RED CHINA SPEAKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73-00475R000102940003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 31, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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RED CHINA SPEAKS
"Political power comes out of a barrel of a gun"
?,Mao-tse Tung
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Communist China's
Attitude on the Current
'Debate" in its Own Words
?
Published in the public interest by:
THE COMMITTEE of ONE MILLION
(Against the Admission of Communist
\. China to the United Nations)
I 4
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"What Does U.S. Big Debate
On Red China Signify?"
Full text of an editorial in the People's Daily published
in Peiping on April 9, 1966.
The so-called China question has
become the focus of attention in the
U.S. in the past two months. U.S.
scholars and idea men in the service
of the ruling classes, and responsible
officials, have put forth their views in
a great debate on China policy.
Beginning from the latter part of
January, the House Far East and West
Pacific Sub-Committee held a num-
ber of public hearings on China
policy. From the beginning of March,
the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee invited a number of "experts
on the China question" to give testi-
mony. Discussions on the "China
question" have also been held in
American universities, "learned so-
cieties" and other "non-governmental"
bodies, and among religionists. The
U.S. President and some high of-
ficials have also spoken on China
policy on many occasions.
This is a continuation of the de-
bate on the Vietnam question some
time ago.
The consequences arising from the
constant escalation of the war of ag-
gression in Vietnam by the Johnson
administration are the immediate
cause for the discussion on the
"China question." This aggressive ad-
venture has not only met with strong
opposition from the American people
but also aroused anxiety among cer-
tain sections of the U.S. ruling circles.
They fear that this would lead to a
"clash with China" and that such a
"clash" will be for the U.S. "the
worst possible catastrophe that could
develop in the rest of this century."
There is a more profund reason
why the China policy is so widely dis-
cussed in the United States. The U.S.
imperialist policy of hostility towards
China has failed to prevent China
from advancing by leaps and bounds
along the path of socialist revolution
and socialist construction and to check
the ever expanding influence of the
Chinese revolution.
The anti-China betrayal of the re-
visionist Soviet leadership does not
help the United States at all. China,
which holds high the banner of anti-
imperialism, has become the greatest
insurmountable obstacle to the execu-
tion of the counter-revolutionary glo-
bal strategy of U.S. imperialism. U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs William Bundy said
on February 21 that the foreign policy
aims of China and the U.S. are "total-
ly antithetic" and there is "a very
fundamental conflict" between them.
He admitted that "Communist China
is without doubt the most serious and
perplexing problem that confronts our
foreign policy today."
It can thus be seen that the present
debate reflects not the "powerfulness"
of the U.S. but its weakness and de-
feat and its helplessness and dilemma
in face of the great Chinese people.
Some influential Americans criticised
U.S.-China policy as "in a fundamen-
tal sense unsuccessful" and "long since
out of date". They called for a
"fundamental review of our China
policy." It is against such a back-
ground that the Johnson administra-
tion wants to make use of the debate
as a smokescreen to sidetrack the
strong dissatisfaction at home and
abroad with the U.S. anti-China policy
and to cover up the continuance of the
policy of hostility and aggression
against China.
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The debate shows that the differ- Committee hearing on March 8 that
ence between these idea men is about while sticking to its military "con-
what counter-revolutionary method tainment" of China, the U.S. should
should be adopted. They are at one aim at "maximum contacts with and
in persisting in the policy of hostility maximum involvement of the Chinese
and aggression towards China. That Communists in the international corn-
is why none of them could put forth munity." This idea was very favorably
a feasible formula. After repeated received in American political guar-
deliberations and consideration, the ters. U.S. Vice-President Hubert
experts ended in agreeing to the con- Humphrey said in a speech on March
tinuation and stepping up of the 19, "we must achieve the contain-
"containment" policy. They added the ment of Asian communism without
phrase "without isolation" after the isolating the Chinese people." The
word "containment", hence the so- idea of "dual approach" advanced by
called formula "containment without Professor Donald Zagoria, another
isolation." Columbia University "expert on
Let's see what kind of stuff this China", amounts to the same thing.
formula is.
The "containment" policy is the
core of the U.S. China policy. News-
week of March 7 said, "the necessity
for containment of China has become
an axiom of U.S. foreign policy."
Since taking office, the Johnson ad-
ministration has pushed this policy a
step forward. It has openly declared
that China is the principal enemy of
the United States, and has shifted the
focus of its global strategy from
Europe to Asia. Besides building up
more vigorously the "crescent defense
line" stretching from South Korea to
Thailand, it pins its hopes more and
more on collusion with the Khrush-
chev revisionists, Japanese militarists
and Indian reactionaries to "contain"
China. William Bundy said in his
February 21 speech that the "con-
tainment" of China "is the essence
of what we are trying to do."
There is also an aim in the U.S.
policy of "containment" which can-
not be made public. By raising the
anti-China black banner, the U.S.
wants further to tighten its control
over the countries around China, sup-
press the revolutionary movements in
these countries and turn them into
U.S. military bases.
What then is "without isolation" all
about? A. Doak Barnett, acting di-
rector of Columbia University's East
Asian Institute, said as the first wit-
ness at the Senate Foreign Relations
In reality, the "containment with-
out isolation" formula is a manifes-
tation of the U.S. imperialist counter-
revolutionary dual tactics on China
policy. In short, this means on the one
hand continued aggression against and
encirclement of China, containment
and isolation of China, while on the
other, indulging in the vain hope to
bring about "peaceful evolution" in
China so that revolutionary China will
degenerate gradually. "Containment"
is the main thing in the dual tactics.
Commenting on this formula, the
Christian Science Monitor said on
March 6 that the U.S. policy of "con-
taining" China militarily "has not
changed. On the contrary, it has stif-
fened as a result of the war in Viet-
nam." But the Johnson government
wanted this policy "applied together
with a long-range political policy" to
"lead them (Chinese Communists)
down the path that the Russians fol-
lowed between Stalin and Brezhnev,
away from violence and toward an
enforced responsibility." This reveals
the counter-revolutionary character
of the policy of "containment without
isolation."
But U.S. imperialism has found a
wrong target. The Chinese people
have long seen through the aggressive
nature of U.S. imperialism. Whether
by its "tough" tactics or by its "soft"
tactics or by the simultaneous appli-
cation of both tactics, U.S. imperial-
9
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ism cannot hope to browbeat or de- sell had to admit that as far as the
ceive the Chinese people. Even the
U.S. ruling circles themselves are not
sure whether or not these tactics will
bear fruit. William Bundy said on
March 16 that insofar as the policy
of "containment without isolation"
was concerned, the United States had
been acting on it for sometime. But
he admitted that there was no indica-
tion that China would change its
policy.
Helplessly and hopelessly, Harvard
Professor John K. Fairbank, the so-
called veteran "China specialist", and
others again put forward the long
discredited "two Chinas" formula.
Some others proposed that "uncondi-
tional discussions" be held and "diplo-
matic relations" established with
China before the future of Taiwan is
discussed. But even Dean Rusk him-
"two Chinas" proposal was concerned,
"it was useless" because China had re-
jected it.
U.S. imperialism's persistent hostili-
ty towards the Chinese people is
determined by its reactionary and ag-
gressive nature. There is nothing
strange about it. What is strange is
that U.S. imperialism even hopes to
find a "way out" of the blind alley
of its China policy. The great debate
in the United States over Washing-
ton's China policy shows once again
that it is mere illusion. Look, how
many politicians, "scholars" and "spe-
cialists" took part in these discussions.
But nothing fruitful has come out of
them. Nor will there be any result if
more discussions are held. Gentlemen
in Washington, there is nothing you
can do about it!
Members of the 89th Congress who have endorsed the Committee of One Mil-
lion's Declaration against any concessions to Communist China: the admission
of Communist China to the U. N.; United States diplomatic recognition of the
Peiping regime; trade relations between the United States and Communist
China; any policy of accommodation which might be interpreted as U. S. acqui-
escence in, or approval of, Communist China's aggression, direct or indirect,
against her neighbors.
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Suite 709 0 1790 Broadway 0 N.Y ., N. Y. 10019 0 Tel: A/C 212 679-6640
The Committee
of
ONE
MILLION
Against the Admission of Communist China
to the United Nations
Honorary Chairman: Hon. H. Alexander Smith
Treasurer: Dr. B. A. Garside
Secretary: Mr. Marvin Liebman
Steering Committee:
Rep. John M. Ashbrook
Sen. Thomas J. Dodd
Sen. Peter H. Dominick
Sen. Paul H. Douglas
Hon. Charles Edison
Sen. Bourke B. Hickenloo per
Hon. Walter H. Judd
Rep. Thomas E. Morgan
Sen. Hugh Scott
Additional copies of this pamphlet may be ordered @ 5? each by writing to the
Committee of One Million at the above address.
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About this pamphlet . .
?
Early in 1966, the Committee of One Million published a pamphlet en-
titled "RED CHINA SPEAKS: An Examination Of Communist China's
Attitudes On War And Peace In Its Own Words". The publication quoted
a number of official statements made by the Peiping regime as an indication
of the futility of attempting to deal with Communist China in a rational and
civilized manner.
Notwithstanding the attitude of Red China's leaders, there have been
increasing efforts during the past months ? well-publicized and well-
financed ? to change present American policy toward Communist China:
withdrawal of United States opposition to the admission of Communist
China to the United Nations; unilateral American action which would lead
to full diplomatic recognition of Peiping; dropping all barriers to trade
and other "exchanges" with Red China. This growing campaign is being
carried on in the face of Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia
and at the same time as young Americans are being shot down by Chinese
Communist bullets in Vietnam!
Each day, newspapers report on some new statement urging unilateral
American concessions to Communist China. These emanate from various
academic groups, religious bodies, editorialists, organizations concerned
with foreign affairs and "civil rights," and from a few Senators and Con-
gressmen. This minority point of view ? rehashing old and defunct ideas
? is presented as part of a great American "debate" on United States-
China policy.
Unhappily for those who urge changes in present American policy, the
Chinese Communists simply refuse to cooperate. Americans have been
hearing the arguments of those who would offer practically unlimited con-
cessions to Communist China. It is important that Americans also know the
attitude of the Chinese Communists.
What follows is the text of an editorial in the People's Daily (the official
mouthpiece of the Peiping regime) which was published on April 9, 1966.
In the article, the Chinese Communist regime replied in no uncertain terms
to the current domestic debate on U.S.-China policy. It denounced the
"containment without isolation" formula as "a manifestation of the U.S.
imperialist counter-revolutionary dual tactics on China policy." Mentioning
the House and Senate hearings and the academic discussions, it charged
that the Johnson administration wanted to make use of the debate "as a
smokescreen to sidetrack the strong dissatisfatcion at home and abroad with
the U.S. anti-China policy." It attacked everyone, including Prof. John K.
