HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON S. 537 A BILL TO AMEND THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946 TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE FISCAL REQ

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000300160002-1
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 19, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE
ON THE BUDGET
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 537
A BILL TO AMEND THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION
ACT OF 1946 TO PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE EVALUA-
TION OF THE FISCAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 19 AND 20, 1963
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96545 WASHINGTON : 1963
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS?
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ANN M. GRICKIS, ASSiStaNt Chief Clerk
GLENN K. SHRIVEN, Professional Staff Member
ELI E. NOBLEMAN, Professional Staff Member
W. E. O'BRIEN, Professional Staff Member
JAMES R. CALLOWAY, Professional Staff Member
ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor
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I.
CONTENTS
Page
Opening statement of the chairman 1
S. 537. Amend the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to provide for
more effective evaluation of the fiscal requirements of the executive
agencies of the Government of the United States 4
MARCH 19, 1963
Hon. Spessard L. Holland, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 7
Hon. Ben. F. Jensen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa_ 22
MARCH 20, 1963
Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, accompanied
by Robert F. Keller, General Counsel, GAO 31
Hon. Robert McClory, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois 40
Dr. John S. Saloma, III, assistant professor of political science, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology 46
Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., Princeton, N.J 59
COMMUNICATIONS AND STATEMENTS
Allott, Hon. Gordon, letter to Senator McClellan, dated March 11, 1963_ _ 68
Anderson, Dewey, executive director, Public Affairs Institute 44
Bell, Daniel W., former chairman of the board, American Security &
Trust Co., letter to Senator McClellan, dated March 13, 1963_ 75
Colm, Gerhard, chief economist, National Planning Association, letter to
Senator McClellan, dated March 13, 1963 75
Hook, Charles R., chairman, Committee of Hoover Commission Task
Force Members, letter to Senator McClellan, dated March 15, 1963 77
Marsh, Hon. John 0., Jr., statement in support of a Joint Committee on the
Budget 69
McGlory, Hon. Robert, letters to Senator McClellan, dated March 26,
1963, and March 22, 1963 43, 78
Mines, Barry T., executive vice president, New Hampshire Tax Payers
Federation, telegram to Senator McIntyre, dated March 5, 1963 78
Muskie, Hon. Edmund S., statement in support of S. 537_ 68
Reid, Ralph W. E., resident manager in Washington for A. T. Kearney &
Co 70
Saltonstall, Hon. Leverett, letter to Senator McClellan, dated March 20,
1963 69
Tillinghast, Carlton W., chairman, National Taxpayers Conference, letter
to Senator McClellan, dated March 20, 1963 76
Wallace, Robert Ash, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury 71
APPENDIX
Staff Memo No. 88-1-27: Authority of the Senate to originate appropria-
tion bills 81
Exhibit 1?Power of the Senate to originate appropriation bills (H. Rept.
147, 46th Cong.) ? 97
Exhibit 2?The legislative right to originate money bills, by John A.
Kasson 112
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CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 1963
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
-W ashington,D.61
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m. in room 3302,
New Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators McClellan, Gruening, Pell, Mundt, Curtis, and
Pearson.
Also present: Walter L. Reynolds' chief clerk and staff director ;
Ann M. Grickis, assistant chief clerk: and Eli E. Nobleman, profes-
sional staff member.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
These hearings have been scheduled to develop testimony on S.
537, to amend the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to provide
for more effective evaluation of the fiscal requirements of the execu-
tive agencies of the Government of the United States.
The purpose of this bill is to provide the Congress with the ma-
chinery necessary to enable it to meet its constitutional responsibilities
in connection with the appropriation of funds required for the con-
duct of the Federal Government. It seeks to accomplish this objective
by establishing a Joint Committee on the Budget, composed of mem-
bers of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, which
would assist the Congress in exercising adequate control over the ex-
penditures of public funds by the executive branch of the Government.
This proposed Joint Committee on the Budget would be staffed with
nonpartisan fiscal experts and technicians who would be engaged in
making continuing studies-12 months of the year?of programs and
expenditures proposed by the executive branch. The establishment
of this joint committee would provide the Congress with the same
type and caliber of detailed technical information as the Joint Com-
mittee on Revenue Taxation provides for the revenue committees
of the Congress, and the Bureau of the Budget provides for the
executive branch.
One of the most serious problems confronting our Nation today
is the maintenance of national solvency in the face of ever-growing
demands on the Federal Government for programs and services,
coupled with the necessity of meeting the national defense require-
ments of the cold war and the atomic and space age.
1
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2 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Our national expenditures budget has grown from $66 billion in
? fiscal year 1956 to an estimated $94.3 billion for 1963, and a requested
? $98.8 billion for fiscal year 1964. In other words, we are now moving
rapidly toward an annual expenditures budget in excess of $100 bil-
lion, and toward annual expenditures in all categories that will exceed
$150 billion, bearing in mind that approximately $25 billion in annual
spending does not appear in the appropriated budget. Our national
debt, now more than $300 billion, is rising at a rate in excess of $8 bil-
lion annually. Nor does the end appear to be in sight.
This matter is of the gravest concern to the Congress, since, from
the formation of our Government down to the present time, it has been
clearly understood that the Constitution vested in the Congress and
the Congress alone the exclusive right to appropriate supplies of
money to the various branches of the Federal Government, and to
designate the purposes for which the money shall be used.
Although we are now operating in an era of annual expenditure
budgets of $100 billion, the procedures used by the Congress in carry-
ing out these vital responsibilties are fundamentally no different than
those used 20, 30, or 40 years ago. In other words, the methods and
procedures which we now use in the appropriations process are simply
inadequate to meet present-day needs.
In January 1950, after having served 1 year as a member of the Sen-
ate Committee on Appropriations, I became convinced that under
then-existing procedures, which were no different than those presently
followed, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses were labor-
ing under a tremendous disadvantage in their efforts to pass upon
budget requests for Federal expenditures. The fundamental 'problem
which I found to exist at that time?and it still exists today?is due to
the fact that the Congress, which is most generous in equippincrthe
executive branch agencies with personnel to handle its affairs, Ailed
to provide itself with adequate machinery to carry out one of its most
vital functions and responsibilities?the appropriation of funds for
the conduct of the Government.
Instead of equipping itself with an adequate number of experts and
technicians to examine every detail of the appropriation requests sub-
mitted by executive branch agencies and departments, the Congress
has been content to limp along without the assistance and information
it requires. Thus, aside from the overburdened staffs of the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees, which cannot possibly make
the kind of analysis of budget requests which is necessary in the time
available, members of the Appropriations Committees are forced to
rely upon the testimony of representatives of the executive branch who
formulate the programs and present them in a light most favorable to
their requests. Furthermore, they are apt to tell us only as little or as
much as they desire to disclose.
Accordingly, on January 19, 1950, I introduced a bill, S. 2898, which
was similar, in many respects, to the pending bill. The committee
studied the bill and revised it, but took no further action on it during
the 81st Congress. Thereafter, the committee reported favorably,
and the Senate approved, in the 82d, 83d, 84th, 85th, and 87th Con-
gresses, virtually identical bills proposing the creation of a Joint Com-
mittee on the Budget. On each occasion following Senate passage,
the measure was permitted to die in the House of Representatives.
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In each Congress, these bills were cosponsored by a substantial ma-
jority of the Members of the Senate. In the 85th Congress' 'Ti Mem-
bers of a total of 96 cosponsored the measure. In the 87th Congress,
there were 67 cosponsors. The bill presently pending before us has
the largest number of cosponsors it has ever had-77.
It appears perfectly clear that the conditions which prompted the
initial introduction of this measure, in 1950, and its initial passage
by the U.S. Senate, in 1952, have in no way diminished. On the con-
trary, they have increased in intensity. In fact, it appears quite clear
that there is greater need for this measure today than there was pre-
viously, and that need grows with each budget message we receive
from the President of the United States and with each session of the
Congress, as the cost of Government increases, as expenditures rise,
and as the tax burden is felt more keenly by the American people.
An additional important factor to be considered in connection with
the committee's consideration of S. 537 is the breakdown in our appro-
priations procedure which occurred during the 87th Congress, and
which is a matter of the greatest concern to all of us. It is my firm
conviction that if this bill had been enacted into law earlier, and the
proposed joint committee had been in operation, this breakdown would
not have occurred. I say this because I believe that the establishment
of a Joint Committee on the Budget will be conducive to better co-
operation and a spirit of working in harmony between the two Appro-
priations Committees of the Congress. If we can have members of
these committees working together, each getting the same information,
each having access to the tools with which to work and each relying
on the technical advice and information furnished by a joint staff,
they will be able to obtain better information with which to evaluate
intelligently the requests made. This, in turn, should go a long way
toward removing the frictions and disagreements which have cropped
up from time to time in connection with the appropriation process.
S. 537 has been developed and perfected by the Committee on
Government Operations through careful studies and previous hearings
in the 81st and. 82d Congresses. We have scheduled these hearings
today because we believe it is important to hear any additional expert
testimony which may assist us in further establishing the need for
such legislation and to assist the committee in perfecting the measure,
if that is found to be desirable. Equally important, however, is the
fact that the American taxpayers have a very real and vital stake in
this legislation, despite the fact that the subject may appear technical
in nature. Public hearings generate public interest, and it is hoped
that any issues which may not be completely clear to the American
taxpayer at this time will be fully clarified.
Although the Senate has been endeavoring, for more than 12 years,
to effect the necessary improvements in the fiscal operations of the
legislative process, the House of Representatives has so far failed to
act favorably on this proposal. I am convinced that a majority of
the Members of that body are as interested in correcting these budget
management deficiencies of the Congress as are Members of the Senate.
This is evidenced by the fact that 21 Members of the House have al-
ready introduced identical or similar bills in the 88th Congress.
It is the sincere desire of the committee that these hearings will be
instrumental in obtaining the support of a majority of the Members
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4 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON MU. BUDGET
of the House so that this important legislation may be enacted into
law at the present session of the Congress.
I will ask that there be printed in the record at this point a copy of
S. 537.
(S. 537 follows:)
[S. 537, 88th Cong., 1st sess.)
A BILL To amend the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to provide for more effective
evaluation of the fiscal requirements of the executive agencies of the Government of the
United States
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 138 of the Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
"SEc. 138. (a) There is hereby created a joint service committee, to be known
as the Joint Committee on the Budget ( hereinafter in this section called ?the
'joint committee') to be composed of fourteen members as follows:
"(1) Seven Members who are members of the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate, four from the majority party and three from the minority party,
to be chosen by such committee; and
"(2) Seven Members who are members of the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives, four from the majority party and three from
the minority party, to be chosen by such committee.
"(b) No person shall continue to serve as a member of the joint committee
after he has ceased to be a member of the committee from which he was chosen,
except that the Members chosen by the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives who have been reelected to the House of Representa-
tives may continue to serve as members of the joint committee notwithstanding
the expiration of the Congress. A vacancy in the joint committee shall not affect
the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint com-
mittee, and shall be filled in the same manner as the original selection, except
that (1) in case of a vacancy an adjournment or recess of Congress for a period
of more than two weeks, the members of the joint committee who are members
of the committee entitled to fill such vacancy may designate a member of such
committee to serve until his successor is chosen by such committee, and (2) in
the case of a vacancy after the expiration of a Congress which would be filled
from the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the
members of such committee who are continuing to serve as members of the joint
committee, may designate a person who, immediately prior to such expiration,
was a member of such committee and who is reelected to the House of Repre-
sentatives, to serve until his successor is chosen by such committee.
"(c) The joint committee shall elect a chairman and vice chairman from
among its members at the first regular meeting of each session: Provided, how-
ever, That during even years the chairman shall be selected from among the
members who are Members of the House of Representatives and the vice chair-
man shall be selected from among the members who are Members of the Senate,
and during odd years the chairman shall be selected from among the members
who are Members of the Senate and the vice chairman shall be selected from
among the members who are Members of the House of Representatives.
"(d) The joint committee may make such rules respecting its organization and
procedures as it deems necessary: Provided, however, That no measure or rec-
ommendation shall be reported from the joint committee unless a majority of
the committee assent.
"(e) It shall be the duty of the joint committee?
"(1) (A) to inform itself on all matters relating to the annual budget of
the agencies of the United States Government, including analytical, investi-
gative, audit, and other reports on Federal Operations prepared by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office pursuant to section 312 of the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921, the Government Corporation Control Act, and section 206 of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and by other Federal agencies, and
including the initiation or continuation of Federal programs by utilization of
borrowing authority, contract obligational authority, or other means which
do not require direct appropriations for the initiation or continuation of
such programs; (B) to provide the Committee on Appropriations of the
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5
House of Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-
ate with such information on items contained in such budget, and the justifi-
cations submitted in support thereof, as may be necessary to enable said
committees to give adequate consideration thereto; (C) to consider the
President's messages on the state of the Union and the Economic Report, to
consider all information relating to estimated revenues, including revenue
estimates of the Department of the Treasury and the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, to consider essential programs, and to consider
changing economic conditions; and (D) to report to the Appropriations Com-
mittees of the House of Representatives and the Senate its findings with
respect to budget estimates and revisions in appropriations required to hold
expenditures to the minimum consistent with the requirements of Govern-
ment operations and national security;
"(2) to recommend to the appropriate standing committees of the House
of Representatives and the Senate such changes in existing laws as may
effect greater efficiency and economy in government;
"(3) to make such reports and recommendations to any standing commit-
tee of either House of Congress or any subcommittee thereof on matters
within the jurisdiction of such standing committee relating to deviations
from basic legislative authorization, or to appropriations approved by
Congress which are not consistent with such basic legislative authorization,
or to cutbacks in previously authorized programs which require appropria-
tiOns, as may be deemed necessary or advisable by the joint committee, or
as may be requested by any standing committee of either House of Congress
or by any subcommittee thereof;
"(4) to report to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate at the beginning of each regular session of the
Congress the total estimated costs of all programs and projects authorized
by the Congress, together with estimated costs of such programs and projects
during the fiscal year underway, the ensuing fiscal year, and subsequent
fiscal years, and to make such interim reports as may be deemed advisable.
"(f) The joint committee, or any subcommittee thereof, shall have power to
hold hearings and to sit and act anywhere within or without the District of
Columbia whether the Congress is in session or has adjourned or is in recess; to
require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of witnesses and the production
of books, papers, and documents; to administer oaths; to take testimony; to have
printing and binding done; and to make such expenditures as it deems necessary
to carry out its functions within the amount appropriated therefor. Subpenas
shall be issued under the signature of the chairman or vice chairman of the com-
mittee and shall be served by any person designated by them. The provisions
of sections 102 to 104, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 2, secs.
192-194) shall apply in the case of any failure of any witness to comply with
any subpena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.
"(g) The joint committee shall have a staff director, an associate staff director,
and such other professional, technical, clerical, and other employees, temporary
or permanent, as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the joint committee.
Such employees shall be employed without regard to the civil service laws, and
their compensation shall be fixed without regard to the Classification Act of
1949, as amended. The staff director shall be appointed by and responsible to the
members of the party of which the chairman of the joint committee is a member,
and the associate staff director shall be appointed by and responsible to the
members of the opposition party. No person shall be employed by the joint
committee unless the members appointing him have favorably considered the
data with respect to him submitted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation after
a thorough investigation of his loyalty and security.
" (h) The joint committee shall make available members of its staff to assist
the staffs of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and of the Senate and the several subcommittees thereof during the periods when
appropriation bills are pending.
" (i) Professional and technical employees of the joint committee, upon the
written authority of the chairman or vice chairman, shall have the right to ex-
amine the fiscal books, documents, papers, and reports of any agency of the
United States Government within or without the District of Columbia, and
data related to proposed appropriations incorporated in the annual budget trans-
mitted by the President.
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"(j) The annual budget of the United States shall henceforth include a spe-
cial analysis of all active long-term construction and development programs
and projects authorized by the Congress, showing for each the total estimated
cost, and the actual or estimated expenditures during prior fiscal years, the
current fiscal year, the ensuing fiscal year, and subsequent fiscal years. All
grant-in-aid programs shall be included in this analysis, in a separate grouping,
showing under the heading 'Subsequent Fiscal Years' for grants of indefinite
duration the estimated annual cost for a ten-year period. Each agency carry-
ing on any program by utilization of the borrowing authority shall, at such times
as the committee shall specify, report to the committee upon the extent of its
borrowings under such program, and upon its operations generally under such
program. Upon request of the joint committee, any agency shall submit to
the Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate
estimates for proposed appropriations on an annual accrued expenditure basis.
"(k) Qualified members of the staff of the Bureau of the Budget shall, at the
request of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
or the Senate, or any subcommittee thereof, be assigned to attend executive
sessions of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees and to explain
the content and basis of proposed appropriations.
"(1) The Comptroller General of the United States shall, at the request of the
chairman of the Joint Committee on the Budget, make such investigations and
reports with respect to any agency as will enable such joint committee to give
adequate consideration to items relating to such agency which are contained
in the budget as submitted by the President, and the justifications submitted in
support thereof; and, for this purpose, the Comptroller General is authorized
to employ technical and professional personnel without regard to the civil serv-
ice laws, rules, or regulations, and fix their compensation without regard to
the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.
"(m) When used in this section, the term 'agency' means any executive de-
partment, commission, council, independent establishment. Government corpora-
tion, board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or
other establishment, in the executive branch of the Government. Such term
includes the Comptroller General of the United States and the General Account-
ing Office, and includes any and all parts of the municipal government of the
District of Columbia except the courts thereof.
"(n) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. Appropriations for the
expenses of the joint committee shall be disbursed by the Secretary of the
Senate upon vouchers signed by the chairman or vice chairman."
SEC. 2. Section 133 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(g) (1) All bills and joint resolutions authorizing appropriations reported
from committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives shall be accom-
panied by reports in writing, which shall be printed; and there shall be included
in each such report or in an accompanying document an estimate from the
department or other agency of the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of
the Government primarily concerned of the probable cost of carrying out the
legislation proposed in such bill or resolution over the first five-year period of
its operation or over the period of its operation if such legislation will be effective
for less than five years. If the chairman of the committee determines that no
existing department or agency is primarily concerned with the legislation, the
estimate shall be made by the Bureau of the Budget.
