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CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1924-1951.

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CREST
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General CIA Records
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CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8
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RIPPUB
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U
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242
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December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 6, 2013
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2
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Publication Date: 
November 28, 1951
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REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 PROJECT RAND RESEARCH. MEMORANDUM NOT TO BE QUOTED, ABSTRACTED, OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT 5PECIFIC PERMISSION RAND Research Memoranda are available to authorized persons or agencies for their use. Further dissemination is not permitted. Distribution to abstracting agencies is not authorized. ? This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at any time. 41 TOWITH ST. ? SANTA MONICA. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019000218 111111111.111111111111111111111 ? ? ? Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 T co' A:1D TAELE3 ? 0 ?Op.. I Introduetion? PAft, I: Co.-iccptual an,.1 Oroni2ationll Aspects of 3oviet Capital Formation. A. Thc. Sovi.it Concept of Capital Investments The Capital Investment Plan C. 3oviet Inv4;stment CateLorins 6 1. Above-11:1dt Investments 2. Ilelow-limit Invesments 3. ET.tra-1LT.It Ilvestmonts 4. Capital Repirs 5. Nonproductive Iroiet.,%. D. The 3ourcs for F1);Ini... Ients 16 Fart II: 1 1 E. Tile Di5tinction beten clen+ralize6 Noncentralized Investments Soq,1)t InvestrIents 1924-1951 A. Total Inveotments by Major Components 36 Table 1: Total Ilvestme;:ts in the 3ocialist Sector, 1923/4-1951 Table 2: Noncentralizefl and Total Investments for Selected Years 39 TAble 1. Conetructdon Expenditures and Total Centralized Investnents for 3elected Years , 41 Gross Investment :,Ed Livest!rienc,s in Fixed and Wo.rkinE Capital for 3e1ected Years 29 36 TablP 4: ? Table 5: The Rate of Investment for Jelected 'iears 49 B. Investments by Aajor iectors of the Economy 50 ,e f. a mi Ca -.14.,a1 Investments by 3ectors of the .;ocialist l 1, Economy, 1923/4-1950 . 52 C. Investments by Mor 3ectors of the Economy with "Nonproduvell InvestiLionts Eliminated from the Economic 3ectors r;.4 ? Table 7; 7Nonpro,luctive" Invcstments by Econwic 3(ctors, 1923/4-1950 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT 1, ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 OONTENT3 AND TAMS Inttro#ction Part I: Conceptual an0 OrganizationU Aspects of Soviet Capit1.1 'Formation. A. The Soviet Concept of Capital Investments ". The enpltal In;estment Plan C. soviet Investment Cateories 1. Above-limit 'Investments 2.. Below-limit Investments 3. _c_ra-lim:It Investments 4. Capital Repirs 5. Nonproductive Investments 1 3 6 D. The Sourcee for Fin%ncing Capital Investments 16 E. Tie Distinction between Centralized End Noncentralized Investments 29 Fart. II: Soviet Invostrlents 1924-1951 36 A. Total Investments by Major Components 36 Table 1: Total Investments I.:. the Socialist Sector, 1923/4-1951 Table 2: NonCentralized and Total Investments for Selected Years 39 Table 3: Constructdon Expenditures and Total Centralized Investments for Selected Years 41. Table 4: Gross Investment ii-id LvestnA in Fixed and Working Capital for Selected Years . 44 Table 5: The Rate of Investment for selected bars 49 50 P. Investments by Major Sectors of the Eeoaomy Table 6: Ca.4ta1 Investments by Sectors of the ,;ocialist Economy 1923/4-1950 52 Investments by Mor Sectors of the Economy with ?Nonproductve" inestments Eliminated from the EcOnomic Sectors 54 Table 7: "NonprotAuctiven Investments by Econo:nic Seetors, 1923/4-1950 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4 0 1E01 II Ilimmoimommumm ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 A22.ssIlx ? Table 8: Capital Investments by Sectors of the Socialist Economy, 1923/4-1950 ("Nonproductive" Investments Elitidnated from the Economic Sectors). 53 D. Investments by Various Branches of the Economy 59 Table 9: Investments in Industry and in Group .1% Industry, 1929-1942 Table 10: Investments by Industrial Nin15r1es, 1929-1941. Table 11: Investments by Principal Branches of Industry, 1929-1950 60 66 Table 12: Investments by Principal Pranches of 4ricu1ture, 1928-1950 63 Table 13: Investments in Railroad Transport, Total Transport and Industry, 1929-1950 70 Table 14: Housing Construction and Total Investmerts, 1929-1950 Tae I: Table II: Table III: Table IV: Table V: Capital Investments by Periods from 1923/4-1927/8 to 1946-1950 Capital Investments by Jectora of. the National Econov from 1924 to 1934 Capital Investments. by Sectors of the National Economy from 1933 to 1937 Capital Investments in Socialist Agricultural Enterprises from 1928-to 1935 Capital Investments by Sectors Of the National Economy from 1933 to 1938 91 rui 70 102 111 Table VI: Total Investments, Investments from the Budet, and Budget Financing of the National Economy from 1933 to '1951 117 VII: Extra-lirdt Investments, Capital Repairs, and Collective Farm Investments from 1929 to 1951 133 Table VIII: Capital 'Investments, Capital Repairs, and Housing Construction by Ministries and Department in t:le 1941 Plan ? 154 Table IX: Capital Instments by Sectors 3f the National , -11,-..c'ed Years ail-Ice 1937 . _ 14,1 Capital Investmen!,s by Elnistries and Der,;art, Juefrcz. 1929 to 1941 167 ' STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1.1 ?? I ? ? # ? ? OW, ??1 ? ? . Tablr? X-A: Comparison of, .5ector and Ministry Preakdowns of Capital Invet7,tment5 Tablo XI: Nonproductive Inm;tiloLts by M.thistries %nd DepartmenA for 3econd Five Year Plan, ?1935 Plai:, 176 Plan and 1941 Plan Tata XII. . Capita:2. Inve.!;tlionts by Priiicipal Pranchvs of the Lemony fr.: 1.929 to 1950 199 . .11-11-11 KIM Total Inves'.,7%ent.s In '.3ociiillst. :;ector of tne Econo:v from 1.927)-392:1 t,0 1951 215 Table XIV: Cayltal Invostmts Ly 3ector3 of Lhe Eewiot.5, from 1923-1924 to 1950 21.8 Tale XV: Capital Inveritments Ly 3ectorl of tl'.e Ecolomy . (with Nonprt,luctive Inve.ztiAel:ts alminated from the Ecoamic 3ector) from 1925-1%4 to 190 221 PRE 177 3.71 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 CAPITAL INVESTKENTS IN THE sour JNIONJ 1924-1951 r r Introduction The present paper is the first of four papers on Soviet capital formation. All will consider investments in fixed capital exclusively. In the present paper, I will be concerned only with investment flows in current rubles. Later (and shorter) papers will discuss: (1) Soviet data on the value of capital stock; (2) deflators for, and the deflation of, the investment series; and (3) international comparisons of the rate and direction of investment. The present paper consists of two parts and an appendix. In part I,I will discuss those conceptual and organizational aspects of Soviet capital forma- tion which are prerequieite for understanding and interpreting the Soviet data. In part II, I will summarize the basic data on annual investments. I will present: (1) annual investments by major components--i.e., centralized investments, extra-limit investments, collective farm investments, and capital repairs; (2) annual investments by major sectors of the economy?i.e. industry, sericulture, transport, communications, trade, and social-cultural services; and (3) annual investments by scattered branches etr s. the economy?e.g. ferrous metallurgy, railroad transport, housing construction. I will leave to the appendix a detailed statement of: (1) the data and sources on Soviet investment flows; (2) the reasons for particular interpre- tations of the data; and (3) the bases for specific estimates and extrapolations. The appendix consists of a series of tables for each of which there is a statement of sources and a set of notes; references to the appendix will be by table number and note. As a study of Soviet capital formation, the present paper is substantially incomplete. It contains estimates which will be checked, and gaps which will be filled, by later papers. Even fairly obvious international comparisons are postponed until the subject is examined syntemAtinAlly. nn 1111LimMil_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .17 ..? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ??? r ? of investment choice and on pcvapects for future developments, attention should be directed to "The Choice Among Investment Alternatives in Soviet Economic Theory," STAT STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , Ii_lelLsutual and Orilnizational As ,ects of Soviet Cedtal FormAtion age In the present section I will discuss in turn: (1) the Soviet concept of cepital investment; (2) the capital investment plan; (3) the various investment categories--above-limit expenditures, below-limit expenditures, extra-limit expenditures, capital repairs, nonproductive investments; (4) the sources for financing capital investments; and (5) the distinction between centralized and noncentralized investments. Most of the matters to be discussed will be definitional and institutional in nature. One major point of substance which emerges is the existence of a rather surprising sphere for decentralized investment decisions. A. The Soviet Concept of Capital. Investments The Soviet concept of capital investments (kapitallnye vlozheniia) includes: (1) construction; (2) assembly of equipment; (3) purchase of equipment and implements; (4) desizn, geological, and prospecting work connected with a given object of construction; (5) land betterment, irrigation, and drainage; (6) formation and replacement of draft and productive livestock herds; and (7) certain expenditures not connected with an increase of fixed capital. In comparison with current United States practice, the major item of difference is the Soviet inclusion of a part of expenditures on livestock as investments in fixed capital. Since the uee of livestock for draft purposes is considerable in the Soviet Union and virtually nonexistent in the United States the Soviet inclusion of expenditures on the acquisition of draft livestock would seem to be justifiable from the viewpoint of international comparison. On the whole, the Soviet category of capital investments represents ? ...t STAT 17. Productive livestock (produktivnyi skot) consists of livestock bred and kept for milk, hides, meat, wool and other products. Cf. 3. V. Sholtte, Kurs sellskokhoziaistvennoi statistiki (Agricultural Statistics Couree), Gosplanizdat, Since the concept of fixed capital in agriculture excludes adult animals being fattened exclusively for slaughter, it may be concluded that expenditures on such activities are excluded from capital investments. Cf. Slovart- s ravochnik pototsi o-ekoLo aghps. (ary.12.142.tioz, 2ajocial-Economic Statistics Gosplanizdat 1948, pp.. 8- 47. Even with the exclusion of expenditures on adult liVestock being fattened for slaughter, not all the remaining expenditures on livestock are reported as investtents in agriculture. ,Cf. Table I, note Table IV., ..notes 1, 4, :and 6; Table V, note 2. (References to the appendix tsbles .are of three L: (a) Table I--the reference is to Table I; b Table I, note 1--the reference ' is to note 1 to Table 1; (e) Table I .and note 1--tne reference is to Table 1. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , STAT Page 2 what we ordinarily think of as Investments in fixed capital. Constructioncludes: (a) the erection, expansion and reconstruction of buildings, mines, dame, roads, bridges, blast-furnaces, etc.; (b) the erection of electric power transmiesion and communications lines; (c) the assembly of metal constructions; (A) the laying of found i.ons for buildings and.equip- ment; (e) the preparation of land for construction?the felling of trees, the demolition ef buildings, etc.; (f) landscaping the building site; (g) the irrigation and drainage of land and other land improvements; (h) various kinds of mining work which are not part of the operating expenses of existing enterprises--the driving of mine shafts, the drilling of oil wells; (1) capital repairs to buildings, mines, dams, etc. The asseisbly of equipnent includes the assembly and installation of technical and power equipment. Assembly expenditures are a separable category only when the assembly work is performed by a special assembly or installation organization. Otherwise assembly expendituree are included in the cost of equipment. Construction plus assembly expenditures are called "pure construc- tion" (chietoe stroitellstvo). r,iquipment includes technical, power, hoisting and transport machinery-- machine tools, prime movers, turbines, locomotives, railroad cars, airplanes, autamobiles, tractors, agricultural machinery, ccnstruction machinery, boilers, pumps, laboratory equipment, shop and experimental installations, and medical and hospital cabinets. Implements include hand tools, measuring and testing instruments, tables, desks, lamps, office equipment, fire-fighting equipment, in, wooden, and metal packaging, and technical libraries. Implements, the value of which is less than ea) rubles or the life of which is less than one year, are excluded from the purchase of equipment and implements. Expenditures not connected with an increase of fixed capital include, enong unspecified others: (a) geologic and prospecting expenditeres which are not connected with specific objects of construction; (b) expenditures on the training of labor cadres for enterprises under construction; (c) expendi- tures on the support of the management of enterprises under construction. soviet sources recognize that such expenditures arc not strictly investments in fixed capital. Their inclusion is justified by the institutional practice of including such activities in the estimate of costs of construction and of financing such activities out of grants for capital construction. It should be emphasized that not all of the expenditures on geologic and prospecting work nor on the training of cadres are included in capital investments. The budgetary category of operational expenditures (22.2aIgam_aglialz) is defined to include: (a) expenditures on the training of cadres for economic organizations; (b) expenditures on scientific research; (c) expenditures on geological surveys; (d) prospecting expenditures; and (e) expenditures on experimental measures. Athin the budgetary category of "financing the national economy," operational expenditures constitute an expenditure which is in addition to financing capital investments. (Cf. V. P. Dliachenko, Fillaa-1.1=11.10-1L-LleIlDaa9AL.P1,1-Gosfinizdat 1948, PP. 404-- 405). Where such items are included seams to depend upon how they are financed. It should be noted that one Soviet source states: "At the present time, expenditures for preparing an enterprise to start production and for the actual initiation of production (pyskovye expenditures) are not included in the volume of capital work. These expenditures must be provided for in the financial plans of the various enterprises in accordance with provision for their basic activity." (L. Kantor, clamp fondy_mmyshlennosti i ikh ispollzovanie?FixedCaitalofIrtaGoslenizdat 1947, p. 91.) Precisely what expenditures are so treated is, however, unspecified. For a discussion of expenditures included in capital investments, cf: Slovart-spmatnik 22_EIIIIIIE2:,ekonomicheskoi statistike, pp. 248-250, 355-358; D. Savinskii, Kura ro shlennoi statistiki Industrial 3tatistics Course), Gosplanizdat 1949, pp. 2.7-271; M. Dliachkov and V. Kiparisov, Uchet kapitallnogo stroitellstva (The Weeletiee ee A.--k 40 ..... . .. - a1iti7ed Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I Page 3 In Soviet statiatical practice capital investments (kapita11111112Ehenlia), capital work (2211114110.1A1221,2) and capital construction (hadallaas 2/ stroiteltstvd) are used synonomously. I will use "construction" in the usual more restricted sense. B. The Capital Investment Plan The capital investment plan is an integral part of the national economic plan. The capital investment plan includes: (1) the total volume of capital work; (2) the breakdown of capital expenditures by (a) type of work, (e.g. new construction, expansion, restoration), (b) branch of the economy, and (c) regions; (3) the volume of new fixed assets to be put into service; (4) the amount of financing necessary for capital work; and (5) the itemized lists of projects. The volume (obtem) of capital work includes all capital expenditures STAT 11 4 regardless of whether the object of expenditure is put into service in the 4, 1/ accounting periou or not. The volume of capital work is stated in terms 2/ D. Savinskii, op. cit., pp. 270-271; M. Dliachkov and V. Kipar sov, opecit., p. 6. EXcept where otherwise noted, the subsequent discussion of the capital Investment plan is taken from L. Kantor, oppcit., Pp. 89-101. V M. Dliachkov and V. Kiparisov, op.oit. p. 28. . npriaccifien in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ?1..) LI 0 I .62/ of estimate (smetnye) irices. From 1937 to 1946, the estimate prices on construction and assembly expenditures were the prices in effect on December 1, 1936, and the estimate prices on equipment were the listed (olifklmalayt) 2/ prices of 1937, By A December 13, 1946, decree of the 1.133R Council of The use of estimate prices is prescribed in the process of project-making Expektirovanie) in investment planning. Construction (in the narrow sense) without project-making is prohibited except for nail reconstructions of buildings and shops. The basic task of projectHmaking is "to justify the necessity and the technical-economic possibility oi constructing a given object with a specified capacity in a given place and in a specified time" (Kantor, 91411., p. 84). The starting point for project-making in industry is the planned task (z1241222Lzap111.2) which is worked out by the chief adsinistration of the ministry and sent to a project-making organization. The planned task for an object of capital construction includes: (a) the planned capacity of the enterprise to be constructed and perspectives for its future expansion; (b) the basic kinds of output of the enterprise; (c) the expected consumers of its output; (d) the region of construction; (e) the planned construction period; (f) a tentative cost of construction. Proceeding from the planned task, the project-raking organization works out a technical-economic project which specifies the details of construction and the indices of the normal operation of the enterprise. Two stages in this process--the project task (aroektnoe zadanie) and the technical project and estimate (tekhnicheskii mi.roekt srg.773.77distinguished by decree but L n practice arc frequently combined. The project task simply re-states thc planned task in greater detail. The technical project is the basic codument fer each object of construction. It solves the basic technical and economic questions; it eliminates alterna- tive variants of construction. The technical project contains: (a) the general design of the enterprise; (b) a statement of its requirements in terms of traAsport, power, water supply, labor force, etc.; (c) a calculation of the factory cost of the output of the enterprise and of its requirements for circulating capital. Attachsd to the "technical project" must be an estimate of construction which states the required expenditures of materials and labor for the construction .project as a whole and for its various components. The prices of materials (including equipment) and labor used in the estimate are the so-called estimate prices. Once the project has been approvedby the appropriate authority, the project-making organization works out the blueprints according to which tPe construction will be effected. The foregoing account of project-making is taken from Kantor, op.cit., pp. 84-87, and Wiachkov and Kiparisov, op.cit., pp. 16-19. 7/ statistike, p. 360. I have been able to find no references to the use of estimate prices (in the sense of a set of prices which are not current .prices) prior to the use of 1936-37 prices. I assume, further, that Third Five Year Plan references to 1936 prices are elliptical references to these estimate prices. I have, accordingly, referred to 1936-37 prices where soviet sources refer to 1936 prices (Cf., for example, Table I). STA ; El Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release .@ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 roved for Release 9 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 '1,41:4.4,606.1444kihimww?i lanisters, the estate prices were changed to those prices which prevailed on December 31, 1945. On January 1, 1949, the government decreed that estimate ivices were to be current prices; this practice has continued through 1950. The amount of financing necessary for capital work may be greater than cr less than the volume of capital work. t1ny difference between those two magnitudes is due to: (a) a difference between estimate and current prices; (b) planned changes in construction costs; (c) a difference between expenditures 2/ in an accounting period and investment expenditures in that period. Ath respect to the last difference, an enterprise may plan to purchase supplies of materials in a given accounting period which will be used for construction r:xtivities in a later period. amilarly, planned construction in a given period may use supplies purchased in a previous period. It is pe2fectly true that for a given object of construction such differences will cancel over the construction period. It is, nevertheless, also true that if the volume of construction is steadily expanding, if the materials time lead rains constant, and if the only cause for a difference between the amount of necessary financing and the volume of capital work is the difference between expenditures and investment expenmtilres, the amount of necessary financing will continue to exceed the volume of capital work. An important part of the capital investreent plan is the itemized list of investment projects (titulive spiski). Here the projects are enumerated ET-7. Dliachkov and et al, Creanizatsiia (The Or.anization of p. 79. 2/ In addition to Kantor, oo.cit., pp. 89-90, op.cit., pp. 27-8. V. Kiparisov, p. 19 footnote 1; N. N. aovinSkii finansircvaniia i -xeditovanklaaapitalln-kh viczhenii Ca ital investment Finances_ and anT Gosfinizdat 1951, cf. Dtiachkov and Kiparisov, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043Roo25oniqnnn9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .?. Page ? 12/ individually with detailed information about each. In the published 1936-- plan, the itemized list of "the most important" investment projects occupied 11/ 85 out of 253 pages of statistical, data. g.L.J21.121.11IPARSLIELIVELIS Soviet practice distinguishes three kinds of investment projects: (1) above-limit (sverkhli4Laze) investments; (2) below-limit (r1Littline) investments; and (3) extra-limit (xailialitt) investments. 1. Above-limit investments are those the cost estimates of which 11g/ exceed or equal specified amounts, established by the Council of Ministers and differentiated by branch of the economy. The limits are high in relation to 11/ the costs of even expensive items of equipment; it seems clear that only 0 Such information includes: (a) designation and location of the project; h) date of initiation and completion of the project; (c) date and authority of approval of technical project and estimate; (d) planned capacity; (e) estimated cost of the project; (f) work performed prior to the beginning of the plan year; (g) plan of capital work and expenditures for the plan year. 11/ State Planning Commission of the USSR, y42:Etno.._...sh2L,i.ti-l2A_pl.stvenx_Lania 122Lmi (National Economic Plan for 12L), Moscow 1936, pp. 558-643. Ila,/ For, simplicity, I refer to "ministries" and "councils of ministers" for the entire period rather than to the pre-1946 designations of "commissariats" and "councils of proplesf commissars." ly Examples of the limits are as follows (in millions of rubles): I. Industry 1. Coal enterprises 3.0 2. Petroleum refining 4.0 3. Nonferrous metallurgy enterprises 4.0 4. Ferrous metallurgy enterprises 5.0 5. Enterprises of basic chemicals industry 3.0 6. Electric power plants 5.0 7. Enterprises producing machinagirand electrical equipment 3.0 8. Textile enterprises 3.0 9. Meat processing enterprises 3.0 10. Other branches 0.5 - 3.9 II. Transport and communications 1. Stations and terminals 3.0 2. Automatic blocking equipment 3.0 3.. Auto repair shops and garages 141 4. Airfields . 2.0 5. Lilies of communication 1..0 1 ' Declassified in Part-SanitizedCoAptifol-IDrovec-Yr2013/09/06 : CIA-WIPiAP I V4 .? I WOO Al i 4 ? A ST) ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Footnote 12/ continued; III Agriculture 1. Irrigation and land betterment investments 2.0 IV. Trade and Procurement 1. Stores and warehouses 1.0 Page 7 V. Social-cultural , 1. Housing and social-cultural construction 2.0 (Finansirovanie stroitellstva?Financing Construction?a collection of decisions and decrees, Gosfinizdat, 1948, pp. 40-43. The complete list of limits is stated in this source.) The indicated limits are those which were established in 1934. The current limits are higher; a later source states the limits to be 10 million rubles for ferrous metallurgy enterprises, 5 million rubles for machine- building enterprises, 3.5 million rubles for housing, hospitals, sanatoria, 5 million rubles for irrigation and land betterment investments (Rovinskii et al., op.cit., pp. 51-2). ? These limits should be compared with the following examples of expensive' items of equipment from recent 3oviet price books& Item Boiler Hydro-turbine with metal helical frame Electrolyzer Three-Phase Induction Motor Heavy-Duty Coal Cutter with Feed Control by Steps Centrifugal Artesian Pump Brief Description Price 230 tons/hr. 1400 PSI 3,000,000 rubles Diameter of working wheel-1200 milli- meters; capacity-4000-8000 kilowatts; weight-40 tons. 540,000 rubles Obtains hydrogen and oxygen by decom- posing water with electric current; diameter--800 millimeters; length--3897 millimeters; weight--7702 kilograms; obtains 25 cubic meters of 'Irdrogen and 12.5 cubic meters of oxygen per hour. 132,000 rubles Voltage-6000; speed--750 RPM; power-- 1000 kilowatts; weight-9300 kilograms. 130,000 rubles Speed of cutting chain--1.9 meters per second; width-740 millimeters; height-- 400 millimeters; weight-3500 kilograms; length on descent--5200 millimeters (with 2 meter bar). Capacity-880 gals. per minute; head-- 100 meters; speed-1450 RPM; power-130 HP; 5 wheels; pump diameter-333 millimeters; weight-12,000 kilograms. 49,000 rubles 59,000 rubles Cf. USSR Ministry of Machine-Building, m_htsPreiskurtotolanennakhinicheskoe 4 standartnoe oborndovanie. (Price-list of Wholesale Prices on Standard Chemical uient) 1949 p. 39, and Preiskurant o to kh teen nsulkatjElla (Price- list of Wholesale Prices on Hydro-Turbines 1949 p. 9: 22E1m9halls_22 elektroizmeriteltn-m I radioizmeritellnvm priboram (Handbook on Electric and Radio Meaaurin Instruments,, 1940; USSR Ministry of Coal Industry, Freiskurant oetovykh teen na garnye mashiny I obordovania (Price List of Wholesale Prices fochi....}2,07 and k:21.1122E1), 1949. Ur. ? STA , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-0104:1Rnn9nniannno 52 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 :41P Footnote la/ continued: It should be noted also that whether investments are above-limit is not solely a matter of costs. Thus: (1) in industry, the construction of new enterprises or new shops in existing enterprises which are to produce new kinds of output is above-limit regardless of cost; (2) all new railroad construction, railroad electrification projects, new river and sea ports, and new airlines are above-limit regardless of cost; (3) all new machine-tractor stations and state farms are above-limit; (4) all new water supply syst,..as, sewage systems, trolley systems; and municipal power stations (with a capacity of at least 500 kilowatt hours) are above-limit (Finansirovanie strOitellstva, pp. 41-42). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? - '.?.--";,^:?"-";:,-; " 4?\ major pro can qualify as above-limit investments. In any case, aboveii - limit projects must be approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. The itemized lists of above-limit projects are drawn up by the ministries of the USSR and by the union republic councils of ministers. The lists are approved by the USSR Council of Ministers "on the basis of the conclusions of the State Planning Commission and the U3SR Ministry of Finance." (Kantor, 224.211t, p. 98.) The technical projects and estimates are approved by the appropriate ministry and also, since July 1, 1950, by the State Committee on Construction Affaire (a committee attached to the U33R Council of Ministers) In the case of all projects other than civil municipal construction projects. Technical projects and estimates for the latter (including housing, communal services, and cultural projects) are approved by the Ministry of Municipal Construction. (Kantor, 22121412j p. 98; Roviniskii et al., antailts p. 670 The formation of the State Compittee on Construction Affiars (by decree of May 9, 1950) is apparently one of a number of connected changes in the organization of Soviet capital formation which allegedly arose from serious deficiencies in the economics and planning of investments. (Cf. B. Smekhov, "The Planning of Capital Work," Planovoe hozia1st7o, 1951 No. 4, pp. 82-90). 1. The chief tasks of the State Committee on Construction Affairs are to examine the technical projects and estimates which must be confirmed by the U3S:i Council of Ministers, to state its conclusions to the Council of Ministers, and to exercise control functions over the fulfillment by ministries of state decisions on project-making and construction. Sbornik zakonov S3SR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovno-o Soveta 33SR 1950 v.--Collection of Laws of the USSR and Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Surreme Soviet for 1950?Moseow 1951, pp. 13-14. 2. The State Committee also has responsibility for working out norms for construction work for preparing and approving "standard" projects in construc- tion work. (Rid.) It is not clear just what the latter means. 3. Beginning in 1951, project-making (proektnceizyskateltskie) expenditures are financed from the state budget and are no longer part of the investment plan. The objective, it is stated, is to economize such expenditures, more specifically to make the earnings of project-makers dependent on the economies in project solutions rather than on the magnitude of the cost estimate (Smekhov, on.cit., p. 85). 4. General dissatisfaction is expressed with respect to the costs of construction and the changes in construction organization are described as at effort to reduce construction costs. (Cf.: 3mekhov, ?pica.; F. Dobrynin and L. KvItni.tskii, tine the TmprneamAnt of ProjPnt-Egtimat.A Wnrk in Constric- tion," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1950 No. 6, pp. 45-57; B. 3oko1ov, "Certain Questions of the Economics of Capital Construction," opisy 1950 No. 10, pp. 17-28; F. Dobrynin and L. Kvitnitskii, "For the Further Improve- ment of the Organization of Construction and the Reduction in the Cost of Construction," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1951 No. 4, pp. 21-32.) 5. The distinction between centralized and noncentralized investments Is abandoned in 1951 and extra-limit investments were included in the invest- ment plans in 1949 and 1950 (Cf. below, pp. 33-34). . - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 7-- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release. @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06.: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 T v" ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? s? ? ? ? ? ??????1 I 1??? ? ? age STAT It ,should be noted, parenthetically, that there are two ways in which construction activities--.(i.e. "pure construction"--cf. footnote 2, p. 2)--are carried out: (a) the "economic method," in which the enterprise undertakes its own construction via a construction section with a separate accounting system and separate personnel; (b) the "contractual method," in which special .construction organizations (under a ministri of construction) undertake projects on contract with enterprises or other organizations. The contractual method predominates. 2. Below-limit investments are those the cost estimates of which are below the specified amounts. For such projects, the U33R Council of. Ministers establishes expenditures by individual branches of industry and not by individual projects. Itemized lists of such projects exist but are approved by individual ministries or by union republic councils of ministers. 3. Both above-limit and below-limit capital expenditures are planned po sotsialtno-ekonomicheskoi statistike, p. 360; Dliachkov. and KiLarisov: on.cite, ppe 1546. 1,./ Itemized lists of below-limit investment projects under union authority are approved by U33R ministries. The technical projects and estimates are approved: (a) by the chief administration of the mieiltry when cost exceeds 500,000 rubles; (b) by the trust when the cost is 100,000-500,000 rubles; and (c) by the director of the enterprise when the cost is less than 100,000 rubles. Itemized lists of below-limit investment projects under republic and local authority are approved by the union republic councils of ministers or by oblast executive comittees, depending on the cost of the ?proJect. The technical projects and estimates are presumably handled at a similar or lower administra- tive level. - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - AI ? ? 8.00 ? 01 centrally in the sense that, in the process of plan construction, the USSR Council of Ministers establishes such expenditures either by individual project or by aggregate expenditure for the industry (or other sector) branch. Extra- limit investments, on the other hand, are initiated in a decentralized way and are financed mainly from internal funds. Extra-limit investments include the following: (a) acquisition of inexpensive equipment and implements; (b) small construction and repair expenditures; (c) capital repairs to housing, hospitals, schools, etc.; (d) expenditures on construction and on the acquisi- don Of equipment and implements without cost limitations when financed from 1Y A brief statement of the process is as follows: "Approval by the government (in a tentative way) of the amounts (limits) of capital expenditures precedes the construction of the annual plans of capital expenditures by the ministries and departments. On the basis of this data, the ministries, the departments and the union republic councils of ministers, using planning materials received fram enterprises and construction organizations (drafts of itemized lists and other materials), work out the drafts of the plans of capital expenditures and present them for the approval of the USSR Council of :iinisters. The annual plans of capital expenditt''es, approved by the USSR Council of Ministers with repsect to each above-limit preject, are reduced by the ministries and departments to the appropriate constructions (with separate specification of the indices on housing construction). Umultaneously the ministries and departments distribute the appropriations, approved by the government, for below-limit investments among the chief administratione and the latter reduce the appropriations to each below-limit project (with ? indications of their specific parpcse)." (Rovinskii et al., ple.cit,., p. 54. Parenthetical remarks are Rovinskiits.) norinccifiprl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ay. ????????????ao.....aaaaaaa????? ???ea. ? 41...:?44...4 a** aa???????????? ana ??????????????a???? *am ???????????...?????? na??????????????? waammaaaa ? .??????????? ???? ? w.o, VA. .1.71 the director's fund; (e) expenditures by cooperatives on 'construction and '.equipaent of small new enterprises; (f) expenditures by regional authorities on the construction of new enterprises for the production of consumers! goods (with a cost limitation); and (g) all capital investments of collective amormalolaaallaalt....??????????????????????????41,011...1.11 STAT 12( The director's fund is created for any hhozraschet enterprise (ies0 roughly, an enterprise which is financially independent of the budget for current operations) which has fulfilled the state plans with respect to output (as a minimum) and costs (as a maximum). ..hterprisos in the most important branches of the naUonal economy pay 10:, of planned profits and 7.5,.: of above- plan profits into the director's fund; enterprises in other branches pay of planned profits and 25-50::, of above-plan profits. Enterprises with planned losses pay corresponding percentages of planned and above-plan economies fro the lowering of costs. Pe: law, the directoOs fund can be spent only on needs of the enter- prise. The following kinds of expenditures can be made by the director of the enterprise in agreement with the factory committee of the trade unions: (1 (2 construction and repair of housing; (3) premium payments to employees 3 expansion of production via construction or acquisition of equipment; other than the director; (4) "cultural? expenditures on construction and equipment of rest homes, clubs, nurseries; (5) extraordinary assistance to workers. (Cf. I. Ioffe, Elanirevanie roreshlenno.o roizvodstva--ilaszLani of Industrial Froduction--Gosplanizdat 19480 pp. 19-a. Formation of the director's fund was suspended with the outbreak of war in 1941 and was reinstituted in 1946. A similar fund, the fund of the chief of construction is created for construction organizations and for conetruction sections of existing enterprises; the percentages here are 2% of planned profits and 30% of above-plan profits. Cf. I. Iugin and V. Kaplan, ..a0 .t.,11.40 kapitaltnogo stroiteltstva na mashinostroitel/ h zavodakh (!lggli,aljg apj.tal Construction in nachine-Buildin Factories), 1949, pp. 101-105. .411 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , . 1 0 farms. The capital investments of collective farms, however, are reported 6,111,11.4 STAT Page 13 12/ More specifically, extra-limit investments include the following: a. In the case of existing enterprises and institutions, expenditures on the acquisition of equipment and implements costing up to 200 rubles per unit (for enterprises of the Ministry of Railroad Transport up to 500 rubles per unit); b. In the case of industrial and agricultural enterprises, expenditures on repairs and minor installations, including replacement and renovation of equipment, where the estimated cost does not exceed 5000 rubles per enterprise and the work is completed within a year; c. In the case of commercial and procurement enterprises and public catering enterprises, expenditures on acquisition of equipment and implements and on reconstruction of accammodatione uD to 5000 rubles a year (10,000 for enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev); d. In the case of transport enterprises, expenditures on small construc- tions, installations, and land improvements up to 10,000 rubles per enterprise; e. apenditures on construction and on the acquisition of equipment and implements without cost limitations when financed fram the director's fund or from profits obtained by the sale of consumers' Goods produced in salvage shops of existing enterprises--except that such expenditures by any enterprise cannot exceed the amount in the director's fund or the amount of profits received by the salvage shop; f. Expenditures on capital repairs of municipal and cooperative housing, of hospitals, schools, etc.; g. In the case of housing developments of industrial enterprises, transport enterprises, and state farms, expenditures on capital repairs provided that they do not exceed one-half the current amortization allowances of the given enterprise; h.xpenditures on rearing young livestock and on the acquisition of productive and draft livestock to replace livestock which have perished or have been sold; i. apenditures by local councils and social organizations on construc- tion for raur.icie?el services and for cultural purposes in regional centers and workers settlenents where the cost does not exceed 25,000 rubles per year per city or settlement and where the work is completed within a year; j. EXpenditures for the restoration of property destroyed by the elements to the amount of the insurance award or, in the case of uninsured state property, to the amount of the restoration cost of the property but not to exceed 100,000 rubles; k. apenditures by industrial cooperatives, cooperatives of invalids, and rural consumers' cooperatives on: (1) the construction of new small enterprises; (2) the acquisition of equipment with an estimated cost not in excess of 5,000 rubles for these enterprises; (3) minor construction work in existing =tee-prises; (4) the acquisition of equipment costing 10,000 rubles or less per artel or cooperative; 1. I]xpenditures by the union republic councils of ministers and the regional and city executive cermittees on the construction of enterprises to produce consumers' goods, building materials and fuel from local raw materials up to 50,C 0-00,00 rubles per enterprise (depending upon the regional authority involved); m. al capital investments by collective farms. Cf. UA Council of anistere decrees of Leptamber 19. 1935, and January 7, 1941, reproduced in ...?.21..tn.K.411.t...41.9A9.., pp, 166-162. number of minor categories of extra-limit investments have been excluded from the above list. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ?? ?? ? o? ? ?? ? ? ? ,???????? 61. ? ?.,t ??? ? STAT age separately in Soviet statistics. I will adhere to 3oviet statistical practice by henceforth excludinc collective farm Lnvestments from the category of extra-limit investments despite their legal kinship. The purpose of permitting extra-limit investments was, in the words of the decree which established the category, to simplify the method of inexpensive construction and repair work and of acquiring inexpensive equip- _ ment. It is probably evident from the foregoing list of extra-limit investments that they are not all small scale. This becomes even more evident when the authorization necessary for such investments is exemined. When the estimated cost of the investment project does not exceed 100,000 rubles, the investment elay be made by order of the director of the enterprise. For projects which cost between 100,000 and 500,000 rubles (1 millioe rubles for enterprises under the Railroad Ministry), the authorization of the chief administration of the ministry is needed. When the estimated cost of the project exceeds 500,000 rublen, authorization of the ministry?with a subsequent report of this fact to the U33R Council of Ministers or the appropriate union republic council of ministers, depending on whether it is a USA or union republic. 10/ tal lainistree--is needed. A noteworthy aspect of extra-limit investments and of the investments made by collective, farms is the sphere it implies for decentralized invest- ment choice and consequently for the production of some commodities, so to speak, or tYe, market. The magnitude of such expenditures will be discussed below, In the foregoing disceesion we have spoken of capital repairs as if this category were unambiguous. This, of course, Is not so. The line between p. 160. 12/ WA Council of Ministers decree of E22111111_q_al.L1ILT2A PP. 16:464. p}oects rubles 3eptember 130 1936? reproduced in In 1940, 40:;. of the extra-limit or more; cf. table VII, note 5. Cnnifiori r.nnv Anoroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? 1. capital and current repairs is, perforce, thin. In 3oviet usage, repairs embrace throe kimis of activities: (1) capital repairs; (2) avorage (or planned periodic) repairs; and (3) curront (or planned preventive) repairs. Capital repairs are relatively large scale renovating activities in which defeotive parts of a fixed asset are replaced--e.g., the replacement of heating system. The object of such activities is to restore the asset to full working power. If the object is to increase the working power of the asset, the activity is called not a capital repair but reconstruction (and is created like other investments and net like repairs). Average and current repairs are snaller scale activities devoted to the maintenance of fixed capital in normal working condition, provided for by plan and involving the replacement of small parts, the cleaning of machinery, etc. Current repairs are shop expenditures (i.e., part of operating expenses) tnd, as a rule involve no work stoppage--e.g., whitewashing a building. The distinctions between average (periodic) repairs, on the one hand, and capital and current repairs on the other, are the arbitrary factors. In practice, if the repair involves replacement of important parts or larger scale activities, the expenditure comes out of funds for capital repairs and is called a capital repair. If the repair involves replacement of a mall part of a machine or the ronlation or cleaning of a machine and if it is not very labor-expensive, the expenditure comes out of operating costs and 2:2/ is called a curfent repair. ;ince industrial (and other) enterprises typically make capital invest- ments in housing, clubs, nurseries, etc. as well as in fixed assets which tr.-e directly connected with their productive activity (and since statistical practice sometimes separates these kinds of investments) it is important to ifj -, ..1.0.--12221:ii.VOChnik DO sotsialino-ekonomicheskoj statistiki vim D aChkOV i;iparisov, ga.1.0 pp. A rriC fnr Release 50-Yr@i-13/?919-C-i-P111----RDP_81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 40 ? ? ? ?? ? e? ? 0, 1110.1 ? Page 16 STAT keep in mind the Sov::.et distinction between "productive" and "nonproductive" fixed capital. "Productive" fixed capital consists of the durable assets of industrial, agricu1tUral, transport, connunications, commercial and, supply enterprises including the office administrative and Warehouse promises of these enterprises. "Nonproductive" fixed capital consists of housing, hospital, school, municipal service and other constructions which are devoted to.the cultural and social needs and welfare of the population and to the needs of 21/ government administration. D. The .3ources for Financin: Ca ital Investments The Soviet economy finances its capital investments from many sources-- from budget grants, from various internal resources of economic organizations, from bank loans, from labor participation in kind. I will discuss each of these in turn. 1. The most important source for state (as vs. .cooperative) enter- prises and organizations is the budget. Budgetary grants for capital invest- ments, which need not be repaid, are reflected in the "financing the national econoMe category of the combined budget and also, to a. much lesser degree, in the "social-cultural measures" category. It should be not.Ad that . budgetary grant for an investment project does not necessarily imply that the project is above- or below-limit. For example, the budget may'grant funds for extra-limit investments or for capital repairs. 2. The profits of economic organizations are used to finance capital investments in at least' three ways: a. Part of planned profits is paid into f)le budget and is used as A source for general budget expenditures among which are expenditures on capital tr. 21/rCf ;lovarl-spravochnik_12_Rat2ialfno-ekonomicheskoi statist iki 359- )0; Machkov and Kiparisov, op.cite, p. 4. aa/ nkov and Kiparisov, ep.cit., pp 274-275. ay Cf below, p. 22. PP? npr.lassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 41.4'4;mi:hag, Page 17 investments. Part of above-plan profits is sixtilarl,y paid into the budget. . b. Part of planned and above-plan profits are left with tho enter- prise for planned expenditures on, among other things, capital Investments. ". least 10Z: of planned profits and of above-plan profits not paid into the divectorts fund must be paid into the budget. But the exact percentage which 13 paid into the budget depends upon the increments of working capital and the investments in fixed capital planned for the enterprise or chief administration (whichever is the accounting unit). Thus, apart from foll-ation of the director's fund and apart from whatever percentage of profits is left with the enterprise outside of the director's fund for its more or less unrestricted disposition, the distinction between profits paid into the budget and profits left with the enterprise is an accounting distinction only. To this extent, the distinction between financing investments from the budget and from enterprises' own resources is not a 'distinction of substance. c. Part of planned and above-plan,profits are left with the enter- prise in the form of the director's fund. such fund5 are used, in part, for "Lan ...4,m^14miehri extra limit investments and do represent a financial source for VA5UeLAV10.4WW. investment choice. 3. Amortization allowances represent a third source of investment funds. In c.)liriet practice amortization allowances are calculated for fixed capital in tho following branches of the economy: (a) industry; (b) transport; connunications; (d) trade and supply; (e) state rams; (f) municipal services; (g) housing. Known exausions are fixed capital in: (a) collective On payments fromirofits into the budget, ,cf. A. K. Suchkov, GosudarStvennye, body 33 (Jtate Incones of the 11331.1), Oosfin!.zdat 19454 PP. 85-94. . ag Cf, aboviii pp. 11.712 and footnote 17. The following constitute timilai firncil sources; (a) te fund .of the chief of Construction; (b) profits from the -production of consumers' goods by salvage shops of existing enter- prises. (Cf. footnotes 17 and 17a). . , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ? ? ? STAT ??? age farms and (b) macUne-tractor stations since 1938). Problematic are: .(a) which. elements of fixed capital are subject to amorti7ation allowances.; (b) whether prodacerst and consumers/ cooperatives need or do make allowances for ay amOrtization. In any case, the known exclusions indicate significant under5tat ement of capital consumption. The wortization rates are established by the government as percentages az/ of original cost,. In industry, transportation, communications, and municipal LiV I have been unable to find a complete list of elements of fixed capital subject to amortization allowances. For the known inclusions and exclusions Cf.: L. Bronshtein and B. 3udrin, r anirovanie uchet avtamobiltno o (Planning. and Calculating autamob.111-laaaRaft 0 Gosplanizdat 1942, pp. 168-170; N. I. Iltin, Duchgalterskii uchet v sovetskoi torgovle (Accountin- Calculation in Soviet Trade), Gostorgizdat 1949; pp. 311-314; I. A. Kalik et al., Buch-Alterskii uchet i kontrolt v khoziaistve sviazi (Accountin. Calculation and Control in the Communications Econamr Sviaztizdat 19)0, pp. 159-1u2; V. P. ilslakov et al., Ispmmuna1tno* khoziaistva ;L:conam7, Gosfinizdat 1948, pp. .:0-:2; I. I. Shkarednyi, "Social Funds and their 1,.o1e in Socialist ]xpanded Reproduction in Collective Fanns," an essay in msaulliAlk (Scientific !Totes), published by the Acadaw of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, volume 13, 1937, P. 46', ',Molts, on.cit,., pp. 159-160i N. G. Vinnichenko, FingLairovanie zheleznykh dora, (The Financing of 'Ailroads), Transzheldorizdat 1946, Pp. CO-64;SloagLq2.rardAsotsaatno-ekomtnicheskd,Y2a...M_._-.1...------......-..-Ag4Jagap p. 247. On the problematic factors: (a) I suspect that in general, in sectors wtere amortization is calculated, the elements of fixed capital included are the usual ones--at least I have no evidence of any raaarkable exclusions; (b) I suspect that cooperatives do allow for amortization since the accounting system of the cooperaVves is prescribed by state law and sincenTsentrosoluzn (the central consinerst cooperative organization) apparently does establish amortization allowances for its constituent organizations (Cf. Iltin, p. 311). In the case of housing, amortization rates are not established by law but in practice the following rates are used: (a) for brick and stone houses-- (b) for wood houses--2. Both percentages are of the replacement value in 1939-1940 prices. Easlakov et al., on.cit 41, sr n . II. No allowance is made for obsolescence on the grounds that in the Soviet econany no loss is involved in the replacement of old machinery due either to technical improvements in the machinery or to technical improvements in machine building. The idea is that machinery will be replaced only if it is advantageous from a national economic point of view and, even if replaced, will find use in same other enterprise. Consequently, the only depreciation considered is use depreciation. Kantor,22421t.11 , nfp T14 ,1 . NMI ee Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release , 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , M!1 11,1 ?? I I services, the rates are said to be calculated on the basis of a straight- line depreciation formula. A decree of the Suprelle Economic Council ftabad ..;&p.I.,54110.124walhala) of the U32 in 1930 established deo The formula is as follows: 100 (C IZ - r.)) ?, OM ToC where A re amortization rate (as a percentage of original cost), C original cost, ,4 cepital repairs expected over the life of the asset, 3 scrap value of the asset, T el period of expected service of the asset. (Kantor, 22424., p. 47; l'aslahov et al., p. 19.) It should be noted that: (a) The formula is decidedly unelf.arsi.st. Marx thought of constant capital gradas)ly transferring embodied labor to output. Soviet practice makes depreciation a function of time rather than output. (b) The fonaula indicates that the period of service of fixed assets cannot be deduced by taking the reciprocal of the amortization rate. (c) Kantor observes that frequently in industry fixed capital items continue in service beyond the period in which accumulated amortization allowances equal original cost. The amortization allowances, however, are continued on the grounds that original cost which is used as the basis for amortization allowances lags behind current prices and the continuation of amortization serves to reduce this gap. The only exception to this practice is the case of oil wells where amortization ceases when accumulated amortization equals original cost. In the case of oil wells, however (as also in the case of certain other elements of fixed capital associated with rapidly exhaustible mineral resources), the period of service of fixed capital is not the physical life of the asset but rather the economic life of the oil supply. Since, after 6-7 years further extraction of oil becomes unexpedient in the Soviet view and the well is abandoned, the period of service of oil wells is calculated at 6-7 years ever though the physical life of the well is far greater. Cf. Kantor, op.cit., p. 41; L. Kantor, Amortizatsiia I remont v proewshlennosti S3SP. (Amortization and Re irs in U3Sil Indust 1940, p. 23. (d) Kantor mentions the existence of other methods of calculating amortization but does not specify them and refers to the indicated formula as the most widely used eta as used in industry. (Kantor; psnovnye foryty. p....srsoetiroeenn Ijh noltzovanie. p. 47.) 3holts, however, indicates that in the case of stale farm agricultural machinery, the amortization allowance is based on the units of work performed by the machine in the given year in comparison with the number of units of work the machine is expected to perform throughout its life. (Lholts; op.cit ., pp. 159-160.) STA Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Rnn9cnn1onnno_Q Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 20 amortization rates which were differentiated by type of fixed capital and by the number of shifts worked. The main deficiencies of the 1930 decree were stated to be:. (a) that the subsequent rise in prices made the amortiza- tion allowances inadequate for replacement of fixed capital; and (b) that no 22/ specific sums were designated from the amortization funds for capital repairs. To rome4y these and other inadequacies, a new decree was pranulgated for industry by the USSR Council of Ministers in 1938. The 1938 decree provided: (a) specific average amortization rates by ministries (Which for most ministries were higher than the previous actual rates); (b) specific average percentages of waortization allowances to be used for capital repairs; (c) that ministries could differentiate ,oth amortization allowances and capital repair funds by chief administrations and that the chief administrations could do the same by a2( Cf. Kantor, Amortizatsiia i remont v ro shlennosti 336R pp. 82-85, for 1930 amortiTation rates for state enterpr ses. . 22/ Kantor, Osno-fire fond,' nro.-snle;Lnosti i i'rh isi,NsiltzovaLie, p. 39; Kantor, Amortizatella i ramon; v --Tor7sh1e::losti 363R, 1?. 49. The minis:i estdaLlished allowances for capitu repairs by chief 2(1,r;niqtrations: the latter did the sATP by entAroriqeq. The:. AllmonnAR were established withott attention to the amount of amortiTation funds, 21/ No attempt will be made in this paper to describe amortization practic:e or rates for all sectors of the economy; Industry is regarded as an example, the representativeness of acu is 'assumed. STAT ial, 1" MINI Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 age la/ enterprises. The enterprise still uses the 1930 rates for the various types of fixed capital and, if necessary, corrects the total by adding a sum sufficient to meet the average allowances required by the chief administration. The director of the enterprise has disposition over the funds for 22/ 1111011 ?? ? ? .1 capital repairs. 2ven if funds arc unused in the current year, they remain with the enterprise; only in exceptional cases can the chief administration transfer funds to other enterprises within the chief administration. apenditures, however, must be approved by the chief administration. On the other hand, the remaining portion of the amortization allowances are made available to the The averages established for the ministries must, however, be adhered to. The amortization allowances, as percentages of original cost, are: Mtniqtri Rate Heavy Industry 5.6 nachine-Building Industry 5.5 Defense Industry 5.5 Timber Industry 6.0 Light Industry 5.5 Food Industry 6.0 (Kantor, ortizatsiia rnot sh1epji 3SJ, 13. 530 The capital repair funds, as percentages of amortization allowances, are: Percentage of amortization allowance 4inxisti7 Heavy Industry 43 Nachine-Building Industry 40 Defense Industry 47 Timber Industry 50 Light Industry 65 Food Industry 46 Kantor, 2a111., p. 53. Kantor observes that the percentage is highest in light industry because of the predauinance of old equipment and lowest in machine building because of the predominance of new equipment. (Kantor, Ltial-01211z.armagennotti i ikh isDollPgYarde, p. 57.) For railroads and subsidiar7 enterprises, the amortization allowances are 4.7% of original cost, of which 64'; is designated for capital repairs. (Vianiehenkos p. 64.) For state farms, the amortization allowances are 7.2% of original cost except that no amortization allowances are applied to draft and other livestock. (P. A. Khromov, Amortizataiia v ro: shlennosti 3J3P.--Amortization in USSR Industry--0 1939, p. 95. For amortization rates differentiated by chief administrations within the Ministry of Light Industry, cf. Kantor, Amortizatsiiaierrinosti 333R, p. 76. Kantor, Osnovn e fond, .ro' shlennosti ikh is-)oltzovanie, pp. 51-53. The applicable rates for automobile e_ransport; however, were established in 194,r, (Finansirevaxiie stroite)stva. On January 1, 1950, new amort4:zation and capital repair rates were established for all ministries and departments (Rovinskii, et al., op.cit., p. 270). How the new rates compare with the old is not stated. In view of general comDlaints abo.A4 the inadeouacies of thA old ratpx And in Nriour , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 -f Page 22 ministry for financing investment projects of the ministry. Projects so financed must be part of the annual plan of capital work, approved by the Council of Unisters. Again, in the case of amortization allowances not used for capital repairs, the distinction between financing investments frau the budget and fram enterprises, own resources becames an accounting distinc ? - tion only. It should be noted also that not all capital repairs are financed from amortization allowances. As I have already observed, same capital repairs are extra-Unit expenditures. In addition, grants are provided by the budget for some categories of capital repairs--for repairs necessitated by war daelage and accidents, for repairs in seasonal industries (where, apparently, amortization allowances cease in off-seasons), and others. 4. The so-called indivisible funds (nedelireye fon of collective fanns constitute a third source of investment finance. The sources for financing investments in aEriculture deserve a special parenthetical remark because of institutional peculiarities in agriculture. State fanns are identical with other state enterprises; their capital investments are financed from the budget and from their own resources, Machine-tractor stations are (since 1938) budgetary institutions; all expenditures, including investment expenditures, are financed from the budget and all receipts are paid into the budget. Investments in collective farms, on the other hand, are financed almost entirely from two sources: (a) the resources of the collective 36/ farms; and (b) repayable loans from the Agricultural Bank. Va-kantor, pp e 3940. LI Kantor, 22,t911., pp. 34-36. 1Y The only exception would be those land betterment and irrigation measures Ilich arc financed from the budget. ' Cf. below, pp.. 25-28, for a brief outline of the institutions and the role of the L'oviet banking systen.. ? im,,,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: STAT 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002--8 The resources of collective farms to be used for capital investments 22/ are accumulated in the indivisible funds. Upon organization of a collec- tive farm, its indivisible fund is formed from: (a) part of the value of 2g/ the collectivized propel-ty of the collective farm members; (b) initial money paymenta, in lieu cf property, by collective farm members; and (c) the value of property given free of charge to the collective farm by the government. The most important source of annual incroments to the indivisible fund is the required deductions from the money incomes of the collective farms. Of annual money incomes, from 12 to 155 in grain regions, from 15 to 205 in regions of industrial crops and livestock production and not more than 15% in fishermen's collective farms must be paid into the indivisible fund. Other sources for annual increments, beyond the contributions of new members are: (a) suns received from the sale of surplus property of collective farms; (b) sums received from the sale of draft and productive livestock if these sums, in accordance with existing law and the decision of 1 general meeting of .he collective farm members, are not to be distributed among collective .farm members, are not to be distributed among collective farm members.; (c) receipts of insurance payments for damaged or destroyed property; (d) interest payments by the gricultural.Bank.on sums kept in deposit with the bank; (a) the value at' labor participation in the construction of collective farm buildings and equipment. Nally of the components of the indivisible pind are durable assets 22/ The indivisible fund is one of a number of collective farm nfundson established and reollated by law. The productive funds, in addition to the indivisible fund, are: (a) the seed fund; (b) the fodder fund. The seed and fodder funds are reserves in kind. There are also: (a) funds for social purposes (e.g. funds for aid to invalids and aged, the cultural fund, etc.); And (b) funds fur distributim according to labor days worked. Of. 6hkarednii, uticlk., pp. 40, 44. 12/ From 1 to 3/4 of the value of collectivized property is considered to be the share of the member and, in principle, an equivalent sum of moreov is nwitoo. 1,4.- J. neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ??? or ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?1?0?