Fairbank, who was described as "helplessly and hopelessly" promoting
the long discredited "Two Chinas" policy. All these so-called "experts," it
sniffed, were Washington's "idea men," seeking to perpetuate these "dual
tactics."
The Committee of One Million is reprinting this editorial in full as a sup-
plement to its earlier pamphlet and for the benefit of those Americans who
seem convinced that the leaders of Communist China can somehow be
made to behave in a responsible and peaceful manner.
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1
FOUR AGAINST
The Red China Lobby
DAVID NELSON ROWE ? WALTER H. JUDD ? FRANZ MICHAEL ? GEORGE E. TAYLOR
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Introduction
THE WAR in Vietnam has brought
into sharper focus the perennial
question of Communist China; the
question, that is, of what should be
done?if anything?about admission
to the United Nations, diplomatic
recognition, increased trade, cultural
exchange.
In this connection, it is astonishing
to note how little things have changed
since the late 1940s when Mao Tse-
tung & Co. were helped to power by
the band of China experts in the
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)
and in the State Department.
Then they were saying that the
Chinese Communists were merely
agrarian reformers and that the ele-
ment in China to be most concerned
about was the "corrupt" Chiang Kai-
shek and the warloads. Our China
experts of the left-Liberal persua-
sion helped the Communists seize a
continent.
Now they are concerned with le-
gitimizing the Red China regime in
the concert of nations. Their help is
being extended precisely at the time
when Communist China finds its
fortunes at low ebb?at home and
abroad, economically and diplomat-
ically.
These friends and members of the
Red China lobby point to the Soviet
Union as a happy example of the
co-existence spirit which the free
world might expect from Communist
China, if only the mainland regime
were accorded the minimal interna-
tional courtesies?diplomatic recogni-
tion, admission to the United Nations,
expanded trade.
The final abandonment of National-
ist China which such a policy would
entail creates no crisis of conscience
among these self-described realists,
for the main enemy in the Far East
continues to be Chiang Kai-shek.
One of the ironies of the situation
lies in the fact that the very people
who in large measure are personally
and historically responsible for the
political disaster on the Chinese
514 NATIONAL REVIEW
mainland are today hailed as experts
by the communications media, the
universities and important members
of the Congress.
Thus, despite the brilliant and
scholarly exposure of the IPR and its
collaborators by the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee more than a
decade ago, once again we hear the
confident voices of such experts as
Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank,
John Stewart Service and Oliver
Edmund Clubb. A sorry confirmation
of Hegel's observation to the effect
that the one thing we learn from
history is that we do not learn from
history!
The recent hearings by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
furnished a platform for many
spokesmen for the Red China lobby,
all of whom peddled the new line
of "containment without isolation,"
the now fashionable euphemism for
appeasement.
The Opposition
Fortunately, the hearings also fea-
tured testimony by some spokesmen
for a realistic approach to the China
question. Among these, four in par-
ticular developed a vigorous and
closely reasoned rebuttal to the
vagaries of the Red China lobby. The
four are: Professor David Nelson
Rowe of Yale University, former Rep-
resentative Walter H. Judd, Profes-
sor Franz Michael of Georgetown
University and Professor George E.
Taylor of the University of Washing-
ton.
?David Rowe is a professor in the
Department of International Studies
at Yale University. He was born in
Nanking, China and worked with the
OSS during World War II. He was
a special assistant to the U.S. Am-
bassador to China. He taught at Tai-
wan University from 1954-1956; was
a member of the international sec-
retariat of the United Nations Found-
THEODORE LIT
ing Conference in San Francisco in
1945. Among his books is Modern
China: A Brief History.
?Walter Judd was a medical mis-
sionary in China from 1925 to 1938.
He returned to the United States
with his family in '38 and spent the
next two years lecturing to church
groups around the country on the
dangers of Japanese imperialism. He
was elected to the 78th Congress from
the Fifth Congressional District in
Minnesota and served through the
82nd Congress. He was a U.S. dele-
gate to the 12th session of the UN
General Assembly; one of the found-
ers of the Committee of One Mil-
lion against Admission of Red China
to the United Nations. He speaks
Chinese fluently and knows person-
ally most of the influential Chinese
leaders, both Nationalist and Com-
munist.
?Franz Michael taught in Hangchow,
China from 1934 to 1938. From 1942
to 1964 he was professor of Far East-
ern History and Government and as-
sistant director of the Far Eastern
and Russian Institute at the Univer-
sity of Washington. He is now pro-
fessor of International Affairs and
Sino-Soviet Studies at George Wash-
ington University. Among his pub-
lications is The Origin of Manchu
Rule in China. He has just published
the first part of a three-part docu-
mentary history of the Taiping Re-
bellion.
?George Taylor is Director of the
Far Eastern and Russian Institute of
the University of Washington. He
lived and taught in China from 1930
to 1939. During World War II he
served as a China expert in the State
Department. He is the author of a
number of books on the Far East,
including The Struggle for North
China and America in the New
Pacific. He is the co-author (with
Franz Michael) of The Far East in
the Modern World.
Although these scholars represent a
minority view in the American in-
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tellectual community, their testimony
articulates American public opinion
on Red China (an opinion mobilized
in large degree, since 1953, by the
Committee of One Million).
Significantly, the national platforms
of the Democratic and Republican
parties oppose the admission of Red
China to the UN; a Gallup poll of
January, 1966 shows 67 per cent of
the American people are opposed to
the admission of Red China to the
UN; the Congress has repeatedly gone
on record opposing concessions to
Peking.
All of which opens the nagging
question: Why does the Liberal Es-
tablishment pursue an appeasement
policy toward Communist regimes?
The appeasement policy is not based
on a principled pacifism, in view of
the fact that the Liberals enthusi-
astically supported the war against
Nazi Germany. Nor does the appease-
ment policy spring exclusively from
a fear of a mutually destructive nu-
clear war. It should be remembered
that the Liberals also pushed for an
appeasement line during the early
postwar period when the United
States enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear
bombs.
The answer is indirectly suggested
in a statement by Senator J. W. Ful-
bright in the first of his Johns Hop-
kins University lectures. Commenting
on the national debate on the Viet-
nam war, the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee warned:
"It is by no means certain that the
relatively healthy atmosphere in
which the debate is now taking place
will not give way to fears, and toler-
ance and freedom of discussion will
give way to a false and strident
patriotism."
Senator Fulbright's qualification of
patriotism is not to be taken too liter-
ally. This is the Aesopian language
of the modern, sophisticated Liberal.
For it is patriotism?normal, healthy
patriotism?which propels the aver-
age American to oppose international
Communism. And it is this normal
healthy patriotism which, in the
nature of things, would be heightened
in the course of a genuine, all-out
struggle against international Com-
munism. The Liberal senses the vio-
lent contradiction between patriotism
?of any degree?and the intellectual
power position of the Establishment.
It is patriotism?more than Commun-
ism?which the Liberal Establish-
ment sees as the main enemy.
The China Problem Today in
United States Policy-Making
THE KOREAN WAR proved that Com-
munist China was willing to fight the
Free World in order to achieve Com-
munist expansionist aims in Asia vis-
et-vis Korea (Japan was the real
objective and the most important
one).
The formula has been repeated in:
Tibet?anti-India and Nehru.
Laos-250,000 Chinese Communist
troops massed on the Laos frontier
in 1961-1962 to bring a settlement
favorable to Communist China.
Indian Frontier?this involved an
actual Sino-Indian war, with Com-
munist Chinese troops fighting Indian
troops.
Communist Chinese support for
North Vietnam aggression against
South Vietnam. The Sino-Russian
ploy: North Vietnam (the North
To be sure, there is always the
possibility that normal, healthy patri-
otism, under a condition of great in-
ternational stress, may be trans-
formed into ?the "false and strident"
patriotism that Fulbright evokes. It
is this added risk from which the
Liberal particularly shrinks, prefer-
ring instead, through an appeasement
policy, the risk of a Communism
triumphant.
If this be so, there can be no genuine
debate between the Liberal and the
anti-Communist communities. Yet it
is important that the formal argu-
ment against appeasing Communist
China be widely disseminated. For
the argument finally finds its way to
grassroots Americans and fortifies
them in their conviction that there
is no substitute for victory. And it
does correct the thinking of those
members of the Liberal Establish-
ment who are sensitive to the persua-
sive power of right reason.
Unfortunately, but not surprisingly,
the press, radio and television gave
only meager coverage to the genu-
inely expert testimony of these wit-
nesses. In the interest of fuller re-
portage, the thrust of their polemic
is reproduced in this Special Supple-
ment.
DAVID NELSON ROWE
Korea of this episode) is immune
from destruction at the hands of the
United States and its allies, because
of its joint Sino-Soviet backing. Com-
munist China stands behind North
Vietnam's aggression militarily, to
prevent such military action against
North Vietnam as is necessary to
the attainment of our military objec-
tives in and for South Vietnam.
Thus, Communist China achieves for
North Vietnam immunity from the
consequences of its aggression in
South Vietnam which the previous
Sino-Soviet techniques and strategies
of support for North Korea failed to
achieve, and this without any cost
thus far in Communist Chinese man-
power.
Thus, Sino-Soviet "indirect" ag-
gression in South Vietnam depends
upon their joint success in prevent-
ing the United States from taking
military action against North Viet-
nam adequate to achieve the defense
of South Vietnamese independence.
The chief Sino-Soviet weapon in
this psychological warfare struggle is
the threat of massive Chinese man-
power intervening as "people's vol-
unteers" in the Vietnamese war.
To mitigate the risks of Communist
China's Southeast Asia policy is the
aim of all true friends of Communist
China in the U.S.A. today. Many
others aid and abet this aim for a
variety of reasons.
Thus, almost immediately after the
Johnson policy of heavy, direct
United States military involvement
in the Vietnamese war was initiated,
the friends of Communist China be-
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gan to emerge from the relative
obscurity into which they had been
forced by the Communist Chinese
attack on us in Korea and to start
openly supporting Communist China
again and attacking the United States
Far Eastern policy at the same time.
