CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001000120001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 18
OCI NO. 77.54/56
13 December 1956
towmEw
No. VI
CLASS. CHAAI(f2 TO=
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
:Z rs a- ?R 11 &T64w.
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Now
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFID
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
HUNGARIAN REGIME LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN
TO CRUSH RESISTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet-sponsored Kadar regime took strong repres-
sive measures on 9 December designed to eliminate resist-
ance. The regime's imposition of martial law and the out-
lawing of the regional workers' councils--the leading
forces of the opposition--have strengthened worker re-
solve, however, and resulted in a new and eff ctive zen-
eral strike and a. flare-up of armed violence. 25X1
a 7
THE POLISH SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The Gomulka regime in Poland has continued its ef-
forts to win increased popular support in the face of
popular unrest as exemplified in the recent riots in sev-
eral Polish cities. It has reached agreement with the
Catholic Church on outstanding differences, is rehabili-
tating former Socialist leaders, and has allowed independ-
ent youth groups to organize. The regime may feel com-
pelled to exercise some controls over the youth groups,
however, to keep them from becoming involved in anti-
Soviet activities.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
25X1
SUEZ PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Arrangements for clearance of the Suez Canal are be-
ing delayed by Egyptian opposition to British or French
participation in clearance operations. The British and
French continue to urge that their salvage fleet at Port
Said be permitted to carry on its work. Approximately
half of the British and French forces have now been with-
drawn from Egypt. Final departure may be delayed a few
days beyond the scheduled 18 December date.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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? ',-'_ SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The USSR has withdrawn its offer to send "volunteers"
to fight in Egypt. The leftist group in Syria appears
now to be exploiting Iraqi arms-smuggling operations to
facilitate a cabinet change and stepping up their efforts
in Iraq to unseat Nuri Said. Iraq is withdrawing its
troops from Jordan, as requested by Amman, which, how-
ever, has not requested Syria and Saudi Arabia to with-
draw their troops.
EGYPT'S MOVES AGAINST JEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Reports from Egypt indicate that moves against Jews
have not been as extensive as Israeli propaganda has
claimed. The Nasr regime does appear to be using the
present situation as an opportunity to eliminate foreign
influences, especially British, French, and Jewish.
Ma.karios and to Athens.
BRITISH PLANS FOR CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page, 6
Britain intends to publish about 20 December, after
pro forma consultations with Greece and Turkey, its draft
constitution providng limited autonomy for Cyprus. While
the constitution would appear to meet Turkey's minimum re-
quirements, it will probably be unacceptable to Archbishop
Recent reports suggest that some Soviet "W-class"
long-range submarines have been equipped to launch guided
missiles. Such a role for Soviet long-range submarines
.was forecast by party leader Khrushchev last spring when
he said that a submarine equipped with guided missiles
SOVIET MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
portedly will be included.
KHRUSHCHEV FORECASTS MINOR MODIFICATIONS
IN SOVIET POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . Page 7
The question of adapting the decisions of the 20th
party congress last February to developments since the
congress will be discussed at the central committee ple-
num scheduled for this month, according to Khrushchev.
Measures to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer re-
is the "most suitable naval weapon," and that its develop-
ment would be emphasized by the Soviet navy.
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25X1
USSR EASES INTERFERENCE WITH ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN . . . Page 8
back on 5 December to avoid such a search.
truck convoys, after an American convoy had turned
Allied trains and truck convoys are running be-
tween West Germany and Berlin without further Soviet
attempts to board or inspect them, although the USSR
still insists on documentation checks objected to by
the Allies. The tension was eased when Soviet au-
thorities agreed not to insist on searching military
BULGARIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9.
The Bulgarian regime is pursuing a two-pronged
policy of severe police repression and economic con-
cessions to deal with the popular unrest and faction-
alism within the party and groups closely associated
with it. There have been reports that workers have
demonstrated in the provinces, students have advo-
cated less political indoctrination, and youthful
"hooligan" elements have eneazed in demonstrations
against the regime.
AMOY RAILROAD COMPLETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Quemoy and Little Quemoy Islands. 25X1
ule. The line will greatly increase the Chinese
Communists' ability to deliver military supplies to
the Taiwan Straits aria. Completion of the railroad
also enhances the potential value of Amoy as a com-
mercial port, but merchant vessels using the harbor
would be exposed to Chinese Nationalist artillery on
Tracklaying on the Yingtan-Amoy railroad in
Fukien Province was completed to Amoy station on 9
December, about one year ahead of the original sched-
CHOU EN-LAI' S ASIAN TOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Chou's remarks at the conclusion of his of-
ficial visit to India. emphasized his desire for im-
proved relations with the United States and were
slanted to support possible efforts by Nehru to
mediate Sino-American differences during his talks
in Washington. Chou is now in Rangoon, where he
may be meeting with Burmese resistance to settlement
of the border dispute along the lines of the tenta-
tive agreement worked out in Peiping last October.
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CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Communist bloc's economic penetration of Cam-
bodia. is increasing. A Soviet economic mission re-
cently arrived in Phnom Penh and additional members
have joined the permanent Chinese Communist economic
mission already there. The projected Soviet aid pro-
gram will be "unconditional," as in the case of Pei-
ping's assistance to Cambodia. in order to derive
maximum good will.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The Laotian National Assembly is soon to vote on
whether to include in the.government two Pathet Lao
officials--one of whom would be Pathet chief Souphan-
nouvong. In return for the cabinet seats, the Pathet
Lao movement would be formally "dissolved." Souphan-
nouvong would make a public declaration that he is not
a Communist and would provide written guarantees on
the restoration of royal government authority in the
two northern provinces and integration of Pathet
forces in the royal army. The American embassy be-
lieves that sentiment for a settlement is strong and
there are probably few deputies willing to vote openly
against the proposal, even at the risk of losing Ameri-
can assistance.
HAITI a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The resignation of Haitian ruler Paul Magloire
on 12 December in favor of Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis,
president of the Court of Appeals, may ease the tense
situation in the country. The selection of Pierre-
Louis, who was Magloire's legal successor before the
"palace revolution of 6 December," may lead to a re-
turn to constitutional order. Political conditions,
ely to remain unsettled for some time.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NEHRU' S CURRENT INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Prime Minister Nehru, when he comes to the United
States on 16 December, will probably be concerned princi-
pally with discussions on the Middle East, the position of
Communist China, the danger of a renewed cold,war, Hungary,
Pakistan, nuclear weapons tests and disarmament, as well
as India's relations with the United States. At the
same time, Nehru faces a crucial national election with-
in four months and must obtain about two billion dollars
in foreign aid in the next few. years for the ambitious
Second, Five-Year Plan to which he has pledged his pres-
tige.
manding real independence of the USSR.
Since the Poznan riots of June 1956, Soviet leaders ap-
pear to have been firmly united on the need to tighten
control over the Satellites and check a drift toward de-
SOVIET POLICY ON "DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM"
IN THE SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Contrary to speculation about a
split within the Soviet ruling group over Satellite
policy, none of the Soviet leaders has favored letting
the Eastern European Satellites freely seek their own
"different roads to socialism" in the Yugoslav manner.
In crucial policy debates in 1955, Khrushchev and Molo-
tov disagreed sharply over the wisdom of Soviet recon-
ciliation with Yugoslavia and the consequences in the
Satellites of thus implicitly commending Titoism. There
were also disputes over the degree of "liberalization"
of Soviet rule best calculated to satisfy national senti-
ment in Eastern Europe and ensure Satellite loyalty to
Communism and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, all the
Soviet leaders agreed and, from their public utterances,
still appear to agree, that preservation of the unity of
the Communist world is a prerequisite to the development
of each Socialist country's specific national pecularities.
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'rut' WT-7 TN T TRTi
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
to that of the UN specialized agencies.
Y e referred to the subcommittee composed of the
Big Four and Canada. The new International Atomic
Energy Agency is expected to be given a status similar
DISARMAMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY QUESTIONS
IN THE 11TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Disarmament discussions at the 11th General Assem-
bly are likely to focus largely on the problem of nu-
clear testing. India and the USSR will probably call for
a complete ban, and the growing apprehension among UN
members over the effects of increased radiation indi-
cates that a majority would support some UN limitation
on testing. General disarmament discussions will prob-
abl b
CHINESE COMMUNIST "PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY" . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Liu Shao-chi's statement before the recent eighth
congress of the Chinese Communist Party that "our
friends are increasing daily, .,our doors are open to
all" reflects Peiping's confidence in the success of
what the Chinese call "people's diplomacy." Its pur-
pose is to sell Communist China abroad as a cultured,
industrious, and peaceful member of the community of
nations; it relies heavily on guided tours for visitors
to Communist China and exchanges of "cultural" groups,
which have been made with suc various non-Com-
munist countries.
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TAM
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
HUNGARIAN REGIME LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN TO CRUSH RESISTANCE
The Soviet-sponsored Kadar
regime took strong repressive
measures on 9 December designed
to eliminate resistance. The
regime's imposition of martial
law and the outlawing of the
regional workers' councils--
the leading forces of the op-
position--have strengthened
worker resolve, however, and
resulted in a new and effective
general strike and a flare-up
of armed violence.