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? . S TAT valued in an unspecified way and, in general, not marketable. The li components, however, are kept on deposit with the Agricultural Bank and are used for investment expenditures. Those money resources may be used tenporarilv for other economic needs (e.g. purchase of seed or fodder) but such use must be authorized by a general meeting of the collective farm and must be reiubursed in $pecified time periods. Provided that the funds are to be used for investment expenditures, the Agricultural Bank is required to pay the funds on demand of the collective farm. It should not be thought that the category of investment expenditures financed fran the indivisible fund is restricted by cost or type. On the contrary such expenditures include the acquisition of agricultural machinery, equipment and means of transport, the construction of buildings for productive and nonproductive use, investment expenditures in draft and productive livestock, etc. 5. Collective farms also receive long-term loans, repayable with interest, from the Agricultural Bank for specified purposes, the most important of which are investment expenditures in livestock production. Such loans may be extended if: (a) the collective farm has observed the indivisible fund regulations; and (b) the collective farm has insufficient resources in the indivisible fund for the specified expenditure. The government exercises greater centrol over loan-financed investments because. USSR Council of Ministers approval of the annual credit plan of the Agricultural Bank implies general approval of the investment projects so financed. Loans from the Agricultural 127 According to the regulations of the agricultural artell collective farms must keep the none:r components of the indivisible fund with the Agricultural BanL. It is stated, however, that the Agricultural Bank cannot this practice but rather must use .tass organizational work," the provision of services, and an interest rate payment to persuade collective films to comply. (.invinskii et al., px.cit., p. 104.) I would expect that thi 'bass organizatiuLal trork? would be most persuasive, but complaints exist that some collective farms continue to resist. (N. N. Khmelev, Finansovoe hhozillia4a2201412;227-Financi4 :]conomv of Collective Farms-- 1911 0 p. If? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 = Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 NO 00 4 4, I. ? "*esk Page 25 Bank are l'epaid out of indivisible funds. The indicated role of the Agricultural Bank in collective farm investments raises a general question of the role of the MC% banking system in capital formation. A brief treatment of this question will reveal: (a) additional sources of investment funds; and (b) the mechanism of investment finance and control. A basic principle of Soviet finance is to separate the resources to be used for investment and those to be used for current expen,es. For example, an enterprise which undertakes its own construction (as against contracting the job with a construction organization) will create a construction section with its awn resources and accounting statements. This separation is achieved in general by concentrating resources in special accounts in the banking . system. The (LITZ banking system consists of the 3tate Bank (Gosbank) and four specialized investment banks. The investment banks are: (a) the Industrial Bank (rraubank), through which investments in state industry, electric power stations, transport, and industrial housing are financed; (b) the Agricultural Bank (Lmlikhozbank), through which investments in state farms, machine tractor stations, and collective farms are financed; (c) the Bank of Cammerce (122ELaaL), through which investments in trade organizations (both state and cooperative), producerst cooperatives, and supply organizations are financed; and (d) the Central Bank for Municipal Services (Tsekombank) through which investments in housing municipal services, and social-cultural construction are financed. The first three of the investment banks have regional branches. The last operates not through branches but through independent local banks for municipal services. STAT State Bank, among other things keeps the current accounts of hrd T m discussion of collective farm investments is taken frdm: Khmelev, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001900m_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 extends short-term credit to,economic organizations. The purposes for %hid such credit may be granted are rather strictly circumscribed and confined to working capital requirements. It is, of course, possible that the steady increase in the amount of State Bank credit outstanding way in effect be an indirect source of funds for financing capital investments. 44/ Budget grants for capital investmends are placed in the appropriate investment bank which then oversees the use of these funds for the purposes 43/ and in the amounts intended. That portion of profits which is not paid into the budget and is not intended for extra-limit expenditures is also segregated in the accounts of the appropriate investment bank. The portion of amortization allowances intended for capital repairs 13 kept in an enterprise State Bank account segregated for this purpose. The remaining portion of auortization allowances is paid into a ministry account 45/ of the appropriate investment bank. Funds intended for extra-limit expenditures are kept in the ordinary enterprise State Bank accounts if the cost of the intended object of expenditure does not exceed 100,000 rubles and All state khozrasshet enterprises and all cooperatives except collective farms are required to keep their free money resources in the State Bank. Collective fams may keep their money resources, except for the cash portion of the indivisible fund, in the State Bank or in the savings bank system, as they wish. Cf. Z. V. Atlas and E. I. Bregel,Denezhnoe obrashchenie kredit SSO. Clojely Circulation and Credit in the UlTa?osfinizdat -1947, p. 452. 42 The resemblance between Soviet credit principles and the "real bills doctrine" is very close. Compare Atlas and Brei...el. op.cit., pp. 292-339, and Lloyd Yints,sinr(Theo University ef=Chicago Press, 1945, pp. 1-38. 41/ Rovinskii et al., Ratall., 31ovary s ravochnik ? sotsiallno-ekonomicheskoi statistike. p. 415. 41/ fncY p. 40. The Kantor statement refers to industry only but presumably can be extended to other sectors. 46/ Budget (as vs. khczraschet) institutions and social organizations also have eu::ent accounts in the 3tate Bank. Funds intended for extra-liait expenditures are, with the cost linitation mentioned, placed in these accounts. I ?Ilaimmimmenms. j Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: ... Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 -??? Page 27 in the appropriate investment bank if the cost does exceed 100,000 rubles. we have seen, the indivisible funds of the collective farms are kept in Agricultural Bank accounts. In addition, the investment banks are independent sources of investment funds. All but the Industrial Bank extend long-term loans repayable with interest for capital investments. The Bank of Commerce extends long-term credits to producers, and consumers, cooperatives for capital investments. The Central Bank for Municipal Services, the local banks for municipal services, and the Agricultural Bank extends long-term loans to individuals for housing 22/ construction. The Central Bank for Municipal Service extends loans to enterprises for the construction of homes which will besold to individuals. The Agricultural Bank, as we have seen, extends loans to collective farms for capital investments and, in addition, to the rural poplation for housing construction and the purchase of productive livestock. . Finally, all the /77/Upliallaceja....sloittstvo pp. 163-4. 01 The interest intes charged by the investment banks for long-term loans are: (a) Central Bank for Municipal Services and local banks for municipal services--1; (b) Bank of Commerce-15; (e) Agricultural Bank--3; (d) on loans to individuals for housing construction (by banks other than the Agricultural Bank which charges 3)-4. Except for the last category, these interest charges are those in effect in 1936; the 25 rate is definitely a current charge. I have no evidence of changes in the rates. In addition, the investment banks pay 1.5 on balances of their clients accounts except for the Apricultural Bank which pays 3.5. Both rates were in effect in 1936 and the laciter is also the current charm. Cf.: Arthur 2. Arnold, LtalauSingt 34151120211 soviet itussia Columbia University Press, 1937; 1:ovinskii et al., op.cit,.., pp. 104, 321. h2/ Rovinskii et al., op.cit" pp. 311-312 319. IQ/ p. 3.11. 11/ Ibid. p.324. p. 19. The livestock is used for meat, dairy, and other products on the individual homestead. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0075nniannn9_p ...???? I . ? STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 inveoLment banks extend ehort-texr credits for the working capital needs of contract constmction organizations. The hauseheeping functions implied by this differentiation of accounts-- namelsr, to insure that funds are spent for the purposes and in the ammnts intended--are known as "control by the ruble." 6. There are, finally, two sources of labor contributions in kind which are used in investment activities: (a) by law, collective farm members and individual peasants must contribute labor services towards the building and rapair of roads; and (b) collective farm members contribute labor services in kind to construction activities, to land betterment and irrigation projects, and to the planting of perennial crops. Although neither category of services is caspensated, the contributions are periodically reported in value terns; the calculation is apparently produced by totslling the labor days so contributed a/ and multiplying by the standard wage per .labor day. 51/ Atlas and Bregel op.cit., p. 69. Cf. Uovart-s ravochnik o sotsiallno-ekonamichoskoi statistik pp. ,51, 308-9. a/ There are various sources of investment funds which may be lumped tosether on the grounds that little is written about them and, consequently, they may be presumed to be minor. 5uch are: (a) net receipts from the sale of surplus elements of fixed capital in operating enterprises (i.e. elements of fixed capital which have lost their productive significance for the enter- prise in question or which are to be sold ' decision of the government to cooperatives or collective farms); (b) receipts from the sale of surplus construction materials; (c) amortization allowances in construction organiza- tions; (d) receipts from the sale or scrapping of temporary buildings and equipment by construction organizations; (e) receipts fron the sale of tenporary or surplus construction machinery by construction organizations; (f) receipts from the sale of extractive output obtained as a by-product of construction activity; (g) planned profits and economies from cost reductions in construction sections of existing enterprises. Cf. i:ovinskii et al., cm._cit., pp. 91-93, for a brief discussion of these items. Items (b)-(f) are referred to collectively as the mobilization of the internal resources of construction." . These sources of investment funds are kept, largely if not wholly, in the appropria'se special bank. Ibid., pp. 100-102. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001900m_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co ? roved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 E. The Distinction between Centralized and floncentrelieed Investoents The foregoing discussion makes it possible, among other things, to approach . an understanding or the Soviet distinction between centralized and noncentralized investments. Centraiii;ed investments are defined as investments which "are provided for by the state plan of capital work and are confirmed by the USSR g/ Council of Ministers or by the union republic councils of ministers." The synonyms used for "centralized" ane "planned" and "limited" (i. . above- and below-limit). Noncentralized Investments are defined as investments which Jj are outside the state plan of capital work. Analytically, the distinction has a dual importance: 1. It is clear from an examination of Soviet data that announced 2/ "total investments" are usually not global totals. Sometimes the exclusions are explicit, but frequently they must be imputed. Jince the Soviet Union is not excessively given to an understatement of economic mzgnitudes; it is reesonable to suppose that statistical differences between announced and globe_ totals can be explained by institutional differences. Therefore, in order to estimate or explain, as the case may be, the statistical differences, it is important to understand the institutional differences. 2. The distinction between centralized and noncentralized invest- ments implies a sphere for decentralized investment choice the meaning of which is a conclusion Of substance about the Soviet economy. Noncentralized y the decrees on ex investments are identified with investments provided for 22/ tra-limit investments. Although 'Soviet statistical LIZT:TroTrt-s ravoctsotsialtno-ekonomicheskoi statistike 2/ Ibid., p. 372; Dliachkov and Kiparisov, op?cit., p. 15. 2/ Cf. Tables VI and VII and notes. 61ovIno-e1z2nor4chesimi statistike Dfiachkov and Kiparisov, p. 15. Pe 372. 1), 372; STA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: 01. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 a 'practice dtetinguislles between extre-limlt investments and collective farms/ investments the decree of 3eptember 19, 1935, proldded that all capital .(12/ investments by collective farms were to be outside the plan of capital work. In plinciple, therefore, noncentralized investment6 consist of extra-limit investments and collective farms1 investments. Their distinguishing feature is that they are initiated outside the investment plan procedure. This, however, does not necesearil imply that they are unplanned or that they are uncontrolled. The financie sources .for extra-limit and collective fame investments f?.1/ ere prescribed. The general ot;jects, and in mane cases their costs, for (22/. extra-limit investment are prescribed. The procedure for the deposit of funds intended for extra-limit and collective farmst.investmen s into the appropriate bank is specified; the banks, thus, can insure that the funds ere 0/ ? spent as prescribed. Finally, some extra-limit investments must be approved by the chief administration and others by. the ministry (with a report to the appropriate council of minister's); this depends upon the amount of the expendi-. ture. Althmeh noneeni-eeliTed investments tire ceitside the 4.4 -4.10 III IC.:r" are not neoessarily unplanned'. Thus, the financial plans of-enterprises,. 01' - ? include extra-limit investments. Similarly, ..he estimates of expenditures E7751177a7;77e77-77 13., footnote 17a, and pp. 44."4.4 'In 01 (1 Cf. above, !epA.1-14, 23-24. _2/ Cf. pp. 443 above and Table VII note 2. L/ Cf. above, pp. 26-27. Cf. above, _V. Cr. Table VI, note. 3. Cf. also S. M. Kutyrev, Analiz balansa dokhodov i raskhodov knoziaistvennoi organizatsii (Anal-sis of'the .Balance of Incomes and Easiditures of Economic OrLanizationS) ',34osfiniZdat 1948, pp. 10-11, 30-33. In the latter source, the financial plan is for a chief administration and includes both "extra-limit" investments (planned ard realized) and nnonpiannedil investments (realized only). The cnief administration appears to be. the. coordinating unit for the financial plans of enterprises which are not autonomous. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co.y A " proved for Release 1,u ? 4* 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ? 'S TAT For budget-financed organizations include extra-limit investments. Thus, it is possitle to find in Soviet sources planned extra-limit investment figures. It ie possible, also, to find in Soviet sources planned investnents t12./ by ccllective farms. Since collective farms' investments are predominantly from their own resources, I suspect tAAt these fizures are simply forecests, I2/ perhaps derived fro le collective farm income forecasts. The relevant points at the moment, are: (1) that the aforementioned contrels sieeply limit tee kinds and amounts of nonceetralized investments; and (2) that extra-limit and collective ferule' investments are not a part of and, are not cocrdinated with the investment plan. Therefore, the existence of extra-limit anl ccllective farms' investments leplies that a rouehly corresponding proportion of investment goods produced are produced, so to spealt, for tie market. Thus, in the organization of Soviet capital fcrmation there are at least three levels of "decentralized" investment choice: ? 4.) 1. Project-making organizations choose between investment variants which yield identical outputa in kind; the iteedzed lists of above-lindt projects are, however, approved by the USSR Council of Ministers and the itemized lists of below-liedt projects by USSR ministries or union republic councils of ministers. I.e., non-khozraschet organizations; cf. footnote 17, p. 12 above. (E/ Narodeyi kmisseriat finaneov Instruktsiiaaltu ychetu pa dboinoi sistcee v uchreelseniiakn sostoiashchikh na gosudarstvennom I mesemom biudzhetakh (Uz;sit Peoples ,;omelisseriat of Finances, Insturctions on pouole-Entr- Bookkee,ine for State :red Local Fudeet-Financed I;;Tret,73.71-s)7 Gosfinizdat 1e944, p. le. .(22/ Cf. Table VII. Cf. Table I. 22/ At the very lest,, tl:e discrepancy between plan and realization seems unusually large it; this sphere. Thus, in 193;3-39, collective farms' money investeeents were somet'ling like 50-1)0% of planned 1938-1942 collective farms, money investments. And in 19U-1947, collective farms, money investments were something like 35% of elannec 1946-1950 collective farm inveetments LIILIling labor contributions le kind. Cf. Table JII and note3 9-11. 21/ Cf. footnotes 6, 13, d 15 above. On the criteria for choice by project? TiaPers, cf. N. Kanlan, "The Choice Amone, Investment Alternatives in Soviet Eeeemeie Theory," M.539. It is there observed: (1) that the prevailing criterion is to minimize ';he ccsts or the given future outputs; (2) that are coesiderable deeiatione fro crieerioe in te direction of different criteria; are] (3) that there are ale? de\iaeioee froru criterioe ix. the direction of 00 eroadeein. ufic scope ef proeece-euers, cncices 'oeyond the set of investment variants eieldine. identic,1 outpues. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co y Approved for Release 71 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Rnn2nn1onnn'?_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I, ? ????? .? ? ? .ta, Page 32 2. Ministries (and union republic councils of minieters) make belowr limit investment decisions. (with a voice for enterprises and chief administrations) within the expenditures for the branch established by the USSR Council of Ministers; these decieions, however, being explicit (i.e. included in an 'itemized list of projects) on the Ministry level, are coordinated with the investment Plan.. STAT ? Enterprises and collective farms make noncentralized investment decisions outsidethe investment plan procedure. These would be ?known on the 22/ 'Ministry level or above only in exceptional cases. These are, therefore, 2A/ taken to be more or less genuine instances of,decentralized investment choice. The Soviet distinction between centralized and noncentralized investments should not be confused with the distinction between investments financed from the budget and those fie.aneed from enterprises' own resources. The latter distinction occurs when investment data are ard:oueced, in sources primarily concerned with budget data. It 15 clear: (1) that "enterprises' own reeources" refer mainly to retained profits and to that part of amortization 76/ allowances not designated for capital repairs; (2) that budget allowances, as well as enterprises' own resources are used for both centralized and non? centralized investmenta; and (3) that in this context, the distinction between tiee bedeet and eeter-elses' owl. resources is to a conaiderable extent, an accountieg distinction only. 12/ C. p.10 end footnotes 15 and 16 above. 22/ I. e. oney for extra?el.:4v levestments which cost (Li 1936) in excess 'le 12 2? ? 500,000 rubles and, perhaps, for collective farms investments financed by iterical aral Bank loans. Cf. above, pp.14? 24. 2A/ The .ioviet literature on the law of value indicates tnat profitability is not regarded AS an iedex of which traneees of the ecoecmy should be expanded. Cf. N. Kaplan, "The Law of Value and Soviet Economic Planning," RM-488. It is inter(stng to note, however, that in so far as eoecentral:zed investments are rnanced from profits, ,,he marginal expaLsion of enterlxises does depend on their profitability. Cf. Table VI. 7 / N. 'iovinsPL'rosudaestvnneei biudzieet (3taee Pudeet ? j Gosfieizdat 1939, p. 178. " the US3R) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ? ? I ? ? 0 ? I In principle (i.e. by 3oviet definition), noncentralized investhents include extra-limit investments and collective farms! investment.. In Soviet statistical practice,. !lowever, centralized plus noncentralized investments. fail to equal total investments. This is for .two reasons: . 1. Since. 1938 capital repairs are planned and reported separately from capital investments. The reason presumably lies in the organizationally separate arrangements for capital repairs.. 2. All the data exauane,d?state collective farm investments seperately, and in addition to, the total of centralized and noncentralized investments. The Nilson presumably lies in the "cooperative" (as U. S. state) ownership of productive resources in collective farms. Thus, in Soviet statistical practice: (1) total Investments centralized investments - extra-limit investments - collective farms! investments - capital repairs; and 7.22 (2) noneentralized investments = extra-limit investments. Accordingly, for purposes of estimating and comparing total Soviet investments over time, we will interpret reported noncentrrlized investments to. mean extra- limit investments. Two puzzling remarks on the subject of noncentralized investments have appeared recently in Soviet sources The first Is that in 190 and 1950 the "basic part" of noncentralized investments was included in the natioml economic 22/ plan. The second is that in 1951 the distinction between centralized and 7'C.UTh.177-31?(iiet al., prganizatsiia'finansirovanii;t I kreditovaniia kvitalt- vlozhenii, pp. 270-1; Dfiachkov and Kiparisov, ep.cit", p. 6; 31ovar!- -.1Liaotsconornieheskoistatistike, p. 250; Table VII and note 1, 12/ Cf. Table VII and note 1. A,e5ricu1tural Bank loans to collective farts, however, seem to be included in the total of centralized and noncentralized investments; cf. Table VII and note 1, Table I and notea'3 and 22/ Cf. Table xiii, Table VII and note 1. tg Rovinskii et al. Creanizatelia finansirovaniia I kreditovaniil kanita.:1 nykh vlozhenii, p. 102. STAT It Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 211 Page 34 noncontralized investments is eliminated. The significAnce of these remarks is not clear. I would argue in the following way. 1, The implication of the f'rst remark is that prior to 1949 the "basic part" of noncentralized investments was excluded from the national economic plan. I conclude that the specific reference of the remark is to the investment plan. 2. The second remark refers specifically to the investment plan and implies an institutional change (as agalt:st a simple change in statistical 2-eporting procedure). d. There is no evidence of a change in collective farms' investment procedure'. 1 4. There is no evidence that the directorts fund, a source ot investment finance corresponding uniquely to extra-limit investments, has been eliminated. 10 Depending upon the intended MeaninE, of "noncentralized" invest- tents in t e first remark, I tr,trislate it more specifically in one of to 'ME ways: ,either (a) in 1949 and 1950 all extra-limit investments, but not collective STAT , ? ;1 ii farms' investments, were included in the investment plan; or (h) in 19/foind 1950 most extra-limit investments, but not collective farmst investments, were included in the investment plan. 6. 1 interpret the second remark to mean that extra-limit investments, though financed fitm essentially the same sources as previously, now require centralized approval--probably approval by the Ministry or by the US3R Council of Minister:, depending upon cost--and, to this extent, are indistinguishable 21/ "In order to stringthen control over fulfillment of the plan of capital work and to improve the use of thaterial and financial resources for construc- tion prodded for by the national economic plaE? the division of capital invements into centralized and noncentralized is this year eliminated and also the relltive participation of economic orianizntionst own resources in financing capital invesr.ments is increased." Praia, March 8, 1951, p. 30 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: ciA-RDPsi_ninzvlpnnonni ant-Inn r, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page 35 la/ from other components of the inveitment plan. The motivation and meaning of the change however, renin as matters of interest anciignorance. 22/ I, thelefore, connect this change with the other changes in investment organization which occurred in 19504951 and which seam to have a own= denominator of increased centralized control; cf. footnote 13 above. I may be interpreting a casual remark too pointedly in support of my explanation but in any case one Soviet writer, after having discussed the 1950-1951 changes, states: "Total above-limit and below-limit construction constitutes the entire amount of state capital investments." (E. 31flekhov, "Planning Capital Work," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1951 No. 4, p. 88. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4104 Page 3 II: joviet Investments& 1924-1951 In th., present section I will sumgarize and discuss the Soviet data on: (1) total investments Ly major components (i.e. centralized investments, extra-limit investments, collective farm investments, and capital repairs); (2) investments by major sectors of the economy (i.e. industry, agriculture, transport, communications, trade, and social-cultural services); (3) invest- ments by major sectors of the economy with nonproductive investments eliminated from the economic sectors; and (4) investments by various branches of the economy (e.g. ferrous metallurgy, railroad transport, housing construction). The tables in this section are distinguished from the appendix tables by the use of Arabic numerals for the former and Roman numerals for the latter. In both sets of tables we adopt tho convention of placing estimated figures (but not the totals constructed from them) in parentheses. A. Total Investments berklorinents 1924-1951 Total investments, and their major components, in the socialist sector of the economy for 1924-1951 are given in Table 1. Witlan the socialist sector, there a-e two exclusions from Table 1: (1) labor participation in roadbuilding, which averaged about .9 billion rubles annually in the period 1931-1938 and which has continued in unknown magnitudes eo date; and, in the annual figures since 1932, (2) labor contributions in .1:ind to collective Term investments, which in Soviet evaluations were about 30% of money investments in the 1933-1940 period and which have continued in unknown magnitudes to date. In the 1923/4-1927/8 period, investments in the private sector were about 40% greater than in the socialist sector; in the 1928/9-1932 period, investments in the private sector were about 14% of investeents in the socialist sector. Alter 1932, capital investments in the private sector were apparettly insignificant 22/ in comparigon with the totals. The main components of private investment 22/ Table XIII, note Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 90/60/?1,0Z 0 cio 0 0 N.) th 0 0 n.) _II_ ___I_ ) TIBLE 1: Total Investments in Socialist Sector. 1923/4-1951 (in billions of rubles; in prices of respeotive years except where otherwise indicated) ????????????? Prices Centra- lized Invest- merits (1) Extra- limit Invest- ments (2) Total Centralized and Non- centralized Investments (3)=(1)+(2) Capital Repairs (4) Total Investments Exclusive of Collective Farm Invest- merits from Own Resources (5)=(3)+(4) Collective Farm InVestments from Own Resources (6) Total Investments (7)=(6)+(5) Periods 1923/4-1927/8 1928/9-1932 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 0 n.a. , n.a. - - n.a. 50.502 n.a. 1.126 11.1 51.628 1929-1933 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 67.821 2.690 70.511 1933-1937 114.675 9.4 124.075 13.4 137.491 13.400 150.891 1934-1938 126.808 155.148 15.452 170.600 Plan 1938-1942 1936-7 prices 181.0 30.5 211.5 32.8 244.3 24 268.3 1938-1940 1936-7 prices 90.5 17.5 108 17.4 125.4 (14.1) 139.5 July, 1941-June, 1945 94.6 (0) 94.6 (14.0) 108.6 (11.8)- 120.4 Plan 1946-1950 - 1945 prices 250.3 (45) 295.3 (50) 345.3 38 383.3 Years 1923-1924 n.a. n.a. n.a. _ n.a. . n.a. .861 1924-1925 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. 1.210 1925-1926 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. 2.138 Oct. 1, 1926-Dec 31 1927 n.a? n.a, n.a. _ n.a. n.a. 3.664 1928 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. ? n.a. 4.088 1929 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.805 1930 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 9.495 .170 9.665 1931 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 15.116 .385 15.501 1.932 n.a. n.a. n.a. _ 19.351 .515 19.866 L933 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 18.1 (1.3) 19.4 034 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 23.5 (1.7) 25.2 L935. n.a. n.a. n.a. - 27.2 2.1 29.3 ..936 - 1.9 - - 35.5 (2.6) 38.1 _937 26.5 3.0 29.5 3.7 33.2 3.1 36.3 Dian 1938 1936-7 prices 29.3 6.5 35.8 (5.0) 40.8 (3.9) 44.7 -938 1936-7 prices 29.2 6.5 35.7 (5.0) 40.7 (3.9) 44.6 !r!qr'Frrrrrre.?????....wfs,..ronm, moomeluiwwwwnwer.78,!...mr.P.P! 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( --t 0 C.4 H If' NG LA, Sti r-4 r-1 H C.1 (-4 HH ? 4t.:? 3 ?--1 F-1 I.ot??? 014 cop?, ???????????????????11.1???????411111?11.4????????????11.111.01?????????????????????????????? /".? 1.1 \ If\ Ir? cr, ?????? r ON 0 N.0 Ls- N CI) 0 IA NO tip H , t.11 4) (r) ei) 4-)> 0 s:44 H re'?? r-4 "r 'O :'??? H fd\ ..f\ n0 N cr\ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I ? 4.0 \ 0 ` ? N 0 0% Cl CI L' \ ?17: 4 Lr\ (f)..c) 1:1) C? (.4 H ? C't 0 C) N. ........???.111??????????????.011.14.. r?-? C.- ts- ".- C`? i'A VI Cel IC1 ?C) ?1:.) Cr% CiN 0.1 fr1 C;\ ON ON ON (.1? C^ 4\ H 4: N. 0 0'. 0% H H I t- tO CT OH *.Ci C'(4-\ cn .44 -4 C7'0' C% a' a' C% , ri? H r-I IH r-4 H I ?0 C- (`-? .V.,' f..0 g 0 CO 5:: 4 \O (.--? r'l in r'''\ 111 crN (r 4 C11 ce 4 cd .4.4 c:f? CN ON H C% r-i f.7.\ ON rA ON H 0' 0" r-4 H r-4 C. H .34 H H 0. HIH H .4 Page 39 44* ? STAT ' nprlassified in Part - Sanitized COPY Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT dal . age 40 director, with expenditures subject to approval by the chief administration; hut budget allowances for capital repairs may be earmarked for specific expenditures. Feom the standpoint of investment goods produced for the market, cap!tal repairs should be considered in part as an addition to the magnitude. From the standpoint of the sphere for decentralized investment choice, however, capital repairs should probably net be retarded as a significant component. Capital repairs are restricted to renovations which restore the asset to previous prod zetive power. %von the financial means, the implied ? sphere for choice is, thus, extremely limited?namely, which of a set of assets under one roof shall he repaired? 2. What proportion of 3oviet investments ie represented by construc- tion? The 3oviet concept of construction (i_21,.stroieeltee-a;) includes: (a) the erection, expansion and reoonstruetion of residential and nonresidential building, mines, dams, roads, bridges, blast-furnaces,etc.; (b) the erection or electric power transmission and communications lines; (c) irrigation and land improvement; and (d) the assembly and installation of technical and power equipent wherever such activities are of sufficient dimensions to require the work of special installation erganizationa, Soviet constructicn expenditures are presented in Table 3. 7777-above, pp. 15. Et Cf*. above, footnote 2. It should be noted th.Lt net all the remaining investment expendituree are equipment expenditures. 3ome are investment expendi- tures which do not reoult in an increase in fixed capital. 1 ?r? - r.nnv Annroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4 Table 3: Construction Expenditures and Total CentraiLled Investments for Selected Years ??????????????????? (in billions of rubles; in prices of the respective years ex:cept where otherwise noted) (1) 1928 1929 19':0 1931 1932 1933 1934 ? 1940 1943 1944 Plan 12A6-1rL'O. rices ????????????????????? onstrualon .oaws.A.?????AAAAAAn7A.A.Aw?No........o?AfA.?AA.?Ao.A,+AA?AAAA.AAswA,.?..AA?Av...? Total Construction as .a Percentage of Total Investments 2.636n 3.612a 5.3134 9.787n 13.015' 10.7698 14.8171 Ia? qi c ... ? nr; .51C A , p (4) 4.083n 5.3056 9.4968 ?15 .116' 19.351a 16.7901 21.909a '?1 C L ? ? 1.2 (5)- 2 e 100 - (4) 64.6 62.2 61.2 64.7 67.3 64.1 67.6 60.8b 67.2b 61.4b 61.1 3ources: a. Central Adminjst-a-...ion of Economic and 3ocial jtatistics of the US5R State Planning Cemmission (T3UNKTO, jotsialisticheskoe stroiteltstvo 335R (Socialist Constr.ction c: U33) 1936, pp. 384-, 407. The total investment figures are exclusive of: CFTC;Tive farms investents from their own resources; (2) labor participation in road-building; and Ce) expenditures for special purposes (in 1933 and 1934). Thus, the total investment figures are the ? best possible analoc,ue of the later total centralized investments fi4;ure (cf. Table II, note 6). It should he noted that this eource also presents construc- tion figures by sectors of the econo:v p. b. K. N. Plotnikov, Biud2het sotsialistichesko.-o Yosudarstva (Budt7et,of the Socialist State), r.;osfinl71at 191.8, r1. 307. Od, the perconta,:es are ,,iven in this source and o idicatioa of the coverggo or total investeients is :ilentioned. The percentages are quoted by Plotinikov frm another Soviet source which I have :Lot had the opporte..:,ity to ee.,:ardne,; this so:.rce is E. .:,okolov, Promyshlennoe stroitellstvo v otechestvenLoi voi. (Industrial Constraction in the Years of the PatFlo..dc Cosplar.vdat 1946, p. c. Z;akor. Dlane vosstanovlenila i ratvitAia narodnoco khoziaistva 333R na 194e-l0 1?.-.t_ELLa2_1921L:LELPi70 Year Plan for the Recon- struction al-tc-tent of U.;311 National :e:conom0, Gospolitizdat 196, Pp. 9, 35. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ' ? ? - ? .:* 717 " ? These figures, tsi:en at their face value, indicate little char,ge over the ' Soviet plan period in thn proportion of total investments'represen ed by construction. Two qualificetions, however, should be appended: () the substantill increase in postwar houeing eonstruetion as a perceLtage of total investments indicates a shift in the proportions of construction between residential and nonresilential Landings; and (t) tlx substantial decrease in centralized investments as a proportion of total investments may indicate, depending on the proportion of noncentralized inveetments and capital repairs represented by construction, a xre substantial change in construction as a percentage of total inventnents than Table 3 suggests. 3. The estimates of .ioviet national inewee made by Professor Abram Bergson and Me. Hans Heymann, :48_81 eentain estimates of gross investment in 1937, 1740, 1944, and 1948. Gross investment here includes: (a) invest- :lents in fixed capital; (b) inventory accumulations; (u) edditions to stockpiles; and (d) not foreign balance. In principle, therefore; differences hetwAnei the national income estireatee o. cross investmen:, el,d my estimates of investments in fixed capital should be explainable by inventory accumulation, additions to 218' Cf. Table XII, note 23. fl/ A. Dergson, Seviet Natieeal Income and Product (in press) Columbia University Pres. A. netgson 'Ind H. Heymann, Jr., "National Tnuome of the U331 in 1940: Preliminary Report" RAND RM-122 (unpublished). A. Oergson :eel H. Heymann, Jr., "Netional Economic Accounts o, the U3JR in 1944: Preliminary Report," RAND R4-566 (unpublished. A. Derssor. and H. Henn, jr., ',National Economic Accounts of the UR in 1948: Preliminary Report," RAND RM-233 (unpublished). I am indebted to the authors and to RAND for pendssion to cite figures from tnese sources in advance of publication. I am indebted to the authors also for making available to me revisions of the estimates contained in the indicated sources. In the nature of the case, I will be unable to cite page .ceferences for the relevant figures. Comments on the methodology of the national income estimates will refer to A. Pergson, "Joviet National Income and Product in 1)37,"terirJoar, May, August ]951, pp. 203-241, 40-441. Li A. bert;son, "Soviet National Income and Product in 1937," pp. 215-220. 111111111111 ' '' _Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 stockpil gJs an.1 net for talanc; of t tho-i :1o31% imromant quantitatively inventory acinnulation. however, mn,./ -not Le so. In the national ; studies, Invesl...ri:ent is ca..H.....1.1.1.ateci as iresiduEl; Cross i.tatlonal product. (coinr,utl o:, income side of national .c.cono,Jc !tocow,r,.$)--27total (x.itivs 0 :.Aouseholds Or roods and SE3!",1,1.r.S" serliice3 frov e n a...1ministration # ? der en .96::?I gross investment. The result is that the gross investment fizure will reflect any noncompensatin-, errors in th,,; total Erosn national prod.u?A fiGure and -1 the other outlay figures. 3i;;Li1firly, n investmen!, fi6uree contain conjectured components. A comparison of investmeitS in fixe,1 and v.orklr,,g capital, on the one had, aild the national, income estirantes of gross litve.stment, on the other, is presentf. in Table 4. The figuves on incr(Irre:Its in work in6 capital (coin.: 3, Table 4) al.e inakle.o.uate representations of Inventory accurmilLtions for at least, fi.ve re%sons: (a) except for 1937 and 1940, they are plalined figures; .(b) except frIr 1937,. figures refer to "owned'? wor?Ing capital only; (C) t!ie figures - 901 cnanjes in cash and be.:1k account b&lances; .(d) whether thr!. fiz-urcs -include or .0,:o1ude #.;ooperati ve orsani ation 9 is not clear; and (e) the fieure;-3 pr.esuzably exclude agricul!,,,ral income in k.i.r.d Vr:ich is not. consumed. For, purposes of the compa.rison n Table 4, howe'iler, the figures wLll'be -,t_42,,,:r!r: as rough indicators of inventory accumulation-. Because of ti.e curious confituration of. differences, in Table 4 (Colural 6); vrif.1 discues each .of the ;,...ea l's separately. Also, Lecause the dt filerces Of 21/ . the investment in fixed. capital totals have been discussed elsewhere, . I will 89 A 7,3erpson, D3oviet Nations.). Income. and Product in 1937,11 pr). 215-220. 22/ capii,a1 sredstva) is ,Jefineti to inc?..ude cash arid Lark account ? balances. Cf. A. M. i3irrr.an, oborotnvkl-: sredstvo. (The Glanizdat 232 Cf. Table. VI., 1tes 1-3; _TaLle? 71.1, itots 1-3, 6, 7, 9, 10; Table m, note -1. 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? or Table 4: Gross Investment and Investments in Fixed and Working Capital for Selected Years (in billions of rubles; in prices of the respective years) ...................? Wren:ince between gross investments and invest- Total Gross investment manta in fixed and Investments Increase in investments in (as a residual working capital In fixed working fixed & working in the national (In billions As % of gross Year sultal capital cadtal income estimates of rubles - investment (1) (2) (3) (4) : (2) -(3).() (6)=(5)-(4) (7)= 15114.1, - ?...-....... 1937 .36.3a 15b 51.3 56.1f 4.8 . 8.6 1940 50.1a 7.6! . 57.7 59.26 1.5 2.5 1944 40.6a 4.5" : 45.1 52.7g 7.6 14.4 1948 100.2a . i 17.16 - 117.3 152.4g 35.1 23.0 * p1innedY Sources: a. Table XIII. The 1940 figure (or at least the major components thereof) is probably in 1936-37 prices (Table VI, note 3); it is believed, however, that 1940 prices were not substantially higher thar 1936-37 prices for investment good6 (Table VI, note 3). b. Cited from Soviet sources by Bergson, (Soviet National Income and Product). As pointed out by Bergson, this figure includes increments in "owned" and "loaned" working capital but whether it includes the working capital of cooperative as well as state organizations is problematic. Other Soviet sources mention the following figures. The planned increase in working capital, including the growth in bank credit, for 1937 was 12.2 billion rubles (A. Smilga,. "Finances of the Socialist State," 1937 No. 2, p. 115). The planned increase in flowned".working capital for 1937 was 11 billion rubles; the realized increase in "owned" working 'capital for 1936 was 9.9 billion rubles (Ibid., p. 118). Total "Owned" working capital was 37.3 billion rubles on January 1, 1937, was planned to be 48.3 billion rubles on January 1, 1938, and was Actually 45.7 billion rubles on January 1, 1938 (Ibid., p. 114 C. F. Crinko, Finansovaia ro,ramma Soiuza 33R na 1222 . Financial .....g.ILKProraeU3SR1 or 19 1937, p.39; A. C. ZvereviGosuderstvenn-e biudzhet MILLW:12U773tate Bud ets of the Nip11221:1945--Gosfinizdat 1946, P. 19). These figures are to be compared with the total "owned" and "loaned" figures cited by Bergson of 7. billion rubles on January 1i.1937, and $6 billion rubles on January 1, 1938. c. The planned increase in "owned".working capital for 1940 was 10.3 billion rubles (Zverev, 22...A1t, P. 80). T11,) preliminary realized figure for the increase'in "owned" working capital of ,state organizations' waa underfulfilled by 2.7 billion rubles "Zverev, pp.eit.4 pp. 107408). Thusuthe'preliMinary. realized figure may. be taken to be 7.6 billion. rubles. The planned, increase in "owned" working capital for 1939 waiv101 billion rubles; the preliminary realized increase was 8.6 billion .(Zvereviopicit.4.:2. 511 V, P. ViaOhankolYinansy'i kredit 333R.,4SSR Finances and Credit-1940, p. 390.: The planned increase in "owned" workin&capitalfor 194 was 10.2 billion rubles (Zverev, p. 108). The value of "owned" working capital Was Planned to be 71.1 billion rubles on January 1, 19414 of this sum, the "owned" working capital of state organizations Was to be 68...8 billion rubles (Zverev opecit., Pp. 80, 107408). The "pro-war" value of (presumably "owned" and "loaned") working capital was in exceas of 100 billion rubles (A. 14... Birmani 9222ratna_sredstva ro, shlenno o red riatila--The Working d. Zverev, 2p.cit.? p. 133. This figure is the increment in "owned" working capital only. The similar figure, planned for 1945 is 6.8 billion rubies (Zverev, op.cit., pi, 154). e. A. G. Zverev, "On the ussR state Budget for 1948 and Fulfillment of the USSR Budget for 1946," in Narodnoe khoziaistvo 83SR (U,..61.111.201122112m) 1948, a collection of articlea, p. 485. This figure is the increment in "owned" working capital only. Similar figures, planned for 1947 and 1949 respectively, are 13?2 and 2306 billion rubles (A. G. berm', lion the State Budget for 1947," Sovetskie finansy, 1947 No. 2, P. 14: A. G. Zverev, "State Budget of the Fourth Year of the Postwar Five Year Plan," PlAnoviohoziaistvo 1949 No. 2, p. 45. A. Bergson, Soviet National Income and Product g. ,These figures are unpublished revisions of the figures originally contained in the RAND memoranda cited in footnote 88. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: - 2500190002 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I1 11111:::mmomm,mm ? MVONV*13 not re-examine here the sources of possible error in these figures. a. In 1937, as 73ergeon points out, the otserved difference is easily explained by the exclusions from the figure on investments in fixed and working capital. The net foreign trade balance on commodIty account was about 4387 Tedllion rubles (at official exchanze rates), gold production was about 1 billion rubles (at official exchange rates), collective farm investments out of income in kind were about 2 billion rubles, and 22/ was about 1.7 billion rubles. . cornodity stockpiling b. In 1940, the difference between gross investment and invest- ments in fixed and workine; capital was smaller than in 1937. Two offsetting considerations must be mentioned. The increase in working capital excludes "loaned" working capital. OR the other hand, investments in fixed capital probably inelude the construction of military facilities and fortifications which may have beer. 4-5 billton rubles; in the national income accounts, the construction of military facilities and fortificstions are included in defense expenditures. On balance, the effect of these considerations right be to raise the magnitude of the difference between gross investment and investments in fixed and working capital. It is problematic, however, whether the adjusted difference would be large enough to account fcr commodity stockpiling, collec- tive farm investments out of income in kind, gold production, and the net foreign trade balance. The increase in commodity stockpiles alone was probably 2A/ about 2-3 billion rubles. Bergson, 3oviet National Income and Product. 22/ Cf. Table VIII, note 6; Table IX, notes 3 and 4; Table X, note 22. 2!:!/ Voznesensky states: "In the course of the one and one-half years preceding the Patriotic War, state commodity reserves in the U33R increased from 4 billion rubles to 7.6 billion rubles." (N. A. Vo7nesensky, The Econouer of the 1533R During World War II, Public Iffairs Press, 1943, p. 91. Eergson and Heymann also cite the following magnitudes: (a) gold production = 250 million dollarP or about 2.5 billion domestic rubles; (0 net foreign balance -.1 I-Anion rutles. (A. Bero-on and Heymann, Jr., "National Income of the U33R in 1940: Preliminary Report," RCD 11R-122, pp. 46-7.) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104002500190002-8 ST] Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , . 4 STAT Page 46 c. Durinr! 1944 the 3oviet. Union was virtually f'.eed for PiaZ1 oecupation. The reconstruction requirements of the economy may well have brought the realized increase in working capital ibove te planned increase. When Lhe increase in "loaned? working capital is added, the adjusted difference between gross investment end ilivestment in fiKed and working capital is probably not too great to he explained by the exclusions from the latter figure. d. In 94e,1 the msgnitude of the differeLce in column (6) of Table 4 is much too large to be explainaLle by auy of the factors mentioned. Either the investment figure in col= (2) is too small or the gross national proluct figure for 1948 is too large or gross investment contains some outlays which belong in other outlay categories. 4. ;4,11at has been the 3ov1et rate of investment? Because of the inadequacies or 3oviet data on inventory changes, I will define the rate of investment to mee..n inventments in fixed cacital divided by gross national p7oduct. The quantity I want is the proportion of total resources in the 3oviet Union which is devoted to investments in fixe-1 cdpital. The denwlnator, therefore, should be national income at factor cost ? amortization allowanees and ail categories of the national economic accounts should be net of indirect 2L/ This.discussion is 'not meant to imply that Bergson and Heymann are unaware of tlie discrepacies monLione.i. The pednts are ralsol wiew 'nem fcr Whatever ro- capitAl investMcut estimates may throw on tne problem. npriassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? -4a twp , 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 47 taxes aad gross of subsidies. Bergson and Heymann have ca eulated cross national product in "adjusted rubles," i.e., net e turnover taxes (which are regarded as indirect taxes) and gross of .subsidAes. These adjustments siosificAntly alter the totals. Bergson and Heymann have also attempted to break down turnover taxes and This is a simple?minded statement, but it seems both out of place and out of proportion to discuss in detail here the prlblems in the evaluation of "real" national income. Reference should be made to Bergson's discussion in Soviet National Income and Product, Ch. iii. Suffice it to make the following remarks here: A. Application of the theory of resource allocation to the evaluation of Soviet national income requires a model of the Soviet economy (i.e., a model of eerfect Joviet socialism" which is logically analogous to the model of persect competition) which will elucidate the role of prices in the 3oviet economy. This is because the Soviet economy resembles neither of the models implied by the literature on the .economic theory of socialism--i.e., neither the case where consumers' preferences decide everything (or everything but the rate of investment) nor the case where planners' preferences decide every-- thing. The 3oviet case ray be described roughly as one in which the planners (the Politbureau) decide certain (present and future) outputs and, apart from the consequences of these decisions, consteners decide the remaining allocations. The Lange?Lerner model emerges as a special ease if the planners decide onla aggregate future output (i.e., the rate of investment). The completely centralized economy emerges as a special case if the decisions made by the planners are sufficient in number to leave no, or virtually no; degrees of freedom in the economy. The deteeuination of t!es rationality and efficiency conditions, and particularly tee role and meaning of prdces; remains a problem in the nonextreme casea. se. If, in the absence of such a model, the model of perfect competition is taken as the guidepost; I have in mind the evaluation of national income in accordance with Bergson's "'real' cost standard' (Ibid., Chs. iii and iv). That ie, the quantity I have in rind is the proportion of the total volume of eesources devoted to investment, where resources are added in proportion to their inarginal productivities. Or, to put it in still other words, the intention ia to anproxinate the coordinates of a point on the "production possibilities" surface. c. The main operational imperatives of Berp,son's "real" cost standard, in the Soviet case, is that each category of the national economic accounts should be net of turnover taxes and gross of subsidies. Throughout this paper I make comparisons between zomponents of invest? meets in rubles. The quantities I have in mind are the same as here--e.6., changes in the proportion of total investment resources devoted to investments Jr. industry. jtrictlar, I should add subsidies to, and subtrlct turnover taxes fro, each of the components; I am, of eourse, tumble to do this. I must assume, t'eenefore, that the differential incidence of turnover taxes and subsidies within the category of investment goods is virtually nerc. ince turnover taszes an6 subsidies seem to be concentrated on basic fuels and materials, this ascumption presumably does not lead to large errors. nni-laccifiinri in Part - Sanitized Com/ APproved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4110"' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .. t.k dge 4 26./ taxes and gross of subsidies. ? Bergson and Heymann have ca)culated gross national product in "ad,!usted rubles," i.e., net of turnover taxes (which are regarded as indirect taxeS) and gross of subsidies. These adjustments eioificantly alter the totals, Bergson and Heymann have also attempted to break down turnover taxes and E7 This is a simple-minded statement, but it seems both out of place and out of proportion to discuss in detail here the prlblems in the evaluation of "real" national income. Reference should be made to Bergson's discussion in Soviet National Income and Product, Ch. iii. Suffice it to make the following remarks here: A. Application of the theory of resource allocation to the evaluation of Soviet national income requires a model of the Soviet economy (i.e., a model of oerfect Joviet socialism" which is logically analogous to the model of persect competition) which will elucidate the role of prices in the 3oviet economy. This is because the Soviet economy resembles neither of the models implied by the literature on the economic theory of socialism?i.e., neither the case where consumers' preferences decide everything (or everything but the rate of investment) nor the case where planners' preferences decide every? thing. The 3oviet case esay be described roughly as one in which the planners (the Poliobureau) decide certain (preeent and future) outputs and, apart from the consequences of these decisions, consussers decide the remaining allocations. The Lange-Lerner model emerges as a special case if the planners decide only aggregate future output (i.e., the rate of investment). The completely centralized economy emerges as a special case if the decisions made by the planners are sufficient in number to leave no, or virtually no, degrees of freedom in the economy. The determination of ti.e rationality and efficiency conditions, and particularly the role and meaning of prices, remains a problem ie the nonextrems! 0-A410,4: b. If, in the absence of such a model, the model of perfect competition is taken as the guidepolt, I have in mind the evaluation of national income in accordance with Bergson's "'reel' cost standard' (Ibid., Chs. iii and iv). That ie, the quantity I have in reind is the proportion of the total volume of teeources devoted to investment, where resources are added in proportion to their isarginal productiviLies. Or, to pse it in still other words, the intention ie to approximate the coordinates of a point on the "production possibilities" surface. c. The main operational imperatives of Bergson's "real" cost standard, in the 3oviet case, is that each category of the national economic accounts should he net of turnover taxes and gross of subsidies. Throughout this paper I make comparisons between zomponents of invest- meets in rubles. The quantities I have in mind are the same as here?e.g., changes in the proportion of total investment resources devoted to investments in industry. Arictly, I should add subsidies to, and subtract turnover taxes fro, each of the components; I an, of course, unable to do this. I must assume, therefore, that the differential ineidehce of tarnover taxes and subsidies within the category of investment goo's is virteally zero since turnover Sas:es an6 subsidies seem to be concentrated on basic fuels and materials, this assumption presumably does not lead to large errors. npriaccifiad in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT slAbsidies by use categories of the nationa:1 cconossic accounts for the yea's 19371 1940, 1944, and 1963. Except for 1948, the adjust:sent of investmeets in fixed capital for turnover taxes (which must be subtracted) and subsid es (which must be added) does not materially affect the investment total. The incilence of turnover taxes is predominantly on agricultural goods and consumers goods. The incidence of subsidies appear to be predominantly on mechine?tractor stations (and, probably also, state farms) and basic industrial materials (e.g., coal and metals). Total subsidies, however, are relatively small except for 1943. In 1948, therefore, the adjustsient of investments for turnover taxes and subsidies results in an appreciable increase in the invest? ment figure. Table 5 presents Use Soviet rate of investment, using the Berson?Heymann essss national product figures in "adjusted rubles" and irNy investment figures both unadjusted and adjusted for turnover taxes and subsidies. In view of the discrepancies noted in Table 4 above, the following remarks should. be added: a. If the causes of the discrepancies are errors in the other outlay categories of tie national economic accounts the rate of investment computed in Table 5 will be unaffected by a correction to the "true" outlays, b. If the causes of the discrepancies are errors in my investment figures or errors in the total gross national product estimates, the rste of investment should he decreased slightly in 1940, increased slightly in 1944 and increased appreciably in 1948. c. Except for the possibility of a concatenation of compensating and noncompensating errors, only the 1948 rate of investment would appear to be materially affected by a removal of t?;ei discrepancies noted in Table 4. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043Ron9snnionnno_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ,0rt: ? 1110 13ilra' ? V. ?'.r 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Table Year (1) Gross Nattoual Product (iN "ndjusted rubles") (2) TI'm Rate of Invrestri.c1,1, for ,:;electe Years ?????? ??????? rar-rie-STAT Investments in fixed Turnover 3ubs1 1.1as In of rubl,-r 77 ?????????????110 ????????????????? (3) ( 4 ) Adjuzited I: ye L Fixed Capia.1 (t):(:)- (,)+(5) (:.hiari?:usteri L.7estmeilts) 1 1' at 100 \ ? ' ??????????????????mos...11 1937 223.1kri 1940 365.8L) 1944 1948 648.3b 36.3c 50.1(' 40.6c 100.2c ? 0 C v is .....r....er*??????????? 30Urf.' a. i...ergr!or., 1,:atiorial Income an.- learwmeaseall/...??????11/?1....0/1/.... :.o duct . 3!.5 7 40.4 16.2 12 ? 7 0 9.3 15.4 ??? (Adjusted Investment) 4 J ? (2);(12t)0100 9 ? 40 9 1 4404 U. r:-.se 13q::,ures are unputals'ned revisions origina2.1i Contained in te RAND :nen-lora/16a cited in footnote 88. c. Table XIII. Ile 2940 fie.;re (or at least the r::tjor couoneNts thereof) is probably in 1936-37 prices (Table VI, note":.); it is be]!eve, however, tnat 1940 prices were not substant!,ally Uglier than 19?(-3" 1;ricr.:3 for investment 7,00ds (Table VI, note 3). d. Ilergson, ,.;ovlet National income and Product. I have applied the estimated effective turrover ',az rate of 7.5 for inve niert i ftAed c"pital to the i:Ivestl:te figure in rellm (1), ? e. Eergson and HI:mann assu..-Le that the 1937 effect4ve turnover tax rate for Invest- ments in fixed capital holds also for 19401 1944, a:.d 1948. I have applied this rate to the investment figures in column (3). 1. These figures are from unpublished reNisiont, of tbe RAND lemorarlda cited in footnote 88. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 tagyolp+WohiroNtativertavagigliatratiala.iralaffisumax ? ????? ? ? ? ? .1 ? ?? ? STAT F. Investrente b MYor eiectors of the Eooeor l92/44 95Q age ) 3oviet sources report Levosleeents by six sectors; ( ) induetry; (2) agriculture; (3) transport; (4) communications; (5) trade and procurement; and (6) social-cultural services and administration. The sectors have the 22/ following meanino. 1. "Industry" includes rnintie leanufaetering, and most electric power stations. Munieipal electric power stations are included in social- cultural services and adednietration"; rural electric power stetions are included in "agriculture." n "Agriculture" includes state farns, collective farms, macUne- tractor stators, and suCh zeneralized wicelt.eral investments es irrivition and land improvement measures. Capital investenents in "agriculture," further- more, include some but not all expendituees on livestock. Only young livestoc's ar.d draft livestock (of whatever are) are considered to be fl.xed canitnl. More- over, only expenditures on the acquisinice of such livestock seem :o be included in the investment figures; for some reasoe liveetock breeding exnenliteles fp..31 appear to be eeecluded. 3. "Transport" includes railroad, wat.en, .and and air teansl:crtation. Urtan trolley SySteale sulmaye, and the construction of local roa:1s are included 11111 in "social-culturel services and administration." The construction of natioally important rowts is included in "transport." 4., procurement organizations, . erement" .12,cludes retail trade and "wholesal" e , "Communieations" includes mail, 'epnone, teeegraph, aed radio. 5 "Trade and Proc Tr Cf.: Table I, note 1; Table II, note 1; Table III t note 3; Table IV 1 ( 1 1 Including expenditures on the Checking the data in Table IV with other data from eoviet sources, I conclude; Livestock, poultry, apiaries breeding expenditures; and (b) that only the lower figure 13 included in cultural investments as they are usually stated. rhe second of these conclu- sion s depende, of course, on the vali,tie., of identLfying the 19284933 procedure ? ???* ??? 1???? v. I ? ft ? .. ??? . I ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - V0,-,4444.11PNW;04VW Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release WO:yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4, 4 4, V fp, ,N,It; LAO STAT 6. "3oc1al-Cu1tural 6ersice8 and Administration" includes; (a) housing; (b) ehscaion and public health; (c) municipal eervices, which in turn inc lucks seJsKays and trolley systems, tnuLicipal land transport, water supply, see.ss,:e systems, city ssnitation, bath houses and laundries, municipal electric power stations, gas works, ad local roads and bridges; (d) administration and usilltnry facilities and fortifications. The distribution of investments by sectors of the economy is given in Table 6. .4 comparison of the totals in Table 6 with the totals in Tal'le 1 indicates that from 10 to 25% of total inveotments is excluded from the pest4937 sector 221 dIstr!bution of investments. These Are extra-li:sit tnvestments or capital repairs er both. The quantitative evidence on the sector distr!,bution of extra- limit investunts and capits1 repairs is rather sketchy. From this evidence, however, and from te nature of capital repairs and extra-limit investments, I corclude that inclusion or exclusion of axtra-lisit investments and capital '00/ repairs will not saterially effect the sector distribution of investeients. Accorliagly, I sesume the sector distributions in Table 6, taken as percentages, to be representative of te sector d1stri6stions of total investments in the osst-1937 period. A characte istic of the Soviet econony is that economic organizations esesei invest a1rect1:: in "sonpsoductf.ve" assets. For eKamples, industrial enter- prises eonstrect houses for their employees, finance projects for the provisios or :lur.icipal services, etc; by far the slo'st imprtant of such activities it housing Construction. In Table 6, "nonproductive" investments by economi6 221 "., also, Table XIV, note 2. The oae esception to these percentages is the 194 planned sector distribution. 12.2/ Cf. Table 'VII, notes 2 and 8; I would espect at most a 2-3 percentage point increase in industry and decrease in oocial-oultsral services ahd administration with the inclasion of extra-limiL investaents and capitsi repairs in the post- 1937 data. 1C1/ "Nonnroductive isvestments" iclsie investrie;.te in housln1, capital forma- Lion for the provision of auhicipal and social-cultural servictis, the construc- tion of schools, hospital, etc. Cf. above, pp. 15.464 "Economic sectors" is used to mean industry, agriculture, transport, ccrxr.lrIcation? ssd trade ind procurement. "Zconomic orgsnizations" are those whose princisa] ectilties lie in the ecuncesic sectors. neclassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ?:" ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Table 6: " 't Capital Investmerts by Sectors of the Socialist' in billions of rubles; in prices of the respective years except where itherwise noted) riculture Exclusive of coil- Collective Indussly511.21Lars_ri2,..farms (1) (2) (3) Total (4) (3)4.(2) Transport (5) Commun- icationa (6) ?????????????... ?rade and Procurement (7) (8) 4,9 n.a. n.a. 24.789 9.687 1.126 34.458 12.396 2.690 65.763 16.760 13.400 72.948 17.714 15.452 103.580 18.000 24 19.y 38 .355 n.a. n.a. .481 n.a. n.a. .972 n.a. n.a. 1.760 n.a. n.a. 1.880 n.a. n.a. 2.165 n.a. n.a. 4.114 2.420 .170 7.407 3.260 .385 10.431 3.306 .515 (.2090 2.495 (1.3) 1 :7868 2.972 (1.7) 1'3.024 2.993 2.1 15.969 3.884 (2.6) 15.012 4.146 3.1 17.46 2.47 (3.9) 17.075 3.449 (3.9) 17.59 1.59 (4.7) 19.19 1.23 (5.5) 27.48 1.06 (6.3) 15.26 1.10 n.a. 46.39 4.32 (8) 72.23 9.21 (10) 11111 otes "not applicable." 0.7 10.813 15.086 30.160 33.166 42 57.9 _ .056 .071 .126 .213 .384 .804 2.590 3.645 3.821 3.795 4.672 5.093 6.484 7.246 6.37 7.349 6.29 6.73 7.36 1.10 12.32 19.21 2.7 8.933 11.886 25.411 29.019 35.824 (53.A ...111??? 0.1 ' .565 .943 .759 1.258 1.336 '3.245 1.510 2.769 \,12.748 2.563 25:7- J 2.7 5.585 7.064 24.976 30.188 26.581, 41.????????4 1.1 51.628 70.511' 150.871-- 170.600 212.300 2' 1 .214 .272 .019 .523 .021 .860 .043 .905 .054 1.179 .070 1.660 .123 2.694 .184 3.472 .186 3.015 .202 4.250 1 .278 5.455 1 .300 6.917 .310 \,5.774.24(1) 6:82 6.623 .376 4 -9:21 , 1.09 13.54 .236 .040 .051 .078 .065 .099 .174 .260 .351 .238 .486 .562 1.046 .913 .66 .763 .49 .37 .51 .16 egl, .99 .327 .445 .709 .801 1.002 1.004 1.311 1.606 2.404 3.443 4.866 7.374 7.109 8.35 7.414 10.10 9.90 8.01 3.18 5.61 9.57 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104:1Rnn9cnn1annno .861 1.210 2.138 3.663 4.089 5.805 9.665 15.501 19.867 19.544 24.997 29.300 38.100 36.300 39.66 39.60 39.43 41.63 52.57 20.79 74.16 115.54 f;i????., STA Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release WV1112:: 11114?04S4.11,411.01'4.4e. 41.V:11141Alqq.,,,,W MO, 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? :ononor I 1923/4.-1950 in % of total Industl riculture (10) (11) Commun- Trade and Trans.. bat ions _procurement (12) (13) (14) 41.2 6.5 39.3 5.9 45.5 5.9 100 27.0 100 20.8 100 48.0 5.8 46.0 ?.4 45.0 14.5 42.6 26.8 47.3 23.5 r2.5 19e2 ,0.6 19.4 1-47,5 18.7 44.5 17.4 41.9 17.0 41.4 20.0 44.0 16.1 43?1 18.6 44.6 16.0 46.1 16.2 52.3 14.0 73.4 5?3 62.6 16.6 62.5 16.6 23.5 22.1 20.3 17.2 17.4 17.5 15.4 17.0 18.6 18.2 1 ? 