These movements, so patently anti-
anti-Communist, seem to have forced
the Administration to speak as though
Communism by and large was not
involved in the Vietnamese war, thus
robbing us of one of the chief psy-
chological supports and chief political
bases of the war in Vietnam and the
such as the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense (much of whose
testimony has to be classified). This
show then goes on radio and TV
(highly edited toward the Left). The
whole effect is to depict public "ex-
perts" as at odds with the Adminis-
tration. This not only convinces the
Communists in Hanoi, Peking and
Moscow of divisions of opinion in the
United States that do not exist in
fact. It also seems to drive the
Administration toward public posi-
tions on Communist China that con-
tradict its public position that the
whole war against Communist ag-
gression everywhere. This is clearly
seen in President Johnson's Balti-
more speech and even more so in
his recent speech at Freedom House,
New York where he uses "Red" and
"Communist" just once each in the
whole speech, playing down Com-
munism as an issue in the Vietnam
war.
The purpose of the anti-anti-Com-
munists here is clear, namely to try
to show that the war in Vietnam
has no valid ideological basis and
thus to depict it as naked United
States aggression without any justi-
fication. Who sold President Johnson
the line of de-emphasizing Commun-
ism as an issue in the Vietnamese
war?
Paralleling these movements are
the hearings in the Senate which
seem to aim at two main effects:
1) To align selected civilian propa-
gandists uniformly against the main
lines ?of United States foreign policy
in Asia and then to bring to rebut
them the main Administration figures
516 NATIONAL REVIEW
war in Vietnam could soon be ended
if only Communist Chinese attitudes
and measures would change. It also
seems to lead members of jthe Admin-
istration to start softening their policy
of resistance to Communist China by
talking "containment without isola-
tion" and to that extent undercutting
the Administration's own experts such
as Secretary of State Rusk and As-
sistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs William Bundy.
2) To have a main effect of soften-
ing our resistance to Communist
China. Senator Fulbright himself
states that the main aim of his hear-
ings on China is a political aim,
namely to prevent a war with Com-
munist China.
In fact, the prevention of a mili-
tary showdown now between the
United States and Communist China
is the main aim of Communists every-
where. Why?
If such a showdown came soon it
would destroy Communist China as
such and constitute the single most
catastrophic setback in history to the
course of the Communist world re-
volution. In the course of such an
event, however, the USSR would as-
suredly grab both Manchuria and
Sinkiang, in order to have those
Chinese areas available as bases to
start over again the job of commun-
izing east Asia. But the rest of China
could be saved, without doubt.
If such a showdown can be pre-
vented for five to ten more years,
the pro-Communist-China and anti-
anti-Communist elements in this
country count on the development of
Communist Chinese thermonuclear
power to produce a standoff and
make Communist China then invul-
nerable to United States destruction,
by means of the retaliatory threat.
They could prolong this stage ten
to twenty years during which either
one and probably both of two things
would happen:
The United States would prove
unable to develop any effective deter-
rent to so-called "indirect aggression"
and "people's war" with the result
that all of Asia would come under
Chinese Communist domination and
control and the impact on Africa and
Latin America would be disastrous.
Under the deterrent of terror the
political and psychological pressures
toward a d?nte with Communist
China similar to present illusions
along that line with the USSR, would
engender a thorough and complete
co-existence policy vis-?is the
Communist Chinese.
The Communist Chinese need co-
existence much worse than do the
Russians. Why? The lack of massive
external support and their huge and
insoluble internal problems doom
them forever to weakness and medi-
ocrity and complete totalitarianism
and military adventurism. They are
trying their hardest now to soften
our approach to them under the
blackmail of aggression and war, to
gain at no cost to them politically
what they need in outside economic
and technical support from the West
and particularly from the U.S.A. This
is why their friends in the United
States are trying so hard to soften
the American approach to Commu-
nist China.
What are the main themes now be-
ing pushed by the pro-Communist
China and anti-anti-Communist ele-
ments along this line?
(Theme) The historical causation
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line. The Communist Chinese foreign
policies are merely a logical result of
China's frustrations and suffering at
the hands of the outside world for
the last century or more.
(Theme) The "inevitable softening
of the Communist Chinese." This
line is pushed hard by all the pro-
Communist-China and anti-anti-
Communist elements. Even Fidel
Castro gives them aid and comfort by
blasting the current Chinese Com-
munist leaders as "senile" and anti-
cipating a less dangerous Communist
Chinese leadership to come with the
demise of Mao.
(Theme) The "two-Chinas" line.
This is tantamount to saying we can
play with enemies without alienating
friends. Whatever the distant future
holds we cannot know. But for the
responsible policy-making future
there can be no two-Chinas policy for
the United States or anyone else. For
example, the United Kingdom has
tried to adopt a two-Chinas policy:
recognition of Peking and trying to
do business with Taipei. Result: it
has neither China. The Communist
Chinese have never entered full dip-
lomatic relations with the United
Kingdom, and the United Kingdom
cannot really cooperate with the Re-
public of China, or Taiwan, the single
most rapidly advancing and develop-
ing area in Asia. By contrast, the
United States without recognition of
Peking has much higher-level diplo-
matic contacts with the Chinese Com-
munists than Britain, and is the main
ally and collaborator with the Re-
public of China on Taiwan.
Hard and Soft
Question: Can any United States
Administration advocate abandonment
of the Republic of China without
committing political suicide?
Answer: This is what two-Chinas
policy advocates really are urging the
Administration toward, some know-
ingly and others unwittingly. I.e. the
two-Chinas policy means to start full
diplomatic and other relations with
Communist China, and with a trend
toward this once set in motion we
can more easily abandon the Republic
of China on Taiwan, particularly since
it would break relations with us if
we recognized Communist China.
(Theme) The "they don't mean
what they say" line. Anyone who be-
lieves in drawing the lessons of his-
tory should not object if we say the
world would have been better off if
more people had taken seriously such
historical documents as the Marxist
Manifesto, Hitler's Mein Kampf or
the pre-World War II utterances of
the Japanese imperialists. The cur-
rent utterances of the Communist
Chinese leadership seem just as dan-
gerously unrealistic today as the pre-
viously cited ones did then. They are
therefore hard to give credence to.
They are, in fact, filled with non-
sense, but then of course so too was
Mein Kampf! But this is merely to
say that all madmen are dangerous,
to a great extent precisely because
they are mad.
Questions: When men talk madness
(as the Communist Chinese do) would
it not be wise to assume they mean
it until and unless they prove other-
wise by their acts? Yes. Are the Com-
munist Chinese proving otherwise by
their acts? No?they do just the op-
posite. Witness: Korea, the Taiwan
Straits, the Indian frontier, Laos, and
Thailand, as well as Vietnam. ?
(Theme) The "simultaneous hard
and soft" line: "containment, but not
isolation." The friends of Communist
China and the anti-anti-Communists
are constantly describing our post-
World War II policy toward the USSR
as combining these two features and
advocating that we adopt such a
policy toward Communist China.
What is thetruth?
Our immediate postwar policy to-
ward the USSR was not one of con-
tainment, but of surrender. Eastern
Europe and Outer Mongolia were
surrendered to the USSR with' the
connivance of the U.S. and the highest
pressures being brought to bear by
the U.S. on our allies to surrender
to the USSR land grabs, as in the
case of Nationalist China and of Mon-
golia. This was an effort to appease
Stalin and get him to accept this as
his price for cooperating with us. He
took the bribe, but did not cooperate.
The containment policy was then
resorted to and it has prevented fur-
ther territorial takeover. However,
this whole policy is now threatened
by French action in re NATO, and
the chief deterrent to armed action
by the USSR in Europe is now the
mutual thermonuclear threat.
Accordingly, we have generally not
applied the policy of surrender of ter-
ritory to Communist China, and in
every case but one have resisted
Communist Chinese efforts to push
outward. This case was Laos in 1961-
62, and much of our trouble in Viet-
nam stems from the application to
Laos of the formula of appeasement
and surrender through the device we
tried to use in China (1946-47) to
prevent a Communist Chinese take-
over pure and simple, i.e. the coali-
tion government with Communists in
it. Sino-Soviet cooperation helped
bring about the surrender in Laos
and thus to mark out South Vietnam
and Thailand as the most likely Com-
munist targets.
As far as Communist China is con-
cerned containment means isolation:
the two are one and inseparable and
the crux of this problem is Taiwan.
The Communist Chinese price for
non-isolation (which is a two-sided
matter, not solely under our control)
is the handing over of Taiwan to
them, i.e. destruction of containment.
Any United States Administration
which would even suggest any such
thing would commit political suicide
by producing a major catastrophe in
Asian affairs.
What About Our Allies?
(Theme) The "there is no support
among our allies" for our Southeast
Asian policy line. This line was, for
example, advanced in re the Japanese
by that great authority (?) on Ja-
panese affairs, Mr. George Kennan.
Mr. Kennan today seems to know
even less about Far Eastern affairs
than he did seventeen years ago, when
I asked him what Asia would mean
in our future struggle with Com-
munism. He replied then that the
struggle with Communism would be
settled somewhere along a line drawn
between Stettin in the north and
Trieste in the south. Of course, since
then we have had Greece and Turkey
in Europe; Korea, the Taiwan Straits,
and the 17th parallel in Vietnam, not
to mention Laos, and the Indian fron-
tier, in Asia.
The Japanese people will respect
and honor success on our part in
Vietnam. Like others, they view with
apprehension any irresolution, lack of
determination, or willingness to pull
out and surrender, on our part. This
is generally true of all Asians, from
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Japan clear around through Korea,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Southeast
Asia and South Asia. This is one of
many reasons why we cannot and
must not fail in Vietnam.
Other friends and allies, including
Korea, the Republic of China, the
Philippines, Australia and New Zea-
land, are all helping in various ways
in Vietnam, and will doubtless help
still more in the future. If and when
the need arises, the arrangements
have no doubt already been worked
out for the Republic of China, on Tai-
wan, to become directly involved. But,
whether this will be required only
time can tell.
As to allies and friends in Europe
and elsewhere the vast preponder-
ance of them approve what we are
doing whether they say so or not.
Secretary Rusk is right on this.
What Price Knowledge?
Indeed the notion that to know the
Chinese Communists better will make
it easier for us to tolerate them is
no more true than if we were to say
that to know Italy better would make
it easier for us to tolerate the Mafia.
The fact is we already know enough
about both the Mafia and the Chinese
Communists to know one thing, and
that is that we do not need to know
any more in order to justify our poli-
cies of opposition and hostility. Of
course we can always use more
knowledge on what can be described
as a tactical level, such, for example,
as is being supplied by U-2 over-
flights from Taiwan. But we are not
likely to learn much from proposals
to allow our scholars and students of
China to visit Communist China, and
for two reasons:
1. The Chinese Communists are not
going to allow anyone to visit there
unless they are convinced that he is
a dependable friend of Communism
and of Chinese Communism, in par-
ticular. They have been following this
policy for years.