Regime Policy and Position
Faced with determined and
continued worker opposition,
the Kadar regime has proved it-
self totally incapable of re-
storing order or regaining any
popular support. Kadar--a na-
tional Communist by orienta-
tion and a victim of Rakosi
oppression--has in fact had to
compromise almost all his basic
national-Communist tenets in
his effort to overcome political
and economic anarchy. One of
the major reasons for his fail-
ure has been the lack of an
effective party organization;
reports indicate that Com-
munist workers and intellectuals
and national Communists are
shunning the Hungarian Social-
ist Workers Party, and only
Stalinists and opportunists are
joining.
Despite his lack of a
party apparatus and his in-
ability to organize ?a large
and reliable security force,
Kadar has turned to repression
in an effort to check the
workers. On 9 December, he
announced the abolition of the
territorial workers' councils
which had become the focal
points for worker demands and
action. The lower-level factory
workers' councils remain, charged
only with maintaining production
levels and devoid of any politi-
cal responsibility.
The regime has also moved
against all vestiges of active
or potentially active resist=
ance. Declaring martial law
on 9 December, the regime an-
nounced that all persons pos-
sessing arms after 11 December
would be subject to severe
penalties, including death.
Worker :Attitude
In the face of Kadar's
threats, the workers have
staged repeated demonstrations
since 3 December. These shows
of strength culminated in a
48-hour general strike on 11
and 12 December, which was
resumed shortly after its "of-
ficial" end in protest over the
arrest of labor leaders. The
strike may continue if Kadar
does not recognize worker
demands. Although members of
the workers' councils have
been arrested, a basic unity
appears to exist among the
workers which is giving them
renewed energy.
The strike which started
on 11 December came after the
most. extensive regime efforts
yet seen to prevent such a
public demonstration of worker
strength, and served as a
symbol of the relative strengths
of the Kadar and worker positions.
The workers have made full
use of classic Communist tactics
of resistance and subversion--
~..EN 111 AALL
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
strikes, guerrilla warfare,
cellular organizations and
infiltration.
Soviet Policy
By trying to use the Kadar
regime and its small police
forces to implement a policy of
total repression, the Soviet
Union has demonstrated that it
still hopes not to commit its
troops to more than minimal
police activity to restore
order. It also apparently
hopes to avoid a complete Soviet
military dictatorship. But--
as has been the pattern for
six weeks--regime repression
has strengthened popular
resistance and has, accordingly,
increased the likelihood of
greater Soviet military involve-
ment in support of the weak
security units of the regime.
The USSR undoubtedly
recognizes the urgency of finding
a quick solution of its problems
in Hungary. In view of deter-
mined worker resistance, there
appear to be only two basic
courses of action open, neither
of which is particularly
palatable for the USSR. The
first alternative--basic con-
cessions--might include the
restoration of Nagy--or some
former minority party leader--
to the premiership and a
reversal of the ban on the,
politically active workers'
councils. Such an alternative
would involve another threat
to Soviet control but might
eventually achieve a return
to civil and economic order.
The second alternative--
complete suppression--toward
which Kadar and the Soviets
appear to be moving, albeit
somewhat reluctantly, would in
effect necessitate the es-
tablishment of a Soviet military
dictatorship, presumably through
a reorganized puppet regime.
A more adroit, tougher-minded
Communist, perhaps Ferenc:
Muennich, might be expected
to assume control of the party
from Kadar, whose failures
and policies have certainly
discredited him in the eyes
of the people, the party and
possibly Mosc as well.
THE POLISH SITUATION
The Gomulka regime in
Poland has continued its ef-
forts to win increased popular
support in the face of the popu-
lar unrest exemplified in the
recent riots in several Polish
cities and towns. It has
reached agreement with the
Catholic Church on outstanding
differences,. is rehabilitating
former Socialist leaders, and
has allowed independent youth
groups to organize. The regime
may feel compelled to exercise
some controls over the youth
groups, however, to keep them
from becoming involved in anti-
Soviet activities.
In early December, riots
occurred in at least three
Polish towns, the most serious
apparently being those which took
place in Stettin (Szczecin).
The Stettin riots, which cul-
minated in an attack on the
Soviet consulate, were sparked
by youths and illustrate the
difficulties facing the regime
in keeping the deep-seated
popular hatred of the USSR from
taking overt form. The regime's
use of the army to quell the
riots indicates its determina-
tion to avoid giving the USSR
a pretext to intervene. The
stern attitude it has taken
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
toward the youths involved in
these riots and the 18 November
Bydgoszcz riots may fore-
shadow a reassertion of its
authority over the youth
groups lest they spark large-
scale demonstrations against
the USSR.
Youth Groups
Three new youth organiza-
tions were organized in recent
weeks to replace the dis-
credited Communist-controlled
Polish Youth Union, which
admitted on 14 November that
it had been "incapable of
action" and had "played no
part in the battle for de-
mocratization." Shortly after
this declaration was published,
a Union of Democratic Youth
and a Peasant Youth Organization
were set up, apparently loosely
affiliated with the Democratic
and United Peasant Parties
respectively, and a Marxist-
oriented Revolutionary Youth
Union was organized on 7
December. Although the latter
group proclaims it will work
to implement the present
policies of the party, the
party may have difficulty in
controlling it, since it has
already declared its opposition
to party control of the organi-
zation, and reserves for itself
the right to interpret the party
line.
Church-State Agreement
The joint church-state
commission which was set up
shortly after the release of
Cardinal Wyszynski announced
on 7 December that agreement
had been reached on principles
governing future relations.
The most far-reaching aspect
of the agreement was the
provision that religious ed-
ucation could be given in state
schools for children whose
parents request it, and that
the state would pay the cost of
such a program. In addition,
the state agreed to relinquish
its veto over church appoint-
ments, to allow priests to
function as chaplains in
hospitals and prisons, and to
permit the church to establish
several independent publica-
tions. In return, the church
has publicly supported the new
regime and reportedly agreed
that no Catholic political
party will be organized.
Since Gomulka's return to
power, a special politburo
commission has been set up to
rehabilitate former Socialist
leaders and take them into the
Polish United Workers (Commu
nist) Party (PZPR) in order to
give the party wider appeal.
,Even before he was purged in
1948, Gomulka favored including
most of the Socialists in the
PZPR, which had been formed by
merging the Socialist and Com-
munist Parties. His successors,
however, insisted on an ex-
tensive purge of the Socialist
Party before admitting the
remaining pro-Communist ele-
ments. The new commission has
already announced that over a
dozen former Socialist officials
have been made members of the
PZPR, and more are apparently
to follow.
While most of these former
officials appear to have been
middle-echelon figures, they in-
clude former premier Edward
Osobka-Morawski, who was purged
in 1948 and imprisoned in 1951
in spite of his?earlier co-
operation with the Communists.
Even more striking was the
recent statement of a Warsaw
newspaper that Czeslaw Bobrowski
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
would soon be named deputy chief
of the newly organized planning
council. Bobrowski, head of the
planning commission in the early
postwar years, is a right-wing 25X1
Socialist who defected in 1950
and was living in Paris at the
time of this announcement.
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`o-Im'. 1 1AL.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SUEZ PROBLEM
UN secretary general Ham-
marskjold is seriously concerned
that Britain and France will
jeopardize the entire canal
clearance operation by insisting
that their personnel as well as
their salvage fleet at Port
Said be used. Egyptian agree-
ment to UN clearance opera-
tions is based on the condi-
tion that no British or French
technicians be used other than
a few to train other nationals
to use the equipment. London,
on the other hand, has indicated
it would have to start with-
drawing its equipment unless
assured that its personnel, pro-
tected by diplomatic immunity,
could operate it.
Hammarskjold plans to use
six of the 40 British salvage
vessels now in the area. They
would supplement the 28-vessel
UN salvage fleet, and would be
operated by Dutch and Danish
personnel, after a short train-
ing period by the British.
Britain has taken the position,
however, that the UN must use
all or none of its vessels, for
the addition of only six Brit-
ish vessels capable of medium
or heavy lift would not be
enough for quick clearance of
the canal. American chief of
UN salvage operations Lt. Gener-
al Wheeler estimates, however,
that salvage operations would
be delayed only a matter of
days if the British fleet is
not used.
Withdrawals of British and
French forces from Egypt have
continued, with about half of
the 20,000 troops apparently
now gone and the rest scheduled
to leave by 18 December.
There are some signs that this
final date may be put off for
a few days. Incidents such as
the kidnaping of a British of-
ficer on 11 December could pro-
vide a pretext for longer delays.
Britain, after recalling
all major naval vessels from the
eastern Mediterranean, reportedly
has sent back a task force to
cover the Anglo-French withdrawal
from Port Said. This group, con-
sisting of two carriers, one
cruiser, three destroyers, and two
escort vessels, would presumably
also be concerned with the se-
curity of the numerous salvage
craft and their crews which are
in the area. Of major French ves-
sels, only a carrier remains.
Egyptian Tactics
Egypt's tactic has been
to appear accommodating on de-
tails in private, but in public
to make withdrawal as humiliat-
ing as possible for the Allies.
The smuggling of arms into
Port Said and the increasingly
bold demostrations there are
probably instigated by the
Nasr regime not only to harass
the British and French forces
but to found a legend that
Egyptian popular resistance
rather than American and Soviet
pressure got the invaders out
of the country.
