would very much like to dwell on yet another such example. In piloting a
plane by supporting instruments with the static line of the PVD [pitot tube] turned
off or with the gyrohorizon switched off, a pilot commits deviations of short duration
in speed, altitude, and course at different stages of the flight. True, these devia-
tions do not go beyond the limits of "good" evaluations. But can a good mark be
given for such a flight as a whole? I think not. And this is why. The commander
should take into account not only the magnitude and duration of the deviations but also
the facts as to how timely and correctly the pilot determines the failure of individual
instruments, whether he shifts his attention to substitute instruments properly, and
how confidently he pilots the plane by their readings.
In our opinion, some commanders do not evaluate with sufficient objectivity the
results of checks of fighter pilots in navigation. They consider the principal rule
to be maintenance of speed, altitude, time, and course of the flight that ensure
accuracy in maintaining the assigned route. But the accuracy in coming out at the
turning points (at the target) at the assigned time, which is an inseparable part of
the general evaluation of navigation, is often not considered. This leads to careless-
ness on the part of the flight personnel in practicing a very important element -- air-
craft navigation -- especially in flying a combat plane when ground check points are
not visible by eye. Also bad is the fact that the crews of ground radar stations are
not always brought into teaching pilots accurate entry on the target at the assigned
time, while the diagrams of the way they fly the planes along a route are sometimes
not even used in evaluating the flight.
That is how matters stand in regard to general evaluation of a training or check
flight in a combat training plane.
How then to evaluate a flight in a combat plane? This question is also very cru-
cial and it arises among a large number of commanders. For example, take a flight
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
44
for piloting in the practice zone in the daytime or at night, as well as other flights
under conditions when visual observation from the ground is impossible and there is
no special apparatus that permits checking all elements of the flight. In this case,
in the opinion of some commanders, grades should be given for the flight elements
that can be observed visually (takeoff, approach for landing, accuracy of final ap-
proach, touchdown, etc.) in accordance with the norms of the five-point system,
while the rest should be noted in general -- "performed exercise" or"did not per-
But how to determine whether the pilot performed the exercise or not? In order
form".
to answer this question, it is suggested that all the shortcomings and deviations that
he himself noticed in the process of carrying out thee mission be first discussed
with the pilot (from his report). We think that this alone is far from enough. In
order to determine the quality of the exercises practiced in a combat plane, checking
in a combat training plane should be resorted to periodically.
An evaluation of "did not perform" for some exercise or another must without
fail be supplemented by an indication of the circumstances that were the cause of this.
If the pilot did not carry out the mission because of lack of confidence or as the result
of serious errors and inability to correct them, all the errors must be thoroughly
analyzed with him on the ground, then a check flight must be made, and only after
that can he be sent out again in a combat plane.
In evaluating aerial combat, firing of combat weapons at ground or aerial tar-
gets, as well as exercises in tactical flight training, the commander must take into
consideration a whole series of elements that comprise a single whole in the given
exercise. Thus, the quality of aerial combat is composed of evaluations of the tactics
in waging it, the technique of maneuvering, and the results of photogunnery, with
the tactics and the maneuvering in the course of the battle being evaluated directly
by a commander participating in this battle. The commander also takes into consid-
eration the precision and rapidity in executing commands which vector the plane to
the aerial "enemy", the search, surprise and swiftness of closure with the "foe"
from the moment he is spotted to gaining the initial position for attack, the correct-
ness of the pilot's (group's) decisions and actions in gaining the initial position,
maintenance of tactical and fire cooperation in the group of attacking fighters, the
actions in pulling out of the attack and in repeating it, and also evasion of a strike,
disengagement from the battle, and assembly.
In making a general evaluation of an aerial battle, the commander compares
the results of the photogurmery of both sides and the elements enumerated above,
and determines which side (pilot, group) had the advantage.
The general evaluation of an exercise in firing at ground targets and aerial tow
targets is composed of evaluations of the results of the firing and the maneuvering.
In evaluating the maneuvering of a pilot (group) during firing at ground targets, con-
sideration is also given to how accurately he maintained the assigned speed and alti-
tude of going into the dive, the established altitude for pulling out of the dive, the
assigned combat formation of the group in approaches and attacks, whether the AA
evasion maneuver and repeat attacks were properly executed, the time of assem-
bling the group into a combat formation after the attacks,
The commander obtains the data for evaluation of the maneuver in firing at
ground targets from the flight controller on the range for each pilot individually and
G. G. Semenko
45
Flight Evaluation
for the group as a whole. In giving a grade for maneuvering during firing at aerial
tow targets, the commander also takes into consideration whether the pilot properly
took up the initial position before the attack and whether he maintained the assigned
range and target course angle at the moment of firing. The first data are taken from
the report of the tow plane, the second are obtained from an analysis of the photo
film.