2. Under these circumstances what
knowledge is brought back is likely
to be either superficial or biased along
pro-Chinese Communist lines.
Even in the USSR, as my colleague
Professor Barghoorn [of Yale, who
was imprisoned by the Soviets for
a fortnight] could no doubt testify,
efforts at objective fact-gathering by
foreign scholars are not without their
518 NATIONAL REVIEW
risks! The hazards to life involved in
even minor contacts with the utterly
incompatible, are clear from the re-
cent death of an innocent American
traveler [Newcomb Mott] while in the
hands of the Russians. The subsequent
warnings to such potential travelers
by the State Department were well
merited.
The campaign along the lines ana-
lyzed above is being carried out in
this country at a pitch of intensity
unmatched in recent propaganda his-
tory. The so-called "teach-in" more
extensively used in the earlier phases
of the anti-Vietnam-war campaign,
has not been emphasized in this one.
Instead, full-blown new organizations
have been established on a nation-
wide basis, including ARFEP, or
"Americans for a Review of Far East-
ern Policy." This organization was
started on the Yale campus by a
group of students and faculty mem-
bers. It has been spread across the
country from there by a well-manned
group of promoters and organizers.
Recently a large advertisement ad-
vancing its views appeared, for ex-
ample, in a San Francisco newspaper,
as emanating from the "Northern
California Chapter" of ARFEP.
Certain features of this organiza-
tion appear very clearly. For example,
what they mean by a "review" of our
Far Eastern policy usually turns out
to be nothing but propaganda in fa-
vor of Communist China in the shape
of support for its admission to the
United Nations, United Sthtes recog-
nition of the Red regime, full United
States relations in trade, cultural re-
lations, etc., well calculated to ad-
vance the aims, purposes, and in-
terests of Communist China. This pro-
paganda also, at times, is heavily in
derogation of our ally, the Republic
of China, of President and Madame
Chiang Kai-shek, etc.
Second, the main centers of or-
ganization and the main personnel in-
volved are the colleges and universi-
ties. I do not know how many ARFEP
centers and branches there are, or
how many persons have "signed up"
or are otherwise formally or infor-
mally affiliated with them. Nor can
we fully know at present just what
activities they engage in. The follow-
ing is no doubt an incomplete list of
activities: signing petitions and plac-
ing advertisements in newspapers;
holding small and unadvertised "semi-
nars" conducted by faculty members
on China and China policy; sponsor-
ing open debates on China policy
questions, with both sides represented
(a minor feature); conducting what
amounts to a speaker's bureau to sup-
ply speakers from one campus to
another.
It should be noted that at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania conference,
not a single academic expert on
China will be present to speak on the
program in favor of the official United
States policy toward Communist
China. This defense is relegated to of-
ficial representatives of the United
States.- Government and of the Re-
public of China. This repeats the pat-
tern so clearly seen elsewhere, of
putting up as academic "experts" on
China only those in opposition to the
official policy, and "balancing" them
with "official spokesmen" who can be
discounted in advance as such. Thus,
the false impression is created that
the "public," represented by the aca-
demic experts, is uniformly opposed
to the policy of our government at
this time. This is false, utterly false.
Owen Lattimore Again
At a conference at Harvard under
the auspices of the Collegiate Council
for the United Nations on March 25-
27, Professor Owen Lattimore of In-
stitute of Pacific Relations fame was
scheduled to speak on "The Chinese
Revolution: Causes and Conse-
quences."
Also, from an organizational point
of view, new and political uses are
being made of an organization that
predictably would be used for pro-
Chinese Communist purposes if and
when the time comes to do so. This
is the Association of Asian Studies.
When I say its current political uses
are predictable, I mean just that. I
refer you to my statement on this
organization made in testimony un-
der oath before the Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, on March 27,
1952 (pp. 4010-4013). I referred then
to the Far Eastern Association, which
is now the Association of Asian
Studies, and I characterized it as de-
signed, at least in part, to take over
the political propaganda functions of
the Institute of Pacific Relations in
case the latter institution came to
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grief, as I believe it subsequently did,
over questions of the pro-Communist
bias of its activities.
What the New York Times will
print is well exemplified by the letter
in its columns for March 18, 1966 by
Professor Vera M. Dean of New York
University. In this letter the profes-
sor, while expressing her views on
various policy matters, also expresses
her hopes. Among these, as she puts
it, is that the "ghosts," as she de-
scribes them, of "Senator McCarthy
and the Committee of One Million on
China" should be "exorcised," and
that former "China experts" who she
says were driven from the State De-
partment by "McCarthyism" should
be sought out to advise the President
and Secretary Rusk. Leaving this
latter point aside, the Professor
should be informed that before she
can exorcise the "ghost" of the Com-
mittee of One Million it will have to
die and produce such a ghost. Far
from dying, the Committee is very
much alive today, and shows no signs
of atrophy. All reports to the contrary
are highly premature, to say the least.
In this situation and from this back-
ground, in what policy area should
our best and strongest efforts be
made, to counter the current attempts
to support Communist China and its
program for Asia and the world? We
are talking here, of course, of United
States policy alternatives.
I do not believe the matter of pos-
sible United States recognition, trade
and cultural relations, etc. is central.
It is quite doubtful that, under cur-
rent circumstances, any Administra-
tion in Washington would move to-
ward such policies. More real is the
danger that we will succumb to the
admission of Communist China to the
United Nations. In fact, so central do
I believe this whole question to be to
the problem of "standing up to Com-
munist China's grandiose demands"
in world affairs, as Professor John
Fairbank puts it, that I believe here
is where major emphasis should lie
in respect to China policy today.
Let us see why the Chinese Com-
munists should not be admitted to the
United Nations.
What was the origin of the United
Nations?
The United Nations originated as an
association of victors in World War
II. It excluded the soon-to-be-de-
feated powers, Germany, Italy, and
Japan. In its very origins it was thus
exclusive, not universal. The essential
feature was the wartime association
of the wartime allies, the "United
Nations," and the community of in-
terests that that alliance embodied.
The United Nations: what for?
The United Nations was founded in
the hope of peace and to search for
it. The functional approach was adopt-
ed, i.e. cooperation wherever possible,
in whatever measures possible. Meas-
ures were to be taken for common
and mutual security. The problem of
expanding the United Nations mem-
bership arose at the United Nations
Conference of 1945. Exhaustive de-
bate at San Francisco in 1945 pro-
duced the decision that the organiza-
tion should not be based on univer-
sality of membership, but that there
should be qualifications for member-
ship. In the Charter these are:
a) Only peace-loving nations are
eligible. It may be difficult to define
and determine what is meant by a
peace-loving nation, but it is not hard
at any given time to determine what
nations are breakers and disturbers
of the peace.
b) Only those nations are eligible
for membership that are willing to
assume and live up to the obligations
of the Charter.
This opened the way for the de-
feated nations in World War II to
enter, if and when they qualified, and
also for new states to enter. But the
United Nations, unlike the League of
Nations, has never expelled a mem-
ber, although a member [Indonesia]
has voluntarily withdrawn.
Now, what are the issues today?
Communist China's record as to
aggression. This is overwhelmingly
relevant to the question of its ac-
cepting the "obligations of the Char-
ter." This is not just a matter of
Korea. In February 1950, five months
after the Chinese Communists estab-
lished their regime, it began its ag-
gressive course. This was predictable:
Mao says every good thing comes out
of the barrel of a gun. In February
1950 the Chinese Communists issued
a call to all people of Southeast Asia
to overthrow their governments. Was
this merely a move against colonial-
ism? No. It called for revolution
against independent governments also.
Then there came the Chinese Com-
munist 1950 Korean aggression and
the United Nations resolution (still
outstanding) which branded Com-
munist China as aggressor. The Chi-
nese Communist philosophy is: "Ours
is a policy of fight-fight, stop-stop,
half-fight, half-stop. This is no trick,
but a normal thing." This is a phil-
osophy of alternating war and sub-
version. This was followed by direct
Chinese Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia (Laos and Thailand),
Tibet, India, and indirect aggression
in Vietnam.
In view of this, in order to admit
Communist China to the United Na-
tions, the United Nations Charter
would have to be changed and the
relevant qualifications for member-
ship removed. The Communist Chi-
nese know this and themselves say
the Charter must be revised as a pre-
requisite for accepting a seat.
Communist China's position re the
United Nations is as follows:
"All countries should review the
United Nations Charter together."
All "independent countries" should
then be admitted and all "imperialist
puppet states should be driven out."
It wants to expel some members even
before its own admission. Clearly the
Chinese Communists neither want nor
plan either universality or "coexist-
ence."
They openly state what kinds of
changes would have to take place in
the United Nations:
As a prerequisite to Communist
China's accepting a seat, the United
Nations would have openly to declare
that the United Nations resolution
condemning Communist China for
aggression in the Korean War was
"wrong," and brand the United States
as the aggressor in Korea.
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Another United Nations would
have to be set up as a rival to the
present United Nations.
Thus, there is no more argument
possible about what the necessary ef-
fect of the United Nations admission
for Communist China would be: it
would destroy the United Nations as
we know it. The United States could
not be a member under those condi-
tions and would have to withdraw.
The current issue today is the war
in Southeast Asia.
The Communist Chinese show com-
plete obduracy here and hold to a
hard line of demanding total United
States-South Vietnam surrender.
Can we change this by admitting
Communist China to the United Na-
tions? On September 1, 1965 New
China News Agency authorized broad-
cast stated: "The Vietnam question
has nothing to do with the United
Nations."
Another current issue is the Tai-
wan issue. Communist China demands
that we abandon a loyal ally, an ex-
cellent partner in economic, social and
political development, and a strategic
strength close up, by insisting that the
United Nations throw the Republic
of China out of that body as a pre-
requisite for its own entry. This would
mean we would tell everyone else:
"Go make your own settlement with
Communist China; become its vas-
sal." Is there a way out of this in
the so-called two-Chinas policy? No;
this policy is utterly unfeasible, be-
cause the two main parties to it, Com-
munist China and the Republic of
China, reject it totally and absolutely.
The general issue today in regard
to the western Pacific is: can we have
any security if the whole area falls
under control of such a hostile power
as Communist China? No. We tried
withdrawal between 1920 and 1941,
but it just led to a greater war.
Can we hope for change in Com-
munist China? It is often said that
we can make the United Nations a
reform school for Communist China.
But, of course, the answer is that if
the United Nations is made over on
the Communist Chinese model, Com-
munist China won't have to change,
will it? Since we can't change that
much, we will have to get out if they
come in on their terms.