W INL
W-1-11 .
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'-'" SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Israel
Israel has been reluctant
to leave Sinai without some
kind of guarantee that the
peninsula would not again be-
come a "base for aggression."
Failing diplomatic assurances
from the great powers, the
Israelis apparently are writing
their own warranty by tearing
up roads and railway tracks
and demolishing Egyptian in-
stallations as they withdraw.
How long this kind of guarantee
will be effective is problemat-
ical, but the American embassy
in Tel Aviv reports that at
least for the moment Israel's
apprehensions over its military
situation are probably at the
lowest point since before the
Egyptian-Soviet bloc arms deal.
In line with this relaxa-
tion, the active strength of
the Israeli army is now esti-
mated at 80,000, including
paramilitary units. This is
about the level at which Israel
maintained its forces before
the build-up for hostilities
against Egypt.
The short-term effects
of the Sinai campaign on the
Israeli economy do not now
appear to be serious. Decreases
in industrial production are
probably only temporary, and
the distribution system, dis-
located by the mobilization of
transport, should return to
normal as vehicles are re-
leased by the army. The gov-
ernment apparently is making
arrangements to counter the
USSR's refusal to ship petroleum
products by increasing imports
from Western sources to meet
minimum needs, Israel's long-
term development program has
been set back, however, by the
diversion of resources to
the military effort, and any
possible solution to its
balance-of-payments deficit
has been pushed further into
the future.
British and French Economies
The unofficial sterling
exchange rate rose sharply
following the International
Monetary Fund's authorization
on 10 December for Britain to
draw an unprecedented 1,3
billion dollars. The pound
sterling has thus been
strengthened, at least tempo-
rarily, but British officials
expect Britain's trading posi-
tion to be weakened during
coming months. They see this
resulting from rising import
prices for oil and other raw
materials, and the expected
decline in industrial output.
London now estimates that ad-
ditional dollar oil will cost
$445,000,000 by the end of
August 1957.
In France, gold and dollar
reserves are down to a low
working level of 1.3 billion
dollars; the American embassy
expects them to decline below
one billion dollars by mid-
1957. Because France derives
13 percent of its industrial
energy from petroleum in con-
trast to only 4 percent in
Britain, industrial production
will be harder hit. This poses
a grave threat to France's ef-
fort to continue the expansion
of output as one facet of the
fight against. inflation.
Political Situation
In both Britain and France,
the political tensions of the
past weeks are easing. The
Conservative government in
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~-- SECRET 'Sft--04
13 December 1956
In France, the foreign poli-
cy debate scheduled for 18 Decem-
ber in the National Assembly is
not expected to posed a threat
to ollet government.
Britain successfully weathered
its parliamentary debate and
vote of confidence on Egyptian
policy with only 15-defections
from the party's normal vote--
considerably less than had been
feared. Prime Minister Eden
will return on 14 December from
his three-week rest in Jamaica.
In an apparent attempt to
ease Western concern over So-
viet activities in the Middle
East and to avert further out-
breaks of military action in
that area, the USSR last week
withdrew its 10 November threat
to send "volunteers" to fight
in Egypt. Moscow is apparently
confident that it can win credit
for easing tension and averting
further fighting in the Near
East through diplomatic and
propaganda maneuvers.
A TASS statement of 8
December declared the USSR's
"great satisfaction that in
the Arab East, the fire of war
has been extinguished" and
stated that the withdrawal of
British, French and Israeli
forces from Egypt "eliminates
the question of the departure
of Soviet volunteers for Egypt."
The TASS statement may have
been an attempt to assure the
Syrians that tensions had
slackened, despite a continua-
tion of Moscow's propaganda
campaign against alleged West-
ern plans of "military aggres-
sion against Syria."
Syria
The leftist group in Syria
which has been pressing for
changes in the Asali cabinet
appears now to have decided
that the first order of busi-
ness is to investigate and bring
to trial the Syrians involved
in Iraqi arms-smuggling opera-
tions. Previous abortive Iraqi
plots have furnished an oppor-
tunity to eliminate opposition
elements, and the leftist group
apparently intends to exploit
this latest conspiracy. These
tactics have the advantage of
lessening the chances of right-
ist countermoves while preparing
the way for cabinet changes
favoring the left. The contin-
uation of Syria's radio and
press camapign against Iraq's
Prime Minister Nuri Said keeps
tension high between the two
countries.
There have been reports
from Damascus that rightist min-
isters backed by Quwatli are
resisting leftist pressures to
change or enlarge the cabinet.
The rightist ministers report-
edly have agreed among them-
selves to stay in the cabinet
as long as possible in order
to avoid yielding the field to
the leftists. The pressures
for the elimination of the
rightists will continue, how-
ever, and almost certainly in-
crease as the Iraqi arms plot
is unraveled, and as the threat
of foreign intervention recedes
with the withdrawal of British
and French troops from Egypt.
The Egyptian embassy in
Damascus has reportedly sub-
mitted a list of Egyptian-
approved ministerial candidates
to President Quwatli and advised
him to make his selections
accordingly, but an Egyptian
embassy official has stated that
no immediate cabinet change was
contemplated. Ambassador Moose
reports that the Syrian poli-
ticians listed by the embassy
are ineffectual or strongly
anti-Western.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
The leftist group is also
apparently making use of the
Syrian popular resistance move-
ment to intimidate the rightists.
Armed "young patriots" of the
resistance movement are now
seen on all Damascus streets.
Last week 3,200 of them, all
armed with Czech small machine
guns, paraded for President
Quwatli. Some 80,000 to 100,-
000 Syrian youths who enlisted
in the movement have completed
training, 20,000 of them in
Damascus alone.
The movement was organized
ostensibly for resistance a-
gainst external aggression, but
the training--street fighting
tactics, the use of small arms
and explosives--has been under
the direction of junior army
officers sympathetic. to the
nationalist, pro-Egyptian poli-
cies of the Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party and Colonel
Sarraj, head of Syrian army
intelligence.
Jordan meanwhile appears
preparing to draw still closer
to. Syria and Egypt. A shake-
up'of Jordanian government
personnel, involving the re-
moval of some allegedly pro-
British sub-cabinet officials,
was begun on 12 December.
At the same time, cooling
relations with Iraq, as a con-
sequence of its identification
with British interests, cul-
minated in the withdrawal of
the 3,500-man Iraqi brigade
group from Jordan on 10 Decem-
ber. An additional factor in
the removal was the unwilling
ness of Iraq to place its forces
in Jordan under the Arab Joint
Command.
Over 5,000 Syrian troops
and 500 to 800 Saudi Arabian
troops apparently will remain
in Jordan. Syrian forces are
concentrated in the north near
the Syrian border, guarding
key Jordan River bridges, and
in the N blus area of West
Jordan
Ira
25X1
25X1
The intensity of anti-
government feeling in Iraq has
diminished over the past week,
and will probably relax as
the British and French withdraw
from Egypt. American observers
believe that, barring the pos-
sibility of disaffection in the
army or lack of continued sup-
port by the palace, Prime Minis-
ter Nuri Said will remain in
control. However, the continua-
tion of popular agitation a-
gainst the government indicates
that the period of strain is
far from over. Bitterness a-
gainst Britain and Nuri has
been stored up and may have a
delayed reaction after the pres-
ent period of acute tension
has passed,
Damascus and Cairo, abetted
by Moscow, are continuing their
anti-Nuri propaganda offensive,
and the Iraqi government still
has to face the problem of re-
opening the schools and colleges
and eventually releasing
.failed politicians.
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Reports from Egypt indi-
cate that moves against Jews
have not been as extensive as
Israeli propaganda has claimed.
The regime does appear to be
using the present situation as
an opportunity to eliminate
foreign influences, especially
British, French and Jewish.
Cairo insists there is no
anti-Jewish campaign as such
and Egyptian spokesmen have
pointed to Egypt's liberal
treatment of its Jewish popula-
tion during the past seven
years. Official expulsion or-
ders have been directed at
British and French nationals--
as "enemy aliens"--and at spe-
cific stateless Jews who have
been found dangerous to Egypt's
security. Egyptian officials
contend that the latter cate-
gory numbers only some 280 per-
sons, and that probably no more
than'450 expulsion cases would
involve Jews. The American em-
bassy calculates, however, that
if dependents are included, be-
tween 450 and 500 expulsion
cases could mean an exodus of
about 2,000 persons.
The Jewish rabbinate in
Egypt reportedly has received
applications for resettlement
outside the country from 1,500
Jews of all nationalities.
These applications have arisen
from various motives, including
official expulsion orders, gov-
ernment pressure to leave and
the applicants' own desires.
Voluntary applications at this
time are probably relatively
few, since applicants are
allowed a very short period to
dispose of their property and
cannot take out of the country
any significant sums of money--
$575 maximum, less cost of
tickets, jewelry, and other
goods carried with them.
The Nasr regime has also
moved to sequester Jewish prop-
erty. As of 3 December, se-
questration orders had been
carried out against 539 indi-
vidual Jews and 105 Jewish
firms. Unemployment among the
45,000 to 50,000 Jews in Egypt
is believed to be growing. In
addition to economic and social
pressures to drop Jews from
payrolls, government officials
appointed to manage sequestered
businessess or firms taken over
under the industrial mobiliza
tion orders have in many cases
either dismissed Jewish employ-
ees or put them on leave with-
out pay, although regime spokes-
men have indicated such action
does not have official approval.