"(2) Estimates received from departments or agencies under this subsection
may be submitted by the committees to the Bureau of the Budget for review,
and such reviews, when practicable, shall be included in the reports or accom-
panying documents before said bills and joint resolutions are reported.
"(3) The Joint Committee on the Budget shall maintain compilations of all
such estimates, and semiannually shall print those compilations (together with
any comment of the Bureau of the Budget) for the information of the Congress."
SEC. 3. Section 139 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(e) The Joint Committee on the Budget is authorized to recommend that
joint hearings be held by the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, and of subcommittees thereof; but such joint
hearings shall not affect the power of the respective committees, and of sub-
committees thereof, to conduct separate additional committee hearings, and
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shall not affect the independence of committee deliberations and decisions. The
chairman of each such joint hearing shall be the chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, or of the appropriate subcommittee thereof, of the House in
which the bill is pending at the time of the hearing, and the vice chairman shall
be the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the other House, or of
the appropriate subcommittee thereof."
The CHAIRMAN. At this time, I want to welcome the witnesses who
will appear this morning. I believe we have three scheduled. The
committee appreciates their interest and their willingness to come and
testify for the record, giving us their views and their counsel with
respect to this measure.
The first witness scheduled is our distinguished colleague in the
Senate, Senator Holland.
Senator Holland, will you come forward? please?
Senator HOLLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you and we very much appreciate not
only your cosponsorship of the bill, but also your willingness to testify
in support of it.
STATEMENT OF HON. SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator HOLLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
I first would like to express my appreciation for your invitation to
testify on S. 537, a bill to amend the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946 to provide for more effective evaluation of the fiscal require-
ments of the executive agencies of the Government of the United
States.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that the title of this important proposal is?
most revealing. It not only states clearly the intent of the bill but
also implies the necessity for its enactment into law if the Congress is
to discharge its constitutional responsibility to maintain control over
the seemingly ever-increasing expenditures of the Government and of
the public funds.
Note the words in the title, "to provide for more effective evaluation
of the fiscal requirements of the executive agencies." To me, this
means we do not presently effectively evaluate the fiscal requirements
of the executive agencies and certainly from the many years of experi-
ence I have had as a member of the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, we do not effectively evaluate the expenditures they make.
I think that the chairman probably knows as well as any other
Member of Congress the impossibility in the Senate, at least?and the
same point, I think, can be made, however, with less force, in the other
body?the impossibility of any Senator, no matter how active and
how conscientious, to have complete understanding of all of the mat-
ters he is required to handle as a member of the Appropriations
Committee, in the time allowed for him to do so.
Mr. Chairman, wholly as a matter of illustration, I would like to
call attention to the facts in my own case, because I know something
about this situation from my own experience, that, with the various
assignments that we have to carry because of the smallness of our
body as compared with the substantially larger body at the other end
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of the Capitol, it is a monumental task, and, I think, impossible of
complete solution, to really master all of the matters which come be-
fore us.
In my own case, in addition to the Appropriations Committee, I
am also a member of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and
the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, more widely
known as the Space Committee and of various subcommittees of the
former. But, confining myself to the Appropriations Committee, I
am the chairman of one of the subcommittees, that dealing with
agricultural appropriations, and a member of five others, all of them
charged with the handling of matters of great detail.
For instance, I have the honor to be a member of the subcommittee
chaired by the able chairman of this committee, the Subcommittee on
Appropriations for State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary,
and the amount of detail handled by that one committee is of tre-
mendous consequence.
I am also a member of the subcommittee chaired by the distin-
guished senior Senator from Louisiana, Senator Ellender, the Public
Works Subcommittee, which, again, is one involving endless detail;
and of another subcommittee headed by the distinguished Senator
from Alabama, Senator Hill, having to do with appropriations for
the Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare; and a member of the subcommittee handling the sup-
plemental and deficiency bills, which spread across the entire rain-
bow of the executive departments and other agencies of the Govern-
ment.
It is completely impossible for any one Senator to find the time to
grasp completely all of the details of such assignments, even if he had
no legislative assignments, and I have already mentioned that in my
own case I have the legislative assignments of the Agriculture and
Forestry Committee, and of the Space Committee, from which I have
just come here to testify.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Holland, will you yield at that point?
Senator HOLLAND. I will be glad to yield.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, do you agree with me, in view of the work-
load that these committees have, that the present staff which we pro-
vide ourselves with on the Appropriations Committees and its sub-
committees can do no more, in the time available to them, than check
on appropriation requests as submitted. We cannot put additional
burdens on them by requiring them to go out and follow through on
appropriations or to make an investigation of the need for appropri-
ations?
Senator HOLLAND. Of course, I agree with that, Mr. Chairman. I
do not know of any more dedicated group of public employees than
that which we have in the staff of the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations. From my observations, they are not only overworked, but
they are among the most intelligent and knowledgeable group, as to
the matters which they handle, that I have ever found in any branch
of government, anywhere.
I certainly commend them, and I appreciate and heartily approve
the statement of the chairman.
? The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to make it very clear in the record
on this bill that this is not a reflection upon the staff of the Appropria-
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9
tions Committee. They perform the task that is now assigned to
them. They do it and do it well. But the staff that we have is so
limited that it cannot be given this other work of checking budget re-
quests and obtaining the information that the Senators, the members
of the Appropriations Committees and the Congress need, to weigh,
to correctly evaluate, to pass an informed judgment on those requests.
I think that is what we are searching for here: some tools with which
to work, that will help us to do our job more efficiently and assist in
effectuating some economies, where now there may be some waste and
extravagance.
Senator HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman' I certainly approve that state-
ment. We are now considering for fiscal 1964 a budget of some $99
billion in expenditures and $108 billion in appropriations and other
spending authority; in addition, every year we are faced with requests
for supplemental appropriations which reach us from time to time
during the course of the session. We generally have about three sup-
plemental bills, sometimes four or more.
We have already passed one, the commodity credit supplemental,
which is regarded as a very small one, and was passed without any
extended debate, but it involved $508 million, as the Senator well
knows.
So it is very clear that really coming to grips with this problem re-
quires more machinery, more detailed information, more skillful ad-
vice than we can possibly have under present conditions.
My own feeling, and I have talked to some Members of the other
body who feel the same, although, of course, their commitments are
generally smaller than ours because of their greater number and be-
cause of the fact that, generally, most of them have only assignment to
one of the standing legislative committees, but, even in talking to them,
I find that they are quite aware of the fact that frequently they need
information which they do not have under the present arrangements,
and which they have not acquired during the time of the hearings
which they conduct.
I commend them, Mr. Chairman, upon the very able and active hear-
ings which they do conduct, and which, in many instances, are longer,
more complicated, and bring out more facts than we are able to do in
the more limited time which we have.
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield further at that point, I
would like to point out that in our legislative processes, in processing
a bill, a legislative act, the opposition has an opportunity to be heard.
We will have a bill before us. We hold hearings on it, as we are doing
here now. Those who oppose the measure have an opportunity to be
heard. Often, those who oppose a measure indicate where amend-
ments may be needed to the original measure to prevent it from doing
something that it should not do and that someone has overlooked; or
they may present outright opposition that convinces the committee
holding the hearings and the Congress that the measure should not
pass.
But I point out this difference:
In the Appropriations Committee today, because of lack of staff,
because of lack of tools with which to work, the processing of an
appropriation bill is largely an ex parte proceeding on the part of
those who are asking for the money. Persons who oppose a proposed
spending program seldom appear.
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Most of them, of course, are officials of the Bureau of the Budget
and executive-branch departments and agencies. Thus, again, we
are compelled to rely upon one side and a one-sided presentation,
because there is no preparation of essential information concerning
the need for the requested funds. We have not provided ourselves
with an independent source which would enable us to make a check
against that testimony which is presented by those who want the
money to spend.
I think it is important that we find some way, if this is not the way,
that we do find some way, to get information as to the other side of
the picture before the Congress.
Senator HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that suggestion.
By way of illustration of that point, the subcommittee of which I am
chairman, the Subcommittee on Appropriations having to do with
agricultural appropriations, has just completed its agenda for hear-
ings, in which, in a bipartisan way, I have had the privilege of con-
fering with my opposite number, the Senator from North Dakota,
Mr. Young.
I am not sure how many days, but I think it is 11 that have been set
up for the hearing of the agencies in that farflung empire which is
now the Department of Agriculture. So far we have set up 3 days for
the hearing of witnesses from outside the Government which, I think,
illustrates the point that the able chairman has just made.
The CLIAIRIVIAN. Very likely, most of them who will want to be
heard outside of the agency are there to support a particular appro-
priation and will ask for an increase in it.
Senator HOLLAND. There are some who will ask for support of
items in the budget, some who will want increases, and very, very
few who will object to anything that is requested, I am sure.
Mr. Chairman, may I add to my earlier testimony my sixth sub-
committee, which is the Subcommittee on the Independent Agencies',
which, itself, as the chairman well knows, covers the greatest single
block of appropriations made for any department, for any single
group of activities in our Government other than the Defense Depart-
ment.
Mr. Chairman, I am well aware, as is every member of this com-
mittee, that the Senate on five separate occasions has passed this
most important measure by overwhelming majorities. I am also
equally aware that the other body of the Congress, the House of
Representatives, has not, as yet, seen fit to approve the Senate's action.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, and I am inclined to believe, that we may
find a changed attitude in the other body at this time because it is
becoming so very clear that we are overspending and that we are
digging ourselves more and more into indebtedness which somebody
has got to meet someday, unless we have a catastrophe in this country
of the like of which we have not seen for many years. I think that
there is a real chance for passage of this bill this year, and that is
why I gladly accepted the invitation to be heard on it.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me most significant that the chairman of
this committee, my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from
Arkansas, Senator McClellan, who in his 20 years of service in the
Senate has contributed so greatly to the welfare, financial stability,
and the security of this great Nation of ours, together with 76 of our
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colleagues on both sides of the aisle, is again, despite five previous
efforts, making the stanch fight to provide the Congress with the
means to discharge its constitutional responsibilities to safeguard the
financial foundation of the country and to protect the disbursement
of the public funds.
Mr. Chairman, these days when we know that the Executive power
is so greatly enhanced, when we are realizing every day?and any-
one who reads the decisions of the Supreme Court yesterday will
know that they illustrated the point quite well?that the Court, the
judicial branch, is taking more and more power and responsibility,
whether rightfully or wrongfully. The power of the purse is the one
thing which the Congress can control, provided it controls it, and
this bill is a tool, a piece of machinery, which, in my humble judg-
ment, will enable us to do a much more effective job in controlling
our exercise of the power of the purse, which the Congress, alone,
has, and which, if the Congress, alone, does not safeguard, will not be
safeguarded in behalf of the preservation of fiscal responsibility
and financial stability in this Nation.
Whether we realize it or not, Mr. Chairman, in these days of great
world responsibility for our Nation, there is not any single thing
which I think could destroy our effectiveness more than to allow
ourselves to go ahead in the present course, so evident for the last
several years, of overspending, of piling up indebtedness, and of
weakening our financial stability. And our stability is the greatest
and strongest staff that the whole free world has to rely upon in these
difficult times.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield at this point?
Senator HOLLAND. I am glad to yield.
The CHAIRMAN You spoke of the power of the purse. Since power
of the purse is vested in the Congress, I think of it as the brake that
Congress can apply, if it will, to this course which you have illustrated
here and pointed out as being possibly a dangerous course that we are
traveling.
The Congress can, if it will, apply the brakes.
Senator HOLLAND. We not only can, Mr. Chairman, but we should.
We must.
? The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Senator HOLLAND. And if we do not, we have missed, I think, a
very fundamental element of our responsibility in this field, which
is of such great importance.
The CHAIRMAN. Sometimes, in public addresses, I emphasize over
and over that, notwithstanding the President submits the budget?and
that is his prerogative and responsibility?the final responsibility is
in the Congress, itself. It must share the blame if things are going
wrong; in fact, it has the power to stop it and to check it, if it will.
Senator HOLLAND. The Chairman is so right in that, and I commend
him for that statement. In fact, I make that point in my statement
as you will note.
I therefore commend you, Mr. Chairman, each member of this
committee and every Member of the Senate who is so stanchly behind
you in sponsoring this measure. Their sincerity of purpose cannot
be challenged, their dedicated interest in constitutional government
is to be commended, and their determination, despite the previous
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failures, is to be applauded. And I do applaud all of them, Mr. Chair-
man, but particularly yourself, for you have carried the brunt of this
fight.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to join the Senator in expressing the hope
that the other body this time will act favorably in considering this
proposal and weigh its objectives in the light of the need of the times,
the need of the situation today, and not with any idea that there is any
purpose, either by design, imaginary or otherwise, for the Senate
of the United States to trespass upon any constitutional prerogatives
of the House of Representatives.
Senator HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I join you in that statement.
As far as I am concerned, I have already said what I think about the
thoroughness of the hearings in the House of Representatives, and,
having sat on conference committees in this field for a good many
years, I frequently find a situation under which members of the com-
mittees of the House have the firmest possible grasp of some matters
which we may have not been able to obtain because of the shortness
of time and our other heavy duties.
I must say, in behalf of the Senate, that we frequently get a view
as to some matters which are appealed, which are supplemental to, and
I think helpful to, the reaching of a more favorable decision, and then,
of course, we frequently have before us many new items which are not
considered by the House of Representatives.
So this is a joint job, Mr. Chairman, in which I think we will be
most helped and most served by the setting up of this new congres-
sional staff arm, but in which I am very sure that the other body will
also be substantially helped. My observations are not made at all
with a view to assisting only one body. After all, the Congress, as
a whole, is responsible for the appropriation of public funds; and
after all, this power of the purse is exercised by the Congress, as a
whole; and, after all, it is in the exercise of it that we can most firmly
hold on to the constitutional power and responsibility which is ours
above any other department of Government, and for which, in my
judgment, the informed people of our country will judge us as to
whether or not we have acquitted ourselves well or otherwise in this
field.
Mr. Chairman, it is not necessary for me to go into the details of
this measure. That has been done well at previous hearings by many
of my colleagues whose concern over the Congress' inability to main-
tain control of the purse strings is equally shared by me. I would
only say that it has become more essential than ever that we equip
ourselves with the means by which we can intelligently evaluate the
executive agencies' budget requests, make a sound, sensible decision
on the amounts that should be appropriated to them, and then?and
this to me is most important, Mr. Chairman?maintain close scrutiny
over their expenditure of the public moneys appropriated to them.
There is no better way that I know of, Mr. Chairman, for us to
deal intelligently with the $99 billion expenditure budget, or the
$108 billion budget, from whichever point of view you consider it,
which the administration has presented to the Congress for fiscal 1964.
There is no better way that I know of for us to make a fair, equitable
determination on the estimates that the executive agencies present
to us, and, finally, there is no better way that I know of for us to
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13
effectively evaluate how they have spent the moneys we have given
them than for us to be in possession of complete information, such
as this joint committee would allow us to have, providing the hard,
cold facts justifying the expenditures of the taxpayers' money.
I make these points, Mr. Chairman, and I wish to make this ex-
pressly clear, with no criticism of my colleagues who serve with me
on the Appropriations Committee and certainly without the slightest
criticism of the hardworking, loyal members of the Appropriations
Committee staff.
Mr. Chairman, along with you and other members of this committee
who also are members of the Appropriations Committee, as I may
have previously pointed out, I can speak with some experience in this
matter.
I repeat what I have said earlier: it is most difficult, and some-
times impossible, for members of the committee even though they
attend most conscientiously to the task before diem, which each of
them does, to always make intelligent decisions upon complicated
budget matters of the magnitude of those with which we must contend,
in the brief length of time given to consider the matter, and upon
the basis of the information presented by the staff in the short time
allowed them.
In my opinion, the present measure would provide means by which
the two Appropriations Committees may better evaluate the estimates
the executive agencies submit and the necessity for the expenditures
they propose.
The bill provides for the establishment of a Joint Committee on
the Budget, which would consist of seven Senators who are members
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, four from the
majority party and three from the minority party, and seven Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives who are members of the House
Committee on Appropriations, four from the majority party and
three from the minority party. The Joint Committee would:
Inform itself on all matters relating to the annual budget of the
executive agencies, including analytical, investigative, and audit re-
ports prepared by the General Accounting Office and including Fed-
eral programs financed by borrowing authority, contract obligational
authorey, or other means which do not require direct appropriations
for their initiation or continuation.
Report to the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House
Committee on Appropriations at the beginning of each regular session
of the Congress the total estimated costs of all programs and projects
authorized by the Congress, too-ether with estimated costs of such pro-
grams and projects during the fiscal year underway, the ensuing fiscal
year, and subsequent fiscal years, and make such interim reports as may
be deemed advisable.
Provide the Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Ap-
propriations Committee with such necessary information on the esti-
mates contained in the Federal budget, and the justifications sub-
mitted in support thereof, as may be necessary to enable the two Ap-
propriations Committees to give adequate consideration thereto.
The bill, in addition, provides that the Federal budget shall hence-
forth include a special analysis of all active, long-term construction
and development programs and projects authorized by the Congress,
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showing for each the total estimated cost, and the actual or estimated
expenditures during prior fiscal years the current fiscal year, the en-
suing fiscal year and subsequent fiscal years. All grant-in-aid pro-
(Prams would be included in this analysis, under a separate heading,
lowing, for grants of indefinite duration, the estimated annual cost
for a 10-year period.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, to keep members of the two Appropriations
Committees currently abreast of the preparation of the annual budget,
of its development in the executive agencies during the fiscal year,
and to provide them with adequate information for its consideration
by the committees, the bill provides for a permanent professional staff
which, at the direction of the joint committee, may be assigned to work
with the budget officers of the executive agencies throughout the fiscal
year. It also provides that qualified members of the staff of the Bu-
reau of the Budget shall, at the request of either of the standing Ap-
propriations Committees of the Congress, be assigned to attend
executive sessions of the Appropriations Committees' subcommittees
to explain in detail the budget estimates their agencies submit.
