USSR REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000200260005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR Review
SOV UR 87-01OX
December 1987
Copy 607
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Intelligence
USSR Review
The USSR Review is published by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the
Reverse Blank Secret
SOV UR 87-OIOX
December 1987
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Contents
Pieces After the Yel'tsin Affair
General Secretary Gorbachev suffered a serious political setback
with the sacking of Moscow party leader Yel'tsin, one of the most
outspoken proponents of reform in the Soviet Union. In response to
growing pressure from more conservative members of the leader-
ship, Gorbachev has distanced himself somewhat from party radi-
cals, but he continues to promote his broad reform agenda. He
probably will seek to regain the initiative before the All-Union Party
Page
Conference next June.
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Moscow's human rights performance has improved under Gorba-
chev, particularly in the realm of freedom of association and
freedom of movement of people and ideas. Nevertheless, change is
taking place only within limits carefully set by the regime, and
official reaction to efforts by citizens to test the limits has been
increasingly negative since the summer. Thus far, the relaxation has
not been given a legal framework and could be reversed, although
Moscow does not appear about to revert to an across-the-board
repressive approach.
Secret
SOV UR 87-0/OX
December 1987
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Over the past year, the Soviets have displayed a new activism at the
UN that appears to be designed to gain them greater influence
within the UN organization, improve the image of the USSR in the
global arena, and garner support for their proposals for disarma-
ment, settlement of regional conflicts, and increased Soviet partici-
pation in international economic affairs. Moscow also has expressed
interest in expanding its involvement in international cooperation on
environmental, medical, and other functional issues.
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Newly published speeches by General Secretary Gorbachev and
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reveal that there has been an even
sharper break with President Gromyko's legacy at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs than had been evident earlier. The decision to
release these previously secret speeches reflects a desire to communi-
cate to Soviet and foreign audiences that policies and practices have
changed at the Ministry and suggests a further decline in
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Boris Asoyan, a leading Soviet specialist on Africa and an adviser to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, authored an article critical of Soviet
policy on Africa in the Literaturnaya gazeta of 7 October. At a time
when Moscow is discussing possibilities for "new thinking" in
foreign policy in general, and on African policy in particular, it may
reflect advice Asoyan is giving to the Foreign Ministry.
After a relatively good performance in 1986, the Soviet economy
sputtered again this year. Unless changes are made to the economic
plan for 1986-90, General Secretary Gorbachev's effort to modern-
ize the economy and increase the rate of economic growth may be
seriously delayed.
Use in Machine Building
"Squeezing" more output from existing machinery is a key element
of General Secretary Gorbachev's strategy for improving Soviet
industrial performance. By moving workers off old machinery and
equipment and onto a second or third shift using newer, more
efficient production lines already in place, the Soviet leader hopes to
boost production and accelerate plant renovation. Where it has been
seriously attempted, however, the transfer of workers to additional
shifts has proved highly disruptive and even counterproductive-
problems that portend little increase in capital use through the
remainder of the current five-year plan (1986-90).
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High Infant Mortality in Soviet Central Asia
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of Economic Performance
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Articles
Gorbachev's Political Position:
Picking Up the Pieces After
the Yel'tsin Affair
Since winning one of his biggest political victories at
the Central Committee plenum last June, General
Secretary Gorbachev has suffered a series of political
challenges and setbacks, culminating in the extraordi-
nary public humiliation and dismissal of his erstwhile
ally Boris Yel'tsin. Events in recent months have
strengthened the influence of more conservative mem-
bers of the leadership, led by "Second Secretary"
Ligachev, who want to slow the pace and narrow the
scope of reform. In response, Gorbachev is distancing
himself from the radical approach to reform that he
took earlier this year in favor of a more politically
tenable middle ground. Gorbachev still commands a
strong position in the leadership and evidently is in no
danger of losing his job. Moreover, while his reform
campaign has lost some momentum as a result of
conservative sniping and the Yel'tsin debacle, Gorba-
chev has continued to promote perestroyka vigorous-
ly, leaving little room for an alternative policy agenda
to be articulated. He will probably try to strengthen
his power base and regain the initiative before the All-
Union Party Conference in June 1988, which he hopes
to use to make changes in the Central Committee and,
perhaps, to ratify his more controversial policies.
The June Plenum
Gorbachev's reform campaign appeared to reach a
crescendo at the time of the June Central Committee
plenum:
designed to loosen central controls over economic
decision making and give greater scope to market
forces.
? The plenum also gave Gorbachev authorization to
hold an All-Union Party Conference next June, the
first since 1941. Gorbachev wants to use the confer-
ence to boost his plans for "democratization" of
electoral procedures and to make changes in the
Central Committee, where his support has been
weaker than in the Secretariat and Politburo.
? The plenum strengthened Gorbachev's support at
the top by promoting three party secretaries to full
Politburo membership. One of the three-ideology
secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev-is unambiguously a
strong Gorbachev ally. The other two, economic
secretary Nikolay Slyun'kov and agriculture secre-
tary Viktor Nikonov, clearly favor moving ahead
with economic reform. The additions of Yakovlev
and Nikonov also served to dilute the power of
Ligachev, who had previously been the only senior
secretary overseeing ideology and agriculture.
Around this time, there were also tentative indica-
tions that secretary Lev Zaykov, a Gorbachev ally,
was challenging Ligachev's authority in the critical-
ly important cadres area.
? The plenum approved a comprehensive program of
"radical" economic reform, to be in place by the
beginning of the 13th Five-Year Plan in 1991,
Conservative Counterattack
Despite-or perhaps because of-Gorbachev's show
of strength at the June plenum, more conservative
members of the leadership began to indicate their
Secret
SOV UR 87-010X
December 1987
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growing discomfort with certain aspects of Gorba-
chev's reform agenda, particularly concerning glas-
nost and "democratization." In the ensuing months,
as Soviet media carried an extraordinarily frank
debate over current policies and sensitive questions of
Soviet history, and as glasnost began to generate
grassroots demonstrations and turmoil among disaf-
fected nationalities, some members of the leadership
expressed their growing concerns publicly about the
"excesses" of reform:
? In early July, while praising glasnost in general
terms, Ligachev charged that, in the process of
implementing it, the media had dredged up some
"scum and debris." He called for "constructive"
glasnost, blending artistic merit and "profound
ideological commitment," warned against unleash-
ing "alien forces," and affirmed that the party
would not depart from Communist principles.
? In early August, Ligachev said that "genuine glas-
nost has nothing to do with demagoguery and a
disrespectful attitude toward the history of socialist
building." He lashed out at "class opponents" who
entertained the "vain hope" that reform in the
USSR will lead to a "deviation from socialism in
the direction of a market economy, ideological
pluralism, and Western democracy." In contrast to
Gorbachev's emphasis on exposing past deficiencies
and shortcomings in the system, Ligachev praised
the "grandiose achievements" of the Stalin era and
stressed that, along with the shortcomings of the
Brezhnev period, there were "remarkable"
accomplishments.
? KGB Chairman Chebrikov used a speech in early
September to paint a stark picture of the dangers
that excessive reform could unleash. He warned that
Western intelligence services are attempting to ex-
ploit the democratization process to "split the mono-
lithic unity of party and people," reminded his
audience that some Soviet citizens hold views that
are "hostile to socialism," and claimed that "ex-
tremist elements" had come to the fore in the
atmosphere of glasnost. He argued, in effect, that
concessions on human rights issues were backfiring
since released political prisoners were aiding the
West, and imperialists were stirring up nationalist
Gorbachev on the Defensive
Gorbachev responded to these pressures by moderat-
ing his rhetoric and taking a more cautious approach
on certain controversial issues, while continuing to
promote his reform agenda vigorously:
? A few days after Ligachev's July speech, Gorba-
chev, in a meeting with media officials, stressed the
benefits of glasnost but cautioned against under-
mining "socialist" values or creating a climate of
disrespect for party officials, noting that some peo-
ple are just waiting for "you or me to make a
mistake ... to turn it against the entire process of
democratization and glasnost."
? Gorbachev also seemed to back off from one of the
most controversial aspects of his "democratization"
campaign: secret balloting in elections for party
secretaries up through the republic level, an idea he
first proposed at the January 1987 Central Commit-
tee plenum, but which has reportedly been the
Gorbachev reform most feared by the broader Sovi-
et elite. Ligachev
strongly opposes the idea, and of Soviet leaders only
Zaykov has made favorable public reference to it-
a reference that significantly was deleted by
Pravda.
? Gorbachev has also sought to balance his frequent
calls for placing reform-minded officials in party
posts at all levels with reassurances that he is not
declaring war on the party apparatus. He told the
Leningrad party aktiv in October that party leaders
must be "seized completely by the idea of the
revolutionary renewal of society," but added that he
was not issuing an appeal to "open fire on function-
aries," as China did during the Cultural Revolution.
While moderating his tone, Gorbachev clearly at-
tempted to regain the offensive after returning in
September from an unusually long vacation. He gave
speeches in Murmansk and Leningrad that strongly
reaffirmed his commitment to carrying the reform
process forward, saying that, if backtracking is al-
lowed, "that will be it; our restructuring front will fall
demonstrations in the USSR.
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The Revolution Day Speech
Debate within the Politburo evidently came to a head
as the leadership prepared for the anniversary. =
Gorbachev hoped to use his
apart," and that "I would not be able to conduct
another policy ... there is no other way for me."
The Yel'tsin Affair
Gorbachev's political situation took an unexpected
turn when Yel'tsin decided to use the October plenum
to air his longstanding grievances against party con-
servatives and to voice, at least indirectly, his frustra-
tion with Gorbachev's inability or unwillingness to
challenge them. His subsequent public excoriation
and removal from office was the most damaging
setback to Gorbachev's leadership since he became
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speech to criticize basic features of the authoritarian
and repressive system that Stalin had created in order
to legitimize movement toward radical reform.F_
victims of Stalin.
Instead, Gorbachev's speech stopped short of ques-
tioning the overall validity of the Stalinist political
and economic structure. While he denounced Stalin's
purges and his overreliance on centralized, adminis-
trative power, Gorbachev justified the main lines of
Stalin's policies as historically necessary. Moreover,
he did not rehabilitate symbolically important figures
like Bukharin-father of the New Economic Policy,
which allowed wide scope for private enterprise-
although he did announce the creation of a commis-
sion to review Bukharin's case and those of other
Gorbachev was
forced to water down the most provocative sections of
the speech in response to objections from party con-
go, go, no matter how difficult it is."
Gorbachev's Revolution Day speech also introduced a
new note of caution on current policies, most notably
concerning the proper pace of reform. As he has done
in the past, Gorbachev criticized unnamed conserva-
tives who want to undermine reform by slowing it
down. But, uncharacteristically, he went on to lash
out at "impatient" elements who try to force change
too rapidly, a charge clearly aimed at Yel'tsin. By
contrast, earlier this year Gorbachev repeatedly ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of
restructuring. As recently as 12 October in Lenin-
grad, when a man in a crowd commented that "you
cannot restructure everything all at once," Gorbachev
responded that such an approach could lead to the
conclusion, "why hurry?" "While you can not change
everything all at once," he said, "you've got to go, go,
General Secretary.