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 .8 2.1 19.4 no 1.6 19.6 100 1.7 17.: 100 1.3 10.4 100 1.7 8.5 100 1.8 8.1 100 1.2 12.3 100 1.9 13.8 100 1.9 16.6 100 2.7 19.4 100 2.5 19.6 100 1.7 21.1 100 1.9 18.7 100 1.2 25.6 100 .9 23.8 100 1.0 15.2 100 .8 15.3 100 i1 7.6 100 .9 8.3 100 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-n1n4nPnn9cnni annnn 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release _ ? ? wmnottibik r reirrwhon.,,,,r411:111t?Od, 41.51lball,11 1111?0110.111 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , _ ? ? ? ?? ? - ? ? ? N.' 1 ? ? ? ? STAT ? Page organizations are included in the sector in which the economic organization falls. Since "nonproductive" investments are an.appreciatle proportion of total investments in the economic sectors, particularly for "industry," an attempt will be made below to eliminate such iLvestments.from the economic 12/ sectors and to add them to "spcial-cultural services and administration. With these qualifications in mind, one may underline the following trends in the sector distribution of Soviet investments: 1. Investments in "industry" as a proportion of total investments exhibited a decline in 1933-1938 as against 1928/9-1933 and a revival in the Third Five Year Plan period (1938-1942). There is some evidence, also, that the 1939 and 1940 plans were underfulfilled as totals and overfulfilled for 19.1V industry. 2. Postwar investments in "industry," as a proportion .of total investments, were significantly greater than prewar. 3. Investments in "agriculture" as a proportion of total investments remained virtually constant over the planning period (1928/9-1950) except for the years of intense collectivization, 1930 and 1931. .In contrast with 12g Cf. below, pp. It is also characteristic of Soviet econoudc administration that, for example, the Ministry of Pailroad Transport will have under its jurisdiction eneeeprises which build railroad cars. I have called these investments "extra- eeetor investments." By this I mean "productive" investments which belong in a sector other than the one :In which the economic or economic-administrative oronization falls. On the basis of both quantitatiee and nonquantitative information, I have argued in the appendix: (a) that "extra-sector investments" are relatively small; and (b) that the major proportion of such investments are appropriately placed in the soviet sector breakdown. (Cf. Table XI, notes 20 and 21, and Table XI A.) In any case, it should be noted that the 1941 plan distribution of investments i5 not, in 3oviet sources, a sector distribu- tion of investments. To obtain the indicated distribution I have classified into sectors the 3oviet breakdown by ministries and departments. (Cf. Table VIII and note 20; Table IX.) 121/ Of. Table IX note 5. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDPRi-ninaqpnnoarmlnrw,,,? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 04,10.0,11:4114*.ft STAT Page 54 the 1923/4-1927/8 period, there has oertainly been a.forced industrialization at the expense of agriculture. In the 1923/4-1927/8 period Investments in "industry" and "agriculture" were, respectively, 196% and 56.6% of total . 12.41 investments, inclusive of the private sector. Sinee 1929, however, there has been virtually no decrease in emphasis on agricultural investments. 4. Investments in ransport" as a proportion of total investments exhibited little chan,i,e in the pre-war period a:t.d in the Fourth Five Year Plan. The 1948 realized and 1949 planned distributions, however, indicate an appreciable decrease in the postwar proportion of total investment represented by "transport." The 1936-1)41 increase in "social-cultural services and administra- tion" as a proportion of 'total investnents probably reflects the coLstruction 122/ of tilitary facilities and fortifications. ,?1 IMO "VW C. Investments by Major 3ectors of the Econom, .witjlron Toductive" Investreents Elieeinated from the Econon.ic 3ectors. As I have already mentioned, 3oviet economie eronizatioris invest directly in "nonprod'ictive" assets and 3oviet statistical sources nchde "nonproductive" investments by econmic orgariization In the sector in which the economic organization falls. Ty far the most important of the "nonproductive" invest- ments by econoLdc orcanizations Is housing construction; others are investmeAs fer the provision of municipal services and tl,e, coneLruction of schools, 1c.ki iiospitals and sanatoria. It is by no meant obvious that for al purposes "nonproductive" inveat-- ments should be olLainated. from the economic sectors. If, for example, the objective werc to approximate marginal capital coeficients and if the housing constriction undertaken by ferrous metalluray enterprises were necessary to 12,/ Cf. Table I. 10V Cf. Table VIII, note 6; Talc IX, otee 3 and 4; Table X, note 22. k2L) Cf. Table KI and Lae 1. vuminimm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019non9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 %jowl, 1 1 Page 55 obtain tLe 1;iven expansioc; in steel c%pacity, then "nonproductive" investments by ferrous metalluru enterprAses s'elould no be filLminated. For the purpose of international comparleen of he direction of invstent, however, "nonproductive" investments should 1-e elinanaterl from the econoeic sectors ana I have, accord? ingly, attempted to do so. For the early !ears, 3oviee sources indicate the ragnitude of "nonproductive" investments in w..ndustri4 (through 1934) and "a;.riculture" (throujj1 1935). For the rent of the yeers anA for the other sectors, only indirect indications can be obtained. I have igrored "nonprod]ctive" investewnts "teansport," "cormnicatIons," and "trade and procurement" prior to 1933 on the grounds that such inveetments were insignificant. If. order to estimate "nonproductive investments t;,- ecoeomic organizations for th,, remai.ning prewar years, I have applied percentages ("nonproductive" investments as percentages of total investments) obtained from the Second Five Year Plan and the 1935 and 1936 annual plans for the various economic sectors. (Similar percentages obtained from the 1941 plan suggested that the pereentages did not change appreciably in the later years of the prewar period.) For the postwar years, I have used percentages estimated from the Fourth Five Year Plan data on: .(a) housing construction; (b) percentage of housing construction undertaken by economic organizations; and ) municipal services investments. Two checks are possible for these estimates of "nonproductive" investments . by economic organizatione., Since housing construction i.e the predominant portion of such investments; independent data on housing construction and the percentage of housing construction undertaken by economic organizations can be compared with estimates of "nonproductive" investments by economic organiza? tions. Pre?war distributions of "productive" fixed capital by economic sectors can be compared with the distribution of annual investments exclusive of "nonproductive" investments by economic sectors. Both checks are, of course, rough. The :first was Applied -in the apper,dix and the estimates seemed Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 MN Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 two.. STAT Page 56 122/ reasonable. The secord will be applied in a later paper. 12f/ In any case the results of the procedures described are presented in Table 7. The estimates of "nonproductive" investments in each of the ecmomic sectors (from Table 7) are, then, subtracted from total investments in the economic sector (Table 5); and the total of "nonproductive" investments in the economic sectors (column. (8) of Table 7) is added to investments in "social cultural services and administration" (Table 5). The result is a sector distribution of investments wit "nonproductive" investments by economic organizations eliminated from 1,..he ecolioric sectors; the result is presented in Table 8. It should be noted that the trends in the sector distribution of soviet inveF Aents which were mentioned above (pp. 5:).-54 ) reappear in Table 8. ...rads.........??0?01.,????????????????????????????! 0/ Cf. Table XI, note 4, lgg/ For details, cf. Table XI and notes 1-4. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Table 7: "Nmgrod:xtive" Ecobomic Jotorso. 1923/4-1950'.. (In billibna Of ruftes; L priGes of t,16 respeeAve yeara wUre ?otherwie. noted) Period (1) .Prices (21._ -______ Industry Agric.21ture ' r...sport (.? Connuni- cations (4) Trade & .r"7? procurement (7) Total 0) 1923/44927/s ..D) ..?,..-.1.1.-4 c 3 1 0 . 4- 41 0 0 0 632 1923/9-192 3617 96,0 0 0 0 4577 1933-1937 ' (9749) (1326) (1917) (-.3) (271) (13346 Plan 193,...3-1942 1936- (147M (680 (2687) (39) (218) (18336 Plan 1946-1150 1945 (33100) (1600) (4300) . (39500 Years I 1924-192!:, 65 3 0 0 0 68 1925-1926 126 6 o o o 132 0ct.1926-Dec.1927 207 12 0 0 0 219 1928 193 20 '0 o o 213 1929 307 32 0 0 0 339 190 , 607 281 0 0 0 388 1931 1066 292 0 0 n v 1358 1932 1637 355 0 0 0 199Z 1933 . 1683 292 0:90 (13) (21) '199 1934 1947 1,18 (268 (17) (4'j.) 2693 1935 (17-1'9) 310 (507 (19) (40) (2595 1936 (2268) (148) (519)- 1 (16) (89) (3040 1937 (2132) (15e) (L33) -1371 (is) ,/ .(78) (2319 Plan 1938 1936-7 (2480) I (90) (60 (3140, 1933 1936-7 -(2425) (131) (497) . (20 (tf,5) (3133' Plan 193.7/ 1936-7 (2500) (60) \,. 370 (40), (2970, Plan 1940 1936-7 (2720) (50) ... 4j0 _I (30)' (3210; ?Ian 1941 1936-7 (900) ,(40) N' '_,/ '(40) (4670; L948 (9740) (350) , LO i (0) (1099,0: 'Ian 1949, (15170) (740) 10 (90) (17220: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Table ': Capital Investments by Sectors of the Socialist Economy, 1923/4-1950 (Nonproductive investmentseliminated from economic sectors) Billions of rubles; in prices of respective years except where otherwise noted Prices Industr- riculture cultural & admin. of to--ta,14. Industry I Agriculture Transport 4.31 21.172 _ 56.014 88,872 124.4 - .66 -9.853 28.834 41.316 56.3 2.7 8.933 23.494 33.139 48.7 .1 .565. 1.253 %-.1?709 11.1 51.628 150.891 212.300 294.1 41.0 - 37.1 41.9 _41:3 5,9 19.1 19.1 -19.5 19.1 24.3 17.3 15.6 15.6 16.6 0.9 30:0 1.1 1.8 I 19.7 2.0 25.4 .3 1.1 21.2 100 100 100 100 700 1936-7 pr!ces 1936-7 prices 1936-7 prices 1936-7 prices 1936-7 prices 1,553 .201 1.687 .364 2.308 .808 3.507 2.309 6.341 3.353 8.794 3.466 8.207 3.503 9.921 4.254 11.305 4,783 13.701 6.336 12.880 7.088 14.98 6.28. 14-.650 7.218 15.09 6.23 16.47 6.68 23.58, 7.32 36.65- 11.97 57.06 18.47- .272 ,019 .040 .395 .523 ,021 .051 .577 .860 .905 1.179 1.660 2.694 3.472- 2.325 3.982 4.948 6.398 ? 5-341 6:31 ?6.126 4.59 8 12.32 .043 .078 I .928 .054 .065 1.014 .070 .099 1.341 .123 .174 1.892 .134 .260 2.669 .186 )351 3.598 .189 .217 4.603 .261 .443 6.136 ,281- .522 7.461 -.294 957 10.414 .224i .835 9.928 .6o 11.49 .698 10.552 .45 13.07 .34 13.11 .47 12.68 .76 16.59 .90 26.79 1.210 2.138 3.663 4.0139 5.305 9.665 15.501 19.867 19.544 24.997 29.300 38.100 36.300 39.66 39.600 39.43 41.63 52.57 74.16 115.54 42:4 41.3 39.8 36.3 40.9 44.3 42.0 39.7 38.6 36.0 35.5 37.8 37.0 38.3- 39.6 44.9 49.4 49.4 5.5 8.9 13.9 23.9 21.6 17.4 17.9 17.0 16.3 16.6 19.5 15.8 18.2 15.8 16.0 13.9 16.1 16.0 23.5 1.2 22.1 1.3 20.3 1.2 17.2 1.3 17.4 1.2 17.5 0.9 14.5 1.0 15.9 1.0 16.9 1.0 16.8 0.8 :14.7 0.6 ,/ 15.9 ,15-5 11 . 6 - ./ 11.0 10:7 2.1 1.6 -1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.8 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 25.3 100 24.8 100 23.1 100 19.6 100 17.2 100 18.1 100 23.6 100 24.5 100 25.5 100 27.3 100 27.3 100 29.0 100 26.6 100 33.1 100 31.5 100 24.1 100 22.4 100 23.2 100 mouillmisMimlMgllrclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 111111111111111111111111111111111111M111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? , ???4?-??r, ? Page 59 D. Investssents Varicsis Uranch2.2_21:111Liminy. I.have used the wont 'Isector" to refer to the major subsections of the econov--i.e. to industry, a.61.c'sltuAo, transport, comunisstions, trade and procuressent, and soslalcult!xal services and adsdsdstration. I U30 the word "bsanch" to refer to lower levels of aggreotion, to cvspsnents of the sectors-- e.g, to ferrous metS1JuS:: A$ a ?branch" .of industry. I will summarize .the Soviet data on: (1) investments by braliC,-105 of istdustry;, (2) investments by branches of agriculture; (3) investMents in railroad transport; .and (4) housing construction. A cosTarisoL of investments in a branch with investments in the sector of which it is a part os Aith total investments will be a comparison of data fro in the sae Soviet source wherever possibls anu even if sector or total investments are known to be incomplete. This is on the grouLds that if an increment Tust be aced to thu sector or total investments figure to make it sosTlste, it is likely that some portion of the increment must be added also to. the branch figure. Since ths latter portion is unknown, it seems pre:eraus ,o u e toth fi;susss from the same sol::rce wherever possible. s. There are at ism three sets of Sovist data which bear on the ?question of the direction of iLveStment wiin ndustry; ?( 14040. ? 0 ? STA 41.'P division of investMents tetwsen cSnT,ss(!rs' and producer S1 goods. industries; (b) the distri- butios Of isvestments bi islust ial Tinistries; and (c) the distraution of ir.ssstmsnts by psincipal 'srancbes sr industry. I wis1.1 discuss each in turn. Soviet sources divide insustry into groups A and r. Group A industry embraces, tose branchca of: i:tdustrY which produce producers' goods. Group B industry pro uses consumers' coods. Where a branch cf industry produces both prolucers' and consumers' gocs!s, 10 ? destination of its output." it is classified according to the "predominant It should be noted that the subd vision of ETZETT:i7a7;chnik so sotsial" no-ekonomicheskei statiotiket pp. 107-108. Cf. %hie XII, nots I>, fos s:s soviet classification of actual branches of is,...ustr:s int- L.Toups k 2. No mentios of detests? industry is made in this classificatios; it asems clear, however, that dkfesse industry would be reEarded as group A. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 0 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 U.77 Yr.. Soviet ind.I.Ft,.y ,o7tr,c es 3.1eri to 1.: fiele enouj gross claslcation errom., ',10 not aprloar. Thus, classfir?d.in entirety as [roup A industry A:0 1) .1 012 ,c1 4- It. `4 Page 60 80 that the.otvious fuel industry 13 not locause the value of fuels produced for industrial consu,ption exceeds tw! va.uo ind 1 vidual use; rather, , ?.bc. production . of illuAnatiur .p,as s 10 of ftelu Froducel for the fuel industry a:id iu classified as ;roup E ind4stry. separated from the Soviet direction of in-i%stmet, therefore, may be obtained from a co:r.parison of inv.r.:stments 1.n. group, A industry and a total Lidustry. The coriparison is presented in Table 9. _Lrfal_e_11_12/_?_,str.ents n Indus4,r, .and in Grou A IndUstr Year Prices In tillions of rubles; in prices of the respeeJive years except where otherwise :J)ted Ir.vestens Grou.:1 A Industry Lidustry 19 Investments in Oroup A industry as a.percentage of lr.- Z.t.LI.r.LLILIERiLL._ (i) (2) I le'111111 1929 100 1931 192 Plan 1933-1937 1933 19?4 1935 Plan :1936 Plan 1937 193:4937 1K4-1938 Plan 1938-1942 1932 prices 19::6-7 prices ?????????? Source: Table XII. 109a 2.127 3.1,25 6.513 9.0'10 53.442 7.401 8.692 10.516 10.647 11.510 10.919 54.565 60.777 87.162 2.615 7.47 10.431 69.545 10.624 11 44..744 . 13.956 14.259 13,923 6r).763., 72.94R 10.380 or details, cf. Table XI and notes 1-4. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for !Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT age Gielnting the difficult!es of classification, I regard the percertages in co ll (5) of T11:le 9 as luccinct expressions for the overwhelm:Inc emphlsis in 11Q/ Sovie% invest:nent policy on the Erverth of producerst goods industries. Apart from a peneeptible but unappreciable decline in the percentages for 1936 and 1937, there as heen no relation of this emphasis. A sirdilar picture emerEes from a slightly different point of view. Soviet scYlrces have prnsented distributions of investlients by ministries and other eli:Tdnistrative depart,rients X). Prior to the proliferation of industrial Ainistries in the late 19Wts, there were foer industrial ministries: (a) the Ministry of Heavy Induetry; (0 the Ministry of Lii:ht Industry; (c) the Ministry of Timber Industries; and (d) the aepublic Mintries cf Local Industry. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Heavy Industry were the following 1-,raneles: electric power stations, the coal industry, the petroleum industry, ferrous and nonferrous ore ;a:mine, ferrous and nonferrous metallusc, the auto:Labile and tractor industry, the machine-build. ng industry, the construc- tion ;laterials in!ustry, the .cereicals industry, the defense industry. Under the jurisdIction of the Ministry of Light Industry were: the textile industry, the clothing industry, the leather, bOot, and shoe Industries, the glass industry.' Under he jurisdiction Of-the Min..i.J7.try of Tiniber Industry were: the NO," It is interestine to Lote that the percentages are sensitive, but only slightly so, to ti.1- exclusior, of capital repairs and extra-limit investments Cro1.1 investents i" industry. Thus, investments in Group A industry, as a proportion of i:vestmeitts in industry, exclusive and inclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit investments, are as follows (from Table 1): 1 Investments in Group A. industry as ajsercentagen of investments in industr &eluding extra-:11:4P.; Including extra-limit 1.1.1vest7.1ents and. . investments and SE-2iLL.1224rs 1933-1937 19344938 35.0 85,.3 83.0 G3.3 The planned 193-19;i2 Table meet..s; And eapitel:repidrs, are exclusive of extra-limit invest- _ ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 411Plid. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Relvoiseligywrmi224.9.29,:SLA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , .? , .??? woorh.iorkin_inJustr.? thc furni?-..are indust the wood chK.icil. LIO:o.stry. the _ pAper industry, t'ne List,y, the thdustTy. The jrisdict..!on of . the Mini*try of Fo..3d Inriustrl is felf.,-v.mt. Under the jurisdIctiori of the Ministries of Local InUI;st,rv local industri.al branches of all losial a ?iiLrat ve class:ficAtions. Thus, if "heavy Lndustry" i5 i.aken to mean the branchs of industry which are basic to 5:,conoi1Je growt:I (ad to cconomie war potentlal), tLe ratio of itrrients (2y the Mist ri of ilrnYy industry to total investments in industry serve: as m ey.collent ine,cator of the 3oviet emphasis on "heavy industry." It !.s. true that 5n:e3t4ents by the ii.dustrial idnietries include "nonproductive" invn,st::.ents; but an.,..x.aminaA.o:- of the ta on "nonproduct!.ve" investments by (Tab',-1 XII leads tO ?the conc2usion that thi: ratio of investr.:ente ? . ? 4 14t, ; of 'Awry I:au -.etry to total stm inveente indt du rxr would he 1^ ,1 S ur aNged, if toythl.g, 1ih crefisedt y t.he eNolusion of " hO"Or;r.n UCti 'fiztt ? ? vetnj froboth nu.lerator nnd denoirti_nator. STAT ? ^ ' Table 1.3 presents investA:ente by t..he industrial .?:itistmes in billions of: tra.L1 F.; anC: 1.-.4.1.c.:.ent,a4,.es of total ifo.estme.ni., in .? . ? rot:, collunn (6) Of: C. nt:al tato: of Zoonomi,:, PLa!3ocla: 6!..at istic3 of thc UR :tat n Plan!, int; Courd ( ) 5ot si al i st Co .LCJC.'rI Mosco.. 19t.-, L. PlawLng 77, 7-1 Z7 ? 01 ".,f:t: 105.11 p a.rofix-IA - ai V " Loccor....c.1 r.L ,an 1?)-r,) s4 . I an*, pi.. 4, ) Fllnh- Ala 1136 t10.1 Eccnomic Plail for 1236), ow 1?3o, pp. 391, 512, 521-3. No r.ttPmDt was made to list a'1.1 industrial branches ander the lurisdint!nn of :_inistry; indoed, it is '..104b;,f w'nether thic r;ould be done. The as simpl. to present ne principal iAustrial Uranches under the stry and to int.li%,te Le 1,..!..ads of industries under each. , thf:: case of thc Mi.,istries of Local Ind..tstry, about 45% of total i%vostme%ts were pla4ned for 193r.) and i6 in heavy isidas'..ry, 4 in liEht Indutry., 5, iL and LQ in food induedry. Nurodno-khoziaistvennyi 121-:L_ILL.71.11L112a, Op. 524-28). The Mistrie3 of Loca.1 Industry, :.owever, repreoented at 'aos 4. of tok,a. invetexts ir. .&ztry in the prewar period (Tal-,le 10). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0-02500190002-8 Table 10: Investments by Industrial Ministries, 1929-1941 in millions of rubles; in prices of the respective years Total Ministry of 1/ Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of V2 investments Ministry of Ministry of Year heavy Industry light industry timber industry food industry local Industry Other in industry heavy Industry light industry ,3 + 4 + 5 + FilitIT , 3_3 (2) (9).wUiy . 100 (8)= 7 . 100 W.. 1:21 (4) (5) (6) (6 1929 1981 3.4 96 204 n.a. 40 2635 75.2- 11.9 1930 3147 318 200 411 n.a. 95 4171 75.4 7.6 17931 6113 276 '382 592 n.a. 146 7509 ? 81.4 3.7 1932 8505 389 444 868 n.a. 197 10403 81.8 3.7 1933 ' 7420 513 409 V 919 n.a. 214 V 9475 78.3 5.4 - 1934 8458 629 V V V 467 934 471 285 11244 . 75.2 5.6 1935 8959 720 559 852 500- 199 11789 76.0 6.1 Plan 1936- 10269 1370 1042 1165 1057 115 15019 68.4 9.1 L:re1iminary -1936 9300 1100 850 1050 750 362 13412 69.3 8.2 Plan 1937 8667 1406 V V .1010- 970 770 323 V 13146 , 65.9 10.7 (1936-7 pric.es Plan 1943.V - 25393 757 469 545 247 65 27476 92.4 2.8 SOURCE: Table X; "n.a." denotes "not applicable." Notes: 1. Explicitly includes defense industry for 1935-1937 and presumAbly for the earlier years as well. Cf. Table X, note 13. 2. Consists of : (a) producerst cooperatives; and (b) the Chief Administration of Photography and Cinema Industry. Cf. Table X. 3. py 1941, the ministry structure of Soviet industry had proliferated tremendously. In order to make the 1941 plan figures comparable with earlier years, the 1941 Ministries were classified into the earlier ministries from, which they proliferated. Cf. Table VIII, note 20. v?,....., .....? ,.. __ . _ . - .. . . ........ v _- - - - .? .-_ ., - , .. ? . ? . .. . - .. ....? .. ?.- , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Investments by Industrial Ministries 1929-1941 In percent of total 2 Other Total investments In Industry Ministry of heavyAndustry Ministry of light Industry Ministry of timber Industry Ministry of food industry Ministry of local industry Other Total 7 - 1 * ,e +1 1-41 151 (14)48)4M+ -_, 6N: C3 + 4 4. c 6 +j(8)= (9).ial (7) . loo (1o)44 7) 6 loo 1 ' 1 ,=(7) aoo .(6) (13)=(7).loo (10)+(11)4. (12)+43) t 1 lop )=(7).- 40_ 2635 ' 75.2- 11.9 3.6 7.7 n.a. 1.5 100 4171 I 75.4 7.6 4.8 9.9 n.a. 2..3. 100 146 750.9 81.4 3.7 5.1 7.9 n.a. 1.9 100 197- 10403 -81.8 3.7' 4.- 8.3 n.a. 1.9 100 214.- 9475- -78 3 . 5.4 4.3 9.7 n.a. 2.3 100 285- 11244 75.2 .5.6- 4.2 413 4.3 2.5 100 199- 11789 1 76.0 6.1 -41 .117 7.2 4.3 1.7 100 115 -15019 68.4, 9.1 6.9 ' 7.8 7.0 078 100 13412. 69.3. 8.2 6.3 7.3 5.6 . 2.7 100 323 13146 65.9 -10.7 7.7 7.4 5.9 2.5 100 ?:65 27476 ' 92.4 2.8. 1.7 2.0 100 as well. Cf. Table X, note 13. phy and Cinema Industry. Cf. Table X. der to make the 1941 plan figures comparable with h they proliferated. Cf. Table VIII, note 20. 111=111111111111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap rt. roved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , STAT Page 64 of Table 10, three conclusions emerge: (a) in the 1964937 period when tempos and totalitarianism relaxed perceptibly and living standards increased, the oviet emphasis on heavy industry also relaxed somewhat; (b) prior to 1936- 1937, at least three-fourths of Soviet investments in industry went into heavy industry; (c) despite the previously meager comrdttents to light and consumerst goods industries, the 3oviet Union foun practicalle a war preparation plan (the 12.4.1 plan) in which investments in industry increased substantially and the ratio of heavy and defense industries to total industry increased to more than 90%. The data on invest:sents by specific hranches of industry are scattered and somewhat assbiguous. The particular ambiguitiss are as follows: a. Whether the data refer to &train's rative classifications or to genuine branches (i.e. to the branch regardless of Lhe administrative jurisdiction of a particslar enterprise) is frequently unknown. b. Whether the branch includes or excludes "nonproductive" investments .,-...r.fpror -41? 1.? in the branch is frequently unknoWn.. c. What the coverage of the branch is and whether branch coverage over time is constant are unknown. d. Highly conjectural estimates have been employed for the poastwar years. The postwar data are confined to percentage figures which express 1-rancn investments in a given year as a percentage of branch invest- ments for the previous year. The general procedure has been to link the percentages into an index number series and to search for a ruble figure for one of the postwar years. In most cases, the latter figure had to be estimated from a planned figure. Thus the dependence of the postwar estimates on a single and doubtful ruble fsure makes the post-war estimates particularly tenuous. Accordingly the following table should not be used without further investi- rstion for anything but an Indication of the most gross orders of magnitude. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250n1qnnn9_R Declassed .in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? 4. A P. It is hoped that- VI aealysis of Soviet data on the distribution of axed assets within industry will both add to the present data and remove some of the preeelit eelbitvities. Ttle will be diecussed in a later paper. 113/ Table 11 prescits investments by principal branches of industr7. I iDclufle Table 11 withoet detaiJed comment for whatever intrinsic interest it Leers; more extensive comment will attend a similar but more complete and less ambiguous table in a later. paper. ;uffice it to make the following aservations here. In 1948 and 1949, investment* in electric power stations, the coal and petroleum industries, and ferroue nonferrous metallurgy together accounted for about 60% of total liae.reetments lei industry. The corresponding percentage for the prewar years lees ra.OUt. 410 or less. The difference in these percentages beoomes accentuated with the realizAt on that the postwar ratio of investments in eU indest!.ee to total investments s.gn ficantly exceeded the prewar ratio. The MOS 7, intereseiee component of these five Industries is the coal industry. Its reletive place in total industry investments increased from a ratio of 4? . to 1:1. postwar ratio of 20,Z. From a prewar situation prewar in which its relative eosition was about the same as that of the petroleum industry, the postwar Coal sind,ustry emerged as ea substantiallY more important' object of investment tha1e4e'ee evetroleum industry. .goreeVer, the difference in -the prewar and poetwar positions of the five industries mentioned i greatest ,eaet accomted for by the increase in the relative position of in the coal industry; Investments in electric power rtations and in the petroleum 4 ...1?????????111r ? The specified branches ef industry are a number of Mieor branches for which prewar On the other hand, theire'are major branches included for lack of Jate. 112/ Cf. Tables 6 and 7 11.4/ With the exception of 1738 when the ratio was 13.4%; I believe, in the absence of et'eer ileforebetion, that he data 1 percentage ie calculeted e:Ree have contained a misprint. Cf. "prietipal" in the sense that : date exist have been eliminated. of industrywhich could net. be , an inclined to rom which this - Table 21, note 21, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Otimmetortimis , Table 11: Investments Ly Principal Branches of Industry, 1929-1950 A. in billions of rubles (in prices of the respective years except where Otherwise noted) Period - Prices 1929 1930 1931 1932 , Plan 1933-37 1933 prices . 1933 Plan .1934.? 1934 ?Ian 1935 L935 ?lan 1936 ?Lan 1937 Tul 193$ 1936-57 prices L938 L939 , 9/.00 n.an 1941 193627 prices L945 .. 1945 prizes '1An 1946-50'1945 prices L946 1945 pric,Js nan 1947 194; prices' L947 1945 prices 1948 1945 prices 1949 1945 pricss 1950 1945 prices Total Indust 2615 4114 7407 10431 67545 8863 11834 10624' 12205 12542720 12956 13928 (18800) 17075,, (174)0)g (17900)Y 27476 - 157500 (I.040C) (4730(') . - Electric power stations ' 251 ' 295' , 550 719 5350 609 .799 640 841 976 1250 1031: 1245 . 1011_ 1497 (2600 - (2900 3000 (3000) (3600) (5000) (6600), I Coal ' industry 230 309 599 782 3500 561 630 595 625. '500 . 1026 2339 159 - 1680 (4300 (5100 6300 (6300) (110C (9930 (0704 I Petroleum!Perrous indu_stry -7711Tri77- NOrZ'erreus.buildinc aotal:.-111- 0hemica0.s L...,,Allr.d.;;Ljaikiata.. Construction materials Paper industry Textile- Industry Light industry Food industrx_ 249 350. 415 452 4700 4A3 710 . 698 860 1000 1150 - 1440 2402 2955 - . - 2100 (2100) (3(00) (4400- (700) 1 Imetallurg.y 263 418 836 1422 9340 1726 1627 1827 1549 1050 850 1210 1326 :2238. .s.27(). . 1560C) - ' (4500) ',..ii900 . . C5M) (W 15 (10001 (1160C 91 150 320 544 3791 406 610 464 857 1100 . - - - . 1131 142/ - ' 12000 P000 . / - - - - 8060 - 2179 2345 1960 - 2214 zel . . . - - - 4770 1030 1038 . 17.35 - - - - 1.1!6 - . - - - - - - - - - - 110 156 100 --270 255 474 - 369 - - .. - . ?:47 65 - 60 147 92 207 415 - .141 '. . .- - 193 122 144 209. 353 349 405 766 '551 ' 1005 1040 587 -, - - . ' :. ' I 314 318 276 389 9200 498 743 774' 740 ' 1380 1400 - 436 451. 170 162 270 . 416 632 '715 848 ? 804'. 790 852 ' 1130 970 990. 1054 1292 296 15 ,5600 - (200 3300 (3301 (4400 (5000, (5500) . in percentages of tett,: InvsuientS in Jauetzy Period Prices IrcrAj industry 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 100 - 100 - - 100 1042- aectric power statior 9.6 9.6 7.4 6.9 707 6.9 6.3 6.3 6.) 7.0 6.6 6.3 7.2 5.t, 5.4 - 3.9 :,...? 3oal INIustr ? 8.6- 7.5 8.1 7.5 5.0 t..." 5.3 5,f 5.1 - 3.6 - ,.5 13.7 1.9 6.1 - 2:w.0 -.0..)I.'?! - t F4tro1eue. indu84r7 9.5 8.5 5.6 4.3 6.8 7014 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.2 - 6.1 - 8.3 13.4 10.1 8.9 - ter-o 3 clotsiiu.L.: 10.1 10.2 13., 13.6 13.1 0.'? of 13.7 17.2 / 12., - 7.5 -.. 4.5 7.1 7.6 12.5 9.9 -E-.0 21.1 ...ls 4a.,1,:y: 3.5 3.6 4.3 5.2 5-5 1 LAA 5.7 4.4 7.0 _ 7.9 - 9.7 5:1 - Mh;h:r ? .,u'Lil, io, ...,:tr - _ 11.6 .. 18.4 - 19.2 - 14.0 12.;. 1.2 ,r11,lic... .n1L3tr. - _ 6.9 _ 9.1 8.5 - 11.0 .. - - 4.3 - :ont.,:rlotiot ..At.rials ir.iust. - - - - 1.5 - .- 1.3 0.7 _ 1.5 2.7 1.3 - - Paper Indusr 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.7 - 3.0 - 1.4 , . u.) - - OD - Toaxtile i.dustry 7.4 4.7 1.6 1.4 2,J 3.0 3.3 3.3 5.5 2.9 5.9 6.0 2.1 - OM - Light industry 12.0 7.7 3.7 2.7 13.2 I- I .6 1 6.3 7.3 6.1 5.7 9.9A--1 10.1 2.6 2.6 0.6 3.6 .........7........ Food Industry 6.2 6.6 5.6 6.1 8.1 7.2 7.6 6.5 6.8 I 7.0 5.3 6.2 7.4 1.1 - - - 1929 1930 1931 1932 Plan 1933-37? 1933 Plan 1934 1934 Plan 1935 1935 Plan 1936 Plan 1937 Plan 1938 1938 1939 1940 Plan 1941 1945 Plan 196(-'50 1946 Plan 1947. 1947 1948 1949 1950 10.6 SOURCE: ' Table XII. 5i4r.? ,OnOtes "not a%ailatle. sC7. Table XII note 'a, fof t e detail.S o tnt. es'..4ar "Nstimates.? Votes: 1,:',11 1939 a. .d: prIc-es were not s'ustantIally higher than ' 1. The total industry fig,:re,'.4s proclAC: tr prices; IL is ellev,:d hcwevtr 1936737 prices fer good. 7.aU:e V14 note 3. I; , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190007_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ,r1,111.r.rammrromt, - ledu;ltry, :?..ercentages of total Lnvestments in industry, were sligi.tly higher th 1948 ant] 1949 than in almost all prewar years. There were a numeer of prewar yean..; in which the relative importance of ferrous and nonferrous Inetallw.gy was greater than in the pcstwar years. One posle ex},lanation of the extraordinary role of the coal industry :zLght to war Aarliage aud the greate: costs of reconstruction. Anotner might 1::(1 ,t;reer capital costs per additional ton of coal as new rescrles are e%ploited. In the search for e-".planations, however, the highly conjectural natus. of the postwar estir:.atd,:s should not be forgot. 2. The post-1935 data on the distributim of investments within a:.;.:!,cultare ai'e quite sketchy; a preliminary survey indicates that little, if av, help can be expects'l from an examination of the data on the distribu. n of fixcd asse-:s within agriculture. Nevertheless, the sketchy data do ?Aint to so:le general trends wahin soviet agriculture. distribuon of inestments wIthin agriculture :s presented in Table 12. Notewovthy are t foliodin developments: (a) the tremendous decline STA !..yt:ate farm 'evec:meuts as a proportion of total agricultural inyestments; (b) te decline in 1:-.aohine-trutor station.investrents aa a paportion of the tetra in the Thlvd iulcl fourth Five Year Kan, L co4Iparison With 193-1935 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R007son1gnnn9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ,r1,111.r.rammrromt, - ledu;ltry, :?..ercentages of total Lnvestments in industry, were sligi.tly higher th 1948 ant] 1949 than in almost all prewar years. There were a numeer of prewar yean..; in which the relative importance of ferrous and nonferrous Inetallw.gy was greater than in the pcstwar years. One posle ex},lanation of the extraordinary role of the coal industry :zLght to war Aarliage aud the greate: costs of reconstruction. Anotner might 1::(1 ,t;reer capital costs per additional ton of coal as new rescrles are e%ploited. In the search for e-".planations, however, the highly conjectural natus. of the postwar estir:.atd,:s should not be forgot. 2. The post-1935 data on the distributim of investments within a:.;.:!,cultare ai'e quite sketchy; a preliminary survey indicates that little, if av, help can be expects'l from an examination of the data on the distribu. n of fixcd asse-:s within agriculture. Nevertheless, the sketchy data do ?Aint to so:le general trends wahin soviet agriculture. distribuon of inestments wIthin agriculture :s presented in Table 12. Notewovthy are t foliodin developments: (a) the tremendous decline STA !..yt:ate farm 'evec:meuts as a proportion of total agricultural inyestments; (b) te decline in 1:-.aohine-trutor station.investrents aa a paportion of the tetra in the Thlvd iulcl fourth Five Year Kan, L co4Iparison With 193-1935 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R007son1gnnn9_R _ ? Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ago.. 111/ NA eter a Aeady incre:isa in %;,c, 1928-19;5 poriod, (c) tni. rise in. :Lac);!.e-tr.:4.ctor staUon invot5tets al..i a proportion of t're total in the As al.rst Third Five Yea;* Plan; .(ri) the .:rater iwportance of :ochinc-tractor stations in corT8rtson wit state fars as objccts of invest - in the Yourth FiVt Yea:.. Plan; and (e) the very laze increasf; in collectiwe farr: az. :.olportio ot'Actal agricultural, invistments. Investments .1n ra11roe.1 tral*:ort should be compared.witn: (a) inwet:nt in total transpor),, aar index of the !.mportance of railrads. azad!:st ot'ler forms o trwIsport; and (b) luvest!ilots in industry, as an inez of the relationship beteen railroad and industrial developments. These 7:agn1tuen a;-e prevnted in Table 13. ?It a.:.vsear?: (a) Lhati?ith 1A:o oxception of ttc 1929, 1932, 1941 plan, 11.5./ The &cline is more substantial than it Appears. The 1928-1935 data include expenditures On the breeding 'and feeding of young stock as well as expenditl.lre!; on ti:e ricquisition of livesto...fx. Apparently, oni.y-the latter are included in otola- taLe (cf: Table IV, note 6; Table I, note 1). Examini4, ths data fro: a .7.o1;.r.-.,e L.ch epic1Li excluth.ts livestock breeding expeditul'es, I LIld fo1loAn6 fi;;ures for machine-tl'acto station 5.nvest- :Lent,s and total agricultural investments: Livestment,s in: Ai:ricuir,ure Year (1) (2) ?3 tractor stations of rubles Machine-tractor s-tation invAmtments as a proportion Of total investments in agFiciature 121 , (4) (2) 10J .2 21.2% 22.6% 1929 e40 .1930 2590 .1931 3645 1932' ? )32.0 .3900 1934. 4661 ?:(Cf..Tablo 10? 113 405 589 826 1052 Here, machine-tractor station investttnts..as.a prcportion Of total inveatments are iee,s '..;han in. Table .12 ..becaus&tOtal r14Ll.ura1 inVestmentS herP.G*.cludo-livestoek Lfeeriing expenditares and-lqi.chine-trActor stationa did not eage ii suer . It is belieVedthat the Third and Fourth Jive Year Kali datairi Table 12 e7./clude liveE.tock-breeding. expenditures (OfI.. Tale IV, note.6;:. Table -1, note 1). .? ?.. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 =1111.1 I Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002. 7. II!Lvez.;t:r.eT!ts in . 1 . raf .Iroa,::: 1-,ra.-.1spor,.; ; Investr.Lcnts I Invc:st,nler::t...s I las 14 pereeLl.tage of ? ? i re..1.1.road ot ._: l Livestents 1:linv,-.t il ,,,,et,s -: 1 in. La ? m u.rans-x)r-..?.. 14railf;-.-,ort.. :.rt i:.:_i'..1stz-,- I ,.? ??4- ? (5) . . ii(6)-(3) j.1 1 .:1 I, il `i Fc.a.i.arOa.:-_ - Tran7f;p00.-? ?? in Lillions ruble::in p1C5 of the respective jears except 1 - _.; otheruist; not.ed 1(714(1) (3) -ic30 1,51 Pia.191.-37 1933 15.35 Flaz4 1936 Pr-211..a-inaly 1936 Plaa 1937 193.-1937 Plan 1938 1934-1932, Plan 193:3-42 1941 Plan 1946-50 194.3 i_949 -- 1933 prices 1936-7 prices -":521-? prices 1945 prices 1945 prices 1945 prices . , . 2.928 4.762 17.077 5.000 19.627 40.1 (6.7) (8.8) Table XII. The sign, Is- leRIMPriffs"..rwerromm. (4) ???I. denotes no available." ? "VPIPaimmim I. ..--allroao as of Itivc3i.c:41-.,s ; . 74.0 70.'d 74.0, ? 7 6400 67.2 67.7 81.975.0 - 100 .aust _ 100 - (5) 26.8 25.5 if .6 18.6 1 1-_7;sified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? age 11k/ and the Fourth Five Year Flan, invostinents in railroad transpert have been a virtually constant proportloe of investments le total tmisport (rrom, roughly, 2/3 to 7/10); and () .,at, with the e4cuption of 192'1, 19)6 plan, 111/ .1937 plan, 1948 and 1949, investments in railroad transport have teen a virtually constant proportion of investments in industry (frve, rcuLly, 1/4 to 3/10). It should be noted that the data on investments in railroad transport. and industry include "nonproductive investments by railroad and industrial enterprises. The exclusion of such investreents would probably increase the 122/ ratio of railroad transport to industry investments. 4. Table 14 presents the Joviet ,data on housing construution in billioas of rubles and as percentages of total investments. Although it is reasonably clear that the housing construction figures exclude individually owned housing construction, tne scope of the data with respect to housing 112/ repairs and collectively owned rural housing is ambiguous. Nevertheless, on the assumption that the prewar and postwar data are roughly comparable in scope, Table 14 ind cates that postwar housin construction, as a percentage of total investments, doubled in comparison with prewar housing construction. 116 The 1941 _plan figures relate to a distribution of nvestient y rinistries. It is likely, therefore, that tee percerta,;e is so:aewhae overstated becasse tile Ministry of Railroad Transport iscludes sues industrial enterprises. (Cf. Table X, note 20, and Table X-A). The Fourth Five Year Plan figure ia obtained by assumption based on scattered data (Cf. Table 1, note 6). 112/ The 1948 ani. 1949 fil,7urce for inveetments in railroad transport are hiej,hly conjectural. They are derived frw Le following dhta: (a) postwar investments in "transport" stated for each year as a percentage of investments for the preceding year; and (I) a rutle figure for railroad transport invest- ments planned in 1947. Tie assureption is esade that, since investments in railroad transport have been sush a large proportion of isvestments ia 'total transport, the perceneages for railroad transport are not signifleantly different from the percentages for total transport. (Cf. Table XII, note LI/ Cf. Table XI. 112/ Cf. Table XII notes 1749. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R00250niqnnn7_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .ac,e Table li.: *ow.. ?????????????????????????? Housing ContArunlon arid Tot,a1 Lwestments, 1929-19r,0 ???????????Pwoe/..?n???.i.??????I????????IP??I?a....N.M........Maw Pc Prices ? (1) 1929 1930 1931 1932 Plan 193-37 1933 1934 1935 Plan 19")6 Preliminary. 193 Plan 1937 1933-1937 . Plan 1933-42. 1940 Plan 1941 1945 Plan 1,6-50 1946 1 C: '7 .1- i 1948 1949 1950 (2) 193; prices ToLal ousing ...:.vestmmts construction ,1.2.one of v.Ales; Ln lic; respective ex.;ept whore other.r viae nok.21._ (3) 5.80 7).496 15.116 1.116 1951.3 1.91 1.3.400 13.412 16.790 1.343 21.909 1.729 24.772 1.930 32.365 3.065 31.750 2.400 32.593 2.425 137.491 12..575 1936-7 prices 188.300 15.500 1936-7 priz.eE 38.0 3.2. 1936-7 prices -47.0 4.050 . 36.3 (3.9) 1945 prices 250.3 42.3 1945 prices (42.5) 6.0 1945 prices (46.3 7.0 1945 Pri("' (69.1 1 (12.2) 1945 Pric" (57.6 (9.5) 1945 prices (85.0) . (14.4) (4) .509 ,/r! ..iOURCE: Table XII. NO _ II Rousing 1110.0???????????????????????? (5)=1.1,11 . 100 (3) 8.8 8.2 7.4 8.2 10.1 8.0 7.9 r7 ? 6 9.5 76 7.4 9.1 8.2 8.4 3.6 10.7 16.9 14.1 15.0 16.5 17.7 16.9 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ta ????????.... 41.1 ? ...v.? wt.. ? ? r ??? ? '?.' ^ r? ?? .114 ? v If irLdivitlually owned 1,crai oont, ruct,f,..on were ',aker. In Iwo 4.;e0u...?.4. ? the difroreitoe prot...,1.,;., 'Ay 1,..t3 liirg;er .1.v taJ. ly owne..1 C ocrt51., rue - t ion appears' to...Ittve t I sign, prewar y.::ars b.cj, so:r.etshirig, of ? toi.,(12, 1,, ,st ruction in the postwar yeuirs. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT . APPENDIX The appendix is intended to state in detail: (1) the data and sources on Soviet investments in fixed capital; (2) the reasons for particular inter- pretations of the data; and (3) the bases for specific eCkamates and extrapolations... The appendix goes somewhat beyond what is necessary to document the text. Soviet capital formation has been virtually ignored by non-Russian students of the Soviet economy. Accordingly, the collection and presentation of the data on Soviet capital formation became something of an end in itself. To this end, the appendix .sometimes presents data which have little or no direct bearing on the liscussion in the text. (I am concerned here only with investment flows; the Soviet data on capital stock will be presented in an appendix to a later paper.) No pretense is made to complete Coverage of Soviet sources. Indeed, one category of Soviet sources has been scarcely touched - namely, books and periodicals on particular industries and branches of the economy. Attention has been confined to more general sources with some confidence that the most important of these have ben examined. That some data exist and have. not been mentioned in this appendix is without question. An attempt has been made, however, towards as complete coverage as possible for the data on: (1) total investments in the socialist sector of the economy; (2) the main components Of total investments i.e? centralized investments, extra- limit investments capital repairs collective farm investments; and (3) total investments in the main sectors of the economy - i.e. industry, agriculture, transport, communications trade and procurement, and social- cultural services. The author would of course, appreciate citations to any data he has overlooked. d im,,,i,ecifinri in Part - Raniti7ed Coov Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4 The appendix consists of a series of tables for each of which there is a statement of Sources and a set of notes. The appendix tables have been arranged in some semblance of a logical sequence. The reader who is inter- ested in the details of Soviet capital formation or who wishes to use the data for some purpose should read the appendix with care. The arrangement in the form of a series of tables with sources and notes for each makes in- evitable some scatter of comments on the same subject. Although an effort has been made to cross-reference the tables, economies had to be admitted. Therefore, an investigator who wishes to use the data may err by ignoring qualifications, cross references, or ancillary tables. The sequence of tablls it as follows. Table 1 presents capital invest- ments by sectors of the economy, planned and realized, for 3 to 5 year segments of time from 1923/4-1927/8 through 1946-1950. Table II presents annual investments by sectors of the economy from 192445 through 1934. Table, III presents annual investments by sectors of the economy, planned and realized, frOm 1933 through 1937. Table IV presents annual investments in agriculture by types of economic organization from 1928 through 1935. It turns out that Tables II - IV do not yield results consistent with the second Five Year Plan fulfillment data. Table V4 accordingly, utilizes additional information to present annual investments by Sectors of the economy for 193371937 which are consistent with Second Five Year Plan fulfillment data. Table VI presents annual investments and budget financed investments, planned and realized, from 1933 through 1951 plan. The data on financing the national economy from the budget, also included in Table VI are used only to estimate investments in particular years. Table VII presents extra limit investments, capital repairs, and, collective farm investments; 1930.4951. Table VIII presents centralized. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ???????????6 ??????? N.;:.a.41??????..,??????,..?'??????40*," 41,,??????"...?????44:?????;......4..????????.:4444.4'????W.,?,,e.i.a... 4..4 ? 4?????...U.????? ?.???? ? I age investments, capital repairs, and housing construction by ministries and departments for the 1941 plan. Table IX presents the sector breakdown of capital investments for the post4937 years for which data exist - namely 1938-1941; 1944, 1943, and 19490 Two problems exist with respect to the sector breakdown of investments. The first is whether the breakdown into economic sectors is mutually exclu- sive or simply a sector classification of the main activities of ministries and departments. That is, if the Ministry of Railroad Transport builds locomotives, are investments in such activities included in industry or transport? The second problem is the magnitude of nonproductive investments by economic organizations. Table X presents annual investments by ministries and departments for 1929-1938 and 1941 and classifies the ministries and departments into sectors; the main purpose of this table is to make possible a comparison of the sector breakdown, on the one hand, and the sector class- ification of the ministry and department breakdown, on the other, for identical sources and total investments. Table XI presents nonproductive investments by ministries and depart- Merits for the Second Five Year Plan, the 1935 Plan, the A.936 Plan and the 1941 Plan. Its main purpose is to make possible an estimate of the magni- tude of nonproductive investments included in the economic sectors. Table XII presents scattered data on investments in the principal branches of industry and of the national economy. Included are, perhaps, interesting but highly conjectural estimates of post-war investments in certain of the principal branches of industry, in railroad transport and in housing construction. - It Tables XIII XV are essentially summary tables. Table XIII presents total investments in the socialist sector of the economy, including centralized Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .???? .?,.. ? ? ?? ? s? ..?,?????.??? V.v.... ? ?111..i. ????. ? ? .????? STAT 4 ? Page 77 and non-centralized investments and capital repairs, for 1923/24 through 1951 plan. Table XIV'presentithe seCtor breakdown of investments for 1923/24 - 1941, 1946-1950 plan, 1948, and 1949 plan. Table XV presents the sector breakdown of investments, with nonproductive investments excluded from the economic sectors, for 1923/24 - 1941, 1946-1950 plan, 1948, and 1949 plan. The notes to the tables should .be prefaced by. a few general remarks. 1. 1 will have occasion to speak of various segMents of time in Soviet economic history. To prevent ambiguities the time references will be clarified here. a. The hyphenated years, for example 1924-1925, are economic years" running from October 1 of the first year to September 30 of the second year. The other years are the usual calendar years. b. The First Five Year Plan was to embrace the period from October 1, 1928, to September 30, 1933. The First Five Year Plan was stated to have been fulfilled in 4,2; years; accordingly, realized data for the First Five Year Plan period refer to October 1, 1928 - December 31, 1932. . The Second Five Year Plan covered the period fram January 1, 1933 to December 31 1937. d. The l_ird Five Year Plan covered the period from January 1, 1938 to December 31, 1942. The "4 war years' .1945. (Cf. Table VI, note 5). The Fourth Five Year Plan covered the period from January 1, 1946 to December 31, 1950 use sector" and "branch" in a fairly precise sense. "Sector" is used in two ways: (a) to refer to the private and socialist parts of the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4.? , .I???? 4.,????? ?????,? 410 10 STAT ,economy; and (b) to refer to the main sub-aggregates of the socialist part of the economy - 1.e. industry, agriculture, transport, communications, , trade and procurement, and social-cultural services. "Branch" is used to refer to lower levels of aggregation, i.e. to components of the sectors in the socialist part of the economy - for example railroad transport is a branch of transport and ferrous metallurgy is a branch of industry. It,is true, however, that the tables on investments by sectors of the economy also contain data on branches and that the table by branches also contains data on sectors. The titles of the tables Are intended to convey the main orientation of the tables. 3. The appendix contains data on investments in the private sector of the economy for only 1923/4-1927/8 and 1927/8-1932/3 (cf. Table I). Pmission of the private sector of the economy is presumed not to be serious in the post 1932 period (cf. Table XIII, note 1). 4. For simplicity, I refer to "ministries" and "councils of ministers" for the entire period rather than to the pre-1946designations of "commissar- iats", and "councils of peoples' commissars". In the breakdown of capital investments by "ministries and departments", "department" is a translation of the Russian word vedomstvo and refers to administrative organizations 'other than Ministries. 5. I refer occasionally to economic sectors and ministries and to in- dustrial ministries. In this context "economic" means, other than 'social- cultural" -- i.e. the economic sectors are industry*, agriculture, transport, communications, and trade and procurement and the economic ministries (and departments) are those whose principal activities lie in the economic sectors.' Industrial ministries are those whose principal activities lie in industrial Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDID8i-ninziRnn9crin onnnn 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT 4 11/4 ! age production (in the Soviet sense of mining, manufacturing and electric power ,generation). 6. In the notes to the tables, cross references take the following forMs: a. Table VI - the reference is to Table VII b. Table VI, note 3,-.the reference is to note 3 to Table VI; c. Table VI and note 3 - the reference is to Table VI r and to note 3 to Table VI. 7. I adopt the convention of placing estimated figures in parentheses except: (a) where a figure has been obtained by mechanical processes (adlition, subtraction, etc.) from other Soviet figures for the same period of time; and (b) in Tables XIII-XV where the summary figures are naked but the estimated components are clothed with parentheses. A methodological antithesis exists between the kopeck counting in the pre-1937 data and the frequent extrapolations of a point in the post-1937 data. This has been conscious, if psychotic. As the Soviet data becomes' thin, it is necessary to use historical analogy as a method of interpretation. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that complete understanding of a point improves extrapolations of it. One should not lose sight of the conjectural nature of some estimates contained in the appendix.. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release -lf 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01 043R002500190002-8 Page80 TABLE 1: CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, pLARgEO AND REALIZED, BY PERIODS FROM 1923/4-1927/8 TO 1946-50, (In billions of rubles) In Includes Cr pital Repairs Planneo Realized ealize Planned 1928/ 1924/9- 929-33 1933737 2 2 1-000 of rePP19.LtEILZEIEE-- elude apital pairs Includes Capital Repaira ed 933-37 Realized 1933-37 Realized 1933-37 Realized 1934-38 Realized 1934-38 Planned 1938-42. Realized 1938- une Realized 214 War E," n ItadavioLs_efrpecIp.mgears Includes EXludes Extra-Limit Extra-Limit Expenditures Expenditures and Capital and Capital Excludes Extra-TOmit Expenditures and Capital l's In 1 6 rices Includes Extra-Limit Expenditures and Capital Excludes Extra-Limit EXpedditures and Capital Re Includes Noncentralized Investments 62.49 !L8.22 103.580c 62 12.3960 14.061 5.093 e_788 23.845 1,T.76$ 3.934 3.069 1.0 1?162b 2 062b - Cultural Services and 10t2 :t1' 137.49lb 28.033 11.480 3.378 17.0 7.5a 64.5a 6o.o1 Editions Labor Participation in Road Building. Capital Investments of Collective Farms tram CN Resources. 4.307. 15.4520 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Pad- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release, .0 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT SOURCES: a. Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five Year Plan For the Develo.fent Economy Report of the State Planning Commis- sion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Second Revised Edition, International Publishers, New York 1934, pp. 50,55,280. Hereinafter referred to as First Five Year Plan Fulfilment. b. State Planning Commission, Ito i vj.olneniii vt oro o iatiletne o ?lana razvitiia narodno o khoziaistva Soiuza SSR Luisla_oLthejit of the Second Five Year Plan for keiatIelament of the NationAlisslam of the USSR), Gosplanivial 2939, p.71. Hereinafter referred to as Second Five Year Plan Fulfilment. c.-State Planning Commission, Icei1l_piatilet211.12ELIEALIJaLETsjam khoziaistva Soiuza SSR (Third Five. Year Plan for thekAlzeglAjarle Economy of 1939, pp. 120,197,225. Hereinafter referred to as Third Five Year Plan, ? State Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan for the DevelgaasA of the National Economy of the USSR, International Publishers, New York, 1936pp. 558,559. Hereinafter referred to as Second Five Year. Plan. e. Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelistvo soiuza SSR 1 1 8) (Socialist Construction of the USSR 1222:22,, Gosplanizdat 1939, p.113, p.115. Hereinafter referred to as Socialist Construction 1933-38. ? f. Zakon o piatiletneni plane vosstanobleniia i razvitiia narodnqm khoziaist2R_MiLm_12L:122222. Law of the Five Year Plan for the Reconstruction and Develo ent.of the National Economy of the USSR for 1-54*4-1956). Gospolitizdat 19b6, pp. 9,13,38,45,54. Hereinafter referred. to as Fourth Five Year Plan. g? N. Rovinskii et al, Or-anizatsiia finansirovaniia ikreiovaniia kapitallnykh vlozhenii (Organization of Finances and Credits for Capital. Investments), GOsfinizdal 1951i pp.15,16. h. N. Voznesensky, TIheGr.c:Niz2moslty_j1[jttsj2yiet Union, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1941,- p.8.- , 1. E. Lokshin, Promyshlennostt SSSR (USSR Industrz), 1947, p.50. SSSR. Strana sotsializma (USSR) Land of:Socialisn1)01936.8. This figure includes the fourth quarter of 1928, whereas the other data for this period excludes the fourth quarter of 1928; The .figure for total transport including the fourth quarter of 1928 is 2.8 billion. (Ibid., p.8). k. Obtained as a residual from the transport total. Estimated; of. note 5 to this table. Estimated by assuming that 1929-33 (1934-38) investments in communica- tions bear the same ratio to 1928/9-1932 (1933-1937) investments in communications as do total investzents in. the socialist sector of the economy for the same periods. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop 50-Yr 2013/09/06 ? ria_pnpoi Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ........................... ? ... STA7 age n. Obtained as a residual from the total for the socialist sector of the national econouv. o. Estimated; cf. note 6 to thie table. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Ron25nn1qnnn9_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Fage 3 1 NOTES TO TABLE I 1. The sector break-down of capital investments requires some explan- ations: a. "Industry" includes manufacturing, mining, and electric power stations. (p. Savinskii, Kurs prornsh1ennoi statistiki Industrial Statistics Course - 1949, pp.50-51). Not all electric power stations are, however, included in "industry". Municipal stations are included in the ? municipal economy (kammunaltnoe khoziaistVo) which is a part of "social-: cultural services and administration". Maslakov, N.L. Filatov, and V.V. Barmin, Finansirovanie zhilishchno-kommunallno o khoziaistva Finan- cinp the Housing-Municipal Economx - 1948, p.8; Table II, note 3 ? Agri- cultural stations are included, in "agriculture" (Table II, note 3). . The basis for the division is not clear. The electric power stations included in industry embrace generating stations, transmission lines, and substations. (Sevinskii, op. cit., p.50). It may be that the division is geographic or by prime user. In any case it seems that the predominant portion of in- vestments in electric power stations is included in "industry"; in the period 19241932, 80-90% of total investments in electric power stations were included in "industry". (Table II, note 3). b. Soviet industry is divided into groups A and B. Group A industry produces producers' good's; group B industry produces consumers, goods. Where a branch of industry produces both consumers' and producers' goods, it is classified according to the "predominant destination of its output". (LEILL:_mumslinkin_InIg211122.7.1112nssish2skoi statistike, pp.107-1011 cf. Table XII, note 15, for the classification of branches of industry into groups A and B). c. Sector VI is stated to be investments for social, cultural and administrative purposes and to exclude such expenditures by economic minis- tries. (Second Five Year Plan, pp.558,559, Second Five Year Plan Fulfilment, p.71, Third Five Year Plan, p.225). Such expenditures by economic minis- tries appear in thesector in which the Ministry falls. (Socialist Con, struction.1922:1222, p.13 footnote 2; Table II, note 4; Table III, note 4 .Table XI and note 1.) The category labelled "All Social-Cultural Services" is re- ferred to by Soviet sources variously as: (1) "all social-cultural con- struction" (Socialist Construction 193)-1?38, p.115); (2) "housing, municipal, social-cultural and administrative construction" (Third Five Year Plan, p4119); and (3) "housing and municipal construction and con- struction for cultural and social purposes" (Second Five Year Plan, pp.558, 559). According to the last source, the category includes the following kinds of expenditures: (a) housing construction; (b) investments for the provision of municipal services; (c) construction for educational purposes; (d) construction for the training of cadres; (e) public health construction; and (f) construction for workers' supply (i.e. for the supply of commodities to employees of a given organization). In those cases w!..?.re the category, "all social-cultural services is itemized it should be noted that the components are housing, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4r1i?????????????.r. '' ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ??,Ir 8,ro ????????????..1...11.44.?? 00,1,0'1,^114yrr,. ' ?????????r????????????1011?MO.? rAMMINIbi????9 4???,....?o.M?14.41.410.0 004.????1?1?..6.i.irr 1.M.*,441,41?????1411.??? STAT 'age municipal services, education, public health and welfare but not adminis- tration (cf. Table III). It is believed that: (1) except for the Third Five Year Plan figures, "all social-cultural services" excludes adminis- tration; (2) except for the Third Five Year Plan figures, the difference between "all social-cultural services" and "social-cultural services and administration" consists of administration construction (on which, appar- ently, economic ministries spend little or nothing) and expenditures by economic ministries for social-cultural investments; and (3) in the Third Five Year Plan figures, the difference consists exclusively of expenditures by economic ministries for social-culturalinvestments. It is believed also that administrative construction probably includes the construction of military facilities and fortifications. (Cf. Table IX, note 3). d. "Agriculture" includes, in the First and Second Five Year Plan periods, "state financing of collective farm investments by loans from the Agricultural Bank". In the Third Five Year Plan, "agriculture" includes "state investments in agriculture above the basic plan of capital invest- ments". In the Fourth Five Year Plan, "agriculture" includes nor-central- ized as well as centralized investments. In all cases, "agriculture" excludes collective farms investments from their own resources. (Second Five Year Plan Fulfilment, p.71; Socialist Construction 10 -1 8, p.113; Third Five Year Plan, p.119; Fourth Five Year Plan, p.38). For reasons which will appear below (notes 3-5 to this table), I judge that in the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans the most important inclusion in "agri- culture" beyond centralized investments consists of bank loans to collec- tive farms. e. Since Agricultural Bank loans to collective farms are pri- marily for livestock expenditures, "agriculture" May be,presumed to include at least part of investments in livestock. In the Third and Fourth Five' Year Plan, state farm investments in draft livestock are explicitly in- cluded (Fourth Five Year Plan, p$38; V. Kabitskii? "Financing State Agricultural Enterprises", ,SovetskisIMIsi, 1940 No. 172,, p'60). Expenditures on "mature" livestock being fattened for slaughter are not considered to.be capital investments. (Cr. above, p.2,' footnote].). There seem to be two kinds of investments in livestock: (1) expenditures on the breeding and feeding of young livestock; (2) expenditures on the , purchase 'of livestock (and of buildings .for stock-rearing purposes). There is some evidence that the data on investments in "agriculture" .in- elude the latter but not the .former (Table IV, notes 4 and 6; Table. V, note 2). It is possible that purchases of livestock represent the bulk of investments in draft livestock. f. "Agriculture" excludes the private sector, i.e. particularly the individual homesteads of the collective farm member (Table IV, note 2). g "Transport" excludes local road construction, subway construc- tion, and local trolley systems. These items are included in "social- cultural services and administration" as "municipal services" construction. (Table XII, note 20). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104riRnn9nniannno Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Ap roved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 vie 4.44,10i,; STA h. "Communications" includes mail, telephone, telegraphi and. radio (Table II, note 1), i. Two general questions emerge in the discussion of the sector breakdown. First, what is the magnitude of investments in non-productive fixed capital .(cf. above, p. ) by economic organizations? Secondly, are the sector classifications mutually exclusive with respect to productive fixed capital? That is, are investments by, for example, agricultural'organ- izations in industry included in "industry" or "agriculture" and what is the magnitude of such integration? Scattered information on these questions will appear in a number of the tables below. Additional information will appear in Tables X and XI and the argument on these questions will be stated in the notes to Table X and XI. rage It is believed, unless otherwise noted, that similar sector break-downs in other tables have the same meaning. ' 2. Realized 1928/9-1932 investments, as reported in First Five Year Plan Fulfilment (p.280) are in billions of rubles: Total for Socialist Sector 52.5 a. Industry 2408 b. Agriculture 10.8 c. Transport 9.8 d. Communications 0.56 The difference between these figures and those presented in the table is accounted for by the facts that "transport" includes labor participation in road-building and "agriculture" includes collective farms' investments from their own resources. (Second Five Year Plan, p.376). 