It is interesting to note, Mr. Chairman, and heartening, too, that
we in the Senate stand not alone in this fight for more effective finan-
cial responsibility. The Tax Foundation, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the Comptroller General of the United States, and others who,
in my opinion, represent some of the most astute financial thinking in
this Nation, all vigorously support the objectives of this proposal. I i
would say n passing, and not necessarily lightly, Mr. Chairman, all
of us cannot be wrong.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to strongly reaffirm my deep in-
terest in this measure. I have supported it in the past; I support it
even more strongly today, and I will join with the members of this
committee in making every effort to enact into law this measure, which
I believe is so vital to our country's welfare. I think that the 27
members of the standing Appropriations Committee, augmented, as
we are, by the 3 members who are ex-officio in various fields of appro-
priations, are doing the best they can under the conditions now ob-
taining, and I think that the expenditure of this very small amount
of money, whatever it is, will not be very much larger than the salaries
of various specialists, consultants, and accountants whom we bring
in from time to time.
That the expenditure of this money to keep a going, permanent,
active contact with this whole problem and to keep the Congress in-
formed about it will be the best money we will spend, or provide for
the expenditure of, in this session. I do hope that your effort and
the effort of others who stand with you will be successful at this time.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Curtis?
Senator Curns. Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend the distin-
guished Senator from Florida upon his statement. I gathered from
the colloquy between the chairman of this committee and yourself as
the witness that you feel that the present procedures are inadequate
to hold down expenditures as they should be held, is that right?
Senator HOLLAND. That is completely true, simply because of lack
of sufficient information in detail as to what is involved in some of
these enormous requests that pour in upon us.
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Senator CuRzTs. Then, in other words, you would welcome such
reasonable changes in procedure as would place a restraint on the urge
to spend in Government?
Senator HOLLAND. I would welcome it, and I would work hard for
it.
Senator Cuirris. Yes.
Now, I hope you will notice that the junior Senator from Nebraska
now speaking is a cosponsor of this bill.
Senator HOLLAND. I have noticed that, and I appreciate the fact
that he is one of those who feels that this is necessary.
Senator arms. I mention that to point out I am certainly not
hostile to the idea. I favor a joint House-Senate Budget Committee,
and the fact that I am for the measure, I trust that the question which
I am about to ask will not be considered as anything but constructive.
Certainly, I am not motivated by any committee rivalry. But is
there any particular reason for the number of 14 for this committee?
Senator HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with the exist-
ence of any such particular reason.
It may be that the chairman of your committee, Senator McClellan,
had a particular reason, but that number, seven to each House allows
as a reasonable matching of numbers from the two parties. in other
words, the majority party at any time will have four ? the minority
party will have three of the seven Members from each House.
It might be that a total of five would do as well. It might be even
that three would do as well. Apparently the chairman, who has spent
so much time in evolving the details of this program, has felt that seven
from each House is a more appropriate number than any other.
Senator CURTIS. And they would be from the Appropriations
Committees?
Senator HOLLAND. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield at that point?
Senator CURTIS. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would make this observation about the
number. There is no magic in the number. Nobody is wedded to this
particular number. The idea was to make an initial determination of
some number, and also to indicate that we do not need a big commit-
tee. It could become cumbersome, if it were too large. This is a mat-
ter that can be resolved in discussions in executive session when we
mark up the bill.
I see no magic in the number. I just thought it ought not be a very
large number.
Senator CURTIS. If I may say to my chairman, my reason for rais-
ing the point is merely preliminary to the main point that I want to
raise about this proposed legislation. It just happens that the greater
share of my almost quarter of a century in the Congress has been
spent on committees charged with raising revenue. The Ways and
Means Committee of the House of Representatives is the oldest com-
mittee in the Congress. It is older than the Republic. It was the first
committee created by the Continental Congress, and it has been in
continuous operation.
Upon that committee falls the responsibility of keeping up with
the appropriations in the House or recommending measures to pro-
vide for the public debt. The Senate has the Committee on Finance.
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Upon these two committees fall the responsibility of recommending
the measures to the Congress to take money away from the citizens
to keep current with appropriations. It is constant.
The decision in the House of Representatives on whether or not
existing corporate rates will have to continue must be made and car-
ried by those 25 men.
Many bills will be introduced. I could pick up a dozen bills that
would suggest the personal exemption be raised from its present $600
to $1,000. If that were done, 16 million taxpayers would go off the
tax rolls completely, but a lot of people favor it.
Those two committees must take the responsibility of saying "Yes"
or "No" to these proposals.
When excise taxes expire, those two committees?and, while the
Senate Committee on Finance's action is not final because the Senate
considers tax bills under an open rule, it still is very important. The
House usually considers tax bills under a closed rule. So 25 men have
to take the responsibility in deciding the excise tax on liquor, tobacco,
gasoline, automobiles, personal income tax, corporate tax, debt taxes,
and, if they fail to get in enough, then they must recommend a raise
in the debt ceiling.
This is a statutory function. It should not be abolished. I do not
think it serves quite the purpose it should, but I do not think it should
be abolished. But, in any event, they have jurisdiction over the
national debt in some manner.
Now, if you want a restraint on spending, I think that you should
tap the personnel of the committees who have the job of taking this
money away from the citizens, recommending measures to take it
away, because that makes it a concern of the individual.
I think such individuals as Harry Byrd, the chairman of the
Finance Committee, the distinguished Senator from Delaware,
Mr. Williams, the outstanding chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, Mr. Mills, and the ranking member of that committee,
Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin, would bring to this overall Budget Com-
mittee an insight on the problem of balancing income with outgo.
Now, if they would not do your Budget Committee any good, I am
sure they would do themselves some good for this reason: They would
at least have a picture of what the spending program is. It was not
always so. I think history will show that the House Committee on
Appropriations is an offspring of the Ways and Means Committee,
because one committee could not handle all the detail.
I would like to have your comment on that.
Senator HOLLAND. Well, Senator Curtis, I certainly would have
no possible objection to the amendment of the bill so as to include
some of these gentlemen. I do call your attention to the fact that
there is already a Joint Committee on Revenue Taxation on which
the distinguished Senators and Representatives whom you have men-
tioned are members.
Perhaps that enables them to fulfill the function which you have in
mind, perhaps not.
I am perfectly willing to leave it to the committee, and I would
cosponsor this bill with equal firmness.
.What I want to do is to get the machinery set up and to have it
piloted by outstanding Members of both Houses. I realize we have
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some other agencies, like the Joint Committee on Revenue Taxation
and the General Accounting Office which is an arm of the legislative
branch and which enables us to find out, after the expenditure, how
well the executive agencies have adhered to the directions of the
Congress.
This committee by whomever it may be controlled by, so far as
the committee personnel is concerned, is, as I see it, to fulfill a com-
pletely different function and to supplement the activities which we
now have.
Senator Cum.'s. May I say in response that the Joint Committee
on Federal Revenue Taxation fills a very fine purpose, but not at all
what I had in mind here. The problem I raise is not one of House
and Senate cooperation. Those two committees have excellent cooper-
ation. The Senate members of the Finance Committee readily go over
to the House side and sit down at a conference with the members of
the Ways and Means Committee, they have the finest relationship,
and the staff of the Joint Committee on Revenue Taxation has proved
to be very efficient.
My point is that the committees charged with recommending the
harsh and unbearable and destructive taxation have, as such, not
the slightest control over expenditures. There is no machinery set up
to give them the inside dope as to what might happen in the way of
appropriations. I think that is the weakness of this proposal.
Now, I do not believe I am motivated by mere committee rivalry or
jealousy. The junior Senator from Nebraska has been criticized for
having more standing committees than any members of this body in
the Senate' and so I am not seeking any more for myself. But, if it
is an overall picture involving the financial stability of this Republic,
I think we have to give attention to the income as well as the outgo.
Therefore, I would hate to see this bill become law and do only
half a job.
Senator HOLLAND. If I may comment on that, not only would I have
no objection to any such change, but if, in the joint judgment of such
able men as those whom I see before me, three of whom as I see now,
have served in both bodies?that is, the chairman, the Senator from
South Dakota, and the Senator from Nebraska, who has just been pro-
pounding these questions?it would seem to me that from such a broad
view and broad understanding of what happens in both bodies and
what is not happening to our Nation, that the recommendations of
such a committee would be most persuasive.
So far as I am concerned, I am willing to accept them in advance on
the question of from what source the committee shall be drawn. I
just want them to be the most able, the most experienced, the most
dedicated members of the two Houses, whom we can call to this new
and, I think, highly important task.
Senator Cl7RTIS. I thank the Senator.
Now, my point really boils down to this. Take the chairmen of
those two committees: Senator Byrd and Wilbur Mills. They have
a tremendous responsibility. They have to recommend the legisla-
tion to collect their tremendous sum of money, or it will fall upon them
to bring in an amendment to increase the debt requirement. Yet, we
revise our budgetary procedure, and they are excluded.
I think what is done here is excellent, but it falls so short of what
we could do in the samo apid.
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Now, I want to ask another question along a different line.
Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask a question. Will you yield?
Senator CURTIS. Yes.
Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask my colleague the question as to
whether he does not feel that the provision on page 6, identified as
subsection 4, would not pretty well meet this problem. It says among
the functions?
is to report to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate beginning at each regular session of the Congress the total
estimated costs of all programs and projects authorized by the Congress together
with estimated cost of such programs and projects during the fiscal year under
way, the ensuing fiscal year, and subsequent fiscal years, and to make such
interim reports as may be deemed advisable.
We could add to that, without doing any violence to the basic con-
cept, to report to the Committees of Appropriations of the House and
add to it the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways and
Means, to have this information available in deciding the burden that
you would have to meet taxwise.
Senator CURTIS. My point is not alone that they have information.
My point is that they be participants in arriving at how much we
spend. Now, that leads me to my next question.
Will this new joint committee formulate a legislative budget of
recommended appropriations and expenditures for the ensuing year?
Senator HOLLAND. I think that the power to formulate and report
the budget will still have to be in the Executive. I think that this is an
agency which will be charged with close supervision of that, and report
as to where they think the budget has gone astray; what is the sound
amount that could be spent without hurting the country; all types of
information that, I think, would still be short of formulating a specific,
overall budget, because, after all, the Executive has to recommend that
under the system of government, and the Congress, as a whole, has to
pass upon it. This, then, is a body in between, and is to be the most
knowledgeable group. I may say that I think the staff of such a
committee is going to be the real source of detailed information of the
greatest importance, because, if the committee members themselves are
charged with this additional, detailed duty, it will just be added to the
huge load which every Senator now carries so that I think it is the
added staff?the permanent professional staff?that is going to be most
helpful to Congress in mastering the tremendous problems we are faced
with, and will always be available to assist the members of the revenue
committees if they so request.
Senator Currris. It was mentioned that in our appropriating proc-
esses there is an ex parte proceeding, appearance of people who want
money. Is that not even worse than the preparation of the budget?
Senator HOLLAND. Yes.
Senator Cuirris. Did you ever hear of a taxpayer being heard?
Senator HOLLAND. Oh, yes; yes. I, myself, asked for various tax-
payers in my own State to be heard by the Bureau of the Budget on
specific projects, and I am sure that the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska has had the same experience, and they have been heard.
But they are in the minority, and, of course, the will of the Execu-
tive, the President, after hearing all of the things he cares to hear,
either personally or through the people whom he delegates to help
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him, is what really determines the formulation of the budget, or more
precisely its contents.
Senator CURTIS. Yes.
The gentleman has been very gracious and helpful, and I do not want
to delay any longer. I do think that our basis budget law is very de-
ficient. We have had some dedicated people in the Bureau of the
Budget, some dedicated Budget Directors. But I believe there would
hardly be a solvent household in the United States if they followed
the same procedure.
What it is, it is a collection of requests of what everybody wants, and
if the head of a household having several children would have every-
body make up a list?"Now, what do you need? what would you like
to have this coming year? do not forget travel, transportation, clothes,
library, everything under the sun, new furniture, decorations"?then
have the hired help submit a list of what they need, then take an adding
machine, add it up, and then growl at them a little bit, cut it down a
few percentage points, they still would end up with a requested budget
many times more than the income of the family.
It seems to me budgetmaking should be for someone to tell them
what they are going to get, rather than have them tell you what
you are going to give them.
Senator HOLLAND. Of course, there is very much soundness in that
position. I am not without some experience of observation in this
field. In our own State where, as the Senator knows, I had the
responsibility at one time to serve as chief executive, we had a budget
bureau keyed with the chairmanship of the chief executive, himself,
and with the members of the cabinet, who, themselves, were elected
on a statewide basis. Since they were able to succeed themselves, in
many instances they were much more knowledgeable than was the
chief executive, at least speaking of my own time.
It came to be true a few years later than the expenditures of the
State grew so heavily that the legislature saw fit to set up a con-
tinuing legislative committee to hold hearings throughout the State
and to allow the citizens the chance to be heard upon proposed ex-
pansion of State services, let us say in the field of education or wel-
fare or other services that were growing greatly.
That committee proved to be very effective and very useful. While
it is not wholly comparable to what is suggested here, it has, in my
judgment, served as a brake in our own State, the State of Florida,
upon the ever-increasing trend of expenditures in certain fields.
I believe that the committee such as is suggested here?and, again,
I am glad to leave to this subcommittee the matter of determining
the question of personnel?can render a very great service. I think
that the service will not only be direct, but I think it will be indirectly
of great value, because I think that the Bureau of the Budget and
the executive, knowing such committee exists and is checking every
day of the year, will regard it in the nature of a cautionary device
which will bring even more car'efin consideration by the Bureau of
the Budget and on the part of the executive, and perhaps clearer jus-
tification of the appropriations they request and expenditures they
propose.
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I think it will be a well worthwhile brake just to have it in exist-
ence and sitting at all times and headed by personnel of the high
type that everybody has in mind here.
The CHAIRMAN Are there any further questions?
Senator GRITENING. Yes, I have just a few questions of the dis-
tinguished senior Senator. First of all, I want to commend him
upon his statement. I find myself in agreement with the views he
expressed.
Senator HOLLAND. I thank the Senator.
Senator GRUENING. As a cosponsor of this bill, I wonder whether I
could ask him whether, as a member of the Appropriations Commit-
tee, he has been impressed with the disparity in the procedure dealing
with domestic appropriations and those dealing with appropriations
in the field of foreign aid. It seems to me that the appropriations on
domestic matters are pretty well spelled out. They require authoriza-
tion and then the appropriation process, whereas in the foreign aid
there seems to be sort of a blanket granting which takes the foreign aid
program very largely from the control of Congress.
Does the Senator share that view at all?
Senator HOLLAND. No, I do not share that view. I think we have a
good, heavy fight each year on the authorization bill. There are few
fields in which an authorization has to be annual.
And then I note, and sometimes I have complained of the attitude
on the part of certain members of the Appropriations Committee who
immediately start, even before the authorization bill has been signed
by the President, to effect greater cuts than those which the Senate
has accomplished on the floor.
The only complaint I would have, and on which I would uphold
the attitude of the distinguished Senator from Alaska, is that these
two bills both reach us so late in the session, and particularly the
appropriations bill, that I think that the care of the hearings, the
detail in which it is gone into, is largely affected by the lateness
thereof.
My own feeling is that this has become so important, the amounts
involved have become so great, the question of continuance in certain
areas of the world has become so acute in the minds of citizens and in
the minds of Members of the Congress that this subject matter ought
to be handled at an early date in the session so as to permit of much
more exhaustive hearings than has been possible under the system
which we have followed now for some years in both Houses.
Senator GRUENING. I would like to develop that point a little with
a current issue.
There is a financial delegation here from the Republic of Brazil
which is seeking a very large amount of assistance; whether it be
called credit, grant or loan, it makes very little difference; and it may
be that, as a result of this meeting, they will leave here with half a
billion dollars more than they had when they came here.
Now, it is true that foreign policy is the duty of the executive
branch, of the President, but here is an enormous sum, the disposal of
which is taken wholly from the control of the Congress.
We have poured something over $2 billion into the Republic of
Brazil under the foreign-aid program, and I think it will not be
denied that there is very little to show for it.
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Now, it seems to me that there is an example in which there is a
great disparity between our attitude, the congressional attitude,
toward the foreign-aid program and the domestic program. It would
be unthinkable for the President or the executive branch to suddenly
drop half a billion dollars into any part of the Union for purposes not
authorized by the Congress, and, yet, that happens repeatedly in the
foreign-aid program.
I wonder whether my friend from Florida has any suggestions as
to how that could be controlled?
Senator HOLLAND. I do not have any at this time. I appreciate the
continuing interest of the Senator from Alaska in this field. I con-
gratulate him on it.
I think that the fact that we do not appropriate in detail in this
field is not comparable to our regular, annual, domestic operation, so
much as it is to what happened in time of great depression when we
appropriated large amounts to the Executive to spend more or less in
the ways that he determined would be most effective in promoting
employment and in restoration of the public prosperity, because, after
all, we are dealing with problems which primarily in this field of for-
eign aid are predicated upon our thought that these nations need help,
and that we should give them help, I think, sometimes too generously.
I think?and I have agreed frequently with the Senator from
Alaska?we have not differentiated as closely as we should between
those who are our friends and those who are not, those who are willing
to stand with us and those who either cannot or will not.
There are many questions yet to be determined in this field. But I
hardly think it will ever become possible, when we are dealing with a
subject that is primarily a subject of relief, to deal with the great
detail in which we are accustomed to deal with all domestic problems.
Much as I would like to see that done, I doubt if that will become pos-
sible, because of the complete difference, both in the size of the problem
and the nature of the problem. Perhaps I am wrong.
Senator GRIIENING. Well, the question of relief varies so greatly.
We are now pouring aid into some hundred foreign countries, and
they are certainly not all in equally straitened conditions, and, yet,
the Congress really, in my judgment, has very largely abdicated its
control over this tremendously important field.
It has been my observation that frequently appropriations that are
sought in a rather vague way in the foreign-aid program from the
Appropriations Committee are then diverted in the field to entirely
different purposes. This could not happen in the domestic program
without immediate corrective action by the Congress as soon as it was
apprised of it. That has not happened in the foreign field.
I will not take the time of the committee now, but there are plenty
of illustrations that I could cite to buttress that. I think that is one
of the things that the Congress has got to be a little more vigilant
about. We are dealing with tremendous sums. We talk about $4.9
billion for aid, but, if you begin to look into it, you find that there are
a dozen spigots by which foreign aid is ladled out, variously called
loans, through AID, the Export-Import Bank, the International De-
velopment Bank, all kinds of ways that one discovers, loans which are
not really loans at all.
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I think that that is one of the things I hope that this committee, if
this legislation is enacted, as I hope it will be, can be watchful about.