Yel'tsin had been closely associated with Gorbachev
since December 1985, when Gorbachev personally
appealed for Yel'tsin's controversial installation as
Moscow party leader. Over the next two years,
Yel'tsin was one of the most outspoken proponents in
the leadership of Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and
perestroyka. To many Muscovites, Yel'tsin's efforts to
break up the corrupt political machinery of his prede-
cessor, raise the standard of living in the capital, and
allow greater freedom of expression seemed to em-
body the aspirations of the Gorbachev regime.
Given the magnitude of Yel'tsin's misbehavior at the
plenum, Gorbachev probably had little choice but to
break with his former ally and punish him. Not only
did Yel'tsin commit a gross violation of party disci-
pline in bypassing the Politburo and taking his griev-
ances to the Central Committee, he also ignored a
direct order from Gorbachev to wait until after the
70th anniversary celebrations to air his frustrations.
Complaining that the Secretariat was interfering with
his efforts to implement reforms in Moscow and
overhaul the local party apparatus, Yel'tsin singled
out Ligachev as the main culprit, but he reportedly
took on Chebrikov as well. Yel'tsin even went so far as
to criticize the paucity of results from perestroyka
and thus implicitly attack Gorbachev's leadership.
By questioning Gorbachev's commitment to reform
and denouncing conservative obstructionism before
the Central Committee, where support for Gorba-
chev's reforms is weakest among the party leadership
bodies, Yel'tsin put the General Secretary in a politi-
cally untenable position. Gorbachev could not afford
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to fight it out with the conservatives on such inhospi-
table ground, nor could he be seen as condoning
Yel'tsin's violation of party discipline.
There were some signs that Gorbachev initially hoped
to keep Yel'tsin in place, but his management of the
1 l November Moscow Gorkom meeting suggests that
Gorbachev eventually concluded that he had to cut his
losses and avoid a fight with Ligachev. By taking
charge of the Moscow plenum and leading the attack
against Yel'tsin, Gorbachev was able to limit de-
bate-at least in public-to Yel'tsin's personal mis-
conduct and prevent the meeting from turning into an
evaluation of perestroyka. Indeed, Gorbachev and
other speakers at the meeting argued that Yel'tsin's
efforts to do everything in "one fell swoop" had done
more to hurt than help the cause of reform. Moreover,
by placing Zaykov-another close ally-in the Mos-
cow position, Gorbachev also signaled that he was still
in control of the party and that restructuring in the
capital would not be halted.
Gorbachev has been able only to limit, not prevent,
the damage. Even though Yel'tsin was punished os-
tensibly for his maverick behavior and not his political
views, his removal was widely perceived in the USSR
as a blow to glasnost and perestroyka. For the first
time, Gorbachev is being seen as setting limits on the
reform process, rather than expanding it. His credibil-
ity has suffered at a time when he is trying to mobilize
By removing First Deputy Premier Aliyev from the
Politburo in October, Gorbachev probably ensured a
slim working majority for continuing reform at a
measured pace. He has at least three solid supporters
in Propaganda Secretary Yakovlev, Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, and new Moscow party chief Zaykov.
He can probably also usually count on backing from
Premier Ryzhkov and Secretaries Slyun'kov and Ni-
konov. With Aliyev gone, the conservative wing of the
Politburo has been reduced to four probable members:
Ligachev, Chebrikov, President Gromyko, and Ukrai-
nian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy. RSFSR Premier
Vorotnikov and Party Control Committee Chairman
Solomentsev appear to occupy the middle ground, and
they may serve as critical swing votes on controversial
issues. Overall, there appears to be stronger leadership
backing for Gorbachev's economic reform initiatives
than for his promotion of glasnost and "democratiza-
tion."
The General Secretary also has a strong base of
support in the Secretariat, the party's executive arm
and second most powerful leadership body. He proba-
bly can count on the support of four of the five
secretaries who are full Politburo members. Three of
the other six secretaries are also closely associated
with Gorbachev.
Zaykov's departure from the Secretariat-a move
that would be consistent with past practice but,
not yet certain-would
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reaction on the popular level, leading to demonstra-
tions and even work stoppages. Although Soviet me-
dia have not identified Yegor Ligachev as Yel'tsin's
principal adversary at the October plenum, the Soviet
public has apparently come to that conclusion: one
Embassy source said that students demonstrating on
Yel'tsin's behalf at Moscow State University carried
placards saying "You are wrong, Yegor."
The Balance of Power
Gorbachev evidently still has sufficient support in top
leadership bodies to retain power. The goal of more
conservative leaders at present seems limited to keep-
ing Gorbachev and the reform process within manage-
able bounds.
deprive Gorbachev of a key ally there. Since his new
position does not give him responsibilities relating to
national security issues, Zaykov may also lose his
membership in the Defense Council, somewhat weak-
ening Gorbachev's strength in that body.
Gorbachev's support is weakest in the Central Com-
mittee, where a majority of members attained their
positions under Brezhnev. Many Central Committee
members-especially economic administrators, party
bureaucrats, and military officials-feel threatened
by Gorbachev's policies.
strong resistance to Gorbachev's program wit in
much of the elite below the leadership level.
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managers.
Outlook
Events since Yel'tsin's dismissal suggest that the
debate over the scope and pace of reform is far from
resolved. There are some signs that conservatives have
been emboldened to speak out more forcefully about
the need to limit certain reforms. For example,
Pravda published an article that endorsed "democra-
tization" in principle, but decried "distortions and
excesses," and especially denounced efforts to hinder
party organs' influence in the election of factory
tablish firmer controls in this area.
In addition, the use of massive police force in quash-
ing demonstrations in Latvia reinforces evidence that
the leadership has adopted a harder line than previ-
ously on the issue of non-Russian nationalism-prob-
ably inevitable in view of the burgeoning unrest.
Coming in the wake of statements by Ligachev and
Chebrikov sounding the alarm about the danger of
unleashing nationalistic unrest, Moscow's reversion to
repressive measures suggests a determination to es-
balloting, suggesting that the issue is not dead.
At the same time, Gorbachev and his supporters are
still able to use the media to propagate controversial
ideas. Soviet periodicals-particularly Moscow News
and Ogonyok-continue to publish provocative arti-
cles on historical questions and current issues. Mos-
kovskaya pravda, the organ of the Moscow party
organization, published an article on 20 November
implicitly advocating an increase in the size of the
Central Committee-a move that could dilute the
influence of conservatives in that body-by bringing
in workers with little experience in party affairs. The
same article also repeated Gorbachev's January pro-
posal for multicandidate party elections using secret
As the struggle between conservatives and reformers
continues, Gorbachev will be under pressure to show
that he is still in charge of the party and that his
reform agenda will not be narrowed or rolled back. In
particular, he will need to signal that there remains a
strong consensus behind the policies of glasnost,
perestroyka, and demokratizatsiya, the three pro-
grams most closely identified with his leadership. If
conservative themes become more prevalent in the
media and in leadership rhetoric, opponents of reform
and fence sitters-many of whom occupy critical
positions within the party and government hierar-
chy-will probably be even more resistant to the kinds
of changes Gorbachev is pressing them to make.
In the personnel area, Gorbachev has several opportu- 25X1
nities to augment his power in the coming months:
? He may be able to add a new ally to the Secretariat
to replace Zaykov if he is removed, or at least shift 25X1
Zaykov's responsibilities for oversight of defense
industries to a supporter already there. Gorbachev
has a strong stake in this decision, since Zaykov
seemed to back the General Secretary's effort to
hold down defense spending through arms control.
? Local and regional party organizations will formally
conduct elections for their leadership positions be-
fore the end of the year. Gorbachev may hope that
his call for more "democratic" procedures will
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? In early 1988, the party will begin selecting dele-
gates to attend the first Party Conference since
1941, to be held on 28 June. Gorbachev hopes to use
the conference to make changes in the Central
Committee and, perhaps, to ratify some of his most
controversial policies.
If Gorbachev is able to control these appointments
and elections, he will go a long way in consolidating
his power and building a broader constituency for
reform. He will face a formidable obstacle in Liga-
chev, however, whose interference in Yel'tsin's party
organization demonstrated the substantial power he
wields in party personnel matters. If Ligachev man- 25X1
ages to place officials who share his go-slow approach
in key positions, the momentum for reform will
diminish and Gorbachev's own political future will
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Recent Soviet Human Rights
Initiatives: What They Have
and Have Not Done
Under General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet human
rights performance has changed for the better-
particularly in the realm of freedom of association
and freedom of movement of people and ideas. In
terms of traditional Soviet practice, the change is
striking. Nevertheless, it is taking place only within
limits carefully set by the regime and on issues of its
choosing. Thus far, the relaxation has not been given
a legal framework and could be reversed when
deemed expedient. Gorbachev recognizes that greater
tolerance for a diversity of views and protection of
citizens against harassment from officials is necessary
to strengthen the regime's legitimacy and to promote
the initiative and creativity on which his moderniza-
tion program depends. He has also made clear that
the Communist Party will retain its authority to judge
the proper limits for individual action. Arbitrariness
continues in many areas, in part because many in the
bureaucracy are not in tune with the changes being
directed from the top. Regime reaction to efforts by
citizens to test the limits of tolerable political behavior
has been increasingly negative since the summer.
Nevertheless, the leadership does not appear about to
revert to an across-the-board repressive approach, and
it is still fine-tuning its human rights strategy
Freedom of Expression and Free Movement of Ideas
Gorbachev's policy of glasnost has significantly in-
creased freedom of expression in official media and
exposed the Soviet public to more uncensored infor-
mation from unofficial journals and the West:
? Soviet media have begun to discuss formerly taboo
societal problems-such as alcohol and drug abuse.
Editors have also mounted a broad attack on cor-
rupt and ineffective bureaucrats and middle-level
party officials and have even reported on police
abuses.
? Discussions of contentious historical issues have
mentioned former "nonpersons" like Nikolay
Bukharin and Lev Trotskiy, and historians continue
to probe sensitive issues.
? The official media have included some uncensored
remarks by Western leaders, and cessation of jam-
ming of the VOA and BBC has provided additional
access to Western views.
In most cases, however, glasnost has been a means for
the leadership to spotlight deficiencies in the existing
system that it wanted to resolve and to pressure
recalcitrant lower level bureaucrats. It has not been a
means for criticizing the overall system. Criticism in
the political realm is especially limited. Direct attacks
on the top leadership are still taboo unless they are the
consequence of a deliberate party decision, such as the
attacks on ousted Kazakh party leader Kunayev and
Moscow party chief Yel'tsin. The media have provid-
ed no objective exposition of many unpleasant aspects
of Soviet history, such as the forced deportation of
non-Russian nationalities.
The party apparatus still closely monitors the official
media and sources of outside information:
? The Central Committee has reviewed several liberal
journals, including the provocative weekly Moscow
News. "Second Secretary" Ligachev's decision to
remove a letter from a dissident delayed one of its
issues in April. decisions
about whether to publish sensitive materials are
frequently made at the leadership level.
? The regime continues to jam the more politically
hostile radiobroadcasts, notably those of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Israel.
? The inefficiencies of the Stalinist command econo-
my have been frankly acknowledged, although with-
out directly challenging socialist principles, particu-
larly state ownership of the means of production.
Secret
SOV UR 87-OIOX
December 1987
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Most important, while relaxing censorship of the
state-owned media, the regime has not moved to
legitimize independent publications:
? Several former dissidents have organized publica-
tion of unofficial journals that address a variety of
politically sensitive topics, but their requests for
official permission to publish openly have either
been rejected outright or ignored.
? Editors and contributors of some unofficial journals,
such as Glasnost which is published by released
prisoner Sergey Grigoryants, have been repeatedly
harassed by the KGB.