These moves, and the pub-
licity given them outside Egypt,
have led to protests in the UN
and to approaches directly to
Egypt. Such representations
seem to have lessened the harsh-
ness of implementation of the
expulsion orders, and elicited
statements from Nasr's cabinet
denying any anti-Semitic ideol-
ogy.
However, the other Arabs
presumably interpret the Egyp-
tian moves s ecificall anti-
Jewish. 25X1
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
BRITISH PLANS FOR CYPRUS
Britain intends to publish
about 20 December, after pro
forma consultations with Greece
and Turkey, its draft constitu-
tion providing limited autonomy
for Cyprus. While the constitu-
tion would appear to meet
Turkey's minimum requirements,
it will probably be unacceptable
to Archbishop Makarios and to
Athens.
Colonial Office deputy
under secretary Martin told the
American embassy on 10 December
that the proposed constitution,
which would confer extensive
self-government, offers what
may be the last chance for a
considerable time to proceed
toward a solution. Martin in-
dicated that the Radcliffe re-
port, as well as a plan for in-
creased financial assistance
to Cyprus, will probably be ap-
proved and published by the
government about 20 December.
Implementation would not take
place, however, until order had
been restored on the island.
The embassy believes
Britain wishes to avoid
modifying its plan, and will
therefore probably consult
Greece and Turkey only at the
last minute. Britain apparent-
ly, does not intend to consult
Makarios at all, despite the
belief of some British officials
that this is necessary to ob-
tain Cypriot support. The
Greek prime minister has in-
dicated that the Cypriots
would be much more likely to
accept a less desirable settle-
ment backed by Makarios than a
better seLtiement backed by
i.The new constitution,
though apparently meeting
Turkey's minimum requirements,
will probably be unacceptable to
Greece, and Makarios will prob-
ably continue to balk at any
scheme retaining ultimate
British control over the island.
on on rnJ 1n
addition to the constitutional
proposals issue a statement
promising a self-determination
plebiscite after 10 or 15
years of internal self-govern-
ment. The proposed Cypriot
government would have no
authority to alter the interna-
tional status of the island.
The constitution is prob-
ably being published at this
time in order to conciliate
both British and international
public opinion. The Cyprus
question will be taken up by
the UN General Assembly in
about two months, and a number
of powers, including the Soviet
bloc and Asian-African countries,
will probably support Greece.
Britain, still determined
to retain effective use of
Cyprus as a military base, has
indicated that the alternative:;
of either partition or de-
militarization, as suggested by
some, would be. unacceptable.
Londur- has stated repeatedly
that the Suez crisis proves the
importance of maintaining mili-
tary bases on Cyprus. It now
plans to hold armed forces
there above the pre-Suez level
of about 21,000, all available
for internal rity duty.
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SECRET
25X1
25X1
The question of adapting
the decisions-of the 20th party
congress last February to devel-
ents since the congress
will be discussed at the cen-
tral committee plenum sched-
uled for this month, according
to Khrushchev. Measures to
improve the lot of the Soviet
consumer reportedly will be
included.
Acknowledging that prepa-
rations for the plenum were
somewhat difficult.
the decisions of the 20th
party congress would be re-
spected in their essentials, but
that there was a question of
"adapting them to developments
which have taken place since
the congress." The plenum,
he said,'would be held in the
second half of December and
would be followed in January
by a session of the Supreme
Soviet which would be called
to approve measures decided
at the plenum.
Reports from Moscow on
11 December stated that new
plans for the USSR's economy
would be announced at the
central committee meeting. Ac-
cording to these reports, the
current Soviet five-year plan
is to be modified to provide
for increased production of
consumer goods and more housing.
One report said that light industry
was slated to get twice as much
in the way of investment in
1957 as originally planned and
that additional funds would be
allocated for housing up to 40
percent of the total for all
construction in the coming
year. Budgetary adjustments
would also have to be made to
reflect the economic conces-
sions recently made to Poland
and Rumania and probably to
be extended to the other 25X1
Satellites.
Supreme 2
oviet Presidium secretary
Aleksandr Gorkin said on 6
December he did not "antici-
pate" any important personnel
changes. In reply to a fur-
ther question as to whether
this applied to the party
as well as the government,
Gorkin answered in the af-
firmative, saying "he did not
know" of any importanti.changes
pending in this field either.
in Kronstadt a Soviet
su mar ne equipped with a
cylindrical tank approximately
22 feet long and 8 feet in
diameter, and possibly an in-
clined ramp, both located aft
of'.the conning tower., This
arrangement is similar to
one used by missile-launching
submarines of the US navy.
The submarine probably was a
"W-cross" long-range boat. The
USER is believed to have had
an operational capability since
1955 of launching subsonic,
cruise-type guided missiles of
500-nautical-mile range from
submarines.
On 18 November, American
naval aircraft. sighted an un-
identified: submarine in the,
Sea of Japan which had a sep-
arate structure aft of the con-
ning tower described as a tank
similar to the one reported
on the submarine in Kronstadt.
A similar submarine was also
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``""'' SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
,Qy1 `W-CLASS'LURMARINE WITH TANK AND LAUNCING RAMP
=Emnno
61211 4
reportedly sighted in the
Northern Fleet area.*in July.
The USSR has constructed
over 200 long-range submarines
of the "W-class" since 1950.
Modification of a number of
"W-class" units to carry mis-
siles externally would only
be an interim measure until
the USSR develops a submarine
which can carry larger mis-
siles in greater numbers
within the pressure hull.
USSR EASES INTERFERENCE WITH
Allied trains and truck
convoys are running between
West Germany and Berlin with-
out further Soviet attempts
to board or inspect them,
although the USSR still insists
on documentation checks ob-
jected to by the Allies. The
tension was eased when Soviet
authorities agreed not to
insist on searching. military
truck convoys after an Ameri-
can convoy had turned back
on 5 December to avoid such
a search.
Colonel Kotsiuba, the
Soviet commander in Berlin,
agreed on 6 December there
would be no inspection of
trucks, although he insisted
that such inspection implied
no interference with the con-
voys. While some points of
disagreement remain over what
documentation is needed,
several military convoys have
since made the trip without
difficulty.
The use' of Soviet long-
range submarines to carry
guided missiles was forecast
by party leader Khrushchev last
spring when he said that a
submarine equipped with guided
missiles is. the "most suitable
naval weapon," and that its
development..would be emphasized
by the Soviet navy. Khrushchev
added that possession of this
weapon would give the USSR the
capability of making "defensive"
attacks on the United States.
(Concurred in
ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN
The USSR continues to in-
sist, over 'Allied objections,
on checking identity documents
of passengers on Allied mili-
tary trains as well as Russian
translations of their travel .
orders. Despite hints that they
might board trains in the future,
Soviet authorities have 'not
insisted on this prerogative.
The USSR probably believes
it has already achieved` its
purpose of warning the Allies
against stirring up trouble in
East Germany by emphasizing its
retaliatory capabilities, but
may continue the stricter
traffic controls in order to
cause continued uneasiness in
the West. It evidently does
not intend at present to--effect
a partial Berlin blockade by
instituting those inspection
measures which the Allies have
flatly refused to accept.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
BULGARIA
The Bulgarian regime is
pursuing a two-,pronged policy
of severe police repression and
economic concessions to deal
with the popular unrest and
factionalism within the party
and groups closely associated
with it. There have been re-
ports that workers have demon-
strated in the provinces, stu-
dents have advocated less
political indoctrination, and
youthful "hooligan" elements
have engaged in demonstrations
against the regime.
Approximately one third
of the central committee mem-
bers of the Bulgarian party
are reportedly opposed to the
present leadership. There is
no evidence,-however, that dis-
sident elements are united.
Furthermore, unlike the situa-
tion in Poland and Hungary last
summer, the dissidents are not
in control of any organization
which can give expression to
their various views.
The regime has arrested
an estimated 1,200 suspected
unreliables and reopened at
least one concentration camp.
most of
the rehabilitated Kostovites,
purged for Titoism following
Yugoslavia's break with the
Cominform, have been rearrested.
Two army generals have report-
edly been demoted and 200 of-
ficers pust d for pro-Titoist
views. 25X1
depor- 25X1
-tations to the provinces of
"unreliable" elements, includ-
ing peasants who refused to
join collective farms.
By way of economic conces-
sions, the government has an-
nounced increases in family al-
lowances and pensions, and
within the last week has abol-
ished compulsory delivery of
some agricultural products and
promised wage increases aver-
aging 15 percent beginning in
January.
The border with Yugoslavia
reportedly is now floodlighted
at night and has been restrung
with barbed wire, only recently
removed. Persistent rumors of
the introduction of Soviet forces
into Bulgaria have been conclu-
sively disproved.
Tracklaying on the Yingtan-
Amoy railroad was completed to
Amoy station on 9 December.
The 450-mile line was completed
roughly 600 days after construc-
tion began, about one year ahead
of the original schedule. A
spur to the POL dump at Sunghsu,
where a marshaling yard will be
located, is presumably nearing
completion.