3. Realized 1933-1937 investments, exclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit investments, as reported by Third Five Year Plan (p.225) in- clude a figure of 14.619 billion rubles for agriculture. I suspect that the 11.334 figure presented in the table excludes and the 14.619 figure includes Agricultural Bank loans to collective farms. The figure for long- term loans to collective farms during the Second Five Year Plan period has been variously stated as 2,2-3 billion rubles. (Table VII, note 12). The observed discrepancy might be entirely explained by adding to loans to collective farms, state-financed extra-limit investments by state farms (and possibly machine tractor stations). The difference between the 14.619 billion rubles and the 16.760 billion rubles for agriculture (including extra-limit expenditures and capital repairs) presented in the table probably consists largely if not wholly of capital repairs. My feeling is that the 14.619 figure, however explained, has the same meaning (i.e. the same exclusions and inclusions) as the figures for "agriculture" In the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans. 4. Different figures for Third Five Year Plan investments have some- times been stated: a. Third Five Year Plan itself speaks of 181.0 billion rubles for total investments in the national economy and 10.7 billion for agriculture. It is clear, however, that these figures are derived by excluding "state investments in agriculture above the basic plan of capital investments" Declassified in Pad- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I Page 'which were planned to be 7.3 billion rubles. (Third Five Year Plan, pp.119, 197,225). Loans to collective farms were planned for this period to be about 6 billion rubles (Table VII, note 12). Since collective farms' investments from their own resources are stated as an addition to the 18 billion rubles for "agriculture", the predominant part of the 7.3 billion rubles must be loans to collective farms. The rest is probably .state financed extra-limit investments by state farms and, possibly, machine tractor stations. ' b. Various sources present the following figures (in billions of rubles): Total National Economy 1. Industry a. Group A 2. Agriculture 3. Transport ("Report and Concluding Remarks of Comrade V. Molotov", Problem Ekonomiki, 1939, No. 3, p.58. This source also contains the Third Five Year Plan data 181.0 for "total national economy" and 10.7 for "agriculture", - with no explanation of the difference between the two sets of data). It should be noted that 192-181 is approximately equal to 111.9-103.6 plus 3743-35.1; in other words, the other sector totals ("agriculture", "communications", "trade and procurement", and "social-cultural services and administration"), remain virtually Unchanged in the two sets of figures. .The present figures (192 for "total national economy", etc.) are stated to be in "actual esti- mate prices" (deistvuiushchikh smetnykh tsenakh). In view of the invariance of the other sector totals, it is extremely doubtful that "actual estimate pricms" could mean anything other than the 1936-7 prices, in which the Third Five Year Plan data are stated. 5. In the Fourth Five Year Plan, just as in the Third Five Year Plan, "agriculture" includes non-centralized and centralized investments. collec- tive farms' investments frem.their own resources are separate from, and in addition to, the 19.9 billion rubles of centralized and non-centralized investments in agriculture. Similarly, in the Third -Five Year Plan, .the collective 'farmst investments from their own resources were excluded from the id billion rubles of centralized and non-centralized Investments in agriculture.' Let us compare the specified inclusions of the 18 and 19.9 billion rubles 192 111.9 93.9 11 37.3 Third Five Year Plan Fourth Five Year Plan Machine tractor stations 5.3 8 8 Irrigation and land betterment 1.3 2.0 Draft livestock.in state lams' 215._ 2 Total 9.1. , 12..8 (V. KabutSkii, "Financing State Agricultural Enterprises" Sovetskie Finansy, 1940 No, 1-2, p.60; Fourth Five Year Plan, p.38). In the Third Five Year Plan, an additional 1.6 billion rubles represented centralized investments Inagriculture, and the remaining 7.3 billion rubles Were "state invest- ments in agriculture above the basic plan of capital investments". In view of the other components of agricultural investments, the 1.6 billion rubles probably represented investments (other than in draft liVestock). in state farms. :It should be noted that if we examine the proportions be- tween livestock and other investments in state farms for 1928-1935 (cf. note 7, Table IV), the implied proportions in the Third and, as, we shall see, the' Fourth Five Year Plans do not .seem unreasonable. STAI Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ;;;;Igoo....?44,44?W.41.4ii.44-44aih"m4A STAT Page 87 By historical analogy, we might estimate the remainder of centralized investments in agriculture for the Fourth Five Year Plan to be 1.3 billion rubles and regard this also as investments in state farms. Then the amount of noncentralized investments in "agriculture" for the Fourth Five Year Plan would be 5.8 billion rubles. Since collective farms' investments from their own resources are stated as an addition to the 19.9 billion rubles for "agriculture" in the Fourth Five Year Plan, a large part of the 5.1 billion rubles must be loans to collective farms. The realized figure for 1946-1950 loans (in current prices) seem to be in the neighborhood of 8 billion rubles (Table VII and note 12). One statement Implies that the entire 5.8 billion rubles are loans to collective farms. The statement is that: "Of the 7.1 billion rubles of state and collective farm resources desi nated b fialLIIi_s2,211eLsEj.truction in collective farms, the basic portion will go Loran increase of productive assets of agricultural importance...". (A. I. Kuropatldn, "Problems of Mechanizing .Socialist Agriculture", g2h2n12.1211611 p.132; my italics). The 47.1 billion ruble figure is pre- sumably obtained by subtracting the. 8.8 billion ruble figure for machine tractor stations and the 2 billion ruble figure for state farms from the 19.9 billion total for "agriculture" and adding collective farms'. invest- ments from their own resources. If so, the implication is that the irriga- tion and land betterment investments are for collective farms and that the rest of investments in "agriculture", 7.1 billion rubles, are state loans to collective farms because these are the only two ways in which the state directly aids collective farms. Actually, Kuropatkints statement seems unreasonable for it also implies no investments in state farms except for draft livestock. While state farms seem to have been de-emphasized in the Fourth Five Year Plan, I feel certain that the development of state farms could not have been arrested to this extent. It is, furthermore, undoubtedly true that par*. of the irrigation and land betterment investments benefit state farms as well as collective farms. (It may also be true that part of the 2 billion rubles for draft livestock in state farms actually are for other kinds of investments in state farms). My feeling is that Kuropatkin concocted the 47.1 billion ruble figure for investments in collective farms hastily and carelessly. The main burden of Kuropatkin's statement I take to be confirmation of the belief that a large part of the 5.8 billion rubles of non-centralized investments in "agriculture" consists of loans to collective farms. Since machine tractor stations are budget organizations (since 1938), their extra-limit investments, if any, are probably included in Fourth Five Year Plan non-centralized investments in "agriculture". It is very possible, however, that machine tractor stations make no extra-limit in- vestments; I have never seen mention of machine tractor stations in this connection. Since state farms have, on the whole, been unprofitable, budget grants for extra-limit investments by state farms are probably also included. Dar'. - Rnniti7Rd C0171111 ...1.11"1111111. :illy Approved for Releaseiiii:111111.111111111111111111111111111111.1111"1"@ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,..,L.Icissiriea in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09)06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? , STAT Page By historical analogy, we might estimate the remainder of centralized investments in agriculture for the Fourth Five Year Plan to be 1.3 billion rubles and regard this also as investments in state farms. Then the amount of noncentralized investments in "agriculture" for the Fourth Five Year Plan would be 5.8 billion rubles. Since collective farmsl'investments from their own resources are stated as an addition to the 19.9 billion rubles for "agriculture" in the Fourth Five Year Plan, a large part of the 5.3 billion rubles must be loans to collective farms. The realized figure for 1946-1950 loans (in current prices) seem to be in the neighborhood of 8 billion rubles (Table VII and note 12). One statement implies that the entire 5.8 billion rubles are loans to collective farms. The statement is that: "Of the 47.1 billion rubles of state and collective farm resources desi nated by the (fourthY five year plan for capital construction in collective farms, the basic portion will go for an increase of productive assets of agricultural importance...". (A. I. Kuropatidn, "Problems of' Mechanizing Socialist Agriculture", p.132; my italics). The 47.1 billion ruble figure is pre- sumably obtained by subtracting the 8.8 billion ruble figure for machine tractor stations and the 2 billion ruble figure for state farms from the 19.9 billion total for "agriculture" and adding collective farms! invest- ments from their own resources. If so, the implication is that the irriga-? tion and land betterment investments are for collective farms and that the rest of investments in "agriculture", 7.1 billion rubles, are state loans to collective farms because these are the only two ways in which the state directly aids collective farms. Actually, Kuropatkints statement seems unreasonable for it also Implies no investments in state farms except for draft livestock. While state farms seem to have been de-emphasized in the Fourth Five Year Plan, I feel certain that the development of state fame could not have .been arrested to this extent. It is, furthermore, undoubtedly true that part of the irrigation and land betterment investments benefit state farms as well as collective farms. (It May also be true that part of the 21Allion rubles for draft liVeetock in state farms actually are for other kinds of investments in state farms). My feeling is. that Kuropatkin Concocted the 47.1 billion ruble figure for investments in collective farms hastily and carelessly. The main burden of Kuropatkinls statement I take to be confirmation of the belief that a large part of the 5.8 billion rubles of non-centralized investments in "agriculture" consists of loans to collective farms. Since machine tractor station's are budget organizations (since 1938), their extra-limit investments, if any, are probably included in Fourth Five Year Plan non-centralized investments in "agriculture"., It is very. possible,' however, that 'machine tractor stations Make no extra-limit in, vestments; I have never seen mention of machine tractor statiens,in this connection. :Since state farms have, on the wholeo'been unprofitable, budget grants for extra-limit'investmente:by state farms are probably also included. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/0catnR ? /NA nmm., Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT age 8 In the Third Five Year Plan, loans to collective farms were to be about 6 billion rubles but all of this may not have been for investments in fixed capital (Table VII, note 12). Thus, extra-limit' investments by state farms and, possibly, machine tractor stations were to be something like 1.5-2.5 billion rubles in the.Third Fivs Year Plan. If we assume this range to be unchanged in the Fourth Five Year Plan, we obtain 3.5-4.5 billion rubles as loans to collective farms.' On other evidence (Table VII, note 12), this seems to be about the right magnitude. On balance, then, I obtain something like the following distribution of investments within agriculture (in billions of rubles): Third Five Year Plan Fourth Five Year Plan Centralized Investment.: 1. State Farms 2. Machine Tractor Stations 3. Irrigation & Land Betterment Non-centralized Investments: 1. State Farms 2. Machine Tractor Stations 3. Loans to Collective Farms Collective Farms' Investments from Own Resources. Total 4.15 5.25 1.3 2.5 0 4.8 24 to) nn 3.3 8.8 2.0 2 0 3.8 38 57.9 If my interpretations have been correct, the conclusions are: (a) as objects of investment, machine tractor stations have become relatively more important than state farms in the Fourth Five Year Plan; (b) both machine tractor stations and state farms have become of lesser importance than collective farms as objects of investment in the Third and especially the Fourth Five Year Plans; and (c) collective farm investments are being under- taken in the Fourth Five Year Plan with increased reliance on collective farms' own resources, with decreased reliance on loans froth the Agricultural Bank. Let us attempt to estimate the excluded sectors in the Fourth Five Year Plan. a. In the transport sector we have ?investments only in railroad transport. In order. to expand this figure to total transport, let us con- sider the pre-war ratios of total transport to railroad transport. These are: Realized 1928/9-1932 Realized 1929-1933 Plan 193371937 (in 1933 prices) Realized 1933-1937 (excluding extra-limit investments & capital Realized 1933-1937 (Including extra-limit investments & Capital Realized 1934-1938 (excluding extra-limit inveStMents & capital Realized 1934-1931 (including extra-limit investmentS & capital Planned 1931-1942 (excluding non-centralized investments) 140.0% 140.9% 151.7% repairs) 155.7% repairs) 148.8% repairs) 154.9% repairs) 147.9% 147.8% Since Fonrth Five'Year Plan investments exclude non-centralized investments (except in agriculture) one Would be inclined, to extrapolate the .Third Five Year Plan ratio of 148%. In my opinion, .this would be a mistake Investments neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I. a Page 89 in railroad transport as a percentage of total investments were higher in the Fourth Five Year Plan than in the Third Five Year Plan (Table I). At the same time, budget expenditures on transport and communications as a percen- tage of budget expenditures on the national economy were uniformly lower in 19464950 than in 1938-1940. (K. N. Platnikov, B,iudzhet'sotsialistichesko o alaalaLelyi - Budget of the Socialist State 1- 1948, p.207, A. G. Zverev, Gosudarstveurlyi biudzbet SSSICE:15777 Budget - 1946,.. p.18; A. G. Zverev, "On the USSR State Budget for 1948 and Fulfillment Of the USSR State Budget for 1946", Narodnoe khoziaistvo,? volume 2, 1946, a collection of articles and reports, pp.482-3; A. G. Zverev, 0 Gosudarstvennom biudzheteSSSR.Lob ispolnenli rylesobietaSSSRza 948 i949 gp4 - On the USSR State Budget for 1950. and Fulfillment of the USSR.State Budge_tfor._1.i.L..._2.423&1 - 1950, p.12). Therefore, I concludes investments in railroad transport constitute a larger percentage of invest- ments in total transport than in the immediately pre-war period. Accordingly, I propose to use a ratio al_ 1/3 in Order to eXpand railroad transport to total transport. Investments in total transport would then be 53.5 billion rubles. b. Subtracting the figures for industry, agriculture, and transport, from the total we obtain for communications, trade and procurement and , social-cultural services and administration combined 19.4 billion rubles. This, however; seems unreasonably small in comparison with pre-war years. c. The trouble with the 19.4 billion rubles figure is' probably that the 250.3 billion rubles for the "total socialist sector of national economy" exclude the non-centralized investments in agriculture just as in the Third Five Year Plan the total of 181.0 billion rubles excluded state investments in agriculture above the basic plan of capital investments. If we accept the estimate in note 5 of 5,8 billion rubles for non-centralized investments in "agriculture" and add this to "total socialist sector of national economy", we obtain the 'following sector break-down: Total Socialist Sector of National Economy 256.1 Industry 157.5 Agriculture 19.9 Transport 53.5 Communications Trade and Procurement 25.2 Social-Cultural Services and Administration This estimate is, of course, conjectural. STK 7. The 1938-1940 and 1938-1941 totals include non-centralized invest- ments (Table VI, notes 3 and 5). Non-centralized investments in the "4 war years" are assumed to be virtually zero (Table VI, note 2). Since the 193$-1940 and 1938-1941 data are characterized as the "volume of capital investments", they are probably in 1936-7 prices'. (On the Meaning of "volume of capital investments", cf, above, pp. 3.-5, and Table VI, note on the 1938-1941 data cf. Table VI, notes 1,3 and 5). The "4 war years" total is probably in prices of the respective years (Table VI. note 1). Planned l93-.1942 investments are stated by Third Five Year Plan to be in 1936 prices I assume that all such references are elliptically to Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0075oni qnnn9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? , the estimate prices in force at that period. I have to 1936-37 prices where Soviet sources refer to 1936 p.4 and footnote 7). 8. Fourth Five Year Plan investments of 250 billion rubles are divided into: (a) capital investments for "new construction" - 135 billion rubles; and (b) capital investments for "reconstruction" - 115 billion rubles. (Atlas istorii USSR - - edited by K. V. Bazilevich, I. A. Colubtsov and M. A. Zinov'ev, Part III, 1950, p.50): The source also indicates: (a) the location and type of basic industrial enterprises designa- ted by the Fourth Five Year Plan as objects of construction and reconstruc- tion; (b) the railroads designated by the Fourth Five Year Plan as objects of construction, reconstruction, and electrification; (c) the location of the most important irtigation equipment to be constructed during the Fourth Five Year Plan; and (d) the canals to be reconstructed and the gas pipe- lines to be constructed durinp the Fourth Five Year Plan.(Ibid., pp.49-50. am indebted to T. Shabad for pointing out this source to me Page accordingly referred prices. (Cf. above; STA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043Rnn7s1)n1cannn9_st MEMMIE Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ' rage yl CAPITAL 3:NVESTMETTS B'E SECTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONC-1r LaCLUDING PRIVATE DivEsTmENg 1924-1934 (In prices or the respective years; in ni.11ions of rubles) 1925-1926 1933 125.5 679 1?60.4 1879.7 192.7 .0.6 10431.2 1947 8692 ? Agriculture biding nonproductive in- eats. 3. A. State Sector 28. 10 .Machine Tractor Stations B. Collectivized Sector j 39 Transport A. Railroad 220 B. Water 27. C. Road 24.4s D. Civil Aviation 20.3 165.7 213?4 715.0 85.4 60.0 731.0 94.8 76.0 3.5 873 168 128 10 266 1520 113 660 1112 289 224 35 320 2530 405 475 292 2300 826 178 414 2788 1052 190 368 335 180 3084 2107 494 376 107 2928 745 548 174 20.8 51.1 445.0 Public Health. 21 C. Ak&inistration and Special Construction Projects ? Az1icip31 Services E. Housing Construction 64.7 800.5 130.0 99.0 61.0 230.7 279.8 Vital, for National Economy. (=lasive of private in- egiestment) xi a addition: ,1. Collective fana and coop- erative ilLIVOI3i211611t3 fran their atm resources and with thoir own labor. a.. Collective farms only Participation of labor in road building. 5804. 9255.3 - . Aittlaistriaticsa at, raft0=11.42 and &vial inatiatica of the trb3R State CouP,=zsacga 1936, pp. 346-7. (Hereinafter referred to as So.ek_lai rt Constrvtion 1236. A. a stnation of Economic and Social Statistics of the USSR State Planning Ccralissiort e Moscow 1934, pp. 300-1. (Hereinafter- referred to as 13.....422.1.1,.........qtatjasuillik. 928 data are tram Socj.alikt Construction 1934; 1929-1934 data are from .....alibitftA_......24aataga426.22X Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 LCIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 6,141.4.1???????.. ??? 4.14.!.." Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 M., ???? SOURCES: Central Administration of Economic and Social Statistics of the USSR State Planning Commission (TSUNKHU), Socialist_ Construction in the 11SR (In English), Moscow 1936, pp.346-7. (Hereinafter referred to as Socialist Construction 1936). Central Administration of Economia and Social Statistics of the USSR ?State Planning Commissiontsialisticheskoe_stroitellstvo SSSR (Socialist Construction in the USSR., 'Moscow 1934, pp.3004. (Hereinafter referred to as .LS11111212E11.1129.11211_1220.' 1924/5-1928 data are from Socialist Construction 1; 19294934 data are from Socialist ConstilgI42D:1E. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01n4f1Pnn9Cnni annry, 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? NOTES TO TABLE II 1. In the sector break-down the following explanations should be noted: a. "Industry" excludes industrial enterprises of non-industrial ministries. b. "Agriculture" excludes live-stock breeding (which amounted to 1 billion rubles for 1929-1932). Socialist Construction 1 6 states that agricultural expenditures are state budget expenditures. Cf. also Table IV, note 6). c. "Transport" includes some industrial productive transport. Neither .S.I.t...colction...12,2A nor Socialist Construction 1936 mentions this. However, another source, which presents identical figures for "trans- port" as Socialist Construction 1234 and Socialist Construction 1936, does indicate this inclusion. (Cenral Administration of Economic and Social Statistics of the USSR State Planning Commission, Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel/- stvo SSSR - Socialist Construction in the USSR - pp.464-465). The source does not explain the meaning of industrial productive transport. But from the knowledge that republican ministries of automobile transport operate motor pools, garages and repair shops we may conclude that some por- tion of capital expenditures on industrial trucks and automobiles are in- cluded in "transport". (L. Bronshtein and B. Budrin, Planirovanie i Uchet Automoil/nogo Trpnsporta - &_Planninand3.2.92intijiforAutsrt - Gosplanizdat 1948, pp.13-19). d. "Communications" includes mail, telephone, telegraph, and radio. e. "Trade and procurement" excludes investments in industrial en- terprises.. . f. The category, "social-cultural services and administration", does not appear in Socialist Construction 121L or Socialist Construction 1936; the total is obtained by adding the indicated components. g. Education and public health, exclude investments of iriustrial ministries for these purposes. h. Housing includes only municipal and cooperative housing; investments by industrial or agricultural enterprises in housing are included in "industry" or "agriculture". (Cf. Socialist Construction 193/t, pp.300-1, Socialist Construction 1536., Pp.346-7). 2. Socialist Construction 122A omits subdivision of cooperative indus- try into groups A and B. Accordingly, the group A data for 1924/5 through 1928 are understated. But total investments in cooperative industry were small for these years - 10.2 million rubles in 1924/5 and 32.7 in 1928. For 1929-19344 group A state industry is &Med to group A cooperative industry to yield the indicated group A total. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 3. Socialist Constaitim_1214 (pp.300-1) gives the following data for investments in electric power stations (in millions of rubles): 1926-27 1924 1925 and to to Oct-Dec 15211921___1232.1928 1222.1211.12.31_1232 Total electric power stations 94.8 116.2 170.4 217.8 308 1 457.0 612.9 803.7 a. Regional stations 75.4 92.2 137.8 176.2 250.9 394.5 549.6 719.0 t. Municipal stations 17.0 21.0 28.6 36.7 47.1 46.9 39.6 58.0 c. Agricultural stations 2.4 3.0 4.0 4.9 10.1 15.6 23.7 26.7. Socialist Construction 1936 does not present this data. In the present table, regional stations were allocated to industry, municipal stations to munici- pal services, and agricultural stations to agriculture. It is observed that such allocations result in the Socialist Construction 1936 data except for agriculture.. In the case of agriculture, the discrepancies are minor and in both directions. Thus, 92 1930 191 32 Total Socialist Construction lnli 907.8 21743 3057.1 2954.0 9093.2 with agricultural stations Socialist Construction 122. 80 2180 3005 301 9076 Within industry, electric power stations are added to group A. (Slovar'- ?_pravochnik sotsiallno-ekonomicheskoi statistike, p.105). 4. Of the total investments in 1928, 891 million rubles in the fourth quarter wer Included in the First Five Year Plan fulfillment data. (Social- ist Construction 1214, pp.3004). If we total the annual sector data for 1929-32 and compare the totals with First Five Year Plan sector fulfillment data, (cf.. Table I and note 2 to Table I) we obtain the following results: Industry Agriculture (excluding investments by collective farms and cooperative farms from own resources Transport (excluding labor participation in road-building) Communications Trade and Procurement Social-cultural services and administration Total for Socialist Sector of National Economy (1929-32) Plus fourth quarter of 1928 Total for 1928/9-1932 Total Total (Socialist Construction) (First Five Year Plan) (in billions of rubles ) 24.58 9.08 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 9.01 .56 .88 4.92. 49.03 49.92 24.8 01 7s 1 8.9 .56 .94 5,59 50.5 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001 qnnn9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 .4 STAT The discrepancy in the "agriculture" totals is probably explained by a difference in treatment of cooperative farm investments. Socialist .glauLEILL12212_12)1). presents the following data on investments from own re- sources by collective farms and cooperative farms (in millions of rubles): 1,922.1232j...9.21.1.222 Total ...1112:1M Collective farms and cooperative farms -- 41e 640 769 1819 Collective farms only (Table II) -- 170 385 515 1070 For the First Five Year Plan fulfillment data investmentsfrom own resources by collective farms of 1126 million rubles were stated to be in addition to "a7iculture" totals. Since the 1930-1932 fure of 1070 for collective farms is virtually the entire amount of their investments from their own resources, and since cooperative farms invested an additional 693 million rubles (subtracting 1126 fror 119), it is very likely that the discrepancy in the "agriculture" totals is explained by the inclusion of cooperative farm investments from their own resources in the "agriculture" total for the First Five Year Plan period. (It shouJi be noted that the Socialist Construction "agriculture" data in Table IV can be reconciled with First Five Year Plan fulfillment data and that the former includes cooperative farm investments - cf. Table IV, note 6). The correspondence between the two sets of totals indicates that cov- erage and breakdown of the data are virtually the same. Since the sector breakdown of the Socialist Construction data includes nonproductive invest- ments in at least industry and agriculture, it follows that the First Five Year Plan fulfillment data also include nonproductive investments in industry and agriculture. 5. The sector breakdown of "expenditures for special purposes" can be obtained from Table VI by placing the ministry or department in what appears to be the appropriate sector. Thus, (in millions of rubles), 1. Ministry of Heavy Industry 2. Ministry of Light Industry 3. Ministry of Timber Industry 4. Ministry of Food Industry 5. Ministry of Local Industry 6. Ministry of Internal Trade 7. Ministry of Foreign Trade 8. Ministry of Agriculture 9. Ministry of State Farms 10. Ministry of Railroad Transport 11. Ministry of Water Transport 12 Central Highways Administration 13. Chief Administration of Civil Air Fleet 14. Ministry of Postal and Electrical Communications 15. Committee for Products Collection Attached to Council of Ministers 1933. 1224 670 746 15 38 37 75 8 37 3 eV OM 3 3 9 31 25 31 25 129 6 22 64 9 9 6 awe& 3 Sector Allocation Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Trade and Procurement Trade and Procurement Agriculture Agriculture Transport Transport Transport Transport Communications Trade and Procurement Ems.= Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 16. Chief Administration of Photo & Cinema Industry 17. Special Construction Projects and Administration Total. Adding by sectors, we obtain: Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade and Procurement Social-cultural & Administration Total 1933 1934 2 _212 1275 1696 1933 1n4 730 901 62 50 15 224 6 3 15 ..01 _222 1275 1696 The sector breakdown including expenditures for becomes: Industry Agriculture Transport Cor munications Trade and Procurement 1221 1934 (b93 2540 3099 184 375 11525 3028 4619 284 522 Social-cultural & Administration 2164 3467 Total 17955 23445 Sector AUocatq Industry Social-cultural and Administration special purposes then This sector breakdown bears a closer correspondence to that in Table III than does the sector breakdown exclusive of expenditures for special purposes. The differences which remain may be due to differences in coverage or to erroneous sector classifications of expenditures for specL1 purposes. . 6. Expenditures for special purposes (tselevye zatraty) are not de- fined in Soviet sources, so far as I know. As a stadstical category, they appear in 1933 and are not mentioned after the realized 1933-1937 data. Since the two sets of realized 1933-1937 investments are sometimes stated as excluding or including extra-limit investments, capital repairs, and expenditures for special purposes (Second Five Year Plan Fulfillment, p.72) and sometimes as excluding or including just extra-limit expenditures and capital repairs (Third Five Year Plan, p.225), it may be tentatively concluded that expenditures for special purposes are somehow related to capital repairs and/or (as antecedents of) extra-limit investments. 7. It is possible to extend the series in.the present table one year in both directions with confidence that the coverage is the same. Thus, another source presents figures from 1923/4 through 1935 on investments in: (a) socialist sector of national economy; (b) industry; (c) agriculture; (d) transport; and (e) railroad transport. (IKE, Strana sotsializma - USSR, The Land of SocialisM - 1936, p.8). The figures for 19245117ough 1934 check with the Socialist Construction data including collective and 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 cooperative farm investments from own resources, including labor participa- tion in road building and excluding expenditures for special purposes* The data for 1923-1924 and 1935, then, are (in millions of rubles): ? 19234924 1215. I. Industry ?' 355 11880 II, Agriculture 56 4983 III. Transport 214 6097 A. Railroad 178 ? 4038 IV. Other (by subtraction from annual total). 236 4733 Total for national economy 861 ? 27693 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 TABLE Int CAPITAL INVESTMITS BY SECTORS OP THE NATIONAL re?Nola, 1933-1937 (In prices of the respective years; in billicxas of rubles ? . Realized 1733 Planned 1934 Realise 1934 Planned 1935 Planned 1935 ----- Realizpd 1935 .12.542d 3.0.53.6d Planned 1936 13.956b i.o.647b Plarniedl 1936 16.2996 12.9773 liminary 1936 14.259d 11.510d Planned 1937 3.3.923d 3.0.93.9d. I.I . Industry ; -A. Group .A. ,- -l 10.030a 8.400a 11.834a - 9.617a 11?695-b 9.6311D 10 543a 8.481a 12.205f 9.986' Agriculture A. Atate.Fanns B. Machine -Tractor Stations 2.100a 1.025a .713a 2.523a. 1.205a .869a 2.4741) 101541 ' .890c 1.897a .750a .925a .2.239' 2.297d 4MI ? 2.6331 2?8573 2.577d 2.659d III.- Transport - A. Railroad B.- Water C Road 3.015a 2.065a ? 520a 0330a 4.826a 3.249a .852a - 4.2501) 2.7577e. ? 785' .5601) 5.030a 3.557a .697a .44aa 5.455r 3-843! 1.029' .458f 50455d 3.7521 1.122" - 7.173b 4.76213 1-533b .615b 7.928e 5.140? 1-737e 6.922d 4.4284 1.540 7.3704 5.323d - 1.2104 - (Die Ccomnraications .202a .310a. .278b .286a .305 .300d .393b -.3454 ?370d- V. Trade and Procurement .238a .428a .486b .456a .552f .562d 1.0466 . .9044 .7954 Social-Cultural Services 3.566g 7.527b 7.773g 6.743g 747Lit _ 32.5934 6.73.712 2.425 1.813d 1.4544 1.025d .And -Administration 2.4a4A .._. 3.604g 3.443b 2.978a 4.306f .. .. .. .. .., .... . ?,. ... _ r-3, Erazuzz 24.7224 4.310h 1.930d 1.400d .5!50d 0430d 32,365b 6.9201 3.065b 1.885b 1.278b ?70013 . 36.343e - - - - 31.7504 - 6.300h 2.400d 1.8C04 1.300d - .SOOd Total for liaticsial Economy 17?989a Including: 1., _All- Social-Cultural Services 2.71411 a. City -& industrial housing 1..343a b. Municipal services, ?750a c. -Educatioa . .346a -d. Public health, pensionS and relief ? .275a . 23.525a - 22.626b 3.802h 1.729? .1.283P ?430b ? 360b 21.1 90a 24.842; 3.85011 4.47011 1.82,7a 2.02; f . 1.143a 1.44-7f ?437a .530: ? 41.3a 0470f a.. State Planning Commission of the USSR,.n.a.E.a...2.ftstrirtve_sma_s .2151 kos.cow 1935, p? 460? Hereinafter referred to as 1935 Plaz. ? b. State PlanniriE Ccannission of the USSR, rodai8tLe nv Ian 2234 NatEcon c for 1916), MOSCOW, 19369 pp. 504-505. Hereinafter referred to as 122?.3.12A. .0 These are preliminary, with a preliminary total for agriculture of 2.458. /535 J1n. p. 460. State Planning Commission- of the USSR? for 1937)? Moscow, 1937, pp. 142-143. Hereinafter referred to as 22232_6124a. e. "Basic Indices of the National Economic Plan for 1937,n rka2v...0-3tm,? 1937. No? 32 pro? 222-248. The 1936 Plan, stated in this source, includes changes introduced after the plan was confirmed. npriassified in Part- Sanitized COPY Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT SOURCES: a. State Planhing Co:mission of the US3R, (Gonplan) Narodno-hhoziaistve (Nationallm9g121112_1(a_12227TMoscow 1935, p.4 Hereinafter referred to as 122221E. State Planning Commission of the USSR, (Gosplan) Narodno-khoziaistve plan na 1936 pod (National Economic Plan for 19i3Moscow, 1936, pp.504-505. Hereinafter referred to as 196 Plan. c. These are preliminary, with a preliminary total for agriculture of 2,4. 1-215.21111, P?4600. d. State Planning Commission of the USSR, (Gosplan) Narodnokhoziaistvenn pLsal.nSSSC7?od (USSR National Economic Plan for 122), Moscow, 1937, pp.142-143. Hereinafter referred to as 1211.1211. e. "Basic Indices of the National Economic Plan for 1937", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1937 No. 3, pp.222-248. The 1226 21.211, as stated in this source, includes changes introduced after the plan was confirmed. f. 1226E1E, p.391. The 1935 Plan, as stated here, includes changes after the plan was confirmed. By subtraction from annual totals. h. Ey addition of indicated components. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 a NOTES TO TABLE III 11936_ Plan and 122121m state the following exclusions in the annual capital investments: a. Expenditures of industrial cooperatives and trade and procure- ment organizations for the acquisition of small equipment and for small repairs; b. Expenditures on live-stock breeding and on the acquisition of draft live-stock to replace live-stock which have been discarded or sold or which have perished; c. Expenditures on housing repairs; d. Capital investments from own resources of collective farms and collective farm members; e. Capthil investments from long-term loans to collective farms; f. 'Labor participation in road construction. (1936 Plan, pp. 504-5; 1937 Plan, pp.142-3). The exclusions refer to real- ized 1933,1934 and 1935 totals, to planned and preliminary 1936 totals and to planned 1937 totals. 1226 E1m, further, states that the exclusions amounted to 1.718 billion in 1933 and 2.891 billion in 1934. 2. Sector VI is stated to be construction for social, cultural and administrative purposes and to exclude such expenditures in the plans of industry and other economic sectors. (193) Plan, p.460; 1226 Plan, pp.504-5). The same sources indicate that the complete total of social-Cultural invest- ments is given in items 1.1a-d, of the table. The total, indicated in the table, for "All Social-Cultural Services" was obtained by addition of the indicated components. Comparing these figures with the figures for "Social-Cultural Services and Administration" (which . are exclusive of such investments by economic ministries), one is struck by: (a) the absence of discrepancies of the magnitude observed for 1933-1937 in Table I; and (b) the fact that for some years the figure for "All Social- Cultural Services" is less than the figure for "Social-Cultural Services and Administration". , The explanation probably is that in the sources for the present table "All Social-Cultural Services" is meant literally, i.e. is exclusive of investments for administrative purposes. If these were added to "All Social-Cultural", it is believed that the result would be in accord with the results of Table I for realized 1931-1937. 3. "Munir!ipal services" includes investments in subway construction, the urbap trolley and transport system, municipal Water supply, city sanita. tion and the sewage system, bath-houses and laundries, electric power . stations and transmission lines, gas works, and local roads (Table XII, note 20). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT In 1933-1937, investments in "municipal services", exclusive of extra- remit investments were 6.5 billion rubles (Table XII, note 20). Totalling investments in "municipal services" for realized, 1933, 1934 and 1935 and planned 1936 and 1937, we obtain 7.1 billion rubles. The difference is probably accounted for by the exclusion of extra-limit investments in the 6.5 fitrure and by differences between plan and realization in 1936 and 1937. 4. The totals are indicated to be the volume (ob'em) of capital work. For these years, however, the totals are believed to be in prices of the respective years. For one thing, no reference has been found to the use of other than current prices as estimate prices before 1938. In addition, 1935 Plan contains the following passage: "In 1935, the rolume of expendi- tures on capital construction is established at 21,190 million rubles. This stabilization of the amount of financing of construction in comparison with 1934 (the preliminary total in 1934 was 21,500 million) corresponds to the tasks of 1935 in the matter of a further strengthening of the ruble, development of commodity circulation and lowering of prices. One should emphastze that fulfillment of the task established by the 1935 Plan - to lower the cost of pure construction by 125 ... and to lower prices on equipment by 4i - should result in an increase of the phyeieel volume of construction in comparison with 1934 by about 8%." (pp.301-2). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 TABLE IV: CAPITAL INVES -ea. S IN SOCIALIST AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, 1928..a935 millions of rubles; in prices of the respective years) State farms & coopera- tive farms Machine Tractor Statio $ Socialist Agricultural Ente rise 1929 State farms & coopera- tive farms (Data in Parantheses are State faxis & co-opera- t ghrms .....112TEggs_lence ? Machinery and Implements A. Agricultural Machinery and Implements B. Tractors C. Vehicles J.W.c ? Moti_1orel_ 20.0 (9.6 (3.6 4.2 206.6 (3.18.6 (41.1 (33.9 69.0 (29.4 (15.5 (14.8 est-ock, Poultry, Apiaries ___LIL.1tAMAItures on Acquisition of Livestock and Buil L--LIFIA-Attterne Buildings and Equipnent of Agricultural Electric Per Stajons Buildings, Equipment and Inventory of Industrial Enterprises At_ft_RILr shore 30.8 _(16.7 255.2 202.6 "Waal Investments in Basic Means of Production i.e. productive fixed assets) 2. Total Investments in Fixed Assets (1. -11- Housing and other Nonproductive Fixed Assets) 3. Total Capital Investments (2. 4- Migration Expenditures an Expenditures on the Organization of Land Exploitation) Includtag: Capital Investments of Cooperative Farms 11111111.1111111111111111111 336.8 357.1. 402.2 3.4 90.9 109.0 2.09.0 15.3 68.5 70.7 81.2 102.2 751.4 783.8 8487.7 36.8 232.3 260.2 260.2 (174) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 26.3 219.9 224.0 266.4 245.8 2116.9 2397.9 2685.2 88.1 865.8 1101.6 1169.1 (88.6) 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Collective arms State far= Machine & coopora- Tractor Collective t ve farm St t ons Farms State farms & coopera- tive f rn }achin Socia1ist Tractor CollectivcAgricultur Stations arm Socialist Collective. Agricultural F rms rises 967.8 380.5 (447.1 (154.6 (208.2 (80.0 (237.9 (101.0 1.2 340.2 (144.5 (126.0 _Jlt:' 596.2 (211.5 (250.9 (109.0) 939.7 688.2 398.4 222. 8,6 1075.9 (462.4) 1604.7 563.2 f613.7) 18 0 1..0 15.0 67.1 16.3 310.2 3407.9 3700.1 3882.6 91.8 1516.4 1782.6 1847.8 (206.3) 334.5 357.5 377.5 57.7 992.6 998.6 1033.7 315.7 3861.6 4217.0 .1 245.9 1730.1 2040.1 2191.7 (264.2) 159.1 0 568.1 589.3 589.3 56.0 1345.4 1358.3 1358.3 119.0 4413-6 4705.6 4841.9 43.8 1505.5 1739.9 1814.0 (123.5) 0 61.0 788.6 1999.7 827.0 2029.7 827.0 2090.0 150.5 5357.0 5775.1 5828.3 dr 1011111111111111111111111111111011.11111111110 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - - - lective Met Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-.Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Socialist Agricultural to prises 1 17.O. ]011.8 1934 State farms & coopera- tive farms Machine Tractor Stations 19.4 1699.2 88.4) (455.9) (1.0) (674.4) 03.4) (3854) 181.1 2020.6 556.3 (140.0) (-45.3) (113.8) 10.2 1935 Socialist Collective Agricultural t4 *rises II 0 86 State farms & coopera- tive trms Machine Tractor tations Collective anis 752.0 (1841 (428.0 05.8 86 3340 (134.6) (0.8) (168.9) 3. 2160.8 (531.7 1046.2 (433.2 22 521.6 (117.1) (260.5) (106.2) ? 1176.0 416.8 (217.3) (195.0) (779.2) (0.8) (128.1 (186.0 1 8.6 66 31.2 1121.4 199'6.8 7624 23.4 1247.4 1,0 16.0 62.0 I 309.9 61.0 9916 297 0 150.5 5357.0 5775.1 reinel n 3040s) 15.2 .354.8 '367.7 (153.6) 103.8 (.O. .811 87.9 , .5 995.0 1049.3 1074.5 20 84.1 91.5 2186.4 2226.4 2226.4. 6.0 233 163.2 . 5571.2 5881.3 5881.3 28,0 81.4 62.5 1705.7 1932.4 1932.4 (77.8) ,41.3 1283.6 1305.5 1305.5 92.0 100.0 2417.2 2462.2 2462.2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-"(r 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDI;81-61 6-4i14 66H5-6-1 6666 S Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ; SOURCES: STAT 1928-1931 data from .Socls.14Lt.gczAL_.uctioi..2,2411, pp.168,169,170,171. 1932-1933 data from ?pci_ji1i_.stconstr.221, pp.287,288,289,290. 1934-1935 data from Socialist Construction-1.21, P?243,244,245,246. As ha:, been indicated above (sources for Table II), Socialist Construc- tion 12'6 is in English. The Russian version - TSUNKHU, Sotsialisticheskoe stroiteltstvo SSSR (Socialist Construction of the USSR), Moscow 1936 -.is . not identical with the English version. (Let us refer to the Russian version as Sotsialisticheskoe stroitellstvo 1 16). Sotsialisticheskoe stroitellstvo 122_ has tables of capital investments in agriculture for all the years 192971935; the English version has only the years 1928, 1932, 1934, 1935. There are some discrepancies in the figures but 411 are minor. The list of notes to the tables in the Russian version has been eliminated in the English version. The present table and its sources have been preserved on the grounds that: (1) .s.S.g.L.11,214.2s.q.122.11.4.1.9.14 and nSocialistColtaqg2E_1222 pre- sent more information for the years covered than Sotsialisticheskoe stroitell stv0.1936; and (2) the discrepancies in the figures between the Russian and English versions are few and minor. Since the notes to the tables have been eliminated in the English ver- sion, we will have occasion to refer to the Russian 'version in this and other tables. In all cases, references to the English version will be denoted by Socialist Construction 1931 and to the Russian version by Sotsialisticheskoe 4 P ?l93. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002506166662-8' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ii jV 11,Sii j Jc") 0 NOTES TO TABLE IV age; 1, 1935 data are preliminary. (29121.111112.112h2?at_tLult.1221112_1236, p.243). 2. Socialist agricultural enterprises are stated to include: a. Enterprises of the state sector - i.e. "state farms of all systems of union, republic, and local jurisdictions, machine tractor stations and machine tractor repair shops and other economic oreanizations within the Jurisdiction of agricultural ministries and servicing agricultural production"; b. Collective farms but only with respect to collectivized produc- tion, i.e. excluding production in the individual homesteads; c. Cooperative farms (koopkhozy). (Sotsialistichelliat_elE211.211atm2216., p.706). Cooperative farms were the fame of the Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives (Tsentrosoius") and farms cooperatively owned by the workers of various enterpri3e5 to supply themselves with food. As the data 1222.pozy were of some importance in the early years of collectiviza- tion but became far less important after 1932. This was at least in part due to the formation of Workers' Supply Departments in non-agricultural organizations which ran state farms for the provision of food to employee:: of the organization. (Cr. note 5 below). 3. Capital investments include capital repairs and exclude redis- trihutions of fixed assets within the socialist sector of agriculture. (3otsialisticheskoe stroitellstvo 1936, p.706; Slovart-spravochlk.22 sotsialino, Ekonomicheskoi statistike, pp.250-137 4. The amount of capital investments in livestock is determined by the value of young stock (i.e. by expenditures on livestock until "maturity") plus the value of the net increase per year of young stock plus expenditures on the acquisition of livestock (Sotsialisticheskoe stroiteltstvo 1936, p.7v,). Such investments apparently include expenditures on buildings for stock-breeding purposes. (Cf. item III A in table). 5. The data for 1932-1935 include capital investments in state farms owned by Workers' Supply Departments of all organizations. (Socialist Construction 196, p.246). Workers' Supply Departments (Otdel rabochego snabzheniia) are branches of non-agricultural enterprises which procure, produce and distribute various commodities to the workers of the particular enterprise. 6. Let us attempt to reconcile the data in the present table with "agriculture" data from other sources. a. The data in Table II were stated to exclude livestock breeding (note 1 to Table II). Expenditures on "mature" livestock being fattened for slaughter or, presumably, used for draft purpose's sre not ' 1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4 considered to be capital investments; capital investments are stated to be confined to the formation and replacement of draft and productive livestock herds (cf. above, p. 1 footnote 1). There seem to be two kinds of invest- Ihents in livestock (including buildings for stock-rearing purposes): (1) expenditures on the breeding and feeding of young livestock; (2) expendi- tlages on the purchase of livestock. In the present table we find data for investments in "livestock, poultry, and apiaries" (item III) and, as a sub- total of the former, "expenditures on the acquisition of livestock and builiings" (item III A). There is no evidence that poultry and apiaries as such are considered to be fixed capital; the reference must be to buildings used for these purposes. In any case, the difference between item III and item III A would seem to represent livestock breeding and feedinc expenditures by agricultural organizations which intend to use the livestock for its own draft or productive purposes. I add the last clause because without it there would be double counting. If, for example, state breeding farms which sell livestock were to consider increments in young stock as invest- ment the buyers of such livestock would also consider the purchase an in- vestment expenditure and the itm would be counted twice. Moreover, since Item III is not twice (or more) item III A and since little, if any, purchases of livestock from individual peasants occurred in the period considered, it follows that in fact there is no double counting involved. Let us subtract from "livestock, poultry, and apiaries" (item III) the "expenditures on the acquisition of livestock and buildings" (item III A). The result is (in millions of rubles): 1928 1212. 1222 1221 1221 1222 17.6 39.6 107.1 251.5 613.5 991.0 This series is taken to represent expenditures on livestock breeding for use (as vs. sale). It should be noted that these figures total 1.01 billion rubles for 19294932, which is the magnitude of livestock breeding stated to be excluded from the 1929-1932 data 'In Table II (cf. Table II, note 1). From Table II we obtain the following data (in millions of rubles): 1.12L;_y:L21.12212.?4.(YM9'1102111 Investments in "agriculture" Collective Farm and Cooperative Investments from their own. Resources and with their own Labor 10 6 0 6 2.1681 Total Investments in Agriculture 384.0 840 2590 3.45 3820 3900 4 1 384.0 840 2180 3005 3051 2478 2978 For comparison we obtain from the present table "total capital investments" from which we subtract the livestock breeding expenditures obtained above (item III - item III A) with the following results: 928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 "Total capital investments" 402.2 887.7 2685.2 3882.6 4411.1 4841.9 5828.3 Livestock breeding expenditures 17.6 39.6 107.1 251.5 613.5 991.0 Total capital investments minus livestock breeding expenditures 384.6 848.1 2578.1 3631.1 3797.-6 3850.9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019000243 . . STAT The two series so obtained, "total investments in agriculture" from Table II and total capital investments minus livestock breeding expenditures from Tat,le III, are virtually the same. Thus we conclude that although the data in Table II exclude livestock breeding expenditures they do not exclude expenditures on the lcquisition of livestock and buildings. The reasons for such treatment are not clear. Perhaps, the difficulties and ambiguities of statistics on expenditures for breeding young livestock account for their exclusion.. Perhaps the intention is to include, in so far As possible, only draft livestock and draft liveetock represents the ,bulk of livestock purchases (i.e. livestock bred for meat, etc., are retained by the enterprise until slaughtered). b. If we add "total capital investments" for 1929-1932, we ob- tain 11.8 billion rubles. Total investments in "agriculture", from Table I, were 9.7 billion rubles in 1928/9-1932. If we add to this capital invest- ments of collective farms from their own resources (1.126 billion rubles, from Table I), we obtain only 10.8 billion rubles. The problem is to account for ene difference. My belief is that the "agriculture" data in Table I for 1928/9-1932 exclude livestock breeding expenditures but include expenditures on the acquisition of livestock. "Livestock breeding expen- ditures" for 1929-1932 were 1.012 billion rubles (cf. above, this note). If we subtract this figure from "total capital investments" for 1929-1932, we obtain 10.8 billion rubles. It is concluded that investments in "aericulture" in 1928/9-1932 exclude livestock breeding expenditures but ? include expenditures on the acquisition of livestock. (Cf. Table 1, note 1; Table II, note 4). c. In Table III, investments in "agriculture" were stated to be 2.100 billion rubles for 1933 and 2.474 billion rubles for 1934. These figures explicitly exclude investments in livestock, and collective farms' investments from their own resources and from state loans. If we,attempt to duplicate these figures from the present table by calculatingl("total capital investments" in socialist agricultural enterprises --- "total capital investments" in collective farms) 4-- (investments in livesteck, poultry, and apiaries of collective farms) , we obtain 2.168 billion rubles for. 1933 and 2.702 billion rubles for 1934. The discrepancies, gain, are not large. d. The general conclusion is that the data contained in Table IV are complete for the socialist sector of agriculture -- i.e. include all livestock investments, investments by agricultural enterprises from their' own resources, and investments by collective farms and cooperative farms from state loans. 7. The data in the present table point to a number of characteristics and developments in Soviet agriculture: ? a. The relative importance of state farms, cooperative farms, machine tractor stations, and collective farms is indicated by the following percentages of total investments in each: A for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ' r- ? " " : ' State Cooperative Machine Collective Farms Farms Tractor Stations Farms Other .. 20.2 52.7 2.0 1.1 30.0 39.6 3.3 4.2 32.6 19.7 5.3 9.7 26.6 16.1 6.0 13.4 30.8 6.1 2.6 17.1 43.2 2.2 2.6 18.4 38.2 2.8 1.3 22,2 41,9 3.1 .---...--.0 1928 27.1 1929 27.3 1930 40.2 1931 42.3 1932 43.7 1933 34.9 1934 31.0 1935 31.5 Page 107 The developments to be noted are: (1) the steady increase in relative im- prtance of machine tractor stations; (2) the ?rise and fall of cooperative. farms; (3) the early predominance of state farms (1928-1932); (4) the subseq, ent prelominance or collective farms (1933-1935). The "other" category was obtained as a residual', i.e. as socialized agricultural enter- prises minus the specifies types of agricultural organizations. Its meaning is unknown but it seems to be accounted for mainly by generalized land betterment and irriE:ation measures (i.e. which cannot be allocated to specific a(,ricultural enterprises). The distribution of agricultural investments unallocated by type of organization was as follows (in millions of rubles): 1928 au 02 1931 1932 au .1.224 1935. Total unallocated invest- ments in basic means of production 177.4 289.5 431.9 564.4 218.0 119.8 160.4 164.7 I. Non-residence farm buildings 13.1 33.4 40.8 53.6 15.5 13.1 22.2 38.8 II. Machinery and implements 20.0 50.7 31.4 22.5 9.1 11.2 56.4 46.4 III.Livestock, poutry, apiaries 0.3 17.4 59,5 88.5 2.2 -7.3 23.1 -36.4 IV. Land betterment and irrigation 65,7 109.3 155.1 222.8 160.0 70.0 85.4 97.0 V. Agricultural power stations 3,7 6.4 5.7 0.8 VI. Industrial enterprises 12.5 33.2 43.1 15.5 17.4 18.6 2:7 18.4 VII.Other 62.1 39.1 96.3 160.7 13.8 14.2 -29.4 0.5 The negative figures are, of course, meaningless; they probably result from differences in the'coverage of item VII as between total socialized agricul- tural enterprises and each of the specified types of enterprises. b. The amount of investments in industrial enterprises which are subsidiary to, or connected with agricrltural organizations has been rela- tively small. Such investments, in millions of rubles and as percentages of total investments in agriculture were as follows: STAT 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 "NI STAT Page 1(..)8 1222 1222 1222 1221 122 1222 121t 122/ Investrents in industrial enterprises 25.0 64.4 139.8 118.6 338.6 256.0 309.9 233.1 Investments in industrial enterprises 1).2% 7.3% 5.2% 3.1% 7.7% 5.3% 5.3% 4.0% Total eapi Lal investments The identifiable portions of the total investments in industrial enterprises are machine tractor station ,repair shops and flax and hemp plants attached to machine tractor stations (:w.1t,.L22cia.Ust..C-uctionl."6, p.241). The . flax and hemp plants were transferred to the Ministry of Light Industry in 1934 and,,accordingly, machine tractor station investments in industrial enterprises were exclusively in repair shops in 1934 and 1935. C. The amount of non-productive investments has been relatively small. The magnitudes may be obtained by subtracting item. 1. in the table from item 2. Thus, non-productive investments, in zillions of rubles and as percentages of total capital investments, were: 1221 1E2 1222 2221 122 12/2 1:22A 1221 Non-productive investments 20.3 32.4 281.0 292.2 355.4 292.0 411.1 310.1 Ncn-productive investments 5.0% 3.6% 10.5% 7.5% 8.1% 6.0% 7.2% 5.3% Total capital investments These fiEtires for non-productive investments correspond roughly to those in . Tal..le II (except for 1932). The correspondence is explained by the fact that. collective farms have spent only insignificant Amounts on nonproductive assets (compare items 1 and 2 in the present table for collective farms), d. The structure of investments by types of agricultural organiza- tions may he of some interest. In the case of machine tractor stations, the predominant part of ,investments in productive fixed capital went for mach- inery and implements. Investments in machinery and implements. as percent- ages of investments in productive fixed capital were: 1222 1222 1931 122 1222 1214 1221 87.6 79.3 84.7 60.0 75.6 75.6 91.6 The structure of investments in productive fixed capital for state and cooperative farms and for collective farms, as percentages of the total, were as follows in selected years: n,,,ineeifiari in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1111.111 1-_!fied in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I. Non-residence farm buildings II. Machinery & implements III. Live3tock, poultry, apiaries IV. Land betterment & irrigation V. Electric power stations VI. Industrial enterprises VII. Other Total inve3tment in produc- tive fixed capital ? 1921 1930 ? 1932 State & Coopera- tive Farms Collect- ive Farms State & Coopera- tive Farms Collect ive Farms State & Cooper- Coll- ati-,-e ectiv Farms Farms state & 1 Cooper- Co11-JCooper- ative ectiv Farms Farm-, :5tate & Co11- ati7e ecti,J Farms Farrt 24.8 5.7- 12.6 23.2 32.4 22 17.6 24.2 14.3 22.1 22.0 38.5 3().,1 34.2 22.0 17.7 2-7.6 15...) 30.A 17.2 33.9 27.6 29.5 26.4 21.6 51.4 41.9 51.3 44.7 51.(3 2.2 4.7 5.1 3.S 3.0 1.0 2.5 1.1 2.0 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 13.1 0.9 5.0 6.6 6.7 3.4 5.9 3. 4.1 3.8 - 7 22 10.2 8.5 14.2 4.2 4-4 4.2 3-7 4.1 _ 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1uu.o MIME Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT ? ? The followin points are noteworthy; .(1) with the expansion of machine tractor stationsvthe-most important object or !nvestment'by collective - farms '.Nas livestock; (2) in the latest years of this 'series, the most im- portnt ol.ject of investment by state farms was, also, live-stock; (3) in -all but the earliest years of this series, state farm investment expendi- tures were relatively ereater for machinery than in the case of collective farms. There is apparently an error in the machine tractor station data . for 191 an 1933. In 1931, total investments in livestock, poultry, and apiAries mire 4.2 million rubles; expenditures on tht. acquisition of livestocK an,A uuillings (a sub-total) were 13.9 million rubles. The zame fiures fc.Nr 1933 were 27.5 'and 45.2 million rubles respectively. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Ronn-ignnno_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 2 STAT fALLE V: CAPITAL INVEAUT3 17 jECTOR$ OF .ME NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1933-1933 (In lillioris of i-LILl.:!s; in pr 's ol respee4vc yna.1.9) 1933 1'134 1935 133 ll.1 1937 1933 "....................."..................................... TOTAL I. nfiustry 11. kriculture III. TrInsport IV. CommuNications IT v . T:.ade ano. Procurent VI. 2ocial-127..tural z.11!..1 Adri rii sl I f 'P.:tin!' Co:::rted Total (z of itcmb 1-VI )1 13.1a 9."77,)Or d 2.1495" 3.015e .202'.' .238e 944n4? 18.244 23.5a t 11.36 2..972 4.0r , .273'1 .4.7.-- 3.!.443f 23.297 27.2 13.024b 2.993d 5.6?t.,5g ...".0047 , .fJ62. 1,.PAII)" - 35.5a 15.960 ":.)rl' 1.0]..61 7.774- - 33.28 15.012c i).771.41' , .913.) 7,2: 0'4:' - 1.:,a,':;1. 1 . ,-- ., ., SOURCES: a. E. L. Granovskii and B. L. Markus, Ekonomika sotsiaaisticheskoi pranyshlennosti (E.s.gllicsof Socialst ,or) 1940, p. 533. Note that these totals, when summed over the period of the Second Five Year Plan, equal the Second Five total total of 137.5. b. A. Arakelian, 0,_112.-millatf...p.rrirslaormostiSSSR (glalpigapilg_g_ma Industry) 1938, p. 71. The same figures appear in Granovsky and Markus, o c't., p. 375 and in P. Khramov, Amortizata v r Tshlen, Amortization in USSR Industi7), 1939,,p. 1 Khramov indicates TsUNKhU as the source of the data. c. Obtained by subtraction of total investments in industry in 1933-36 from .total Second Five Year lan Fulfilletak figure of 65,763 for industry. Granevsky and Markus (op.cit., p. 533) state the 1937 figure to be 15.0. Kantor (msnaEZt-laUqL_P.Y'MYA1.412PS211JJALJAZ4.1.EYEL.141., P. 64) states it to be 15.012. These are not necessarily confirmations of the figure. So far as I know, no 1937 realized figure has been published by the State Planning Commission or the Central Statistical Administration. The state- merits, by Granovsky and Markus and Kantor may simply indicate that they are as adept at substraction as I. d. Estimated; for method of estimation see note 2 to this table. 12/521E6 P? 460. 1.911.1.911, PP. 504-5. g.12=1.011., PP. 142-3. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,:::.::. r ," d, 1. ? STAT Page 112 gtagalgagal: h. Estimated;. for method of estimation see, note 3 to this table. i. This figure is a 1936 plan figure (cf. table III)..Prelininary results for 1936 indicate a total of .904 for trade and procurement (1217.1/11,46 pp. 142-3). The plan figure was, accordingly, used, j. Obtained by subtraction of total investments in trade and procurement in 1933-36 from total aczEllkyLitarlarfent figure of 3.245 for trade and. procurement. Obtained by subtraction from annual total. ObtAined by the following calculation for each of the indicated sectors and for the national economy as a whole: (Total 1934-38) - (Total 1933-37) - 1933. 1934-38 and 1933-37 data are found in table I ; 1933 data in the present table. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? NOTES TO TABLE V 1. Let us take the realized 1933, 1934, and 1935 data and the planned 1936 and 1937 data from Table III, add them by sectors for the period of the Second Five Year Plan, and compare the results with Second Five Year Plan fulfillment data (from Table I). We obtain the following comparison (in billions of rubles): 1222._ a. Industry 10.030 b. Agriculture 2.100 c. Transportation 3.015 d. Communications .202 e. Trade and Pro- curement .238 f. Social-Cultural and Admin. 2.404 Total 17.989 Second Plan Plan Five Year 1221.1112-.12,36 19,7 Total Plan Total 11.695 12.542 16.299 2.474 2.297 2.857 4.250 5.455 7.928 .278 .300 .440 .486 .562 1.046 2.443 aai 22.626 24.722 13.928 2.659 7.370 .370 .795 64.494 12.387 28.018 1.590 3.127 _742.23 7.471 24.657 65,763 16.760 25.411 1.336 3.245 24.976 36.343 32.593 134.273 137.491 The 1936 planned data took into account changes in the plan made during the year so its approximation to realized 1936 data should be close. The noteworthy (absolute) discrepancies lie in "agriculture," in "trans- portation," and in the totals for the entire period. a. The annual plan "agriculture" data (Table III) were confined to the state sector, i.e. excluded even state financing of the cooperative sector. In addition, investments in livestock in the state sector were excluded (Table III, note 1; Table IV, note. 6). b. The exclusions just mentioned may also account for part of the dis- crepancy in totals. Capital repairs were still part of the annual plan of capital work. Extra-limit expenditures had been introduced in September 1935; only part of such expenditures were excluded from the data in Table II (Table III, note 1). c. The discrepancy in "transportation", as well as other discrepancies (perhaps partly offsetting) may be accounted for by differences between planned and fulfilled investments in 1936 and 1937. In the present table, we attempt to obtain a more accurate sector break- down ("more accurate" defined a6 "in closer correspondence with second Five Year Plan fulfillment data") by deriving 1936 and 1937 realized data from other information, by deriving, annUal "agriculture", data from other informa- tion, and by using other information for annual "Industry" totals (which, however, are not substantially different from the annual plan data for 1933- 19:35). We proceed from the data in Table III rather than the data in Table II because the transport sector in Table II is apparently obtained by summation of investments by transport ministries and departments and, therefore, in- cludes some investments in industry (Table X and note 20). Dmi-F - Caniti7Pd Cony Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT U. 2. Plotnikov states that: "The financing of capital investments in agriculture in the years of the second five year plan was accomplished through the Agricultural Bank of the USSR". (K. N. Plotnikov, Bindzhet sotsialistichesko o gofiudaretva - JBAgILIC.1111.110ADALLILI Gosfinizdat 1948, p. 139.). Plotnikov presents the following data on the role of the Agricultural Bank in the Second Five Year plan period (Ibid, pp. 139440): 1 6 I. Financing of State Sector of Agriculture (nonrepayable) A. Units of Union jurisdiction 2.1245 2.4354 2.3941 3.0089 2.8236 " 1. Financing of capital.; - investments 1.7879 2.0430 2.0553 2.3983 '2.0553 2. Financing of special expenditures .3366 .3924 .3388 04694 06730 3, Financing of other extra- limit expenditures -- -- -- .1412 60953 B. Units of Republic- juri$diction .1561 .1743 .1217 #1760 04045 1. Financing of capital investments .1457 .1557 .0840 00677 .1669 2. Financing of "operativnal" . (22pratsionnyl) expenditures .0104 .0186 .0377 .1083 .1857 3. Financing of extra-limit expenditures .. -. -. -- .0519 II.Long Term Credits A. To collective farms B. To collective farmers for pur- chases of livestock 42247 .3809 .5147 .8082 1.1040 .1780 .2971 04484 .6900 1.0073 C. To. workers and salaried employ- ees of state farms, machine trac7 tor stations, and rural railroad administrations for housing con- struction and the purchase of livestock .0131 .0430 .0051 .0296 .0197 The "agriculture" totals are obtained by totalling these figures ex,. elusive of loans to Collective farmers and to workerscf state farms, etc. (on the grounds.that such expenditures are in the grivate sector of the economy) and exclusive of the financing Of "operational expenditures (on the grounds that these are not considered to be capital investments The 'annual totals so obtained for "agriculture's tum to 16.491 billion rubles for 1933-1937 as against 16,760 from Second Five Year Plan. fulfillment data. This calculation is not entirely satisfactory. The Plotnikov figure for loans to collective farms (3.033 billion rubles for 1933-1937) is contra- dicted by other sources (Table VII, note 12). If all of the 3.033 billion , , , . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page rubles was not used for investments in fixed capital (as the other sources suggest), it is possible that some agricultural investments did not go through the Agricultural Bank. In addition, the investments in "agriculture" Obtained by the present calculation are 2.495 billion rubles in 1933, 2.972 in 1934 and 2.993 in 1935; whereas investments in "agriculture" exclusive of collective and co- operative farm investments, as obtained from Table IV are 2.628 billion rubles in 1933, 3.448 in 1934 and 3.341 in 1935. Since we know that the investments in "agriculture" from Tables I, II, and V include collective farm investments financed by state laws, it follows that something has been omitted from the state sector of agriculture in the present calculation. The close correspondence between the present figures and those in Table II for "agriculture" in 1933 and 1934 leads me to believe that livestock breed- ing expenditures have been excluded, i.e. that only expenditures on the acquisition of livestock are included. If this is true, the investments in "agriculture" in Table I for 1933-1937 have the same exclnsions and inclu- sions as investments in "agriculture" in Table II and for 1928/9-1932 in Table I. (Cf. Table I, note 1; Table II, notes 1 and 4; Table IV, note 6.) It should also be noted that if we add the financing of capital invest- ments for units of union and republic jurisdiction over the years 1933-37 (from Plotnikov, 52.21 _sit.), we obtain 10.960 billion rubles as against 11.334 for Second Five Year Plan fulfillment data exclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit expenditures. This tends to lonfirm the validity of the present calculation. 3. The "transport" and "communications" figures are obtained in the following way. 1933-35 totals are obtained and subtracted from the Second Five Year Plan fulfillment totals for "transport" and "communications". The differences are presumed to be the realized data for 1936 and 1937. They are 12.691 billion rubles for "transport" and .556 for "communications". The budget allowances for capital investments in each of the sectors is known for each of the years of the Second Five Year Plan period. (USSR Ministry of Finances, Gosudarstvennyi bindzhet SSSR za vteryi piatgetki 1933-37 USSR Bud,et in -- 1939, p. 76). Total investments in "transport" and "communications" are assumed to vary in 1936 and 1937 proportionately to budget allowances for invenments in "transport" and "communications". Thus, the "transport" total for 1936 is taken to be 54.5% of 12.691 billion because 1936 budget allowances in "trans- port" was 54.5% of the total budget allowances for 1936 and 1937. Similarly, the percentage was 55.8% in "communications", so 1936 investments in "com- munications" were 55.8% of .556 billion. The remainder in both cases was attributed to 1937. The results, again, are not entirely satisfactory for in "communications" budget allowances for investments exceeded estimated total investments for both 1936 and 1937. This may, however, be dun to a difference between budget allowances and investment expenditures. The same discrepancy appears for "transport" in 1934 where the investment figure is a realized figure. 4. Granovskii and Markus state that the 1933-1936 "industry" invest- ments are in productive fixed capital only (Granovskii and Markus, ?D cit., p. 375). Arakelian does not mention this when he presents the "industry" series in rubles. In connection with a USSR-Germany comparison, however, he presents investments in "industry" as an index number series which, he states, I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT' 1 age 116 excludes housing construction by industry. (Arakelian, op. cit. pp. 710 73, and footnote 1 P. 73). If we express the ruble figures presented by Arakelian as an index number series, we obtain the same index numbers that Arakelian states. The ruble series could include, and the index numbers exclude housing construction only in the unlikely case that housing construction and invest- ments in productive fixed capital increased in exactly the same proportions. Arakelian also states that beginning in 1933 investments in "industry!' include investments in industrial fixed capital by non-industrial ministries. (Arakelian, op. cit., p. 71 footnote 1). Comments will be made .on these points below, tables X and XI and notes. Suffice it to. say here that I doubt the exclusion of nonproductive investments. 5. Arakelian presents the following series for investments in the social- ist sector of the national economy (in billions of rubles): 12a/a 1926/7 1222 1221 1930 1221 1932 1222 1224 1221 1226. 2.138 3.664 4.083 5.885 9.786 15.875 20.512 20.369 26.214 30.665 40.612 (Arakelian, op. cit., p. 71). The corresponding figures from Tables 11 and V are: 1925A 1926/7 lug 2221 1222 1221 1122 2222 1224 124 1936 2.1j8 3.664 4.088 5.805 9.255 14.861 19.097 18.1 23.5 27.2 35.5 Arakelian makes no explanation for his series. The' divergence between the two series may be explained by the inclusion in Arakelian's series of collective farms' investments from their own resources and labor participation in road building. The magnitudes of these two categories seem about right to account for the divergence. (Table VII and notes 10 .and 13). 6. The 1938 data are derived from a comparison of 1933-1937 data, 1934- 1938 data and 1933 data. All three series are stated to include extra-built investments and capital repairs and to be in prices of the respective years. . Therefore, the 1938 data presumably are in 1938 prices and presumably include extra-limit investments &.0 capital repairs. There is, however, some evidence that the 1938 component of the 1934-1938 totals exclude capital repairs (Table VI, note 3). We will return to 4 discussion of the 1938 data below (Table VI, note 3). A rrInv Annroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - Page 117 TABLE VI: TOTAL CAPIrAL INVESTMENTS, INVESTMENTS FROM THE BUDGET, AND BUDGET FINAtiCikG OF THE NATIONAL =Nan 1933-1951. (In billions of rubles) ???????????????????? ..amis.moNfi ?MIEN........ =WWI . toing the national Irr,--esizments In Fixed Capital Total From Budzet Soviet Cbaracterization of the Total Investment Figure 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Plan 1938 1938 Plan 1939 1939 Plan 1940 1940 Plan 1941 1941 Plan 1942 19/42 Plan 1943 1943 Plan 1944 194453.7! Plan 1945 1945 Flan 1946 1946 Plan 1947131.8e 1947 Plan 1948 1948 Plan 1949 1949 Plan 1950 1950 Plan 1951 25.0a I 3/.2a 39.e 41.9a 43.4a 47.2a 51.7a 59.3c 60.4a_ 57.1a 58.3a 73.2? 51.7d 31.6a 331a 1,4.7a 64.6- 74. 102 .3 106.2r: 1334:' 149.0f! 147?5!` 152.5K 161.9k, 16444 157.3n 178.5n 17.2a 21.8a 24.0a 30.3a21.5,!" 27.8a 35.8c 35.7t 34.7c 34.31 361,1e 38 - 60.0c 304-34.1)1 18.6a ? 19.5? 29.0 c 40 .1f 36.32. 49.4114 44.2.1 58.8J (53.1)844 - , 66.24- 105.51 (112.9r 135.6 (129.7)1 135.7n 14.2/3 16.2 16.3.:f 20.7? 24.9c 24.1c ..: 24.4,e 25.7w? 46.6c 31.8a 20.80 23.0c 212 c 3 7:451 4.1.3n 37.44 49.2J r .5 60.9P, 57.24- 79.81 - 106.5m - 101.7n "capital investments finances " alnansirov e ka'at- ..t 'voltam of capital work" (obteza kealauxist_mi..):Hat "volume of capital work" "volizae of capital. work" "volume of capital investments" "cap:Ltal work financed" (..anansirov- . e kait t rabot "volume of capital work on 1936 prices" equalled 57 billions "total amount of capital investments" (o1.21thsjr...st=3. kap1'nyk1LsztheniiJ g. "volume of centralized capital projects" "volizne of capital work financed" obtem f 4.1 tvr. - - - 1..+4.-4. !ifbo - "volume of capital work financed" "volume of centralized capital investments financed" "volume of centralized capital investments financed" "amount of centralized capital investments financed" (razmer finansiravantia kapitaltnykh rabot) "amount of centralized capital. investments financed" - - "total amount of expenditures on Capital investments" (skihais. 0,.c.--m_al?,LAL?a,,m&E2.21tzmiapjam "total amount of expenditures an capital investments" - "centralized and noncentraLized capital investmonts financed"gaY7Crlar2fgninage.tegniat...maamtiLL n(teentm zovU...T,loattp.,1ovlozheni1). "capital investments financed" manner ? i Declassified n Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release e 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 0 ; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 SOURCES: ? a. K. N. Plotnikov Biudzhet sot sialisticheskogo gosudarstva G131.0z4t.alkl Socj1t Stat3, Gosfinizdat 1948, pp. 126, 129, 207, 303, 307. USSR Ministry of Finances, gAglIatki USSR State Bud 19*123 ' rstve I b uftet SSSR vt ro A. G. Zverev, Gouudarstve e biu het SSSR 8-1 Caltuautu of th USSR 8-1 Gosfinizdat 19 pp. 15, 17, 47, 49, 105, 128, 131, 132, 148, 153. d. K. N. Plotnikov, "Finances and the Development of the Socialist National EconoPY," ??`.&elg..1-9..../2WIZIM 1947 No. 11,,p. 28. e. A. G. Zverev, Gosudarstven bi d t mrimeuvilmAl o e USSR for p. 15. N. Rovinskii, "25 Years of the.USSR Budget System," :?pifedc_itAngig, ?1942 No. 11-12, p. 45. V. M. Buzyrev,. osstanovit e rakkilkair'f.xdronaire (Reconstruction Wort_AndltaIRanciap 1945, p. 59. The statement is that budget alloca- tions for investment constitute 67.5% of the total. h. Zasedaniia verkhovno o soveta SSSR Vto sessiia eet s of the -19., p.1 ...49.3r.easjzlet of the USSR Obtained by subtracting from Voznesenskyts 1938-1940 total (cf. table.) of 108 biU.i?ubles, the 1938 and 1940 totals. Also cf. note 3 to this table. kf "On the Sta pp. 12, 13. dget of the USSR for 1947," SOVeteilllialErv- 1947 No. 2, k. PravdA: October 16, 1946, 13. 2; February 1, 1948, p. 2; February 3, 1948, p. 3; March 11, 1949, pp. 2, 3; June 14, 1950, p. 2.. 1. A. Zverev, "State Budget of the Fourth Year of the Post-War Stalinist Five Year Plan," planovoe Kho73aistvo, 1949 No. 2, p. 43. m. A. G. Zverev, .0.gp_s_....rAysiLudalnd_LE,Jthete SSSR, na 1 d ob s osudarstveano o biudzheta SSSR z the USSR State Wpet for 1S50 gentofiTURSts...._,Auetf.2.17.2ajd 1949) Gospolitzdat 1950i p. 13. 'Wks March 8, 1951, p. L=ALla. states that this includes circulating capital: A later statement, however, indicates that the circulating capital included is only the circulating capital of construction conducted by the "economic method," i.e. that the figure represents the usual category of "capital investments finanted." (A. G. Zverev, "A Budget of Peaceful Economic and Cultural Construction," Planovoe Khp4aistv.9.,1951 No. 2, p. 29. Zverev refers to the 132 billion ruble figure as the "total amount of capital work financed.") N. Voznesen&y, Th.....seEconoftheUS*- Public Pffairs Press 1948, p. 85. 1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDPsi-nir4lpnn9cnn1cannnn 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 119 SOURCES (Contld): p. "Oln the State Budget of the USSR for 1948 and Fulfillment of the State. Budget of the USSR for 1946," the report of A. G. Zverev published in Narodnoe khoziaistvo,SSSR (National Econortr of the USSR), Volume 2, Gosplanizdat 1948, p. 483. q. Estimated by assuming that the proportion of actual to planned investments is equal to the proportion of actual to planned "financing the national economy." r. Travda, March 11, 1949, p. 2. The statement is as follows: "Large' appropriations were directed to capital construction. Of the total expenditures for this purpose amounting to 66.2 billion rubles, 57.2 . billion were appropriated from the budget, i.e. 12.7 billion more than in 1947." s. Estimated by assuming that the proportion of total to budget investments is the same as the proportion of. planned total to planned budget invest- ments. Particularly little confidence is to be attached to this estimate.. Judging from the tone of the complaints about investment plan fulfillment (cf. Pravda, February 4, 1948, p. 2) and fram the failure to publish a realized figure for 1947, 1947 was probably an unusually bad year. This may have taken the form of proportionately fewer investments fram enter- prises, own resources. (cf. also note 7 to this table.) t. Table Y. Also cf. note 3 to this table. u. Estimated; cf. note 5 to this table. ?.. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 NOTES TO TABLE VI 1. In the present table, Soviet characterizations of the total invest- ment fieure have been appended to the data in an effort to discover: (a) whether the data include only centralized investments or non-centralized investments as well; (b) whether the data are stated in estimate or current prices; and (c) whether the data include or exclude changes in the stocks of construction.materials on hand. For the moment, only problems (b) and (c) will be connidered; the inclusion or exclusion of non-centralized invest- ments will be discussed in notes 2 and 3 to this table. Problem (c) is not regarded as important in itself. The magnitude of net changes in the amount of construction materials on hand is certainly small in relation to the mag- nitude of investment. Yoreover, stocks of construction materials held by contract construction organizations seem to be treated like changes in the working capital of any independent enterprise; apparently only changes in the stocks of materials for construction conducted by the "economic method" may be regarded as a component of investment in fixed capital (cf above, r. 10, and below, this note). The significance of the treatment of changes in stocks of construction materials is as an indicator of the corcept of investments used. It has already been noted (pp. 4-5, above) that, in statements of the capital investment plan, Soviet sources use the "volume of capital work" to refer to investments undertaken in estimate prices and the "amount of financ- ing necessary for capital work" to refer to expenditures in current (or planned current) prices including gross increases in materials stocks on hand and ex- cluding previously purchased materials which are used in construction. Since no reference have been found to the use of estimate prices (in the sense of a set of prices other than current prices) prior to the use of 1936-37 prices, it is assumed that prior to 1938 estimate and current prices are the same. The pre-1938 difference in concept between "the volume of capital work" and the "amount of investments financed" may be: (a) the exclusion or in- clusion of planned economies in construction costs (table X, note 17); or (b) the treatment of changes in stocks of construction materials on hand. The fcrmer ie irrelevant for realized figures. The latter is quantitatively un- important. It is obvious from an examination of the present table that there is ,no uriforrity in the Soviet characterizations of the total investment figure. I interpret the 1942-1951 data to be in current prices, to include gross in- creases in materials stocks on hand, and to exclude previously purchased materials used up in construction (i.e. to be the analogue of the "amount of finarcthg necessary for capital work" in theinvestment plan). Justifi- cation or this interpreVation is as follows: a. All the figures except realized 1942 and realized 1943, are deecribed in phrases which contain the words "financed" or "expenditures". The 1942 figure, further, is not described as the "volume of capital erork". Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190007-A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 b. It is stated by one Soviet source that during the war invest- mentseefere undertaken without the prewar project-making and estimating procedure due to war pressures. (F. Carynin and L. Kvitnitskii? "On Im- p-ovement of Project4ak1ng and Estimates in Construction", Elgoll Khoziaistvo, 1950 No. 6, p. 49. c. The planned 1947 figure is stated to include: (2) the volume of centralized capital investments = 50 billion rubles; (2) additional ex- penditures by ministries = 3.6 billion; (3) compensation of construction organizations .for wage increases and increases in working. capital = 5,2 billion. (Zosedaniia verkhovno o Soveta SSSR trettta sessia Meetines of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Third Session -- Stenographic Report, 1947, p. 24) d. The planned 1949, 1950 and 1951 figures are explicitly stated to be in current prices. The planned 1951 figure, inaddition, is stated to include increases in working capital of construction conducted by the econ- omic method. e. Pravda states the "volume of capital work" for each of the years 1946-1950 as a percentage of the preceding year (Pravda, April 27, 1951, p. 2). The percentages are: 1946 1947 154S 1949 195Q 117 110 123 120 123 If we express the realized investment figures in the present table for each of the yews 19464950 as a percentage of the preceding year we obtain: 12/1 1948 1242 1252 121.8 120.1 124.7 169.1 115.8 Thus, in each of the years except 1950, the Pravda percentages are lower than the percentages we calculate; and in 1950 there was a general de- crease in wholesale prices. Moreover, the percentages we calculate reflect, and the Pravda percentages fail to reflect, the known price increases with the removal of subsidies in 1949. Finally, if we assume that the Pravda percentages compare investments in 1945 prices (tLe Fourth Five Year Plan estimate prices) and use the percentages with 1945 realized investments to calculate realized investments in 1945 prices for the Fourth Five Year Plan a2 a whole, we obtain 301 billion rubles. This figure is 120, ? of the Fourth Five Year Plan figure of 250.3 Union rubles; and Pravda (April 17, 1951, p. 2) states that the Fourth Five Year Plan was overfulfilled with respect to capital investments by 22%. I conclude that the Pravda percentages com- pare investments in 1945 prices and that the realized figures for 1946-1950 in the present table are in prices of the respective years. (The percentages calculated may be used to construct a rough index of price changes of investment goods. Thus, 1246 1947 1948 lai 1222 I. Capital. investments in 1945 prices (1945 a 100) 117 128.7 1580 190.0 93367 II. " " " current prices( " " ) 128.1 146.3 182.4 - 308.4 357.1 III -Index of the 'pride level of investment goods (II * I; 1945 = 100) . 104.1 113.6 115.2 162.3 152.8 will return to the question of changes in investment annds nrir,sie 4v et 1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 age The planned 1938, 1939 and 1940 figures, the realized 1940 figure, and the realized 1938-1940 total are all described as the "volume of capital work". This suggests that these figures are in 1936-7 prices. Although the realized 1938 figure appears to be in 1938 prices (since itis obtained from data which are stated to be in prices of the respective years), we assume that 1938 and 1936-7 prices did not differ substantially and that all the 1938-1940 data are in 1936-7 prices (Cr. also note 3 to this table.) Though the possibility of error here should not be overlooked, I suspect that 1936-37 prices were not substantially different from current prices for these years. Planned 1941 investments in 1936-37 prices (the "volume of cap- ital work in 1936 prices") were 57 billion; the capital work financed was 60 billion. Let us assume, for the moment, that the gross increases in the stock of construction materials planned were precisely equal to the materials prev- iously purchased and planned to be used in construction. Let us assume, fur- ther, that the planned cost decrease for industry of 3.7% was typical of con- struction. (Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiia narodno o khoziaistva SSSR na 11.4.12a1 -- State Plan of the Develo .lent of the USSR National Econo for 1941 -- p. 566 Then, 1941 planned investments in 1940 prices was 62.3 billion and the ratio of 1940 prices to 1936-37 prices was slightly more than 1.09. To the etent that planned gross increases in the stock of con- struction materials exceeded (were exceeded by) the amount of previously purchased materials to be used in construction, 1.09 is too high (low). To the extent that the planned cost decrease in industry exceeded (was exceeded by) the planned cost decrease in construction, 1.09 is too high (low). Another calculation leads to virtually the same figure. Zuerev states that volume of centralized investments planned for 1946 (49.4 billion rubles) is 140% of the volume of capital investments financed in 1940. (A. G. Zuerev, "On the USSR State Budget for 1946 and Fulfillment of the Budget for 1944 and 1945", Dentgi I kredit, 1946 No. 10, p. 10). Since "capital investments financed" is normally in current prices, the realized f!gure for 1940 would seem to be 35.3 billion rub: !s in 1940 prices. Our assumptions led to a 1940 figure of 32 billion rubles, exclusive of extra-limit investments, in 1936-7 prices. If the difference between the two figures is accounted for by price differences, a 10% increase in prices from 1936-7 to 1940 is implied. A similarly rough calculation (note 3, this table) leads to the sugges- tion that prices may have risen by about 7Z between 1936-7 and 1939. 2. The auestion 4hich 'remains to be answered is theexclusion or inclu- sion of noncentralized investments. It should be remembered that, as a matter of Soviet statistical practice, noncentralized investments are identi- cal with extra-limit investments. Collective farm investments and, since 1938, capital repairs are reported spearately and in addition to both cen- tralized and noncentralized investments. Pre-1938 capital repairs, it should also be remembered, are not reported separately from other invest- ments. (Of above, p.3 p and table VII, note 1)0 Let us begin by noting the explicit exclusions and inclusions. a. The 1933-37 data "include only economic comiissariats and de- partments and do not include capital investments undertaken in expenditures on social-cultural measures, in the financing of the construction of adminis- trative and other institutions, in budget expend!tures from operational Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2913/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,STA" (geratsionnykh) and other means which are not reflected in the fulfillment of the financial plans of departments". (o2,j21_14.elc_ILtiPlotnileSocialiat. State, p. 129, footnote 1).. Capital investments from budget expenditures. on social-Cultural measures (and "other capital investments" from the budget) ' were, in billions of rubles: ' 1933 .35 1934 .60 1935 .84 1936 2.13 1937 2.41 (USSR Ministry of Finances, USSR State-Bud et In the Second Five Year Plan p. 76). If we add these to the total investment figures in the. table we obtain: 1933 17.6 1934 22.4 1935 24.8 1936 32.4 1937 30.2 If we compare these results with the totals in table V (which include cap- ital repairs and extra-limit investments), the deviations Are as follows (in billions of rubles) 1933 .5 1934 -1.1 1935 -2.4 1936 -3,1 1937 -3.0 suspect that the deviations consist largely, if not entirely, of extra- limit expenditures (and, probably, part of expenditures for special purposes, which seem to be related to capital repairs and extra-limit expenditures; cf. table II, note 7). In this connection it should be noted (though the possi- bility of accident should not be overlooked) that in 1937 total investments exclusive of extra-limit expenditures but inclusive of capital repairs were stated to be 30.2 billion. (Third Five Year Plan, p. 26). b. The 1940 planned figure excludes: (1) extra-limit expenditures of 4.8 billion (3.4 billion of which is to be financed from the budget); (2) capital repairs of 6.A billion (5.2 billion of which is to be financed from amortization allowances); (3) loan to individuals for housing con- struction which amounted to .243 billion in 1939. (Zuerev, State Budgets of the USSR 193-19, P? 79.) c. The realized 1940 figure includes about 6 billion rubles of non- centralized investments. (N. Voznesensky, The Growing Prosperity of the Soviet Union, Workers Library Publishers, New York 1941, pe 8.) d. The planned 1941 figure of r billion rubles (in 1936 prices) Includes 9 billion noncentralized investments. (Zuerev, op. cit., p. 105). e. The realized 1943, 1945, and 1946 figures and the planned 1946 1947, and 1948 figures are explicitly confined to centralized investments. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Ron9snnionnno_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 _ 11 Page 124 f. The planned 1950 figure is stated to include noncentralized investments. g. The distinction between centralized and noncentralized invest- ments is abandoned in 1951 (cf. aboveop.33-34). The 132 billion rubles, stated as the "capital. investments financed", for 1951, exclude: (1) capital repairs of 29.4 billion rubles; and .(2) expenditures on project-making of 3.7 billion rubles. In order to make the planned 1951 figure comparable with the previous figures the ?.7 billion.rubles should be added to the 132 bil- lion rubles. As a consequence of changes introduced in 1950, project-making rn-Tanioations have been separated from ministries and are financed directly rrom the budget. (Cr. footnote 13 , p.9 ). The 19?8-1940 figures will be discussed in note 3,to this table. For the years 1942-45 it is assumed that the total investment figures include only centralized investments but that, in any case, the amount of extra- limit investments must have been small.. In discussing the conversion of the Soviet economy to a war economy, 'roznesensky states: "The allocation and rationing of metals, fuels, electrical energy, and other types of raw mater- ials and supplies were strictly centralized". (The Economy of the USSR During World War II, Public Affairs Press, 1948, p. 19). Similarly, the Director's Fund was eliminated July I, 1941, and was not re-instituted until December 12, 1946. The opportunity to exercise decentralized investment choice was certainly much diminished. On the basis of the explicit exclusion of non-centralized investments for 1946 and 1947 and an examination of the annual changes in investments for 1946, 1947 and 1948, it is assumed that the 1948 figure also excludes noncentralized Investments. On the basis of the Rovinskii statement that the."basic part" of noncentralized investments were included in the national economic plan for 1949 (cf. above, p. 3, it is assumed that the 1949 figure includes noncentralized investments. The 195071951, figures, as we have ob- served, explicitly include noncentralized investments. It must be re-emphasized that, as a matter of Soviet statistical prac- tice, collective farm investments and, since 1938, capital repairs are re- ported separately and in addition to both centralized and noncentralized investments. In other words, it will be necessary, even when we have cen- tralized and noncentralized investments, to add capital repairs (beginning in 1938) and collective farm investments in order to obtain complete totals. 3. The years 1928-1940 represent something of an enigma in Soviet in- vestment statistics. Voznesensky states that the "volume of capital invest- ments" in 1938-1940 totalled 108 billion rubles, including 17.5 billion non- centralized investments. (The Growing Prosperity of the Soviet Union, p. 8). From table I we obtain the 1938 total of 35.7 billions. Voznesensky states the 1940 total to be 98 billion rubles, including 6 billion noncentralized inventments (Voznesensky, 2p. cit, p. 8). Assuming the Voznesensky 1938- 1940 total to be correct, we obtain by subtraction 34.1 billion for 1939. Buzyrev states that extra-limit investments were 6.5 billion in 193$. (V. Y. fliy'rev1 Finensirovanie i kreditovanie ka Italln-kh vlozhenii - Capital Investment Finances and Loans - 19410 p. 212). We have pointed out elsewhere tat "noncentralized investments" in Soviet statistics are identical with Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ?@ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page 125 extra-limit investments. (Cf. above, p.33 ? and table VII, note 1). Assum- ing that the Voznesensky 1938-1940 total for noncentralized investments is correct, we obtain by subtraction 5 billion rubles of noncentralized invest- ments for 1939. Two sources, hodever, imply that extra-limit investments were about 7.5 billion in 1939. (A. Lushchitskit? "The Cnmmercial Bank and Extra-Limit Capital Investments", Sovetskie finansi, 1940 No, 4, P. 39; Buzyrev, op. cit., p. 212). Although'neither source states specifically that this is a realized figure, in the.atsence of other evidence one would have little doubt that it is a realized figure.. There is, however, other evidence: 'a. Buzyrev also has a sector breakdown of extra-limit investments which is stated to be according to 1939 plan and which totals (though the total is not stated by Buzyrev) 749 billion! Thus, extra-limit investments by sectors are stated to be (in billions of rubles): Industry .917 Transport and Communications .522 Agriculture (excluding collective farm investments) .823 Trade and Procurement .413 Cooperatives .855 Municipal Economy .517 Social-cultural measures 1.591 Capital repairs to housing by local soviets; capital investments in public health, education, etc. 1.852 Total . 7.490 , b. Both source S state that extra-limit investments are about 20% of limited (i.e. above-And below-limit) investments. It is true that 7.5 is about 20% Of both the 34.7 billion planned for 1939 and the 34.3 billion realized for 1939. But if Vonesensky's 1938-1940 total is correct, the - 34.3 billion includes extra-limit expenditures. H The explicit exclusions from the planned -1940 figure (note 2 to this table), the separate mention of- extra-limit investments in connection with the 1939 planned figure of 34.7 billion rubles (cf. immediately below) and the identity in language describ- ing the planned 1939 and 1940 figures suggest that both figures exclude extra-limit investments! c. Zoerev states that in 1939 extra-limit investments of 3.2 bil- lion were planned according to the financial plans of departments and .ex- cluding cooperatives. (A. G. Zuerev, GosudarstVennyi:bindzhet Soinza SSR na 1939 god the USSR for 1939,- p. 20). If we tike the total planned extra-limit investments for 1939, as given by Butrelt, and eliminate cooperatives and those departments which have no financial plans (i.e. social-cultural measures, capital repairs to housing by local soviets, etc.), we Obtain 3.192 billion rubles as planned extra-limit investments. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-n1a4ln9crin1 afIritIn 0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr ?013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page I assume, therefore, that the 7.5 billion rubles of extra-limit invest- ments is a planned figure for 1939 and that realized extra-limit investments were, as given by Voznesensky, 5 billion rubles. Since the Voznesensky 1938-1940 total presumably excludes capital re- pairs, the cluestion arises as to the .coverage of the realized 1938 figure. The realized 1938 figure by implication includes capital repairs and extra- limit Investments. There is evidence, however, which contradicts this. Rovinskii states that beginning in 1938 capital repairs are planned and financed separately frcm capital investments. (Rovinskil et al, Oreanizatsila finansirovaniia I kreditovaniia ka kh vlozhenii, pp. 270-1). This statement is repeated by other writers. Buzyrev, Finansirovanii i kreditovanie kapitallnykh vlozhenii, pp. 220-1; A. M. Aleksandrov, Finansy, i kredit 5SSR -- USSR Finances and Credit - Gosfinizdat 1948, y. 63). The decree of 1938, which established the new arrangements for capital repairs, was promulgated in January, 1938. Soviet statistical practice since 1938 has been to report capital repairs separately from centralized and non- centralized investments. Furthermore, if we attempt to calculate 1938 investments exclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit investments, we are led to a contradiction. Total investments exclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit investments were 126.8 billion -ubles in 1934-1938 and 114.7 billion rubles in 1933-1937. Total investments in 1933 (from table II) exclusive of expenditures for spec- ial purposes (but inclusive of cooperative farm investments) were 16.8 billion rubles. We do not know t'\e magnitude of capital repairs in 1933 because they were not reported or financed separately from other investments. Some, in- deed, may have been part of expenditures for special purposes. In any case, if we subtract 114.7 from 126.8 and add 16,8 we obtain 28.9 billiori rubles for 1938. The difference between this figure and the 35.7 billion ruble fig- ure for 1938 is almost exactly the magnitude of extra-limit investment for 1938. If the realized 1938 figure did include capital repairs, then cap- ita] repairs included in the 1933 figure of 16.8 would have to be the same as capital repairs in 1938. Since most of the fixed capital existing in 1933 had been built during the First Five Year Plan, and since 1938 was a year in which financial provision for capital repairs had been sharply increased, this is manifestly impossible. The'magnitudeeof the difference between 1933-1937 investments inclusive and exclusive of 'extra-limit investments and capital repairs was 22.8 billion . rubles. It-should be recalled(a) that expenditures forspecial.purposes also are included in the 137.5 figure and excluded from the 114.7 figure for 1933-1937; and (b) that expenditures, for special purpose's seem to resemble capital repairs and extra-limit investments. (Cf. table II, note 7). If we recall the magnitudes of known exclusions from the 114.7 figure:, we will see that it is quite possible that only, or not Much more than, the stated 1.3 billion rubles of expenditures for special purpose's were excluded from 1937 investments to obtain the 1933 component of the 1933-71937 total of 114.7. billion rubles.. l'hus,.extra7limit investments arid capital repairs only: apart from any expenditures for special purposes) were 6.7. billion rubles in 1937. The magnitude of the exclusions was probably greater in 1936 than in 1937 (judging from the magnitude of tctal inVestments).. The years 1936 And 1937, ,thus, may have accounted for 14-15 billion of the total . 1931-1937 difference of 22.8 billion. Since expenditures for special pueposes were 1..3 billion in 1933 and 1.7 billion in 1934, this would leave '5-6 billion Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 . , fa ? STAT Pao 127 rubles to be accounted for by the 1935 exclusions. It seems quite possible, therefore, that the 1933 component of the 19334937 total of 114.7 billion rubles was about 16.8 billion rubles, i.e. excluded only expenditures for special purposes in 1913. I conclude that the realized 1938 figure excludes capital repairs and that the realized 1938-1940 data are as follows (in billions of rubles): Total investments (Including extra-limit investments and ex- Extra-limit ' cluding capital repairs) Investments 1938 35,7 6.5 1939 34 5 1940 38 , 6 108 17.5 One question remain:4 -- the recunciliation of the realized figures for 1938-1940. Planned investments are: 1938 35:8 1939 34.7 1940 36.1 and planned We have already argued (above, this note), on the basis of the explicit exclusions from the planned 1940 figure, the separate mention of extra-limit investments In connection with the planned 1939 figure, and the identity in language de3cribing the planned 1939 and 1940 figures, that both exclude extra-limit investments It also seems evident, on the basis of the explicit exclusions from the planned 1940 figure and the post-1937 practice with ' respect to capital repairs, that All three planned figures exclude capital repairs. Despite the identity in language between the planned 1938 figure, on the one hand, and -the planned 1939 and 1940 figures, on the other, I believe that the planned 1938 figure includes extra-limit investments. My reasons are as follows: (a). There was no mention of a separate figure for extra-limit in- vestments in connection with the planned 1938 figure. (b) There is a close correspondence between planned and realized 1938 investments. Since we have no reason to .suspect poor plan fulfillment in 1938' and since we have already argued that realized 1938 investments in- clude extra-limit investments aid exclude capital repairs (above this note), the .correspondence suggests that planned 1938 investments also include extra- limit investments. 1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0025-0?5190062-8 (c) Third Five Year Plan (p. 2 Tage 128 states the following investments: Plan Plan 22/2 214 1938-1942 12/1:1243 (in 1936 prices) Capital investments (including capital repair; & ex- cluding extra-limit investments) 30.2 Capital investments (excluding capital repairs & extra-limit investments) 50.0 2138 26.5 41.5 181f0 If we interpolate linearly between 1937 and plan 1942, we obtain: Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan 122 1938 1932 1940, 1941. 120. Capital investments (including capital . repairs & excluding extra-limit investments) ? 30.2 34.2 38.2 42.2 46 50.0 Capital investments (excluding capital repairs & extra-limit investments) 26.5 29.5 32.5 35.5 38.5 41.5 It should be noted: (1) that Third Five Year Plan was published in 1939 and, therefore, should be fairly close to the 1938 and 1939 annual plans; (2) that the result of our linear-interpolations for plan 1939 is a planned cap- ital repairs figure of 5.7 billion which corresponds to the planned 1939 capital repairs figure of 5.8 billion stated eleewhere by Third Five Year Plan (p. 1)5); (3) that the total of the interpolated figures and the planned 1942 figure corresponds closely to the Third Five Year Plan totals; and (4) that such linear interpolations seem to be consistent with the planned annual developments under the previous Five Year Plans. The point of this calcula- tion is that the planned 1938 and planned 1939 figures exclusive of capital repairs and extra-limit investments correspond fairly closely to the stated 1938 and 1939 planned figures on the assumptions we have made about the latter. If we assume that the planned 1938 figure of 35.8 billion rubles excludes extra-limit investments (as well as capital repairs) and that the amounts of planned and realized extra-limit investments were equal (i.e. 6.5 billion rubles), we obtain 29.3 billion rubles as planned 1938 invest- ments exclusive of extra-limit investments and eapital repairs. The inter- polated figure from Third Five Year Plan is 29.5 billion rubles. Again, the stated 1939 plan figure of 34.7 billion rubles and the interpolated 1939 plan figure cf 32.5 billion rubles seem close enough to be consistent with the assumption that the 34.7 billion rubles exclude extra-limit investments and capital repairs, especially if we recall that planned extra-limit invest- ments were 7.5 billion in 1939. STAT 1 The close correspondence betWeen the planned and realized. 1939 figures suggests either that the planned 1.939 figure includes extra-limit invest- ments or that the 1939 plan was significantly underfulfilled. In part, the correspondence may be accidental. The realized. 1939 figure was obtained as a residual from the Nbznesensky 1938e1940 total with, therefore, any errors reflected in tis figure. In any case, there is reason to expect that the 1939 investment plan would be underfulfilled and some evidence that this is: so. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ?-66-Yr2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8' Page 129 (a) In 1939, the war in Europe began and the, Finnish-Russian war occurred, Dudget defense expenditures increased sharply in 1939 as against 1938 and all against the 1937-1938 increase. Thus, defense expenditures were (in billions .of rubles): . 1937 1211 W2 17.5 23.2 39.2 56.7 (Plotnikov, rlinceti...___.sLg_gIesk000sudarstva, pp. 142, 216). The occurrence of a, "local" war and the increased preparation for a prcbable future war might account for underfulfillment of the investment plan. . (b) It is stated that the volume of capital work planned for 1940 at 36.1 billion rubles (which excludes extra-limit investments) is 115% Of the amount of capital work realized in 1939. (A. G. Zverev, "On the State budget of the USSR for 1940 and Fulfillment of the USSR State Budget for 1938", Sovetskie finansz, 1940 No. 1-2, pp. 17-18). Thus, the realized figure for 1939 would be 31.4 billion rubles. Our assumptions led to a figure of 29.3 billion rubles exclusive of extra-limit investments. It is possible that the difference is accounted for by price differences - namely, that the 29.3, billion ruble figure is in 1936-7 prices and the 31.4 figure is in current prices. This implies a 7% price increase from 1936-7 to 1939. In any case, the suspicion of underfulfillment of the 1939 investment plan seems justified. (c) It is known that the investment plan with respect to agri- culture was underfulfilled in 1939 (note 6, table viii) and that economic organizations in 1939 failed to achieve the planned amount of profits (Zverev, Gosudarstvennye bindzhetx SSSR 1938-1945, p. 78). . In summary, our argument leads to the following picture of-planned. and realized investments in 1938-1940: ' Total Investments STAT Exclusive of capital Extra-limit repairs and extra- investment limit investments Exclusive of capital repairs; inclusive of extra-limit investments 35.8 35.7 Planned 1938. . Realized 1938 ' 6.5 . 29.2 Planned 1939 7.5 34.7 42.2 Realized 1939 5 29.3 34.3 Planned 1940 36.1 Realized 1940 6 32 38 It is obvious that the argument of this note has large elements of con- jecture in it. .The 1938-1940 totals may be taken to be firm, but the deter- mination of the annual figures is based on a number ol assumptions any of which could be wrong. There are undoubtedly other explanation's for the 1938- 1940 data which could not be refuted and which lead to somewhat different . conclusions. ? - - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved -for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in rt-Pa Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ? STAT Page One point, in particular, has played little part in this discussion e-se namely, the problem of the prices in which the data are stated. The language used in deecribing the 1938-1940 total, the, planned annual figures and the realized 1940 figure -- the "volume" of capital work e- suggests that thee, are in 1936-7 prices (note 1, this table; note 7, table I). The realized 1938 figure, however, seems to be in 1938 prices since it is obtained from data all of which are stated in prices of the respective years. It ie prob- ably true that 1938 prices did not differ substantially from 1936-7 prices; on the assumption that the rest of the data are in 1936-7 prices and tc the extent that 1938 Prices were higher than 1936-7 prices, the realized 1939 ? figure would be understated. On the basis of the language ueed'in.describing the stated figures for this period and on the basis of the assumption that 1938 prices were not substantially different rom 1936-37 prices, we assume that all the 1938-40 data are in 1936-7 prices. It is certainly possible: (a) that we have been rieled by the language and ar the 1938-1940 data are in prices of the respective years; or (b) that some of the figures are in 1936-7 prices and others are in current prices. Some rough calculations indicate that prices rose by something like 10% between 3936-7 and 194C, (note I, this table). Thus, the error involved in assuming 1936-7 prices if the data are actually in current prices is not substantial. The figures for extra-limit investments for these years have been associated by Soviet sources with the stated investment figures; no errore therefore, occur in the proportion of extra-limit to centralized in- vestments from the assumption that all data are in 1936-7 prices. On the other hand the estimates of collective farm investments are interpolations of data in current prices (table VII, note 10) and the estimates of capital repairs are based on data in the same prices as planned 1938-1940 invest- ments Table VII, note 7). Thus,if all the data are in 1936-7 prices, we have overestimated the proportion of collective farms' money investments frnm their own resources. If the planned data are in 1936-7 prices and the realized data are in current prices, we may have underestimated the propor- tion of capital repairs. It should also be noted that another source states planned 1938 invest- ments to be 38.5 billion rubles (table X). Since Soviet plans are often changed In the course of the year it is assumed in the absence of other infor- mation that the 38.5 figure represents another version of the 1938 plan. 4 In The Economy of the USSR During World War II, (r. Voznesensky states that capital investments in 1940 were almost 43 billion rubles as agai .st 30 billion in 1937, 18 billion in 1932 and 3.7 billion in 1928. The only way I can explain this 1940 figure as against the previously stated 38 billion rubles for 1940, is to assume that the 43 billion includes collective farms' capital investments. The magnitude of the discrepancy between Voznesensky's two 1940 figures seems, on this explanation, to be abcut right. (Cf. table VII and note 10; cf. also note 5 to table V for an instance of similar unexplained discrepancies.) 5 Let us attempt to estimate the realized 1941 figure. The realized figure for 31, years of the Third Five Year Plan is 130 billion rubles. (Cf. table I) Subtracting from this the Voznesensky 1938-40 total of 108 billion Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP8i-ninztqPnn'?gnnicalnry, Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? r' Page 11 rubles, we obtain 22 billion rubles as the realized figure for the first half of 1941. Since both the 108 and 130 figure are presumably in 1936-7 prices (table I, note 7) the difference is also presumably in 193677 'prices. This seems about right (i.e. the two figures of 108 and 130 billion seem to have the same coverage) in view of the well-known seasonality'of Soviet plan fulfillment experience. RoVinskii states that "for the four war years" capital investmetts were 94.A billion (Rovinskii et al, Organizatsiia finansirovanlia kreditovaniia kapitaltuykh vlozhanii, p. 16). The time span of this data is very probably July 1941 - June 1945; other sources relate this figure to "the years of the Patriotic War (1941-1945)". (Cf. K. Plotnikov "Finances and the ,Development of the Socialist National Economy", Sovetskie finansz, 1947 No. 11, 5). Total investments for 1942-1945 (from the present table) were: 1942 18.6 1943 19.5 1944 29.0 1945 36.3 ASsuming that the first half year 1945 bears the same proportion to total 1945 as the first half year 1941 to total 1941 (i.e. 22/57 Or 39%), we ob- tain for the first half year 1945 total investments of 14.2 billion rubles. 3ubtracting from 94.6 billion rubles total investments in 194271944 and the first half of 1945,. we obtain 13.3 billion rubles as total investment for the second half of 1941. This figure is, presumably, in current prices and should be reduced by something like 10f (cf. note 1 to this table) to get it in 2936-37 pricer. Thus, realized investment for 1941 would be 34 billion rubles. If, on the other hand, we assume that 1/2 the total investments of 1945 occurred in the first half of the year (on the grounds that the end of the war and the reconversion of the economy counteracted the usual seasonal pat7, tern) and repeat the same procedure, we obtain 9.3 billion rubles as second half 1941 investments in current_priceS, f;',.4 billion rubles as second half 1941 investments in 1936-7 prices, and.30.4 billion rubles as realized in- vestmens for 1941. 6. Voznesensky.states that capital investments it 194271944 amounted to 79 billion rubles, "exclusive of the value of evacuated equipment". (The Ecorof the USSR During World War fl, p, 26). The total indicated in the presenttable for 1942-44 is 674 billion. We have assumed, correctly I think, that extra-Emit investments were unsignificant during these years (cf. note 2 to this table). It Would not be correct to assume, however, that collective farm investments were insignifica (hiring these years. In- deed, .An 1944 Collective farm investments appeared to be about 6.6 billion rubles (Cf.table: VII and note 10; the. figure May be somewhat too high). I 'conclUde that the difference between the 79 billion rubles and ,the 67.1 billion rubles Is explained largely if not wholly by the inclusion in the: :former figure of Collective farm investments. If this is true, the amount Of collective farm investments in 1942 and 1943 Might be estimated at some- t/111.Pg-:like .2 billion rubles per year (taking into account the possible over- estimate of 1944 collective farm investments). tI STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,, ? 411) 7. The estimate of investments for 1947 is subject to particular doubt. In view Of the tone of complaints about investment plan fulfillment for 1947 (Pravda, February 4, 1941, p..2) and in view of the Soviet failure to puh- lish a realized figure for 1947, one may conclude that 1947 was probably, an unusually bad year. This may very well have taken the form' of proportion- ately fewer investments from enterprises own resources. (The estimate.in the table assumes the same ratio between budget financed investments andr anvestments from enterprises' own resources for planned and realized 1947). Baykov and Barker present the iolloWing. figures for realized 1947 and planned 1948 investments: Realized 1947 Plan 1948 Total Investments Investments from the budget 53.8 44.5 60.9 54.5 (Alexander PAykov and G. R. Barker, "Financed Developments in the U3SR"4. hlletint, on Soviet Economic Develo ment, Bulletin 3, August 1950, kp. 13). .2 .have checked all the sources cited by Baykov and Barker and find no explicit reference to the 1947 figure for total investments (indeed, I have found no reference anywhere to a realized figure for 1947). The 53.S b1- - lions iscresumably derived from the statement that the "volume Of capital work" in 1948 was 123% of 3947, since 66.2/53.8 1.23 (Cf. Pravda, March 11, 1949 p. 2). This seems to me to be incorrect, since the percentage almost certainly refers to a comparison in constant prices (cf. note 1, this table). The 60.9 billions planned for 1948 is clearly described as "allowances from the ztate tattL for capital construction". (Pravda, February 1, 1948, e. ?). There is, however, an additional statement in Pravda (February 5, 1948, p. 5) which says; "From the state budget in 1948 will be granted for cap- ital Investments 10 billion rubles more than there was in 1947" ("iz gosudaretvennogo bindzheta v 1948g. budet vydeleno na kapitalovlozheniia na 10 mard. rub. boltshe, chem eto bylo 1947g."), Baykov and Barker have apparently interpreted this as a comparison of realized 1947nand planned 1948 budget allowances for canital investments (their 54.5 figure appears nowhere explicitly in their sources) and have ignored the clear character- ization of the 60.9 figure. My Russian is too inexpert to make me certain of the nuances of Soviet statements, but it seems to me that the quoted state- ment may refer to a comparison between planned budget allowances and realized total investments, which is stated ambiguously so as to veil a bad 1947 ful- fillment figure. In other words, it may be that total investments in 1947 were not more than 50.9 billion rubles. In any case, the indicated ambiguity should not go without comment. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Itctra-Limit stments 1132 1928/9-1932 1929-1933 (In 1933 Prices) Plan 1933-1937 .515 1.126P 1936 1937 1933-1937 1934-1938 13.4 150452q (In 1936 Prices) Plan 1938-'1942 1938 MiNNAIMIOdPitiMUllimumml/NIND.O.Mp :Plan 1939 1939 30.5? 32.8? 6.5 (5.0)v 5.8r 5? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release SOURCES: 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Page a. A. Snilga, "Finances of the Socialist State," Loble_u_nekonaniki 1937, . No. 2, p. 118. b. Obtained Iran the following infonnation (Granovskii and Markus, Ekonamika sotsialj..s.tjs.kesjs_ojmhlmnojLtl,..p. 533; Th...L..voir...L...2...21.m.,ear p. Second Five Year an Fulfi4mant, p. 71): Total Investments, inaluding Capital Extra-Limit Investments. Total Investments, including Capital excluding Extra-Ling Investments. Total Investments, excluding Capital Extra-Limit Investments. 2,231 Repairs and 33.2 Repairs but Repairs and 1212:121Z 137.5 30.2 128.1 26.5 114?7 c. 1111rd Five Year Plan, pp. 116, 120. The statdments are: (1) that the total amount of extra-limit investments planned for 1938-1942 is 45.2 billion rubles, whlch include 14.7 billion rubles of money expenditures on fixed capital by collective farms; and (2) that 32.8 billion rubles of capital repairs were planned above the indicated volume of capital work, including 26 billion rubles from amortization allowances. d. V. Buzyrev, aiairoyae jvozhenU (Capital Investment Finances and Loans), 1941, pp. 169, 212. Cf. also note 3, table VI on the extra-limit investment data and note 12 to this table on the loans to collective farms data. e. Obtained by subtracting realized 1938 and 1940 from realized 1938-1940. Cf. alb() note 3, table VI. f. A. G. Everev, il;lAto Budgets of the USSR 1938-12AL.p. 79. The 1940 extra- limit investments probably exclude same elements of extra-limit Investments (cf. note 3 to this table) VoznesenskY, ae....2E2dallAlnaElk:of the Soviet Univ.)) 1941, p. 8. The figures are described as "aoncentralized" investments. On the identity between extra-limit investments and noncentralized investment, cf. note 1 to this table. A. G. Zverev, ? sudarst biudzhet soiuza SSR na 1 od (usaR State Bu et for 1939, p. 20. The stateiment is that of the total amortization allowances of 7.933 billion, 3.725 billion is to go to c capital construction and the rest to capital repairs. Itemi.W0 March 8, 1951, p. 2. The capital repair figures are presumed ? to be total capital repairs because of their magnitudes; the 1939 total of amortization allowances, for example, was 7.9 billion. I ? j.EralAg, February 26, 1941, p. 3. Obtained from Table I by subtracting total investments excluding capital repairs and extra-limit investments from total investments including capital repairs and extra-limit investments. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDPRi_nininpnnogrm4nr,,,,,, STP Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ......... ?t". n40,411104Ww034,,,Y1111.111^ STAT ?), ? Page 135 1. Obtained by multiplying money investments per collective farm and the nulber of collecthre farms for the indicated years. The source of the fir it sf:Ties is: N. Anisimov, Seltskoe khoziaistvo v novoi staliukoi riatike (AulD13Agre in t):e Jew Stalin Five Year Plati71W, p. 13. The source of the second series is: O. D. 3hepilov, "The Collective Farm ;tracture of the E2," Prolopliki, 1941, No. 1, p. 35. The mvoev of collective farms for 1944 was estimated. Cf. note 10 to this tnble for details and checks. ;..? E. Nesnii, "Capital Investments of Collective Farms and the Agricultural LtlIgApticheskaia rekonstruktsiia seltskogo khoziailka, 1938, No. 1., p. 3. n. Plotnikov, Biudzhet sotsialischeskaszpsudarstva (1111dEgLILAhe_ L)ocialist Stat-e),-1948, p. 138. o. Rovi,Iskii, et al.,222111111.141A,finansirovaniia I kreditovaniia ka nirkh p. 19. The statement is that capital investments of collective. farms, excluding labor participation of collective farm membnrs, were 14 billion rubles for 1946-1947. The total was arbitrarily halved to obtain annual amounts. p. Second Five Aar Inal) pp. 558, 559. q. SocialisUns11101101921-2g, pp. 113, 115. rI Third Five rP1, pp. 115, 119. It should be noted, in connection with the capital repairs figure, that Third Five Year Plan was published in 1939. s. Fourth Five Year Plan. p. 38. t. Ciocialist Constraction 1936 PP 346-7. u. Interpolated linearly. Cf note 9 to this table for details. v. Estimated; cf. note 7 to this table for details. The very rough nature of the post-war estimates should be noted. w. Estimted; of. note 6 to this table for details. The very rough nature of these estimates should be noted. x. Estimated; cf. note 10 to this table for details. The very rough nature of these estimates should be noted. V, a? S. 2rmilov, "Long-term Loans to Collective Farms and Tasks of the Agricultural Dank," 2glksiga..4.11401:, 1940, No. p. 56. It is possible that not all of this sum is to be directed to investments in fixed capita. Cf. note 12 to this table. proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250n1gnnn9_R ,1 ? 1.. 11 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ,7.7:7;t77 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ?,- ? A eV ,[1411, .v.ttarr, n40,07 STA NOTES TO TABLE VII Page 13 1. The components of noncentralized investments are, by Soviet defin- ition, those which are urplertaken by decentralized decision. Thus, in princiele, the compenents of non-centralized investments are: (a) extra- limit :nvestmente; ?anl (0 collective farm investments. (Cf. above,. pp. In Soviet statistics, however, the category of non-centralized investments isless inclusive: a. Since 193'1, capital repairs are planned Separately from capital. investments; and 'sine 193, capital.repairs are reported separately, And in aldition to, total (centralized and non-centralized) investments.. (Cf.t. Rovinekil et al, Orsanizatsila finansirovaniia i kreditovaniia kapita171 rykh veozhenii, pp. 270-1; Rliachkov and Kiparisov, iespialleLLUchetiloo stroiteltstva, p.6; Slovari-s ravochnik sotsiallno-ekonomicheskoi statistike, p.250; Thirei Five Year Plan, pp.11o,120; Zverev,ilat_eseLt.&;deleLeftle_leja 2222:12L0 p.79; lEiLtlan, pp.483-509; A. M. Aleksandrov, Finansy i kredit SSSR - Finances and Credit of the USSR - 1948, p.62; Pravda, March 51, 1954 p.2). The reason for separate treatment presumably lies in the ereanizationally separate arran-dements for capital repairs (cf. above, pp. 20-22,26). All the data examined, including data prior to the 1935 decree which estahlishefl extra-limit investments, state collective farm investments separately from, and in adAition to, total investments; similarly, all the data examined state collective farm investments separately from, and in ad(lition to, extra-limit investments. (Cf: Table I and notes 3-5; Table II and note 4; Table III, note 1; Buzyrev, Ca ital Investment Finances and Loans, p.212; Zverev, 21_411112-21:1tLIcibett.EILL21.122.2, P.20; A. Smilga, "Finances of tde Socialist State", p.118). The reason presumably lies in the "coopera- tive" (as vs. state) ownership of productive reseerces in collective farms. In a number of cases, state aid to collective farms via Agricultural Bank ]eaes is included in total investments, exclusive of collective farms' investments from their own resources. (Cfs Table I and notes 3-5; Table lIe Cf. Table VII, notes 9 and 10, for the treatment of this factor in our estimates of collective farms' investments). If we except mareinal items like extraelimit investments .which must be approved by the Ministry and, in some cases, Agricultural Bank loans to, cellective farms, the conclusion is that in Soviet statistical practice.non- centralized investments and extra- limit investments (exclusive of collective farm investments) are identical. Soviet terminological practice has at: least once confirmed this conclusion. In 1914, planned centralized invest- ments were 48 billion rubles. ,An additional '9 billion rubles of investments have been described both as noncentralized investments (Voineeenskr, The Growinc Prosperit- of the Soviet Union, p.33) and as 'extra-limit invest- ment m Buzyrev, Capital Investment Finances and Loans, p.212). 1 Accordingly, reported noncentralized investments Are regarded as identical with extra-limit investments and, in order to determine total investments, capital repairs and collective farMAnvestments must be added to centralized and noncentralized investments. . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Ron7snnlannn9_p Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release - 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 2. It i8 ponsille.to.obtaJn a sector breakdown of extra-limit invest- ments for on1;.! two years - 1937 and 1939. In ?these years planned extra - limit investrers In the indicated sectors of the economy were as ?follows: 1937 . 1939 Billions % of, Billions .% of of Rubles Total of Rubles Total T. Inlustry .3 11.5 .9 12.0. II. Agr!cnitlr.,9 (exclusive of .collective .5 19.2 .8 10.7. ? . farms) IF. Transport and Corzunications .1 3.8 .5 6.7 IV. Trade and ?Procurement .1. '3.8 .4 5.3 V. CocptiravcA' (prodacrs' and cnsumerst) .4 15.4 -.9. -12.0 Other (MtnIcipal economy, housing, 1.2 46.2. 4.0 53.3. olucation public health) Total 2.6 100.0 7.5 100,0 (A. 3mi1ga, "Finances of the Socialist State", Eatley ekono, 1937 No. 2, p.11?; Buzyrev, 2.1.21. p.212). Probably little violence would be done to reality if the extra-limit investments of ccoperatives were cOnsidered as investments in industry. As an in.licator of the relative importance of producers'. cooperatives we may cite the distribution of Bank of Commerce long-term loans to,cooperatives (in billions of rubles): 1 1-1 r 122.Ei 1222 120 Producers" cooperatives 1. .63 .79 .92 Consumers' cooperatives .81 .07 .08 .07 Total 2,.47 .70 ..87 .99 e (Buzyrev .on. cit., p.189). Let us compare the sector breakdown of planned 1939 investments inclusive and exclusive of extra-limit investments,(cf. Table IX and note 1). Investments, Extra-limit Investments Investments Excl., Investments Incl. Excl. Ircl. extra-limit extra-limit extra extra ----(=ions of 1752i) 2 (% of total) I. Industry 17.6 1.8 - 19.4 II. Agriculture 1.6 .8 2.4 III. Transport & Co*unications Trade & Procurement Social- cultural & Adiinistration Total 50.6 45.9 4.6 5.7 5.0 .5 5.5 14.3 13.0 .4 .9 1.4 2.1 i12 14.1 29.1 7.5 42.3 3 The inclusion of extra-limit investments, thus, reduces the relative impor- tance of industry ard transport and communications, and increases the rela- tive importance of the other sectors, especially of social-cultural and alministration. ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 0 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDPR1_n1naqpnnogn,-,4ntnn? n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 138 .Since industry in Fourth Five Year Plan centralized investments repre- sents 63% of total centralized investments the extrapolation of pre-war sector breakdowns of extra-hint investments would even more materially affect the sector breakdown of post-war 'total (i.e, including extra-limit) investments. It is probably true that the pre-war breakdown of extra-limit invest- ments is inapplicable to the post-war situation. A decree of January, 1941, widened the range of measures admissible as extra-limit investments. Thus, Buzyrev states: "The 1941 national economic plan permits ministries, depart- ments, and the republic councils of ministers to undertake in addition in 1941 as extra-limit investments a series of measures and expenditures the majority of which were earlier limited investments". (Buzyrev, Finansir- ovanie i kreditovanie kapitaltnykh vlozhenii, p.211). While no indica- tions of the relative importance of these measures are given, I judge from the list of measures and from Smilgals characterization of earlier extra- limit investments that the roles of industry and transport and perhaps also of agriculture in extra-limit investments were intended to increase and the role of the social-cultural and administration sector to decrease. Buzyrev lists the ew measures as follows: (a) Investments for the extraction and the drying of peat; (b) The acquisition and installation of equipment for ' operating shops and enterprises; (c) The acquisition of automobiles by the ministries of automobile transport and of trolleys and trolley busses for urban transport; (d) Geological, prospecting, design and research work for future construction; (e) The construction of economic structures in state farms, machine tractor stations and other agricultural enterprises, and also tne construction of local state farms and the acquisition of machinery and equipment for them; (f) The construction of stores, warehouses, and other accommodations by trade organizations; (g) Excavation, drainage and levelling worn; (h) Irrigation and land improvement work with the partici- pation of colle.ctive.farms; (i) The construction of roads of republic and local importance; (j) The construction of rural hospitals and selools; (k) Small wooden ship building; (1) The construction of movie theatres; (m) The construction of intra-regional telephone, telegraph and radio systems; (n) The construction of garages and repair shops by the ministries of auto- mobile transpert; (0) The acquisition of urban sanitation equipment; and (p) Capital repairs to plants and buildings. Thus, Ruzyrev concludes, "beginning with 1941, the range of extra-limit inveeszents will expand sig- nificantly in comparison with those established by the USSR Council of Ministers decree of Sept. 19, 1935". (Buzyrev, 221_911., p.211 and-foot- note 1, p.211). No post-war data on the sector breakdown of extra-limit investments are available. If an expansion of the roles of industry, transport and per- haps agriculture is a correct interpretation of the 1941 change and if this tendency, interrupted by the war, was resumed in the post-war period, then extrapolations of the 1937 and 1939 sector breakdowns of extra-limit in- vestments will understate the post-war role of industry, transport and agriculture. In this connection, it is of interest to examine the sector breakdowns of 1941 and planned 1949 investments because the former pre- sumably exclude, and the latter include, extra-limit investments (cf. Table VI, note 2). These breakdowns are (in percentages of total investments): STAT ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 120 Planned 19/ I. Industry 70.1 . 