Senator HOLLAND. I certainly agree with the Senator that very
much much more detailed information could be furnished to the
Congress than is furnished, and that this committee would be a means
by which this end could be accomplished, along with other very
worthwhile ends.
I thoroughly agree.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator HOLLAND. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We do appreciate your support of this measure and
your presence and the very fine testimony that you have given in sup-
port of it.
Along with you, I am hopeful that our friends in the other body
will understand the objective of this bill and embrace it and support it
and let us (ret this machinery established for the good of our country.
Senator TIOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I certainly join in that hope, and
I have tried in my statment to have the record show how much greater
is the task upon an individual Senator to come to grips with these
enormous problems than is the case in the other body, with the hope
that the other body will realize that, while I think they will receive
great benefit from this new program, if it be adopted, that in this
body a much greater degree of assistance will be given.
I thank the chairman.
The CHAIRMAN Thank you very much.
The Chair would make this observation at this point. The clerk
of the committee has checked and advises me that out of the 27 mem-
bers of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 19 of them are co-
sponsors of this bill, and of the 8 members who are not cosponsors
some 3, 4, or 5 of them have a definite policy of not cosponsoring any
legislation.
Also, I would note for the record that all members of this Govern-
ment Operations Committee are cosponsors of the bill.
We have with us today Congressman Ben F. Jensen of Iowa.
Please come forward, Congressman.
Congressman Jensen is the ranking minority member of the House
Appropriations Committee, and I believe he has introduced in the
House a comparable bill, maybe identical, I am not sure. He can tell
us about that. It is H.R. 3692. He has introduced it at this session
of the Congress.
I might observe that in the past the ranking minority member of the
House Appropriations Committee did not, I believe, give his support
to this measure, and, thus, we are glad to see that his successor is
supporting it.
Congressman Jensen, we are delighted to see you and to have you
appear before us and give us your views regarding this proposed
legislation.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEN F. JENSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased and honored by having
an opportunity to testify before this committee on this very important
matter.
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I have, as you know and as you have said, introduced a bill exactly
worded as the bill which you and 76 other Senators have introduced
in the Senate. I did that because I want to do everything I can and
work with the Senators and anyone else who is anxious to reduce the
budget to a reasonable amount.
Now, this proposed Budget Committee can be effective only if the
Members of the Senate and the House, or a majority of the Members
of the Senate and the House will make an about face and vote the con-
servative line, instead of the more liberal line, which has been the case
over the past 30 years to a very great degree.
Mr. Chairman, I am in the habit of talking plainly and expressing
my innermost thoughts and let the chips fall where they may. It
seems that I have not gotten along too badly in doing so.
I note in reading the sponsors of your bill, S. 537, that there are at
least a dozen Members who are cosponsoring this bill with you in the
Senate that, to my knowledge, have voted the liberal line constantly.
Now, of course they may have sponsored this bill with you for sheer
demagoguery. I shall not say positively that they have done so. But,
surely, they will have to change their spots considerably, if they mean
what they say in sponsoring this bill.
The old adage is that a leopard never changes its spots. Human
beings do, occasionally, when they see the writing on the wall which
might affect their own political future.
Since the country seems to be going more conservative and the peo-
ple of America are becoming alarmed about this trend toward national
bankruptcy, I hope these liberal Members who speak proudly of their
liberal attitudes and their votes will change their course and vote the
more conservative line.
Unless they do as Members of the Senate and the House?and we
have them in the house, also, who talk conservative and vote liberal?
that has been the scourge on the body politic of America for a long
time.
As I say, I hope they have now seen the writing on the wall, the
American people are more anxious to support more conservative candi-
dates than has been the case for many years.
You know, Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the minority members of
the Appropriations Committee of the douse have established a budget-
cutting task force. That was done at my request. Five members
were named to the task force committee. I appointed Congressman
Frank Bow, of Ohio, as chairman.
We became alarmed when we read the budget which was sent to
Congress by the President of the United States, a budget of $98,900
million, in direct appropriations also it called for in round figures $10
billion in obliffational authority. I made up my mind the minute I
saw that budget that something had to be done hence.
I recommended to the Republican members of the Appropriations
Committee of the House early in the session that we establish this
budget cutting task force. We called in many experts in the field of
Government, one being Mr. Maurice Stans, the last Budget Director
under the Eisenhower administration. We worked with those men
diligently. We went through the President's budget with a fine-tooth
comb, item by item, and we found where we felt the budget could and
should be reduced by a little over $15 billion without hurting any
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agency of Government and without affecting our economy but to the
contrary be a shot in the arm so to speak for the American people, who
are now greatly concerned about this trend toward national bank-
ruptcy, with a $304 billion Federal debt, and with a planned deficit of
almost $12 billion for fiscal year 1964.
Something has to be done, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that
you, with your 76 colleagues, have taken notice of the fact that some-
thing must be done so you have again recommended this Joint Budget
Committee be established. Certainly, I, as one Member of the House,
along with many others, are hoping that this committee can be estab-
lished and be effective. I have some misgivings, I must say, relative
to the effectiveness of such a committee.
I was quite pleased and interested when the gentleman from Ne-
braska, Mr. Curtis, mentioned the fact that he thought members of the
legislative committees of the House and the Senate should be made a
part of the team. I have that recommendation written in my note
here. Not only that, but I think the bill should be amended in the last
paragraph, which reads:
The chairman of subcommittee hearings shall be the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations or of the Appropriations Subcommittee thereof of the
House in which the bill is pending at the time of the hearing and the vice chair-
man shall be the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the other
House or of the appropriate subcommittee thereof.
Now, it appears to me the chairman of the committee should alter-
nate between the minority chairman and the majority chairman of the
Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate. That would
be the democratic way. I suggest that three Senate Members be
chosen from the Legislative Committee of the Senate to serve with the
four members of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, and
three members of the Legislative Committee of the House should be
chosen to serve with four members of the Appropriations Committee.
The reason I make that suggestion is simply this. As you know full
well, Mr. Chairman the members of the legislative committees of both
the Senate and the House have, on numerous occasions, expressed the
feeling that the Appropriations Committees have usurped the preroga-
tives of the legislative committees.
We had a little grumbling recently in the House relative to that
matter. But that has been smoothed out and I think the legislative
committees of the House and the Appropriations Committee are now
quite in harmony and understand each other, and are going to work
together as a team on this budget-cutting process.
Now, there have been a number of objections raised among House
Members, and I made note of those objections, Mr. Chairman, and I
think we are going to have to meet those objections head on, and that
unless we can do that, I doubt the House will pass this bill.
I will at this time read some of the objections which I have noted,
as expressed by the Members of the House.
First objection: Membership is drawn entirely from the Appropria-
tions Committee. Thus, they would be wearing two hats, advising
themselves and in effect, reporting to themselves. Who would expect
them to act and vote differently on a given proposition when wearing
one hat as against another?
Now I think that objection can be met, by putting members of
legislative committees on the Joint Budget Committee. Also that
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Senators on the joint committee would be party to recommendations
to the House Committee on Appropriations. This would be considered
interference with the historic practice of appropriations recommenda-
tions originating in the House.
The second objection which I have noted, getting into jurisdiction of
legislative committees. A provision in the bill contemplates the joint
committee making recommendations to standing legislative committees
for changes in basic laws as may affect great economy and efficiency.
Imagine the reaction of the legislative committees to continuing free
advice on various subjects from appropriations members.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be misunderstood. I do know,
as I said before, that if this bill is to be enacted in the House, these
objections are going to have to be met head on, and effectively.
The third objection I have heard about larger expert staffs. This
is the heart of the bill. Really because without a large staff it is
doubtful that anything substantial could or would be done. Lack of
time is already a problem with appropriation members. Even more
acutely so in the Senate where Members are spread too thin among
committees. As Senator Curtis has said, he is a member of?how
many committees, Senator Curtis?
Senator CURTIS. Five.
Mr. JENSEN. Five committees, as compared to a Member in the
House, where he can only be a member of the Appropriations Commit-
tee. We can be a member of minor committees, also. But the stated
purpose of the bill is to provide the tools to enable the two Appropria-
tions Committees to give adequate consideration to the budget, and
they say it is an unassailable fact that each Appropriations Committee
now has full authority.
Another objection. The Appropriations Committees of the House
and Senate now have full authority to hire all the staff they feel they
need. All they need is to write in more funds and hire the people.
But they have not felt the need to enlarge the present staff, these
opposition members say. Why would they suddenly feel the need
while wearing another hat?
The CHAIRMAN. Will the Congressman yield at that point?
MT. JENSEN. Yes, I would be happy to yield.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct in stating that the commit-
tees can now hire additional staff. I don't think there is any question
about that. Again, I come back to the fact, though, that a staff that
works for a joint committee, for both committees, could get the same
information and make it available to both, whereas if each committee
had its own staff for that purpose, this would be duplication.
We ride herd on the executive branch of the Government for doing
the same thing.
Mr. JENSEN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN And I think we should set an example.
Mr. JENSEN. I agree.
The CHAIRMAN. The example is already provided for US by the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue and Taxation. This isn't a
new venture or a new idea. It is not an innovation. It is actually the
acceptance of something that has already been demonstrated to be of
considerable value in another area of the legislative process.
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Mr. JENSEN. Yes ? well, as I said before these objections I have
heard and noted. Unless we can meet them Lad on and prove to these
Members of the House that this is a good move, that it will affect sav-
ings then our bill has little or no chance of passage in the House.
The CHAIRMAN. If it isn't a good move and won't effect savings,
it ought to be defeated.
Mr. JENSEN. Absolutely.
Senator GRUENING. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield to Senator Gruening ?
Mr. JENSEN. Yes.
Senator GRUENING. I want to express my regret that an engage-
ment causes me to leave because I consider nothing more important
in this matter than to listen to the able Congressman from Iowa,
whose service in the House I have admired for all the years he has
been there. I know he is making a very vital contribution in present-
ing the view of the House. I am hopeful that some of his points will
be taken into consideration and that we may come up with a bill
which will satisfy both Houses, because I think it is important that we
have the full collaboration of both the Senate and the other body.
I just wanted to express my regret that an obligation on the floor
compels me to leave, but I shall read the testimony in the record
with great interest.
Mr. JENSEN. Governor?I will still call you Governor because I
well remember how fine you treated us when we made our inspection
tour of Alaska in 1946 and you were in some trouble with the Legis-
lature up there' and the members in both parties on that tour took
your side and I think we helped you do some good for that great terri-
tory at that time, which is now a State.
Senator GRITENING. I have never forgotten the way Representative
Jensen and the other Representatives on the Appropriations Subcom-
mittee of the House defended me against the attacks of Members of
my own Party, when they were in Alaska.
Mr. JENSEN. It was quite interesting. I know, Governor, that you
and I have been good friends ever since I met you in Alaska, I have
enjoyed your acquaintance.
Senator GRITENING. Thank you.
Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Chairman when we look at the record of the
history of this world, and we find that every nation, without excep-
tion, that traveled the full length of the reckless spending road, that
we have been traveling for about 30 years, have all come to misery,
strife, revolution, currency depreciation.
Now2 some may say it can't happen here. Well, it can happen here
and it is happening here this very minute, and that is what concerns
the thinking people of America. There is another thing that always
stands out in my mind.
I was born and raised by immigrant parents, the 10th child of a
family of 13. I was obliged to quit school in the ninth grade. But I
did read a few books and I did keep up with the doings of Congress
and the doings of the State legislature. I have discovered by facts
and figures and by statistics that the best friends of the so-called
little people that a lot of people cry elephant tears over, is the public
servant who saves the people's tax dollars, local,. State, and Fed-
eral. Records show, and not too many people realize this fact, that
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,,....MITTEE ON TRE BUDGET 27
the ultimate consumer of goods pays all the bill in the final analysis,
and must pay about 70 percent of every penny that local, State, and
Federal Governments spend, because the people that draw a salary of
$6,000 or less in this blessed land of ours consume 70 percent of all of
the goods that are consumed in America.
Hence the so-called little people that some of these great spenders
say they have a great heart for and say we should tax the rich in
order to help the poor, are so very wrong when we know the facts.
And so, Mr. Chairman, what we are trying to do in this bill, the effect
of which we hope will be to reduce the budget substantially; is in effect
to help the so-called little fellow. Industry and business must add
their taxes to the price of their goods or they would soon be out of
business. The consumer pays the bill. He has no place to shift his
tax to anyone else. He pays the bill, the whole bill, and so I hope
the so-called little people in America will appreciate the conservatives
in Congress. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, we
should know that we are on the road to currency depreciation. All
we need do is note the flight of our gold.
Most nations in this world and their great financiers have lost confi-
dence in the stability of the American dollar, and hence they demand
gold in payment for the goods they export to us.
That gold, as you know, is the only thing back of our currency. I
have visited many foreign lands that went to the end of the spending
road that we have traveled for three decades. I have used their
depreciated currencies. I have asked what happened to their cur-
rency. They said, "We spent and spent the people's money until the
people lost faith in the value of our government bonds and so would
not buy government bonds. Then there was but one recourse, and that
was for the government to start the printing press, rolling out the
bills by the tons until the time came when it took a handful of bills
to buy a loaf of bread."
Some say it can't happen here, but it will happen here, and it is
happening here this very minute.
And so I want to work with you, Mr. Chairman, and every Member
of Congress and every American who is determined to put a brake on
this mad rush to national bankruptcy. In its wake comes personal
bankruptcy.
I don't know as there is much more to say, Mr. Chairman. I do
lolow that here in the past 2 years and now, the President is asking
for 36,000 more Federal employees. In 1962, we ended up with 77,000
additional employees; in 1963, 50,000; and for fiscal year 1964 the
budget request is for 36,000 additional, making a total in 3 years of
163,000 more Federal employees than were on the payroll 3 years ago.
Each one of those employees gets on an average of $6,500 a year,
including office space and per diem pay, et cetera. Multiply that by
163,000 and we have $1,000,590,500 additional pay for employees of
this Federal Government for only 3 years.
With a Federal employment roll of 2,500,000 people in round figures,
it is costing the American people today just to be governed from Wash-
ington over $16 billion. That amounts to over $25 per month for
every American family to pay just to be governed from Washington,
D.C. That puts it in figures we can understand. Something has to
be done, but it seems we have gotten on a treadmill, Mr. Chairman.
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LIO unx,n.i.u, oviri. uvidMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Men in public life have contended with the size of the Federal Gov-
ernment and its expenditures since the Nation was founded in 1789.
Jefferson said he placed economy among the first and most important
virtues, and public debt the greatest of dangers to be feared. If we
can prevent the Government, he said, from wasting the labors of the
people under the pretense of caring for them, they will be happy. And
one of the wisest observations on the matter in modern times is attrib-
uted to President Coolidge.
He said: "Nothina6 is easier than the spending of public money. It
does not appear to belong to anybody. The temptation is overwhelm-
ing to bestow it on somebody."
And, Mr. Chairman, I must say, in the light of the growth of Federal
bureaucracies in the last 30 years, the growth of our public debt, and
our demonstrated unwillingness to live within our national revenue,
has brought about a sad situation. The sad truth of our situation is
that we are on a treadmill, it seems, and don't know how to get off it.
Through countless ways, both directly and through grants-in-aid
that were never conceived to be permanent but which become more so
each year, the tentacles of a vast Federal bureaucracy now touch the
lives of every American. The executive power began its climb 30
years ago and has never stopped climbing, and as it climbs, the power
and influence of Congress has been steadily eroded. We still have the
constitutional powers over money, but as a practical matter most of the
real power has passed to the bureaucracies, and the lives of the people
are in danger.
This trend must be reversed or the problems of today will not be
solved. We don't need a change in our traditional system. What we
need is a change of heart. We need some self-reliance. We need to
change directions, and until we start hacking at the roots instead of
hacking at the branches, these budgets and appropriations will keep
right on going up and up.
And if Congress and the people don't somehow find the collective
will to take the bit in their own mouths, the past certainly strongly
suggests that no matter how much our revenues may increase, the debt
will go on up and bureaucracies will find more ways to draw the Ameri-
can people and the Congress into its ever-widening grasp for more
power and more influence.
In conclusion, I say again, Mr. Chairman itnd members of this im-
portant committee, thatI want to work with you and every Member
of the Senate and the House and every American in an attempt to head
off misery, strife, decreased value of our currency, with its twin sister,
increased cost of living, and all necessities of life.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I wish to
say that your suggestions with respect to amenelments which might
be considered in this bill are most welcome. There is no disposition
on the part of the authors or cosponsors of this measure to make its
present terms, as now drafted, sacrosanct in any way. The idea is
to find some measure, some tools with which to work.
Mr. JENSEN. I am sure of that.
The CHAIRMAN. We are seeking a way in which we can do a better
job than we are doing, a job that needs to be done. Whatever bill
the Senate may pass, even if it should pass it in its present form, your
committees in the House will be handling the bill, and amendments may
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29
well be adopted in the Committee on Rules or on the House floor that
a majority of the Members of the House would favor. The Senate
may pass it in its present form, or there may be some amendments but
there is no reason why a bill we might pass over here, which somebody
thinks needs some amendments, should not be perfected and enacted
into law.
Let us work on it. Let us get the job done. Let us come out with
the best product that the collective wisdom of both Houses can pro-
duce, so it will be something that will be workable, something that
will enable us to get some of the results we see the need for. I feel
a bit encouraged now and I feel a bit confident, possibly more so than
at any time in the past, that we are ready, that the Congress is ready,
to take this proposal and revise it, if that is the will of the Congress,
or develop it into a piece of legislation that we can enact and there-
after be proud of.
Thank you very much, Congressman. Senator Curtis.
Senator CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, the hour is late and I won't take
but a second, but I want to thank the distinguished Congressman
from Iowa for appearing here and for his excellent statement. No
Member of Congress has contributed more to fiscal stability of this
Republic than the distinguished Representative from Iowa, who has
appeared before this committee today. He has been consistent. He
has also been intelligent and he has been just in his endeavors, and
he has made a good contribution to these hearings.
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add that the argu-
ments presented in favor of the passage of this bill by the distin-
guished Congressman from Iowa are much more persuasive for its
enactment than are the objections which he made, as having come from
his associates in the House, who argue for its defeat.