Roadbed work on the major
branch line to Mawei, near
1'nnnilnW_ is also under way.
engineering divisions now in 25X1
Fukien are transferred to work
on this branch, it can probably
be completed during the first
half of 1957.
The Yingtan-Amoy railroad
will greatly enhance the logis-
tic capabilities of the Chinese
Communists in the coastal area.
It is estimated that the line,
after a brief shakedown period
of perhaps three to six months,
will be able to handle 4,000-
5,000 tons of cargo each way
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CURRENT INTELLIGENC1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
YINGTAN - AMOY RAILROAD
Railroad, operable -----Railroad under construction
0 Airfield
Shihma
Haicheng
auseways
'_Koochi
per day. Only about 2,000-
3,500 tons per day can now be
moved into the coastal areas
via existing highways. The
added tonnage would be suffi-
cient to support, at least
initially,: offensive operations
by seven divisions of jet
fighters and a ground force of
11 armies and supporting troops.
The new line also enhances
the potential value of Amoy as
a commercial port, although mer-
chant vessels using the harbor
would be exposed to Chinese Na-
tionalist artillery on Quemoy
and Little Quemoy Islands. A
marshaling yard is located at
Amoy station, from which a spur
extends toward, but does not yet
reach, the dock area itself.
The port of Amoy has been
largely inactive since the Chi-
nese Communists came to power.
It formerly could handle some
2,000-3,000 tons of cargo per
20-hour day. No heavy cargo-
working facilities have been
available. Aside from the con-
struction of additional ware-
housing prior to 1955, little
work appears to have been done to
ready ant vos-
sels. (Pre- 25X1
pared by OR1t
Chou En-lai ended his of-
ficial tour of India on 9 Decem-
ber in Calcutta, where he talked
to newsmen for nearly two hours.
His remarks emphasized Peiping's
desire for improved relations
with the United States and were
clearly slanted to support pos-
sible efforts by Nehru to medi-
ate Sino-American differences
during the Indian leader's
Washington visit'
Chou avoided giving a
direct answer when a reporter
asked if Nehru has been re-
quested to carry a message to
the American government. He
implied, however, that if Nehru
advanced proposals for improv-
ing Sino-American relations, they
would be endorsed by Peiping.
"We know Nehru has more under-
standing of the world situation
than we do," Chou said,
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Chico ou
~?Chienou
Wangtai Napping
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13 December 1956
"therefore, any suggestion we
could make could not be more
than what he has in mind."
The stand taken by New
Delhi on major issues between
Communist China and the United
States--the question of Taiwan,
recognition of the Peiping re-
gime and its seating in the UN--
has been so close to Peiping's
position that the Chinese could
confidently hint at acceptance
of an Indian solution to these
questions.
When queried by reporters
about Americans held prisoner
in Communist China, Chou said
they might be freed prior to
expiration of their sentences
if their behavior was "good."
This is nothing more than a
reiteration of previous Commu-
nist statements, however, and
in the absence of American con-
cessions or strong pressure
from Nehru, the men are unlike-
ly to be granted an early re-
lease.
Chou asserted that his
government had been doing its
best to improve relations with
the United States, and reviewed
earlier proposals by Peiping
for a Sino-American meeting at
the foreign minister level, re-
moval of the trade "embargo,"
and cultural interchange as
means of reducing tensions.
He noted with regret that
Washington had not responded
favorably to these overtures
and indicated that the next move
was up to the United States.
On his arrival in Rangoon
on 10 December, Chou expressed
hope that his visit there would
help solve the border dispute
between Burma and Communist
China. He said he was confident
the controversy could be set-
tled on the basis of "peaceful
coexistence." The Burmese
reception, however, has been
rather restrained and there
are signs Chou may run into
trouble in his effort to get
agreement on the terms of a
final border settlement..
the Burmese
have developed reservations
about the tentative settle-
ment worked out in Peiping
last October between Chou
.and former premier Nu in-
volving the transfer of three
Kachin State villages to China
in exchange for the withdrawal
of Communist troops from the Wa
States. These. reservations stem
from the strong opposition of
local Kachin leaders to ceding
any territory to Peiping, and
possibly from second thoughts
among Rangoon leaders about giv-
ing up control over an all-
weather pass between China
and Kachin State.
The Communist bloc's eco-
nomic penetration of Cambodia
is increasing. A 16-man Soviet
economic mission recently ar-
rived in Phnom Penh, and addi-
tional members have joined the
permanent Chinese Communist
economic mission already there.
The projected Soviet aid pro-
gram will be "unconditional,"
as in the case of Peiping's as-
sistance to Cambodia, in order
to derive maximum impact and
good will.
On arriving in Phnom Penh
on 4 December, the leader of
the Soviet mission stated that
the mission's goal was to draw
up "practical measures" to re-
inforce economic and cultural
bonds between the USSR and Cam-
bodia. It was announced that
the USSR, respecting Cambodian
sovereignty, would furnish aid
without conditions.
The size and composition
of the Soviet mission, which
reportedly is to. remain two
or three months, suggest that
Moscow will undertake a com-
prehensive aid program. The
mission includes specialists in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
planning, economic organiza-
tion, foreign trade, industry,
agriculture, irrigation, public
health, education, culture and
construction. These are the
fields in which Sihanouk is
most interested in obtaining
assistance to implement his
ambitious two-year economic
development program. Soviet
aid along these lines would
also have the greatest grass-
roots appeal.
Meanwhile, the $22,400,-
000 Chinese Communist aid pro-
gram in Cambodia is getting
under way. The 11-man mission
from Peiping which arrived in
September to administer the
program has been augmented by
eight technicians who reported-
ly will supervise the construc-
tion of a textile mill, cement
plant, paper factory and ply-
wood factory. The Chinese
Communists have also offered
Laotian premier Souvanna
Phouma asked his cabinet on 10
December to accept two Pathet
Lao officials--one of whom
would be Pathet chief Sou-
phannouvong--in the government.
in return the Pathet Lao move-
ment would be formally "dis-
solved," Souphannouvong would
make a public declaration that
he is not a Communist, and would
provide written guarantees on
the restoration of royal gov-
ernment authority in the two
northern provinces and integra-
tion of Pathet forces in the
royal army.
The cabinet reportedly
agreed to submit Souvanna's
proposal to the national as-
sembly, and presumably will ac-
cept its verdict. The American
embassy in Vientiane reports
that sentiment for a settlement
medicine and equipment for a
Buddhist hospital and a Chinese
hospital in Phnom Penh. Peiping
has also expressed willingness
to improve Cambodian broadcast-
ing facilities.
The Communist bloc aid
programs seem likely to over-
lap those being undertaken by
the West, particularly in the
absence of any effective
mechanism in the Cambodian
government to co-ordinate its
diverse aid requests. Recently,
however, the Cambodian minister
of planning assured American of-
ficials there would be no mixing
of Communist and American aid on
individual projects. The Commu-
nists, however, apparently hope
to gain greater impact with
their programs by avoiding
"administrative red tape"
which Cambodians allege sur-
round Western aid programs.
of the Pathet problem is strong,
and it is unlikely many deputies
will openly vote against Sou-
vanna, even at the risk of
losing American assistance.
Souvanna has reportedly re-.
called Vice Premier Katay from
the UN General Assembly to win
his support for the proposals.
Katay is expected to arrive on
15 December and the issue will
probably be put to a vote in.
the assembly shortly thereafter..
Souvanna's move will in-
evitably alter the circumstances
in'which the Pathet Lao negoti-
ations have been conducted to
date. With Souphannouvong in
the cabinet, a final settlement
is likely to assume the char-
acterists of a "family af-
fair" with the country's inter-
ests vis-a-vis the Pathets
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARI
13 December 1956
subordinated to national reuni-
fication. Souphannouvong's
offer to "dissolve" the Pathet
Lao is nothing more than an
exercise in semantics, as Pathet
hard-core elements would un-
doubtedly continue to operate
in clandestine cells or in
front organizations. Despite
the sweeping guarantees on the
two provinces and integration
of Pathet forces, important
"details "would remain to be
negotiated, while the govern-
ment would have sharply reduced
its bargaining power. Moreover,
there is little reason to
believe that Viet Minh influence
over the Pathets will not re-
main strong.
Rejection by the assembly
would result in the fall of the
Souvanna Phouma government. It
would indicate a lack of confi-
dence in his policy of "faith"
in the Pathet Lao. as well as a
disinclination to risk losing
Western support. Such circum-
stances would probably hasten
the return of Prince Petsarath
from self-exile in Thailand to
form ? arian overn-
ment. 25X1
HAITI
The resignation of Haitian
ruler Paul Magloire on 12 De-
cember in favor of Joseph
Nemours Pierre-Louis, president
of the Court of Appeals, may
ease the extremely tense situa-
tion in the country. Pierre-
Louis would have been Magloire's
legal successor. prior .to the
"palace revolution" of 6 De-
cember, and his assumption of
power may lead to a return to
constitutional order. Politi-
cal conditions, however, are
likely to remain unsettled for
some time..
Unrest increased sharply
following the palace revolt by
.which the army returned Presi-
dent..Magloire to power shortly
after. his first resignation on
6 December. Magloire, who'had
resigned allegedly to satisfy
opposition claims that his
legal term ended on that day,
was authorized "t.o take ex-
ceptional measures" to restore
order. Constitutional rights
were suspended, the legislature
dissolved,. and many opposition-
ists arrested. A successful
general strike protesting these
acts of the impromptu regime
was largely responsible for the
latest change in governement.