If there are no remarks on the maneuvering, the grade for an exercise in firing
combat weapons (photogunnery) at ground and aerial tow targets is given in conform-
ity with the established norms. If, however, the pilot's maneuvering in attacking
the target is not entirely satisfactory, the commander reduces his grade for the ex-
ercise, but he must without fail explain the reason for the reduction.
If the pilot has made mistakes that threatened flight safety, a grade of "unsatis-
factory" must be given for an exercise in aerial combat, gunnery, and photogunnery
at ground targets and aerial tow targets, irrespective of the results of the photo-
gunnery or the firing of combat weapons.
And how to evaluate correctly an exercise in aerial combat or aerial gunnery
performed by a pair, an element, or a squadron? If the guide used in this is the
norms of group flight for combat employment, then individual pilots who have not
even carried out the task set may receive "good" or even "excellent". It is quite
clear that such a methodology, if one may call it that, of evaluating group exercises
cannot serve as a stimulus for improving the combat skill of a pilot and brings enorm-
ous harm to the combat training of a subunit or unit.
In order to avoid this shortcoming, it seems to us, it is best to give each pilot
participating in the flight two evaluations: in the numerator -- the evaluation receiv-
ed by the group; in the denominator -- an individual evaluation for firing from com-
bat weapons at ground (aerial) targets or for photogunnery in aerial combat.
With such a methodology, the commander will always know the level of training
of the pair, element, or squadron, and also of each pilot individually and, in accor-
dance with this, will be able to take steps to improve the quality of training of the
lagging pilots and groups.
In addition, in making a general evaluation of a flight for a single pilot or a
group, especially in practicing combat employment, the commander must constant-
ly take into consideration such important factors as manifestation of reasoned initia-
tive and strict observance of flight discipline. The commander can judge this either
by his own observations or by the conclusions of the flight controllers on the range,
the commanders of the target plane crews, the tow plane crews, and the crews of
command posts (PN) [vectoring post] who do the vectoring and exercise control over
the execution of the mission.
We have examined only opinions about the evaluation of flights in certain forms
of flight training as expressed by the commanders of leading units and subunits.
These suggestions, without a doubt, do not exhaust by far all the methods of evalu-
ating a flight and require extensive creativeness from the commanders.
Every air commander must remember that not a single omission in flight work
brings such detriment as non-objective evaluation of a pilot for a flight. Only this
can explain many flight accidents and causes of them that arise because flight per-
sonnel are inadequately trained.
And conversely, proper and objective evaluation excludes the possibility of un-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
46 G. G. Semenko
trained pilots flying out in a combat plane and, consequently, improves the quality
of combat training of the subunit and unit as a whole.
AN INSTRUMENT FOR CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS UNDER
ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
For controlling aircraft flights by the system and along a route, we make use
of an instrument (Fig. 1) designed by officer Yu. F. Negonov.
This instrument makes it possible to control the flight of aircraft and helps to
evaluate the precision with which the pilot maintains the flight regime and the com-
puted data in cloud penetration. In addition, it gives the flight controller and the
duty vectoring officer the opportunity to follow the movement of aircraft in space
constantly. For this it is enough to cast a quick glance at the instrument, where
the movement of silhouettes of the aircraft can be seen, and then at the RLS[ radar
station] control plotting board, after which the appropriate corrections are made.
This instrument serves also as a valuable visual aid in teaching pilots flying by
the OSP [instrument landing] system. With the aid of a supplementary mechanism,
it is possible to follow aircraft in the piloting zones.
A control panel is situated on the face of the instrument. The instrument is
powered by a type 2PP-40 direct-current electric motor (1) of 18.5 volts (Fig. 2).
The speed at the outlet shaft is 4100 rpm. On one end of the armature there is a
fan to cool the motor; fitted on the other is a worm reduction gear (2). The speed at
the outlet is 93.75 rpm. Fitted to the outlet shaft of the reducer is a single-cut worm
(3), which transmits rotation through gear (4) to the shaft of the friction disk of the
timer (5). The friction disk, 185 mm in diameter, makes 0.788 rpm. For better
engagement, its working side is faced with leather.
Fig. 1. Overall view of the control instrument: 1 -- V-belt; 2 -- silhouette
of plane on a special mounting; 3 -- signal control case; 4 -- box for storing the
aircraft silhouettes; 5 -- rheostat; 6 -- voltmeter; 7 -- current switch; 8 --
signal system switch; 9 -- pilotage zone switch and lights.