68.4 II. Agriculture 6.5 8.7 III. Transport :and CoMmlinications 13.6 12.8 .IV. Trade and Procurement . 1.3 . .9 V. Social-cultural and Administration,' 8.5, .211 Total' . 100 40 Page 139 ? The direction of the changes between 1943 and planned 1949 investments are identical with the changes noted for 1939 investments when extra-limit investments are added to centralized investments (except for trade and pro- curement). The mapitude of the changes (in percentage points) between 1941 and planned 19h9 investments is less for industry, transport and commun- ications, and social-cultural and administration than in 1939. Thus, the results are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that in the post-war period the roles of industry, transport and agriculture in extra-limit invest- ments have increased and that inclusion or exclusion of extra-limit invest- ments will leave the sector breakdown of investments virtually unaffected. On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed results are due to an offset between the inclusion of extra-limit invest- ments and changes in the sector breakdown of centralized investments between the two years. 3. It is believed that the planned 1940 extra-limit investments are not comprehensive. The. belief arises from a comparison of the figure with contioous years. In 1939 planned extra-limit investments were 7.5 billion rubles. The figure presented by Zverev for 1939, however, was only 3.2 billion; this figure was stated to be exclusive of cooperatives and collec- tive farms and inclusive only of investments provided for by the financial plans of departments (Table VI, note 3). The 4.8 figure, also stated by Zverev, is unqualified. My suspicion is that its exclusions and inclusions may be the same as those for the 3.2 figure; the total extra-limit invest- lents (excludinc collective farm investments) planned for 1939 may, thus, have been something like 8-9 billion rubles. The figure for 1941 is stated to include extra-limit investments by state economic organizations and "cultural" institutions of union republic and local jurisdiction, i.e. excluding cooperatives and collective farms. (Buzyrev, op. cit., p.212). Cooperatives' extra-limit investments were probably planned to be 1 - 1.5 billion rubles for 1941. Thus, total extra-limit investMents were probably planned to be 10 - 10.5 billion rubles in 1941. It is likely, also, that the realized extra-limit investments for 1938, 1940, and 1938-40 exclude such investments by producers' and consumers' cooperatives. In the case least of producers' cooperatives virtually all of their investments are extra-limit. (A. Lushclitskii, "The Bank of Commerce and Extra-Limit Investments", ?sLyitp_LiejlaLyls, 1940 No. 4, p.39). L. The amount of extra-limit investments financed from the budget is not insignificant. The amounts planned from the budget were 1.6 billion in 1937, 2.2 billion in 1939, 3.4 billion in 1940, 6 billion in 1941. (Smilga, cp. cit., p.14; Lverev, State Budgets of the qssR 19384945, pp.51, 79; 5uzyrev, L2. cit., p.212). On the Soviet statements that extra-limit Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STA Page investments are outside the plan of capital work, the appropriation of budget funds for. such ?investments reflects 'a surprising affection for market processes. 5. Extra-limit investments are certainly not all small investments. In 1939, 40% of the total extra-limit investments were from investment bank (as against State Bank) accounts; that is, 40% of:the.extra-limit invest7 ment projects cost 100,000 rubles or more. (Lushchitskii, op. cit.., p.39). The first year in which extra1imit investments appear is 1936. It is ? possible that the stated figure for 1936 extra-limit investments is an understatement. Some of "expenditures for special purposes" may have been an antecedent of extra-limit investments. (Cr. Table II, note 7). 6. Extra-limit investments in comparison with centralized investments were as follows (in billions of rubles): Centralized Extra-limit .Extra-limit investments investments investments Centralized investments 1937 (source b to present table) 26.5 3.0 11e3% 1933-1937 (source b to present table) 114.7 9.4 8.2% Plan 1938-1942 (Table I & source to present table) 181.0 30.5 16.9% 1931 (Table VI & note 3) 29.2 6.5 22.3% Plan 1939 (Table VI & note 3) 34.7 7.5 21.6% 1939 (Table VI & note 3) 29.3 5 17,1% Plan 1940 (Table VI & note 3, : note 3, to present table) 36.1 4.8-9 13.3-24.9% 1940 (Table VI & note 3) 32 6 18.8% 1938-1940 (Table VI & note 3) ' - 90.5 17.5 19.3% Plan 1941 (Table VIII & note 16; note 3 to present table) 48 .9-10.5 18.8-21.9% . Thus, in the years following the Second Five Year Plan, extra-limit investments were something like .l7-22: of centralized investments. In the years of the Second. Five Year Plan, in the last half of which extra-limit investments as such were established, extra-limit investments were some- thing like 8-11% of centralized investments. Extra-limit investments in 1941 may be assumed to bear the same ratio to planned extra-limit investments as realized investments bear to planned investments, i.e. something like 5 billion rubles in 1936-7 prices. In the war years, extra-limit investments may be presumed to be virtually zero (cf. Table VI, note 2). In the post-war years no data on the magnitude of extra-limit investments are available. In order to arrive at (highly tenta- tive) estimates of the amount of extra-limit investments, we might apply the pre-war percentages to the post-war amounts of centralized investments. Let us use 18% for the Fourth Five Year Plan, 10% for 1946 on the grounds that decentralized investment choice was just getting started after the wartime restrIctions, 15% for 1947 on the grounds that this was a relatively bad Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025nniqnnn9_A Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Pa 1.41 year and IA% for 1948.. (Extra-limit investments are included in the pub- lished figures for 1949-1951). This results in the following figures for extra-limit investments (in billions of rubles): Plan 1946-1950 45 1946 6.5 1947 8 1948 12 It is, of enurs61 impossible to know how ,far from the truth these fig- ures ray be. There are, however, some bits of evidence which tend to support these magnitudes. a. It is stated (Fourth Five Year Plan, p.54) that 1946,1950 houeins construction is planned to total volume of capital work. Housing construction in 1946-1950 was planned to be 42.3 billion rubles exclusive of individual housing censtruction. It is observed that 1,2.3 is more than 14,5% of the planned 1946-1950 total of centralized in. vestments. If we add the estimated 45 billion rubles extra-limit invest- ments to the 250.3 billion rubles of centralized investments, we observe that housing construction turns out to be 14:Z of total investments. The same source states that Third Five Year Plan housing con- strection was to be 10.5 of the total volume of capital work (Fourth Five Year Plan, e..54). The fiseere given VY Third Five Year Plan (p.ITTST-- housing construction is 22.1 billion rubles, which is precisely 10.5% of total centralized and non-centralized investments (211.5 billion rubles) for the Third Five Year Plan. It should be noted, however, that Fourth Five Year Plan (p.54) Eives a figure of 15.5 billion rubles for Third.Five Year Plar nousing construction. The difference between the two figures seems to be that the 22.1 billion figure includes extra-limit investments in'nousine, and capital repairs to housing. (Table XII, note 17). Since 15.5 billion rubles is siolificantly less than 10.5% of even centralized in- vestment, I assume that Fourth Five Year Plan is making the comparison with the 22.1 figure. b. Maslakov states that extra-limit investments in the housing- municipal economy planned for 1948 were 2.6 billion rubles from the finan- cial plans of republic. and local housing-municipal organizations. (V. P. Maslakov, N. L. Filatov and V. V. Barin, Finansirovanie zhilishchno- konsenaltnoe7o khozisistva Finning the Housinr-Munici al Econom' 1948, p.U). The total?fisure for extra-limit investments in the housing-municipal economy was apparently larger than this. Maslakov indicates the following financial sources, in addition te financial plans, for extra-limit invest- nents: (a) mobilization of internal resources; (b) above-plan'accumulations; (c) special funds for housinp repairs; (d) insurance funds; (e) bank loans; (f) budget c'ant; (t) and sewage taxes. These additional sources are probably net srall in relation to the 2.6 billion rubles. In 1939 extra- limit investsents provided for by the financial plans were about 40% of total extra-limit investments (Table VI, note 3). To be conservative, let us assume that total extra-limit investments in the housing-muricipal economy were to be L-S billion rubles in 1945. Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 0, 11, STAT 4 Pe 142 In 1937, extra.gimit investments in the housinr-municipal economy were planned to be about 1/3 of the total extra-limit investments. (A. &Alga, "Enances,of the Socialist State", Problerr ekonomiki, 1937 No. 2, p,11). In 1939, extralimit investments in the municipal economy were planned to be 517 million rubles, and in housinr, public health and education 1852 million rubles. (V. M. Buzyrev, Finansirovanie.i kreditovanie qp.A111 nykh vlozhenii, p.212). If we assume that 1500 million rubles of the latter fii7,ure represent extra-limit investMents in housing, we conclude that in 1939 extra-limit investments in the housing-municipal economy were planned to be about 30% of total extra-limit investments. If we have correctly, Interpreted the 1941 changes (cf. note 2 to this table); and if this tenlency persisted in post-war extra-limit investments, the percentages may even have been less for 1948. In view of these calculations, our estimate of 1948 extra-limit investments seems to be reasonable. 7. It is the purpose of this note to arrive, with virtually no data, at annual estimates of capital repairs for 1938-1950. The amount of capital repairs normally depends not on the volume of current investment but on the age of the stock of fixed capital. Thus, in the planned figures for 1939-1941 we see a steady increase in the Amount of capital repairs without the sharp increase observed for total investments in 1941. For the pre-war years we will take planned figures as realized figures (except, of course, for 1941) and project backwards to obtain 5 billion rubles as 1931 capital repairs. In comparing 1937 and estimated 1933 capita.1 repairs it should be remembered that in 1938 provision for capital repairs from amortization allowances was established in an envir- onment of comments that the pre-1938 expenditures on capital 'repairs were inadequate (cf. above, p.2(:). We will assume that realized capital repairs for 1941 bear somewhat the same proportion to planned capital repairs as realized investments bear to planned investments, i.e. something like 4 billion rubles in 1936-7 prices. In 1942-43, capital repairs were sharply reduced; expenditures were 1/2 1/3 of the allowances for capital repairs. In 1944 capital repairs sharply increased and "approached" the pre-war level. (Kantor, flumpa_12nly_i ikh isDoltzovanie, p.77). One might estimate 1944 capital repairs, taking into account a reduced territory for at least part of the year, to be something like 5 billion rubles, 1943 capital repairs to be 2 billion rubles, 1942 capital repairs to be 1.5 billion rubles. Kantor also states that amortization allowances in induury were about 5 Lillion rubles of which 2-2i billion went for capital repairs (pp. p.37). The time reference of the statement is not entirely clear but ap... parently the reference is to the immediately post-war years. Kantort6 book was published in 1947. The pre-war. magnitudes of amortization allowances in industry were 3.8 billion in 1937 and 4.1 billion in 1939. (V. 5?1)61, "On the Question of the Evaluation of Fixed Capital", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1947.No. 4, p.54). Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 waVW. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 14) We will assuMe, therefore, that the 2-2i billion rubles refer to 1945' In 1941, capital repairs from current and past unexpended amortization allow- ances in industry were planned to be 3.1 billion rubles, of which. .6 billion were to Us in .:efense inlustry. Total capilal. repairs were planned to be 7.3 billion. (Cr. Table VIII and note 19). Since the magnitude of unex- pended amortization allowPocer inherited from the 1942-43 years was probably substantial and since Lhis magnitude was very small for 1941 (1.?41 Plan, p. 502), we guess that total capital repairs were probably about 7 billion rubles in 1945. For went of a better estimation procedure we assume that Fourth Five Year Plan capital repairs were somewhat higher in proportion to total central- ized investments than were Third Five Year Plan capital repairs. In the Third Five Year Plan, the proportion was 18%; in the Fourth Five Year Plan we assume the proportion to be 20%. Thus, 1946-1950 capital repairs are estimated to be in 1945 prices something like 50 billion rubles. In 1950 capital repairs were 26 billion rubles; in 1951 capital repairs are planned to billion. In 1'/50 a:.prt17,ation allowances wure clArved ayLd presurnatly raised (cf. above, I. 21, footnote :5.2). We will ;t3SUMC i.hat the char g in amortization all)vances aeccunted for a 1.5 billi6n rLble increase in capital repairs between 1949 and 1950. In additifm, lot tat; assw,e that the observed diffccu becweon realized 1950 and planned 1951 capial rptirs is also 1)4)-1950 ?..ifference, net of ch,L change In capital repairs indu(1 by the ,:hanL,e t.mcti/atior. allowanc-:s. On tide; Lai;, we arrive at a 21 billion ruble figure for 1949 capital repairs. In 1949 the "removal" of subsidies was reflected in a sharp price in- crease of perhaps 0-45%. (Cf. Table VI, note 1). Let us reduce the 1949 capital repairs figure by 20% to reflect the change in prices (on the assumption that capital repairs costs did not rise as much as general capi- tal goods). From the result, 17 billion rubles, we subtract about 3 billion rut les (about 80,g of the 1949-1950 difference), to account for the secular increase in capital repairs. On this basis we arrive at a 14 billion ruble fit:4re for 190 capital repairs. In order to obtain the 1946-1947 capital repairs figures we will inter- polate linearly between 7 billion rubles (estimated for 1945) and 14 billion rubles (estimatel for 1903). Thus, we obtain the following capital repairs series for 1938-1950 (in billions of rubles): Plan 1959 1940 1941 1942 1,943 1944 1945 1946-1950 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 5. 5.3 6.6 4 1.5 2 .5 7 50 9.3 11.6 14 21 26 This series is, of cpuree, highly conjectural. The generally higher level of post-war (as vs. pre-war) capital repairs is to be explained by the 3...irdtted failure to make adequate capital repairs during the war years and by the consequences of occupation and more intensive utilization of fixed capital luring the war. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-n1ndqPnn'?gnnintinry, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page 144 Mezhalkin presents the following index of the amount of capital repairs financed (193P 61100): 1221 ?1242 1226._ 142 100 3o8 450 .600 (C. V. Meshalkin,,Finarsirovanie kaAtaltnoro remonta'osnovn kh sredstv.- FinancirJ, Canital Re )airs of Fixed Assets - 194i, p.J/. The 1940 figure ? we have used .11:: fairly firm, being.derived only from the assumption that ? 121anned and realized capital repairs are identical. ? Meshalkin's ineex aum- bers imply that 193 capital repairs were only 2 billion rubles. ?This is certainly not $o.% Capital 'repair's in 1937 were 3.7 billion rubles. In ' a.tlition, we know the following expenditures on capital repairs (in?Millions of rubles): 1221. 1222_ Coal industry 224.5 166.7 Ferrous metallurgy 226.8 273.7 Construction materials industry 35.9 97.5 Timber industry 92.2 121.1 Textile industry 188.2 233.3 Light industry 58.3 73.0 Food industry 138.3 184.1 Local industry 64.4 32.2 Producers' cooperatives 61.2 100.8 Total 1090 1282 (Kantor, aOsuovrrehisoltzovanie, p.58). It is inconceivable that these few industries could account for one half of the total capital repairs in 1938. Furthermore, if we regard these industries as a representative sample of the economy as a whole, our estimate of 1933 capital repairs seems reasonably accurate. For these industries, capital repairs in 1939 were 118;)' nf capital repairs in 1938; in our estimates total ri',..ital repairs in 1939 lere 116% of total capital repairs in 1938. I ruspect that Meshalkin, or perhaps the printer, has made an error Eimpl:,- in the specification of the hase year. If we assume that this is so a::,1 express the 1946 and 1947 indices as percentages of 194r. we obtain: 2:22 ? 100 146 195 If we express our estimates as percentages of 1940, we obtain: . 1040 2..2/f6 1942 .,100 141 '176 This by no means can be regarded as Confirmation of our estimates. But if Meshalkin's relations between 1947, 1946, and 1940 are correct, it is an indication that our estimates, And particularly the relationships. between the early post-war and the pre-war figures, are of the right order of magnit:Ide. If any changes are called for, out immediately post,-war estimates should probably be increaSed. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 14 8. .The post-war data on the sector distribution of inveatments. gener- ally exclude extra-limit investments 'and capital repairs (cf. Table IX and Table XIV and note 2). The problem is: what ef:ect Would the addition of these categories have on the sector distribution? . The sector breakdown of extra-limit investments was discussed in note 2 to this table. No data on the sector breakdown of capital repairs are avail- hie.except for the treakdown of a portion of the total in 121121E (cf. Table The sector breakdown of total capital repairs is estimated ,for the 1941 Plan as follows (cf. Table VIII, note 19)': Billions of rubles Percent of total 44.6 6.8 27,0 114 2.7 17.6 100 Industry 3.3 Agriculture Transport 2.0 Commnications .1 Trade and procurement ,2 Social-cultural and administration , 1.3 , Total ? 7.4 I would expect the sector breakdown of capital repairs in percentage tems to conform pretty closely to the sector breakdown of capital invest- ments especially if the relative sector breakdown of capital investments has not charred substantially over time. Unfortunately, we have no data to test this hypothesis. The best we, can do, in order to estimate the effect of capital repairs and extra-limit investments on the sector breakdown of cen- tralized investments, is: (1) to indicate the 1933,1937 and 1931.-1938 sector breakdoans of capital repairs and extra-limit investments; and (2) to ob- serve that the inclusion or exclusion of capital repairs and extra-limit investments has not materially affected the relative sector breakdown of capital investments in the period 1933-1938. Thus, the sector breakdown of capital repairs and extra-limit invest- ments was (from Table 1): Capital Repairs and "Extra-Limit 'Investments 1933..1937 1934'1938 Billions Percent Billions Percent of rubles of total of rubles of total 31.3 9.329 23.8 6.263 20.7 5.072 0.8 .220 5.2 1.598 I. Industry 7,150 32.9 II. Agriculture 5.426 22.1 III, Transport 4.712 17.9 , IV. Communications. .174 0.8 V. Trade and Procurement 1.183 5.6 VI. Social-cultural Oi Administration 1.171 Total : 22.816 52211._ 20.7. loo 28.340 100 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Rnn7nnlannno_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .r ? CD? 11 ? I,. .? fo,1??7?6?14.1..???????????????*4.1 Also from Table I, 1 compute the following percentages: I. Industry ? II. Agriculture Ina Transport, IV. Communications V. Trade am; Procuremtnt VI. .Social-Oultural Services anJ Administration Total InntEll.A1-1222:1937 Excluding Including capital capital repairs & repairs & extra-limit extra-limit 51.1 47.8 9.9 18.1 1.0 1.8 12.2 18.5 1.0 2.4 STAT Page 146 ---ALIKL-2/..481nvestm Excluding Including capital capital repairs & repairs 8(' extra-licit extra-limit 50.2 47.0 9.0 11.4 189 18.7 1.0; 1.0 1.7 2.4 100 100 100 100 (The possibility that the 1934-31.tota1s exclude capital repairs for 1938 ha n been sugrested previously; cf. Table VI, note 30 The Thlri and Fourth Five Year Plan figures for agriculture include part of noncentralized investments (Table I, notes 4 & 5). The corresponding fit:- ure part but not all of 11 investments in agriculture) for 1933- 1937 agriculture is 14.619 billion rubles (Table I, notes 3-5). I will, therefore, perforr the following calculations. I will take the difference Letween 14.619 billion rubles and 11.334 billion rubles and add it (3.285 billion rubles) to total investments in agriculture, ex.,:lusive of extra- limit investments and capital repairs. I obtain 121.245 billion rubles (cf. Table I). I will then compare 14.619 as a percentage of 121.245 with the cnr;.esponlinc, figures for agricultural and total investments including all extra-lint in-estments and capital repairs (from Table I). I obtain the following result: luntmal222.71-222 Excluding extra-limit Including extra-limit, investments and investmentS and capital. repairs . . c_EIRA,tal repairs. Billions of 'of Billions of % of rubles total rubles ? total. .Agriculture . -7-7171-9- 12.1 16.760 12.2 'Total Investments ? ' 121.245 100 137.491 100' - If I ad.: collective farm investments .to agriculture and to. total investments in both cases above, it is obvious that agriculture as a proportion of total investments will not change with the exclusion or inclusion of all extra- limit investments and capital repairs. Since the Third and Fourth .Five Year Plan figures for agriCillture include part of noncentralized investments and all collective farm investments, I conclude that agriculture as a percentage of total investment for these periods would probably be unafferted by, the exclOion or inclusion of all extra-limit investments and capital repairs. For the post-war period there is little direct information on the effect of 'extra-limit investments ani/or capital repairs on the sector breakdown. A comparison of 1948 and planned 1949 investments hints that the inclusion Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : ? - .01 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 : 1 STAT No 147 or exclusion of extra-limit investments does not materially affect the relative sector distribution of investments (note 2, this table). The 1941 change in extra-limit investments, if I have interpreted it correctly and if it is extrapolatable, tends to support this (note 2, this table). The planned post-war increase in the percentage of centralized investments in industry (Table I) is certainly, in part, a response to war damage and neg- lect, the sector distribution of capital repairs may be presumed to follow the same tendency. The post-war (and immediately pre-war) increase in the proportion of total agricultural investments represented by collective farm investments (Table I, note 5) reduces the effect of the inclusion or exclu- sion of extra-limit investments and capital repairs on agriculture. On balance, I judge that the relative sector distribution of investments in the post-1938 period (cf. Table XIV) would be virtually unchanged by the inclusion or exclusion of capital repairs and extra-limit investments. On the basis of the available information (cf. also note 2 to this table), I would expect at most a 2-3 percentage point decrease in industry, a 2-3 percentage point increase in social-cultural services and administration, and smaller changes elsewhere with the inclusion of capital repairs and extra-limit investments in the post-1938 data. 9. So-ialist Construction 1"L (pp.346-7) presents the following data on investments from own resources including labor participation) by collective farms and cooperatives: Collective farms and cooperative farms Collective farms only Total 1222---12-20 1211-12.23---1222-jr22:1-221-3214 4110 410 640 769 1422 3241 1683 170 385 515 1312 2382 1523 1 concludes that the totals for 1928/9-1932 and 1929-1933, presented in this table, include collective farms only. Cooperative farm investments seem to be included in the agriculture "totals for the periods in question"(cf. Table II, note 4). The following figures are stated to include money expenditures and labor. participation: 1928/9-1932 1.126 1929-1933 2.690 Plan 1932-1937 5.000 1934-1938 15.452 The following figures are described as "investments by collective from their own resources (sredstv)": 1933-1937 13.4 Plan 1938-1942 24 Since both of these figures can be contrasted with figures which are stated to be money expenditures only, there is no doubt that the 13.4 billion and 24 billion include an evaluation of labor participation in kind. The Fourth Five Year Plan figure is described simply as "capital invest- ments by collective farm themselves". In the absence of additional information, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ? Page 143 the 38 billion rubles figure is regarded as inclusive of labor participation. The money expenditures of collective farms include, at least in the annual figures, state aid via loans to the collective farms. While these loans are repayable and part of the collective farm payments into the indivis- ible fund are for purposes of repayment, a secular increase in the amount of loans extended (with a constant period for repayment) would cause the annual money expenditures plus labor participation to exceed total investments from own resources including repayment of loans. This inequality is observed in the present table for 1932 and is strongly Aggested by a comparison of money expenditures for 1935-1937 and extrapolated figures for total investments by collective farms for 1935-1937. The money expenditures from indivisible funds for 1933-37 were 7.5 billion. This figure is less than the total money expenditures for 1933- 1937 (including interpolated figures). The inequality may be explained by: (a) the considerations just discussed; or (b) the fact that state aid to the collective farms is included in the five year.plar totals for agriculture and the likelihood that the 7.5 billion rubles of collective farm money expenditures is net of state aid via loans. For purposes of Table XIII, the following procedure will be adopted out of necessity. Total collective farm investments including labor participa- tion [column (6)) will be used for the five year plan periods and for the annual figures, 1930-1932. For the annual figures beginning with 1933 only money expenditures [column (5); note 10, this table] will be used with no effort to distinguish loans to collective farms and no effort to add labor participation. This will mean that the annual figures will not necessarily sum to the five year plan period totals. 10. The following information on collective farms' money incomes and capital investments is obtainable (figures in parentheses are estimated): I. Money income of collective farms II. Money income per collective farm III. Number of collective farms IV. Calculated money income of ;ollective farms (IIxIII) V. Money investments by collective farms VI. Money investments per collective farm VII Calculated money investments by collective farms. (VIxIII) Units of measuremEL1222_2225..1222-..12112-.12hi Millions ? of rubles 4567.9 9681.0 14180.1 20600 24720 .Thousands of rubles 21.7 38.8 58.8 88.1 114.1 Thousands 211.1 245.4 243.7 236.6 (216.7) Millions ?of rubles 4580.9 9521.5 14329.6 20844.5 Millions of rubles 2.8 Thousands of rubles 4.1 8.5 12.7 23.2 30.5 Millions of rubles .9 2.1 3.1 5.5 (6.6) Sources for these figures are: 40.11. ? Money incomes of collective farms - S. Nosyrev, "Strengthen Financial Discipline in Collective Farms," Sovetskie finansy, 1945 No. 11, p.19; VI As,y?reto 4.6 k..1.4,9(.111,..14.1..1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104314002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? , ? age S. Nosyrev, "Statute of the Agricultural Artel and the Financial Economy of Collective Farms", Inr.ILIIIALIllygoz 1947 No. 1, p.21; I. I. Shkarednyi, "Social Funds and their Role in Socialist Expanded Reproduction in Collective Farms", 11211=2-a21111i Volume 13, 1951, P.,44; N. Anisimov, Sellskoe khozia- istvo v novoi Stalinskoi iatiletke (A riculture in the New Stalinist Five Year Plan) p.13. The last source states that the money income of collective farms in 1944 was 537.4% of 1932; the 1944 figure is, accordingly, obtained by multiplying the 1932 figure by 537.4%. The result is probably not ac- curate but probably also not far wrong; when percentages similarly stated for 1937 and 1940 are multiplied by the 1932 figure, the results are 14080 for 1937 and 22382 for 1940. b. Money income per collective farm - N. Anisimov, Pobeda sotsial- isticheskogo selisko,go khoziaistva (risIal_pf Socialist AgElculture) 1947, p.82. c. Number of collective farms - 0. D. Shepilov, "The Collective Farm Structure of the USSRullt2hltaLejspnomiki, 1941 No. 1, p.35. The number of collective farms for 1944 is estimated by dividing the money in- 'come of collective farms by the money income per collective farm. d. Money investments by collective farms M. Nesmii, "Capital Investments of Collective Farms and the Agricultural Bank", Sotsialistich- eskaia rekonstruktsiia seltsko o khoziaistva 1938 No. 12, p.38. Nesmii ob. serves that this figure is obtained from reports which cover only 90.8% of the collective farms; the figure, however, includes the repayment of loans. Nesmii also presents a figure for 1936, exclusive of repayments of loans but covering 96.4% of the collective farms - 2.276 billion. These exclusions may explain the difference between the reported figures of . 2.276 and 2.8 billions and the calculated, (and interpolated) 'figures of 2.6 and 3.1 billions for 1936 and 1937. e. Money investments per collective farm - N. AnisimoVe Sell- skoe khoziaistvo v novoi Stalinskoi piatiletke (ricu1ture in the New Stalin Five Year P1L;7; 1941 p.13. It is observed that multiplying the number of collective farms by the money income per collective farm yields results which are not substantially different from the reported data on money income of collective farms. It Is assumed, therefore, that multiplication of the number of collective farms by the money investments per collective farm will yield similarly ac- curate results. The check for 1937 is reasonably close with the discrepancy explainable by inadequate coverage of the reported money investments figure. Accordingly, in Table XIII the .following figures will be used with linearly Interpolated figures in parentheses: 1222 1222 1224 1222 1216 1222 1222 1222 120 .1-2gi Money investments of collective farms .9 (1.3) (1.7) 2 1 (2.6) 3.1 (3.9) (4.7) 5.5 6.6 It is possible that the 1944 figure is too high. The number of collec- tive farms assumed for 1944 seem reasonable. But since this was a war years, ?-? r'r,n?r A nnmved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page 1 and since investment figures seem to be obtained by sample coverage, it is possible that the investment figure per collective farm was obtained from an inadequate or unrepresentative sample. It should be noted, however, that if even 75% of the reduced number of collective farms had average investments of 30.5 thousand rubles and the rest hal no investments, the total would be 5 billion rubles. Planned collective farm investments for 1941 might be estimated by extrapolation to be 6.3 billion. Realized 1941 collective farm investments might be estimated, using the ratio of planned to realized total investments for 1941, at something like 3 billion rubles. . The 1939-1941 figures should, perhaps, be reduced by something like 10% to put them in 1936-37 prices; because of the rough nature of these estimates, however, this factor will be ignored. We have already estimated collective farm investments to be.about 2 billion per year in 1942 and 1943 (Table VI, note 6). Collective farm in- vestments for 1945 may be taken to be the same as in 1944, i.e. 6.6 billion rubles. No information about the money investments of collective farms is avail- able for 1948-1950. It is assumed arbitrarily that the money investments for these years increased, from the annual average of the 1946-47 reported figure, by 1 billion rubles per year with an additional 1 billion ruble increase for 1949 to reflect the price increases of 1949. Accordingly, the . post-war money investments by collective farms are taken as: Plan 1946 j.9471948 ,1!9149 1212 1211 7 7 8 10 11 12 11. Because of the absence of information it is necessary to ignore, in the annual figures for recent years, the investment contribution of labor participation in kind. For the years 1933-19/40, the magnitude of this factor is probably about 30% of the money investment figure (with the labor contribution evaluated according to the standard return per labor day - cf. above, p.28). I judge this from the following information. Total collec- tive farm investments (including lauor participation) as a ratio of money investments were 178% in 1933-37 and 163% in 1938-1942 (planned). These money investment figures, however, seem to exclude state loans (cf. note 9 this table), which were something like 2.5-3 billion in 1933-37 and were planned to be something like 5-6 billion in 1938-1942. This factor reduces the stated percentages to about 130%. In the United States some part of agricultural investments goes unre- ported because farmers do not report their own labor spent on investment activities - digging irrigation ditches, repairing barns, etc. - on the farm. For purposes of a US-USSR comparison, therefore, exclusion of labor parti- cipation in kind from the USSR data renders the agricultural investments more comparable. The trouble, however, is that the use of collective farm labor in kind for large scale projects (i.e. the kind which uses hired labor and is fully reported in the U.S.) is organized systematically in the USSR. This seems to be particularly true in recent years when the agricultural aspects of the new power projects call. for systematic increases in the use of Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001900n7_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ????1.1...1,?,4 ? STAT No 151 collective farm labor without compensation. (Cf., for example, Pravda, Jure 6, 1951, p.1). It follows that a US-USSR comparison of investments in agriculture which ignores labor participation in kind will understate Soviet investments in agriculture. 12. The data on loans to collective farms and farmers exhibit certain ambiguities. Plotnikov states that in 1933-1937 loans to collective farms were 3.0 billion rubles and loans to collective farmers were 2.6 billion rubles. (aligAjat21121121412h2laga_gpsudarstva, pp.139, 140). Buzyrev states that the loans to collective farms by the Agricultural Bank are pri- marily for investments in fixed capital; the State Bank makes short term loans to collective farms for the purchase of seed, fodder, etc. The figures presented by Buzyrev for loans to collective farms are (in billions of rubles): 1928/9-1932 1.418 1933-1937 2.621 1938 .867 1939 .993 1940 1.095 (Finansirovanie I kreditovanie kanital'n kh vlozhenii, p.169) A third source states that in 1933-1937 collective farms received more than 3 billion rubles of long term loans, of which 2.2 billion were used to increase the fixed capital of collective farms. (S. Ermilov, "Long-term Loans to Collective Farms and Tasks of the Agricultural Bank", Sovetskie Pnansy, 1940 No. 1-2, p.56). The same source states that: (a) in the Third Five Year Plan loans to collective farms were planned to be in excess of 6 billion rubles; (b) in 1938 and 1939 loans to collective farms and farmers were 2.124 billion rubles; and (c) in 1940 loans to collective farms and farmers were planned to be 1.4 billion rubles. (Ibid., p.56). Nesmii states that collective farms recetved 2.648 billion rubles in long-term loans from the Agricultural Bank in 1933-37 and that collective farmers received .396 billion in the same period. ("Capital Investments of Collective Farms and the Agricultural Bank", p.40). I do not know how to resolve these figures but in any case the discrep- ancy is small and loan financed expenditures are probably included in the money investments of collective farms. The point of including these fig- ures in the table is to indicate the magnitude of state aid to collective farms and the decline in relative importance of state loans over the period of the five year plans. In this connection it should be noted that the director of the Agricul- tural Bank has stated that 1949 loans to collective farms will be triple those of 1948 which in turn were double those of 1947, and that 1949 loans will be "considerably greater" than those of 1940 (Pravda, May 13, 1949, p.2) Zverev states that loans to collective farms in 1950 are planned to be 3.8 billion or 41.8% greater than in 1949. (A. G. Zverev, Lg221.141r8tvennom biudzheteSSSRnalOodiobuslermobiudt_zhetaSSSR al.2.4W2/12.Losiz - On the USSR .tate Budget for 1950 and Fulfillment of the USSR Sta1211111ELI2L1Lijmilik2 - 1950, p.18). Combining these Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Ron9snn1onnno_sz Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT Page 152 statements and assuming that planned 1949 loans were equal to realized 1949 loans and planned 1950 loans were equal to realized 1950 loans, we obtain the following series for loans to collective farms (in billions of rubles): 1947 .5 1948 .9 1949 2.7 1950 3.8 Plan 1951 (from Table VII) 3.5 The bulk of collective farms' investments, at least in the early years of the Fourth Five Year Plan, have apparently come from their own resources. The 19494951 figures for loans to collective farms may possibly indicate a reversal of this tendency connected with the agricultural aspects of the power construction program. Thus, Zverev states (op. cit., p.18) that the basic part of the 1950 loans are to be used for livestock and for rural electrification. On the other, hand, it is not known what proportion of these loans are for investment purposes. It is possible that this proportion has declined sharply at the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan and that the in- crease in loans is designed as aid to collective farms during the merger program. 13. Certain minor elements of non-centralized investments and their magnitudes are, perhaps, worthy of mention, a. Loans to individuals for housing construction were as follows (in billions of rubles): 1939 .243 Plan 1940 .256 1941-1942 .008 1943 .036 Plan 1944 .258 Plan 1946-1950 4.5 (B. Istomin and A. Frenkel', "Loans for Individual Housing Construction", Sovetskie finansz, 1940, No. 1-2, pp.66,67; A. Dobrovoltskii, "Greater Attention to Individual Housing Construction", kattALE,Elliamm, 1944 No. 05-7, p.20; M. Arkadtev, 0 zheleshchnom stroiteltstve v SSSR - onlialgas Construction in th7FS-gi b. Loans by the Bank of Commerce to producers' and consumers' cooperatives were indicated above (note 2 to this table). Not all of these sums were spent on capital investments. (Rovinskii et al Or anizatsiia finansirovaniia i kreditovsgilja01010.112tall, p.312 c. Mobilization of internal resources of construction was as follows (in billions of rubles): Plan 1939 .7 Plan 1940 1.3 Plan 1941 .8 1942-1943 (2 Years) 3 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : .01 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,4**1???./ Page 153 (Buzyrev, Finansirovanie i kreditovanie ka italln kh vlozhenii, p.50; Buzyrev, Vosstanovitel/nye rabot i ikh finansirovanie, p. 3. d. Labor participation in road-btalding was evaluated in the .following amounts (in billions of rubles): 1928/94932 .8 1929-1933 109 19334937 4.2 19344938 4.3 ? (Second Five Year Plan Fulfillment, p.71; Socialist Construction 12,3.193q, pa5)7-76ipulsory rural labor participation in road-building has continued (Slovararammtaa_22.22L2A112112:ekonamicheskoi statistike, pp.308-9) but no recent data are available. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy. Approved for Release@_50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 1 1 , 1 1 Ministry of Cl 1.680 .2308 .450 oa Industry 2 .Ministry ,,of Petroleum Industry 2.955 .2624 .200 3 Ministry ,of Electric. Power Stations 1.497. .083 4 Ministry of Ferrous Metilllur . gy 2.730 .220 i'170500, 5 Ministry of Nonferrous Ibtallurgy 6 Ministry of Chemicals In 1.176 .1240 dustry ' 7 Ministry of Construction Materials Industry 1.610 .1483 .369 .0650 .101?5! .020 (8 Ministry of Heavy Machine-Building Industry 1.190 .0720 .1265 .(51 Ministry of Medium Machine4uilding Industry .846 .1351 .105 10 Ministry of General Machine-Building Industry 11 Ministry of glestrical Iridustry 12 Ministry of Cc.1,3trkt#4en .222 .595 J.10 s2.6751' .0351 .0427 .085 .0365 .066 .0817 ...._ .. (13) Chief Administration (In NKVD) of Correctional Labor Camps ...?O.5455140 ' 14 Mot Adainictiiticth, of Siarhuric Asid. and. HidrAyeis Indiati7 15 Ministry of Aviation Industry .0575 3.8541 .0065 .465 16 Ministry of Ship-Building,Iwiastry 1.000 .5838.! .120 17 'Ministry of AttUnition Industry 1 '71 A 46 ? I .t.v I .200 ':::341:4 18 Ministry Of ArMaments:Indixotry . 19 Chief Administration of Military Construction rn..2063"j 20 Ministry of Timber Industry ' .328 ''..= . 21 Ministry of Cellulose and Paper Industry, .1405 29r9 ' 22 Ministry of Light Industry .170 23 ,Ministry of Textile Industry ?587 .050 24 Ministry of Fishing Industry' .100 .0879 .0085 / 25. Ministry of 'Meat and Dairy Industry .149 .0690 .CO3 26 Ministry of Food Industry .296 .1925 .00709 ' 27 Committee for Cinematography Affairs .065 .004 28 Ministry of Local Industry .062 .001 29, Local Fuel Industry , ? , ' .010 to cizt a 27.475 3.0776 II. Agriculture . '30' Ministry of Agriculture .964 31 Ministry of State Farms .090 32 Chief Administration of Forest Protection and A:forestation .0025 TCTAL . 1.0565 Transport 33 Ministry of Railroad Transport (6.00012' 1.470 34 Chief Administration (In NEVD) of Railroad Construction 1?350" .02814 35 Ministry of 'Ocean Fleet .272 .1315 .01410 36 Ministry of River Fleet .549 .1393 .044 37 Chief Administration o; Northern Sea Route .101 .023 .009)2 38 Chief Administration of Moscow-Volga Canal .003 .008 .0004, (39 Chief Administration (In MUD) of Highways .5501. .01114 (4) Ministries of Automobile Transport .0717 .004 (41 Chief Administration of Civil Air Fleet .078 101330 Trade and Procurement 44 Ministry of Internal Trade 45 Ministry of Procurement 46 Administration of State Reserves 47 Ministry of Foreign Trade 48 Central Union of Consumers' CooperatiVes Other 1 49 busing .306553? .3065510. 90 municipal services 1.3571 'I' 0752711* 52. Education, Public,Health, :,Cultural Services 45551'' 0243812. 52 Administration, Dfenno, and Others -------- - - N6 (5.88714; 6,1004013. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Ttade ana rri14-6aketasnx. 1 44 Minist of Internal Trade 45 Mini f Procurement 46 Adminiis.Ation of State Reserves 47 Ministry of Foreign Trade (48 Central Union of Consumers' Cooperatives .00060 .083 .405 .009 .008 Other (49 Ocasing i 50 Municipal Services 51 Education, Public, Health, Cultural Services 52 Administration, De-tense, and Othiis - - Including: (52a) Ministry of Defense } (52b) Ministry of Navy (52c) Ministry of Internal Affairs Excluding Chief Administrations Noted) .505 .083 306553* .91299' .30655? 10? 1.3571 " .07527tt? 5. .45551 L .02438" (5.86714)u? .1004013' (3.350" 2.235 (8.00630) .9129 .04614- .50660 ? ? Capital Investments by the Baltic Republics 53 Industry 54 Agriculture 55 Transport ? 56 Cocaunications 57 Trade and Procurement 58 Other .371947* .0649 7,- .098554? .01283" .03=7- .750 TOTAL FOR NATIONAL ECONOMY 47.000 5.8953 11111:12=1:211:10111111.111=IIM=M311111:1100aMill 3.4775415' _ 111111111111111 _,..garatlejs2M9AAAdysi6SSSELLTja41..g(Uate i o Deiv PP? 4837485, 4900 492-493, 9020 503, 508, 909. Hereinafter referred to as Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy, Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Nots to Table VIII. (Notes 1-1.6 a:e .?o ihdica0ditres the table) 1. Chpital investlimts 1.y the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1IKVD) a.re indicated to 1:o 6.810 1,11.1ion ruLdef.,,, includin.r.: 2.675 billion by the Chief kin1,1straticin of C..-)rn-;.ct.tonal Labor Carps, .550 Linton 1:?y the Chi..of ALliAn- istratic.r., of ,llighways, and 1.10 by the Cif Adr..inistration of Railroad Construc',..ion. :t is asuul:;ed t,ha.t,.. ? (1) the C?..iief Achinistration cf. Correc-. tic.)rial Labor Camps perfor:?.5 cohstruction for industrial purpc.,?ses; and (2) the difference 1...etween the total Tor the ..Kitiistr' of Internil kffrlirs and the indi.catd corre2o.r.ent3 6.:319 - - .550.- 1.350 s 2.235 rubles) reprosPnts expendil,ures or, the cunstruction of 1:ti1itary instfillations. Accordii:i.ly, of the 6.?.1.0 bi1llo r-,11:1e!..; 2.2;)5. tillion is allocated to defense, 2.675 to industry arid 1.9 to tran5port. This allocation, of C,-;u:se, hat; 'large elcmertts of conjecture in it. I1.4 is not a. matter of con:jectare that the tlinistri of Internal Affairs invests for industrial purposes. It is known -that th iisr of Internal Affairs proiui i.dutr18.lcorir.:iodities p. 9). Furtherriore, in the plan :-.?f capital e5t1Cn.63' the Ministry of Internal Lffairs is placad ariong the incluttrial.'....init:tries, and in the plan of budget allcwal-ices part of the el-.periditurer. Ly the Ministr-j of Internal kffrsirs is listed as financing industry. (Cf. 1.941 F`..,an, 4:3-1.4., Vost:naia sessiia v$.1rIcnovno-,,,o 3oveta 3..1)3R Ei 3essior: thc, 3tenog,rap...ic Report., 1941, pp. 498- 516 7.1e sect,or ill:oca.tier. of investmer.ts by the Ministry of Internal A.frairs, howevf.-;r, rer.ains hiLlay conjecture...L. 2. Tnt 1941 pliln of czoital investment* is itemized exclusive of capital invtretme:Its y the; Ili:As-tr.:Lel; of aallroad Triinsport, Defense and the 11'.avy. The tot r.33. ofthf., e4-?ri es a.nd departent s is giver. as 37.650 tc;i1lio:1 4 ..3ince total ,capital investrfterits have previously been gi.,Ten ;is 46.u-47.1) ..11.1.1.Jr, r...41..1.,:.153 (1'14 p. 3), capital investrrienta ? by th tt cexcde(1 ..1.1:..-.1.stries were at most 9.50 billion rubles. . The investment for the Y.inist.ry. of Railroad Transport ,may ue est1mate,.1 vc.ry the 1:asis of the fo13.owing da.ta: ? a. Pr.y-Lierts profits Of the Ylnistry of ?Railroad Transport into the buti;;;et tt;'). .1..1.17.10.ri rublesL 1940 anci rul.acsLi1.)43..ird weve ra.les in 1940. (3hestaia ses5ila jp 3oviet ? , ? ? I elle FIP: ? 1. CI? PO r ..031inala sassiia vockhoync.-.0 3ov.eta rt atencuapluc Report,. 1941 ?. p. .04) ? Profits in the railrcatls were 4.637 'pillion rubles in 1940 (N. , Vinnicher.1.,o, F.".nans3.rovar.ie 2,beIsznykh Fir.a..ncin, the Railroads - 1943., De 46). Retained profits for the railroads were, accord.r..i.:1:-,, about 2 ru'r.:les (4.637 - 2.661) 1940. .31rico payments from profits -into. th budget did not care froin 1940 to 1941 plan, it iy be .assurned that profits and re":.ained profit:: also did not . change froni 1940 to 191+1 plari. c, In 1940, Liviest,rier,tc. in t,ransport an/ conliunications were planned to be 5.424 .cilLianrut.aca, of iLc1..74 bil).ion came fro7.: tl.e budget and 3.70 resow,;'es of t,l'uisport, and comiunicat,ions enterprises (h. Zverev, tate 17-1)(4.-et5 of the it.13C)r.s. 12l5,p. 77). We will assunie t:,at ,plEctried an Atlizoct s,estraer.ts .1940 i:franspo4.t, and communications were t.r.te STAT Wk. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8" Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page st:itistictO prActico, eqpital stock fi.7,ures represent cilo:sation. Mat is, a fixed asset is aot re;garded as car:tal t!le ro;ee rental'prisse of w..ich is is a iJ In) i'Lcco...riLncily, the.:.;?:Iat pla.ns statz: toth invest- cai:Ltal to He 121.1,n operation for the given year. It, is tat fires on t fixed capital to be put into operat., :1:: 5ive yca- ,zay reprr ar approximation of tJ,e aciount invested . we ass17:-,,r1 t'isis to be te and if we further assume a:.-1314 Ln 1940 La transporte.,ion wid commurications t i:xestments IL 1940, we may approx.Ltte 'Ly t Mi:liFtr7 of Railroad Transport in 19/..0. The aLount c:J:ital to w.c. cperatior, jut 1941 was as follows (in billions rubles): Ministry of Railroad Transport not available Chief Administration (in NKVD) of Railroad Construction 0 Ministry of Ocean Fleet .265 Ministry of River Fleet .440 Chief Administration of Northern Sea Route .135 Chief Administration of Mozoow-Volga Canal .003 Chief Administration (in NKVD) of Highways Ministry of Automobile Transport .0783 Chief Administration of Civil Air Fleet .110 Ministry of Cannunications .287 Radio Committee .2921. TOTAL 1.3193 (1941 Plan pp. 483-50 ..3u1Ancting 1.3 billion from total investments in transport and communications for 1940 (planned),',re obtai4 4.1 as the estimated investments for the Ministry T' ;it in 1140. 1.56 A s...:1Aac(A...urt,. may bc obtained in another It. is ?beamed, XII, L':st railrorA tra:;spor. constitutQd from 67,r) to 72% of total r:cr t%e i347 i'.er.lod and for plan 1932-1942, The ,*;C:'.."...;,iCatiO to tite r.te?-?:omi:.ator and the addition of nonrai..road '7t rjo! Railroad Tra:Isport to the numerator probably (cf. Tana:, V x,(!. IX-A) 'to leave the percentages .1z:changed. 0 0.)t planne,:d 2.940 inve:3tments by the Knistry of P.a2.1roa' -::%..tiport, we get 3.6 - 9 billion rubles. 1.J.4e.zet allocatims (for all purposes) to Lle Ministry of .wert pla.:,nf.,d to Le 1.922 in 1940 mnd 4.635 billion verhov:10.-o 3oveta SSR, p. 42,6; scssiia .2,.17j, 1.). t. 0)). 3ince to iave Kmained une!.anc,ec.4. ".! , sIztncant, C:JaniTe inv:isti;:eLts rrast .'iave come (14?:,..1to (al.:h./a:Ices to tLe Mialexy of Railroad Transport. Put ,t in allowar.c.-.1s of 2.7 billion should 1..e attributed in..,ez4./.,en15; some part certa:Inly was iaanned for 1: chpital, amone ot,v-r things. If we issa,:1:: that 2 billion alionnces to go rrJr Increased capital Invest- ., Transpoit anl If we ridd this to t 4.1 Li 1940 (planned), we obtain approximatelj In.-e.itneents 4 LaE;Ilinistry, of hailroad Transport for 1941. By silbLractin'Al 6 billion riftles from the 9.350 billion total for l'mnsport, Dr.:Iense,r Navy, obtain .2.350' Lor: au: f' r;anita:.....1.:rit;SLr.i:t.;.,3 of the stri of Defense ui'J Le . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Y1: 2013/09/06dTCIA3:RbP81!611;4'3R.00'270'0.19060218' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 age 34 The investment figure for housing includes: (a) housing construction by local soviets--.18155 billion rubles; and (b) housing construction by the Moscow Soviet--.125 billion rubles. 4. The investment figure for municipal services includes: (a) the Moscow subway--.590billion; (b) municipal service construction by local soviets--.33610 billion; (c) municipal service construction by the Moscow Soviet--.240 billion; and (d) water supply measures of the union republics-- .191 billion. ? 5. The investment figure for education, etc. includes (in billions of rubles): (a) the Ministry of Public Health--.16117; (b) the Committee on Physical Culture--.01185; (c) the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions-- 6025; (d) the Union Republic Ministries of Education and Printing--.18215; (e) the Committee on Higher Schools--.0062; (f) the Academy of Sciences--.025; (g) the Committee on Culture--.04014; (h) the Society for Assistance to to Aviation and the Chemicals Industry--.004. 6. The investment figure for administration, defence and others includes (in billions of rubles): (a) the Chief Administration of Hydrography and Meteorology--.022; (b) the Committee on Geology--.017; (c) the Chief Administration of Cartography and Geodesy--.009; (d) the Committee on Weights and Mea,ures--.0036; (e) something called the 11X10414210M41.1111111.1141" attached to the USSR Council of Ministers--.01677) the House of Soviets-- .075; (g) the Ministry of Finances of the USSR--.016; (h) the USSR State Bank--.0097; (i) the USSR State Planning Commission--.008; (j) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs--.001; (k) the Ministry of Ju8tice--.003; (1) the USSR Procurator-.003; (m) administration construction by the Union Republics-- .0377; (n) central Institutions and departments--.02114; (o) measures for local anti-aircraft defenses--.060; and (p) the Ministries of Defense and tLe Navy-3.350 (cf. note 2 to tie table); (q) the Ministry of Internal ePairs--2.235 (cf. 'lute 1 to this table). 7. Cal"?..tal of' the La1tic Reputlios are also broken dowl, (]9!?1 Piae, p. 490). Me soctor breal:.down 148g %-eiZC2 ad jepartawnts Lflto te appropridte sector. ? 8. This figure is given for the "Ministries of defense industry" (1941 TPA, p. 502). ? 9. This figure is for capital repairs to houSing and hotels of local . sOviete 4911124z p. 508)* In addition, loans to individuals :for housing repairs were planned to be .028 billion rubles .(..941Plan, p. 508). , 10. Includes': (a) housing construction by local soviets-.18155 billion 'rubles; and (2) housing construction by the Moscow Soviet-.125 billion rubles. 11. This figure represents Investments in housing construction by the agency responsible for the Moscow subway. 12. Includes investments (in billions of rubles) in housing construction by the following organizations: (a) the Ministry .of Public Health.00390;-. .(b) the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions-400430; (0). the Union Republic Ministries of Education and Printing-e,00505; (d) the Academy of Sdiences--.00350; (e) the Caamittee on. Art-400763. 13. includes investments (in billions of rubles) in housing construction by the following organizations: (s) the Chief Administration of Hydro- gra017 and Meteoroloa--.0026; (b) something called the "UgaiampluigaV rilny Annroved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ,STAT a e of the USSR Council of Minister5--.00585; (c) the House of Soviets--.01280; (d) the Ministry of Financee--.005; (e) the State Bank-01045; (f) the State Planning Commis6ion--.00597; (g) the Ministry of Foreign Affaira--.001; (h) the Commdttee on Weights and Measures--.0043; (i) the Ministry of Justice.. .0018; the USSR Procurator.--.0023; (k) the agencies responsible for union republics' construction for adninistrative purpo8es--.00598; (1) central . institutions and department8--.0013; (m) the Ministry of Internal Affairs-- .046 (cf. note 14); (n) the Committee on Geology--.001. 14. Housing expeLditunis by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 140 Ireaklowr: 1:y chief alid;iinrations. nousing exper,Liltl:r,A arc assaL.Lci Lc4., 1.1.31I11,1ted in ULti same proportions AS total in7eEtnentl (c:. n:gc 1) "n.us, ve obtain (in bilEon3 of rullos); Minisr:,. of Lt.:: Tncbd.inE: La'r;or CImps Housing Inveotmt:nts Cons,,ructim c%al Affers 6.810 . .140 . AcLi t.ior, of Correctior.al 2.C75 .055 aio' c: Railroad Co%stfotion st rat !Ictwavs v .028 .550 .011 Other 2.235 .046 15. The data on housing construction exclude investments for these purposes by: ,a, the Ministry of Railroad Transport;. %Pi the Ministry of Defense; and (c) the Ilinistry of the Navy (1941 Plan. p. 492). 16. The total volume of capital work of 46.0-47.0 billion rubles is sLated to exclude 2.14 billion "supplementary" (19222E410210) extra-limit expenditures (1941 Plan. p. 3, footnote 1). ?mem states the planned volume of capital work to be 57 billion rubles in 1941, including 9 billion_ noncentralized investments. (A. G. Zverev, 25,2ge:23z p. 105.) Buzyrev states that in 1.941 extra-limit investments were to be 8.940 billion rubles, inclygIag "supplementary" extra-limit expenditures of 2.207 billion. (V. M. Buzyrev, sirov:?4,e i kre toy kaltalitatgurlartsti, p. 212). From this information I conclude: that the total investments of 46.0-47.0 billion rubles, mentioned in 12.41 12m, represent centralized investments (with the difference of 1-2 billion rubles from the Zverev figure for centralized investments explained by rounding or by unitemized expenditures); and (b) that the extra-limit invest- ments of 2.14 billion rubles, mentioned in 121AJ20, are part of the 9 billion noncentralized investments. The segregation of this 2.14 billion ',ales is explained apparently by the following circumstances. In 1941, ? it was decided to permit certain kinds of investment expenditures, previously made in centralized fashion, to be undertaken as extra-limit investments. (Cf. Buzyrev, po.cite0 p. 211, for an itemization of such expenditures.) These were referred to as "supplementary" extra-limit investments; the identity, of language and the near-identity of amount in the 1941 Plan and the Buzyrev citation yield the conclusion that the references are identical. 17. Expenditures on the construction of schools in 1941 were to be 386.21 million rubles, of which 134.37 million rubles were in cities and workers' settlements and 251.84 million rubles in rural areas (1,11.124E., p. 494.) The 134.37 million rubles are explicitly included, and the 251.8k .. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ec assile in a - anitizea uopy pprove or e ease - 50 -Yr 2013/09/06 ? CIA RDP81 01043R002500190602-8 Pie 159 lfl.. Expend;.tures on gcological-piv;pecting work in 1941 were to be 1.10..7 billion rubles, of wl.icl; .342 billion were included i:: the plan of caiital Ko.;sks, .41.97 1,.i11ion were included in er:tra-limit expenditures and .4; Lillion were included in genera budr,et expenditures (1.2..q..111.411, pp. 49'7,- k:',1). ,1..9. Capita: repairs for lc,141 were planned to Le 1.3 billion rubles of .5 tillior: were to '..:,e financed by ai-.ortization funds (Pravda ll'eLna:y26, 1241, p. 3). Of ...,I.,e capital repa.irs iteirize.ti IL 19.... 1 Pl.an: (a) '..1.1.0::::.: ir. i-siust.ry are i.:)..p1eit.i.d from a:uortization funs; (b those in 1.ousi:-., t.:.ano:-.I., commul.icaor.s and trade are probably in part from p:sort,:;;a0orl .11it,do 1,:.lolkifn t.'hic: ri,-.:...rcial sources are unspecified. Notable t;;,:clusions. fron. the list. of ca a) repairs are t'nose for agriculture and th.*, :;....t..icipal econor.y (fro:: liziortization ful'.ds and the budget) and those for socia).-cal.'i,uPal, adLinist:a'Ave a.rld df,...tnee construction (presumably, from -.;.....t.: '...;udt). From a slar.cz... for t':ie ksaps in the st,atc.c.. capital repairs, the clifft.Y.--,:.ince ';Ttwtien the cqpiLa7 1-AjrF. i_tlized in 1941 Plau. (5.9 billion) a....c.i. f.,-.:0,e, cap.i.ta.l. rt.:pairs (7.3 I:111.100 ;illy be u.lore or less ari)itra:;.ily e.-ALDcat,,:c.: a:3 follow3 (in 1.-11...1:Als of rubles): kidit,ir)nal caTitai'Fairs in industry (f,oi., ::,0,1,-.?.''..":4 Ot:1( .' 17,'iti.',.. a:Jortization allmianc,-..s Capi tal pairs i..-. a.,7:..i1?..ure (for state farm fl'orr, az:orti'i.a. i011 Fa lowaties and for rrtaci..i:ie- tractor 3tw-,i.s fro!. the budget) STAT repaIrs in transport (fro: arnortL,a.tIon, al 10 w i Th setorjreFIKU.CitC: . ? C2.pltal repairs would then. be :50:net/bine, like tz, 11citi-ilig: npur Co.umanications Ti!at!e xid procuremont Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Pad-Sanitized Copy Approved , swam. for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 STAT .N.4011 likt:i14.1141; Pagg 160 9. I,.: orler 1.f. '.a'.4.(? tii,61 19/41 P1aN .',.p:Ilre compardJc wit'n ea.icr Ita --..... , . , , . .. il I kw .1. . ;',:li4.i -.; ' ,:r.c!v:10x.; was Ic6J ,:.0;:iilox), wt ;TAIY pertorm t,iic .0....Low.,.n, ? , 0 lassifictions: a. Items (1)-(19) represent 'the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Heavy Industry (which, according to 121212411.0 p. 46 included defense Industry b. Items (22) & (23) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Light industry; C. Items (20) & (21) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Timber industry; 4. Items (24)-(26) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Food Industry; e. Its (28) & (29) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Local industry; f. Items (30) & (32) represent the equivalent 9f the earlier Ministry of Agriculture; g. Items (33) & (34) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Railroad Transport; h. Items (35) & (36) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry of Water Transport 10 Ttmmx (39) R., (4O) are classified together and called the Chief Administration of Highways; j. Items (42) & (43) represent the equivalent of the earlier Ministry .of.Cammunications, k. Items (45) & (46) represent the equivalent of the earlier Committee for Commodity Procnrement attached to the Council of Ministers. reeniltsof 1414 .1 entered are termd in table II. 21. Vonnesenslq states that in 1941 the volume of centralized capital to .e -uavs,c 30.6 Jbon rulaes were to. tv - prlq ? e 4-1 ' * nylon; . ? , .; - 0 - a Jot- et, Lia .,.) Lhist of 47 'Anion rubles of ..;apital wom to be j industry (including Lhe taltv niAustry" in the sector ad ministry 'oug;A:..y 6re as tl4e relat.;.onships cl.served for o:her years IX-A. It s.,odd c. ote.,4, that the indtistry total ta the present . t' Y4.1t:r,rj of I-temal Affairs allocation (cf. 1,ote 1) and, - L at...a6ed to this allocuiT, , /.4. 1:0::. t . srlte,mo;:t %,.%at piar:e4.1 , 1941 inv6s=ents a 19::?..,, -7 prices ..,,..,.lio... .r..4ble of .,-.::::..c'.; 1,,..:, 1..,ill!,.on vere cen;iralid (ratle VI, -note. 1) de2c.::-Ipl,Lon o.-.. t-:e 1..iy7ed 1941 pia% irivst,x,ellts''(nte 1, -present tf.a:', '-..::,e .:,%ta in ti .f. prese;,ttable an',, 1,. 1?"6 -7 pries Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 =MEM. Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - ? Table IX: Capital Investments by Sectors of the National Economy for Selected Years ? Industry I. Agriculture Transport and Communications V._Trade and Procurement (State Sector) ? Housing' Municipal Services and Social-Cultural Construction I. Other (Administrative, Cooperative, 17.075b 3.449b 60999b 0763b 9.21d .51d 2.12d Table VIII. These data are obtained fram the sector classification of a ministry and depar:tment, breakdown of Capital investments ' exclusive of investNients in the Baltic. .Republics. ".0n the USSR' State Budget for 1944 and Fulfillment of the USSR State Budget for 1940, 1941, and 1942," a report. by A. G. ZVerev,-;Sovetskie finansy, 1944 NO. 12, p. 5.. An estimation procedure was, in part, necessary, Cf. note 2 to this table for details.' A. G. Zverev, "State Budget for the Fourt.ri Year of the Post-War Stalinist Five Year Plan," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1949 No. 2, pl. 43. Declassified in Part - Sanitized CopyApProved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01-04-3?R00250019-0-0-02-:81111111 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 NOTES TO TABU IX 1. 'The 19394941 data include centralized investments only, (Table VI, note 3; Table VIII, note 16). The 1938 data seem to include extra-limit investments (Table VI, note 3). The 1941 data exclude investments in the Baltic Republics (Table VIII). The 1944 data include investments from the budget only (note 2 to this table). The 1q48 data probably include centralized investments only, whereas the 1949 data probably include extra-limit investments as weli (Table VI, note 2). The planned 1938-1941 data are probably in 1936-7 prices (Table IL, notes 1 and 3). The realized 1938 data seem to be in 1938 prices (Table V, note 6; Table VI, note 3). The other data are in prices of the respective years (Table VI, note 1). 