? Regime spokesmen have declared that there is no
need for an independent press and stated that the
regime would prohibit cooperative or private pub-
lishing enterprises that were "purely ideological."
Freedom of expression-although officially encour-
aged on "constructive topics"-is still hindered by the
fear of prosecution under Soviet laws prohibiting
"anti-Soviet" statements and actions. Under articles
70 and 190 of the RSFSR criminal code, those
convicted can receive stiff prison sentences of up to 10
years. This year Moscow has invoked these articles
less frequently, pardoned over 170 political prisoners
prosecuted under them, and indicated that the articles
are under consideration for change or deletion in the
current revision of the criminal coded
public statements by Soviet officials, however,
suggest that a revised article 70 may be retained to
protect national security-leaving open the possibility
of its continued abuse. Moreover,
the regime intends to shift increasing-
ly to administrative, not legal, resolution of these
cases, thus obviating the need for court trials and
further increasing potential for arbitrariness.
Freedom of Association
Moscow has thus far tolerated new attempts to exer-
cise freedom of association--in the form of informal
literary, cultural, and political discussion groups.
Thousands of groups have been formed around the
country, mainly among well-educated youth. The
party permitted 600 representatives from 50 groups to
gather in Moscow in late August for an independent
groups' conference.
While Gorbachev is probably sympathetic to renewed
interest in public policy among young people, the
regime has no intention of taking a laissez faire
position. It is attempting to co-opt the more moderate
groups, perhaps as a prelude to a crackdown on the
more extreme and politically oriented ones. A Central
Committee commission has reportedly been formed to
study unofficial groups, and the Young Communist
League (Komsomol) and Znaniye (Knowledge) Societ-
ies are offering new political clubs as alternatives to
spontaneous grassroots organizations. Several of the
more political groups have already lost their access to
public meeting halls.
Freedom of Assembly
This year, public demonstrations-by human rights
activists, environmentalists, nonconformist youth, na-
tionalists, and others-have become a common way to
register political complaints. About 130 demonstra-
tions-including very large ones-have been orga-
nized in Moscow and Leningrad this year. While the
regime initially showed restraint toward most demon-
strations, the increase in frequency and size and the
infusion of the nationalist element have led to a
general crackdown.
The regime has restricted spontaneous demonstrations
and resorted to physical harassment of those that
violate the new rules adopted in a number of areas. At
least in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Ufa, and the
Baltic states, demonstrators are now required to apply
for permission seven to 10 days in advance. Since
introducing the regulations, the regime has rarely
granted permission. In one case-for a gathering of
Jews at a cemetery outside Moscow to commemorate
the massacre at Babi Yar-the regime tried to exploit
the demonstration for propaganda gain.
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When demonstrators have tried to protest despite
denials, police have used force to disperse them.
While most activists have been detained only a few
hours, some have received 10-day sentences and been
fined. At least three times in Moscow this fall, police
have used preventive detention against dozens of
human rights activists to head off demonstrations.
Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and the
Right to Due Process
The improvement of "socialist legality" has been a
major theme of Gorbachev's program to "democrati-
ze" Soviet society. Several measures have been de-
signed to limit legal arbitrariness:
? The Supreme Soviet passed a law "On the Protec-
tion of Citizens' Rights," obstensibly giving citizens
the ability to challenge illegal decisions by officials
in court.
? The Soviet media have exposed cases of false arrest
and conviction for crimes and improper diagnosis of
psychiatric illness.
? Soviet officials have stated that all psychiatric
hospitals will be under the purview of the Ministry
of Health instead of the Ministry of Interior, a move
that would presumably reduce the use of psychiatry
as a police instrument.
? The RSFSR Minister of Justice has said that
suspects will probably be granted immediate access
to legal counsel, unlike current practice.
Despite these tentative steps, the security apparatus
that makes repression possible-including a KGB
directorate charged with monitoring and controlling
dissent-remains in place. Surveillance, physical ha-
rassment, illegal search and seizure, and detention-
including commitment to psychiatric hospitals-are
still used when the regime deems them expedient.
Freedom of Movement
Emigration of Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians
has increased about tenfold in 1987 over 1986 rates to
a total of over 20,000 (about 7,000 Jews, 12,000
Germans, and 2,300 Armenians) in the first 11
months of 1987. Most longstanding refusenik cases
and most bilateral cases with Western countries of
divided spouses and dual citizenship have been settled.
Emigration of Germans this year is the highest in over
30 years, although Jewish and Armenian emigration
are still well below peak years-over 51,000 Jews
emigrated in 1979 and over 6,000 Armenians in 1980.
According to Soviet officials, only 8 percent of all
applications have been denied this year, and a Su-
preme Soviet commission has overturned some denials
made on grounds that the would-be emigrants had
access to classified information.
The regime has also taken several steps to open up
opportunities for short-term travel, hoping to improve
the Soviet population's morale-primarily that of
intellectuals, who have long resented limits on their
ability to meet with professional colleagues abroad.
Moscow also hopes to head off a rush for emigration
by allowing more visits between family and friends.
Jews and ethnic Germans have been able to make
short-term trips to the West, and their relatives have
been allowed to visit the USSR in increased numbers.
The regime, however, has stopped well short of full
freedom of movement:
? An authoritative editorial in September asserted the
legitimacy of denying emigration on the basis of
previous access to "state secrets," and Soviet emi-
gration authorities continue to interpret "state se-
crets" in an extremely arbitrary way.
? Immediate family members also have a veto over an
individual's desire to emigrate, according to Soviet
law. At least on paper, new regulations implemented
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this year are more restrictive because they limit
emigration to those with close family relations
abroad. The inconsistency with which the regula-
tions are applied makes the attainment of exit visas
still dependent on the fancy of local officials.
? While Moscow clearly has changed its tone on
foreign travel, the prospects for actually securing a
trip abroad have not improved for most people.
Freedom of Religion
Up to half of the Soviet population are religious
believers, and Gorbachev seems more willing than his
predecessors to differentiate between "law-abiding"
religious practitioners and religious activists and pros-
elytizers. Recent leadership statements, media re-
ports, and sociological studies hint that Gorbachev
has mandated a broad review of regime policy on
religion. Several steps have been taken thus far that
suggest the regime may be moving toward a less
repressive policy for registered congregations to iso-
late, discredit, and cripple individual religious dissent-
ers and the so-called underground churches-those
that refuse to register with authorities because doing
so requires them to curtail their efforts to spread the
faith. (Current Soviet law includes prohibitions on
proselytizing and on public religious instruction for
children.) The policy of trying to co-opt the churches
that pose less of a challenge to the regime is not
altogether new, but it is being implemented with
greater sophistication:
? Some press coverage has portrayed church officials
and ordinary believers as reliable, loyal, and re-
spectable citizens. The governmental Council on
Religious Affairs has stepped in to protect regis-
tered congregations that run into difficulties with
local authorities when exercising legal rights.
? The official requirement that baptisms be registered
with the state has been repealed, although there are
still reports of some clergy demanding to see identi-
ty documents.
? A shipment of 5,000 scriptures in Hebrew and
Russian was received at Moscow's main synagogue;
arrangements are in train to import over 200,000
Bibles in various languages; and the Russian Ortho-
dox Church has received permission to publish
100,000 Bibles and a new monthly journal. Soviet
customs regulations have reportedly been loosened
to allow tourists to carry in more than one (personal)
copy of religious materials.
The regime continues to view the renewed vitality of
religion with deep concern, perceiving that religious
values are a serious ideological challenge to its legiti-
macy. The leadership also sees certain ethnically
based denominations as contributing to the political
threat of nationalism:
? The regime is especially concerned about the bur-
geoning of Islam and its confluence with national-
ism in Central Asia. Islamic leaders have generally
not been included among pardoned political prison-
ers, and, in fact, there have been reports of several
arrests of unregistered mullahs over the last two
years.
? The Ukrainian Catholic Church (Uniate Church)
remains an outlawed church, a situation that has
existed since Stalin banned it during World War II.
The Right to National Self-Expression
While both Russian and non-Russian nationalism
have been simmering for many years, glasnost has
given rise to a much more vocal expression of de-
mands on the part of the many nationalities of the
USSR. Non-Russian nationalist activism has been
particularly boosted by the release from prison of
several minority activists. Over 30 separate nationalist
demonstrations have taken place in 1987, involving
hundreds and more recently thousands of participants.
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While the regime has tolerated relatively benign
public protests by nationalists on environmental issues
and preservation of historical monuments, it has
cracked down hard on those making political
demands:
? After initial kid-glove treatment of the Russian
nationalist group Pamyat, the press began to attack
the organization. Members were thrown out of their
meeting places, two prominent leaders were report-
edly incarcerated in mental hospitals, and then
Moscow party boss Yel'tsin was explicitly attacked
for failure to refute the views of Pamyat's "hysteri-
cal women and reactionaries." (The organization
has a strongly anti-Semitic orientation.)
? After initially showing restraint toward Crimean
Tatars while they demonstrated on Red Square for
several days in late July, Moscow authorities de-
ported hundreds under police escort. Each subse-
quent attempt by Tatars to demonstrate-mainly in
the Crimea, Kuban, and Tashkent regions-has
been dispersed by police.
? Unlike the relative tolerance shown to earlier dem-
onstrations in the Baltic in June and August, Latvi-
an authorities on 18 November broke up a demon-
stration in Riga by mobilizing thousands of militia
and volunteer police to seal off the site, arresting 40
participants and holding several organizers under
preventive house arrest.
? Baltic and Tatar organizers have been subjected to
interrogation, surveillance, short detentions, physi-
cal intimidation, arrests, callups for reserve military
service, beatings, and in some cases, even death
threats.
? Many nationalist activists have been deported from
the USSR in 1987, including Latvian nationalists
Roland Silarups and Janis Rozkalns, Estonian na-
tionalist Tiit Madisson, Georgian Helsinki Accord
monitors Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, and Ukraini-
an Catholic activist Iosif Terelya.
The Right to Political Participation
Gorbachev has proposed steps to increase political
participation of the masses with the goal of increasing
pressure "from below" on officials to implement his
policies, and he has called for establishment of "so-
cialist pluralism"-a term he has yet to define:
? In an electoral experiment this June, about 4 per-
cent of local soviets nationwide were elected with
multicandidate, secret ballots. Voters in some areas
took full advantage of their chance to choose among
candidates to vote against unpopular officials.
? A new law that takes effect in January provides for
solicitation of suggestions from the public primarily
on local issues such as housing, schools, hospitals,
consumer services, and protection of historical
buildings, monuments, and the environment.
? A newly emerging form of public participation in
politics is the circulation of petitions protesting
specific governmental decisions. Petitions have re-
portedly been instrumental in shelving construction
of new nuclear power plants at Minsk and Odessa
and in closing a highly toxic chemical plant near
Leningrad. Petitioners on more directly political
matters-such as those protesting Yel'tsin's remov-
al-have, however, been harassed.
"Democratization" of the political process clearly has
limits. Gorbachev has no intention of eliminating one-
party rule and is only allowing for more discussion
within the current framework:
? Elections focus primarily on the local soviets and
factories, which have little independent authority
and are charged with overseeing the details of local
economic development and public services.
? Moreover, nominations are closely controlled. Len-
ingrad authorities used traditional harassment tech-
niques to prevent the candidacy of the leader of an
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independent group that had organized large demon-
strations in spring 1987. The local party in a Gorkiy
rayon coaxed a candidate for the soviet nominated
by workers to withdraw his name, and a "more
suitable" choice was placed on the ballot.