The overriding policy question is
the growing United States-Communist
China confrontation in Southeast Asia
and what it may mean to Communist
China: destruction at our hands. In
view of this, it is natural that more
interest in United States China policy
should develop. The possibility is
clear that this time another major
United States-Communist China con-
frontation may destroy Communist
China.
Finally, Pope Paul VI has been
widely quoted (October 4, 1965) as
urging Communist China's United
Nations admission by saying to the
United Nations that it should "study
United States Policy Toward China
IN0 GREAT EXPANSIONIST movement
has ever stopped until it was checked.
Our choice?with Red China as it
was with Japan and Hitler?is not
between checking and not checking;
it is whether to check early, while we
can, and with allies?or try to check
the aggression later when it is strong-
er, closer, and we have fewer and
weaker friends and allies.
The question is how to check it?
with least risk and cost.
From what I have seen in the press,
most of the proposed changes in
American policy towards Communist
China appear to be based on certain
520 NATIONAL REVIEW
assumptions which do not seem to me
to be justified:
?That the Communist regime now
in control of the China mainland is
here to stay.
The same was said of Hitler, of
Khrushchev, of Sukarno, of Nkrurnah.
People are not so sure now of Castro.
Despots generally appear invincible?
"until the last five minutes."
?That the United States is stubborn-
ly keeping Red China isolated and
therefore we are responsible for its
hostility and belligerence. The reverse
is the truth; it is Red China's hostility
and belligerence in its international
attitudes and actions, that are re-
the right method of uniting to your
pact of brotherhood in honor and loy-
alty, those who do not yet share in
it." But here is what L'Osservatore
Romano, the official organ of the Vati-
can, said of this on October 18-19,
1965. In an editorial under the title
"The Church and the Universal Com-
munity of States," it takes note of the
fact that there are people who have
"given a precise political meaning"
to those words of His Holiness. Then
the editorial declared: "But true uni-
versality does not mean the arithmetic
sum of nations; it presupposes the
convergence of everybody on the ef-
fective recognition of and respect for
natural law, which is the foundation
of the United Nations." That is to
say, the rule of law is primary; ex-
panding United Nations membership
is secondary.
The Pope is thus saying what we
all know to be true, namely that any
form of political association must be
founded on some measure of agreed-
upon community of values, and that
for such associations to tolerate as
components thereof those elements
which deny and forcefully flout the
agreed-upon community of values,
will seriously endanger and probably
eventually destroy the association.
Thus, limitations upon membership
and upon participation in political ac-
tion are common to all political com-
munities. The United Nations, weak
as it already is, is no exception. It
cannot be an exception.
WALTER H. JUDD
sponsible for its isolation.
?That there is a better hope of
getting Red China to change its atti-
tude and activities by giving in to it
on matters like diplomatic recogni-
tion, trade, and admission to the
United Nations than by resolute con-
tinuance of the policy of containment
as long as Red China refuses to act
like a responsible member of civil-
ized society.
?That changing our policy vis-a-vis
Red China just might start an evolu-
tionary process there.
But, of course, it might just as
easily reduce the chances of such an
evolutionary process. Everybody de-
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sires and hopes for "evolution" in
Red China. The debate should be over
what measures are most likely to pro-
duce it:
Giving Red China greater prestige,
influence, entree, that is, making it
stronger? Or keeping it as weak and
isolated as possible?
Concessions from its intended vic-
tims?like the United States? Or
pressures from its present victims?
the Chinese within Red China, those
on Taiwan and in Southeast Asia,
Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia,
etc.?
Proving that Red China's trucu-
lence and stubborn defiance of the
world succeeds? Or showing that it
will fail?
Let us look now at the changes in
policy toward Red China suggested
by some. They are mostly three:
official diplomatic recognition by the
United States, expansion of trade re-
lations, and admission of Communist
China to the United Nations. What
would be the probable results of such
changes, the gains and losses?
Almost no one, so far as I have
seen, goes further than expressing the
vague hope that after these steps Red
China may "mellow, moderate, ma-
ture, evolve." But there is no evi-
dence on which to base the hoped-
for gains.
What benefits, economic or politi-
cal, has Great Britain received from
her granting of diplomatic recognition
in 1950? Or France two years ago?
Prime Minister Nehru of India
recognized Communist China in 1950
and worked out with Chou En-lai the
"Five Principles of Coexistence." He
remarked that Americans didn't get
along very well with the Chinese
Communists because we are not
Asians, implying that he, being a
fellow Asian, could. He was Red
China's chief apologist and advocate
?at the UN and elsewhere. How did
his fellow Asians in Peking respond
to his being their best friend? They
invaded India, and left Mr. Nehru a
broken man.
It is suggested that with diplomatic
recognition we might get more infor-
mation about conditions in Red China.
But we have been getting plenty of
information by a variety of means,
especially from the thousands of
escapees each year. Red China has not
allowed any newspaper correspondent
of any nationality to travel freely in
that land unless it had reason to be-
lieve in advance that he was general-
ly sympathetic. Our trouble is not
lack of information but erosion of our
steadfastness, our patience, our will?
as Mao boasted would be the case.
In contrast, there is no uncertainty
as to the losses that would result
from the suggested weakening of
American policy. Here are some:
It would pull the rug out from under
our loyal allies on Taiwan. The
Chinese are a realistic, even fatalistic,
people. With no hope for reunion in
freedom with their brethren on the
China mainland, they would have
little or no choice but to prepare for
the inevitable. Americans who advo-
cate admitting Red China and then
add glibly, "Of course we would sup-
port the defense of Taiwan," may be
salving their own consciences but
think no Asians will be deceived.
Twelve million Chinese could hardly
maintain indefinitely the will or the
capacity to resist 700 million, with the
world organization for peace itself re-
jecting the twelve million and accept-
ing the 700 million!
With weakening or loss of Taiwan
our Pacific island chain of defenses
would be breached. It is doubtful that
the Philippines could long resist Com-
munist pressures and blandishments.
Filipinos remember that it was from
Taiwan that their country was in-
vaded by the Japanese. It would take
vast intervention with American
forces to save that new nation for
which we certainly have a special re-
sponsibility in the Pacific. I have not
found any responsible Filipino leaders
who favor recognition of Communist
China.
The fifteen million or so Chinese
living in Southeast Asia occupy key
positions of power and influence in
Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Burma,
Indonesia, the Philippines. The gov-
ernments of those countries could not
refuse to recognize Communist China
once we did. That would mean every
Chinese embassy and consulate in
Southeast Asia. and in the world for
that matter, would become a protected
center of Communist espionage, prop-
aganda, sabotage and subversion of
the host government?as recently ex-
posed in Indonesia and Ghana.
Through these "embassies and con-
sulates" the Chinese minorities would
be under direct and almost irresistible
pressure to support the aggressive
policies of the Mao regime.
The stability of the strategic coun-
tries of Southeast Asia would inevita-
bly be weakened. Can anyone reason-
ably expect the governments of these
smaller and weaker countries to be
stronger Sand firmer vis-a-vis Red
China than the great United States
is?
If the United States were to show
that it is not a dependable ally in
Asia, our allies elsewhere, including
those in Europe, would know they
could not count on us either. What
would happen to the whole system of
collective security we have been
building at such cost and effort and
which is absolutely indispensable to
our own survival as a free nation?
Why should any country anywhere
stand by us if it is not sure we will
stand by it?
It would tell the neutrals and "un-
committed" nations that they were
right all along and that they might
as well give in to the winning side
at once.
Perhaps worst of all, it would tell
the 700 million people on the China
mainland that we are accepting their
subjugation, that we think there is
more hope for peace for ourselves in
deals with their oppressors than in
standing steadfastly with them, the
oppressed.
During the war and postwar years
the United States relaxed under the
skilfully built-up illusions that the
Soviet Union was a "peace-loving
democracy," eager and willing to co-
operate to build a world of order and
peace, and that the Chinese Commu-
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nists were just agrarian reformers.
Perhaps our best hope of getting out
of our present predicament and peril
without a nuclear holocaust lies in
the urge-to-be-free that lives in the
hearts of a billion human beings be-
hind the Communist curtains. Unless
these people are able from within to
force their Communist regimes to
change and eventually abandon Com-
munist world objectives, there is little
hope of our avoiding an ultimate all-
out clash. Is it intelligent or realistic
to adopt a foreign policy that can
cause those millions behind the Cur-
tains to abandon hope? If the strong
accept the Communist overlords, how
long can the weak continue to resist
them?
What would be the gains from re-
sumption of trade relations? The
Communists themselves have made
clear on numerous occasions that
their unwavering purposes are:
First, to get military and industrial
equipment and supplies which they
cannot yet obtain within the Com-
munist bloc?not in order that they
can trade more with us in the future,
but so they can become self-
sufficient and not need to trade with
us at all.
Second, to take advantage of a
favorable trade situation wherever
there is one that they cannot match
even by exploitation of their own
people and of their satellites.
Third, to induce countries to be-
come more and more dependent on
trade with the Soviet bloc, and there-
fore more and more at its mercy.
This applies particularly to Germany
and Japan.
Fourth, to divide the free world
powers.
Communist Trade Monopolies
All trade is conducted by Commu-
nist state organizations and monopo-
lies that have as their single objec-
tive the strengthening of the State.
They cannot trade under the accepted
rules of the free world without ceas-
ing to be Communist. They cannot
cease to be Communist without their
movement collapsing. Trade is as
much a weapon of their expansionism
as are missiles. It is to be expanded
or contracted, to be directed here or
shifted there, as those at the top de-
termine to be advantageous in pro-
moting the Communist world revolu-
tion.
Where trade between Communist
China and other countries exists, it is
522 NATIONAL REVIEW
only on sufferance of the Communist
government and will be extinguished
when it has served its purpose. This
has never been denied by the Chinese
Communist leaders. On the contrary,
they have avowed on numerous oc-
casions that complete nationalization
of industries and trade and collec-
tivization of agriculture has to come,
but in stages?which means just as
fast as they feel themselves strong
enough to impose it. Would it be in
our interest, economic or otherwise,
to help them do it faster?
The Head-in-Sand Line
What would be the result of ad-
mitting Communist China to the
United Nations?
Admission would represent for Red
China the greatest possible diplomatic
victory. It would give the Mao regime
the stamp of legitimacy and add im-
measurably to its prestige and power
all over the world. Why has every
Communist government, party, and
front in the world worked tirelessly
for fifteen years for Red China's ad-
mission if that would be bad for
Communism and good for us?