But I would be very hopeful that this time the House of Repre-
sentatives would not permit the bill to die. If there are suggested
improvements, we all want to get them. If there are any reasonable
changes required, we certainly will be happy to accept them.
I had the pleasure of coming to Congress at the same time as the
Congressman from Iowa. I have watched his record with great ap-
proval. He has made some tremendous contributions. I recall one
time for a period of years we carried in all the appropriations bills
what was called the Jensen rider, which did something more than talk
about economy. It actually put dollars in the taxpayers' pockets,
because, as I recall the Jensen rider, it provided that only a certain
number of employees, who, because of the normal process of attrition,
were separated from the Federal Government, could be replaced in
the course of the fiscal year and it worked. I don't know why we still
don't have it as an effective weapon for economy. I think it would
still work. But it worked for a long period of time, and someday,
in this great and growing city, I think we ought to build a monument
in the public square for the amount of money saved by the Jensen
rider during the time it operated.
I know you have a tremendous influence over there now, Mr. Jen-
sen, as the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee. I hope
that you will work especially with the members of that committee,
because that seems to be the genesis of the opposition to his legisla-
tion. If you can't convert them all, I know you can convert some of
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30 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
them. And as to the people who are not members of the committees,
I certainly have nothing to fear.
The objections that they raise are objections without substance.
They have no more cause to be disturbed about the Joint Committee
on the Budget than to be disturbed about a Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion, which has rendered Trojan service, or the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, which has done well by the country.
The pattern has worked and this will not impinge conceivably on
any legislative committee. I hope that you can get the committee of
the House, which handles the bill, which I presume would be the
Committee on Government Operations, to hold hearings, to work on
whatever amendments they want and let us get this bill passed by
both houses in conference so appropriate conference committees can
work out the differences in the two bills and get it enacted during
the current session of Congress.
Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate no end the kind words
that have been expressed by the distinguished Senators, Mr. Curtis
and Mr. Mundt, in my behalf. I can say the feeling is mutual. I
shall continue as always to work with anyone in the Senate, in the
House, or any person in the entire United States in an effort to bring
about some common American business sense into the fiscal program
of this Government of ours. With that, I want to thank you again,
Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before this important
committee, and on this very important bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Congressman.
The committee will now stand in recess. I have already spoken
to Mr. Campbell, the Comptroller General, who is present and who
was to testify this morning. We regret very much, Mr. Campbell, that
we couldn't reach you today. I believe you told me you would be
willing to come back in the morning. You will, therefore, be our
first witness tomorrow, and I do thank you for your cooperation.
The committee will stand in recess until 10:30 o'clock in the morn-
ing.
( Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock, a recess was taken, the hearing to
resume at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, March 20, 1963.)
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CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1963
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
Washington,D D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a.m., in room 3302,
New Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators McClellan, Pell, Mundt, and Pearson.
Also present: Walter L. Reynolds, chief clerk and staff director;
Ann M. Grickis assistant chief clerk; and Eli E. Nobleman, profes-
sional staff member.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Campbell, will you come forward and identify yourself for the
record, please?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman' I am the Comptroller General.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Campbell, we welcome you, and we appreciate
your interest and your willingness to give the committee the benefit
of your judgment and counsel with regard to S. 537. I am very sorry
we didn't get to you yesterday.
You are very kind to return this morning. We appreciate it, and
you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CAMPBELL, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT F. KELLER,
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at
your invitation we appear today to give you our views on S. 537, which
would establish in the Congress a Joint Committee on the Budget,
consisting of seven members of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate and seven members of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
With the annual Federal administrative budget expenditures ap-
proaching $100 billion it is of the greatest importance that all possible
ways and means be found to eliminate waste, extravagance, and other
unnecessary expenditures in the operation of our Government.
It is toward these ends that the General Accounting Office is cur-
rently committing the greater part of its staff and of its appropriated
funds which for fiscal year 1963 amount to $43,900,000. Our sphere
of operations does not now include any participation in or review of
the budgetary process such as is proposed in S. 537.
Nevertheless, though we engage in what is actually after-the-fact
inspections and examinations, the refunds, collections, measurable say-
31
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32 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
ings, and other financial benefits resulting from the work of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office amounted to $162,875,000 during the fiscal year
1962.
During that year we submitted 271 reports on audits or investiga-
tions to the Congress, or to its committees, members, or officers. In
addition, we issued 548 reports to officials of the various departments
and agencies. Each year we are finding increased use of our reports
by the Congress and the agencies.
Above and beyond these measurable benefits, there is the far greater
but immeasurable effect of our activities with the executive depart-
ments and agencies in encouraging thrift and prudent management of
all resources made available to them by the Congress. Our presence in
itself, within the agencies, unquestionably has a very significant in-
fluence on the manner of their stewardship.
In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I recall here your remarks on the
floor of the Senate on June 28, 1961, when, in drawing attention to the
40th anniversary of the establishment of our Office, you commented
upon the close and effective relationship over the years, between your
committee, its staff, and ourselves in striving for greater improvement
in the Government's financial operations.
However, the Congress in fulfilling its obligation to keep Federal
expenditures within bounds, in light of conditions as they may exist
at a particular time, is confronted with a highly complex problem.
Our own Office can, of course, make a contribution to a solution; but,
in the final analysis, it is only the Congress itself which must deter-
mine how it is best able to meet that obligation on an informed and
intelligent basis.
The chairman's introduction of S. 537, cosponsored by 76 other Sen-
ators, is a profound effort to resolve the problem by establishing a
Joint Committee on the Budget to assist the Congress in carrying its
responsibilities in connection with appropriation of funds required for
the operation of the Federal Government. Whether or not S. 537
should be enacted is obviously a matter of policy for judgment by the
'Congress as a whole.
The duties of the Joint Committee would be to inform itself on all
matters relating to the annual budget of the Government, and to pro-
vide the Appropriations Committees with such information on items
in the budget, and the justifications submitted in support thereof, as
may be necessary to enable those committees to give adequate con-
sideration to the budget request.
The Joint Committee would consider the President's messages on
the state of the Union, and the Economic Report, all available in-
formation, relating to estimated revenues, essential programs, and
changing economic conditions and report to the respective Appropria-
tions Committees its findings with respect to budget estimates and re-
visions in appropriations required to hold expenditures to a minimum,
consistent with requirements of Government operations and national
security.
Also, the Joint Committee would have the duty of recommending
to the appropriate standing committees of the Congress such changes
in existing laws as may bring about greater efficiency and economy
in Government; and would make such reports and recommendations
to any standing committee on matters within the jurisdiction of such
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standing committee relating to deviations from basic legislative
authorization, or to appropriations approved by the Congress which
are not consistent with such basic legislative authorization, or to cut-
backs in previously authorized programs which require appropria-
tions, as the Joint Committee may consider necessary or advisable,
or as may be requested by any standing committee.
In addition, the Joint Committee would report to the respective
Appropriations Committees at the beginning of each regular session of
the Congress the total estimated cost of all programs and projects
authorized by the Congress, together with estimated costs of those
programs and projects during the current fiscal year, the ensuing fiscal
year, and subsequent fiscal years.
The desirability of establishing a Joint Committee on the Budget
is, as we have said, a policy question which the Congress itself must
decide. It is recognized that some of the work which would be done
by the Joint Committee would parallel the work being performed by
the Appropriations Committees, as well as some of the work presently
being done by the Bureau of the Budget.
On the other hand, the Joint Committee would provide a means for
bringing together for the Congress the results of work being per-
formed throughout the Government on budget and other financial
matters, and for an independent appraisal of such results by a joint
committee of the Congress, as well as an additional means of develop-
ing information for the Appropriations Committees and other stand-
ing committees of the Congress.
In previous hearings held on legislation which would establish a
Joint Committee on the Budget, a suggestion was made that the duties
proposed for the Joint Committee might be performed by the General
Accounting Office.
While we appreciate the confidence expressed in our Office, we
believe that the work contemplated could only be fully effective if
carried on by Congress itself with the facilities of the General Ac-
counting Office being used as needed. S. 537 follows this approach.
The proposed section 138(e) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
would make it a duty of the Joint Committee to inform itself on re-
ports prepared by the General Accounting Office on Government
operations.
We believe that our reports of audits and other examinations of
Federal agencies would be of valuable assistance to the Joint Com-
mittee. Experience has shown that many of our reports are useful in
the appropriation process because of the factual information and rec-
ommendations included in the reports. They point out many areas
where there have been unnecessary Government expenditures.
We would mention, however, that our reports are based on post-
examinations of budget expenditures as distinguished from examina-
tions of budget estimates.
The proposed section 138(1) would require the Comptroller Gen-
eral, at the request of the chairman of the Joint Committee, to make
such investigations and reports as will enable the Joint Committee to
give adequate consideration to items contained in the Budget and the
justifications submitted in support thereof.
Under the provisions of section 312(b) of the Budget and Account-
ing Act, 1921, the Comptroller General is required to make such
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34 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
investigations and reports as ordered by either House of Congress or
by any committee of either House having jurisdiction over revenues,
appropriations, or expenditures.
We have done considerable work under the authority of section
312(b) and on occasion this work has related to budget estimates. The
language of section 312(b) is broad enough to encompass requests of
the Joint Committee; however, if the General Accounting Office is to
examine budget estimates and justifications as a continuing matter,
we think it desirable to spell out the specific authority in th law.
The proposed section 138(1) accomplishes this purpose. It requires
the Comptroller General to make investigations and reports when
requested by the Chairman of the Joint Committee.
We believe that the General Accounting Office through its intimate
and continuing surveillance of the operations of the departments and
agencies of the Government, could adequately service the requests of
the Joint Committee. Requests could be made of the General Account-
ing Office for examinations of budget items in those areas where it
was determined by the Joint Committee that adequate coverage was
not otherwise being made, or which either or both Appropriations
Committees might require. Also, the proposed section 138(1) author-
izes the Comptroller General to employ technical and professional per-
sonnel without regard to civil service laws and to fix their compensa-
tion without regard to the Classification Act for work to be done for
the Joint Committee. Having in mind that some increase in our pres-
ent staff would be required and the necessity for the employment, from
time to time, of technical personnel of a kind not normally employed
by us, we think that this authority is essential, at least in the initial
stages, if the General Accounting Office is to carry out requests made
by the Joint Committee.
The CHAIRMAN. How many reports did you make to Congress?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Two hundred and seventy-one.
The CHAIRMAN. In a year's time?
Mr. CAMPBELL. In the fiscal year 1962.
The CHAIRMAN. Give us at that point, Mr. Campbell, what com-
mittees those reports go to. Do they go to various committees or are
they just submitted to the House or to the Senate or both?
Mr. CAMPBELL. No, those reports go to the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House, to the Committees on Government Opera-
tions of the Senate and of the House, the Committees on Appropria-
tions of the Senate and of the House, and to the appropriate legisla-
tive committees.
The CHAIRMAN. They go to the legislative committee having juris-
diction of the subject matter?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. And they also are submitted to the Presi-
dent of the United States, to the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, and to the Department and agency concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. The thought occurs to me that when these reports
are sent to so many different committees and no one committee has
specific responsibility they often, I assume, do not receive the attention
they should have.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I fear, Mr. Chairman, that is correct, and we are
sorry that our reports do not receive in every case the proper attention.
The CHAIRMAN. The Comptroller General's office?the General Ac-
counting Office is an agency of the Congress?
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35
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You report, primarily, to the Congress?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you find?and I think the record ought to show
it?that notwithstanding you do your work and you make these
reports, there is very little action taken on them.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Considering all of the reports we make I think that
is a fair statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, having that in mind, I think perhaps if such
a joint committee were created as here proposed and given the specific
direction to follow up on these reports and to determine the legality
of various executive branch actions, and the committee directed their
staff to follow up on these matters some action would result and these
reports would not just be permitted to gather moss and dust and with
nothing being done about them. I think then we would be making a
constructive improvement over present practices.
Would you think so?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, as this bill is drawn as we
understand it, it is obvious that the proposed joint committee will
spend considerable time on our reports. They would have to do this in
order to proceed intelligently, I believe.
The CHAIRMAN. It is charged with that duty.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. If the Congress should establish the Joint
Committee we feel that it would probably find it worthwhile to
devote timein following up the recommendation in our reports.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Would you think the such actions would provide for the improve-
ment in the functioning of Government?
Mr. CAMPBELL. We are very sure that there has not been enough
attention given to the reports of the General Accounting Office. We
have a staff of over 2,000 lawyers and accountants, the only organi-
zation of its kind in our Government today, or for that matter in any
other Government. From about 300 such people, 10 or 12 years ago,
we have built up to about 2,000. We feel we are in the best position in
Government today to give an objective, unbiased, if you will, report
on the financial operations of the Government.
Senator MUNDT. Is it not true that actually the Comptroller Gen-
eral is an arm of the Congress rather than of the executive branch of
Government.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct, Senator Mundt.
? Senator MUNDT. So that in order to have a chance to do your job
as well as you would like to you need some place where you can report
to in Congress to make sure that the services you are rendering de-
velop the optimum results.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct.
Senator MUNDT. We would have here a permanent staff and a com-
mittee which it seems to me in the course of a very short time, there
could be worked out a modus operandi with your shop that would
really save the taxpayers a lot of money. Actually, I am intrigued by
the fact that there were $162,785,000 in one year's savings and collec-
tions?how does that compare with the annual cost of running the
Comptroller General's Office.
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36 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Mr. CAMPBELL. Just slightly less that four times the cost of running
our office. I am reluctant to emphasize this kind of figure, as the real
worth of the Office is in its existence?its presence.
In addition to the reports sent to Congress we also issued, in 1962,
549 reports directly to the departments or agencies which you in
Congress do not usually see. These reports go to the agencies to help
them in their particular area. We are finding increased use of our re-
ports in the agencies as well as by the Congress.
Senator MUNDT. I mention it only, I am aware of these other serv-
ices, I mention it only to point out that I believe we have here the
rarest of all kinds of Government agencies, one which actually turns
hack a profit to the taxpayer.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That is an accomplishment, we think.
Senator MUNDT. Your annual appropriation is around 58?$50
million?
MT. CAMPBELL. Just short of $44 million.
Senator MUNDT. Just short of what?
Mr. CAMPBELL. $44 million; actually $43,900,000.
iv
Senator MuErr. So that whoever thought of this idea, Mr. Chair-
man, a long time ago of establishing the Comptroller General's Office
was very wise and very prudent and certainly it has worked to the
great advantage of our country and I think the program we have in
mind with S.537 is on all squares with what was done originally in
the establishment of the Office of the Comptroller as a branch of
Congress.
This sort of gives the branch of the tree a trunk with which to work
with this committee in operation.
The CHAIRMAN. I think this bill will implement your work, by de-
veloping additional raw material for you to work with. In this way
we will get the greatest benefit from it. I hope that is what our bill
will do in connection with implementing your office and your work
and I am hopful that the force of the committee itself, and the Joint
committee staff will be able to develop information which your office
did not find because you can't possibly look at everything. Here again
we should find instances where corrections can be made and money
saved.
Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. I just can't conceive of the Congress?in view of
the conditions that prevail today, the terriffic expenditures, the bur-
den of Government cost that is upon us, and the imperative necessity
of retrenching and making savings wherever they can be done with-
out impairing the efficiency of Government, and without impairing
our defense posture?will refuse to enact either this or some legisla-
tion that will further implement the work you do and that will fur-
ther assist the Congress, and particularly the Appropriations Com-
mittee, in performing their functions more effectively.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think?I would like to
emphasize that so far as the budget of the United States Government
is concerned neither I personally nor my office see that budget until
perhaps a day before it reaches the press. It is surprising and un-
fortunate that an organization such as ours, does not have access to
the budget justification well before they reach you sometime in Janu-
ary each year. As a matter of fact, we do not usually see the budget
justification until after the appropriation bills have been passed.
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Senator MUNDT. Your office has about 2,000 people, you say?
Mr. CAMPBELL. About 2,000 to 2,100 lawyers and accountants who
are available to do this kind of work.
'Senator Mu NM'. Yes. These are professional people?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
Senator MUNDT. Which would compare, I believe, with around 200
in the Budget Bureau?
The CHAIRMAN. No; 500.
Senator MUNDT. 500.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been around 500 for several years.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I think they have something around that number.
The CHAIRMAN. Bear in mind, in this connection, not only does
the Budget Bureau have 500 personnel, but every agency in Gov-
ernment has its own budget staff working on the budget.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. There are literally thousands of people working
on the budget, and yet we have no adequate effective staff to help
us.
Senator MUNDT. I would envision the way this machinery would
work and I would like to know whether the chairman and Mr. Camp-
bell feel the same, that in the course of practice, this joint committee
would develop some liaison people who would be in pretty close con-
tact with your organization and have a committee room where some
of you people could be up here so we could work together simultane-
ously in these budget matters.
Is that the way you think it would operate?
Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, Senator Mundt, we, as you know, now have
a very close working relationship with your committee.
Senator MUNDT. Yes; I know that.
Unfortunately this committee does not do much on the budget. I
am thinking that establishment of this kind of relationship with this
joint committee which we are talking about setting up under S. 537
would in no way diminish the fine relationship we have had with you
because you people have been magnificent time after time in the prob-
lems with which we grapple. We don't work with the entire budget.
We could and should, but we just don't have time. But this joint
appropriation machinery, I would think, would develop that same
kind of liaison activity.
The CHAIRMAN. I believe I may have overstated the number of
personnel in the Budget Bureau. I have before me here a statement,
which has been prepared by the staff of this committee, to the effect
that the material contained in the Federal Budget is developed and
assembled by numerous employees and officials in the departments
and agencies, reviewed and substantiated by each department and
agency and then reviewed, revised, and finalized by the Bureau of the
Budget where 465 persons are involved in the preparation and sub-
mission of the final document.
Now, I don't know whether that refers only to professional or
technical personnel or whether it includes the clerical personnel.
Mr. REYNOLDS. That includes the whole personnel in the Bureau of
the Budget. We made no analysis?
The CHAIRMAN. It is over 450.
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38 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Mr. REYNOLDS. It was 465 as of January 1, 1963. That is the last
figure they have submitted for the chart on the organization of execu-
tive departments and agencies, which is now being printed.
The CHAIRMAN Very well. I was mistaken. I thought it was
500 or more.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I would expect if our experience is any indication
the professionals there would be probably, perhaps, in the neighbor-
hood of 350.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in the Bureau itself, it is more than that.