? There has been no change yet in overall procedures
for choosing party officials. After an initial flurry of
multicandidate elections at the lowest party level-
the district-there has been little followup on pro-
posals Gorbachev made in January for party elec-
toral reform.
"Democratization" has not affected the top of the
political pyramid. The electoral system as now envis-
aged will not break the back of the nomenklatura
system-whereby the party makes appointments to all
posts of major responsibility-although it may give
the population some input into government decisions
of Gorbachev's human rights policies could help gal-
vanize opposition to his overall reform agenda among
conservative elites.
The resolution of several upcoming issues may provide
a good gauge of Gorbachev's commitment to institu-
tionalizing an improvement in Soviet human rights
performance. These include:
? Whether the current revision of the criminal code,
due for completion in 1988, removes or substantially
narrows laws prohibiting "anti-Soviet" behavior and
many forms of religious practice or legalizes infor-
mal groups, independent publishing, and
demonstrations.
? Whether a statute of limitation is placed on emigra-
tion denials based on access to state secrets and
whether the definition of "state secrets" is
narrowed.
on purely local issues.
Prospects
Gorbachev faces an inherent dilemma: to demonstrate
the sincerity of his "new thinking" about human
rights issues, he needs to go even further than he
already has in guaranteeing basic human rights prom-
ised in the Helsinki Accords and also formally in-
scribed in the USSR's own constitution. Without
further movement, Gorbachev risks sparking a trans-
formation of today's ardent supporters of political
reform into a future generation of skeptics and even
dissidents. Yet, the concessions he has already made
make regime conservatives nervous and have led to
increased activism. Fear of the destabilizing potential
? Whether public political participation is broadened
through new laws on citizens' rights and on discus-
sion of policy proposals and through expansion of
elections to factory, government, and party posts.
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OC\:rCL
New Soviet Activism at
the United Nations
Changes in Moscow's Approach
Over the past year, US representatives to internation-
al organizations have witnessed significant changes in
the Soviet Bloc's approach to the United Nations
(UN) and other international organizations. All of the
changes have, in our view, been devised to attract
maximum media attention. They include:
? An announcement on 15 October 1987 that Moscow
would pay all of its outstanding debts to the UN-a
commitment of $225 million.
? An announcement in July 1987 that Moscow would
contribute to the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) Common Fund-a com-
mitment of approximately $29 million.
? The unprecedented agreement last winter by Kabul
and Moscow not only to discuss the human rights
situation in Afghanistan at the UN Human Rights
Commission but also to allow a UN observer to
assess the situation inside Afghanistan.
? Expressions of increased interest by Moscow in
using the UN and the Secretary General to mediate
regional disputes and in seeking a greater role for
UN peacekeeping forces in settlement of conflicts.
Recently, the Soviets called for a multinational fleet
under the UN flag to replace outside naval forces in
the Persian Gulf.
? Creation of special sections in the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Mission to the UN to
handle UN humanitarian and disarmament affairs.
General Secretary Gorbachev underlined Soviet inter-
est in the UN in September in an article in Pravda
that called for an expanded UN role in international
affairs-especially in the implementation of a pack-
age of Soviet security proposals-and greater member
acceptance of UN authority.
Objectives at the UN
Moscow almost certainly expects its UN initiatives to
promote its objectives within the UN organization
itself, especially at a time when many Third World
states are upset with US criticism of and withholding
of financial contributions to the UN. The Soviets'
objectives include:
? Redefining the mandate of UN bodies to advance
longstanding Soviet proposals such as the "new
international information order" and multilateral
consideration of so-called state terrorism, a term the
Soviets use to characterize US, South African, and
Israeli military actions in the Third World.
? Redirecting and obstructing the work of UN bodies
that do not serve Moscow's interests. UN accep-
tance of some of the Soviet security proposals would
help the Soviets divert the debate on issues such as
human rights and Afghanistan away from criticism
of the USSR and its policies.
? Capitalizing on the influence the Soviets have
gained over UN operations through the placement
of Soviet nationals in high-level UN Secretariat
positions.
In pursuing these objectives, the Soviets will continue
to play up the contrast between their activism at the
UN and alleged Western-especially US-criticism
of and actions "against" the UN and specialized
bodies such as the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
"New Thinking" and Soviet Image-Building 25X1
The Soviets' activity at the UN is also intended to
back up their call for a comprehensive system of
international peace and security (CSIS), which they
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SOV UR 87-OIOX
December 1987
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Major Soviet Activities at the UN
September 1985
(40th UN General
Assembly)
February-March 1986
May 1986
August 1986
Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze pushes for
a world space organiza-
tion and the elimination
of space weapons and
chemical weapons in his
opening speech to the
UN.
February-March 1987 Major change in Soviet
Bloc approach at UN
Human Rights Commis-
sion; Soviets and Af-
ghans agree to discuss
Afghanistan and to send
a UN observer to assess
human rights situation.
Gorbachev first calls for Summer 1987
a comprehensive system
of international peace
and security (CSIS) in
his speech to the CPSU
Party Congress.
Soviets offer $10 million
to help alleviate the UN
financial crisis; and, for
the first time, agree to
support the UNIFIL July 1987
mandate and to pay their
UNIFIL assessment.
Soviets put forward UN
financial reform proposal
that calls for the passage
of UN budgetary matters
by consensus and the cre-
ation of a new UN bud-
geting mechanism.
September 1986 Soviets put forward
(41st General Assembly) CSIS resolution-it
passes, but with many
abstentions. Soviet rhet-
oric notably more
conciliatory.
Soviets launch unusually
agressive pre-UN Gener-
al Assembly lobbying
campaign; particular em-
phasis given to CSIS and
Afghanistan. Rumors
also circulate that Gor-
bachev plans to attend
the 42nd UN General
Assembly.
Soviets agree to join the
UNCTAD common fund.
Gorbachev publishes
"The Reality and Guar-
antees of a Secure
World" in Pravda-an
article that spells out the
Soviet CSIS proposal.
Soviets also announce
that they will pay their
UN assessment in full.
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cite as a practical manifestation of "new thinking" in
their foreign policy (see inset). The CSIS proposal
recycles a variety of international political, economic,
and disarmament proposals previously submitted by
Moscow, the Third World, and others into a single
package of proposals. The USSR has marketed this
package to Third World and Western audiences as a
"radically" new development in Soviet foreign policy.
Many of the proposals, in fact, represent longstanding
Soviet positions, and sections calling for expanding
the powers of the Secretary General and the Security
Council closely resemble a plan proposed by UN
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in 1982.
Moscow has been vague on the mechanisms that
would implement the CSIS, and the recent focus on
the UN may be an effort to demonstrate, particularly
to Third World audiences, some concrete examples of
how the program might be put into practice. Moscow
has also been eager to show that the CSIS proposal is
not an attempt to supercede existing international
organizations, a point emphasized by Gorbachev in
his Pravda article.
Improving the image of the USSR in the international
arena has been a major foreign policy goal of the
Gorbachev regime, according to
Soviet academic writings. The Kremlin has inten-
sified efforts to portray the USSR as a "responsible"
power interested in, among other things, nuclear
disarmament, "peaceful competition" between East
and West, and a "just" international economic order.
It also has claimed that the USSR has no ambitions
that threaten other states. Gorbachev's UN proposals
are probably part of the image-building process,
which the Soviets presumably hope will pay off in
heightened prestige, improved diplomatic flexibility,
and increased Third World support on international
issues, notably disarmament.
Other Foreign Policy Goals
Moscow's moves at the UN support other specific
Soviet policy objectives and themes. Over the past two
years, for example, the USSR has conducted a diplo-
matic and propaganda campaign on regional conflicts
in an effort to counter US support for anti-Soviet
insurgents, gain a role for itself as a player in any
settlement processes, and reduce the worries of many
Third World countries about threats to their security
from the USSR and its clients. Gorbachev's advocacy
of UN involvement in mediating and monitoring
settlements to regional crises is probably intended to
reinforce to UN audiences the sincerity of Soviet
interest in resolving these conflicts, to discredit West-
ern intervention in areas of conflict such as the
Persian Gulf, and to reduce the margin of UN votes
against Soviet positions on Afghanistan and Cambo-
dia.
The Soviet decision to join the UNCTAD common
fund is probably designed to play to Third World
audiences as a demonstration, at relatively little cost,
of Soviet support on development issues. Indeed, the
Soviets' $29 million "commitment" is a financial
payment that will not come due for several years.
Press reports indicate that Moscow also believes that
joining the fund, which has many Western members,
will help in its campaign to gain entree into a number
of other international economic bodies-such as the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the
Asian Development Bank-for purposes of expanding
and regularizing Soviet international trade and finan-
cial ties.
In his Pravda article, Gorbachev claimed the UN
could be a focus for international cooperation in
humanitarian and scientific fields. While this may
represent no more than another attempt at image
polishing, Moscow may have more than rhetorical
interest in expanding its involvement in some func-
tional international cooperation. Over the past year,
Soviet academic writings have paid increasing atten-
tion to the fact that no nation, including the USSR, is
immune from "globalized" problems, such as environ-
mental deterioration and epidemic diseases, and to the
potential benefits of multilateral action in such areas.
Moscow may see the UN as a suitable arena for
increasing its involvement in these fields.
Outlook
The costs of this campaign are low and its potential
for image enhancement is attractive, especially if
Moscow succeeds in selling the contrast between its
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The Comprehensive System of International
Peace and Security
The USSR's Comprehensive System of International
Peace and Security (CSIS) proposal is composed of a
number of initiatives ostensibly aimed at the creation
of a more secure world through addressing several
types of global problems simultaneously. The Soviets
argue that the interdependence of all countries and
the dangers of conflict in the nuclear era dictate the
need for new, cooperative approaches to solving polit-
ical, military, economic, and humanitarian problems.
The list of initiatives Moscow has proposed includes:
Political-Military
? Encouraging international disarmament in all ar-
eas. Reductions in INF and strategic offensive
weapons should be closely followed by drastic cuts
in nonnuclear armaments.
? Promoting the settlement of regional conflicts
through greater use of UN peacekeeping forces,
activation of the UN Military Staff Committee, and
creation of international mechanisms to lessen the
danger of war and to monitor compliance with
agreements.
? Expanding and strengthening the roles of the UN
Secretary General, the General Assembly and the
Security Council particularly of its permanent
members.
Economic Development
? Taking concerted action in international organiza-
tions to relieve the debt burden of Third World
countries by reducing interest payments and trans-
ferring to the developing countries monies to be
freed by East-West disarmament.
Humanitarian
? Broadening human rights discussions at the UN to
include "violations" of other rights such as the
"right to shelter, " "the right to employment, " and
"the right to live in a nuclear-free world. "
? Strengthening UNESCO and bringing all nations
into the "New World Information Order--a pro-
posal that might subject the Western news media to
international censorship.
? Improving information exchange on ecological
questions by having governments submit annual
reports to the UN on their conservation activity and
on ecological incidents that have occurred in their
countries.
Virtually all of the proposals the Soviets have put
forward as part of the CSIS have been offered
separately in various forums over the past several
years. Moreover, Moscow has said little on how the
"catch-all" CSIS proposals might be implemented,
sticking instead to generalities on improving the UN
mechanism and intensifiying international
cooperation.