Some say, "But Communist China
is a fact. We must be realistic. We
cannot hide our heads in the sand
and ignore it or pretend it is not
there." But that is not a description
of our policy. On the contrary, it is
just because we recognize that Red
China is indeed a fact, and such a
powerful and dangerous fact, that
intelligent concern for our own and
the world's future requires its ex-
clusion from the United Nations until
it is willing to meet the qualifications
for membership. To admit it prior to
that time would only make it more
powerful and more dangerous.
The Communist regime in China
avowedly is dedicated to the isolation
and destruction of the United States.
Should America help it to a better
position from which to work for that
objective?
It is an utter non-sequitur to say
that because "Red China is there" it
ought to be admitted to the UN.
There are gangsters in some of our
cities. We do not argue that there-
fore the city councils, courts and
police force should take the gangsters
in. Rather we demand that lawless
elements be kept out of the forces
responsible for maintaining law and
order, or "peace and security"?which
the UN Charter states is the purpose
for which the organization was es-
tablished.
To keep Red China isolated and
weaker than it would otherwise be is
not denying or ignoring its existence;
it is the realistic way to deal with its
existence.
It is said that the United Nations
ought to be a universal organization
with all existing governments in it.
But the Charter makes perfectly clear
that the UN was never intended to
be a universal organization. That con-
cept was discussed at San Francisco
?and rejected. Why would the
Charter have Article 6 providing for
expelling "a member which has con-
sistently violated the principles con-
tained in the present Charter," if
the organization was supposed to be
universal?
So it is grossly untrue that the
United States is stubbornly, blindly,
arbitrarily keeping Communist China
out of the United Nations, as is some-
times claimed. Red China is stub-
bornly keeping itself out. It simply
refuses to qualify. I don't know any
university that will admit a student
without his meeting its entrance re-
quirements?even if he has a gun.
It is said that if the United Nations
is not to admit Communist China,
then it ought to expel the Soviet
Union. This is a good logical argu-
ment, but it is a useless one. The
Soviet Union can veto its own ex-
pulsion.
Never Trouble Trouble
The fact that there are already some
bad actors in the UN is all the more
reason why we should not, know-
ingly, bring any more in.
It is suggested that if we recognize
Communist China and admit it to
the United Nations, it might improve
the functioning of that and related
international organizations. There is
far more evidence that it would
hamper their functioning. The only
time the United Nations has been
able to operate as it was intended to
on a matter as serious as aggression
was in 1950 when the Soviet Union
was absenting itself from the Secu-
rity Council in an effort to pressure
the United Nations into admission of
Red China?and thus was unable to
veto UN action against the Corn-
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munist aggression in Korea. Moscow
is not likely to make the mistake of
being absent again.
It is clear that Communist govern-
ments do not join the United Nations
with the same purpose in mind as
we and other governments do, name-
ly, to help make it an effective
instrument for resolving disputes.
Obviously the Soviet Union joined
in order to make sure the UN does
not work effectively. It has a world
organization of its own, the Com-
munist Party, with organized, disci-
plined, efficient units in every coun-
try. The Communists intend to win
for their world organization. What
could be more advantageous than to
have seats in the other world organi-
zation also, particularly in the Se-
curity Council, where perfectly le-
gally under the Charter, they can
keep the rival organization crippled
and ineffective whenever they wish
to? Almost all of the more than 100
Soviet vetoes have been against
measures that were favored by the
overwhelming majority of UN mem-
bers and were in the direction of
peace.
It is not necessary to have Red
China in the UN in order to negotiate
with her, on this or any other matter.
We have had over 130 negotiations
with it in the last eleven years?
almost one a month?and more than
any other non-Communist govern-
ment has had.
Then there is the old diversionary
argument. "What about Chiang Kai-
shek?" Well, what about him?
History will decide his proper place
and I predict it will be a high one.
But our policy is not and has not
been based on Chiang; if he were
gone tomorrow, America's interests
would be precisely the same. We are
trying to help free peoples remain
free; therefore, it is to our interest
to support all peoples who will make
determined efforts in that direction.
The Free Chinese on Taiwan certainly
are making such efforts?and suc-
ceeding. They are ahead of every
other country in Asia except Japan.
We were able to stop our economic
assistance to Free China last July.
So if one examines the results of
the proposed changes in American
policy toward China, it is apparent
that the benefits would be minimal,
if any. The dangers to the countries
still free in Asia, to the United
Nations itself, and to our own secu-
rity and peace, would be certain and
serious indeed. On the other hand,
the policy of keeping Red China
contained and isolated has proved
successful in promoting the vital se-
curity interests of the United States.
Men have always found ways of
bringing down tyrants?and the Chi-
nese will bring down theirs?if only
we are not beguiled into throwing
the ball game away in the last quar-
ter by failing to stand fast?"five
minutes longer." We are called upon
by history to prove that free citizens
have greater fortitude, stronger
Communist China, Vietnam and
United States Policy
THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT has to be
seen within the framework of Com-
munism, as a power struggle within
the Communist world, and not as an
expression of national interests by
competing states of an international
order of the past.
In discussing today the problems
our own policy faces with regard to
Communist China, in Vietnam and in
Asia in general, I believe it to be of
foremost importance that we accept
the fact that our opponent, or rather
our opponents, are not national states
or traditional powers with traditional
ambitions, but components of that
Communist movement that is out to
conquer the world by whatever
means and to transform it in its image.
I believe that the most fatal mistake
that we can make is to assume that
Communism is dead, that a Commu-
nist ideology is dead, and that we
deal with powers which pursue tradi-
tional national interests and have to
be dealt with on that basis. Lately
it has often been argued that the be-
havior of the Communist Chinese-
nerves and steadier patience and
faith than do tyrants?faith in man
and faith in God.
In summary, seating of Red China
in the United Nations would be
illegal. It would require violation of
the organization's Charter.
It would be immoral. It would al-
most certainly mean removal of a
member that abides by the Charter
to seat a non-member that brazenly
refuses to abide by the Charter. It
would abandon 700 million people to
Communist subjugation. It would
properly be regarded as an attempt
to buy peace for ourselves by sacri-
ficing our principles and other peo-
ples' freedom.
And it would bring no practical
benefits. On the contrary, there would
be certain and disastrous losses?with
our allies; with the neutrals; with the
peoples in Asia and everywhere else
who desire to retain their freedom;
and with the long-suffering millions
now under Communist rule who yearn
to regain their freedom. Do not break
the hearts of the oppressed and their
continued will to resist from within
by accepting their oppressors.
Until someone can suggest policies
that offer better prospects of success,
based on something more substantial
than speculation, wishful thinking or
just hope, I can see no sound, sensi-
ble, or logical reason to change pres-
ent policies and every reason to con-
tinue them, always being flexible in
our tactics as required by develop-
ments as they come along.
FRANZ MICHAEL
leadership can be explained, at least
in part, in terms of the imperial
Chinese tradition of past centuries;
that if we only could understand this
tradition and help to break down the
barriers that have kept its present
representatives from understanding
the world, we would then be able to
deal with them on rational terms, that
is, terms that are rational within our
concept of rationality.
I believe nothing could be further
from the truth. There could be no
greater contrast, ethically and intel-
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lectually, let alone politically, than
that between the emperors of Con-
fucian China of old and the Commu-
nist Party's Marxist-Leninist China of
today. The two are not even histori-
cally related. Between the period of
the rule of the emperors of old and
that of the Communists of today,
China was under the National Gov-
ernment which accepted the Western
concept of the nation-state. When the
Communists took over in 1949 they
did not abolish a Confucian imperial
order but the law courts, the codes,
the educational system, the Western
economy and the Western thought
that had been the basis of a Nation-
alist China that was well on the way
to taking its place in the world until
the Japanese attack in World War II,
and the civil war that followed, de-
stroyed it.
Communizing China
The Communists, after their con-
quest of power, had two major pur-
poses: to communize China internal-
ly and to contribute to the world
Communist revolution externally. It
is the latter purpose which poses the
problems we are facing today in Asia.
Any attempt to ignore this Commu-
nist purpose is done at our risk. It
is simply unrealistic to assume that
by gestures or offers, by trade or dis-
cussions we will sway the Commu-
nists to accept our world of live and
let live. They are realists, of course.
who will not go into ventures they re-
gard as hopeless. They will move
when they regard the time and the
situation as opportune; and they will
bide their time when, in their terms.
the revolutionary wave has subsided.
But we have to understand that their
logic is not our logic. When we nego-
tiate, we have to remember that their
purpose is not ?ours. And until the
Communist purpose of world domi-
nation has changed, all that can be
arranged is at best a truce.
The hope has been expressed that
what is sometimes called the "out-
moded doctrine of Marxism-Lenin-
ism" is losing its grip on Communist
leadership, or that at least the next
generation of leaders will no longer
believe in world revolution. This can
only be regarded as wishful thinking.
There is no evidence whatsoever that
the main tenets of the gospel itself
have been affected in Communist
524 NATIONAL REVIEW
thinking by this or the younger gen-
eration, whatever shifting strategy
may recommend itself to them at the
time.
But, of course, the strategies have
been shifting. Karl Marx's original
predictions of the increasing misery
of the industrial proletariat have been
completely disproved by develop-
ments in the industrial countries, and
then the Bolshevik revolution oc-
curred in what was at best a marginal
area of industrialization. The hopes
which its leader, Lenin, placed on a
Communist revolution in Germany in
1919, 1920 and 1922, proved false. It
was Lenin who then shifted to strat-
egy number two in the Communist
grand plan for world conquest. His
theory of Imperialism as the Highest
Stage of Capitalism permitted the
use for Communist purposes of re-
volutionary tensions in what we call
today the developing countries of the
world. The strategy for Communist
conquest in China and today in Viet-
nam and elsewhere, was Lenin's. It
is the strategy of what the Commun-
ists call "wars of national liberation."
It feeds on two elements. One is
agrarian discontent or what is called
the agrarian revolution in these pre-
dominantly agricultural countries.
The other is the emerging nationalism
of a small, Western-educated elite,
regarded by the Communists as
bourgeois-capitalist or nationalist-
capitalist, but "anti-imperialist." The
use of peasant discontent and of
nationalist aspirations for Communist
purposes must, however, not lead us
astray. Mao Tse-tung, who followed
this Leninist-Stalinist policy, was not
an agrarian reformer nor was he a
heretic. And Ho Chi Minh and the
Vietcong today are Communists and
not nationalists with Communist
trimmings.