The shifts in government
capped a period of heightened
political ferment attending the
preparations for senatorial
and presidential elections which
were scheduled for early 1957.
Magloire explained to American
MAGLO{ RE
ambassador Davis on 5 December
that his initial decision to
resign was influenced by the
serious economic situation and
"irresponsible" acts of the
opposition. Growing opposition
strength, however, probably was
a leading factor.. The adminis-
tration's presidential candidate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
had not attracted as much sup-
port as had been anticipated.
The continuing deteriora-
tion of Haiti's economic situa-
tion has also contributed to po-
litical instability. Directors
of the National Bank and re-
sponsible American businessmen
have informed American of-
ficials that the government--
heavily in debt to industry
and overdrawn at the bank--is
virtually insolvent, and may
be unable to meet its January
payroll. The National Bank,
with its reserves already de-
pleted as a result of financing
government deficits, is ex-
periencing a run on savings,
and fears a run on its com-
mercial department. At the
same time, a poor yield is in
prospect fo the country's chief
cash crop, coffee.
While it appears that the
army, a key factor in the situa-
tion, has supported the latest
transition in government, dis- 25X1
agreement and disaffection
among its members have been re-
ported previously.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NEHRU'S CURRENT INTERESTS
Prime Minister Nehru, in
his self-appointed role as
world peacemaker, will probably
be concerned principally with
international problems when he
comes to the United States on
16 December. These are likely
to include the Middle East, the
position of Communist China, the
danger of a renewed cold war)
Hungary, Pakistan, nuclear tests
and disarmament, and India's
relations with the
United States.
At the same
time, Nehru faces
a crucial national
election at home
and within the next
few years Nehru
must somehow obtain
about two billion
dollars worth of
foreign assistance
in order to suc-
ceed in the am-
bitious economic
program to which he
has pledged his party
and his own pres-
tige (see Weekly
Part III, 6 Dec
1956). Although
he is probably not
yet prepared to
seek this financial aid by
directly requesting it from
either the United States or
the USSR, he is almost certain-
ly prepared to co-operate in
any arrangement under which he
might be able to obtain it
"without strings."
Nehru is probably also con-
cerned about intensified compe-
tition between the USSR and the
United States to fill the "power
vacuum" in the Middle East.
Since he believes world peace is
essential to India's progress,
his internal concerns are prob-
ably still subordinate in his
thiDkiiig to :i:bterriat .Pb a1. problems.
He may feel that relations
with the United States are
really important only in the
context of his world preoccupa-
tions. This outlook reflects
the ambivalent character of a
proudly "democratic" leader
whose country's actions more
nearly mirror his own personal-
ity than do those of many
dictatorships.
Middle East Crisis
Since nation-
alization of the
Suez Canal on 26
July, Nehru's
primary foreign
policy interest
has been the Mid-
dle East.
More than 60
percent of India's
total impotts go
through the Suez
Canal and its
closure endangers
India's economy.
This is reflected
in Nehru's claim
on 8 December that
the cost of India's
Second Five-Year
Plan has probably
risen about one
billion dollars--
partially as a result of the
canal crisis.
Until now, however, Nehru
has subordinated his concern
for the internal repercussions
of the Egyptian situation to
his fear that events in the
Middle East might provoke a
world conflict. India has led
the demand for the withdrawal
of British, French, and Israeli
troops, and Nehru also report-
edly warned Soviet premier Bul-
ganin that any intervention by
the USSR would be a "crime
against humanity."
Nehru is probably still
concerned over the need for a
relaxation of tension in Syria
and Iraq and the prevention of
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13 December 1956
the expansion of Soviet or
American influence in the Mid-
dle East. As the likelihood
of war recedes, however, he
will probably become more in-
terested in reopening the canal
and repairing the economic C_
damage resulting from its clo-
sure.
Communist China
Nehru's recent talks with
Chou En-lai, and the fact that
the two leaders are to meet
again after Nehru's return
from the United States, make
it quite likely he will dis-
cuss in Washington Communist
China's relations with the
United States and its member-
ship in the UN. Chou gave his
blessing for such a discussion
in Calcutta on 9 December.
Nehru may also bring up
recent rumors that Chiang Kai-
shek's son and other National-
ists have been negotiating
with Peiping for a settlement.
These reports are probably
part of a Communist psychologi-
cal warfare effort to increase
discontent on Taiwan. Nehru,
however, probably feels that a
negotiated settlement would
provide a real solution to the
problem of "the two Chinas,"
and may urge the United States
to support it.
Nehru is unlikely to be
dismayed by any appearance of
being Chou's "messenger boy."
He will probably argue that
the United States has an obli-
gation to world peace to accept
China as a respectable great
power. He is unlikely to be
deterred by the thought that
this suggestion might not im-
prove Indo-American relations.
The Dalai Lama's presence
in India, the Tibetan leader's
opposition to the Chinese re-
gime, and the possibility he
may seek asylum in India, may
also be of concern to Nehru.
The Soviet Union
Moscow has tried to spark
to greater diplomatic ini-
tiative, apparently believing
that India's strong stand against
colonialism and military blocs
would serve Soviet interests.
India's reaction to this
has been fairly cool, especially
in regard to Hungary. Moscow
has avoided taking issue with
Nehru by ignoring the lack of
response, although the Soviet
press has criticized individual
Indian reactions.
Nehru has continually. re
(erred to the lack of "facts"
available on events in Hungary.
He probably now has a fair
amount of firsthand reporting
.from Hungary, having sent two
Indian envoys to Budapest. How-
ever, he is probably still eager
for further factual clarifica-
tion of occurrences in Hungary,
and his position on Hungary is
still subject to change.
He has been shaken by So-
viet oppression in Hungary, but
he probably remains reluctant
to accept it as more than an
aberration in the new Soviet
policy--one which may have been
partially justified by the ex-
cesses of the Hungarian inde-
pendence forces. To do so
would b6"ta admit error in his
belief in a "liberalized" So-
viet Union as a real force for
peace.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
Nehru's dislike of mili-
tary alliances--which he be-
lieves are evil and aggressive
in nature regardless of the
motives of their members--is
intensified by his hatred and
fear of Pakistan as the one
potential challenger to India's
security. In his relations
with Pakistan, Nehru abandons
all his broad theories on the
dynamics of world peace and
reacts from a nationalistic
outlook.
New Delhi is now mounting
a propaganda campaign charging
Pakistan with intending to
take military action in Kashmir.
While the Indian campaigns
against Pakistan both at home
and abroad are probably pri-
marily a propaganda build-up
for Nehru's visit to the United
States and Pakistan's presen-
tation of the Kashmir issue to
the United Nations in January,
Nehru may also suspect that
SOVIET POLICY ON "DIFFERENT ROADS
Contrary to
speculation about a split
within the Soviet ruling group
over Satellite..policy.,. none of
the Soviet leaders has favored
letting the Eastern European
Satellites freely seek their
own "different roads to social-
ism" in the Yugoslav manner.
In crucial policy debates in
1955, Khrushchev and Molotov
sharply disagreed over the
wisdom of Soviet reconcilia-
tion with Yugoslavia and the
consequences in the Satellites
of thus implicitly commending
Titoism. There were also
disputes over the degree of
the United States is actually
attempting to use Pakistan to
create a new alignment in the
Middle East. He will probably
continue to look on the Bagh-
dad pact and American military
and political support of Paki-
stan as threats to peace equal
to, if not greater than, Soviet
suppression in central Europe
and Chinese Communist encroach-
ments in the Far East.
Nehru comes to the United
States at a time when he and
other Asian leaders have re-
cently expressed deep respect
for the United States, particu-
larly the leadership of Presi-
dent Eisenhower. Nehru is apt
to be sympathetic and co-opera-
tive in areas in which Indo
American collaboration is
readily possible. However,
his belief in the peaceful in-
tentions of Communist China
and the USSR will probably re-
main unchanged.
TO SOCIALISM" IN THE SATELLITES
"liberalization" of Soviet rule
best calculated to satisfy
national sentiment in Eastern
Europe and ensure Satellite
loyalty to Communism and the
Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, all the So-
viet leaders agreed and still
appear to agree that preserva-
tion of the unity of the Commu-
nist world is a prerequisite to
development of each socialist,
country's specific national
peculiarities. Since the
Poznan riots of June 1956,
Soviet leaders appear to have
been firmly united on the
need to tighten control over
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CURRENT. INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGARY
13 December , 1.956
the Satellites and check a drift
toward demanding real independ-
ence. of the USSR.
July 1955 Plenum Debate
25X1
25X1
a the July 1955 central
commit ee plenum which censured
Molotov for his opposition to
rapprochement with Tito, the
clash of views between Molotov
and the Khrushchev-led majority,
which reportedly included.Bul-
ganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich,
Suslov and Shepilov, brought
into bold relief the differences
in approach on how to deal with
the problem of Satellite na-
tionalism as well as the broad
agreement reached on the
question of Titoism in the
Satellites.