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interest in the UN and alleged US hostility to the
organization, an issue to which it probably will devote
increasing publicity. We expect the USSR to show its
intent to be a "responsible" member of the UN by
fulfilling, at least for the short term, its financial
obligations and to contrast its payments with contin-
ued withholding of contributions to the UN by the
United States.
We believe that the bulk of the Soviets' continuing
activism at the UN will remain at a general, mostly
rhetorical level. Their initiatives will be designed to
assist them in areas where they are most vulnerable,
such as on Afghanistan, Cambodia, and human
rights, by refocusing debate and exploiting UN ma-
chinery to Soviet advantage. For example, we expect
Moscow to continue to attempt to defuse the Afghani-
stan issue at the UN through procedural maneuvers
such as proposing new amendments and UN media-
tion. Recent diplomatic reporting indicates that Mos-
cow's effort over the summer to influence a UN
human rights observer mission to Afghanistan will
soon pay off with a report that is less critical of the
Kabul regime than past reports. We also expect the
Soviets to continue their efforts to channel UN debate
on human rights away from consideration of the
record of East Bloc nations toward discussion of
Soviet versions of human rights, such as the right to
housing, the right to employment, and the right to live
in a nuclear-free world, as well as the right of Third
World nations not to be saddled by debt and high
interest payments.
As long as Soviet activism at the UN is confined
primarily to rhetorical proposals and lofty statements
of intentions, the USSR runs a limited but definite
risk of damaging its credibility with many Third
World states, which at some point are likely to
demand that the Soviets come across with specific
proposals and concrete action. Moscow is most vulner-
able in the economic sphere: if the UN is able to get
down to serious North-South bargaining on develop-
ment aid and debt, the Soviets face being left on the
sidelines unless, as we deem unlikely, they are willing
to devote far greater resources to development assis-
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that the 25X1
USSR will move beyond rhetoric to make more
concrete proposals in certain areas. These include:
? An expanded UN role in negotiations on regional
conflicts. In southern Africa, for example, a UN-
sponsored peace process might serve Soviet interests
by heading off a settlement worked out solely under
US auspices and by complicating Western debates
on providing arms to insurgents fighting Soviet
clients.
? Deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to monitor
settlements to regional conflicts. If the Soviets and
their clients were able to obtain acceptable arrange-
ments in Afghanistan or Cambodia, they might view
the deployment of UN forces as a means to turn
global opinion against any remaining insurgents and
to forestall a renewal of outside aid to the opposition
forces should internal political arrangements break
down.
? The formation of new organs or the intensification
of activity in existing UN bodies to promote cooper-
ation on nuclear energy issues, medical research,
transnational environmental problems, international
legal and commercial questions, and other function-
al areas where the Soviets believe they stand to gain
from relatively straightforward, depoliticized inter-
action with other countries.
We continue to believe, however, that the Soviets are
not likely to accept any new mechanisms that could,
in practice, limit their freedom of action. Indeed,
Moscow's call for an increase in UN authority was
probably made with the knowledge that it would be
rejected by other members of the Security Council
and that the Soviets would never face the problem of
"binding" UN action against their interests.
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New Light on Restructuring of
Foreign Policy and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Newly published speeches by General Secretary Gor-
bachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reveal
that there has been a sharper break with President
Gromyko's legacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) than had been suggested by
=Soviet public statements. The speeches were
published in the first two issues of a new journal for
diplomats, the Journal of the USSR Ministry of
Foreign ,4flairs. They include Gorbachev's 23 May
1986 speech to the MFA, which marked the begin-
ning of the MFA's restructuring and decisively reject-
ed Gromyko's "dogmatic" approach to the conduct of
foreign policy; Shevardnadze's 3 May 1987 speech to
the MFA, assessing progress there after one year; and
a 27 June 1987 speech of Shevardnadze to the MFA's
Diplomatic Academy and Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO), which discussed the education
of diplomats. Previously, only brief accounts of these
speeches had appeared in the Soviet press.
The publication of these speeches in a relatively
obscure diplomatic journal suggests that their mes-
sage is aimed particularly at Soviet diplomats and
foreign policy specialists rather than an external
audience. Their appearance sends a message that
Gromyko's overall approach to foreign affairs as well
as many of his policies is being discredited. The delay
between Gorbachev's speech and its publication is
highly unusual, presumably reflecting a desire at the
time of the speech not to embarrass Gromyko. Its
publication now would appear to reflect Gromyko's
further loss of influence.
Gorbachev's scathing critique of Gromyko's inflexible
approach to foreign policy was not evident in previous
accounts. The General Secretary argued that the
USSR must not be so persistent in defending its
positions that its behavior amounts to "thoughtless
obstinacy," saying that this pattern had earned Soviet
diplomats the sobriquet "Mr. Nyet," a phrase his
audience must have recognized as one often used by
the Western press to describe Gromyko. Gorbachev
insisted that Soviet diplomacy be more conciliatory in
Shevardnadze's MFA speech gave a more negative
assessment of progress in restructuring the MFA than
the account of the meeting published at the time
suggested. He said ethical and professional values
have now been restored, and improved working crite-
ria are being established, but described the results so
far as "extremely modest," stating that additional
steps to improve the diplomatic service would be
taken.
Personnel Policy
The new versions of the speeches make clear that
Shevardnadze was given a mandate to overhaul per-
sonnel practices at the MFA. Gorbachev called for
major changes in cadre policy, particularly a new
approach to the evaluation of personnel and an end to
nepotism, and demanded a careful evaluation of the
capabilities, knowledge, and competency of every
worker. Shevardnadze echoed this message.
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Both leaders made it clear that eliminating corruption 25X1
in the MFA is a top priority. In the months after
Gorbachev's speech, there was an extensive investiga-
tion of corruption at MGIMO and the Diplomatic
Academy. Shevardnadze emphasized that higher
standards had now been introduced in these institu-
tions, adding that for the first time in many years
there were "truly competitive" admissions to
MGIMO.
The Foreign Minister stressed that those who failed to
adapt to new standards would be penalized. He stated
that personnel would be evaluated on the basis of their
understanding of the new thinking, and how skillfully
they translate it into practice. He called for managers
who encourage talent rather than merely ensuring
obedience, condemning the continued predominance
of supervisors who were either "immoderately arro-
gant" or insufficiently independent.
both style and tone.
Secret
SOV UR 87-01OX
December 1987
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Shevardnadze revealed that his tough measures to
clean up the MFA are meeting strong resistance. He
stated that "many comrades" are "insulted" and feel
that the revelations about past mistakes are having a
"negative effect" on the "prestige and authority" of
the MFA. Defending his policies, he argued that
purifying our ranks "can only benefit us with regard
to our authority within the country and abroad."
"New Thinking "and Foreign Policy
Gorbachev explained that the link between foreign
policy and domestic policy is "two-sided" and empha-
sized that foreign policy must better serve domestic
needs. At the same time, he indicated that Soviet
domestic problems have had an adverse effect on the
Soviet Union's influence abroad, saying that this was
one reason why detente had been replaced by a "new
wave of the cold war." With the recent improvement
in the Soviet domestic situation, he noted, there has
also been an improvement in the international situa-
tion.
The speeches make clear that a primary purpose of
restructuring the MFA is to produce "new thinking"
and flexibility in foreign policy. Shevardnadze alleged
that Soviet policy is now based on a "new vision of the
world," free from dogma and without myth and
prejudices. Looking to avoid the impasses of the
Gromyko era, Gorbachev told diplomats to get away
from prejudices that lead to "dead ends" and prevent
a realistic assessment of events. He urged Soviet
diplomats not to look at policy only in terms of the
USSR's own interests, saying that improvement in
international relations will be difficult if each state is
"unable to meet its diplomatic partners halfway" and
Shevardnadze emphasized the need for alternative
views on foreign policy questions, and, in an apparent
swipe at Gromyko's management style, he condemned
"claims of infallibility." He urged MFA officers to
stand up for their views and encouraged them not to
"yield under pressure in a cowardly manner." He
indicated that a clearer evaluation of past policies
could prevent repetition of mistakes, arguing that in
the past "we have not always received the results that
we counted on."
Perhaps the most striking departure in Shevardnad-
ze's speech was his apparent questioning of the long-
standing premise of Soviet diplomacy that class strug-
gle must be the overriding concern in foreign policy.
Arguing that Soviet diplomacy must take greater
account of the problems the Soviet Union shares with
the West, particularly survival in a nuclear age, he
said, "There must be no lines of demarcation between
that which is proletarian and that which is universal
to all mankind." While reaffirming that the ideologi-
cal confrontation between socialism and capitalism
had not vanished, he said that "the search for points
of contact" is now more important than emphasizing
points of divergence.
At the Diplomatic Academy, Shevardnadze criticized
conformism in foreign policy thinking, indicating that
he wanted a more open discussion. He complained
that recently there have been interesting articles on
many topics, but not on foreign policy, and asked
rhetorically if comrades thought it would be impossi-
ble to conduct foreign policy differently. He decried
the "acute inadequacy" in the theoretical underpin-
nings of Soviet foreign policy, stating that it was an
"iron necessity" to overcome this "deficit."
For his part, by encouraging more innovative ap-
proaches to foreign policy issues, Shevardnadze ap-
parently hopes to enhance MFA influence in foreign
policy decision making. He criticized attempts to
exclude the MFA "from the resolution of questions
that pertain directly to its competency," stating that
the MFA had been "bypassed" on many important
questions.
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Implications
This push for "new thinking" is in large part an
attempt by Gorbachev to overcome the loss of initia-
tive and the moribund quality that characterized
much of Soviet foreign policy in the latter years of the
Brezhnev era. This lack of innovation resulted in little
or no diplomatic progress on such crucial issues as the
NATO INF deployments, relations with China, the
USSR's influence in Middle East politics, and US-
Soviet relations, including arms control. The push for
"new thinking" has also been demonstrated by Gor-
bachev's shakeup of both the party's and the MFA's
organizational structures and the removal of ancient
ideologues such as the former head of the CPSU
International Department, Boris Ponomarev, and the
introduction of less narrowly ideological figures such
as Shevardnadze and Dobrynin into central foreign
policy roles. Moscow's current vigorous diplomacy vis-
a-vis the United States, Western Europe, and China is
undoubtedly one result.
Moreover, I Ithe emphasis in
these speeches on "new thinking" and new standards
has had more than rhetorical effects in the MFA. For
example:
Shevardnadze in
1986 instituted a new antinepotism rule that would
in theory prevent several members of the same
family from working at the Ministry.
following Gorbachev's address the Ministry ordered
radical changes in the system of diplomatic report-
ing. Diplomats were enjoined to make a greater
effort to gather information firsthand rather than to
rely heavily on the local press.
? To improve the flow of new ideas into the MFA,
Shevardnadze has reportedly recently created a
research coordinating council headed by former
USA desk deputy Shustov to act as a brid a to the
academic institutes. the 25X1
council will ask the institutes to take long-range
looks at international problems and prepare plan-
ning studies on Soviet foreign policy.
Partly because of such changes, under Shevardnadze's
vigorous leadership the MFA is evidently regaining
some of the influence it lost to the International
Department immediately after the sacking of Gromy-
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Criticizing Soviet
African Policy
An article in the Literaturnaya gazeta of 7 October is
sharply critical of past Soviet policy toward Africa
and is one of the first indications that glasnost is
reaching into the realm of foreign policy. The article
claims Soviet African policy is made by people who
are largely ignorant about Africa and whose policies,
consequently, are either embarrassing to the Soviets
or are unrealistic and ineffective. Written by Boris
Asoyan, a leading specialist on Africa, the article may
reflect advice Asoyan is giving to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) in his capacity as MFA
adviser.