The two strategies of proletarian
revolution and of national liberation
movements or wars of liberation are
by no means irreconcilable. But the
matter of coordinating them may pose
problems. And the question of em-
phasis today, where there are two
headquarters in the overall Com-
munist movement, has become a part
of the expression of the conflict for
power. Communist advance in the
industrial world today is not possible
through proletarian uprisings as once
conceived after World War I, nor
did the Communists prove able to
exploit their participation in the re-
sistance movements during World
War II in France and Italy for
eventual take-over. And since there
is now a universal fear of hydrogen
war, blustering threat of same, as
once used by a Soviet, has been ex-
cluded since it became clear that the
United States would stand for Berlin
or any part of Europe. So the strategy
has shifted to what is called "peace-
ful coexistence." In Khrushchev's
words:
Peaceful coexistence does not imply
conciliation between socialist and
bourgeois ideologies . . . The peace-
ful coexistence of states with differ-
ent social systems presupposes an
unremitting ideological, political, and
economic struggle of the working peo-
ple inside the countries of the capital-
ist system, including armed struggle
when they find that necessary [sic!]
and the steady advance of the national
liberation movement among the peo-
ples of the colonial and dependent
countries.
'Peaceful Coexistence'
Their "peaceful co-existence" does
not mean the end of confrontation
with Communism, but it is confronta-
tion in an area where our superiority
?once we understand the threat?
should not make us fear the battle,
so much better to be fought in the
intellectual rather than in the mili-
tary field.
But it is different with the wars
of liberation. This type of warfare,
focused today in Vietnam, is the
strategy that the Soviets have as
much approved as the Chinese. If
they are somewhat reluctant to go all
out for it as the Chinese Communists
do, it is in order not to compromise
the peaceful co-existence strategy for
which they want to be known. In
my view, Ho Chi Minh has not only
received Soviet support from the be-
ginning, but will be backed as long
as the Soviets believe that this par-
ticular national liberation war looks
favorable. The 'Chinese Communists,
however, have gone all out for this
strategy. Its priority in today's Com-
munist advance was openly stated
by the Indonesian Communist leader
D. N. Aidit, who lost his life recently
in the 'Communist coup in Indonesia.
It has become most memorably pro-
claimed in the often-quoted statement
of the Chinese Communist military
leader Lin Piao, who compared the
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national liberation wars in the de-
veloping countries to the strategy
once used in China by the encircle-
ment of the cities through Communist
control of the rural areas in prepara-
tion for eventual take-over of the
whole country. In the same way the
rural areas of the world?the coun-
tries of Asia, Africa, and South
America?are to be taken over first
by the encirclement of the industrial
nations now regarded as the cities
of the world. The most important
sentence is perhaps the one in which
Lin Piao compared the effectiveness
of the two strategies:
Since World War II, the proletarian
revolutionary movement has for vari-
ous reasons been temporarily held
back in the North American and West
European capitalist countries, while
the people's revolutionary movement
in Asia, Africa and Latin America has
been growing vigorously.
It is this Communist advance that
we are facing today. Should it suc-
ceed in Vietnam it will continue else-
where; in Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, Africa and South America. That,
at least, is the Communist intent But
things have not been going well for
the Chinese Communists both in Asia
and in Africa, and the ?Chinese set-
backs have, in my view, something to
do with the proof of our willingness
to resist in Vietnam.
Since we are facing a Communist
strategy and not Chinese nationalist
imperialism, or for that matter, Soviet
nationalist advance, such Communist
insurgencies as in Vietnam have to be
locally based. But a local insurgency
is only possible as a part of the Com-
munist conspiracy, using the organ-
izational and ideological framework
that is uniform for all Communism.
On this basis the local Communists
receive not only political support
from the movement but also outside
aid in the form of equipment, financ-
ing, military expertise and leadership
and, where feasible, direct military
support. Where they were left alone
as in Malaya or in the Philippines,
such Communist insurgencies could
be defeated. The problem today is to
defeat such an insurgency in Vietnam
where it is receiving that outside
support.
We have today begun to under-
stand that this insurgency is not
simply military action which requires
a military answer. One of its most
important ingredients and one that is
not contained in Mao Tse-tung's
homilies on guerrilla warfare is the
use of terror. This terror is not the
use of atrocities for atrocity's sake or
as some have held, "the killing of
some unpopular landlords or admin-
istrators." It is rather the systematic
elimination of the leadership of the
communities to be taken over by the
Communists through assassinations
of the most educated and most re-
spected local leaders: the local
school teacher, the village head, the
monk, and the families of these peo-
ple. It is also directed against all
those who refuse to cooperate, who
refuse to provide intelligence and
service. Its aim is not only to in-
timidate the communities, to show
on which side one can survive, it is
also directed at depriving the com-
munities of their leadership so that
the Communist cadres can take the
place of those who have been killed.
To fight this strategy requires
more than simple military action.
What is necessary, of course, is the
ability to protect the population from
this threat. Before this protection
can be guaranteed, all the destruc-
tion of the guerrilla forces is at best
a temporary reprieve. But there is
much more at issue.
The problem of the developing
countries of Asia is the problem of
a vast transformation. A revolution-
ary transformation indeed, which will
take place and is taking place in
these countries under whatever
auspices. Under the impact of the
modern world, its ideas and its
economics, the traditional agrarian
societies of this world of old agrarian
civilizations are disintegrating. The
Western-educated small elites are the
first to have been affected by Western
ideas, Western education and West-
ern forms of life. But the gap has
widened between these Westernizing
cities and the rural areas, mostly
neglected and often contemptuously
disregarded or exploited by the new-
ly emerging elites. It is this gap that
the Communists have been exploit-
ing. What is needed, regardless of the
Communist threat, is the re-integra-
tion of the societies and nations of
the world of developing states, a
revolution within their old tradition
based on their own beliefs and ideas.
This revolution does not consist
simply of technical change. Modern
hygiene, health measures, the fight
against malaria, hospitals, schools,
new agrarian methods, are only tech-
nical forms of changes. What matters
is the cultural framework in which
this transformation takes place, and
"cultural" in this sense is more than
the outward manifestations of a ma-
terial world. It has been said that
Communism is strong because of its
political organization. And the fight
against Communism is truly an or-
ganizational battle. But the Commu-
nist organization is based on Commu-
nist ideology and Communist purposes.
If there were no ideology there would
be no Communist Party and no Com-
munist threat. The problem of the
countries of the developing world is
to integrate revolutionary changes
into their cultural tradition. In the
solution to this problem we can and
should assist. To do so we need an
understanding of the beliefs and
ideas of the great Asian cultural
traditions in order to comprehend the
setting in which these changes will
take place. A true nationalism in
these countries?not the Communist
exploitation of it?must be founded
on these cultural traditions.
We have to realize, for instance,
that democratic elections which we
rightly regard as the free expression
of a people's will require a social
framework that does not necessarily
exist in the countries concerned.
Without a viable organization in the
communities there is a serious prob-
blem of political organization. Politi-
cal parties in our sense are a new
development and need time and the
foundation upon which to grow.
MAY 31, 1966 525
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I believe our government's policy
has today recognized the need of
"capturing the revolution." The eco-
nomic, social and political reforms
initiated in South Vietnam, the spe-
cial teams that are to compete with
the National Liberation Front?our
real enemy?lead us in the right
direction.
I would regard it as a deadly mis-
take to give administrative recog-
nition in negotiations?let alone be-
forehand?to the very foe who is
aiming to destroy the society we are
trying to build. Truly free elections,
once they can be held, need not be
feared.
But Vietnam is not an isolated
United States Relations with
Communist China
THE UNITED STATES is better informed
about Communist China today than
is any other country in the Free
World. Our government provides
daily translations of the mainland
press and periodicals for general use,
it translates for its own purposes a
great variety of specialized Chinese
printed material, some of which it
puts at the disposal of scholars. There
are about a dozen major universities
with libraries and staff sufficient to
provide the student with advanced
graduate training on China. Courses
in the Chinese language can be taken
at hundreds of universities and col-
leges. The financial support provided
by private foundations and by the
National Defense Education Act has
been instrumental in giving us hun-
dreds of scholars well trained in the
Chinese language and one or more of
the disciplines. Our library holdings
on Communist China are very exten-
sive, and we publish more studies on
Communist China than all other non-
Communist countries put together.
The combined resources of England,
France, and Germany, both human
and material, are small indeed when
compared with those of the United
States.
The American scholar, it has been
pointed out, cannot go to Communist
China and therefore loses a valuable
asset. This is true; the Communists
will not allow him in. There is no
substitute for being in the land, but
in some cases there is not a great
advantage. Most of the correspondents
of other countries who have resided
in Peking are quite frank about the
difficulties and frustrations facing the
journalistic profession in that coun-
try. Hong Kong is a far more valu-
526 NATIONAL REVIEW
able source of information about
Communist China than is Peking.
The main difficulty in getting in-
formation about China stems not
from the fact that Americans are
not allowed to visit there, but from
the extraordinary efforts made by the
Communist regime to prevent both
its own people and other peoples
from knowing those things it wishes
to conceal. I would not be surprised if
Peking found our economic studies to
be more accurate than their own. I
wish to mention this point about in-
formation because there are those
who feel that we would be much
better informed if we recognized
Communist China and could send
our scholars and journalists to that
country. Unless there were a radical
change in the attitude of the Com-
munist regime the evidence does not
suggest that access to the mainland,
considering the price we would have
to pay, would make that much
difference.
The Soviet 'Model'
I am not suggesting that we have
sufficient information about Commu-
nist China, merely that we have as
much if not more than anyone else.
In the academic profession, while we
all read the same materials, we do
not arrive at the same conclusions.
I find myself in general agreement
with the descriptive material pre-
sented in this testimony?that Com-
munist China's domestic problems are
serious and exacting, her military as
well as economic resources are not
those of a great power, her adven-
turous excursions in foreign policy
have been costly and discouraging,
issue. It is only the focal point in
what I would regard as the present
main front in the battle between
Communist totalitarian aspirations
and the support of our kind of revo-
lution, in a world that we want to
keep free for the pluralism of cul-
tures and traditions, in Asia as well
as elsewhere.
GEORGE E. TAYLOR
and that she is not getting along very
well with the Soviet Union in either
party or state relations. But I cannot
follow some of the policy recom-
mendations of my colleagues because
I think that they are based on de-
batable premises, and it is the
premises that are crucial.
Much is made of the assumption
that we have stabilized our relations
with the Soviet Union and that the
same can be done with Communist
China. The Soviet model is so taken
for granted that it is never clearly
defined. It is asserted that we now
have a stable and tolerable relation-
ship with the Soviet Union and that
this has come about through an evo-
lutionary process marked by changes
within the Communist system. There
certainly have been considerable
changes and there is a sort of stability.