I understand that an estimated 2,000 actually work on the Federal
Budget in all of the departments; we do not know the exact number,
but we do know that a tremendous number of people participate in
the preparation of the annual budget document.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I am not critical of those who prepare the Budget;
that is not the attitude at all, but when we are spending $100 billion
a year and when we have taxed and taxed to the point that we are
saying we have taxed too much, we are destroying incentive. We must
cut taxes and spend less. I think it is time for us to take every con-
structive step we can and to be prepared to make proper adjustments
and economize if it is possible to do so.
But I don't think we can continue?I am very much concerned
about this?I just don't think we can continue spending on credit and
thus spend ourselves into prosperity. I just don't think any institu-
tion can be run that way very long without getting into rather
desperate financial straits. I think we have got to find some way to
put the brakes on spending.
If we can do that and we can reduce taxes legitimately, I believe
we can provide a little more incentive for investment and for venture
in our free-enterprise system.
Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Go right ahead. I didn't mean to get off on this subject, but I
think it is very, very important that we do something in this area.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I agree with you.
In the event a Joint Committee on the Budget is established, you
may be assured the General Accounting Office will render all assist-
ance possible within the resources available to us.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Campbell, we certainly thank you. We appre-
ciate the presentation you have made. I think that no one questions
the excellent job that your Office is doing. I think where we have
fallen down is not making certain that the Congress follows up on
the recommendations' based upon the work you do, and the reports
you make' to the end that we may correct the things that you have
uncovered and disclosed to us.
I think that is one of our weaknesses in the Congress. Your reports
go to the House and the Senate, to the Appropriations Committees,
to the Committees on Government Operations, and to the legislative
committees of the two Houses that are concerned. We wind up with
everybody having the information contained in the reports, but no-
body doing anything about it.
I do believe that if we had a joint committee, as proposed by S. 537,
charged with the duty of doing something about the matters you
report, and with keeping liaison with your office, instead of producing
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39
a saving of the amount that you have reported here today, we could'
probably double that saving and possibly multiply it many times
over. To accomplish this, however, we must set up appropriate staffs
and improve our organization so that we will be able to follow through
more effectively and make certain that we follow through and back
up the work that you do.
I cannot help but believe that there will result from this Joint
Committee tremendous savings dollarwise for each dollar that it
costs to operate the Joint Committee. I do not envision a committee
here with a staff so large that it will get out of control. I do feel,
however, that it should have a staff adequate to search out the facts
in those areas where there is a question as to the proper expendi-
ture of Federal funds; and to pursue reports you make to us, in order
to ascertain where the waste is and where a cut may be made in the
next appropriation, when a request comes before us. We will then
have something to counteract the request, something upon which to
base an intelligent judgment and enable us to present reasons why the
request is excessive or exaggerated or shouldn't be granted.
Today we don't have it. We sit there on the Appropriations Com-
mittee and hear the officials who want to spend the money. We have
no dependable information as to whether they need it or not and no
way of knowing it, nor do other Seantors have any way of obtaining
this information. This is no reflection on these who will be spending
the money; quite often we can spend more money or less. We are not
all thoroughly familiar with Federal business and finance, and cer-
tainly when we get into these matters of spending money we need some
better judgment than that which we are able to develop just on our own
initiative without the aid and assistance of experts who have studied it
and who can come up to us and present to us reasons and justifications
why money is not needed or why the amounts requested are excessive.
With such information at hand, we would be able to exercise better
judgment than we do now.
I want to thank you. I think your office is one that performs one
of the most valuable governmental services that we have today. I
have never heard your work criticized or questioned. The Congress
has confidence in you and the public should, and I am sure they do
esteem the work you do.
Thank you very much.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, you may recall this is a kind of an anniversary
month for us because it was 8 years ago that you as chairman of this
committee proposed confirmation of my appointment which the Senate
voted on March 18, 1955.
The CHAIRMAN I didn't make a mistake. I may have made some in
my public life, but I didn't make a mistake when I did that.
? Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, you are very kind.
The CHAIRMAN. Representative McClory of Illinois is the next
witness.
Congressman McClory, we are very glad to have you.
Will you identify yourself for the record, Congressman?
Mr. MCCLORY. My name is Robert McClory; I am a Member of
Congress from the 12th Illinois District. A new Member.
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40 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
? .The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Congressman. Do you have a prepared
statement?
Mr. MCCLORY. I do, Senator; yes.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. You can either put it in the record and
highlight it or you may proceed to read it, as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT McCLORY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. MCCLORY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is
my opinion that we are met here today to consider what may be the
most critical piece of legislation in our Nation's history. I do not in-
sist that S. 537 in this precise form must be enacted. Instead, what I
do affirm is that workable machinery should be developed immediately
whereby the Congress, independent of the executive branch, may
reclaim its rightful and necessary role in behalf of Federal expendi-
tures.
The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt? You may state later, Congress-
man, that you have introduced a bill in the House, H.R. 3964?
Mr. MCCLORY. Yes, I have, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Dealing with the same problem?
Mr. MCCLORY. Exactly ?
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This bill, H.R. 3964, will be filed as an
exhibit to this testimony. It will be made a part of the record of this
hearing by reference.
Mr. MCCLORY. From my conversations with other Members of
Congress I am persuaded that a great many are of the opinion that
Congress can do little with regard to the Federal budget. Other
Members appear convinced that the two Appropriations Committees
can adequately review and revise the appropriation requests in a
manner consistent with our congressional responsibility. Still others
urge that the machinery, as set forth in the 1946 Reorganization Act,
is fully adequate to do the job and that the Congress should utilize
the Joint Committee provided for there.
There can be little doubt that the existing Appropriations Commit-
tees of the House and Senate are not able to prepare a legislative
budget. In addition, proposals for an informal review and revision
of the budget by a special task force of citizens, or other partisan, bi-
partisan or citizen efforts, could not hope to achieve the success which
a Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget could provide.
I have reviewed a great deal of the literature which has been com-
piled on this subject, including Senate Document No. 11 of the 87th
Congress entitled "Financial Management in the Federal Govern-
ment" and a preliminary draft of the report which accompanied the
introduction of S. 537, as well as the remarks of you, Mr. Chairman,
who sponsored the measure in your own behalf as well as in behalf of
the 76 other cosponsors of the Senate.
Indeed, your statement provides cogent reasons why this bill in its
present form?or in a form whereby it could be passed both by the
Senate and by the House?would enable our Congress to measure up to
its full responsibilities in the fiscal business of our Nation.
In suggesting the subject of a modified form of S. 537, I should
think it appropriate to consider the experience with this measure in
recent sessions of the Congress?of which I was not a Member.
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In the House version, which I sponsored in the House, I patterned
this in large measure from that contained in S. 537. I provided for
a Joint Committee on the Budget to be composed of seven members
of the House from the Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Govern-
ment Operations Committees, and five members from the correspond-
ing committees of the Senate.
This was intended to give recognition to the larger number of
Representatives and, also, to the dominant role which appears to have
been intended?by the framers of our Constitution?with respect to
appropriation and revenue bills.
Without great elaboration, I thought it appropriate to recall that
the committee appointed by the Constitutional Convention recom-
mended that the House of Representatives should be given exclusive
authority with regard to appropriation and tax bills.
A compromise, which resulted in Senate authority to propose or
concur with amendments of this type, suggests that the role of the
Senate is at least more limited than that of the House.
Perhaps the limitation of the Joint Committee as set forth in H.R.
3964, which I introduced recently in the House of Representatives,
would provide the basis for the necessary House support which is
required?if this measure is to be enacted into law. As for my per-
sonal position, I would prefer that form. On the other hand, the
objectives sought to be obtained by this measure are so overwhelming
and so critical that if S. 537 is passed by the Senate, I will support it
unequivocally in the House.
The danger from economic disaster is, in my view, fully as critical
as that from "enemy attack." If planned and managed deficits as
advocated by the Executive are to remain unplanned and unmanaged
by the Congress, if unfavorable trade balances and gold outflow con-
tinue without correction by appropriate legislative action, if budget.
making proceeds as an Executive function without either the will or
the way on the part of the Congress to review or rewrite the Federal
budget, the end of our Republic would seem to me to be inevitable.
While a contest is apparent in this legislation, as between the Con-
gress and its prerogatives and the Executive and its authority, there
is no room for a decision based upon partisan, sectional or other special
interests. The interests of every citizen are involved equally in S. 537
to establish a Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman.
May I just clarify one thing. It probably is already clear in your
statement. You, as I understand it wholeheartedly and unequivocally
support the objectives of the legislation?
MT. MCCLORY. Absolutely.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no issue there as to what we are trying to
do?
Mr. Mcaoxy. No, I think
The CHAIRMAN. The only question here that you raise is that the
House may feel that, in order to preserve constitutional prerogatives,
which they feel they have, there should be more House Members than
Senate Members on the joint committee.
Mr. MCCLORY. There seems to be that resistance in the House from
the experience of this bill before.
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42 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
The CHAIRMAN. That is one point, and your other?
Mr. MCCLORY. I am certain that is one basis for it and I do want to
suggest in my opinion there is some justification for giving ground if
that is the obstacle, if the number of Members of the House on the
proposed joint committee is preventing passage of this bill, I think
that Members of the Senate should give very thoughtful consideration
to conceding greater representation on the part of the House Members.
The CHAIRMAN I am not arguing with it at the moment. I just
wanted to get clear here what is beclouding favorable consideration of
the bill in the House. There is no issue as to the objectives?
Mr. MCCLORY. Not on my part. There may be on the part of other
Members.
The CHAIRMAN. But have you found that there is substantial oppo-
sition to the measure on the basis that they didn't want it at all, didn't
need it or did you find?
Mr. MCCLORY. I think that is a very small minority that appear to
say that.
The CHAIRMAN. That would take that position?
Mr. MCCLORY. Who would say the whole prerogative here belongs
to the Appropriations Committee and we are not going to entertain
such bill. I think that is a rather small minority that hold tenaciously
to this view.
The CHAIRMAN. Actually we are taking no prerogatives away from
the Appropriations Committee.
Mr. MCCLORY. I agree.
The CHAIRMAN As I envision the objectives of the bill, it amounts
to the same thing as the creation of a subcommittee of the two Appro-
priations Committees on the task at hand just as we have in the com-
mittees having jurisdiction over other areas of Federal activity; we
have subcommittees doing all the work. Here all the work of the
subcommittee would come back before both of the committees. I
can't see that we are doing any violence to, or in any way diminishing
the authority and responsibility of, the full Committee on Appro-
priations.
-Mr. Mcaoirr. I agree entirely. It seems to me that this is a
congressional, a legislative aid which is vital for us in the performance
of our functions. I might say that a great many State legislative
bodies have comparable committees such as this Joint Committee on
the Budget.
The CHAIRMAN. We have a Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, and I have always felt from every source of information
available to me, that everybody feels that it works well and works ad-
vantageously. I know of no friction or conflict that has arisen be-
tween the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee in operating it as a joint committee and with a staff of
experts in that field. I do not believe there would be any conflict here.
I just can't see how it could detract from the prerogatives of either
committee. If there is a serious question as to whether the House
should have more members on the committee, I am sure that can be
resolved. I am not wedded to the bill as written. I am wedded to
and most seriously convinced as to its objectives and the need for it.
The Senate has passed it a number of times and I would forget about
it except that I think we are moving toward a critical fiscal situation
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in this country, and unless we do something to put on some brakes
somewhere, to eliminate that which ought to be eliminated, and under
the circumstances
Mr. MCCLORY. I think there is a very important principle involved
and that is that the Congress has the clear authority to determine how
much funds are to be made available, and whether or not these are
to be supported by revenues, and if we don't have the machinery for
carrying out this function, if we are required to take a budget, if we
are required to take appropriation requests and tax recommendations
from the Executive and act on those without the way to act independ-
ently, it seems to me that we have lost a prerogative which rightfully
belongs to the legislative branch and we have lost it to the Executive
and we have further submerged the authority of the legislative branch
which I think stands between the continuation of our Republic and
losing the Republican form.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the failure to do something like
this, to equip the Congress with this tool or facility to aid it, the
failure to do it actually diminishes or weakens the constitutional au-
thority of the Congress to function in this field.
Mr. MCCLORY. Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN SO it isn't the fact that the establishing of a joint
committee might detract from the prestige or power or constitutional
functions of the Appropriations Committee, but the failure to do it
is going to weaken rather than strengthen the Congress in the exercise
of its constitutional functions to control the purse strings.
Mr. MCCLORY. That is the way I view it.
The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, thank you very much. I do ap-
preciate your presence and your contribution and I am certain you
will agree with me, that whatever version may be passed ultimately
by the House and by the Senate, there is no reason why we can't re-
solve the differences in conferences like we do on all other legislation.
Mr. MCCLORY. I want to offer my cooperation and assistance in
any way that you think my influence can be felt in the House of
Representatives.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you very much.
( The following communication, subsequently received from Con-
gressman McClory, is included in the record at this point as an exten-
sion of his remarks:)
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 26, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
U.S. Senator, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN ' A copy of the remarks made by Mr. Dewey Ander-
son, executive director of the Public Affairs Institute, in support of a Joint
Legislative Budget Committee has come to my attention today. I have noted
with interest his assurance that such a joint committee would not impinge upon
any existing committee of the Congress. In addition, I note his recommenda-
tion that the chairman and ranking members of the standing committees on
Government Operations should be included in the membership of such a joint
committee. I commend this suggestion for your consideration as it is an element
I have also included in my version of this subject covered in H.R. 3964.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT MCCLORY,
Member of Congress.
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44 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
BUDGET REFORM AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
(By Dewey Anderson, Executive Director, Public Affairs Institute)
REFORMS NEEDED IN PRESENTING THE BUDGET
Progress has been made in the format of the last few budgets offered the
Congress. More is needed to make the budget a readily understandable and
more useful document. This year the budget is presented in brief in a 25-cent
Government print, a longer summary of 440 pages, including the President's
message, and a huge statistical appendix.
This array is a long step forward. What is still lacking is the separate pre-
sentation of each agency's budget coupled with a description of the services
rendered or proposed which this budget finances.
While not all readers will be interested in all agency reports, some will be
particularly concerned with a single agency or department whose description
should be sufficiently detailed to enable them to understand and appraise the
budget proposals. This step is necessary in order to give both critics and sup-
porters a body of facts from which to reach their conclusions concerning budget
adequacy.
Budget simplification is long overdue. A Senate subcommittee reported in
1961 that the budget today?
"* * * retains the essential format of the first budget submitted by President
Harding. * * * To too great a degree its appropriation categories, its emphasis,
its balance of information detail between programs, remains unchanged * * *
developed its own vocabulary, comprehensible in large measure only to budgetary
specialists. * * * It carries a heavy overburden of legacies from the past. Mat-
ters of little contemporary importance are treated in exhaustive and exhausting
detail?while information on far more important programs is meager or nonexist-
ent." (U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, committee print,
1961.)
Standard nomenclature should be used, consistent with that prevailing in the
business world. When Government statistical procedures became too compli-
cated, a commission was set up to standardize them. Now Congress might very
well establish a commission on budget terminology and presentation.
REFORM IN THE USE OF THE BUDGET AND ITS CONTROL
But while better terminology and more understandable presentation are of
immediate concern, the real defects in the budget process are the failure to
develop an instrument which can be used effectively for forward planning and
for measuring the performance of agencies.
It may be that the experts and technicians within the Bureau of the Budget
know what the agencies under their direct supervision are doing with the funds
provided, and how effective their performance actually is. But anyone outside
the Bureau who is not in daily contact with the agencies cannot determine from
any written reports submitted to the Congress by the Budget Bureau and the
President what is really being accomplished and how well the work is being done.
In this situation, Congress is not able properly to control expenditures or to
appraise requests. The Senate committee summed up by saying "The whole
field is almost unexplored."
The standing committees of the Congress are close to the agencies whose sub-
ject matter comes within their purview. Their staff experts develop considerable
competency and knowledge of the agencies with which they are related. They
are often regarded as the spokesmen for and protectors on Capitol Hill of their
particular agencies.
The Appropriations Committees screen agency requests and examine the Fed-
eral budget from this piecemeal viewpoint. Subcommittees do thorough jobs
on individual agencies, and over the years members and their staffs have become
so familiar with agency activities that they are able effectively to screen requests.
Yet nowhere in the Congress is there any committee or group charged with
the overall responsibility of budget policy and control. Nor does anything in
the budget field exist which is comparable to the congressionally created Office
of the Comptroller General. Nowhere can a decision be made to hold the budget
to any level of expenditure and make such a decision stick. Nor can any exist-
ing agency of the Congress determine how effectively the budget provisions as a
whole are being carried out.
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This same situation prevailed in the States until some among them decided
on a new course of action. In California, for example, the legislature had been
spoon fed separate budget agency items as representing the Governor's requests
with little opportunity to determine from firsthand field surveys whether they
were needed or how these budget provisions were carried out. Policy changed
with each change of administration. Finally, the legislature acted. A joint
committee was set up by the two houses of the legislature, provided with compe-
tent staff and given the responsibility to examine the entire budget, appraise the
overall needs, report by spot checks of accomplishments, and act in behalf of the
legislature as a whole.
Thus, the legislative branch of the Government was provided the information
needed to reach its independent judgment.
Being elected officials responsible to their con,stitutencies, they had a direct
stake in the performance of the various State agencies and in the tax, revenue,
and budgetary policies under which the State government was being operated.
Economy-minded legislators could use their membership on this joint committee,
the committee's reports and access to their own expert staff to be better prepared
to make their case both before the legislature and the public. Spending minded
legislators, and those having new or increased services to promote, had access to
the same facts and the opportunity to make their case with full knowledge of the
situation.
But the major value of this type of budgetary review is the control it exercises
over fiscal matters, taxation, revenue production and expenditure as these are
combined to make a budget policy. Just as the highly regarded Joint Economic
Committee has become an indispensable part of the apparatus of Congress, its
committee positions much sought after, its staff of high quality, and its pro-
nouncements widely respected, so such a joint committee on budget policy would
win its place.
Properly conceived and operated, it would not overlap or usurp the functions
of any of the legislative committees. It would not offer legislation, nor examine
the pros and cons of particular bills. But it would receive the President's
budget message and budget, hold hearings of experts, interested citizens and
organizations on the budget as a whole, thus providing a forum for the discus-
sion of budget policy.