Stereotypical Thinking
For several decades, the Soviets have been compiling
inaccurate information on Africa, according to
Asoyan. He claims that the Soviet system has pre-
vented officials and journalists from clearly and ob-
jectively assessing the situation in Africa and Soviet-
African relations. Even under glasnost, says Asoyan,
journalists are still edited or write with fear of
editorial rebuke, leading them to perpetuate the "false
stereotypes" and "myths" about African countries
that tend to shape Soviet views of Africa. Even though
glasnost has been supported officially, Asoyan claims
that "the breaking of false stereotypes and the banish-
ment of myths is more difficult in international than
in domestic journalism."
Asoyan is especially critical of Soviet journalists who
write about Africa. Those who actually travel to
Africa, he says, write about Africa's "struggle against
imperialism" by quoting "kind words" from real or
imaginary Africans. He accuses some journalists of
pretending to travel to Africa but actually staying in
Moscow, rewriting articles from the Western press
according to the official Soviet line, and quoting
"mythical Black friends." Asoyan is concerned that
these shoddy journalistic practices allow the Soviets to
delude themselves into believing that all of black
Africa supports the Soviet Union, thinks like the
Soviet Union, and will adhere to Soviet policies in the
international arena. Indeed, he notes these Africans
sometimes do not like or even know the Soviet Union
and do not understand the subtleties of "class
struggle."
Distorted Decisionmaking
Asoyan argues that the distorted information base has
contributed to the formation of ineffective Soviet
policies, some of which have embarrassed Moscow in
the international arena. Asoyan points out, for exam-
ple, that the Soviets supported Uganda's Idi Amin,
ignoring the fact that he annihilated thousands and
that Soviet journalists reported "in relatively benevo-
lent tones" the murder and cannibalism carried out by
Central African Republic "Emperor" Bokassa.
Asoyan claims that other policies, such as Soviet
economic policy toward Africa, have been inadequate
in light of the actual situation in Africa. He is critical
of Soviet optimism about the economic situation in
Africa, claiming the Soviets thought Africa would
become "one of the most flourishing continents."
Ignoring coups, falling living standards, economic
devastation, and such poor prospects that "nobody can
offer any formula for the future," Soviet journalists,
according to Asoyan, have written for the past 20
years that these countries have "achieved some suc-
cesses on the path of building a new society." Asoyan
complains: "It is as if we were still looking at Africa
from the sixties, when we were just getting to know it
and had no clear ideas of its problems and its life."
Asoyan points out that Soviet expectations that newly
independent African countries would flourish under a
"noncapitalist path of development" were unrealistic.
He notes that the Soviet approach to the development
process "concealed the truth, shamelessly glossing
over unpleasant realities, passing off wishes for reali-
ty, and bending the facts to fit theories and models."
Secret
SOV UR 87-0IOX
December 1987
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He criticizes Soviet economic cooperation and the
lack of reporting on it, stating that Soviet journalists
avoid the issue "although there are plenty of examples
of unsuccessful cooperation." He calls for a realistic
assessment of Soviet aid to Africa, decrying the
inappropriateness of Soviet aid (for example, trucks
with heating systems) and the failures of Soviet
assistance, such as factories built by the Soviets that
do not function profitably.
Implications
Asoyan's article appears to be responsive to Soviet
calls for "new thinking" in foreign policy. Given
Asoyan's ties to the leadership, his article may also
reflect a broader concern in the leadership about the
effectiveness of Soviet African policy. Gorbachev
himself, speaking at an MFA conference in May
1986, reportedly made the point that the Soviet Union
had forgotten Africa. In the MFA, the problem of
Africa was addressed in part by creating the Non-
Aligned Movement Department
the new department was created to
give particular impetus to Soviet policy toward the
Third World, which the
USSR had ignored in the past, and to provide greater
dynamism and coherence to Soviet policy.
Secondarily, the article also may have been intended
as a signal to Africans that the Soviets will reexamine
their relations with some African leaders and monitor
their assistance programs more closely. Moscow does
not have the resources to keep its African clients
afloat economically and at the same time give them
enough military aid to keep their counterinsurgencies
at bay. The Soviets, in fact, have recently been
encouraging some of their African allies to look to the
West for economic assistance.
Part of the reexamination may involve a more cau-
tious approach toward new African leaders, particu-
larity in extending support. The Soviets reported
factually on the coup in Burkina in October 1987, for
example, but are still refraining from expressing
support for new leader Blaise Compaore
A change in the role of Soviet foreign studies insti-
tutes called for by the Soviet leadership also may have
made Asoyan's article possible.
one of the changes within the
foreign policy making apparatus under Gorbachev is
the enhanced role of the institutes, which now are to
produce analytical reports that can be used by the
policymakers to formulate policy and follow-up ac-
tion, as opposed to their previous role of producing
statistical and factual reports on a given area.
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Moscow Holding Fast to
the 12th Five-Year Plan
When Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secre-
tary of the CPSU in March 1985, he laid out
ambitious plans to modernize the USSR's industrial
plant and equipment and accelerate economic growth.
Two years into the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90),
however, the performance of the economy, while not
without its bright spots, has fallen well short of
Gorbachev's goals. After a surge in 1986, the econo-
my sputtered again this year as the leadership strug-
gled to implement seemingly contradictory economic
programs. Still, the Kremlin has not backed off the
high targets set for 1986-90. Unless some modifica-
tions are made to give the economy time to adjust to
the wide-ranging changes being implemented, Gorba-
chev's efforts to modernize the economy and, at the
same time, step up the rate of economic growth are
likely to continue to undermine each other.
Performance Under Gorbachev
The performance of the Soviet economy during the
first two years of the current five-year plan (FYP)
generally has fallen short of the target (see table 1).
Overall industrial production, for example, has been
sluggish, increasing by 3 percent in 1986 and by
slightly less than 2 percent in the first three quarters
of 1987. In regard to specific branches of industry, the
leadership has special reason for concern about the
poor performance of civilian machine building-the
linchpin of Gorbachev's modernization program. Ma-
chinery output was planned to increase by 7.5 percent
annually during the 12th five-year planning period.
however, civilian ma-
chinery output increased by about 5 percent in 1986
and showed little or no increase during the first three
quarters of 1987. A recent Pravda editorial called the
poor performance of the machine-building sector "ex-
tremely alarming."
Consumer-oriented production and domestic trade
have also been problem areas. During the first three
quarters of 1987, production of consumer durables
dropped, light industry output increased by only about
2 percent, and the growth of output of processed foods
fell. Per capita retail sales from January through
September 1987 made no gain compared with the
same period a year ago, the first such occurrence since
1982.
The energy sector, on the other hand, has been a
success story. Oil production last year reversed a two-
year decline and increased by 400,000 barrels per day;
production at the three-quarter mark this year was up
2 percent. Natural gas and electricity have posted
significant gains as well.
Agriculture also has propped up economic perfor-
mance. It posted a record level of output last year and
will probably come close to matching 1986 output this 25X1
year. A second consecutive good grain harvest appears
in the offing.
On balance, on the basis of results through the first
three quarters of the year, we estimate that GNP and
industrial production increased by 1 to 1.5 percent
and 2 to 2.5 percent, respectively, in 1987.
Cause of the Problems
The faltering performance of the Soviet economy, in
our view, has resulted primarily from contradictions
in the implementation of Moscow's plans and policies
to revitalize the economy. In particular, we believe
that:
? The overly ambitious output targets in the 12th
FYP are incompatible with one of Gorbachev's
primary goals, which is to produce more high-
quality products.
? Enterprises are not being given the time and oppor-
tunity to stand down to retool and modernize their
production lines.
? Little or no account has been taken of the disrup-
tions that inevitably occur with changes in planning
and management.
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SOV UR 87-0/OX
December 1987
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Table I
USSR: Comparing Economic Plans and
Performance for Selected Sectors
Gross national product
Machine building and metalworking (civilian) e
2.1
2.3
Based on value added at 1982 factor cost.
Projections based on nine-month performance.
Plan for 1988 compared with the plan for 1987.
J Based on gross value of output.
Soviet plan believed to include both civilian and military
production.
I Based on value of farm output net of feed, seed, and waste in 1982
average realized prices; includes purchases from outside the sector.
4.9 1.0 to 1.5 7.1 7.4
7.3 - 1.0 to 0 3.4 3.3
--3.9
-0.2
NA 3.9
New programs being put in place are already causing
serious dislocations. The introduction of a quality
control system in civilian industry at the beginning of
1987, for example, led to wide-scale rejection of
products coming off assembly lines, and new financial
and managerial arrangements are causing confusion
at many enterprises.
Holding Fast to the Five- Year Plan
Nonetheless, few adjustments apparently have been
made so far to reduce the tension among plan targets.
Using new information released by the Soviet State
Committee for Statistics on output growth and plan
fulfillment, we were able to infer planned 1987
growth rates for major branches of industry on a
monthly basis. These data suggest that, although
1987 targets for nearly all branches of industry except
energy were reduced early in the year (see table 2), the
targets were raised for later months. This means that
the Soviets planned to "storm" late in the year in an
effort to meet the original plan targets-a difficult
task given earlier production shortfalls.
The 1988 Plan
Information on the 1988 Economic Plan also indicates
that 1986-90 plan targets have not been lowered. In a
major speech to the Supreme Soviet, Gosplan chair-
man Talyzin said that the plan targets for 1988 are in
line with or "slightly exceed" those in the 12th FYP.
Moreover, the limited number of published output
targets for 1988 suggests no letup from the very
rigorous goals Gorbachev has laid down for the
1986-90 planning period.
The plan for 1988 implies that GNP and industrial
output are to rise by 4 percent and 4.5 percent,
respectively, over this year's plan targets-in line with
the 1986-90 goals but roughly double the average
annual rates of growth posted so far. In addition,
some even more ambitious new tasks have been levied.
Goals for gains in productivity and resource conserva-
tion, for example, have been raised markedly. The
FYP already calls for 65 to 70 percent of the growth
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Table 2
USSR: Targets for
Industrial Production
Average annual
rates ofgrowth
in percent
4.4
1.7
2.2
3.3
Wood products
2.7
0.2
0.1
1.2
Construction materials
0.7
1.5
1.3
1.2
Energy
2.2
2.7
2.1
2.2
Fuels
0.6
2.0
1.0
1.0
8.1
3.5
2.6
5.3
Consumer nondurables
1.3
-0.2
1.2
1.1
Light industry
3.2
1.3
2.5
2.8
Food industry c
-0.4
-1.6
0.0
-0.4
a Calculated from plan data published in SSSR v Tsifrakh v 1986,
pp. 12-13, 100-107.
b Planned growth rates were calculated from data published in the
State Committee for Statistics report on fulfillment of the industri-
al plan for January-March, January-June, and January-September.
Planned growth for the food industry is available for only a very
small sample of products. Moreover, output levels or most food
industry products were very high in 1986.
in fuels and raw materials output to come from
resource savings rather than increased production.
During the 11th FYP, however, the Soviets managed
to fulfill only about two-thirds of the plan for energy
savings and, to date, we have seen no improvement in
Moscow's ability to conserve energy. In fact, in 1986
the energy-to-GNP ratio for the USSR increased
slightly. Meanwhile, enterprise managers have been
directed to increase the use of second and third shifts
at their plants and to place greater emphasis on
technological advances.