But in my view the present stability
is brittle in the extreme and is
based mainly on the superior military
power of the United States and its
allies and on a common interest in
avoiding one kind of war, nuclear
conflict between the U.S. and the
USSR. Moscow still favors subver-
sion and "just" wars of national
liberation. The balance can change
because it does not rest merely on a
counting of nuclear bombs. There are
other factors in the balance such as
the state of the economy, the state
of our alliances, the quality of our
leadership. As we showed at the time
of the Cuban crisis, a shift in the
nuclear balance of power can be pre-
vented ?by the use of conventional
weapons. Nor can we fail to note that
the present stability includes a war
with the Soviet Union by proxy in
Vietnam, and Soviet cooperation with
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Cuba in an effort to subvert Latin
America, whose governments are so
alarmed by Cuban activities that
many have broken off diplomatic re-
lations with both Moscow and
Havana.
Two sets of reasons are usually
given for the new Soviet behavior.
There are those who think that the
stability of our relations with the
Soviet Union is due to changes in
the mode of production which have
been reflected in changes in the ideol-
ogical superstructure. They would
phrase it differently but it is still
vulgar Marxism. As the Communists
put on fat, according to this theory,
they acquire a democratic dislike for
muscle. Such scholarly investigation
as we have of this subject, to say
nothing of the record, suggests that
the question of whether or not there
have been basic changes in the politi-
cal objectives of the Soviet Union is
still open to serious question. Then
there are those who think that pres-
ent Soviet behavior arises from the
fact that we followed a policy of con-
tainment combined with recognition
of the Soviet Union and its member-
ship in the UN. The same formula
applied to China should produce the
same results. It is proposed to con-
tinue the containment, offer recogni-
tion, and cease to block the way into
the UN. This is a doubtful analogy
on which to base action. Nor is there
any real parallel between Communist
China and the USSR, nor any surety
that the same techniques will bring
the same results. But the USSR could
be used as an interesting case study
of what happens when a Communist
nation is treated with generosity and
good will (as during World War II)
and allowed to operate within an
organization for the maintenance of
peace.
In my view it is safer to proceed
on the premise that there is no world
community, as the phrase goes, into
which we can induce the Chinese to
enter. Unfortunately we live in a
world in which there are at least two
violently opposed concepts of interna-
tional relations, of political and so-
cial organizations, and of world or-
der. The dialogue between them is
still minimal. Everything we do with
Communist China has to be seen in
this context. Whatever the relations
between Peking and Moscow, as far
as the world community is concerned,
they share the same outlook. The
problem then is how to define our
relations with the Chinese section of
the Communist world. It is clearly
necessary, in this dangerous world, to
do this.
Further to clarify my premises, I
do not think, for example, that the
evidence supports the fashionable
view that the Communist world is
falling apart and that Communist
states have the same sort of foreign
policy objectives as any other nation
state or can be expected to pursue
them in the same manner. The social
and political content of nationalism is
determined by the institutional power
configuration and this is what is new
and lasting about Communism. It is
because it is the nature of power that
determines foreign policy?to put the
matter very briefly?that I feel there
is little hope of any changes in Chi-
nese Communist policies that are not
forced on her. It is necessary to men-
tion this because there is a great re-
luctance on the part of China spe-
cialists, perhaps because they love the
Chinese so much, to admit that the
Chinese Communists are really Com-
munists.
The agrarian reformers of the for-
ties are now the aging paranoids of
the sixties, to be handled, it would
seem, by group therapy. If they were
really nationalists masquerading as
Communists, then Chinese tradition
as well as the humiliations of nine-
teenth-century imperialism would be
relevant to their mood, but in my
view the Communists represent a
complete break with the past. Their
world view is not conditioned by the
imperial past although they are will-
ing to exploit it. A comparison with
some real nationalists will point up
the differences. It was the National
government that won the ending of
imperial privileges in 1942 and lost
the chance of building up a modern
China largely as a result of the
Japanese invasion. We might have
difficulties with them if they were
in power on the mainland, but I doubt
they would be sponsoring the Viet-
cong or fomenting trouble in the rest
of the world. There is nothing about
Chinese nationalism that calls for the
hate campaign of the Chinese Com-
munists against the United States, for
the militarization of a quarter of the
people of the earth, for the racial in-
vective that pervades so much of their
propaganda, even in Hong Kong, or
for the support of revolutionary
movements in Southeast Asia, Africa,
and Latin America as spelled out in
the Central Committee decisions of
1963 and reaffirmed in the Lin Piao
statement. A true nationalism would
call for attention to domestic prob-
lems and would certainly avoid a
quarrel with a powerful neighbor.
The most recent statement of Chi-
nese Communist political goals, the
Lin Piao position paper of September
1965, is variously interpreted. The
Aesopian dialogue of the Communist
world is not always easy to follow
and this effort was clearly designed
to achieve several purposes at the
same time. In my view it should be
taken seriously as a general indica-
tion of the objectives and strategy of
the Peking wing of the movement.
It is not impossible that this strategy
could be made to work. It is based
on the assumption that the revolution
is not going to occur in the great in-
dustrial states, that the Achilles heel
of the West is the Third World, that
the promotion of wars of national lib-
eration in Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia will distract and waste
the energies of the Western powers,
confuse their peoples, and demoralize
their leaders.
Some believe that Communist China
is too weak to carry out such a
grandiose strategy, that in fact she is
now reeling from shattering defeat.
When the Soviets came to the as-
sistance of the Chinese Nationalists
in 1923 they were not a strong power,
but they almost succeeded in taking
over the Nationalist movement at a
MAY 31, 1966 527
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cost of 1,000 advisers and about $3
million. The Chinese Communists
were not very strong when they pro-
vided the Vietminh with the heavy
weapons that made possible the con-
quest of Dien-Bien-Phu, nor when
they intervened in North Korea, nor
when they promoted a Communist at-
tempt to take over Malaya in 1948.
May I also suggest that the Chinese
Communists were involved in the at-
tempted coup d'etat in Indonesia last
October and that it came very close
to succeeding? If it had succeeded it
would have been followed by an in-
tensification of the war against Ma-
laysia; Thailand would have been
caught in a pincer, and our position
in Vietnam would have become very
precarious.
The main question that the leaders
and peoples of Southeast Asia are
asking is, who is going to win? Under
these conditions it would have seemed
that the Chinese brand of Communism
was in the ascendency; Lin Piao's
statement would have looked like a
curtain-raiser rather than noisy brag-
ging or defensive defiance. China is
obviously in no position to seek a
head-on collision with the United
States and is most unlikely to give
us the opportunity to declare war on
her, but she is quite capable of fos-
tering wars of national liberation
wherever opportunities are provided.
It is said that we should not isolate
Peking. It is Peking that is trying to
isolate us. Communist China is far
from being isolated; she has diplo-
matic relations of a sort with about
forty countries and is trading with
many she does not recognize, such as
Japan and Canada. She is very much
in the international community where
it counts; in fact, much too much.
The terms she has announced for tak-
Conclusion: Red China's
Reaction
The official Peking reaction to the
Fulbright hearings was that they
were in effect a venture in futility
since the new proposals made by the
members of the Red China Lobby
were, nothing more than another ap-
proach by American Imperialists to
frustrating the Chinese revolution.
An article in the influential People's
Daily of April 9, 1966, carries this
commentary, in part:
"The so-called China question has
become the focus of attention in the
U.S. in the past two months. U.S.
scholars and idea men in the service
of the ruling classes and responsible
officials have put forth their views
in a great debate on China policy.. . .
"In reality, the 'containment with-
out isolation' formula is a manifesta-
tion of the U.S. imperialist counter-
revolutionary dual tactics on China
policy. In short, this means on the one
hand continued aggression against
and encirclement of China, contain-
ment and isolation of China, while on
the other, indulging in the vain hope
to bring about 'peaceful evolution' in
China so that revolutionary China
will degenerate gradually.
"It can be seen that the present de-
528 NATIONAL REVIEW
bate reflects not the 'powerfulness'
of the U.S. but its weakness and de-
feat and its helplessness and dilemma
in face of the great Chinese people.
Some influential Americans too criti-
cized the U.S. China policy as 'in a
fundamental sense unsuccessful' and
'long since out of date.' They called
for a 'fundamental review of our
China policy.' It is against such a
background that the Johnson Admin-
istration wants to make use of the
debate as a smokescreen to sidetrack
the strong dissatisfaction at home and
abroad with the U.S. anti-China pol-
icy and to cover up the continuance
of the policy of hostility and aggres-
sion against China.
"The debate shows that the differ-
ence between these idea men is about
what counter-revolutionary method
should be adopted. They are at one
in persisting in the policy of hostility
and aggression towards China. That
is why none of them could put forth
a feasible formula. After repeated
deliberations and consideration, the
experts ended in agreeing to the con-
tinuation and stepping up of the 'con-
tainment' policy.
"Helpless and hopelessly, Harvard
ing a seat in the UN are so out-
rageous that they must have been de-
signed to show her contempt for that
organization. Her terms for accepting
recognition are humiliating in the ex-
treme, although she would be de-
lighted to have us help her finish off
the civil war by reducing or eliminat-
ing the international status of the Na-
tionalist government. If the Chinese
Communists really want to live in
peace with the world they are quite
capable of making a move in that
direction.
In the meantime, it should not be
beyond the wit of man to devise ways
and means of putting the burden of
proof, as far as peaceful intentions
are concerned, on the Peking regime,
so long as nothing is done to damage
American credit in Asia and her
willingness to stand by her friends
and her principles.
Professor John K. Fairbank, the so-
called veteran 'Chiang specialist,' and
others, again put forward the long
discredited 'two-Chinas' formula.
Some others proposed that 'uncondi-
tional discussions' be held and 'diplo-
matic relations' established with
China before the future of Taiwan
is discussed. But even Dean Rusk
himself had to admit that as far as
the 'two Chinas' proposal was con-
cerned, 'it was useless' because China
had rejected it.
"U.S. imperialism's persistent hos-
tility towards the Chinese people is
determined by its reactionary and ag-
gressive nature. There is nothing
strange about it. What is strange is
that U.S. imperialism even hopes to
find a 'way out' of the blind alley of
its China policy. The great debate
in the United States over Washing-
ton's China policy shows once again
that it is mere illusion.
"Look, how many politicians,
'scholars' and 'specialists' took part
in these discussions. But nothing
fruitful has come out of them. Nor
will there be any result if more dis-
cussions are held. Gentlemen in
Washington, there is nothing you can
do about it!"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/30:
CIA-RDP73-00475R000102940003-9
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