The membership of this Joint Committee on the Budget should contain chair-
men and ranking members of the standing legislative committees concerned with
revenue, taxation, appropriations and Government operations. They, in turn,
would tend to reflect the thinking and findings of the joint committee in the
conduct of business within their own committees, thereby spreading the in-
fluence and increasing the uniformity of budget policies in their applications to
particular agencies.
No one who knows how Congress works is anxious to add to its burdens
through the establishment of more committees. But the creation of the Joint
Economic Committee did just the opposite. It expedited legislation by helping
to create an understanding of the economy and its overall problems. The same
would be in prospect for a joint committee on the budget.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Saloma, will you come forward, please, and
identify yourself for the record?
Dr. SALOMA. My name is Dr. John S. Saloma III, and I am as-
sistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
The CHAIRMAN. Give a little more of your background; if you would
care to.
Dr. SALOMA. All right, sir.
It has been my privilege to serve as a congressional fellow during the
past session of the Congress, with Congressman Thomas B. Curtis of
the Ways and Means Committee and Joint Economic Committee, and
with Senator Leverett Saltonstall, the ranking minority member of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, and Armed Services.
I have been educated at MIT, the London School of Economics, and
I have my doctorate from Harvard University. I am currently teach-
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46 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
ing courses in American government and American foreign policy at
MIT.
The CHAIRMAN Very well.
Dr. SALOMA. Mr. Chairman, Senator Saltonstall has asked me to
give you a letter in support of S. 537 for inclusion in the record of
these hearings at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The letter will be received and inserted
in the record at an appropriate place.'
Dr. SALOMA. Although the Senator is not a sponsor of the bill he
generally supports the intentions of the bill. As ranking minority
member on Senate Appropriations, Senator Saltonsta,11 has had a back-
ground of experience in this area equaled by few Members of the
Congress. I have the highest regard for his genuine efforts in the
field of Government economy and effective congressional operations.
The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, I see you have a prepared statement of
some length. Would you choose to just insert your statement in the
record and highlight it or would you prefer to read it?
Dr. SALOMA. Well, I would prefer to read sections of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Why don't we direct then that it be printed in the
record in full and that you read such excerpts from it as you desire and
comment thereon.
Dr. SALOMA. Very well.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. SALOMA III, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH-
NOLOGY
Dr. SALOMA. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this invitation to
appear before your committee today to discuss the merits of S. 537, a
bill which would establish a Joint Committee on the Budget. You
and your committee are to be commended for your persistent advocacy
of reforms in the budgetary process. It is encouraging to those of us
who are concerned that Congress assume a more effective role in our
National Government to see examples of initiative such as yours.
My statement this morning will include (1) a discussion of some of
the general problems confronting Congress in its efforts to control
Federal expenditures, (2) an analysis of specific provisions of the bill
in terms of contribution to more effective congressional control, and
(3) an evaluation of the various arguments raised in opposition to a
Joint Committee on the Budget. In general, I shall support the bill
as a moderate yet potentially significant reform for strengthening con-
gressional control of the Nation's finances.
SOME CONGRESSIONAL DILEMMAS IN THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL CONTROL
Congress, through its role in the appropriations process, exercises
tremendous power over both administration and policy. It is not so
clear, however, that Congress exercises effective control of expendi-
tures, that is, that Congress can act in the appropriations process with
meaningful knowledge and understanding of the consequences of its
action. The across-the-board reduction of a budget request is a not
uncommon example of the use of congressional power without con-
Letter to Senator McClellan, Mar. 20, 1063, P. 60.
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gressional control. Faced with the almost impossible task of evaluat-
ing the details of the Executive budget, Congress may resort to a per-
centage cut of the total budget, in effect restoring discretionary control
of expenditures to the Executive. Such arbitrary cuts may also seri-
ously hinder the effective operation of executive agencies in a manner
Congress never intended.
Given the constitutional power of Congress in the appropriations
process, a power that will be exercised with or without effective con-
trol, the basic problem becomes one of providing Congress with the
information and facilities necessary to analyze and interpret the con-
sequences of its use of the power of the purse. Congressional control
in the appropriations process therefore assumes, as Robert Wallace
has pointed out:
(1) Congressional determination of a desirable volume, range,
and direction of program activity.
(2) Congressional exercise of independent judgment concern-
ing the financial resources, required by administrative agencies to
support effectively such volume, range, and direction of program
activity.
(3) Availability of congressional sources of information and
analyses as a basis for exercise of independent and informed
judgment.2
If one accepts the congressional role in appropriations, the rational
use of this power should be an important goal of congressional re-
form. It is not surprising that one of the principal sources of opposi-
tion to such reform is found in that school of thought that would
reduce congressional involvement in the details of appropriations?
in the direction of the British cabinet?parliamentary mode1.3 As-
suming then the desirability of more rationality in the use of con-
gressional power, what are the current problems in the quest for
financial control?
(1) The frustration of budgetary size and complexity. If a single
word can express the emotional reaction of the individual Congress-
man to the Federal budget it is "frustration." How can he begin
to comprehend the sheer size of $100 billion?a question Congress was
asking itself seriously little more than a decade ago when Federal
expenditures were less than half that figure? How can he get on
top of the budget and stay on top? If the senior Members of Con-
gress are concerned with these questions, as the sponsorship of S. 537
suggests, one can imagine the almost total frustration and sense of
impotence of the class of 1962 just entering the Congress.
The problem is not so much one of insufficient information as it is
one of too much undigested information. Few Members have time
to study the voluminous budget document, let alone the extensive
testimony accumulated at subcommittee hearings both for the au-
thorization and appropriation of funds. How can the Member ob-
? tain meaningful interpretation and analysis of the data already at
his disposal or available on request? How can he formulate intel-
ligent questions to ask in the appropriations process? A partial an-
Robert A. Wallace, "Congressional Control of Federal Spending" (Detroit, Wayne
State University Press, 1960), P. 5.
3 See, for example, Arthur Smithies, "The Budgetary Process in the United States"
(New York, McGraw-Hill, 1955), pp. 167-172.
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48 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
swer is provided by the services of the Bureau of the Budget, through
its "Budget in Brief," and its staff assistance to the Congress in ex-
plaining the President's Budget. However, the role of the Bureau
of the Budget poses another range of problems.
Before considering these, it should be noted that an element of
frustration is built into the congressional system?the frustration of
the new Member who must serve his term as "apprentice," the frustra-
tion of the great majority of Members who cannot serve on the Ap-
propriations Committee and must defer to the "specialization" of
those who do serve. But, over and beyond this, the pervasive sense
of frustration in Congress suggests a need that is not being met. It
is also a self admission that Congress does not have control of the
expenditure situation.
(2) The need for independent interpretation and analysis. Con-
gress
has available a number of potential sources for the interpreta-
tive studies it needs if it is to gain even a semblance of control over
appropriations: the Budget Bureau, the General Accounting Office,
the Legislative Reference Service, and its own professional commit-
tee staffs, especially the staffs of the Appropriations Committee, etc.
These staff resources have proved inadequate for two major reasons.
First, the Budget Bureau, which makes the type of continuing
analysis of fiscal questions that would be most useful to the Appropria-
tions Committees, owes its primary allegiance to the Executive. As
the staff arm of the President, located in the executive office of the
President, the Budget Bureau presides over the formulation of the
Executive Budget. The budgetary process within the executive bu-
reaucracy assumes some of the characteristics one usually associates
with the legislative process?interagency and interbureau bargaining.,
negotiation, and comprise.4 Thus, when the President presents his
budget, the Budget Bureau assumes an essentially defensive posture,
treating budget decisions already reached as final, unwilling to upset
the set of balances achieved. The Appropriations Committees thus
receive their primary information on the budget document from a
staff that is pleading its own cause. If the committees receive testi-
mony from the executive agencies themselves, it will most likely be
in the form of requests for even more funds than approved by the
Budget Bureau. The ex parte character of executive staff testimony
becomes a subject for even more serious concern when one recognizes
the potential political uses of the budget. 5 The Budget Bureau will
not be an independent or neutral point of reference in such situations.
Secondly, the major staff alternatives to the Budget Bureau?the
GAO, Legislative Reference Service, and congressional staff have not
been developed or utilized by Congress to provide the detailed analyti-
cal reporting on Federal expenditures that the Budget Bureau af-
fords the Executive. In part this is the inevitable product of the
nature of the executive and legislative roles in our system. The execu-
tive has immediate responsibility for the Federal Bureaucracy?his
sources of information, and day to day involvement in the actual opera-
'See S. H. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," Foreign Affairs,
January 1960, for a discussion of the executive and legislative processes involved in the
formulation of national security policy within the executive branch.
5 See Wallace, op. cit., ch. 8, for a discussion of "budgetary legerdemain."
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tion of the departments cannot be equalled by Congress without a
drastic reallocation of constitutional roles. Yet, this is only a partial
answer: Congress must assume a share of the blame itself. For in-
stance, section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 pro-
vided for expenditure analyses of executive agencies by the Comp-
troller General but Congress has not seen fit to appropriate funds to
the GAO for this purpose.6 Similarly, the Appropriations Commit-
tees of the Congress have unlimited authorization to hire additional
staff?yet they have resisted pressures from within and without Con-
gress to do so.7 The Appropriations Committees could probably staff
their subcommittees on a comparable basis to the staff authorized for
the other standing committees of the Congress by the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946 without creating an unmanageable staff
bureaucracy.8 The Legislative Reference Service, by its very nature
of operations, i.e., providing staff asisstance on request, has not pro-
vided the focus for continuing analysis.
The concept of a Joint Committee on the Budget has evolved in
part from this context of Executive partiality of the Budget Bureau
on the one hand and Congressional reluctance to develop its own inde-
pendent resources on the other. It is, in essence, another alternative,
another approach, to the unsolved problem of placing meaningful
fiscal information at the disposal of Congress. Before considering
its potential utility in this regard, two other problems are suggested
by the preceding discussion.
(3) The limits of congressional intervention?the need for execu-
tive unity. In the quest for fiscal control, Congress should avoid
creating a rival bureaucracy that would disrupt or undermine the
progress made toward a unified executive budget under the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921. The Executive, by virtue of a unitary chief
executive, and its hierarchical organization has provided the logical
focus for weighing agency budget requests and formulating an over-
all executive budget. The President has been delegated the roles of
chief budget officer and initiator of fiscal policy. Congress, maintain-
ing the power of review, has endorsed and strengthened the concept of
executive leadership in the budgetary process through subsequent
le islation.6
However, if Congress is to have access to independent sources of
information, there will inevitably be some duplication of effort, and
some intrusion of congressional agencies into areas of data gathering,
reporting and analysis that have been exclusive preserves of the
executive. The tendency to create rival bureaucracies?rival executive
and legislative Budget Bureaus?is probably inherent in any serious
proposal to strengthen congressional control. It is a cost that should
be offset by the improvements realized in increased congressional
effectiveness. It is also more of an imaginary than a real danger.
Congress, realistically, would not want to duplicate or usurp the task
of formulating the executive budget. It is a much too onerous task
that would require a new staffarm roughly equivalent in size to all
6 Ibid., pp. 155-176.
7 Ibid. p. 57. See also Kenneth Kofmehl, "The Professional Staffs of Congress" (Purdue
University series, 1962), chs. 7, 9.
Wallace, op. cit., p. 58.
See Senate Committee on Government Operations, "Financial Management in the
Federal Government," S. Doc. 11., 87th Cong.
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50 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
the professional staff now employed in the standing committees. One
of the reasons for the failure of the Joint Committee on the Legisla-
tive Budget, established under the Legislative Reorganization Act,
was the failure to staff the committee to meet the overambitious
expectations of the Act.1? Congress is still not disposed to provide the
staff for a full scale congressional Budget Bureau. The objectives
of S.537 are considerably more modest.
Congress need not, however, duplicate or absorb the executive
budget process in order to exercise greater control of expenditures.
Selective studies by the GAO and supplementary staff to the Appro-
priations Committees would contribute to the informational needs of
Congress without precluding a strong?even a stronger?executive
Budget Bureau.
(4) The limits of congressional intervention?congressional dis-
unity. The upper limit of acceptable congressional intervention in
the budgetary process is set by the need for executive unity. The
lower limit of possible action is set by the willingness or rather the
unwillingness of Congress to coordinate its own efforts in the fiscal
field. Woodrow Wilson once referred to the leadership of Congress
as "the disintegrate ministry" or "government by committee chair-
man."" Perhaps the real danger to balance in the appropriations
process is not so much congressional disruption of the executive budget
as it is breakdown of communications and cooperative relationships
between the respective Appropriations Committees of the two Houses.
Holbert Carroll, in his review of the coordination of committee con-
trol reaches the "disquieting" conclusion that?
Congress prefers to behave irresponsibly in dealing with fiscal matters. Con-
gress prefers confusion. The Committees on Appropriations and Congress are not
particularly interested in integrating their control over appropriations, in
making more rational choices among alternatives, or in emphasis * * * con-
fusion * * * enables the Members of Congress to mask their intrusions upon
the executive budget to take care of politically pressing local needs, and pres-
sure groups have more opportunities to get what they want when uncoordinate
appropriation methods are employed.2
This suggests the real dilemma in the quest for financial control.
Mr. Chairman, as you yourself have stated, Congress would be able to
speak with "better grace and more influence" if it set its own house in
order before criticizing the executive branch.13 ?
To summarize, Congress currently faces several major problems in
achieving meaningful control of Federal expenditures. If it is to
overcome the widespread sense of frustration among its individual
Members, it must develop facilities for the provision of interpretive
and analytical studies that will be useful in formulating congressional
questions in the appropriations process. Furthermore, it must de-
velop facilities independent of the executive's Bureau of the Budget.
Several alternatives are available but none have been utilized effec-
tively. Greater congressional control may mean increased duplication
of effort and friction between the branches, but Congress is unlikely
to destroy the basic utility of a unified executive budget. Finally,
10 See Report of the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget, H. Rept. 1361, 80th
Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in the daily Congressional Record, Feb. 5, 1963, pp. 1754-1756.
11 Congressional Government, especially chapters 2-3, "The House of Representatives."
1, Holbert N. Carroll, "The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs" (University
of Pittsburgh, 1958), pp. 207-208.
" Senator John L. McClellan, "Joint Committee on the Budget," a speech by * * *
Jan. 25, 1963.
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51
Congress must assume ultimate responsibility for its lack of control
of the fiscal situation. Until it resolves its internal differences of
opinion, confusion and not control will mark the exercise of its power.
COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF S. 537
Turning now from these general considerations, what potential
improvements may the specific reforms incorporated in S. 537 achieve
in the appropriations process?
(1) The proposed Joint Committee on the Budget would afford
Congress the opportunity for coordinated study of the entire budget
and continuing review of the Nation's budgetary situation, a function
that is fulfilled by neither House of Congress at present. The com-
mittee would consider the President's message on the state of the
Union and the Economic Report, overall revenue estimates, and
changes in economic conditions.
The approach taken in this regard in S. 537 is more modest and
realistic than the approach taken in the case of the Joint Committee
on the Legislative Budget (Sec. 138 of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946). Emphasis is placed on a small committee composed of
members of the two Appropriations Committees avoiding the prob-
lem of enlarged membership and jurisdiction of a joint committee
embracing both the spending and revenue committees of the two
Houses. Emphasis is also placed on developing a core of professional
staff services supplemented by the GAO and Budget Bureau, one of
the major weaknesses of the previous committee. Also the require-
ment for a legislative ceiling on appropriations to be set in the first
weeks of the session?a much too ambitious objective?has been
dropped.
At a minimum, a Joint Committee on the Budget would afford some
14 Members of Congress directly, and the general membership indi-
rectly, the opportunity to get an overview of the Federal budget and
the budgetary process. The value of this exposure in terms of more
effective fiscal control, will depend, of course, on the amount of time
and interest Members are willing and able to devote to an added com-
mittee responsibility. The major value of the joint committee ap-
proach probably lies in the contribution it would make to the intelli-
gent development and use of staff services for the Congress.
(2) The proposed Joint Committee on the Budget constitutes an
imaginative approach to the development and utilization of staff
facilities for the interpretation and analysis of fiscal data. S. 537
would establish a professional staff under control of the joint com-
mittee which would provide services to both individual Members of
Congress and the Appropriations Committees. The alternative ap-
proach of increasing the professional staffs of the respective Appro-
priations Committees would limit the flexibility of the staff, curtail
direct services to nonmembers of the committees and eliminate possi-
ble economies of time and money afforded by pooled resources. Even
under the proposed joint committee there remains a danger that com-
mittee members, especially ranking majority and minority members,
will monopolize staff resources. Your committee, Mr. Chairman, may
want to consider further safeguards to insure that the services of the
joint committee are available to more than a few select members of
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52 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
the Appropriations Committees. This would maintain one of the
principal improvements afforded by the bill.
The professional staff of the joint committee by itself (estimated
unofficially as 25 to 30) could not realistically accomplish the range of
duties assigned to it in S. 537. Rather, it should serve as a mechanism
for coordinating the collection of data and disseminating it to Con-
gress in its most useful form. Thus, one of the most significant re-
forms of the bill enlists the Comptroller General in an important
supporting role to the joint committee. The "new function" of the
GAO envisaged in the bill is to make, at the request of the chairman
of the joint committee "such investigations and reports with respect
to any agency as will enable the joint committee to give adequate
consideration to items relating to agency expenditures, activities, or
appropriation requests." 14 The bill also provides for the assignment
of staff members of the Budget Bureau to attend executive sessions
of the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees with reference
to proposed appropriations, as required. This provision, however,
should be used with discretion. If Congress were to earmark a sub-
stantial number of Bureau staff members on a regular basis, it could
undermine the control of expenditures currently achieved in the execu-
tive budget process. Finally, the requirement that all committees
recommending legislation which would authorize appropriations sub-
mit estimates of project or program costs over the first 5 years of
operation will involve the professional staffs of the standing commit-
tees, if only marginally, in the provision of data for more effective ex-
penditure control.
Senator MUNDT. Dr. Saloma, will you expand on that statement a
little more and tell us what you have in mind?
Dr. SALO1VIA. Yes, Senator Mundt.