A major feature of the 1988 plan is an increased
emphasis on the consumer. The 12th FYP already
contained impressive targets for improving the lot of
the consumer. For example, output of nonfood con-
sumer goods was to increase by 35 percent by 1990;
services by 50 percent; and real per capita income-a
key Soviet measure of consumption-by 14 percent.
Soviet authorities have raised the original goals for
housing construction during the past two years, and
the 1987 target for production of consumer durables
was raised as well. Moscow also has introduced
several other new consumer programs:
? New laws have been passed extending the bound-
aries of private activity and permitting the forma-
tion of producer cooperatives intended to increase
the supply of services by drawing additional labor to
the service sector.
? Enterprises have been assigned mandatory quotas
for providing services to the population. Machine-
building enterprises, for instance, are being ordered
to set up service centers to repair the appliances that
they manufacture.
For the most part, however, planned targets have not
been met, and the leadership's actions thus far might
best be characterized as looking for inexpensive ways
to improve the consumer's lot.
Judging from Gosplan chairman Talyzin's speech on
the 1988 plan, the "on the cheap" approach to
meeting consumer needs may be changing:
? Investment resources allocated to the so-called non-
productive sphere have been increased over that
originally called for in the 12th FYP. Housing
construction, in particular, is to be stepped up, and
investment going to other consumer-oriented facili-
ties such as preschools, retirement homes, clubs, and
theaters is to be raised as well.
? Average monthly wages are to rise almost half a
percentage point above that called for in the current
FYP.
? Targets for the production of food, soft goods, and
consumer services (including personal care, repair,
personal transportation, and recreational services)
have been raised.
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Meanwhile, the regime's investment policy seems to
be largely on track. The 1988 plan calls for new fixed
investment to increase by 3.6 percent. Although some-
what lower than the approximately 5-percent annual
rate of increase planned for 1986-90, this target is not
unexpectedly so given the larger-than-average in-
creases in new fixed investment in 1986 and apparent-
ly 1987 as well. In light of the regime's continuing
commitment to high output targets, it is hard to see
how targets for investment growth could be cut very
much; the investment plan still looks like a mismatch
when compared with the 1986-90 production targets.
The plan implies a sharp reduction in the USSR's
incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) for branches
of "material" production-the increase in productive
fixed capital required per ruble of growth in Soviet-
style national income (see table 3). The ICOR implied
for 1986-90 is much lower than any ratio since the
1960s. Because the increase in the number of people
working in material production will be insignificant,
the Soviet Union has to be counting on a combination
of large improvements in the quality of fixed capital
and the efficiency with which it is used. This may well
be a major flaw in the 1986-90 plan because, we
believe, the collection of actions taken to improve the
quality of investment or management will not have a
large impact during this period
The published versions of the 1988 plan and budget
say almost nothing about defense. As usual, the only
information provided is the single line entry for
defense in the state budget. This figure for 1988 is the
same as for 1987. We believe the budget number is
manipulated for propaganda purposes-by Moscow's
own admission, it covers only a fraction of total
defense spending. Nonetheless, given the regime's
investment and consumption goals, economic growth
in 1988 will have to exceed 1987's lagging pace or
there will be little room for real growth in defense
spending. Moreover, some evidence indicates that
military spending could be reduced:
? Since the June plenum, several high-ranking politi-
cal and military spokesmen have publicly stated
that the USSR intends to reduce military spending
in an effort to accelerate economic growth.
Table 3
USSR: Incremental Capital-Output
Ratios (ICORs), Past and Planned
Increase in Increase in ICOR
Material Productive
Production a Fixed Capital b
6.1
7.3
a Essentially GNP less the labor component of services to the
population and government in 1982 prices. The increases in both
production and fixed capital represent values in year (t) minus
values in year (t-5).
b 1973 estimate prices. Productive fixed capital represents total
fixed capital less that found in the so-called nonproductive sphere-
housing, health, education, and the like.
? Several high-level Soviet officials recently stated
that the defense industries have not made their
"expected contributions" to the retooling of both the
light and food industries and indicated that Moscow
will more actively enforce compliance in the future.
If the defense industries are required to make up for
past years' inattention to light industry's needs, this
enforcement might reduce the resources available
for weapons production.
Implications
Gorbachev may perceive pressing reasons to adhere to
the original output targets of the 12th FYP. Political-
ly, the General Secretary may judge that he cannot
impose reductions given his close association with the
plan. At the beginning of the planning period, for
example, he remanded the FYP to Gosplan for revi-
sion before the 27th Party Congress, rejecting at least
three drafts as underambitious. In contrast, more
conservative Soviet leaders, such as "Second Secre-
tary" Ligachev, have warned of the perils of undue
haste in implementing Gorbachev's programs, and
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Moscow's decision not to back off from the taut
production targets contained in the 12th Five-Year
Plan is consistent with Gorbachev's commitment to
stability in the planning process. The General Secre-
tary has promised that once five-year plans are
approved they will not be changed during the plan-
ning period. By doing this, Gorbachev is hoping to get
a more smoothly functioning economy. Enterprises
and ministries, for example, would be more certain of
their tasks and could plan accordingly. The economy
would be more balanced as a result, particularly
later in the planning period. Under the traditional
practice a planning from the "achieved level, " the
frequent adjustments made to production targets
during the course ctfthe planning period resulted in
dislocations and bottlenecks because of the uneven
development of different sectors of the economy. The
new planning philosophy has been incorporated into
the 1988 plan. Output targets in the 1988 plan are
given as a ratio of planned 1987 production goals.F_
Planning from the "planned " rather than the "achie-
ved" level could, nonetheless, have adverse implica-
tions for Gorbachev's program to modernize the
economy. Under this system, production shortfalls
are not forgiven-that is, they carry over from year to
Gorbachev may be concerned that any retreat from
his rapid growth policy might seem to concede the
superiority of their more cautious approach.
Gorbachev may believe that retreat from his original
growth targets is inadvisable on economic grounds as
well. In particular, he may believe that serious bottle-
necks will develop unless he adheres to his pledge to
make five-year plans stable (see inset).
Gorbachev realizes, furthermore, that his program for
revitalizing the economy depends heavily on the sup-
port of workers. Initially, the regime relied on the
discipline and antialcohol campaigns to raise worker
productivity. Speaking at the June plenum, Gorba-
chev said that the momentum from these programs
had been lost. The increased attention to the consum-
er in the 1988 plan seems to be aimed at eliciting the
year and have to be made up by the end of the
planning period. As a consequence, actual targets are
likely to be unrealistically high during the remaining
years of the five-year planning period. For example,
because most 1987 goals probably will not be met,
the targets for next year are higher than the goals in
the 1988 plan. This could mean that:
? Managerial and worker bonuses will be smaller,
possibly sapping worker productivity. (One-third of
the increase in labor productivity being counted on
by the leadership during 1986-90 is to come from
"human factors.")
? As enterprises scramble to meet the targets, the
economy is likely to be stretched more tautly than
would otherwise have been true. As some sectors do
better than others, dislocations are inevitable-the
very thing the new planning technique is intended to
preclude.
? The higher targets are likely to get in the way of the
regime's efforts to raise the quality of production.
Managers will be even more reluctant than before
to modernize and retool manufacturing facilities.
kind of motivated work the regime is counting on to
be a key element of renewal. In addition, by trying to
increase supplies of consumer goods, the Kremlin
probably hopes to soak up the excess purchasing
power in consumer hands brought about by the
reduced availability of alcoholic beverages and to
quiet public discontent over other aspects of his
program. Several incidents of protest and work stop-
pages by disgruntled workers have occurred this year.
Whatever Gorbachev's motives, the limited data re-
leased on the 1988 plan strongly suggest that he
intends to proceed full bore with the ambitious targets
for growth during the current five-year planning
period (see figure). In our judgment, the consequences
of this decision are likely to include a continuation of
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USSR: Economic Growth, 1981-90
88 1986-90
Plan
-2 1981-85 86 87a
88 1986-90
Plan
90 plan targets.
88 1986-90 0
Plan
the sputtering growth and quality control problems
that have plagued the economy in 1987. Growth is
likely to fall short of the General Secretary's plans,
and Gorbachev's modernization program-the cor-
nerstone of his policies for improving the performance
of the Soviet economy-is going to be delayed and
could even fail without some slackening of the 1986-
probably is already under way.
At the same time that the Soviet leadership is dealing
with whether or not to adjust the current FYP, it will
be formulating its resource allocation guidelines for
the next FYP (1991-95). To meet the requirements of
the planning cycle, these guidelines probably will be
given to the economic planners about the middle of
1988. The first major step in the process-formula-
tion of the plan for development of the armed forces-
The task of pulling together the 13th FYP will be
difficult. It is not yet clear, for example, how much
progress will be realized in modernizing industry
during the current FYP, especially in the machine-
building sector. Will growth dividends, for instance,
be large enough to give generous increments to con-
sumers and defense, as well as to investment, during
1991-95? The answers to such questions are not yet
apparent. A great deal of uncertainty also surrounds
the many new measures currently being implemented
or in train. In sum, the 13th FYP is likely to be one of
the most difficult plans to pull together in some time.
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To Increase Equipment Use
in Machine Building
The majority of machine-building enterprises work
only one shift. This is an inadmissible extravagance
in the use of national wealth.
Soviet Premier N. I. Ryzhkov
June 1986
Figure 1
USSR: Utilization of Equipment in
Civil Machine Building, 1985
=Operated during shift
Not in operation during shift
In his attempt to intensify industrial production and
speed the introduction of new equipment and technol-
ogies into the economy, General Secretary Gorbachev
has called on the critical machine-building sector to
increase its low rate of equipment utilization. After
nearly 18 months, however, the formal program
launched to achieve the party chief's goals has proved
highly disruptive and even counterproductive. Al-
though some of the problems may dissipate, substan-
tial improvement in capital use is unlikely through the
remainder of the current five-year plan (1986-90).
Not in operation at all
The Equipment Shift Coefficient.
Focus of Gorbachev's Plan
For the most part, civil machine-building plants stand
idle during the swing and night shifts (see figure 1).
The utilization of equipment at these facilities-as
measured by a Soviet index known as the equipment
shift coefficient (ESC)-has for the past 20 years
remained at about half its theoretical potential. Gor-
bachev and other top-level Soviet officials have de-
cried this underuse of capital and have called on
machine builders to increase the ESC by some 20 to
30 percent overall and by an even larger margin in the
application of key technologies (see figure 2). The idea
is to move workers off old machinery and equipment
and onto a second or third shift using newer, more
efficient production lines already in place. Simulta-
neously, the older lines are to be removed and re-
placed by the "highest quality" new production
equipment.
The Soviets have not released exact figures on the
number of machine-building enterprises that are or
will be working on two or more shifts. With the
exception of the Ministry of Instrument Making,
Secret
SOV UR 87-01OX
December 1987
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Figure 2
USSR: Actual and Planned Shift Coefficients in
Civil Machine Building, 1963-90
Goal for utilization of
flexible manufacturing systems
Goal for utilization of
numerically and computer numerically
controlled machine tools
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 1963 65 70 75 80 85 90
lines. Indeed, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov assert-
ed in a public speech in March of this year, that "the
transfer to the multishift regime is possible only on a
regional basis." The geographic focus reflects the
need for expanding hours for transport, retail stores,
and social services-activities that are more easily
organized regionally than functionally. At the end of
1986, the Central Statistical Administration reported
that multishift work had been introduced in the
Leningrad, Kharkov, and Kursk Oblasts, the Latvian
SSR, and other, undisclosed areas. The RSFSR was
added this year, and in June the Soviet press reported
that Moscow-a major center for machine-building
activity-was initiating its conversion.