Khrushchev argued that the
failure to assess properly the
problem of nationalism in
Soviet theory and practice was
the root cause of many of the
USSR's setbacks in relations
with the Satellites. He at-
tributed the break with Tito
to Stalin's dictatorial han
dli.ng of the problem of Yugoslav
nationalism, and warned against
the use of such tactics in
dealing with the Satellites.
In strong.,,.support of Khru-
shchev's position, the other
Soviet leaders opposing Molo-
tov--Bulganin, Mikoyan and Kag-
anovich in.particular--pointed
to the many past instances of
tactlessness, brutality and
discrimination in Soviet .economt
is and political relations with
the Satellites.
Despite the far-reaching
criticism of past policy by
Khrushchev and his supporters,
however--the main purpose of
which might have been to dis-
credit Molotov--the resolution
adopted on the subject merely
directed Soviet officials to
observe more courtesy toward
the Satellites.
Molotov held that, apart
from minor mistakes in handling
the Yugoslav affair, the strong
Soviet stand against Tito in
1948 had been necessary to re-
tain the integrity of the So-
viet position in Eastern Europe.
He reminded the plenum that
Poland--a country more important
than Yugoslavia in terms of
its resources and Soviet secu-
rity interests and possessing
its own "rightist deviation"
in the person of Gomulka--might
have been lost if the USSR had
not dealt. firmly with..'Tito.
Molotov warned against the
international repercussions of
implied Soviet toleration of
Tito's ideological heresies,
charging that the significance
of such a step would not be
lost on the Satellite regimes.
Although Molotov admitted that
Soviet tactics, including those
of his ministry, had not always
been proper, he implied that
threats and blackmail were
justifiable insofar as they
served to maintain Soviet
control.
Opposition to Titoism
All the Soviet leaders
agreed that the development
of Titoism would not be?tol-
erated in the Satellites.
Both at the plenum and in his
speech against Stalin at the
20th congress, Khrushchev re-
affirmed the validity of the
1948 Cominform charges of
"national deviationism" against
Tito, charges which have never
been retracted by the Soviet
leaders. The secret minutes
of the July plenum were circulat-
ed t9 the. Satellite leaders,.
in the fall to warn against
attempts to emulate Tito. The
plenum adopted a secret resolu-
tion, the contents of which
were not released until 23
November when Pravda replied to
Tito's Pula speech, declaring
that preservation of the unity
of the Communist world is a pre-
requisite to development of each
socialist country's specific
national peculiarities.
In all their doctrinal
pronouncements, the Soviet
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CURRENT. INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, SUMMARY
leaders have carefully dis-
tinguished between the "roads"
to socialism and the "forms
of transition" to socialism.
They have admitted the pos-
sibility of Satellite dif-
ferences from the Soviet pro-
totype in the "forms," but
have avoided mention of the
possibility of differences in
the "roads," except in the
case of Yugoslavia.
The plenum debate indicated
that the attitudes of the Khru-
shchev group-were generally in
line with Molotov's own policy
except in its estimate of the
risks involved if the Satel-
lites entered into closer
relations with Tito. The
Khrushchev group evidently
felt that Satellite grievances
could be eliminated and Soviet
prestige enhanced by adoption
of more flexible, milder and
less discriminatory policies
and by replacing detailed con-
-trol--through joint-stock com-
panies and Soviet secret po-
lice and "advisers" at all
levels--with a less irksome
and less costly--but in their
opinion by no means less ef-
ficient--control through party,
military,; and economic ties at
the top.
What the Soviet leaders
opposing Molotov did not fore-
see was that the general re-
laxation of Stalinist police
terror and the explosion of
the Stalin.r.1myth would set into
motion forces within the Satel-
lites pressing for a rapid
break with the Stalin era and
a greater voice in the direc-
tion of their national destiny.
Soviet failure to react to
Polish developments until after
the Poznan riots and Soviet
vacillation last summer in
deposing the discredited
Rakosi in Hungary clearly in-
dicate that the Soviet leaders
either failed to appreciate in
time the issues and forces in
dispute or lacked a consistent
policy for coping with the
rapidly changing situation.
'. Poznan:.,.Repercussions
Following the Poznan riots,
opinion within the top Soviet
command swung sharply toward
the alarmist outlook of Molotov.
Authoritative Soviet pronounce-
ments in June and July re-
introduced the theme of "pro-
letarian internationalism," the
old Stalinist formula for
Communist unity under Soviet
hegemony. In rapid succession
from July through November the
top Soviet leaders--Khrushchev
in Moscow and Sverdlovsk,
Bulganin and Zhu4ov in Warsaw,
Mikoyan in Peiping and Suslov in
Moscow--stressed Communist unity
and paid only lip service to
the "different roads to social-
ism" doctrine.
Subsequent Soviet moves--
the 3 September circular letter
to Satellite leaders which
warned them against Titoism,
the failure of Khrushchev and
Tito to agree at Brioni and
Yalta, the blunt pressure
brought to bear on Poland, and
the military intervention in
Hungary--confirmed that the
Soviet leaders had closed
ranks in their estimatecof the
threat of Titoism in the Satel-
lites. The belated admission
on 30 October of past errors
in Soviet-Satellite relations
and the concessions granted to
the Poles indicated reaction
to events rather than any
exercise of Soviet initiative.
Soviet setbacks in Poland
and Hungary may well have led
to recriminations within the
Soviet leadership over respon-
sibility for the consequences
of rapprochement with Tito
and endorsement of the "dif-
ferent roads to socialism"
doctrine. Whatever their
past disagreements as to
the impact of this on the Satel-
lites, they apparently now
have an overriding, interest in
maintaining their unity in the
face of the threat to the
whole structure of Soviet power
in Eastern Europe.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DISARMAMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY QUESTIONS
IN THE 11TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The UN General Assembly's
discussions on disarmament are
likely to result in a resolution
for some form of UN control over
nuclear testing because of the
growing apprehension over the
effects of increased radiation.
To offset majority support for
a complete ban on testing,
which India and the USSR will
probably introduce, Norway and
Canada have already put forth
proposals for limiting and reg-
istering tests.
Nuclear Tests
The establishment last
year of a UN committee to study
and report on radiation effects
has not appreciably satisfied
demands for some control over
testing. In fact, the publica-
tion of the committee's report
may increase the widespread ap-
prehension over excessive ra-
diation.
Since 1954 India has re-
peatedly demanded that nuclear
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
tests be banned and has presented
various proposals to that ef -
f ect to several UN bodies.
Prime Minister Nehru is expected
to discuss the question of
halting nuclear tests during
his visit to the United States,
and he may also use the UN
forum to plead for a ban on
tests.
In addition, the Indian
UN delegate will probably re-
fer during the disarmament de-
bate to the likelihood of test-
ing in the Antarctic region.
India,. had proposed in August
that the Antarctica question
be discussed at this assembly
but withdrew the item pri-
marily because of Latin American
objections.
On 17 November, the same
date on which it announced
another successful nuclear
test, Moscow issued a new dis-
armament statement again call-
ing for an immediate ban on
nuclear tests. Its proposals
again made no provision for
adequate inspection or controls
over compliance with the ban.
The USSR will most likely en-
courage the introduction of
any proposals for banning tests
and may put forth a draft reso-
lution calling for such a ban
during the disarmament debate.
The Norwegian foreign
minister, in his 27;November
policy speech before the UN,
called for advance registra-
tion with the UN of any "weap-
ons tests expected to cause
measurable, world-wide radio-
active fallout." He had pre-
viously told the American em-
bassy that the pressure of
public opinion regarding the
high increase of. radioactivity
made it essential for his gov-
ernment to raise the issue in
this session. The Norwegian
public has become aroused over
reports that radioactive fall-
out measurements in Norway in-
creased tenfold in September.
Canada has proposed that
the nuclear powers agree not
to increase the level of test-
ing over that of last year and
has suggested that these powers
set a voluntary limit on the
number of tests. A Canadian
delegate told Ambassador Lodge
on 5 December that his govern-
ment's proposal was designed
primarily as a "trial balloon"
to forestall proposals for a
complete ban on testing. He
added, however, that Ottawa was
seriously disturbed by reports
of high concentrations of
strontium 90 in British Colum-
bia and has filed the reports
with the UN radiation committee.
The growing 'fears of
various UN members about ex-
cessive radiation has been re-
peatedly reported by Ambassador
Lodge.
General Disarmament
Negotiations for a general
disarmament agreement are likely
to be referred by the General
Assembly to the disarmament
subcommittee, composed of the
Big Four and Canada. This
subcommittee, which has met
twice a year since its estab-
lishment in April 1954, has made
no substantial progress toward
an agreement. UN members are
generally agreed, however, that
such negatiations..~hould':ta:ke
place among the powers princi-
pally concerned, and will prob-
ably endorse further subcommit-
tee talks.
Soviet delegate Kuznetsov
told Ambassador Lodge on 27
November the USSR wanted to do
"everything possible" to reach
some agreement on disarmament,
which he described as one of the
most important problems before
the UN. At some point in the
debate, the USSR will probably
direct the assembly's attention
to its disarmament statement of
17 November in an attempt to
get UN endorsement for its
seven-point plan, which was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
primarily a redraft of previous
Soviet disarmament proposals
rejected by the UN. in past ses-
sions.