Flight Evaluation 47
From this disk, motion is transmitted to a movable friction roller (6), 38 mm
in diameter, which makes from 0.75 to 2.5 rpm. Fitted to the upper end of the
friction roller is a cylindrical gear (7), the motion from which is transmitted to
drive gear (8).
The working regime in respect to time (altitude) is set in by means of timer
knob (9), which is connected to microscrew (10) through a shank. When the latter
is rotated, motion is transmitted to a movable forked nut (11), on the fork of which
is located a movable rubber friction roller.
The readings of the assigned regime are transmitted by means of a link mech-
anism (12) from the forked nut to a movable pointer with an index. The readings are
taken off the time scale (13), which is set on the outside of the instrument case.
Fitted to the upper end of the shaft of the drive gear is a drive roller (14). Its work-
ing diameter is 52 mm. This roller is given a range of rotation from 0.15 to 0.5
rpm, thus changing the speed of the V-belt system. The latter consists of one drive
roller and five driven rollers (15), a V-belt with a flat belt (16) attached to it, a con-
tact signalling system (17), and movable aircraft silhouettes (18) with terminal
switches.
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the instrument.
The reciprocal position of the axes of the rollers of the V-belt system depends
on the regime and profile of the flight in penetrating the overcast. All the magni-
tudes are maintained in scalar time proportions. The V-belt makes a complete
turn in 10-70 minutes (depending on the time or echelon established). Its functional
length is 1225 mm.
When a plane is flying at the assigned echelon and passes the DPRM [ outer hom-
ing radio beacon], the signal system goes into operation.
At the SKP [flight-line command post], the control instrument is operated by
the duty vectoring officer together with the flight controller. Depending on the eche-
lon, the initial data, taken from the table, are set in on the instrument. When a
plane takes off, a silhouette with its index number is placed on the V-belt band oppo-
site the code "Takeoff". As the plane moves through space, its silhouette moves
correspondingly on the instrument, on the condition that the pilot maintain the assign-
ed regime. If, however, the regime is not maintained, the vectoring officer, utiliz-
ing the data from the RLS plotting board, makes corrections on the instrument or
transmits them to the pilot through the flight controller. The reports of the pilot at
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
48 G. G. Semenko
certain stages of the flight are also used for control.
The instrument is mounted on a wooden panel. Its side walls are made of ply-
wood. It is very simple in construction and can be built in the unit. The instru-
ment works without any failure and has received universal recognition among us.
Guards Col. B. A. ABRAMOVICH.
WIND DATA
SERVICEABLE PERIODS
Engineer Col. K. K. GA.RIFULEC,
Candidate of Physico-Mathematical Sciences
The wind, just as other meteorological factors, has a substantial effect on the
work of aviation. On the knowledge and proper consideration of its velocity and dir-
ection depends precision of bombing and accuracy of navigation. In many cases,
the wind has a strong effect on flight safety, as for example, in a jet-stream zone or
in landing aircraft. That is why data on the wind are among the most important ele-
ments of which pilots and navigators must be absolutely certain.
In practice, however, a certain time almost always elapses from the moment of
determining the wind to the moment of utilization of the data on it. Depending on the
methods of measurement and processing, as well as on the method of transmitting
the data, the time gap may attain several hours. Thus, in the radar method of sound-
ing the atmosphere above 10 km, the processed information on the wind may not be
received until 1-2 hours after the measurement. In addition, it is necessary to take
into consideration the intervals between observation times. If the observations are
made 4 times a day, i. e., every 6 hours, the greatest duration of utilization of the
data attains 7-8 hours; in sounding twice a day it is 13-14 hours. Of course, the
wind does not remain constant during this time.
The characteristics of variability of the wind in time make it possible to evalu-
ate what errors may arise in utilizing the wind when a certain interval of time has
elapsed after measurement, or during what period it is possible to use the data on
wind measured earlier with a permissible accuracy given in advance. This period
is called the serviceable period of the data.
The processing and analysis of a large number of observations on the wind at
high altitudes have given us the opportunity to study the variability of wind in time.
This was based on quite accurate data from more frequent observations made with
the aid of radar and the base method in our area over a period of several years.
Since wind is a vector magnitude, it is desirable to examine separately the varia-
bility of its direction, velocity modulus, and vector (Fig. 1).
In Fig. 1, CX, and Vo are the direction and velocity of the wind at the initial mom-
ent of time; Pct and Vt are the direction and velocity of the wind after a time interval
t; L1c(JAV and n V are respectively the changes in the direction, velocity modulus,
and vector of the wind during time t.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
50
K. K. Garifulin
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release � 50-Yr 2014/06/18: CIA-RDP81-01043R004400150005-8
Fig. 1. Elements of changes in the wind vector.
The mean square deviation epxwas taken as the main characterization (measure)
of diffusion. The values of tsAp