2. The data for 1944 (planned) investments from the budget are given as follows (in billions of rubles): I. Enterprises and organizations of union jurisdiction Including: 1. Industry 2. Agriculture 3. Transport and Communications 4. Trade and Procurement U. Enterprises and organizations or republic jurisdiction Total investments from the budget 18.876 14.645 .636 1.086 .090 _11.212 20.786. eon for And local the USSR State Budget for 1944 and Fulfillment of the USSR State Budget 1940, 1941, and 1942", ?attgAlllEgaz, 1944 No. 1-2, p.5. In order to obtain the sector breakdown of investments in enterprises and organizations of republic and local jurisdiction, we assumed that the sector breakdown of investments was proportional to the sector breakdown of expenditures on the national economy from the republic budgets (which in- clude the local budgets). In 1944, the sector breakdown of expenditures on the national economy from the republic budgets was: In Total Expenditures on National Economy 1. Industry 2. Agriculture 3. Transport 4. Communications 5. Trade and Procurement 6. Other a. Roads b. Housing and Municipal Services ? c. Others Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019nnn9_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 " STAT Page 1.3 If we apply these percentages to the 1.910 billion rubles for invest- ments in enterprises and organizations of republic and local jurisdiction, we obtain the following breakdown: Total 1.910 1. Industry .609. 2. Agriculture .464 3, Transport and Communications ' .006 4. Trade and Procurement .067 5. Other .764 If, for enterprises and organizations of union jurisdiction, we.subtract "industry", "agriculture", "transport and communications", and "trade and procurement" to obtain "other" investments and if we add the sector breakdown for enterprises and organizations of republic and local jurisdiction, we have the following results which are presented in the table: m........ ImmAaras Aftel r. i ? i 1 0 V r r l JAAJCIGP 0141%4 . Enterprises and organizations of organizations of republic and union jursd1ction local urisdiction Total 1. Industry 14,645 .60915.254 2. Agriculture .636 .464 1.100 3. Transport and Communications. 1,086 .006 1.092 4. Trade and Procurement .090 .067 .157 5. Other 2.419 ...da 3.183 Total 18.876 1.910 20.786 It should be emphasized that the sector breakdown for 1944 refers to investments froth the budget only. Additional centralized investments (from amortization allowances? profits, p- etc.)w probably of the order of 6 billion were rubles. 3. Sectors I-V are so described by Soviet sources for the 19384940 data. Sector VI is explicitly stated by Soviet sources for the 1938 breakdown only; for 1939 and 1940 the figures for Sector VI are obtained, and the char- acterization of the residuals is assumed, by analogy. The components of Sector VI are matters for speculation. The explicit components in 1938 were cooperatives and administration, but these could not account for 4.68 billion rubles: a. Cooperative trade (i.e. "Tseutrosoiuz?) accounted for 60 million rubles annually in the 1935, 1936, and 1937 Plane (cf. Table 1). There is no evidence of a substantial increase in the state sector of trade and pro- curement in 1938, and cooperative trade had been declining in relative importance. b. It is extremely doubtful that producers' cooperatives are in- cluded; they have always been classified as "industry" and 1938 sector class- ification says nothing about restriction of "industry" to state industry. But even if producers' cooperatives were included, they could hardly account for much more than 100 million rubles. Investments by producers cooperatives were planned to be 64 million rubles in 1935, 115 million in 1936, 73 million in 1937, 65 million in 1941 (cf. Table X). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 1 STAT 0. Administrative construction for non-military central organiza- tions has apparently been small - 245.5 million ruble in the 1935 plan (cf. Table X and note 21); about 150 million rubles in the 1941 plan (cf. Table VIII 'and note 6). I suspect, therefore, that the difference between such expenditures and the Sector VI total is represented by the construction of military facilities and .fortifications. This suspicion is reinforced by an examination of the time series of "administration and special construction projects" in Table X which exhibits a marked increase in 1933 and a tremendous increase in 1936 (cf. also, Table X, note 22). This explanation would, further, account for the very substantial increase in expenditures in sector VI for the 1939 plan and the continued high level of expenditures for the 1940 plan (accompanied, as they were, by a decrease in expenditures in Sector V). Finally, a remark by a recent Soviet writer suggests more or less obliquely that military construction is classified with administration and social-cultural expendi- tures. After mentioning the role of the investment plan in providing for the growth of productive fixed capital, this writer says: "In the second place, the plan of capital work serves as the basis for the planned increase of fixed capital of education, public health, aao of the sph of administration and defense". (B. Smekhov, "Planning Capital Work", Planovoe khoziaistvo? 195' No 4, p.83. My italics). At the very least, I can think of no. other explanation of the behavior of Sector VI (and of its counterpart in item VI D. of Table X) and I can find no other place in which military construction might be recorded. 4. The 1941 plan figure for Sector VI is the sum of investments by central military and non-military organizations, of which only 150 million rubles are accounted for by non-military organizations (cf. Table VIII and note 6). The remainder, however, may be subject to considerable error. It depends upon: (a) a highly conjectural estimate of investments by the Ministry of Railroad Transport (Table VIII, note 2); and (b) a highly con- jectural allocation of the investments by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Table VIII, rite 1). It is possible, therefore, that the '5.89 billion ruble rn s?roa Is too low On the other hand, the 1941 plan seams clearly to have been a war mobilization plan. In view of the previously high magnitudes for Sector VI (and on the assumption that our explanation of the components of Sector VI is correct), the corresponding figure for 1941 may well have been lower than . those for 1939 and 1940. The explanation would be a shift from military construction to investments for munitions end items. 5. Plotnikev states that investments in industry were 18.018 billion rubles in 1938 and "up to 26 billion rubles" in 1940. (K. N. Plotnikov, ..._22.1.....soBiudztjaillisti....stimi_g_coo.zosudarstva, p.205). Sobol states that in- vestments in industry were 22.662 billion rubles in 1939. (V. Sobol, "On the Question of the Evaluation of Fixed Capital", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1947 No. 4, 13.055). The problem is how to explain the difference between these figures and those presented in the table. Let us discuss primarily the 1939 and 1940 figures since the 1938 discrepancy is relatively small, , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co Approved for Release ONNNN v., !Nit.v NV 50-Yr 2013/09/06: Met. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .. 11 I ?1 1,4 4. The differences between the two 1939 figures and the two 1940 figures are certainly too large to be accounted for by a difference between planned and realized figures (or between estimate and 'current prices). In addition: (1) other evidence indicates that the 1939 and 1940 investment plans were underfulfilled (note 3, Table VI); and (2) the fact that such a large divergence occurs in two consecutive years, with planned investments in industry relatively unchanged, argues against this interpretation. b. Sobol!s figure appears in a time series in which the 1933-1937 figures include capital repairs and extra-limit investments (i.e. 49 1933- 1937 figures are the same as those for industry in Table V). It is *Bible that the Plotnikov and Sobol figures for 1939 and 1940 include capital re- pairs and extra-limit investments whereas the figures in the table exclude these expenditures. Capital repairs plus extra-limit investments were same- thing like 11 billion rubles in 1939 and 13 billion rubles in 1940 (Table VII). The share of industry in the total of capital repairs plus extra-limit in- vestments appears to be :omething like 1/3 in the pre.-war period (notes 2 and 8, Table VII). Thus, capital repairs plus extra-limit investments in industry were something like 3.6 billion rubles in 1939 and 4.2 billion rubles in 1940. The differences in industry totals to be explained are some- thing like 5 billion rubles in 1939 and 6 billion rubles in 1940. One might conclude that differences in coverage plus differences between realized and planned figures might account for the .5 and 6 billion ruble discrepancies. The trouble is that the 1939 and 1940 investment plane (which exclude capital repairs and extra-limit investments) appear to have been underfulfilled (note 3, Table VI). To accept the explanation advanced in this paragraph one would have to assume that the non-industry sectors were significantly. underfulfilled while the industry sector was significantly overfulfilled. This may have been the Case. It should be noted, in .favor of this explana- tion, that in 1938 when the discrepancy was relatively small the realized figure of 17.075 billion rubles presumably included extra-limit investments but not capital repairs (note 3, Table VI). On the explanation.of this paragraph, the 1938 discrepancy becomes the puzzle because capital repairs in 1938 were clearly greater than the difference of 943 million rubles. In a .few industries only (excluding, for examples, the machine building indus- try, the chemicals industry, the petroleum industry, and nonferrous Metallurgy), 1938 capital repaira were 1.1 billion rubles (note 7, Table VII).' :t. It is, I suppose, possible that the Plotnikov and Sobol figures.. for industry include some or all of military construction. ,Why they should 15 certainly not obvious; though it May be that construction organizations which work on Contract for Industrial enterprises do so for the military' establishment as well. The only factor which prompts this suggestion is the flimsy observation that the magnitude of the discrepancy becomes larger pre- cisely when the Sector VI.figure.becomes large. On the similarly flimsy grounds that the magnitudes seem about right, it is possible that Pletnikov!, 1940 figure and Sobolls 1939 figure include transportation and communication; but what about Plotnikovls 1938 figure?' It is obvious that none of the suggested explanations is entirely satis- factory. The answer, perhaps, lies in some combination of these explanations; but in the absence of additional information the explanation for these dis- crepancies must remain essentially unknown. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 .11 ? It should be noted finally that one Soviet source states that investments in industry were 58.5% of total investments in the national economy in 19187, 1940. (A. Omarovskii, Sovetskoe stankostroonit - Soviet Machine Tool Construc- tion - 1948, p.23). Since Omarovskii also refers to the 108 billion ruble figure as the total for the national economy in 1938-19400 this percentage implies 63.2 billion rubles of investments in industry for 19384940, a figure which is substantially above the planned 1938-1940 figures and somewhat below the sum of the figures given by Plotnikov and Sobol for 1938, 1939, and 1940. Taken in conjunction with total for industry and transport in 19384940 of 75 billion rubles (Table I), the 63.2 billion ruble figure for industry implies substantial underfulfillment of the investment plans for transport in these years. We have already noted that the 1939 plan for agriculture was underfulfilled (Table VI, note 3). On this basis, I lean towards an explan- ation of the 1938-1940 discrepancies which assumes that the Plotnikov and Sobol figures are properly for industry and which implies overfulfillment of the investment plans in industry and underfulfillment in the other sectors (for example, the explanation in paragraph b above for the 1939 and 1940 figures). 6. The 1939 plan expenditures in the state sector of agriculture are given elsewhere as follows (in billions of rubles): Planned capital investments 1.66 Extra-limit expenditures .75 Operational expenditures 1.01 Total 3.42 (V. Kabitskii, "Financing of State Agricultural Enterprises", Sovetskie finansy, 1940 No. 1-2, p.61.) Thus, it would seem that "agriculture" is confined to the state sector and excludes extra-limit investments. . It is also stated that the 1939 plan was fulfilled by 92.5% (Kabitskii, 2E1_211" p.61). Thus, realized investments in the state sector of agriculture exclusive of extra-limit investments may have been of the order of 1.5 billion rubles. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104f1Pnn9cnni annno o r? ? . ? Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-e ? STAT Page 164 c. .Administrative construction for non-military central organiza- tions has apparently been small - 245.5 million rubles in the 1935 plan (cf. Table X and note 21); about 150 million rubles in the 1941 plan (cf. Table VIII 'and pote,6). I suspect, therefore, that the difference between Such expenditures and the Sector VI total is represented by the construction of military facilities and fortifications. This suspicion is reinforced by an examination Of the time series of "administration and special,construction projects" in Table X which exhibits a marked increase in 1933 and a tremendous increase in 1936 (cf. also, Table X, note 22). This explanation would, further, account for . the very substantial increase in expenditures in sector VI for the 1939 plan and the continued high level of expenditures for the 1940 plan (accompanied, as they were, by a decrease in expenditures in Sector V). Finally, a remark by a recent Soviet writer suggests more or less obliquely that military construction is classified with administration and social-cultural expendi- tures. After mentioning the role of the investment plan in providing for the growt of productive fixed capital, this writer says: "In the second place, thv plan of capital work serves as the basis for the planned increase of fixed capital of education, public health, art, and also of the spheres of administration and defense". (B. Smekhov? "Planning, Capital Work", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1951 No. 4, p.83. My italics). At the very least, I can think of no other explanation of the behavior of Sector VI (and of its counterpart in item VI D. of Table X) and Lean find no other place in which military construction might be recorded. 4. The 1941 plan figure for Sector VI is the Bum of investments by central military and non-military organizations, Of which only 150 million .rubles are accounted for by non-military organizations (cf. Table VIII and. note 6). The remainder, however, may be subject to considerable error. It depends upon: (a) a highly conjectural estimate of investments by the Ministry of Railroad Transport (Table VIII, note 2); and':(b) a highly con- jectural allocation of the investments by the Ministry of Internal Affairs . (Table VIII, note 1). It is possible, therefore, that the 5.89 billion ruble figure is too low. On the other hand, the 1941 plan seems clearly to have been 4 war ? mobilization plan. In view of the previously high magnitudes for Sector VI . (and on the assumption that, our .explanation of the components of Sector VI is correct), the corresponding figure for 1941 may well have been levier than those for 1939 and 1940. The explanation would be a shift from Military construction to investments for munitions end items. 5. Plotnikov states that investments in industry were 18.018 billion rubles in 1938 and "up to 26 billion rubles" in 1940. (K. N. Plotnikov, Biudzhet sotsialistichesko o gosudaratva, p.205). Sobol states that in- vestments in industry were 22.662 billion rubles in 1939. (V. Sobol, "On the Question of the Evaluation of Fixed Capital", Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1947 No. 4, P.55). The problem is how to explain the difference between these figures and those presented in the table. Let us discuss primarily the 1939 and 1940 figures since the 1938 discrepancy is relatively small. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDPRi_ninzrzpnnognr,4r,,,,,,, Ilmr,1=7,2=WWa -"'"'kY,15WWV,'$"Togvw Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A T.I.T7,111:72V77".tiTti, ?,:?Mft'll'1',TA7911,0,',fir.k, ? o? ?? proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 a.. The differences between the two 1939 figures and the two 1940 figures are certainly too large to be accounted for by a difference between, planned and realized figures (or between estimate and current prices). In addition: (1) other evidence indicates that the 1939 and 1940 investment plans were underfulfilled (note 34 Table VI); and (2) the fact that such a large divergence occurs in two consecutive years, with planned investments in industry relatively unchanged, argues against 'thisinterpretation. b. Sobolle figure appears in a time series in which the 1933-1937 'figures include capital repaire and extra-limit investments (i.e. 4, 1933- 1937 figures are the same as those for industry in Table V). It is possible that the Plotnikov and Sobol figures for 1939 and 1940, include capital re- pairs and extra-limit investments whereas the figures in the table exClude, these expenditures. Capital repairs plus extra-limit investments were same- thing like 11 billion rubles in 1939 and 13 billion rubles in 1940 (Table VII). The share of industry in the total of capital repairs plus extra-limit in- vestments appears to be something like 1/3 in the pre-war period (notes 2 and 8, Table VII). Thus, Capital repairs plus extra-limit investments in Industry were something like 3.6 billion rubles in 1939 and 4.2 billion rubles in 1940. The differences in.industry totals to be explained are some- thing like 5 billion rubles in 1939 and 6 billion rubles in 1940. One Might conclude that differences in cove.:age plus differences between realized and planned figures might account for the 5 and 6 billion ruble discrepancies. The trouble is that the 1939 and 1940 investment plans (which exclude capital repatr6 and extra-limit investments) appear to have been ...Inderfulfilled (note 34 Table VI). To accept the explanation advanced in this paragraph one would have to assume that the non-industry sectors were significantly underfulfilled while the industry sector was significantly overfulfilled. ,This may have. been the case.' It should be noted, in favor of this.explana7 tion, that in 1938 when the discrepancy was relatively small the realized figure' of 17.075 billion rubles presumably, included extra-limit investments. but not capital repairs (note 3,' Table VI).. On'the explanation of this paragraph, the 1938 discrepancy becomes the puzzle because capitalrepairs in 1931 were Clearly greater than the difference of 943 million rubles. In: a few industries only (excluding, for examples, the machine building Indus- try, the chemicals industry, the petroleum industry, and nonferrous metallurgy), 1938 capital repairs were 1.1 billion rubles (note' 7, Table VII). t. It is,. I suppose, possible that the Plotnikov and Sobol,figures for industry include some or all of military construction. -Why they should Is certainly not, obvious; though it may be that construction organizations which work on contract for industrial enterprises do so for the military: establishment as well. The only factor which prompts this suggestion is the flimsy observation that the magnitude of the discrepancy becomes larger 'pre- cisely when the Sector VI figure becomes large. On, the similarlyHflimey grounds that the magnitudes seem about. right,' it is possible that Plotnikovls 1940 figure and Sobolls 1939 figure. include transportation and communication; but what about PlotnikovTs 1938 figure? It is obvious that none of the suggested explanations is entirely satis- factory. The answer, perhaps, lies in some combination of these explanations; but in the absence of additional information the explanation for these dis- crepancies must remain essentially unknown. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001gnnn7_R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDp81-01043R002500190002-8 : ? rage It should be noted finally that one Soviet source states that investments in industry were 585% of total investments in the national economy in 1938- 1940. (A. Omarovskii, Sovetskoe stankostreenie - Soviet Machine Tool Construc- tion - 1948, p.23)4 Since Omarovskii also refers to the 108 billion ruble figure as the total for the national economy in 1938-1940, this percentage implies 63.2 billion rubles of investments in. industry for 1938-1940, a figure which is substantially above the planned 1938-1940 figures and somewhat .below the auth of the figures given by Plotnikov and Sobol for 1938, 1939, and 1940. Taken in. conjunction with total for industry and transport in 19384940 of 75 billion rubles (Table I), the 63.2 billion ruble figure for industry implies substantial underfulfillment of the investment plans fir transport in these years. We have already noted that the 1939 plan for agriculture was underfulfilled (Table VI, note 3). On this basis, I lean towards an explan- ation of the 19384940 discrepancies which assumes that the.Plotnikov and Sobol figures are properly for industry and which implies overfulfillment of the investment plans in industry and underfulfillment in the other sectors (for example, the explanation in paragraph b above for the 1939 and 1940 figures). 6. The 1939 plan expenditures in the state sector of agriculture are given elsewhere as follows (in billions of rubles): Planned capital investments 1.66 Extra-limit expenditures .75 Operational expenditures 1.01 Total 3.42 ? (V. Kabitskii, "Financing of State Agricultural Enterprises", Sovetskie finansy, 1940 No. 1-2, p.61.) Thus, it would seem that "agriculture, is confined to the state sector and excludes extra-limit investments. It is also stated that the 1939 plan was fulfilled by 92.5% (Kabitskii, op. cit.., p.61). Thus, realized investments in the state sector of agriculture exclusive of extra-limit investments may have been of the order of 1.5 billion rubles. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop STAT '' ! VP47g=t;;TI 6,17 Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 ? ria_pnipc.., r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 . .410s.44.141 , . LWiaukk.waki,,' / ? Inductry A illnittr, of Remy Indastry 19C11 3147 B. ni.nintiy of Lic."at Industry 314 co Tielx:Mtahis96 200 of Etc4 alustiti irlastritia-of toccti. Industry Produoeret Cooperatives 9336 Ch.1.4..4411.! ..9.f P40'0E1112117 .0410. 4A* II Aeiculture A. Ministry of Agriculture B. Ministry of State Farms C. FinAmcing of Collective and Cooperative Sector of Aviculture 1333 617 IiI.Trancpert A.Ministry of Railroad Transport E4.Eldetpy of Wttcr Trancoort, C ncco Qi-.1724 L1LIAIng Atlatictration 16, ohi6f-ALiastration of Civil Air Fleet 141. Central Highimys Administration . Chiof Admizistration of Northern Sea Route . . . _ . . . . . Trail? and Procurenent A. Ministry of Intornal Trade 130 Yinistry of Forcica Trade C."Tcotrosolu0 (CcAtral union of Consmorog Cooperativea) D.Cazaittes for Caraoatty. Procuronent Attaohcd to Comcil of Ministers Social Culturd and Aiwt .1 titration A. I3 110 EglIcirA'Serviees 0 C..474741:::1011, Public Hcalth, Pendent) AC.minic4ration and Sial Coactruction Projects Woji "414:i ZOM#A1;0146;ptiMW.,0,ti '140';',W4N.Z.:P4'6Q1,Z4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025nnl9nnn9-R Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? SOURCES: ' a. Socialist Construction 19364 pp. 348-349. b. Socialist Construction 1936, pp. 348-349. Excludes expenditures for special purposes. c. Socialist Construction 122?., pp. 348-349. Includes experAitures for special purposes d. 121111.1s, p. 461. Preliminary results for 1934. e. 1936 Plan, pp. 506-7. Preliminary results for 1935. f. 1937 Plan, pp. 42-56, 120-1, 132-3, 140-1. Preliminary results for 1936. g. "Basic Indices of the National Economic Plan for 1937" Planovoe Khoziaistvo, 1937 No. 3, pp. 224-228. Includes changes introduced after the plan was confirmed. h. 197 Plan, pp. 17, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 42-56, 120-1, 132-3, 1404. If the planned reduction in construction costs is taken into account, the volume of capital work planned for 1937 is 29.2 billion. I. I. Boltshakov, "Construction Program for 1938," Planovoe Khoziaistvo 1938 No. 6, pp. 31-34. These figures are probably in 193g-7 prices. e ??? nar.inccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 `1.01.011001 ?+. ?'''4V17,;",:*Z7,Pil,;;;"WIrr711"V"'. 1-o.yr.,.17.,:rem,,,,i;.y,,,riym.?,,,oT ? ,,t.if,fr A'ff'tc?,),444KINT4V10}44M4orlf,0414Y4444,1414n 4041404444,',4444444.14" 4444 V 'OW V'tvP.' , ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? 4. ? , r ? ? ? 0 .? or C:.. . ' 3 ? . 1- -5 :7 oil ly t tf,) (rxit,-,3 2-1'; hr..? to 1;1 r ia4 'or 3". y. o ,111 ???? fice:`,t, I W....Ia..% ? ??:.1 ? ., ? ? . ? 4' 4 *.t? P01' rirur?,1 F. I r.g, workers. " fix: of; (a) 1..hit: Cocil of Pr,-Auc..-rst ; Uideo? of Larlwr CoororL ,.vos; (c) e 4 ? ????? 44. ? to iuh.ercc,c pk:Tat ? ..?or ((!) coo ?-rat.:vos; d (e) so-called cco%)cra4,..lves." ? STAT 71 es- are c of: (a) the P: Ot.1..o..0 ierntives; .1 ".? ",t , , (?) c? .r. Co...cr?-;!,1 ofLasal.-.1.1 ,?. ? ? ? ? ? t inklustrial r..!..:?istrie in tile constructlo.: ???:f? f ?J. ar e h . it:: Mr: ???;o1:1:-I?ir ue., a: e : :xi c pow.?,r t s lL;1?.4- tlAldc lux.: railway ( I.., I rt) C i . ? should. bff.? sattl'iaeted from theYLI:Lis ? . ',?;!??? .MoSoo-4 Mo5;.:oi.;-.iol;....,a ? , Of ile,avy con ? roa tJe Mir.1:???:). of Airi.;ulture.= a.:31tvi thr.3 o.: Focy.1 Ii.:(11. str ,ctry for t.;r,r, cor.u,nio r' f, o 'ea fa.ctorletF3 !...%?.,a Lt?: is :laced indcr t,he sacklrrisior. of thf:., UIsLry r:41):1 rdo the u.r.ion for he WFIL4-29 CO3j; Of assoc....vterl ?-? I rie and. ???? 4 f1e3 47: r .., 4/ I CI ? ?T,iag c' ? ? ? J. p3.1 vrell 1-ps ci ?- coopera- ....?.? ? J., Ja. I ' A ? " ? ? .44, 4. ? 4 4., are 1,;,e sm of spec al confitruction projGets and oti,er ? I ? 4 ng:" C: '111 C.1 LItie t'ne constr:.;c: t? ion of ut t ? ... ? ? a: 4 3,.:oway coristru',:t?.on. ,? Pr- ? :or t-2.,e '44.ini.s.,,r7 of ? ) ? 3, ? ? . ir.d..ist?T-.' - ? ? v4. v.. t rl ..r ? .) :01.411,), %1Fir) biay ci-arl3er :7.ears, education tu-A put).1.ic , Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 eva., 411111. NW ilrwil,1%%%,%%%1-,%%to wPrrrovvaY17^r^"'"r'r,tiv,%' .% ,4., _ ' er.'4"4a,m lafteiteFtiteetite,,r ,,,SCOti ,.. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 . . ? . , . , . ,. , , . . . .. . , , . , (-19) !it.sitmc, i.:4,tevitr..ent8 witer.. r . " 'Lc 1,210 ruLlos tillioh for the mr..T...;m: - ? C.tnal. It c 1t1v lit(A i?vozr,r.kors by t',.(! MI, wer.: o U 423 (A. 3::..11.0.n 912cGc ot 3:hcl'adl9t 3: ?14, " na 137 . ? 01 4; .h! 3.:11 ROLL olitained by an.f.', I-1111m 1.210 nrbi-trhry 1:12L.P111.11 ?%.? 1,e.r) r 64.4 k.4,s, 1 ? ? 4.1 1.) tiC.; ' - A Polt11'....ikov tItatms i.lconed bata". were '311g1,t1- more th;' 1 of 1(1.37 fr.:d .r.v..striy.:ntdo in Ilsav'y 1:11.1ustry planned to 1..e of 1937.. %/e. j..:be p1.. tied 197,7 fiures reductions S natior;P:. - (A. ..;;%:11 . ;3 of t..} ie 3t " Proi%1 1937 No. 2, 117. The 29.165 f'4.7,ure is Liesari'ued Fts of, c,apit,ik! The 32.593 f,tre. fol' 1937 pros,?lited : 'kd:: L. Thi IX, in dcribed RS zrie.volum.e of fli.;ures is clearly trie eCOrtelay 'COM tilt pLitwd Os' C.;CnIst.r.,.ic.;.-1 on cot). . 3thc t.hc raLio of :1;3.5 to 29.1v, (Vreaq 1.-It los of 1C. c t he 32.93 of Table IX ? to tht 3.1 of T-i.ble V are 1...71.; and 116').: res2ect,.1:ely), It. i assk,....Y.:E.1 that Bolts.:13ov ar, .19:7, L., plan 193'; LI plann,r!d, rtY:duct, i on s in cori.[F':,,..uct csts. 145cludine, Flar1! roc of ;IVY lv.Pas ?73 t7. 1!..p.,,smnts in 73? i, .eu used r.,o obtain %Ile .1 ? , led constructior, costs, co!.. 19r, plan p; inthi.stry were plarinHh.3 to Le ficsire ot 11.6 billion rubles for XII ? 11,:ustry esti.ulte ollained Et?: HOic?Ited in nol,e 2 ',c) Talqe 01.!?tii !;erl by t'acon from 9xinua1. tot i. It31).o18.1:$,.: the data c ir,vest..!nts by in...n5'..:ents for thc acokults of t;:e spc.cified a;,(1 ;Ar,-art:ts ad not (wtpital forr:f.c.ion -.21 a physical sen s..?iy trie ministry ,r d,:partmo.:-.1., This is, perhars, obvious except ln oY contrac), co...c.t:,ictiohe There, for exainnle, iiive:)stmenbs of t11(..1 " al 4. vro ? y r 1))1 rut; were to Le 110 miUio rubl es butv'r4-?ry of Con,it,ruct.?.....cn was 4.,o widertake construction actd.j.:3s for ente.rorises of otIler rain-lcitricsount f 6 bi11io nL1s (1941 pp. 44, L,91). The 11tr fiur i reflect.3d i.i tile invest:Lents by tite other minietr'cs. 20.71...2',;r, P1a2: 6F1 werl exairdnerl in detail to cieteruire: (a) of novro(uctive ir.vestmcnts 1:1 each of the and departmmts; (i j.) exider.t of sec,4. . o ovorlx)p-Ing in the invistmol..?s Li cif minIstr' T e.115C:ISSCd Ii ot to Table T1.6 ? of tLin nott . assu..-rie for 4111OtIit - .,*?iat all i.i s corouc niies ..,re prccluctf:ic It3stnE;Itt 4, The cue:Ttion to at clo "industry" ainistri,..,s, for oxa-.%ple, nar7r1.11.12:,t, Ur ?It 7.1 it; to ? a Ott ? . 0 1)01! .t May be ;3U:ill:Z....P. folic.,,tri 1 OitS of Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 (.^ ?? .0 ?Trorit,.. rpeihr????,447, '??Apow ihaia Litik:?4410w.14,W al?! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2913/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 . u 0001. II. A. Tota Lnvt.rt.- , ? , (..;011s16,4-1 cov,s:;%c%ioll) ? 2. Uccp1Nr0 0 Ir. 0 of.Fooci A. Tol,a1 Hindustryn 11 tivr-sLook farr,:o :ea faps A 0 Kinists c.)1 LrcAl'IOustry . h. 'I'Otal Invcs;Afien._,$ 1.At;r::cult,ural flour rills .of R::.i.1ros1 Transport ? no Total ives'.:!.o.t,Ls _ ... In/JFL::v...nts ol,,.611r, "trans:-.)ort" L. Lof.:c...moti,-,f an..! .,:ar buildine face,,oricIS 27.60 2. Coal 4.!u3trv 77.00 , , ). ro:c2e.ri 29.00 4. ...,'pvers!...spply . ?'0.00 , ? . ? ? iiiwaso????4264Ohluigsali. ' ??????40,...??? ???? Pau '1j. p1I..1 i ? ? ? ?????? r -07 An / 0,40k.oki 4 t 41/4/ 8:4743; rA );070:V ? L.'s./ 'I, Minist.ry of '..later Transport ? A. Totsa .-li,vestmerits . ',20.83 ' . I... II Ine...ilent$ outside "transtort!! . , .. '??249.5 ? 1. ? ,iiiipbuildf.ne, ? -) ork(..:rst supply ? ,,..A. ..... rrr ? Jorthern A. Toth], irxestdment-ds "transportu ? 1. JhipL?uildihs. 2. Iad.astrf_al consUruc'don 3. ,DierI:arms 4. Aevickature 4 ' .:;() 40.DO 12.0U STAT ? consLruct,ion 6. AL..pl.fine coLsL.,rUotion: Airfiold co.asruction: ?,8, . VIII .i.r1st of.IntornFil . A. Tot .i iri,vs7-,ments ?- I17estants "tratie.and 1. anki 2. 14thiotri ' - - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page 172 IX. Ministry or Foreign Trade A. To..a1 Investments. 107.54 70.00' 68.00 IilvestrIelit 5 outside "t r 5(1C 4 procurement"' 37.76 29.54 19.84 14 Fur "production" 37.76 . 29..54 19.84 C',.,tra.1. Ur.i.on of Consuairst? Cooperatives A. Total investments . , 255.6. 189.0'. .62.0 r,? Investmcats. outside "trade and procurement"151.2 r.i.'.0 8.7 - 1. 'Fruit And vegetable ? t ;onouly. 21.2 15.0 1.7 -) 2'. 'Neat r.,nd? dairy eeonomy 8.0. 4.5 2.0 3. - .P0 tat r7 A egg conov 1. . ..,1.0 14. 8.0 4.0 ? 5... Inthistri 4-1.0 ? 11.5 .. CO:7117Littee for Commodity Procurement Attached to Council of lelir,isters of U3,3R A. Total investments P. Investments outside "trade and pzioci.lrement" 1. ;'eat.-grindine, Lidustry 262.99 24500 350.0 126.65 100.10 162.4 126.65 100.10 162.4 ? lr'ne. 14initry of :leary Industri had -no plaIlned investments outside of ? "induetry.". The Mirdtry of Cor-authlieritions had 'very e7:).a11 invest?p.eM.S in "industry."' (Cr. ? 195 ?1a, pp. -469, 476-430, 48l, 4860 489; 19;6 Plau-10, pp. 512, 521-5290 54, 360 5,390 We.. love; f.mi T 1 I that ol,t. of a total of 5381.3 Lillion ruble's invted aui.c)Iltze, 233.1 :.illion rubles were ir.,...ested in inchstrial enter- priss.: (cf:, Table IV., aoto 7.). ,STAT Let 'uS refer to inVestments, outSide the sector in which, the Minisi; y belongs as "extra-soctor irtr4nts." It should lie ol,ser:i that kilts for extra-sector investments are recorded for identifiablre cor.poi,ents only. Some Co pont coull not Le placed with nccurac.. eLber 1-.ecause cr.ey aro referred t 'oy ,:lbtreviations va,ich I Jo nct wider:It-1nd (for exar;,ple? NI3 wi.ic:. apers ir many'r..,.ir,istris) or because they are covered Ii i.uns.11ocated These, :-.owevf:r,, were uniforrly small. A130,?-? investments. rria.y be '.oIrttdtod caue? .existenceof - ece;lopic. (as aoiLst w:'41&1') ..ctlt? :P.c.roos: .3eC74..C.T.-.c1assa.f.a.clL;pcs..? .for.?exa,mpl:c7, 11 ye "'nt8 i1C are 6tAt4dto ict i iri may .include ..invotentS it i cotton ?farm_ I '6Us?p'eCt-tilat theae?O:....iSsionsi. also are Finally, :nany of the breakdowns within the ministries appear to be by chief administrations. It is possible that there might be extra-sector investments, in the 5o'5C,' of invesi;ments outside the sector in which the chief administra- tion belonc;s, ii?hich areiLndetectr..,d, by a (lett:L.110d ex.a.r.z.!...aa.tion of bLinistr;,7 vestr;:ents. Sr he chief acir:d.r.istrations tend to ...)e Ir.ore homogeneous than thC) r pr.-I.:4(i I suspect again that theso or,issions are anal). -a1-1(,) I c-r 3T.lents on t,he question (note 20 to tis arnount of' extra.-sect.or invsstments are amr,41road t,rsx:sport trade and clroc.tre- cr. 1:,?-i1ance the e.11..iiiAtion of extra-sector Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-r 2'0'13/097667CIA:RDP8:1-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , Page 173 "transport" and "trade and procaremr.nt" a:: proportions of total investments in cofrphrlson with tne sectior classifications or the presont tlble. T'noro la 1Jome Oditional if indirect c11ece thu marnitule of extra-sactor inv,Isto.ent5. Ih 197', iross ootput of industry w:is plrinned to he 103 LilIion roA.:Is in 1.9,'.6/7 pricus. Of this ar.ount, tne followinc, amounts were planned to Le rmduced by nonlnlustrial !:d.;A:Aries and departments: Comittce. for Colnolity Proc..trement Yfii.,Lstry of lidiroad Transport Ministry of Water Transport Ilinistry of Communications Ministry e)f Internal Trade tiTi,ent.nc siuz" 1.94 Lillian 2.21 anion ..31 billion .14 .57 billion 12 "Ilion - Tots.) 5.89 billion (1.9:17 PlIn, pp. 42-3, 52- J,;;6-7). Thus, about 5.7% of total industrial outpin, oas plal.ncd to ' prod,Iced by nonindustrial orgaLlzatIons. In a 1948 publication, Ioffe :tated that about 10-12% of industrial output is produced by noninusLrial 1.iL13tries. (I. Ioffe, Planirovie rom-sUennoi-o Ino:untrial Production---CosplaLi2dat 1942, p. 9. I would suspect further that industrial production in enterprises of nonindustrial' m-lristrles would tend, on the whole, to be small scale and less capital intensive. Accor1in61y, I wo.alsi expect that the percentage of total Invest- oJiLts in indunry dnd,trtaken by enterprises of nonindustrial ministries would oo les?than the p2rcontage of industrial output produced by nonindu3trial .:Inistries. On the other hand, I would expect that the percentage of toual inJustrial lalor force in Iniustrial enterprises of nonindustrial Llinistries would be greater than the porcentaze of industrial output produced by non- ndllstrial n.inl st ri es . 21. The question to he discussed in this note is,whether extra-sector inoe!tlocr,t3 are appropriately placed in tne Soviet sectcr breakdown.. To put it In tv.ot:le: way, the question is whether the senor breakdown is anythinr n.or-2 than ector cl:issification of the ministry and department breakdown (i.e., the kind of clasalfloation adopted the prescnt table). For the mo:ient, we are not co.ncorned with the magnitude of nonproductive investments within the PCCI-,Ond C sectors; tini:j will be discussed in the notes to Table. XII. AccordinLly, we asslime for the moment that all investmuhts by economic ministries PrLd ,JerarLt...eas are productive Investments. The problem is the relationship Letween the sector and administi.ative classifications. There are scme 3oviet statements on this question. Arakelian states that beginning in 193:: inves tmeLt a in "Ind ustr-,," include investments in industri al fixed capital oy nonindustrial ministries (Cl. TaLle V, note 4). Arakelian was writing only about ?industry and would, therefore, feel no necessity to say anything about other sectors. Socialist Construction 122.?4 states that the 2934.?-1935 dat8 on capital irvestments iL agriculture include investments in state farms operatol by Work'st 3upplay Departments of non- vrioLltur%1 organizations (C:. Table IV, 5). 3?cifIllst Construction _12L Tolf,es LhaL "trade and proc exclude investmer ,JF in industrial enter- 1 prises v,.. L'ALle II note._). .nese reinrKs miald indicate ,s1,at at least swie ea-sector ilivestIoe.tt-i are appropriately placed. On the other hand soc!, allst CcrIct r.404 10- '7ilr sates that "'-ancinor" nclodes r,one iodustrial Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 7",",`",^1111,1e,Nrrlr";r1, Ii ???4 , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved TO1-: Release"-@ '50-Yr 2013/6-6/06 7-6-1A-R6P-6-1:61043R002500190002-8 , Page 174 excludeo Influotriel enterprises of nonindustrial Tieistries (TL II, note 1). Lot ue coepsro eector breakdown; with eectoe claseifications of einistry and aepaetn,eet brodedowns (cnli the litter "tisistry brealdevnsft).from identical soerces. As we have previouely arsued (note 20 to this table) the mag..itude e' e.eees eeceor investments ie proLably small; the comperison, therefore, will 3up,e(;stive only. The daea are presented in Table X-A. ree breekdoves, except for "preliTdnary 1934" date, ,ere presented in Table II note 7, Tel:le III ree3 r:bl IX, (IL ehould be noted with reepece to the Secielist Constraction 17,16 breakdowns that the "einistry breakdowns" Ff7le Yre7cTiTsle---collective fares' investments from their own resources Aceeac the eector breakdoane exclude inveetments by collective faless and cooperative farms from their own resources. Accordingly, in order to make the eector and minietry breakdowns comparable, inveetments by cooperative farms from thcie own resources were added to "agriculture" and to the total for the rational ecorioni in the Soe:aliet Construction 1936 sector breakdowns. It ehould be noted also that Lhe "trade ad procurement" and the "social-cultural art.T.thist,ration" sectoes are eseimates for the 1937 plan sdnistry brtml:dowii.) There is little doubt in ly mina as to the sector classification of ednietries and departsseees presented in Ta'Lle X (except for the 1941 plan difficnitiee aires,ly discussed in note 1 to Table VIII). The inClusion of tile comrittee on Coeeirdiey Peocurement in "trade and procurement" is stated by Socialist Construceion 1936 (pp. 30-)). The data in Table X-A suggest: (a) that the Soviet sector breakdowns are not achieved Ly a sechanical cle.ssificeeien of sthistles and departnents except :or "eransport" in the Socialise Construction 1926 data; (b) that the pre4933 sector breFtA'YrrriS do not include all ext re-sector investments, in particular do not include sontrannport investmenes 1,-) the tralisport mdnistries and ricpartmes:ee; (c) that extre-sector investments are probatly appropriately placed in ei)e poet-1932 sector treakdowns (since the sissIs of the deviations between sector ald rinistry break,!owr, are not random for the economic sectors and eince the eiEns coeform to expectatioee wit: respect to the balence of extre-eector inveetments); and (d) that, if (s) and (c) are correct, the ....agnitude of extra-sector investeeenes are, in abvolute terms, On t'se assu.sption that the 3oViet sector bree:dolvr:s.si:xe 1932 place eppro. .erietelY a's least the obvious eases of eXtra-sector investments there are two cateories of extra-sector insestmeete 'IP/Lich may remain, a. Since the ehief aiiminietratior appears to be the basic etatistical reporting unit for so many economic elngnitudes (for example, eeefits), it is possible that the sector breakdowns of investments are obtained a classification of investments according to chief administrations. It is also possible, ?therefoee, that there may still be extra-sector investments ia ?the sense of investmeets outside the sector in which the edef administration eelonzs. Since the chief administrations tend to be more homogeneous than their parent ministries, I suspect that these inclusions are small. b. There may be extra-eector investments in vertically integrated seteep,eees for which the integretio; cuts across sector lines. In view of the hie;) Seeree o, e,-.grecation ie tee eector classification, I suspect Lhess ssclusions are also sleall. ? ? Ano her Ise tion which areees s whether and where tee constru , Vtn? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0102131k162500190002-8 cf; 11 1! STAT 1 VISSINSWEVIIMODI KIETRI 214MAYMOISEMAINNOWarellIOUGNEIMMileitoMnasimummovos NM.* Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ' ? J. , I. 4 47. of military facilities and fortifica.tions are ineluded. Lajlan (p. 461) states that capital investments by contrs1 organizations were planned to be 1109 million rubles (out of it total of 21190 million rubles for total invest- ments in the 1935 plan cxclusive of chanpes in the plan introduced during the year). Plan, further, presents a breakdown of capital investments by central orgmizations as for.ows (in Tillions of rubles): SecretPriat of the Central Executive Comirittee of the 1133R. 102.20 Unravlenie delami of U..33R Council of Ministers (It.a not sre 7:71lat this is; perhaps, housekeeping functions for the Council of Ministers). 21.75 Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 25.00 7IE21 of the USSR (the meaning of the abbreviation is unknown to me). 18.00 Ministry of Finances and its system. 32.80 'All-Union Central Cou.hcil of Trade Unions Cosplan and TSUNKHU 5.00 Sovlet Control Comnission 1.00 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1.00 Procurator of USSR 0.50 Jupreme Court of USSR 0.10 Total 245.50 I suspect that the difference between the 1109 and the 2.4.50 figures represents expenditures on military facilities and fortifications. If this is correct, such construction is included in "social-cultural and administration." In this connection it snould be noted that the Socialist Construotion 1c/36 data for "alml:dstration" are described as "administration and special constructim. projects." Cf. also: Table VIII, note 6; Table IX, notes 3 and 4. ? 23. An indication of the tremendous Soviet concentration on heavy industry' Is given by tG breakdowns within industry. Using the 3ocl,a1ist Construction 16 data for 19294932 and the annual, plan data for subsequent years, we find the following distributions among the Ministries of Heavy, Light, Timber, Food and Lbcai Industries in percentages of total In7estmentstin industry: '., ... Year Ministry of 'Heavy , Industry . Ministry of Light Industry Ministry of Timber Industr 5.?-? -4-3 r**" CP. 0% reN En 5?i cfl" CNI 'e0 '60 -047:1 c) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? to 0 0% En tO %C) t? C? I Cs./ .4r-4 0 1:1 c: tr-e I-4 L_ Ministries of ' Local Indust ' Total . , 1929 ' 75.2 4 11.9 3.6' _ 98.4 .1930: ,, 75.4 . 7.6 4.8 _ 97.7 1931' ' 81 4 3..7 . 5.1 - ' 98.1 1932 - 81.8 3.7 H .4.3 - 98.1 1933' ' 7$?1 : 3.9 4.3 , ' 4.2 ' 98.3 'Plan 1934 77541 4 6.7 4.7 4.8 98.4' Preliminary 1934 .75.2 * 5.6 4.2 4.3 , ,97.6 ., Plan 1935 ' 75.8 6.4 ..- 4.9'. 4.4 98.4 .1935 - .. . : 76.0 6.1 4.7 4'.0 98:3 ,Plan 1.936 . . 6804 . 9.1 . . 6.9 47.0 , 99.2 .. Preliminary 1936 69.3 8.2 . 6.3 5.6 '97.2 Plan 1937 65.9 10.7 7.7 5.9 , 97.6. Plan 1933 . 61.7 - , PI.J4:1 1941 92.4 ... 24 , 1.7 - - . .9, 99-.8 .........?..................0.4 ...........?????.ft Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 17.",MAT",11,,,r C,""I'l`7N 1,mmx? "0? tmfo.m4or; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 $ININ177124164 An interesting port is the perceptible decline in the share of the Ministry of lieavy Industry, and the increase in'the share of the Ministries of Light- - timber and Local Industry in the 1936-1938 period. This was thu period in which tempos and totalitarianism relaxed perceptibly, if not substantially, and living stmdavds increased. way: rlarlaccifiPri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09106: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ? , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ivv .,i.':;; ? ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 TABLE TABLE PeAs CONPARISM OF SECTOR arZAKDONIN AND AINLSTRY BaRAKDOLI OF CAPITAL INVLSTIENTS (Table:: //, In and 31) (in=Mime of maw; in prices ?Of the Reapaltive Tears) 2420 1660 123 174 ODIs cet 911 Soo !"23 Scotor -1 +94% 0 0 -81.4 SOURCE:As20,..ritjaastalatisa 1936. tt.0.4atit,..Siziu 0 1936, k assisasitsgawissusau t'ssarcalizmonstmaratiktii,7 .4.f.rrrt?-t-rt) Pr m 1 4 r"ft Soltor-PAnt tlaC?*Pr +1.3% +104% 0 0 -884% -.209 ra""nrmmumm77 045 ? 256,1 2328. 3024 3044 184 ? 3.% 372 70_ 7L, "?.4,1,4,,fre"rt 4.4.4!,0 04,v:a on ,171.,rt 1936, 4, l? i rin":r:31,r, 7,4 Rcalincl Scc,to Scator 0959 2458 , 0 TX1mtri rtria lie Gaturf au. Luaransport zo7 70 0=Atiicatigns 263 , . Two and Przturement 549 . sodal.clatuyei ig 11-1.3 Tara au a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001 qnnn9_R Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 NAtar.41a44=i1Fa.= Total Investments Page 178, NONPRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS? BY MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS it: STAT 3. 1 Municipal Social- Total Non- Nunicipal HousingTotal Housing Services Services Cultural Productive Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments Investments 2 6 8 6000 650 560 7210 8739 812.6 133.5 146.8 1092,9 1100 26 180 1306 740 119.1 9.0 19.8 147,9 3 ,3 492 54 114 660 568 63.1 7.9 160 87 450 64 67 581 797 71.9 5.1 15.1 92,1 511 39.5 7432 62 .9 48.3 30 64 1 802_5_________?__ 1 ____,____460 I_____O________......?1,4?.......546......,.......h....?..kka.? 50.3 10 0 11 8 16.0 1518.8 Industry. A.Ministry of Heavy Industry Ministry ot Light Industry C.Ministry of Timber Industry D.Ministry of Food Industry EXinistries of Local Industry F. Producers) Cooperatives G.Chief Administration of Photo And Oinama Industry T AL 10760 1')00 1731 06 III.Transport A.Ministry of Railroad Transport Ministry of Water Transport C.Moscow Canal Building Adainistration D.Chief Administration of Civil Air Fleet E.Central Highways Administratior F?Chief Administration of Northern Sea Route TOTAL 18700 4245 250 .28695 ,1_ 1575 IV. Communications A.Ministry of Communications luva, Trade and Procurement A.Ministry of Internal Trade &Ministry of Foreign Trade C.Central Union of Consumers) Cooperatives Caamittee for Commodity Pro- curement attached to Council of Mini St 81'S ?MAL Social-Cultural & Administration A .Housing B.Municipal Services C.Education, Public 4ea1th, Pensions, Relief Administration and Special Construction Projects TOTAL 1700 1700 940 5595 201 ??14.5 ellan cus Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 )7777TnH-777-7,--,1y7,:w :7',vr.,;-.,ur:Tx:?,7,;40;rv-T,TY,:77.,..m,nrvIrrmt,T,'Twintil7;""IrtrVr,VMPATIM',X.P.Pr4 4MVrI.,t11'"1.4.4Plik Lt14641,1. w;totood Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0-7643R0025001900A02?-18 NY014t Total Investments Housing Investments Plan 12361) Municipal 3ervices Investments Total ' 1 Investments , Housiftg Investments 1518.8 8500 1380 900 1130 930 90 13190 850.0 208.0 98.5 120.0 83.8 11 125.0 46 9 2107 15.0 7,4 10'5.0 2774 134.2 143.0 1014 55.1 20.0 7 .1 464 2 71.0 5059 750 485 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ? ' MINIMPIPMMIMPIPPINigeirmer.,0. 64,,k-uwor:1" ? 4R"r',1'1" ? ?? uma 14 4P Declassified in Part- Sanitize7I-Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-R-6751-01043R-602500190002-8 A IVIIRMV/011 .frtIV,, I' I ,14177777357InVeStMentS ????1???N?MNI??????????????????Y????????.......VM????P otal Nonproductive Investments as a Percentage of Total Investment nan limos an an WORXMANIMIONMENNO; VIM (20)-Llale 100 (4) -(11.. 100 (22)X) . 100 (23).:1121 4, 100 "(11) (16 -(1) (24). 100 (11) 10.0 10.5 15.4 12.5 12.6 15.1 7.3 14.2 20.0 20.1 10.9 . 12.9 19.1 15.4 14.9 10.6 3.4 10.9 11.6 11.0 9.0 4.5 9.5. 10.9 .0 7.3 0? 0 8.7 '6 2 60.1 .1. 56.2 10.5 10.2 15.5 13.2 4.8 3.9 5.6 0 14.6 20.0 2.9 ? 7.4 8.8 (8.2)e 6.3 10.9 8.5 7.1 6.5 11.8 0 13.3 17.3 15.1 2.4 2.5 9.7. 9.0 8.0 7 0 7 8 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - Page ?,, '11 , ' j '1 411 slwrg JOURCLO: a. Second Five Year Plaa, pp. 562, 570. b. 1.9.26_11,1A1,1 pp. 510, 511. . e. Table I. Th 3arle aggregations are employed here as in Table XI; of. note to Mble XI. Total invesrlents differ between the present table and Table X1 because of the exclusion here of investments by the Baltic 4epublics. Total housing construction differs between the present tabl.:, and Table XI because of the inclusion here of an estimate of housing construction by the Ministry of Railroad Transport; of. note to the present table. d. Obtained as a residual between the indicated total and the total of the itemized components. e. Estima4,eJ; cf. ncr,e 2 for details. ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? V 4.? 1L/ 141 I lie I% .4 V M Vi14,10A Declassified in Pa - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0035661.960028-4 4 ipice..iVd..,444.11.,114Q.A. 441:4 N0TE3 TO TABLE XI , 1. It is obvious, fou a comparison of Sector VI and "All 3ocial-Cultura1 Servic:.s" in Table' I, that nonproductive investments (cf above, p. 15) are included in the econoylc sectors. The purpose of the present table is to pro Vi a basio for constructing a sector breakdown of investments in which' nonproductive investmx)nts are mitted from the economic sectors and, thus, to permit international comparisons of the sector breakdown. ? :Nonproductive investtents have been taken here to include housing con- struction, municipal service investments, and investments for public health, welfare, and educational purpose's. The sources for Table X also present data on investments: (a) for Workers' Supply Departments; (b) for the train- ing of cadres by economic organizations; and (c) for scientific institutions. These figures have been omitted from the present table on the following grounds: a. Investments for Workers' Supply Departments do not seem to be, in the Soviet sense, nonproductive investments. They are rather a species of what I have called extra-sector investments (cf. Table X, notes 19 and 20) and are :robably appropriately placed in the Soviet sector breakdown. In any case investments for Workers' Supply Departments declined markedly with the abolition of rationing in 1935. (Cr. Second Five Year Plan, p.570 1936 Plan, pp.510, 511 ). ? ? f 1 b. Investments by economic organizations for the training of cadres have their counterparts in American practice. In addition, with the growth of the State Labor Reserves system in the USSR since 1940, such investments probably declined in importance. , c. Investments by economic organizations for scientific inatitu- -tions may be regarded as approximately counterbalanced by research and development services rendered economiC.organizations by scientific institutions. . ? The effect of the latter two exclusions, in, any case, is mall. If we acid to the nonproductive investments of ministries and departments (in Table XI) their investments in scientificinstitutions and for the training of cadre% And aggregate into sectors (as in Table XI) we obtain for 1936. Plan: Nonproductive investments Percentages Total plus training of cadres & in:colutn investments scientific, institutions (3)m .100 (24) of , (1) 2 Table Industry 13190 2032.8 Agriculture 2562 176.6 Transport 7514 610.8 Communications 400 36.1 Trade & Procurement 845 87.4 15.4 14.2 6.9 3.8 8.1 7.5 9.0 5.2 10.3 8.5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R0a66676"6"662-r' 137m . . .., ''''' A ' two VfirFr STAT Page 181 Inclusion, in addition, of investments for Workers Supply Departments would have made the 1936 plan percentages: Industry 15.8 Agriculture 6.9 Transport 8.4 Communications 9.7 Trade & Procurement 10.8 For 1941 plan total investments by the Ministry of Railroad Transport are estimated at 6 billion rubles and total investments by the Chief Admin- istration (in the Ministry of Internal Affairs) of Railroad Construction are given as 1.350 billion rubles, for a total of 7.350 billion rubles (cf. Table VIII and note 2). Total investments by the Ministry of Railroad Transport are given by 1936 plan as 5.059 and .445 billion rubles respectively. If one were to assume that the proportion of total investments in railroad transport going for housing construction was constint, 1941 plan housing construction would be estimated at about .650 billion. It is observed, however: (a) that something like 1/6 of the total invest- ments in railroad transport were to be undertaken in 1941 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and (b) that housing construction as a percentage of total investments by the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole was only about 2% as against 8.8% for the Ministry of Railroad Transport in 1936 plan. (Cf. Table VIII and the present table). Accordingly, the estimate for 1941 plan housing construction is arbitrarily scaled down to 600 billion rubles. Since housing construction by the Chief Administration of Railroad Construc- tion has already been estimated to be .028 billion rubles (Table VIII, note 14), this implies that .572 billion rubles are estimated to be the housing con- struction by the Ministry of Railroad Transport. 3. There is some data on the source of investments in housing con- struction. a. Kobale-skii presents the following data on capital investments , in urban housing by category of investor: Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01n4f1Pnn9nn1annri-) o Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-131R0025001910"1111111111. ? ? Total housing construction 1. Industry 2. Transport 3. Executive committees of local soviets & housing cooperatives 4. Other (collectivized 1924-28 1928-1932 millions % of of rubles total millions 943 100 4049 402 42.5 2553 92 9.9 319 1933 1934 1935 % millions 100 1213 63.0 727 7.8 84 % millions 100 1601 59.9 895 7.0 211 % millions 100- 1811 55.6 1036 13.1 417 100 57.2 23.0 40.5. 853 7.1.- 328 21.1 196 8.1 206 16.1 283 17.0 202 17.7 216 12.0 12.6 142 7.8 STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2,013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002506190.002-8 v.. Page 163 (V. L. Kobalevskii, ganlzasj.iaconomikazhilishchookhoziaistva$3...SR - Organization and Economics of gy.Lpss.ijousi......u.LEcono.st - 1940, p.107. 'There are'sometiner discrepancies in KobaleVskiits figures for 1928-1932 and for 1934 whereby total housing construction is slightly lees than, the sum of the indicated components.) t. Maslakov states that in the Fourth Five Year Plan 77% of housing construction is to be undertaken by ministries, 8.7% by local city :soviets and 14% by individuals. (V. P. Maslakov, N. L. FilatoV, and V. V. Barmin, Finansirovanie zheleshchno-kemmunaWnOoldlEillta Financing_the Housing - Maiglal_Emasz -, 1948, pk7). Since the Fourth Five Year Plan figure for . housing conStrUction. of 42.3 billion rubles is stated to exclude individual housing construction (Fourth Five Year Plan, p.54), we obtain total housing construction (including individual) by dividing 42.3 by .86,. The result is 49.2 billion rubles of this, 37.9 is to be undertaken by ministries and 4.3 by local city soviets. Thus, 90% of housing oonstruction exclusive of individual construction is to be undertaken by ministries and 10% by local city soviets. c. If we calculate from Table XI the percentage of total housing undertaken by the various sectors and tabulate the results alongside the previous results we obtain: Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Plan 1924-28 1928-1932 2512:22 42.5 63.0 60.4 6.8 9.9 7.8 11.7 .7 IMMO MOM MOM.' Other 7.1 Executive committees of local soviets & housing 'cooperatives 40.5 1.5 8.1 4.8 17.0 12.6 7.9 7.8 21.5 Plan 1222 122A 1222 59.9 55.6 50.0 7.1 7.0 13.1 20.1 .7 ??? OM OP de =lb NO Plan Plan Plan 1222 1226 12A1 1 6,- 57.2 43.7 69.5 ?-- 2.4 .0 23.0 16.6 17.2 -- .5 .2 1.7 -- 2.0 .6 90 21.1 14.1 16.1 17.7 12.5 12.0 13.3 12.5 10 .7,7.704 4. The problem, now, is:. how ,shall we eliminate nonproductive.invest .ients from the, economic :lectors?. The data on nonproductive inveetments, are far .from Omplete and, therefore, any method of elimination can be only approximate. .1 propose to use the following procedure to obtain nonproductive investments. a. For the Years 1924-1925 through 1928, I will use the nonproduc- tive investments given in Table II. This amounts to the assumption that no nonproductive investments occurred in sectors other than industry and agri- culture. . we know, however, from the Kobalevskii data (note 3, this table) that other sectors did invest in housing. Since the amounts involved were very small and since housing has always cnnstituted the overwhelming propor- tion of nonproductive investments by economic organizations, nonproductive investments in the economic sectors ether, than industry and agriculture may, with little violence, be' ignored. Accordingly, nonproductive investments , in the years indicated are taken to be (in millions of rUbles)2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043Rnn9cnn1annno_SZ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019056-273-77 STAT Page , 1::;','?:''....': i.. 1. .,'. 1?? : .V.,'.',. i ? . i. ? , , ',. ? Oct. 1, 1926- Inns r nom. 11. 1027 i9211 1 4 a. ?V ZNIW ?=4;;;AD 07?010.?a? Industry 65 126 207 193 ' Agriculture 3 6 12 20 ? ? b. For the years 1929 through 1932 I will use the nenprOductive investments given in Table II for industry and the nonproductirs investments given in Table IV (i.e. the difference between items 1* and 2. ? di ?able note 7) for agriculture. Nonproductive investments in (Imo& Sectors other than industry and agriculture will, also, be ignored in this period. e Kobalevskii data indicate that the omission is not serious. Accordingly, nonproductive investments in the years indicated are taken to be (ifilditiaMe of rubles): 1222 1222 1 Industry 307 607 10". 1 3 Agriculture 32 281 292 355 c. For the period 1923/4 - 1927/8 I will use the out et nanprodue. tive investments for 1924-1925 through 1928. For the period 192104932 1 will use the sum of nonproductive investments for 1929 through 19329 /hue, nonproductive investments for these periods are taken to be (In 011611ano of rubles): 1923/4-1927A 1 Industry 591 Agriculture 41 960 d. For industry in 1933 and 1934 I will use the nonproduotivo tft4. vestments given in Table II. For agriculture in 1933, 1934 and 1935 1 411 use the nonproductive investments given in Table IV. Thus (in millions or rubles): 1222 1224 1221 1683 1947 -- 292 418 310 e. For the years 1933 and 1935 (except for industry end agriculture), I will use the Second Five Year Plan percentages (from the present tebi,) and the sector breakdown of investments (from Table V) to obtain Mmnpimdito tive investments. It should be noted, as a general caution, that ths $4,* centages are derived from a ministry breakdown of investments and, thOtabre, may somewhat overstate nonproductive investments for industry and aptcultute and somewhat understate nonproductive investments for other economic tectiste even if the percentages are representative. Thus, we obtain: Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Trinsport Communicatiofte Trade & Procurement 486 Total investments (in millions Emproductive investments of rubles Total investments Crom Table V) (from Table XI) 3015 3 2 202 6.2 8.8 238 ?eta/ investment* (in million, tammita:iivikIvestmeas of ruble* Total investmetits from Table V) Wan Table il) 4 4250 3 270 6.2 8.8 STAT age ? ? Nonproductive 100 investments (in millions of rubles) (21;11/1.0.1_. 190 13 21 ? Nonproductive investme'its 100 (in millions ? of rubles) 6:4) 2 8 17 43 f. ?or 1935 isme_pt for agriculture) I will U80 the 1935 Plan percentages percentages and for 1936 snit 1937 L wtU tee the 1936 Plan percentages (from the present table) along vith the *inter breakdown of investments (from Table V) to obtain c mluctiv, Westmont*, Thus we ebtain: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A .dP4 Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Indastry . Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procuremen IndustrY ? Agriculture Transport C9r2r1UniCato iOn 3 Trade & Proc.tvaen proved 14,7 o for ReleasIL2-..y.L3.913/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Total investments (in millions of rubles from Table V) Nonproductive investments . Total investments (from Table XI) 1 STAT age Nonproductive 100 investments (in millions of rubles) 13024 5455 300 562 13.2 9.3 6.2 7.2 1936 Total investments (in millions Nonproductive investments . of rubles Total investments from Table V) (from Table XI) 1719 507 19 40 Nonproductive 100 investments (in millions of rubles) 6:4. 15969 3884 6917 310 1046 14.2 3.8 7.5 5.2 8.5 Total investments .(in millions Nonproductive investments :of rubles Total investments from Table V) (from Table xi) 8 2268 148 519 16 89 Nonproductive 100 investments (in millions o; rubles) 15012 4146 5774 346 913 14.2 3?8 7.5 5.2 8.5 21.'32 158 433 18 78 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? ^1 aro Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ' STA Page 187 It should be noted that agriculture for 1936 and 1937 (and similarly for subsequent years) may be understated particularly because collective farme! investments from their own resources have been omitted. The omission may be justified: (1) by an extrapolation of the pre-1936 data in which nonprod- uctive investments by collective farms were virtually zero (Table IV); and (2) by the observation that the housing for collective farm members was individually owned at least since 1935. g. For the period 1933-1937 I will use the sum of nonproductive investments for the years 1933 through 1937 (as obtained above). Thus, in millions of rubles: Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Total 1.222. 222i 1221 122.1 1683 1947 1719 2268 292 418 310 148 190 268 507 519 13 17 19 16 21 43 40 89 Total 1227 193-1937 2132 9749 158 1326 433 1917 18 81 78 .221 13346 h. For the period 1938-1942, I will use the 1936 plan percentages along with the sector breakdown of investments (from Tables I, V and IX) in order to obtain nonproductive irvestsmnts. For the years in which transport and communications investments ere combined, the transport percentage will be used for both on the grounds that communications is an insignificant proportion of the total. The extrapolation of the earlier percentages to the later years may be justified on the following grounds: (1) the percen- tages in Table XI exhibit little variation except for the decline in agri- culture; and (2) housing construction as a percentage of total investments exhibits little variation between 1936 plan and 1941 plan except, main, for the decline in agriculture. Thus we obtain: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDPRi_ninztqpnnonniemr-w-In (-1 14 rrA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A r ri?r t4 A44,N,L.A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 TotAl Investments (Table 1) (1) 11114111171111tottems.44!?rrr-......-0--- ? " P1s127.1222:4. Lonredestments . 100 . Total investments. ? (Table XI) Page 188 Nonproductive Investments Industry 103,580 AGriculture 184,000 Transport 35,826 Conaunications 1,748 Trade & Frocurement 2,563 Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Industry. Agriculture Transivrt Communications Trade & Procurement 14.2 3.8 7.5 5.2 8.5 Plan 1938 Total La211211EtAILAPIestments 100 Investments Total investments (Table IX) (Table XI) 14708 684 2687 91 218 Nonproductive Investments 17460 2470 ) 6820 660 Total Investments 14.2 3.8 7.5 7.5 8.5 938 Nonr----2.3nts Total investmeas (Table V) (Table XI) La (8) 17075 3449 6623 376 763 14.2 3.8 7.5 5.2 8.5 2480 90 510 510 60 Nonproductive Investments 2425, 131 497 20 65 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 I STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A?proved for Release 0 50-Yr 2013/09/06 :,CIA;RDP81-.01043R002500190002-8 , ? 1=2404F4400000 Se ? 5) 0 Total Investments (Table IX) Industry 1790 AgricUlture 1590 Transport Communications . )4960 Trade & Procurement 490 Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Industry Agriculture .Transport. Communications, Trade & Procurement Lia_111222. _ Non roductive investments Total investments (Table XI) 11 . 100 4. STAT Pagel Nonproductive Investments 12-10'11 Total Investments (Table IX) 1 14.2 3.8 7.5 8.5 Plan 1940 NonnroductiVe investments Total investments (Table XI) ? . 100 2500 60 370 40 Nonproductive Investments 19190 1230 )5440 ' 370 ? Total Investments (Table IX) (16) 27480 1060 )9210 ? 510 .14.2 3.8 7.5 8.5 Fan 19J,. Nonproductive investments . 