Its only new feature was
the expression of Moscow's
readiness to "examine" the
question of using aerial photog-
raphy for inspection in Europe
for 500 miles on each side of
the line between Soviet and
Western. forces--an. area involv-
ing almost no 'S'ov`iet ter'ritory
but including much of Western
Europe..
Atomic Energy Agency
The recent establishment
of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, which derives
from President Eisenhower's
proposals of December 1953,
has been hailed by most UN
members as a step toward the
eventual use of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes alone.
The statute has been signed by
72 countries since it was
opened for signature on 26
October; the agency will become
CHINESE COMMUNIST "PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY"
The statement by Liu Shao-
chi before the recent eighth
congress of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party that "our friends
are increasing daily...our
doors are open to all" reflects
Peiping's confidence in the
success of what the Chinese
call "people's diplomacy..
This is a many-faceted public
relations effort designed to
sell Communist China abroad as
an honest, cultured, industrious
and peaceful member of the
community of nations.
Peiping's emphasis on
this program has increased
steadily during the past two
years and is still growing.
In a recent article, the Chinese
Communists boasted that last
year more than 10,000 people
had taken part in exchanges
which took Chinese delegations
to 33 countries and gave nearly
5,000 visitors from 63 nations
an opportunity to see the "new
China" at first hand. Chou En-
lai has predicted that the num-
ber will be substantially in-
creased this year.
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operative when 18 of these
have ratified the statute.
The agency will have the
authority to engage in research
and development on the peaceful
uses of atomic energy and will
function as an atomic "pool,"
with a: system of safeguards to
enforce some controls over the
use and disposition of nuclear
materials allocated by it to
.recipient members.
Although the actual rela-
tionship of the agency to the
United Nations is subject to
agreement, the 11th General
Assembly will probably recom-
mend that the relationship be
similar to that of the UN
specialized agencies. This
would involve yearly reports
to the UN on the work of the
agency, participation in the
UN technical assistance pro-
grams, and general co-ordina-
tion with the UN, particularly
on such political matters as
memberships. on- 25X1
curred in by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE . WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
The campaign.-for wider in-
ternational contacts functions
at many levels of sophistica-
tion and interest. People's
diplomacy has "something for
everybody"--the intellectual,
the artist, the humanitarian,
the religious enthusiast, the
businessman and the tourist.
The most spectacular appeal
for international good fellow-
ship has been made by itinerant
groups of Chinese entertainers
which:have toured Europe, the
Middle East and Latin America
during the past 12 months.
Avoiding direct govern-
ment sponsorship, these-mer-
chants of good will work to
achieve one of Peiping's main
policy objectives by a care-
fully conceived and executed
campaign to build people-to-
people rapport which can be
nurtured into popular pressure
for official-.relations with
Peiping and alignment with
Chinese objectives.
In Afghanistan, for ex-
ample, the Chinese contribution
to the country's recent month-
long independence celebration
eclipsed both the American-and
Soviet endeavors in popular
appeal and won. resounding ac-
claim in the local press. An
Afghan audience was enthralled
with dancing girls in a per-
formance Western observers com-
pared "to the best of Broadway."
But the performance of Peiping's
ensemble was not confined to
the stage; for four weeks
Chinese dancers entertained
and were entertained by Afghan
officials, gave benefits, pre-
sented gifts, and shook hands
with everyone. By the end of
this time, there was little
doubt in Kabul diplomatic cir-
cles that Peiping had succeeded
in winning many friends in
Afghanistan. The display was
typical of Peiping's elaborate
program to convince the world of
its sincerity in "peaceful co-
existence and international
exchanges."
Ilanthawaddy (Rangoon)
"THE CHINESE CULTURAL MISSION
IS COMING"
Entertainment for the masses
is arranged by the Chinese
People's Association for Cul-
tural Relations with Foreign
Countries. At the merest sug-
gestion of an invitation, the
association is prepared to
dispatch a road show equipped to
perform classic Chinese opera,
folk dances, jugglery, or popu-
lar songs in any language. An
operatic team is now touring
Australia and another has just
completed a long run in Latin
America. Other shows have been
presented in the Middle East,
Africa, and Southeast Asia, and
one was given for Queen Elizabeth
in a command performance. Each
show is preceded by an advance
publicity team, and a press
agent is assigned to the unit.
Although less spectacular
than the cultural delegations,
Chinese trade exhibits are be-
coming more frequent as indus-
trial capabilities increase.
Peiping has taken part in nearly
all the major trade fairs held
during the past year.
Peiping is also busy cul-
tivating special interest
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A BURMESE VIEW
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Pace 11 of iR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY rWL fA,RT
13 December 1956
groups. Specific targets are
professional, intellectual,
business or religious repre-
sentatives whose opinions of
China can be favorably shaped
and whose voice in domestic
affairs in their coun~tries
will not be ignored. The new
"open door" to China affords
selected delegations and indi-
viduals the opportunity of an
expense-paid guided tour of
Communist China complete with
hearty handshake by'Chou En-
lai. Groups of Chinese
specialists are also continual-
ly junketing to negotiate agree-
ments, attend conferences, and
spread news of Chinese progress
and desire to co-operate in
whatever field may bepertinent.
Available figures show
consistent disregard for the
expense involved in promoting
people's diplomacy. In Kabul,
a good part of the Chinese
trade exhibit was presented
to influential Afghans at the
conclusion of the fair. The
cultural troupes performing
in the Middle East and Japan
donated proceeds . to. local
charities. The Chinese have
been anything but stingy in
Number of visitors from country
to Communist China
t4,760 from 63 countries)
25X1 = Number of Chinese Communist
visitors to country
(5,833 to 33 countries)
Iceland FV1 Gtrm t
Motherlands
United Kingdom
Switzerland
France
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Austria
subsidizing visiting foreigners.
One Mexican journalist not only
had his round-trip fare paid
by Peiping, but was offered a
comfortable stipend during, his
stay in exchange for suitable
articles on the glories of
"new China."
Intrabloc travel accounted
for a good percentage of the
reciprocal visits during 1955,
but the number of contacts be-
tween China and the non-Commu-
nist world has been signifi-
cant. Many of the countries
whose nationals visited or
were visited by Chinese Commu-
nists do not recognize the
Peiping government. With a
more aggressive "people's
diplomacy"moving into new
territory, the number and fre-
quency of these exchanges
probably have increased in 1956.
Two of the areas now
being exploited are Latin
America and Australia. An
89-member operatic troupe has
just toured Chile, Brazil,
Argentina and Uruguay, indi-
cating Peiping's increasing
interest in the westerb, hemi-
sphere. Australia is now host
a
Tunisia
Iraq
C-1.
30
a
East Germany
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Yugoslavia
Rumania
Bulgaria
K11.
Egypt
r
41
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Jordan
Israel
r
r Madagascar
Chinese Communist Contacts with Other Countries - 1955
t
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a
II&
Laos
79
? Australia
a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 December 1956
to an opera ensemble which
has just completed a tour of
New Zealand cities.
In the Far East, Japan
continues a prime target for
people's diplomacy. Peiping's
decision in 1952 gradually to
release Japanese prisoners of
war marked the start of an
ever-increasing exchange of
trade, cultural, labor and
professional delegations. In
1955, more Japanese entered
Communist China than did
nationals of any-other country,
including the USSR. This
reciprocal flow of travelers
represented practically every
field of endeavor from song-and--
dance acts to parliamentary
delegations.
The Middle East and Africa
have received considerable
attention under the Bandung
aegis of Asian-African brother-
hood, as well as the community
of religion between Chinese
and Arab Moslems. Burhan
Shahidi, a "professional" Mos-
lem from Sinkiang Province, is
the Chinese roving ambassador
for religious activities in
the Middle East. Burhan has
visited most of the Islamic
nations in the area and has
set in motion an exchange of
Moslem representatives between
these countries and Communist
China.
Chinese Buddhists are now
participating in the World
Buddhist Conference in Nepal
and coreligious groups from
Southeast Asia have toured
monasteries in China at the
invitation and expense of
Peiping. Christian. spokesmen
are also allowed voice occa-
sionally. Dr. Hewlett Johnson,
the dean of Canterbury and a
SECRET
frequent visitor to Communist
China, has praised Christian
progress under the Chinese
Communists.
China's touring minstrels,
have impressed audiences from
Rio de Janeiro to Riyadh.and
Kabul to Khartoum. Peiping's
commercial exhibits are reported
among the most popular at any
show where they appear. Small
groups of Chinese trade, pro-
fessional, and religious spe-
cialists have furthered Pei-
ping's objectives by expanding
contacts in the realms of
commerce, education, science,
and religious affairs--frequent-
ly producing informal exchange
agreements. Visitors to China
are seldom completely enchanted,
unless their allegiance is al-
ready to the left-wing fringes,
but even those who are most
guarded in their praise of the
Communist regime often come
home with the belief that
Chinese leaders are benevolent
despots and that a "normaliza-
tion" of relations with Peiping
is desirable.
This year Peiping has
spent more money, put more
shows on the road, and invit-
ed more. people to China than
ever before, with every like-
lihood the effort to sell
fellowship will continue to
expand. In the light of past
success, Communist China seems
confident that broadening
of its international people's
diplomacy constitutes an ef-
fective instrument in its cam-
paign to win support throughout
the world for its claim to
respected membership in the
international community.
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