To motivate machine builders-who, by Soviet ac-
knowledgment, had grown comfortable with life on
one shift-the leadership has authorized a number of
material benefits. Workers who volunteer to work
during the new shifts will be given preference in the
allocation of trips to ministerial recreational facilities,
and-in the case of the night shift-will receive free
meals. In addition, as Gorbachev told a crowd in Riga
during his February 1987 visit, the evening shift will
receive wage increases of "an additional 20 percent in
order to get it right and an additional 30 or 40 percent
for a third shift."
Automation Equipment, and Control Systems-
whose minister claimed early last year that plants
subordinate to his ministry already had begun work
on two shifts-the Soviets have not disclosed that any
major civilian machine-building sectors have been
converted in toto. Similarly, the extent to which the
defense industrial ministries are or will be included is
unclear. An analysis indicates,
however, that at least some defense producers have
been instructed to boost the ESC for numerically
controlled machine tools and other advanced
equipment.
Since its initiation, the new system of multiple shift
operations and in-place equipment renewal has been
expanded geographically rather than along ministerial
Problems: Resistance and Obsolesence
Despite the inducements offered, machine builders
have given the new initiative a cool reception:
? Yuriy Solov'yev, a candidate member of the Polit-
buro and First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast
Party Committee, publicly acknowledged on Soviet
television late last year that "it cannot be said that
there is mass rejoicing because we are introducing
two- and three-shift work."
? According to the US Consulate in Leningrad, when
a local factory decreed in the fall of 1986, that
evening workers produce at least 40 percent of what
is turned out during the day shift, the day workers
cut back on their production in sympathy.
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? In August 1987 the Soviet regional press reported
that many workers in the Asiatic republics-prefer-
ring unemployment or the black market-quit and
walked off the job after being tasked to work
evening hours.
At the root of worker disenchantment with the new
system is the absence of a supporting social infra-
structure. As a Leningrad economist put it; "The
move to the shift system was simply thrust on Lenin-
grad enterprises without proper planning and prepara-
tion." Public transportation generally shut down be-
fore the end of the second shift. Stores, restaurants,
day care centers, and other service institutions contin-
ued to work regular hours. Only 60 percent of Lenin-
grad's second- and third-shift workers were provided
hot meals, transport, and other services. One-half of
polled shift workers were dissatisfied with city trans-
port, 40 percent with trade services, and 33 percent
with public dining facilities. Moscow has avoided
these problems, leaving their resolution-and the
Problems With the Shift Coefficient
as a Measure of Capacity Utilization
The Soviets are focusing primarily on the shift
coefficient for machine-building plants of machine-
building ministries. This value is much higher than
at machine-building enterprises of non-machine-
building ministries (1.10-1.15) and at machine shops
of non-machine-building enterprises (0.3-0.5). Simi-
larly, the average shift index in single-run and small-
series production-the bulk of civil machinery pro-
duction-was 1.28 in 1985, while it was 1.39 in series
production and 1.48 in large-series production. Final-
ly, the shift coefficient is reflective only of machine
operation and not the time it actually has work in
process. According to an article in a Soviet industry
journal, in 1982 the average shift coefficient was
1.32, but equipment was being used only 62 percent of
the time that it was turned on.
costs of their resolution-to local authorities.
Compounding the labor problems, plant managers
have been hesitant to commit wholeheartedly to the
program. many ma-
chine-building plant managers fear breakdowns or
other interruptions that would seriously jeopardize
plan fulfillment. As the chief of a mechanical shop in
Voronezh put it early this year, "We are afraid to
load this equipment for two shifts. If we did, we would
never have enough spare parts for them."
Performance and Prospects: Little Gain
The Soviets have yet to disclose openly the current
value of the ESC in machine building, but an analysis
of the Soviet central and economic press and reporting
from the US Consulate in Leningrad indicate that the
transfer to the multishift system-where it has been
seriously attempted-has proved highly disruptive
and even counterproductive. For example, an engineer
at a major machine-building plant commented before
a Leningrad lecture audience that all three shifts at
his plant lacked sufficient numbers of qualified per-
sonnel to operate and repair the machinery. He also
asserted that the productivity of the late shifts was
only two-fifths that of the original single shift-at
which three listeners interjected that the same situa-
Moscow's ultimate degree of success in raising the
shift coefficient in machine building is dependent on
several factors:
? Worker resistance to working later shifts must be
overcome by taking steps to bolster the social infra-
structure and by helping to fund financial
incentives.
? Managerial concerns about the impact of equipment
failures must be assuaged through selective relax-
ation of output targets and/or a marked improve-
ment in the supply of spare parts for machines and
equipment.
? Those plants brought under the new system must be
chosen more selectively; cost efficiency and en-
hanced productivity must play a larger role in this
process.
Few steps have been taken to address these concerns,
however. The leadership has as yet given mere lip-
service to the need to expand the social infrastructure,
tion existed at their factories.
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has offered no public solution to the added cost
burden, and is continuing apace in bringing whole
regions and economic branches under the multishift
regime.
Although some of the problems-such as low worker
morale-may dissipate with time, the more funda-
mental disruptions caused by equipment breakage,
spare parts shortages, and taut planning will probably
prevent the Soviets from improving equipment utiliza-
tion in machine building significantly by year's end.
Meeting the targets set for 1990 may be possible for
some selected technologies such as flexible manufac-
turing systems, where the numbers are small and the
applications usually are high priority. The five-year
plan targets for machine building as a whole, howev-
er, will probably remain underfulfilled.
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Notes
After a hiatus of over a decade, the Soviets recently published regional infant
mortality satistics. The figures reveal a wide and growing disparity between the in-
dustralized European regions of the country and the Muslim republics of Central
Asia, where infant mortality rates are comparable to those in developing countries.
The Reemergence of Mortality Statistics. In 1972 the Soviets called infant
mortality "a sensitive barometer of the social, economic, and medical well-being of
a society." A few years later, embarrassment over a rise in this indicator led to a
halt in the publication of infant mortality statistics. The last reported figure was
27.9 infant deaths per thousand live births in 1974. Western demographers have
estimated that infant mortality may have risen as high as 31.1 per thousand for the
Soviet Union as a whole in 1976.
In 1986 national infant mortality statistics were once again published. The figure
now reported for 1986, 25.4 per thousand, is a considerable improvement over the
mid-1970s, but it is still higher than the 1970 rate, and more than twice the infant
mortality rates of other industralized countries.
The Regional Disparity. The regional infant mortality statistics show that the
reported decrease in the national rate reflects improvements that occurred in the
Slavic and Baltic regions of the Soviet Union. In contrast, infant mortality in the
republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia remained high and in some cases
increased. In 1970 the reported infant mortality rates in Central Asia were
roughly twice the rates in the Slavic and Baltic republics-by 1986 they were
roughly three times as great. Moreover, actual infant death rates in these areas
may be much higher than the reported rates. For example, according to Pravda, in
one area of Uzbekistan only 25 percent of infant deaths appear in hospital records.
High infant death rates in Central Asia stem from a number of causes: epidemics
of infectious and parasitic disease, poor sanitary conditions, polluted water, use of
toxic pesticides and herbicides in fields where women perform manual labor, and
inadequate health care. Standards of health care are well below those in the
European regions of the USSR, and little or no progress has been made in
Secret
SOV UR 87-010X
December 1987
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Table
USSR: Infant Mortality, by Republic
a The Soviet definition of a live birth differs from that used by the
World Health Organization (WHO). For example, if a child dies
before it reaches the age of seven days, it is not counted as a live
birth by the Soviets. As a result, Soviet infant mortality statistics
omit an estimated 14.4 percent of infant deaths that would be
counted under the WHO definition.
Deaths of infants
under one year of age
per 1,000 live births a
decreasing this gap in the last 20 years. Medical facilities in Central Asia are often
crude and unhygienic, and medical staffs are poorly trained. Moreover, rapid
population growth in the region is increasing the strain on the health system.
Facing up to the Problem. The reappearance of regional infant mortality statistics
is part of a broader effort under glasnost to increase the quantity and improve the
credibility of official socioeconomic and sociological studies of a number of
formerly taboo questions.
Moscow has taken some steps to address the embarrassing and politically sensitive
problem of high infant mortality in Central Asia. A delegation of 1,460 doctors
and nurses was sent to the region last July and August to combat intestinal and
other illnesses, which are epidemic in the summer months. According to TASS,
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500 children were saved in Uzbekistan alone. Moscow is also promoting family
planning in some parts of Central Asia to lower birth rates in relation to those in
Slavic areas.
It will take a long-term and substantial commitment of resources to bring Central
Asian infant mortality rates down to the level of the rest of the Soviet Union. Con-
tinuing rapid population growth in Central Asia, as well as competing investment
priorities in other regions of the country, will make it difficult for Moscow to
narrow the health care gap before the mid-to-late 1990s.
Soviet Statisticians on Improving
Measures of Economic Performance
The decrees on reforming the management of the Soviet economy-adopted in
July 1987 by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers-include
guidelines for the "radical improvement of statistical work." In the October issue
of the journal of the State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat), two specialists
affiliated with that agency have offered their proposals for revising the USSR's
system of national economic accounts, including key indicators of macroeconomic
performance.'
Taken as a whole, these proposals reflect a desire to find better measures of the
progress of perestroyka-and a willingness to deemphasize ideological consider-
ations in the selection of economic indicators. They represent a clear break from
the traditional system of "gross" indicators, which count the total value of output
and encourage the wasteful use of energy and raw materials. Instead, indicators of
economic performance are to focus on the distribution of output to final uses-
such as consumption and investment-and the incomes originating in key sectors
producing that output-such as industry and agriculture. Moreover, the proposals
show evidence of an increased interest in assessing the USSR's position in the
world economy-by comparing its final output with that of other countries and by
estimating its contribution to international trade and finance.
The decree on statistics stresses the importance of raising "the scientific and
methodological standard" of work on the system of interrelated accounts showing
the major sources of income and uses of output in the economy-often called
national economic balances by the Soviets. The Goskomstat specialists offer the
following recommendations:
? Distinguishing more clearly between final uses of output and other uses (in the
production process), and estimating the final uses in more detail. Better
integration of input-output tables into the rest of the system of economic
balances is to assist in this process.'
Accounts," Vestnik stalisliki, No. 10, 1987, pp. 22-30.
An input-output table shows linkages, sector by sector, between gross output (including materials used
in the production process), the final uses of that output, and the incomes of labor and other primary in-
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? Refining estimates of the linkages between the sources and uses of final output.
Efforts are to include improvements in Goskomstat's two main summary
measures of economic activity, called national income produced and national
income used. The size of the statistical discrepancy between these measures-
sometimes as much as 2 percent-is to be reduced, and the reasons for the
discrepancy are to be investigated more thoroughly.
? Developing estimates of gross national product-as this measure is defined by
Western economists-for use in international comparisons of economic activity.
? Developing estimates of services and financial flows exchanged between the
USSR and other countries, and integrating these estimates into Soviet national
economic accounts.
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