100 Total investments (Table XI) ?12) 14.2 3 7.5 8.5 2720 :50 410 30 Nonproductive Investments (18)206)? (17) 3900 40 690 40 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Ar. v Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release '& 50-Yr 2013/09/06: .CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 mmqm" dy .7.04 COI IA., ? IIRT.1411IVIVAMMA W:A,t1.0 1 q4b 4.47-t; Page 60 is For the post-war period we observe: (1) that housing construe- tion (exclusive of individual housing construction) as a percentage of total investment has doubled in comparison with the pre-war period (Table XII and note 23); and (2) that the percentage of housing construction, exclusive of individual housing construction, to be undertaken by economic organizations has increased slightly (note 3 to the present table). Housing construction for the Fourth Five Year Plan was to be 42.3 billion rubles, of which 90% or approximately 38 billion rubles were to be undertaken by economic minis. tries,(note 3 to the present table). It is clear that the pre-war percen- tages (nonproductive investments ? total investments, for the economic sectors) will not account for this magnitude of housing construction alone. We will attempt to estimate the post-war percentages by 'estimating the magi!. nitude of nonproductive investments to be undertaken by economic organiza- tions. In addition to housing construction, the components of nonproductive investments are municipal services and social-cultural expenditures. Muni- cipal services investments were planned to be 6.1 billion rubles for the Fourth Five Year Plan. If we assume that the percentage of municipal servi- ces investments which were to be undertaken by economic organizations is the same as pre-war -- namely about 10% or 600 million rubles (cf. Table. LI) -- and that the amount of social-cultural construction to be. undertaken by economic Organizations is about twice this magnitude or 1200 million rubles, then nonproductive investments by economic organizatinns must be in the neighborhood of 40 billion rubles. The bulk of such investments, moreover, must have been undertaken by industrial organizations. We will aesume, therefore, that in the post-war period nonproductive investments.as percen- tages of total investments were about 21% in industry, about 8% in agricul- ture, 9% in transport, 7% in communications, and 9% in trade and procure- ment. Except for industry, these percentages represent approximately the- pre-war maximum among the figures we have (cf. Table XI). In industry the pre-War maximum was 15.5% as against the 21% assumed. Using these percent- ages and the sector breakdown of investments (from Tables I and law(' obtain the following results:. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-0104:1Rnn9cnniannno STAT :vP Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release #04,1044gogow444, 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 4.017170T?01;V.,1.11.11,WIN....)01?41,11. 1,40, Total Investments tauoductive investments ? 100 Total investments (Table I) Industry 157.5 Agriculture 19.9 Transport 53.5 Communications . Trade & Procurement 0000 21 8 9 7 9 191 Nonproductive Investments (billions of rubles) (3):(2)' (1) 33.1 1.6 4.8 SOO ? Total Nonproductive Eameuctive investments . 100 Investments Investments Total investments (billions of rubles) /1?6?01...141141.111????????????..1????????????????1?1151.1110.00?10010Y Industry 46.39 21 9.74 Agriculture , 4.32 8 .35 Transport .81 Coritaunications 1 9.00 Trade .& Procurement s84 9.81 ? , Plan 1949 Total Nonproductive EaprOductive investments . 100 Investments Investments -Total investments (billions of Isubles) (7) (9)=(7) g (8) industry:: 7223. -15*17 Agriculture 9.21 a 74 TOnsP9r: 13 54 ComMunications Trade 4 Procurement STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr or 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 49V, r .0% STAT age In summitry, then, the sector breakdowns of nonproductive investments by economic organizations are as follows (in millions of rubles): Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Total Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement Total Industry Agriculture Transport Communications Trade & Procurement 60 65 Total 122.4722_ 65 3 0 0 0 68 1925-26 Oct. 1926- Dec. 1927 126 207 6 0 12 0 0 0 0 132 21:9 1923/4- 1228 1222L2. 199 1222 1221 193 591 20 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 213 632 307 607 1066 32 281 292 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 339 184 1354 1928/9- 1933- 1212 1222.. 1222 1224 1221 122? 1222 1222. 1637 3617 355 960 0 0 0 0 1683 1947 1719 2261 2132 .9749 ' 292 418 310 148 158 1326 190 268 507 519 433 1917 13 17 19 16 18 83 0 o 2)_ 43 40 E_L14.21 271 1992 4577 199 26933040 2819 1334 Plan 1221 1222 Plan Plan Plan Plan 1939AO, 11:4.1. 1946-1950 12.421949 in 2480 2425 2500 90 131 60 497 510 20 370 410 690 2720 3900 33100 9740 15170 50 40 1600 350 740 0 30 40 Ant% 10kni ' IP ? S.. 3140 3138 2970 3210 4 70 39500 810 1220 80 10180 17220 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: nAwnnncnr,..-- Plan 1938,7.1?42 14704 *A4 :19 2111 1833 .. I ?? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 44,11frk ?"3' 40214 WEeg Page 193 Anyone who has read this note need not be reminded of the highly con- jectural nature of the post-1932 estimates. It is, unfortunately, not. possible to provide reliable checks for these figures. But it is possible to provide rough checks on the total of nonproductive investments by economic organiza- tions. We know that housing construction represents the overwhelming propor- tion of nonproductive investments by economic organizations (Table XI and note 1). We know also that since 1928 80-90% of housing construction was undertaken by economic organizations (note 3 to the present table). Accord- iNgly, our figures for nonproductive investments should somewhat exceed (by the amount of municipal service and social-cultural investments under- taken by economic organizations) 80-90% of the amount of housing onstruction. We can try this check, using the housing construction figures from Tables I and XII and 80% for 1928-1932, 85% for 1933-1941, and 90% for the post-War period in order to obtain housing construction by economic organizations. The check must be rough for at least two reasons: (1) we don't know what percentages to use for the thdividual years; (2) the annual housing construc- tion figures exclude housin, repairs for the years 1933-37 and perhaps for other years as well (Table XII, note 19). In .any case, housing construction and the amount of housing construction undertaken by economic organizations are (in millions of rubles): . 1929 1930 Housing Construction 509 775 Amount of Housing Construction by Economic Organizations 407 620 1931 1932 1116 1591 893 1273 Prelim- Plan inary Plan. Plan Plan 1226. 196 1221:17 1,38-42 1222 120 1241 122 1949 Housing Construction 3065 2400 12575 15500 2642 3200 4050 9500 12200 Amount of Housing Construction by Economic Organizations 2605 2040 10689 13175 2246 2720 3443 8550 10980 1928/9 Plan Plan - 1922 1933-37 =I .122h 1935 MI 4640 13412 110 1729 2023 1930 3712 11400 1142 1470 1720 1640 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 41.114. ? ? ? 010 CV., WOW ? ,50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , 1 Page The 1948 and 1949 figures, it should be remembered are in 1945 prices. If we compare our estimates of nonproductive investments by economic organiza- tions with the amount of housing construction by economic organizations, we obtain the following results (in millions of rubles): STAT 1928/9 Flan Plan Plan 1222 1930 1211 1212 -1932 1?3-37 121/ 2224 1212 135 1211 Nonproductive Investments by Economic Organizations 339 888 Housing Construction by Economic Organizations 407 620 1358 1992 4577 13569 2199 2693 2295 893 1273 3712 11400 1142 1470 1720 2595 2630 1640 2605 Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan 1226 1233-37 122:42 198 120 120 1241 190i 1242 1242 Nonproductive Investments by Economic Organizations 3040 13346 18336 3140 3210 4670 10980 17220 Housing Construction by Economic Organizations 2040 10689 13175 2246 2720 3443 8550 10980 Again, it shou34 be remembered that in the 1948 and 1949 comparisons, nonproductive investments are in current prices whereas housing construction is in 1943 prizes, Although 1945-1948 price changes are not substantial, the 19454949 pries shanges are (cf. Table VI, note 1). # The roughnesS of the comparison must be kept in mind - particularly, the exclusion of housing repairs from the annual 1933-1937 housing construction figure* and also, perhaps, from other annual figures and the roughness of the percentages used to obtain housing construction by economic organizations. With this in alnd* 1 conclude that the order of magnitude of nonproductive investment* by 0monomit rganizations which is implied by our estimates seems to be reasonable. 1 euspecto however, that I may have somewhat underestimated the et?wet Etagroltudea. The stew 6/swim 'of such investments is not a matter of great cemeera aim extry obviously contributes the overwhelming proportion of the tet414 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250nicannn9_R 4 , v Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A? proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 : a;74:77,M1V4P77-43,ZWOMPT"- Prices of Res ective Years 1929a 2615 250.9 229.7 248.9 263.22' 91.0 ? Total Industry: A.Electrit Power Stations B.Coal Industry iJ.Petroleum Industry PjerroUs Metallurgy E.NonferroUs Metallurgy F.Machine'Construction G.Chemicals Industry H.Construction Materials Industry I.Paper Industry J.Textile Industry K.Leather Boots. and Shoes ,L.Light'Industry ILFood.InduStry 1.3Ugar:Industry 2.Fishing Industry 3iMeat and Dairy,Tndustry N.Oroup A Industry' II. Total Transport A.Railroad Transport III .Housing Construction IV: Municipal Services V. Total National Economy 4114 394.5 308.9 350.4, 418.3' 150.0 193.5 19'j.0 44.8 46.5. 314.03. 318.0-:' 162.24. 270.24. 47r9 69.4 2127 1179 873 509s 5305 3425 1660 1112 7755 9496 1931 a 7407 549.6 598.8 414.51. 836.1' 320.3 47.2 122-0 54.01. 275.9, 41,5.74' 55.3 104.8 6513 2694 1910 1116s 1 ? .v ZiJi?4,1,1?11?Li?i4U''""m -Table SIX: Capital Investments by Principal Branches of the Economy, 10431 719.0 782.0 452.1, 1421.9" 543.5 65.2 143.6 55.2,1 388.7'. 632.24. 92.1 121.5 9090 J472 2569 1591s) 1962u 1.15116 19351 1933 prices (In million of rubles Planb 2 69545 5350 3500 4700 9340 3791 8060 4770 9200H. 5-;442 26342 17364 13412 7145 133400 8863 609.0 561.0 483.02. 1726.0 406.0 60.0 209.0 rlQO 498.0". 715.04. 126.0 87.0 7401 3084 2107 1343c 750c 16790 SOURCES: a. s2L2,t)_2L21!At_y2_12L.63otssialistichesl, pp. 388-389; Socialist Construction 1936, re 50-'51. b. Second Five Year Plan, pp. 558-59, 571. c. 1225.11m, PP. 460, 461, 468, 469, 476, 477, 478. d. ?1226 E1E, pp. 391, 504-5,506-7, 512, 521, 522, 523. e. ?1937 Plan, pp. 17, 140-141, 142-143. Second Five Year Plan Fulfillment, p. 71. . Socialist Construction 19331933, pp. 113, 115. Third Five Year Plan, pp. 120, 136, 137, 197, 225. I. Boltshakov, "Construction Program for 1938"; Planovoe khoziaistvo 1938, No. 6, pp. 32-37. Kantor, Osnovue fondy_prosyshlennosti i ikh ispollzovanie, pp. 58, 69. Cf. note 21 to this table for details. Calculated from a statement that planned investments in 1941 were, as a percentage of realized investments in 1940, 122% for ferrous metellurgb, 93;, for nonferrous metallurgy, 123% for petroleum) 143% 'for electric Power stations, and 102% for machine construction. Cf. V. BuzYrev, "Fixed Capital in the USSR and the Financing of Capital Investments," 3ovetskie finanay, 1942 No. 11-12, p. 45. Since the 1941 Flag investments are for ministries, the 19/.0 investments are also. ? 1941 Plan, pp. 483-485 (Cf. Table VIII). The figures here are by ministries. mL. These figures are highly conjectural estimates; Cf. note 22 to this table for the scattered data and heroic assumrtions on which these estimates are based. J. ? is Planc 1*1 11834 799.0 629.5 729.5 1627.4 680.0 2178.7 1079.7 179.6 146.9, 353.124: 96.9r 742.6' 847.84. 160.3 156.5 ? 102.0 9617 4.826 3249 mob 23521 1 10624 640 595 698.02 1827.0 ' 464.0 92.0 349.0 101.01 804.04. 107.0 118.0 8692 4395 2938 1729d 1283d 21909 VJ ? 1929-1950 Prices of Respective Years Plan 12205 840.5 624.87' 860.3 1549.3 856.8 2345.2 1038.3 155.5 207.4r 62.7 3. 740.0, 789.64* 113.9 157.7 92.4 9986 5455 3843 2023 1447 24722 Plan le 1936 V.* STAT Preliminary! 19,6 12542 13956 14259 500.0" 1000.0 ? 1050.0 1100.0 1960.0 1535.0 100.0 415=3 766.2i 125.91 852" 1130.0 7203,. 10516 10i944714':(1). 11510 1455;? 7173 ? 6494.22 2. ? 1930 :::: ?2400 1400 1885 1800 32365? 31750 . 31750 ????????????? a ? FoUrth..Five Year Plan, pp. 9, 13, 45, 54. Narodnoe lthoziaistvo (National Economy), volume a collection, of articles and reports,Gosplanizdat 1947, pp. 341 .414-415. 1hie VI. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-n1n4nPnn9cnniannnn o OR. 01 16 a ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 110,w,revfl,Kpir.T.RIMOIM Mrt. ? 1. Economy, 1929-1950. Irices of Res 1 340.5 )424.87= 1860.3 .856.8 345.2 '2,038.3 11.5 fi 62.7 'i789.64.? ,\ 92.4 084.3 02 447 722'..? ?.. 00,......??????dograMellswasidgelamairow.mgramortmow ective Years Plan 1936_ 12542 3. 7250 824. 10516 50-Yr 2013/09/06 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 A. 13956 976.0, 500.0" 1000.0 1050.0 1100.0 1960.0 1535.0 100.0 415.% 766.4 125.93 1380.0, 1130.0 194.5 197.0 144.1 10647 5455 7173 3752 4762 1930 3064 1400 1885 32365 3 750 41111.11,11?1?1....1.8????? for ferrous metallurgy, Of uzyrev, "Fixed investments are for which these estimates '44 5. -ar. Plan) 1947. 63. Preliminarye 1936 14259 Plan 1937e 13928 14063, ? 9704' 11510 10919 6922 7370 4428 5323 2400 2425 1800 1813 31750 32593 19 -1937r 65763 54565 25411 17077 12575 648811' 1 137491 ...142031:2-2r1ces Planh 1934-12211L, 72948 103580 60777 29019 19627 155148 87162 35826 24245 155 ,17' 6950,w 188300 ?3 7 P rices Plani 1938 8 (18.80) ? 1250 1026 1150 850 270 5515= 990 128 5000 (2642)9' (1858)9 38500 1 r. M. Arkadlev, zhilishchnom strOiteltstve v S33R ,(On Housing Const s. D. Buzin, "The Housing and Municipal Services Economy Over 20 Yea t. Table X. U . 3ocialist.ConstructiOn 19 3-38, p. 135. The 1962 figure is for t . V. P. Maslakov, N. L. Filatov, and V. V Barmin, Finansirovanie z Gosfinizdat 19489 p, 7. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? 114reenememlieeimodromem respective years ? total industry and ?nal economy which ? 7400)10 1245 1529 1440 1326 1 474 451 1292, 470 1940Ic (11900)114 1011 2402 2238 1731 2214 3200r 34300P 38000p ? eel Vet tn.= tr..1?11. Wtt Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-6 ?{), e ....moommmrr..omw.mmm...aemmweft;mmeOM.1010111s..m.mmleagftemlOm.*WIFmwemWil..... ,....MON10.00.4117411 Plan1 1 41 Plan 1 4 1 /6 1* 0 27475' 1497 .(2600) 1680 .(4$00) 2955 2730 1610 2258' 1176. 369 140. 58714. 17012. 29613. 10013 14913* )600 )4500) 157500 12000 5600 8975 (53500) 7.:50 (4900) 40100 (4050)t (3900) 4230017* 6100v 1 47000 36300P 250300 1 46m (2901 (5800 (4500) (2000) (200) (5600) 6000r 42500) 1945 prices PIan? 121111942 3000 63)0 2800 4900 3300 6500 (50000 (3001 (6300 (2800 )(6500) 1300 (6000) 7000r (46800 in the USSR) 1949, pp. 15, 38. emy ekonomik 1937 No 5-6, P. 190. Cf. note 18 to this table for details. Five ,Year Plan Period. The 6488 figure excludes extra-limit investments. Id, 10-1?nmnuna_ltnopp khoziaistvo (Finanz.,.nv the hous.n- -Communal .L.,conomy), , (40400 (3600 (8100 (3600 (8500) (4400) (6700 (9500) 57600) 14. f 14 04,7300), (5001 (9900 (4400 (10000) 5000 (8800 (12200) (69100) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 (6600) (10700) (5700) (11600) (5500) (10700) (14400) '(85000) le ' Jost Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? NOTES TO TABLE XII / Notes 147 are to indicated parts of the table) Page ? 1. The branches of the economy covered are "principal" in the sense that a number of minor branches for which data exist have been estimated. (For these branches, cf. lotsialistichesl_titel'stvo,.... 1936, p. 388-389; =no, pp. 4680 469, 476-4,pp. 512, 52l-523). On the other hand, there are major branches which could not be included for lack of data. ? The table, further, contains many ambiguities in the branch of indus- try break-down. In particulars a. Whether the data refer to ministries or to genuine branches is frequently unknown; b. Whether the branch includes or excludes nonproductive in- vestments is frequently unknown (though nonproductive investments are included in the 1223 Plan & 1916 Plan data); c. What the coverage of the branch is and whether branch cover- age over time is constant are unknown. d. Highly conjectural estimates have been employed particularly for the pos.-war years. Accordingly, the present table should not be used for anything but an indication of the most gross orders of magnitude. It is hoped that an analysis of the data on capital stock, and particularly of annual differences in the capital stock figures, will illuminate the question of the prewar dis- tribution of investments within industry. This will be discussed in a later paper. ? 2. Includes the mining of iron ore. 3. These figures are for the Ministry of Light Industry and include investments in the textile industry and the leather, boot, and shoe'induip. try. The socialitcaltostion_1226 figures (but not the 1935 Plan,? 1226. Plan or Lecor_Alizijs.o...2.11.imisrPlat) include the corresponding branches of the ministries of local industry. It should be noted that only in the case of light industry does the inclusion or exclusion of investments by the ministries of local industry matter much. In 1935 and 19361 Planned investments in the indicated branches by the ministries of local industry were (in millions of rubles): Plan Plan 1935 ? 1936 Heavy Industry 201 ? 393 Timber Industry, 15 37 ? Light Industry 189 341 Food. IndustrY ?47 ? 68 ? (1936 Plan pp. 524-528 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RnPRi_ni nAD- ???? 331 STAT 1 t, ... Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release '::IFZtirpi,V114401010,* 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-,RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - 4., 4 4. These figures are for the Ministry of Food Industry. 5. Includes the cotton, woollen, linen and jersey industries. Page 6. Includes leather shoe, finished leathet leather substitute and tanning industries. .7. Includes shales. 8. The industry estimate is obtained in the following way. Investments: . in the national economy were planned, according to Boltshakov (op. cit,. p. 32) .to be. 38.5 billion rubles. According to table VIII, investments in the national economy were planned to be, 35.76 and investments in industry 17.46. It: is assumed that: (a) Boltshakovls figures are either an earlier version of the plan or, exclUde planned reductions in construction costs; and (b) that industry in .BollshakOv's version represents the same proportion of the total as does industry in table VIII. ' 9. Boltshakov (op. cit.., p..37) states .that investments in housing and: Municipal service construction were planned to be 4.5 billion -rubles. The allocation between housing and municipal services is produced by assuming. the same relative distribution at that planned for 1937. 10. The industry figures' are obtained by assuming that industry repre- sents the same proportion of total investments in each of these years:as'in the plans for these 'years. The Percentages' are 50.6% for 1939 plan and 53.1% for 1940 plan.(cf.:. table VIII). ,11. VOznesensky states that the 30.6 billion rubles planned. for 1941 industry is,71%'above the. 1940 figure. The 1940 industry figure (VOtneienskY,. Groj_git.offin.Prtfilon? pi 33) :is obtained, accordingly, by dividing '30.6 by. 1.7I. 12. The Ministry, of Light Industry for 1941 excludes the textile in- dustry which by 1941 was administered by a separate ministry.' 13. The Ministry of Food Industry. for 1941 excludes the fishing indus- try and the meat and dairy industry which by 1941 were administered by sep- arate ministries. 14. The industry figures are obtained by assuming: (1) that induatrY represents the same proportion of total investments in 1945 Prices as in nricee of the respective years; and (2) that the proportion is the same for actual 1949 as for 1949 plan. The percentages are 70.1% for 1948 and 68.4% for 1949 plan. 15. Group A industry embraces those branches of industry which pri- marily produce producers' goods. The Soviet classification of branches of. industry into groups A and B is as follows: ' BRANCH GROUP bleottic power stations (including transmission lines & substations) A II. Fuel extraction industry (coal, petroleum, peat, shale) A III Iron ore A IV Manganese ore Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 CIA_Rnpszi ? ? STAT nc-.,rawo anura Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1/61,41110, tit r , ,P BRANCH 0 ? - - 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , ?., .1 I .? .41 44?11?1?11.0111111111 S TAT age GROUP V. Ores for the chemical industry A 'VI. Nonmetallic minerals (other than V &Awls) A VII. Lumbering and logging 0 A VIII. Fuel refining 1. Coal-tar chemical industry A 2. Petroleum refining A 3. Production of illuminating gas 0 4. Other refining A IX. Chemicals 1. Chemical-pharmaceutical and photo-chemical in- dustrY 2. Wood pulp chemistry . A 3. Other branches of the chemical industry A X. Production of construction materials (cement, refractory materials, brick, roofing) XI. Glass 1. Production of window, mirror and technical glass A 2. Other glassware xi:, China and Pottery 1. Technical china and sanitation Pottery 2. Chinaware and earthenware (except earthenware Pipe) XIII. Ferrous metallurgy A XIV. Nonferrous mttallurgy A XV. Metalworking industry 1. Machine building A and B 2. Production of metal products A and B 3. Metal repair shops A and B XVI. Production of abrasive, micaceous, and graphitic articles A XVII. Rubber and asbestos A XVIII. Woodworking' 1. Saw mills 2. Plywood 3? Furniture & wooden household implements 4. Production of wooden Parts of transport con- struction A 54, Skis and other Porting equipment 6 Other branches XIX. Matches Paper and cellulose Textile (including jersey and felt) 1 Cotton cleaning A 24. Preliminary working of flax and other bast fibers Wool Wishing A Silk winding A Cotton fabric (except packing & technical cloth) B Linen (exeept packing & teahnical. cloth) Woollen fabric ( except technical cloth) , Hemp & jute A 0. Jersey a. Felt Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 144.4 M.., ? Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release '414: ? ,^ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 u ? age ?V .BRANCH 0291E XXII. .Sewing B XXIII. Leathert.tUr, and shoes 1. Production of leather anciartificial leather 'AH 2. Saddle and harness making A. 3, Luggage and haberdashery articles B 4..,.. :Fur B. 5. ShoeS. Pr AIV. Fats, soaps, and perfumes 14 ' Fats ' A 2 Soaps, perfuthes and coimeticS B XXV. Food ' 1 Alcoholic distillation A 2. Other branches . B XXVI. Salt .B. XXVII. Printing , B XXVIII .MoVies 0; XXIX. Water Supply B XXX. . RefrigeratOr0 XXXI. Preparation of animal teed-. .A 16. Third Five YearrPlan states that Investments in the municipal economy will be 5.650 billion rubles as againat4.806'billion:in'the.Second Five Year Plan (15'.. 136). The. figure for the Second Five Year Plan however, excludes Sava) construction (cf. note 20 to the present table). Conse- quently, it is concluded that the Third Five Year Plan figure for subway .cOnstructiOn of 1.3 billion rubles (Third Five Year Plan, p'. 137).4s in.. addition to the 5,650 billion, .The,totalof 6.950 is presented in the table. It is not known whether the 6.1 billion rubles for Fourth Five Year Plan includes or excludes subway. construction. 17. The figures for housing construction in the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans exelude individual housing construction (Fourth Five Year Plan, Pe 54), part 'of which is aided V loans from the banks for municipal ser- vices and the AgricultUra1 Bank* Ibird Five Year Plan states (p, 137) that the volume of housing con- struction is planned to be,22.1 billion rubles, including investments from the directort! fund. Certainly not all of the difference between the 22.1 and the 15.5 figure can be accounted for by investments from the director's fund. Extra-limit investments as a whole (i.e. for all purposes and from all sources) were planned to be only 30.3 billion rubles (table VII) in 19384942. Parte and possibly a large Part or the difference may be accounted for by capital repairs to housing. Whether the annual figures for housing construction include or exclude individual housing construction is not stated. Sines investment figures are generally for the soeialist sector only, I suspect that Individual hous- ing construction is excluded. In any case, the.inclusion or exclusion of individual housing ,construction does not seem to matter 'much Until the post war period. The value of individually owned housing remained virtually un- changed from 1927 to 1936 'and declined steadily from 1931 to 1936. Thus, Declassified in Part: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: ? ? STAT ??? n - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Page Kobalevskii presents the following data on the value of fixed capital in housing (in billions of 1936 rubles): Collectivized Individually ....1Lousiz_z_. owned housinA 1927 24.6 1929 25.8 9.3 1931 29.4 9.4 1933 35.5 1934 38.3 8.9 . 1935 40.4 8.8 1936 43.0 8.6 (V. L. Kobalevskii, Or anizatsiia I ekonomika zhilishchnogo khoziaistva SSSR Organization and Economics of the USSR Housing Economy - 1940, p. 107 If I can judge from the magnitude of loans to individual for housing construction (note 13, table VIII), individual housing construction continued to be insignificant in the immediately Pre-war period and became significant only in the postwar Period. in the Fourth Five Year Plan, 14% of total hous- ing construction was to be undertaken by individuals. (Maslakov et al, 2p. cit., p. 7); this may be due in part to the activities of collective farm members in reconstructing war damaged housing. 18. Buzin (op. cit., p. 190) presents the following index of capital investments in housing construction (1928 = 100' 1E2 1222 1222 1221 1222 193 4 1935 1936 100 160 244 351 547 607 755 8 4 sTI It is observed that the following ratios obtain in Buzints seriea and in the housing construction figures in the table: From Buzints series From the table 1934 1935 124.4 124.4 1935 1934 111.0 111.6 24 1933 129.6 128 7 From the correspondence between each of these ratios it is concluded that Buzinls index numbers may be used to obtain housing construction figures for 1929-1932 These are(in million of rubles): ad 1222 1221 193 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RnPRi_ni CO4 '0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ownsvg PHrnimm,p7m t 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? .4'41,4 4 "44' I STAT Page 19. The annual housing construction data for 19334937 refer explicitly to urban housing only. By inference, the annual 19294932 data may also be so interpreted. If we total the annual 19334917 housing figures (using 1937 plan and realized 193i-1936 figures) we obtain 9827 million rubles. If we total the annual 19294932 figures, we obtain 3991 million rubles. From table I we know that housing construction was 4640 million rubles in 1928/9-1932 and 12575 million rubles in 1933-1937 including capital repairs. Two exclusions from the annual figures may account for these differences: (a) rural housing; (b) housing repairs. The annual 19334937 figures explicitly exclude housing repairs (table III, note 1). Again by inference, the annual 1929-1932 data may be so inter- preted. The magnitude of capital repairs to housing is stated by Kobalevskii to be (in millions of rubles): Plan. 1924-7 1928-1932 1922 1224 1221 121k 2,23'. 1221 1222 216 440 185 268 335 418 561 686 747 (Kobalevskii, ori. cit., p. 124). If,we add these capital repairs to the housing construction figures, we obtain the following results: Plan 19294932 1222 1934. 12,25, 23.31 1227 1221 1233-1937 Housing Con- struction 3991 1343 1729 1930 2400 2425 9827 Capital Repairs o Housing 440 185 268 335 418 561 1767 Total 4431 1528 1997 2265 2818 2986 11594 Thus, :it wou:d seem that most of the difference between the annual housing corstruction figures, on the one hand, and the 1929-1932 and 1933-1937 totals, on.the 'ether, is accounted for by the exclusion of capital repairs from the former and, the inclusion of capital repairs in the latter. The rest of the difference may be accounted for by the exclusion of rural housing from the annual data. .If so, this implies that rural houaing construction was very small. From the scattered data we have, this seems to be the case. In the Second Five Year Plan, the Ministries of Agriculture and of State Farms were to invest 910 million rubles (in 1933 prices) in housing. In 1935 Plan and 1936 Plan these figures were 157 million rubles and 75 million rubles respectively. (Cf. table XI). In the entire Period 1928-1935, collective farms invested only insignificant sums (no more than 45 million rubles annually) in nonproductive fixed capital as a whole. (Cf. table IV). At least since 1935, the hames of collective farm members were individually owned and, therefore, investments in such housing, would probably .not be reflected in the investment figUres for the socialist'sec tore It is possible, that the Postwar increase in individual housing con . struction reflects in large part the act vities of collective farm members in the restitution of war damaged housing. (Cf. note '17, this table). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 41/ IMITb!cf 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ,j.conClude: (1) that the annual housing construction figures for 1929- . .1937:exclude-capital repairs; (2) that, since repairs arereportio4 - 60ParAtqlY since 1938, the post-4937 annual housing construction figures Aprobably exclude capital repairs; (3) that the 1928/9.4932p 19334937 and 19344938 figuresjnelude capital repairs; (4) that the planned 1938.4942 housing construction figure may capital.repairs:(e. note 17 to the present table);. (5) that'the4olanned 1946-1950 housing construction figure .probablyexc1Udes capital repairs tines centraliieciinvesttenta only are. covered; (6) that annual housing construction 'figures for 19294937 ex- clude'ilpdthe 1928/9-1932 and 19334937 totals include. collectively oWned. . rural housing; (7) that all the data in the present table exclude,individ- Ually owned' housing construction. Whether the post4937'figures include or exclude collectively owned rural housing construction is not known. 'By historical analogy, the Third and Fourth Five Year Plan fieures probably do include such investments. .Much'of this it, Again, conjectural. 20 capital investments in branches of the municipal economr(k mmunallnoe khoZiaiStvo) were in millions of rubles: Realized Plan Plan ] 28 1 2 1233 Socialist (135 '11.,91b Construe,. Plan Plan tion l93- ', 13.135) aelease,.....?????????????????110,10 p.494) pp.540- 543) .1.11rOMVSNIINI..10 Subway construction 42 Trolley system 321 102 162 Land transport 100 42 Water supply 300 205 291 Sewage systan 152 86 City sanitation 19 17 Bath houses& laundries 119 54 58 251 Electric power sta- tions 4!c trans- mission 183 74 122 426 Gas works 36 11 48 Roads & bridges 314 194 328 1313 Other branches 374 _JP_ .122. 566. Realized 1933-137 Socialist Construe- tion 1 210 P?135 1681 641 253 856 ) 347 ) 105 Total Plan 1946490 Maslakov et al, 91451, AP? 7-8) 845 1777 945 912 1960 ?875 3302 6487 ?6100 ? The 1933-1937 total is stated to be exclusive of extra-limit investments. The 1928/9-1932 and 1933-1937 totals are stated to be in "the system of the Ministries of the 'Communal Economy". The planned 1935 and 1936 totals are stated to be investments "by the Republics". It is presumed that the 1935 and 1936 figures exclude investments by economic enterprises and/or ministries in the municipal economy. It is presumed, also, that the planned 1935 and 1936 totals exclude subway construction because subway construction appears to be ander separate (i.e. non-Republic) jurisdiction. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RnPRi_ninzle2Drmnann4n?,,, STP ? AtQlru.' ?ffi leo in Hart - Sanitized Copy A , ? lres1rrr. proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-6 J t. /?? ? Page "PI .It is of interest to note that in 1935 Moscow alone was to account for. 185 million rubles, in 1936 Moscow was to account for 350 million rubles, and in 1935 Moscow, Leningrad, Eiciv, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk were to account for 380 million rubles. (1933 Plan, p. 494; 19,6 Plan, Op. 54043). The point, of mentioning theee investments is to. indicate the kinds of. :expandituree:embraced by investments in "municipal services". 21. .Kantor presents the following investment data by branch of industry (in millions Of rubles): Electric power stations 1081 1245 Ferrous metallurgy 1210 1326 Timber industry 701 688 Construction materials industry 255 474 Textile industry 1003 1040 Light industry 436 451 Food industry 1054 1292 Meat and dairy industry 409 470 Fishing industry 242 340 (Osnovnyefondroshier_Limlf_.zoildvanie, p 69). ? In addition, Kantor presents expenditures on capital repairs in millions of rubles and as percentages of total investments in various branches of in- dustrY as follows: EIRIng.tPres 911...gimitallgALEP gmilial_ilysAatul 1938 1939 Millions Percentage Millions Percentage 1938 1939 , of of total of of total rubles' investments rubles investments Coal ,industry 224.5 9.6 166.7 10.9 2339 1529 Petroleum industry 154.1. 10.7 1440 Ferrous metallurgy226.8 ? 18.7''"273.7 4.0 ?1213 ?1369 Construction materials ind. 35.9 ?14.1 97.5 20.6 255 ?473 Timber Industry. 92.2 ?13.2 121.1 17.6' 699 688 Textile industry, 188.2 18.7 233.1 ?22.4 1006 1042 Light industry 58.3 ?13.4 734 162 Fishing industry. 22.0 9.1 54:9 16.2 1264; 3119' - Meat & dairy ind. 49.7 12.1 ? 74.1 15.8 411 469 Food industry 138.3 13.1 1844 14.3' 1056 ? 1287 Since, the investment figures obtained from the capital repair data checks roughly with the first investment series, we use the former for branches of ? industry not covered 'by the investment series -- namely the coal and petroleum ? industries. Declassified in art - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 5O-Yr 2O3/Qq/ .r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for RelealSgly!-------20-1-3-109706 : CIA-RDp81-01043R002500190002-8 VrtltZ 4,7174,24rv, MiTkl4AAMNIMMI1+01.4inim, / Page ? 22. For the postwar years we have the following data on capital in- vestments in the national economy, the figure for each year expressed as a percentage of the figure for the preceding year: 124. 1247 lig 1241 19 Volume of capital work in the national ? economy 117 110 123 . 120 123 Coal industry 120 109 129 Coal and petroleum industries 122 115 Electric power stations 110 104 120 139 132 Metallurgical industry 116 ,131 118 116 Machine construction 112 115 110 109 Light and food industry 167 130 132 110 Food industry 121 Transport 114 108 111 132 122 Housing construction 155 136 126 118 (I. Nueminov, "Continuous Growth of the National Economy of the USSR - A Law. of Socialism", Voprosy ekonomiki 1951 No 6, p. 33). In view of the paucity of postwar information about the Soviet economy. I find irresistable the temptation to use these percentages along with rash estimates and heroic assumptions in order to arrive at rough ordered' magni- tude for investments in the indicated branches. Accordingly, let us use the following assumptions, estimates and bits of evidence: a. Since the percentages for total investments are described as the "volume of capital work" and since 1945 prices were estimate prices for the Fourth Five Year Plan period (until 1949), it is reasonable to suppose that the percentages are comparisons in 1945 Prices* (On the meaning of the "volume of capital work" cf. above, pp. 3.5, and table VI, note 1. On esti- mate prices, cf. above, PP. 4-5). There are four observations which tend to confirm this assumption: 1) Some of the percentages are explicitly stated to be comparisons in =parable prices. (Cf., for example, A. Korobov, "Capital Construction in the Third Decisive Year of the Post-War Five Year Plan", Planovoe Khoziaistvo, 1948 No. 3, P. 140 2) There is no correspondence between these percentages and the Percentages computed for 'investments in current.prices (Cf. table VI note 3) On the assumption that thesa percaltages are comparisons in 1945 prices, I calculated an index of annual price changes for 194671950 (table VI, note 1) which, is in accord With what we }chow or independent grounds about the direction of price changes. 4) A comparison of total investments for 19464950 obtained from these percentages and 1945 realized investments, with planned Fourth Five Year Plan Investments (which are in 1945 prices) results in a ratio virtually identical with the ratio stated for the fulfillment of the Fourth Five Year Plan investments (cf. below this note, paragraph Since the percentages for the indicated branches are explicitly stated as components of the percentages for total investments, it is 'reason- able to assume that all Percentages are comparisons in 1945 prices. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CJA-RflPi ?7171771,', STAT \ on: V ? 01, ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 1/.144017,01*AILI 11,,ifvv!..1,0f,Orooturrev;j40tforr.VratolvV,,,,thi..."44,,,,, ?,. ' ? ' ??-???-??t,???-????????../1?''''' - ? - Trp, 11 14? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 6 6 ? Fags 205 b. We know the planned 1947 investments in certain 'branehes .(in 1945 prices). I assume that the actual 1947 investments, except for metallurgical .industry, equalled planned 1947 investments. c. Investments in nonferrous metallurgy for 194671950 were planned to be,12 billion rubles. (Narodnoe khoziaistvoi volume lp p 341). I assume that realized investments in 1946 were roughly .1/6 of the five year plan total or 2 billion rubles. The 1/6 figure arises from a comparison of the 44 bil- 1i of realized.investmentsin1946 with the total planned Investments. for 194650 of 250 billion (table I). On the basis of the Planned 1947 figure for Investments in ferrous metallurgy, (4.9 billion rubles) T assume that the realized investments in 1946 were about 4.5 billion rubles. This yields 4 total of 6.5 billion rubles for ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy in 1946. I..aseuhe, further..that realized investments in 1947 .inferrous and nonferrous metallurgy were about the same as in 1946 namely about- ,6..billion rubles.. This is based on the beliefthatthereason for excludingHeyen a percentage figure for the metallurgical industry in:1947 was poor Performance in that year. d. The percentages forJ,he,coal industry extend only through 1948;: in 1949 and 1950 the percentages are stated to refer to the coal and petroleum industries together. It 10 observed, however, that the report on plan ful- fillment for: the first 9 months of 1949 gave a percentage of 122% (Of the first 9 months of 1948) for Investments in the coal industry. It is observed, further, that the percentages reported fort the first :3 months 'and the first &months:Of 1949 were 123 and 125% rpspectively, (Narodhoe khoziastvovvolume 3. pp.. 419. 427, 434). I assume, therefore, that the 122% figure for the 1949 coal and petroleum industries combined applies alsoto each separately. ? e. It is stated that for the first 9 months of 1950 in comparison with the first 9 Months of 1949, the volume of capital Investments for thS national , ? ecOnOMy as a whole was 125%,, including 114% in metallurgical industry, 108% .in coal industry, petroleum industry, , 134 In electric power stations, ? 11i:. in machine construction, 113 in lightand'foodinduetry,J25% 1a:trans.- :port, and. .120%,.:inhoUsing:Construction (B. Sokolov, "Certain Questions in .the'140nOMice of Capital ConstructiOn"..:VonrOsY:ekonothiki4 1950 No. 10, p, 17). I assume that the percentage figures for the coal and Petmleum indus- tries hold for the entire year. It should be observed that if we use these percentages and eomPare the combined coal and petroleum industries figure for 1950 with that for 1949 we obtain 114.7% as against the 115% figure stated for 1950 (cf. tables below, this note). In the absence of other information I must assume, also, that the 1291; figure for the 1948 coal industry holds also for the 1948 Petroleum industrY if even rough orders of magnitude for investments in the petroleum industry are to be obtained. There are some indications that this assumPtion maY not be far off. In addition to the general consistency of the results (mentioned in the paragraph above), we know that the annual percentage changes in coal and petroleum output were as follows (in percentages of .the previous ytar). Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 6.61 STAT ii "".7 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ) ? r. . 50-Yr 2013/09/06,: CIA-RDP81-01043R0025001.9000i-r t##,'7011 1, Page 20 2s2 192 Coal output 114 113 111 Petroleum output 113 114 113 (Kuzminov, op. cit, p. 30). The 1.950 .disparity in coal and petroleum in- . vestment percentages would presumably not be clearly seen in output per- centages until 1951. f. We have no percentage for investments in the light and food indus- tries for 1949. It is observed, however, that: (1) the percentage for the food industry alone was 121% in 1949; (2) the percentages for the light and food industries in the plan fulfillment reports of the first 3 months, the first 6 months and the first 9 months of 1949 were, respectively, 127%, 116:4, 113 (each as a percentage of the corresponding period in 1948).' (Yarodnoe khoziaistvo, volume 3, PP. 419, 427, 434). I assume, therefore, that the separation of the food industry was due to a lower percentage (and, perhaps, poor performance) for the light industry and that the 1939 figure for the food and light industries combined was the same as the figure for the first nine months of 1949 -- namely, 113%. g. I. assume that the percentage changes in railroad transport invest- ments are the same as those given for transport (which is, presumahlY, all transport). Since investments in railroad transport have been at least 2/3 of investments in total transport during the entire Period since 1928 (note 23 to this table; and table I, note 6) and were probably greater in the Fourth Five Year Plan (table I, note 6), this assumption could not be far off. h. We have a 1946 and 1947 realized. figure for housing construction, from Arkadlev (Op. cit, p. 38). These are .6 billion rubles for 1946, and' 7 billion rubles for 1947. .It LI not stated whether these are in 1945 prices' or in current Prices. '1 will assUme that they are in 1945 Prices; if .they, are in current Prices one should 'reduce the 1946 figure by, perhaps 5% and the 1947.figure by, perhaPs, 10-15%. (These are Toughly the price changes for'all Investment goods implied by:the calculations in note 1 to table i. There has been no hint of the magnitude of investments in ,machine construction for any postwar year. . The percentages for investments in mach-' the construction, 'therefore, cannot 'be used with any Confidence. One. might assume that the 1941 plan relationship between investments in machine cop . Struction .and. in ferrous 'metallurgy holds also for ,the 1947 plan. It looks as if this would be a conservative Assumption since in all years prior to -1941 for which we have data the ,ratio is greater than the 1941 'ratio of' 83% and Since 1941 was undoubtedly a year in which much. iron and steel outPUt went into munitions. case, ,on this. assumption, investments in machine construction *Nld?he 4100 million rubles for 1947 plan. If we .also assume that realized inYebalenta in machine construction for 1947 were 41000 million, rubles and that this also was the' magnitude of 1946 investments ,(because no. percentage' Is given for 1947 except for the first quarter figure of:112% -- Narodnoe khoiiaistvo'Volume 1, p. 42$) we obtain the following results ./.6r Investments in Machine construction (in millions of rubles): : , , 12.46 1247. 124a 0 3600 4000 4000 4600 100 5600 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: tg STAT - ' Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy A proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 MM4r4irrr STA ? These estimates, however, are so tenuous -- even in comparison with others in the table -- that they have been omitted from the table. j. We obtain investments in the national economy (in 1945 prices) directly by beginning with the realized 1945 figure and applying the annual percentages. It should be noted that the results of this calculation, totalled for 1946-1950, ire 301 billion rubles (cf. table below). This is 12W of the Fourth Five Year Plan figlre of 250.3 billion rubles. The inter- esting point is that Pravda (April 17, 1951, pa 2) stated that the Fourth Five Year Plan with respect to capital investments was overfulfilled by 221. I take this to be a confirmation of the reliability of my calculation and of my interpretation that the percentages given by Soviet sources are comparisons in 1945 prices. Let us tabulate the figures obtained by these assumptions and e timates and the percentages given by Soviet sources: lions of rubles \ I Total National Economy 36,300 Coal Industry Petroleum Industry Electric Power Stations Metallurgical Industry Machine Construction Light and Food Industry. Railroad Transport Housing Construction 117 110 6300 2800 Thus, I estimate the amounts invested in the indicated branches to be (in millions of rubles): 1946 124. Total National Economy 36300 42500 46800 57600 Coal Industry. 4800 5800 6300 8100 Petroleum Industry 2800 3600 Electric Power Stations 2600 2900 3000 3600 Metallurgical Industry 5600 6500 6500 8500 Machine Construction. 3600 4000 4000 4600 Light and Food Industry 1500 2500 3300 4400 Railroad Transport 4900 5600 6000 6700 Housing Construction 3900 6000 7000 9500 The highly conjectural nature of these estimates must be re-emphasized. In particular it should be noted that: (a) whether the data refer to,minia- tries or to genuine branches is unknown; (b) whether the branch includes or excluder nonproductive investments is unknown; (c) what is covered by light and food industry is unknown; (d) whether the branch coverage over time is constant is unknown. In addition, ,and,post importantly, the dependence of the estimates on doubtful ruble figures for a single year makes the esti- mates tenuous indeed. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy A?proved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06 ? CIA RDP81 01n41Rnnnni annno f t Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release Sr, 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 PM 46.4,???14??????,i??????. ???,?**????????,....4.4.1.?????1?106???14 .???? ? ? .4.4.4 WW...4..14?1 ??? 1. won ? 4r ? .??????. ? ?? ?To n??? 4? ,44?11 11,r.??????,????,, ? ? ? ? Page 23. Time trends in the relative importance of various branches mai be of interest. Accordingly, this note will present time series of: (a) housing as a percentage of total investment; (b) railroad transport_as_per- centages Of total transport, of total investment, And of industry; (C).group- A industry as a percentage of industry; and' (d) the various branches of in.- dustry as a percentage of total industry. These percentages are computed from the present table only. Thus, wherever possible, the numerator comes from the Same source as the. denominator 'even where the numerator is known to be incomplete. For example, the industry figure for a particular-year will come from the same source as the coalindustry figure, wherever possible., This Is. on the grounds that if an increment must be' added to the industry figure to make it complete, it is likely that Some portior(of:the increment must be added' also to the coal industry. Since the latter portion is unknown .it seemed preferable to stick to ,sources which contained even incomplete :fig- ures for both the numerator and denominator. The percentages are aa follows: ) UoRsing_mercentage_g_tpAa1 investment Total Investments 1929 8.8 1930 8.2 1931 7.4 1932 8.2 Plan 1933-37 10.1 1933 8.0 1934 7.9 Plan 1935 8.1 1935 7.8 Plan 1936 9.5 Preliminary 1936 7.6 Plan 1937 7.4 1933-37 9.1 1934-38 Plan 1938-42 8 2 Plan 1938 6.9 1938 1939 1940 8.4 Plan 1941 8.6 1945 10.7 Plan 1946-50 16.9 1946 14.1 1947 15.0 1948 16.5 1949, 17.7 ? 1950 16.9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-0104nRnn9nniannno I ? STK 1 ? * Aq't Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190062-8 4 Irmoro;i1ow .1 Z64 ...".4L.4.a.??*???1" HowINJoa.k. FrYtIWII (b) Railroad transport as percentages of total transport, of total investment dnd of indust Page 209 Railroad Rai1ro4d Railroad Total Investments Transport Industry 1929 15.0 74.0 33 4 1930 11.7 S 67.0 27.0 1931 12.6 70.9 25.8 1932 13.3 74.0 24.6 Plan 1933-37 13.0 65.9 25.0 1933 12.5 68.3 23.8 1934 13.4 66.6 27.6 Plan 1935 15.5 70.4 31.5 1935 15.2 68.8 29.9 Plan 1936 14.7 67.4 34.1 Preliminary 1936 13.9 64.0 31.1 Plan 1937 16.3 72.2 38.2 1933-37 12.4 67.2 26.0 1934-38 12.7 67.6 26.9 Plan 1938-42 12.9 67.7 26.6 Plan 1938 13.0 26.6 1938 1939 1940 Plan 1941 12.8 81.9 2; 8 1945 13.5 Plan 1946-50 16.0 75.0 25.5 1946 13.2 ... 1947 12.8 1948 11.6 16.6 1949 12.7 18.6 1950 12.6 (c) Group A indus ri as a percentage of,industa. gmal Industry 1929 81.3 1930 83.3 1931 87.9 1932 87.0 Plan 1933-37 76.8 1933 83.5 1934 81.8 Plan 1935 81.8 1935 83.8 . Plan 1936 76.3 Preliminary 1936 80.7 Plan 1937 78.4 1933-37 83.0 1934-38 83.3 Plan 193842 84.1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-A , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 The various branches of industry as aerp*.tage of total industry. Electric Power Coe' Petroleum Industry Industry Industry 1929 9.6 8.8 9.5 1930- 9.6 7.5 8.5 1931 7.4 8.1 5.6 1932 6.9 7.5 4.3 Plan 1933-37 7.7 5.0 6.8 1933 6.9 6.3 5.4 1934 6.0 5.6 6.6 Plan 1935 6.9 5.1 7.0 1935 - Plan 1936 7.0 3.6 7.2 Preliminary 1936 Plan 1937 1933-37 1934-38 Plan 1938-42 Plan 1938 6.6 5.5 6.1 1938 ? 6.3 13.7 - 1939 7.2 8.8 8.3 1940 5.6 13.4 Plan 1941 5.4 6.1 10.8 1945 - - Plan 1946-50 1946 1947 1948 8.9 20.0 8.9 1949 10.6 20.9 9.3 1950 - Ferrous Metallurse Industry Nonferrous achine Chemicals Light (Electric power Met a11ur u1ding 4E: Food -i- coal t Industry Industry Industry Industry -- petroleum -t-ferrous metal -t-non-n metal) 10.1 3.5 10.2 3.6 11.3 4.3 AIM 11.6 5.2 13.4 5.5 11.6 6.9 19.5 4.6 17.2 4.4 12.7 7.0 19.2 8.5 -- 7.5 7.9 14.0 11.0 4.5 7.1 7.6- 12.5 9.9 21.0 2S.:1 MEMO. ???? OK% .11?MI OMO 12.4 8.2 ? ? 11??? 4.3 - 18.2 14.3 9.3 9.8 13.7 14.9 12.5 12.5 18.0 17.1 OM. 8.7 1.7 4.1.5 39.4 36.7 37.5 38.4 42.7 39.8 38.7 33.2 IMO 38.1 -10.9 10.6 58.8 61.9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Contra- lized Invest- ments Extra- Invest meats Total ?Investmants Exclusive of Collective Farm Invest-. merits from Own Resources P?riods 19257.5;1F7/8 ? 1928/9-1932 1929-1933 1933-1937 19344938 Plan 19384942 19384940 July, 19414une, 1945 Plan 1946-1950 years 1923-1924 1924-1925 1925-1926 Oct. lo 1926-be 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Plan 1938 1938 Plan 1939 1939 Plan 1940 1940 Plan 1941 1941 1942 1943 Plan 1944 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 Plan 1949 1949 1950 Plan 1951 1936-7 prices 1936.77 Prices 1936-7 prices 1936-7 prices 1936-7 Prices 1936-7 prices 1936-7 Prices 1936-7 prices 26.56 29.38 29.28 34.7d 29.38 36.id 326 47i 25.48 18.6d 19.5d (26.2)d 29.0d (53.1)? 66.2d nem, n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n. a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.98 3.0e 6.5b 6.5e 7.5e (5)0 (4.8)? 68 8.90 1 (5 e (0 0 (00 (00 (0)e (0)0 (6.5_) (8)e (12)8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n e nee. n.a. n.a. 29.58 35.8d 35.7d 42.2g (34.3)d 40.9g 38d 55?96 (30.4) d 18.68 19.5 g (26.2)d 2.9.06 36,3g 0.7g 61.1 g 78.2g 105?5d (112.0)., (129.7),u 135.7u n.a. n.a. nee. 9.495? I5.11AD 19.35ib 18.1e 23.5e 27.2? 3515C 33.2? 40.88 40.7g 48.0g 40.16 47.58 44.66 63.28 34.48 20.18 21.58 31?26 3440g 4338 70.0 g 72.7g 92.26 126.5g 133.0g 155.7g 165.1g ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Deaassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 w , 0 cit) ????? NOTES TO TABLE XIII . V11,.. ? Aa6V 0.4.46 1. "Total investments" (column (7) ) exclude the following categories of investments: a. Labor participation in roadbuilding, which averaged about .9 billion rubles annually in the period 1933-1938 (Table I). No more recent data is available. b, Labor contributions in kind to collective farmst investments from their own resources, which seem to be about 30% of money investments in the 1933-1940 period. No data is available for the postwar period except indications that labor contributions in kind are important for the agricultural aspects of the new power projects. ( Cf. Table VIII, note 11.) Labor corltfibutions in kind are excluded from the annual figures since 1932 (Cf. Table VIII, note 9). c. Investments in the private sector of the economy. In the 1923/4- 1927/1 period, investments in the private sector were about 40% reater than in the socialist sector. In the 1928/9-1932 period, investments in the private sector were about 14% of investments in the socialist sector. After the First Five Year Plan, investments in the private sector apparently were, in the aggregate, relativeiy insiEnificant. Thus, we haw. the following data on the percentage distribution of mductive fixed capital by property ownership: 1628 1. 1, dustr Agri- culture Total National Econor- Indust Agri- culture Total National EconoHr . 1. Socialist property (including collectiv farrns and co-opera- . tives) 97.9 63.6 77.8 99.95 96.3 98.7. 2. Individual propert) of collective farm members ? 0.1 - 3.1 1.1 3. Private property of individual peas- ants and artisans 2.0 31'9 19.6 0.05 0.6 0.2. 4. Capitalistic (i.e. labor-employing) private property 0.1 4.4 2.6 - - Total 100 100 100 '100 100 100 The main components of private investment since 1932 were: 1) Investments in the collective farm homesteads.- Agricultural pro.. duction in the individual homesteads seems to.be extremely labor-intensive.. Fro z' this and from the data on bank loans to collective farmers (Table VII, note 12)1 I judge that private irbney investents in individual homettead6. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06 : CIA-RDP81-0104nPnn9cnniannnn 0 2: I, 101,1 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ? 4.1,^....41,Ittryt,ry.t,tHitt?0.04,Kttrt14,t010,14040ttuirctr,41011.ray,..,tiontk4,11,,,,,,to. t/....1.1toolosof `.**,t*A- **tht**-8--t.tt.4,9..*A*Ittldt. , . . t ? KkLv.. N .00000 4. .1 7,7 Table XIV: C sormi?????????????????.????*????????????????????????.???????????..mommusramomrso.........? +01.11001.***????????????111.1....***?~10140~.11110. At?.****4.0?????????????????/***********.*** Periods Prices 1923/44927/8 1928/94932 1929-1913 ? 1933*-1937 ? 1934-1938 ? :Plan 19384942 Plan' 1 6.4. 0 400211,V0 1923-1924. 1924-1925 1925-1926 Oot. 1, 1926.. Dec. 31,1927 1928 .1929 1930 1931 1932 1934 1935 1936 1937 Plan 1938: 1938 ?Plan 1939 Plan 1940 Plan 1941 Plan 1944 948 Ian 1949 ? ?, al Investments by Sectors of the Sot:Jane,: (in billions of rubles; in prices of the respective years except where otherwise noted) Social- cultural services admin Indust r (1) riculture Exclusive of coll- ective farms (2) in 1936-7 prices in 1 4 .rices 1936-37 prices 1936-37 Prices 1936-37 price a 1936=.37 prices 1936-37 prices 4 9a 244898 -31;458a 65.763 a 72.948a 103.5808 5 a 1 .355b .972 u 1.7601) 1.8eob 2.165? 7 407 ? 10.431 b 9.890? 11.868? 13.024 15.969 e 15.012? 17.46 d 17.07d 17.59, 19.19 27?48d 1526.d 4639d 72123d n.a. 9.60.7a 396a 16.7608 17.714a 18.000a a 1 ? ? n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. t 2.420f ? 3.260? 3.306b ? 2.4? 2.972 2.993c 3.884? 4.144? 2.47 3.449,d ?1.5r 1.23 " 1.06 d ? 4.32 9,21d? Collective farms (3) Total (4) - (3)+(2) n.a.? ?1.126e 13.1.40e. 15.452 e 24e 86 n.a? n. a. il?as n.a. 11949 n.a. ? .170? 35e. .515e ((,11.127: 2.1 e (2.6)_a 3.1 e (3.9) e (5,5)g (6 yd n.a. n (8) a (10) g ? 0.7a 10.813' .15..086f 30.160r 33.166f 42f 7 f Trans (5) 2.7a 8.933a 25.4na 29.019a 35.826 a a Commun- ications (6) '0 la 565 a 759a 3436a 1.510a ?1.7488' Trade and Procurement (7) 9438 1.258a 3.245a 3.7698. 2.563a 25:Ta 2. 1 (8) a 5.585a 7?064a 24;97b a. 30.188a 26.583a Tota1 9 ( IC (6 + +8 1l.'1'? 51.62. 70.3W 191) 170.6 212.3 2* 1 STAT ? =661) .07112 ?126b 213b .384, .ao4 D 2?590b, 3.645 ! 3.8211 3.795 fa, 4.672 5.093f. 6.484L 7.246f 6 37f 7134V, 6.29 6.73 7.36f 1.10d' 12.32 f 19.21 f 2114b .019 ? 0.2.1 ? On .523? tu. .272, .043 b .860 b ? .905,1! 5054!! 1.179 ? 1?660b .123? 2.694 b .1841j 3?472 b ?186b 3.02.5 ? .202? 4'250 .278?? 5.455? .300e 6.9170 .310 5.774 246P 6.82u 6.623 e .376 Table 1. ? Table II and note 8. Cooperative farm investments from own resourcea are included in column ( ? Table V. ? Table II:. Table Tr/ and note 90 The sum of indicated components. Assumed to be the same as the realized figure. from Table VII for the given year. . Not applicable because the total refers only, to budget-financed centralized investments. e notation, "flea.", denotes "not applicable"; a dash denotes "not available. ? ? 06774'5981 .260,? ? 351 b 024853 4626 cece .913 .66 d ? .763cl ,49d 37a .51 d ??16d? ,84d? .327 ti! :.445. ? 7D912 .8o1b i.002b 1.0041f 1.311? 1.606b 2.404 c 3.443 C 4.866? 70374 7.109?' 8.35d 7.414d 10.10d 9.90d 8.01 i? ? 3.184. 5.61 d 9.57d ? 1 1.210, 2 13aL 3.663 4.089, 5.805L 9?665ta 1.5.501L 19 ? 867 f 19.544g 24.997! ? 29.300; 38.100! ? 36. 300 394.66f 39. 60 fH 43. 39?43f- 41.63r 52.57 5 ? 20'79 ? 74.16 f 115?5 vduet (10) 44',].' .0 .49 3.6 .8 6 r.? 39s8;. 0 45.0.? 6 47.8 52.5 50.6 47.5 44.5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release - 4, I 1923/4-1950 ? 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 - ' ? Vall??? 440???????????????.????????mowrono.......7r. AL riculture 6.3 20.9 21.4 20.0 19.4 19.8 1 6.5 5.9 5.9 5.8 9.4 14.5 26.8 23.5 19.2 19.4 18.7 17.4 17.0 20.0 16.1 18.6 iL A 1011V 16.2 14.0 5.3 16.6 16.6 in % f total Transport Commun- ications (12) (13) 24.3 17.3 16.9 16.8 17.0 16.9 18.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 .9 .9 .8 24.9 22.5 1.6 24.5 1.0 23.5 1.2 22.1 1.3 20.3 1.2 17.2 1.3 17.4 1.2 17.5 1.0 15.4 1.0 17.0 1.1 18.6 1.0 18.2 .8 rf J. ? Trade and procurement 3ocial- cultural services & Admin. (14) (15) 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.2 24:3 10.8 10.0 16.6 17.7 12.5 Total {. 11 II +(12)t 13 14)4. (15L 100 .4. 100 100 100 100 100 27.4 3.3 2.4 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.7 2.5 1.7 1.9 1.2 .9 1.0 .8 1.1 .9 27.0 20.8 19.4 19.6 17.3 10.4 8.5 8.1 12.3 13.8 16.6 19.4 19.6 21.1 18.7 25.6 23.8 15.2 15.' 7.6 8.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100. .100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ? Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R00250019nnn9_R ? ":17, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A proved for Release 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Pa 215 NOTES TO TAI1E XIV STAT 1. It is assumed that the major portion of what I ha called called_"extra,. sector investments" is placed in the approprite sector 1,y the 3oviot sector f;reakdown.( XI, notes 20 .d 21). Nonproductive irlvestmantS by econonic ozminizaions, however, remain witIln thv eco:lomic sector in which the organiza- tiontion falls (Table XII, note 1).. Me coverage of the sectors vay suwarized as follows: . a. "Industry" includes mining, manufactur.:ne, and mcst t?lectrIc power stdations. Municipal electric power stations are included in "Social-Cultural 3,,.rvices and Administration"; rural electric powea ntations are included in "Agriculture." "ALfriculture" includes state farms, collective farms, mnchine. trP.ctor stations, and such oneralized agricultural invest,ments and land improvement measures. c. "Transport" includes railroad, watr-, land and air transrortation. Urban troLley systems and subways are included in "social-cultural services and adthristration." The construction of natio:.ally Lapert.ant reals is iacl44ed in "tra,isport"; t.nc construction of local roads 13 included in "social-oultral serces and athrinistration." d. "Con-nunications" includes mail telephone, telegaph, and raio. Q. "Tre &,(.1 Procurement" includes retail trade and ,"wholesale" procrement orl:xizations. f. "SocialCultural and "Administration" includes: Housing; 4. Education and public health; 3. Municipal services, which in turn :includes subwayS and trolley ? . nnmicipal land transport, water supply., sdwagesystersi sanitatior: . bat'. 1,6uses hnd laundries,.mnicipal electric pOwer,stations.,....gas-vorks:4. and local ads and bridges; .4. AdMinistration and the-alitary.establ.ishment.. .?(CC:....Table:I?. note .1;.. :Mao, II, note. 1; Ta1le'III4 note:3; Table.IV,?notcs and.?7;:..able.. VIII note- .6;- Table IX,:notes-3 ad ? 4; faole X, .note224fTabi .note 20.) -? . ?2. . The magnitudes and: kinds of. invsstmetts-excluded bra downs are as f011oWs:(from-Tables'.X.III? and 'XIV);. 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 'tft Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy ,A proved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 , . , . ? ?, i?_????? ? ?I " 4.0 :. F.,,..tittsior.s no ? . percent of Amount . tot R1 (frol in1..illiot...s o: ..-cubl??,)_Table XIV') 192V24-1927/28 1923/294932 1929-1933 1933-1937 193k -19: PlAZI 1932-1 942 , )1 L 19264950 89 2 1C01 ? . 19244925 0 0 0 0 20.9 t ??? 4?????????? STAT Page 216 Kind 1?4??????????.?????? 4???????????, ??? h &trR.-lirdt,invest- Capitll repirz. Extra-limit invest-. ;lents & capital repairs. ?NI 1 01 r? 3924 ", October 1, 1.94c - Decr,iber 31 1927 0 15'28 0 1929 0 193C 1931 0 19,2 0 1933 0 1934 0 1935 0 1937 0 91111 Plan 193i 5.0 11.2 Capital repai:s ? 1933 5.0 11.2 Capital repairs 1.),,A, 1939 13. 25.2 11xtr:., -limit invest- ments & capital repaiya. Keel 1940 11.4 21.5 Rictra -limit invest- ments capital rephIrs. Plan 1941 16.9 24.3 invast- -into Plan 1949 ments, capital rePaimi, ad investxents in Republics. n 0 7:tra-1.1:ait, invest- 1.1 ments cap. .a1 repairs. 21.0 15.4 Capital repairs. 3. Despite the 'exclusions mentioned in note 2, the sectorrbreakdovills present table, as percentages, are taken to be representaitve ?of the 5':4ctor breakdodns of total' investments. The Rssumption is. that the incluzi.5n excision of extra-111dt Investments and capital repairs has virtual-1y- no . , efttec,t ont'ne percentat:e breakdown by sectors. (Cf. Table VII, notes 2.d ?, 'for the vider.oe on which this assumption is based.) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043406256016666:6' .11) 00111110 016%114 Table xv: Capital Investments by sectors of the Socialist Economy, 1923/44950 (Nonproductive 'investments eliminated from economid Billions of :rubles; in prices of respective years except where otherwise noted 1 Social- Communi- Trade and cultural cations _procurement & admin. 1923/4-1927/8 1928/9-19p 1933-1937 Plan 19384942 1936-7 prices Plan 19464950 - 1945 ...icee Years 1924-1925 1925-1926 Oct 1926- Dec. 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931' 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 937 /15J1 1938 938 Plan 1939 Plan 1940 Plan 1940 1936-7 priCes 1936-7 Prices 19)6-/ prices 1936-7 Pl'ices 1936-7 prices 1.553 1.687 2.308 3.507 6.341 8.794 8.207 9.921 11.305 134701 12.880 14.98 1 14-650 . ; 15409 16.47 23.58 16e65 57.06 .068 .272 .120 ?523 .201.8C8C .364 .9 .808 1.179 .070 2.309 1.660 .123 3.353 2.694 .184 3.466 3,472 .186 3.503 2.825 .189 4.254 3.982 .261 4.783 4.948 .281 6.336 6.398 .294 72088 s-..5.4341 2228.) 6.28 7.218 6.126 6.23 4.59 6.68 7.32 11.97 18.47 .G78. .928 3.663 065 1.014 4.0a9 .099. 1.341 5.805 .174 1.892 9.665 260' ?2.669 15.501 .351L 3.598 19.867 217 4.603 19.544 .443, 6.136 24.997 .522, 7.461 29.300 .957 10.414 38.1.00 .835 9.928 36.300 .60 11.49 39.66 .698' 10.552 39.600 45 13.07 39.43 4 13.1.141.63 47 12.68 52.57 16.59 74.16 26.79 115.54 5.5 23.5 8.9 22.1 13.9 20.3 23.9 17.2 21.6 17.4 17.4 17.5 17.9 14.5 17.0 15.9 16.3 16.9 16.6 16.8 19.5 .1../.?4_ 15.8 ? 18?2 15.8 16.0 13.9 16.1 16.0 Table 11V and Table XI, note 4. Nonproductive investments in the economic sectors (as estimated in economic sectors (as given in Table XIV) and added to social-cultural services and sdm4ietration. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 ?? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8 41' ??? ??????? ...??????????????????????????????? i" ? 0112;3 TO TAI2LE YX I. thrtl. 1./.1t. al. 'Lily est:n(1;:t.,e) (1'..41)1e XIV) ir;?vost? rt.tr,'.?!? ?ry riec,:l I!) (..xclutio 11;vc),8t1ent9 l.a:, L thaL: ? (t;) cif :le;r.`ztii.,;,. is fiz:d (14 the vAr.) ..f;:ally tionr)v.,):.11.:..:,t,ilr: -:,_;:vest.r.cy.lts by collecti're razi7r.s. .1. t'?E: nos',.,?,-ar? sit :at ce.)11.ec:.ive fa.,'s did make sutistai.tial 4.::)is dale. I tir.di:xstst..ed ''Industrylf arid at,r)J. Z4?13 pe.r.c..11-,ta,8 of to.:.,a1 in the .p-z-tesr:rit, ? t, e. ? -1 o.f' es*.inates ir...v.,:sttrents by in ali.iter ostiiriat e5 'ny ;-.4! of t.,! :13 C ani i. sok ??????,????0 . . In(41:411J,?61.44141, ??01,21?0?U4+., rotkAa. ??,1.44;.k' . ? ? ? ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/06: CIA-RDP81-01043R002500190002-8
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