The total staff of the Bureau itself, Senator McClellan mentioned
earlier, is in the order of 450. I think the professional staff is nearer
to 275.
Senator MUNDT. I think that is right, the professional staff. The
rest of them are secretarial help?
Dr. SALoivrA. Yes, sir. If this staff, say 1 member for each of the
14 subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee, were re-
quired to sit in on a good share of the executive sessions, this would
be a substantial portion of the Budget Bureau on loan to the Congress.
This is if it were used to the full extent?
Senator MUNDT. You are thinking strictly in terms then of the
depletion of the staff of the Budget Bureau rather than any conflict
of interest or something of that kind?
Dr. SALOMA. Well, there is a concern, I think, especially on the part
of the Budget Bureau itself in regard to conflict of interests, that is,
whether the budget examiner could serve two masters. And I have
already mentioned the ex parte character of executive staff testimony.
The risk I am concerned about here is that these people would not be
able to perform their usual functions of budget review and analysis.
This is pretty much a full-time job when you consider the number of
people assigned to the defense budget, for instance. I understand the
14 See Senate Committee on Government Operations, "Joint Committee on the Budget,"
draft committee print.
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53
practice has been for only one member of the Budget Bureau, in the
area of defense, to sit with the Appropriations Committees. This bill
would make it possible for each subcommittee to request the services
of a Budget Bureau professional.
Senator MO NDT. OK.
Dr. SALOAIA. (3) The proposed Joint Committee on the Budget
should facilitate closer cooperation and working relationships between
the two Appropriations Committees. During the past session of Con-
gress, the appropriations process virtually broke down due to differ-
ences between the two Appropriations Committees. The delay of con-
gressional action in some instances almost 4 months after the expira-
tion of the previous fiscal year could not help but detract from the
stature of Congress in the public's eye. The current truce has not
solved the problem.
The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation has provided
a working illustration of the possibilities for cooperative use of joint
staff facilities by related committees in the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives. There would appear to be a similar potential in regard
to the appropriations function. Joint staff would not only increase
the efficiency and speed of the appropriations process, avoiding un-
necessary duplication of staff work, but would also provide precedents
in the development of techniques of cooperation. Section 3 of the
bill, authorizing the Joint Committee to recommend joint hearings
where expeditious, is another precedent in this direction.
There is one limitation to cooperation between the Appropriations
Committees, however, that should be kept in mind in the establishment
of joint staff facilities. The two committees perform different roles
in the appropriations process: the House Committee on Appropria-
tions views itself as the "guardian of public funds," a role that it
feels cannot be reliably performed by any other unit in the appropria-
tions process.16 The Senate Committee on Appropriations serves in
what may more nearly be termed an "appellate" role. Instead of the
traditional bicameral function of review and technical revision, the
Senate Appropriations Committee functions as a court of appeals for
the restoration of budget cuts in the House.16 However, it should be
possible to provide a range of joint staff services without compromis-
ing the independence and separate roles of the two committees.
(4) The proposed Joint Committee of the Budget would serve as
a watchdog for the standing committees to effect greater efficiency and
economy in Government. Its duties would include the recommenda-
tion to the appropriate standing committees of changes required in
existing laws and the making of reports and recommendations to any
standing committee or subcommittee of either House of Congress con-
cerning deviations from basic legislative authorization and related
matters. Such reports and recommendations could be initiated by the
Joint Committee itself or by request of any congressional committee
or subcommittee. The effective use of these provisions of the bill
depends, of course, on the willingness of the standing committees to
use the services of the Joint Committee.
15 See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee," the American
Political Science Review, LXI, No. 2, June 1962, p. 311.
" For a discussion of the factors contributing to the Senate appellate role, see Wallace,
op. cit., pp. 28-29.
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SOME QUALIFICATIONS
The preceding points are potentially significant reforms in the con-
gressional procedures for handling appropriations. But, as staff
services they are essentially permissive reforms. They place at the
disposal of Congress and especially its Appropriations Committees
new techniques for rational control of expenditure. Some of these
techniques?notably the use of the GAO under section 206 of the
Legislative Reorganization Act?have been available for congressional
use before. Even the creation of a joint committee with professional
staff does not assure congressional use. Modest expectations are more
appropriate.
The supporters of S. 537 have also perhaps overestimated the pos-
sible economies these reforms might achieve. Objective analyses of
an executive agency's operation may justify further cuts in the budget.
They may also serve to confirm the agency's budget justification.
Knowledge can cut both ways and it is not unlikely that fuller con-
gressional access to the facts will serve to moderate congressional
de-
mands for major cuts in the budget.
A POSTSCRIPT: THE PROVISION OF MINORITY STAFF
In the light of the recent debate on the merits of minority staff, it
is interesting to note that S. 537 designates a staff director appointed
by and responsible to the members of the party of which the chairman
of the Joint Committee is a member, and an associate staff director
appointed by and responsible to the members of the opposition party.
This accords with the recommendation of the minority members of the
Joint Economic Committee who have endorsed the concept of a Joint
Committee on the Budget with a "high level professional staff which
includes minority representation."
Much of the discussion concerning the Joint Committee on the Budg-
et has been set in the context of executive versus congressional roles.
The respective roles of majority and minority parties within Congress
should also be considered. While partisanship is minimized within
the Appropriations Committees themselves, the budget is a continuing
issue of debate between the party leaderships.17 In this debate the
majority party, if the same as that of the President, cannot serve as an
impartial critic of the President's program, but must side in most
instances with the President.18 The party policy committees of the
minority are clearly not organized or staffed to provide the leadership
an intelligent basis for criticism. Joint Committee minority staff
could, therefore, contribute to increased responsibility in partisan
debate on the budget.
Senator MUNDT. I am glad you brought up the matter of minority
staffs into these hearings. It is a matter of considerable discussion, as
you know, both in the House and the Senate at the present time.
17 Fenno, op. cit., p. 317 if.
" The Congressional Quarterly, weekly rept. No. 9, week ending Mar. 1, 1963, provides
an excellent illustration in this regard. P. 240 :
"House Speaker John W. McCormack (Democrat, Massachusetts), Feb. 20, told reporters
that many senior Republicans had told him they were satisfied with current staffing
arrangements. He said he knew that the so-called Republican `activists' like Ford,
Schwengel, Griffin, Curtis, and Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. (New Jersey) were trying to
develop independent Republican programs but that he saw no need for this since the Job
of the Democratic Congress was to enact the President's program and the 'activist'
movement might be detrimental by creating delays."
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55
We were unduly optimistic, I think, when we passed the LaFollette-
Monroney Act in thinking we had met and solved that problem. It
has not worked out exactly that way. I think if we are going to
establish a Joint Committee, and engage in that kind of innovation,
that this might be at least one committee where we write the rules of
the game so that regardless of the disposition or the nature or the at-
titude of the chairman, the minority, regardless of which party it is,
would be assured of adequate staff representation.
I have been thinking in terms of offering some kind of amendment
to this bill which would try to solve that problem for all time to come.
Insofar as this Joint Committee is concerned, it seems to me if there
is any place where one would want to be sure that the minority and
majority staff reflect, with some degree of comparability, at least, the
character and the party affiliation of the members of the Joint Com-
mittee, that this committee should proceed without any partisan con-
trol, and that the point you make is well taken.
Understandably a party which has its own President in the White
House and, therefore, has its own people in the executive agencies at
all the heads, just naturally is going to feel some compulsion to go
along with the President which it wouldn't feel if the members were
all a neuter gender politically which would be an ideal situation.
I suppose the reverse side is also true, the minority Member would
be more impelled to nick away at a budget than it would be if the
fellow belonged to the opposite party. We can't eliminate politics in
this situation, but I think we can nullify or neutralize the political im-
pact of this kind of committee by setting up the rules of the game
whereby to a considerable degree the party affiliation of the profes-
sional staff will relate itself to the party affiliation of the Members
who belong to the committee.
I am glad you brought it up for discussion. I am sure I don't have
any patent medicine answer but I do think that when we start out now
with something new and something different, and something useful
that maybe we can increase its usefulness and add to its stature and get
better acceptance from its recommendations if we can eliminate as far
as possible any probability or potentiality of political control.
Dr. SALOMA. I think the approach which has been taken already, in
S. 537 is in the right direction. The Legislative Reorganization .Act
is, I think, 100 percent correct in stressing the importance of profes-
sional staff, and professional competence on the part of the staff. I
think the issue relative to minority-majority staff is not so much parti-
sanship as it is control of the staff.
Does the minority have enough staff assistance to draft minority
reports, to look into issues on its own without disrupting the work of
the committee itself but insuring that its points of view are repre-
sented. I think by providing specifically designated top level staff
members to majority and minority you are meeting an important part
of the need. Perhaps the bulk of the staff would remain professional
and for the use of all committee members but at least you would assure
that both the majority and minority had at least staff enough to draft
a report if they choose to do so.
Senator MUNDT. In all events I want to congratulate you for bring-
ing to our minds as the first witness to do so this sticky problem of
how to handle staff assignments in a bipartisan committee. It works
better in some committees than it does in others, but an awful howl
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goes up in some committees, and distinguished and reputable com-
mentators like Roscoe Drummond have been hammering away for
years on the fact he thinks this is a great weakness of bipartisan
government.
He makes it embarrassing for both Members of the minority and
majority by pointing up these statistics and these statistics, I think,
are correct.
I would like to see some progress made in that direction, and I think
when we finalize the legislation in this one, this would be a good place
to eliminate as far as possible any partisan packing of the committee
staff and any partisan purpose of the committee.
This should be dedicated not only to economy because as you point
out we may find out if we get knowledgeable about these things
that some bureaus or agencies are too modest in making their requests.
Many times since I have been a member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee' for example, we have added money into the Department
of Justice for the FBI that the FBI has not asked for. We said,
"You have got to have a little more money, you are doing a good job
and with a little more money you can do a better job."
Maybe we are right and maybe we are wrong, but conceivably if
we had a staff that knew as much about the operation of the agencies
and the bureaus and commissions as hopefully the members of the
Budget Bureau know we might be increasing some appropriations
and decreasing others.
So, I think in addition to having our eye on economy, that the co-
sponsors of this bill had their eye on efficiency in government, and
sometimes you get greater efficiency by a little expenditure of money.
Dr. SALOMA. Apart from the way this would cut, and how much
the budget could be reduced, I think the importance of the measure
is that it attempts to give Congress the means for carrying out its
constitutional role in an intelligent rational manner. This, in itself,
is in the interest of good government and a strong argument in behalf
of S. 537.
I would like to conclude briefly with a summary of the major argu-
ments that have been offered against S. 537.
MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
The arguments in opposition to the concept of a joint committee
on the budget may be grouped in two broad categories: external and
internal.
The first of these arguments, the external argument, assumes that
reforms that strengthen Congress work to the detriment of the Presi-
dent. As James McGregor Burns states the case, "The stronger the
exertion of congressional power, the more conservative and isola-
tionist will be our national policy." 19 In his fourfold classification of
American parties, he would have the presidential parties absorb the
congressional parties. From this essentially proexecutive viewpoint,
any measures that consolidate Congress and its committee structure or
that develop cooperative links between the two Houses are dangerous
and undesirable.
This argument should carry little weight within the Congress.
The simplistic liberal-conservative dichotomy only ignores the prob-
19 "The Deadlock of Democracy: Four Party Politics in America" (Prentice Hall, 1963),
p. 264.
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57
lem of effective use of congressional power. Congress is not likely
to reform itself to conform to the model of Presidential power most
of its critics seems to favor.
The second group of arguments, what I would term "internal,"
are far more basic since they are widely held within the Congress
itself. They include institutional conservatism and particularism.
As I have suggested above, Congress and its Appropriations Com-
mittees have had the authority to provide themselves increased staff
services since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, but have
not chosen to do so for reasons of economy and staff control. This
self-imposed austerity is shortsighted when one considers the for-
feiture of control that has resulted. The oft-cited fear of a legislative
bureaucracy potentially out of control of the legislators is also not an
altogether persuasive argument. Marginal increases in staff in areas
of indicated need should be manageable. In areas requiring major
technical or professional staff assistance Congress might explore
the uses of independent research organizations external to itself. The
GAO provides an obvious illustration in its proposed new relation to
the Joint Committee on the Budget. In the jurisdiction of the Space
Committees, to cite another example, Congress might establish under
its own auspices a Technical Assistance Corporation for obtaining
independent scientific advice of the space program.2?
Finally, congressional particularism in the form of jealousy of
prerogative and jurisdiction stands in the way of cooperative efforts
such as the proposed Joint Committee on the Budget. In theory it
should be possible to reconcile committee independence with joint staff
services. One plausible explanation that has been offered by Robert
Wallace for the continued reluctance of the House Committee on
Appropriations to accept reforms similar to S. 537 is power?the
power both Appropriations Committees enjoy from a virtual mo-
nopoly of fiscal information within Congress:
Studies of the GAO would almost of necessity be made available to the
whole Congress and to the Nation as well. This might lead to justifications for
reductions to which they are opposed, or justification for expenditures they
would want to cut. As it is, Congress and the Nation must rely heavily on the
judgment of congressional Appropriations Committees, and if there is another
source of information, their power is considerably diffused and their judg-
ment not so vita1.21
The interests of a more effective Congress should outweigh the
special interests of even the most powerful committees. Ultimately
particularism will yield to an aroused Congress. The question
remains whether Congress will arouse itself to reform short of the
crisis periods that produced previous reorganizations. S. 537 is a
rtIoderate reform which should help Congress fulfill its constitutional
role of appropriations in a manner that will enhance its stature and
better serve the national interest.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Doctor. I have been inter-
rupted several times in the course of your presentation, but I am
going to read your testimony carefully, and I appreciate the contri-
bution you are making to our consideration of this measure.
20 Alton Frye and John S. Salama, "Congress and Science Policy: The Struggle To
Participate," unpublished article.
21 Wallace, op. cit., pp. 173-174.
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58 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
With respect to the matter of staff, I think it may be very well for
some definite provision to be made, particularly in this joint com-
mittee. I have no objection to it. I operate the Committee on
Government Operations in performing my duties as chairman, with all
deference to members of the minority party. Every staff member on
this committee has instructions to service any member of the com-
mittee, Republican or Democrat, at all times, and to provide them
with every bit of information that we have. They are specifically
instructed in writing minority reports to present the other side on
any question at issue, and to put in the report everything they can
produce favorable to the minority, or to those who wish to present a
dissenting report, and that has the approval of those who are going to
sign the report.
We have never had any problem on this committee, I am very happy
to say, because those are the instructions to the staff.
If you will ask me whether a particular staff member is a Repub-
lican or a Democrat, there isn't a third of them that I can identify as
to any party affiliation?I have never asked them. Politics has its
proper place, but in these matters, so far as I am concerned, where the
affairs of Government are involved and especially on an issue where
all good citizens ought to unite in economy where economy can be
attained, where it can be brought about we ought to do it?I don't
think much partisanship should enter into it.
Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask you a question.
You brought Dr. James McGregor Burns into the picture, and his
basic philosophy, if I understand it is that America would be better
off with a stronger executive branch and weaker Congress and con-
sequently says the way to eliminate the four-party system which
exists in Congress is to have the presidential party predominate and
Congress play a lesser role.
Now, you are also a professor of government and I would like to
ask you whether you embrace or oppose the James McGregor Burns
approach to Congress.
Dr. SALOMA. It is a somewhat political question; but, no, I do not
embrace this partly because of my approach to politics, which is more
realistic and pragmatic. I don't seriously give Professor Burns much
chance before the Congress or the American people. I think the kind
of reform you advocate here which is a marginal, moderate reform
to the approach that should be taken to congressional reform and I
think it is the approach which in the long rim will reach the desired
result.
Senator MUNDT. I must say that in my 25 years in Congress if what
Mr. James McGregor Burns describes, and that is the tendency of
Congress to get unduly strong and the Executive to get unduly weak,
if there has been any such trend that I have ever heard it has been
just the opposite.
But in all events, the check and balance system, I think, is pretty
well justified in our American history. Sometimes you do have Ex-
ecutives who are a little bit stronger than Congress. Sometimes you
have Congress that is a little stronger than the Executive but the
people have a way to settle that in their elections which come up
every 2 and 4 and 6 years, and to take steps and to suggest reforms
as Dr. Burns does which would deliberately decrease the authority
of Congress and make it an even weaker part of the check and balance
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59
system, to me would be turning the course of history back which had
been making progress, that is the reason I am asking that question.
I am glad to have you support it.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lucius Wilmerding, will you come forward, please?
It may be necessary for me to leave to keep an important engage-
ment before Mr. Wilmerding completes his statement. In order that
I may not interrupt his testimony, I wish to make certain insertions
in the record immediately following his statement, as follows:
Statements from Senators Gordon Allott, of Colorado; Edmund
S. Muskie, of Maine; Leverett Saltonstall, of Massachusetts ? and
Representative John 0. Marsh, Jr., of Virginia, in support of g. 537.
Also,
I wish to include statements on the bill submitted by Mr.
Ralph W. E. Reid, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
1955-61, and Mr. Robert A. Wallace, Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury. Letters addressed to the committee from Dr. Gerhard
Colm, Chief Economist, National Planning Association, Hon. Daniel
W. Bell, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1934-39 and
Under Secretary of the Treasury, 1940-45, commenting on S. 537,
will likewise be included in the record.
The committee has also received a letter from Mr. Carlton W. Til-
linghast, chairman of the National Taxpayers Conference, on behalf
of 30 State taxpayers associations and federations, which will be in-
cluded in the record following the above statements and communi-
cations.
I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and
that of the members of the committee to the witnesses who have been
so generous with their time and energy in assisting us in developing
information and suggestions regarding
''ardincr the pending bill, as well as
to those who have taken the trouble to forward their views and com-
ments in the form of statements or letters to the committee.
I assure you that the committee is indeed grateful to all of you for
your cooperation, which I know will be most helpful to us and to
the Congress in the consideration of this important legislation.
STATEMENT OF LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., PRINCETON, NJ.
Mr. WILMERDING. My name is Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., and I am the
author of a book called "The Spending Power" which was published
in 1943, and related the history of the efforts of Congress, mostly un-
successful, to control expenditures from 1789 down to date.
I worked in the Treasury Department for 6 years.
The CHAIRMAN. Worked for whom?
Mr. WILMERDING. The Treasury Department here in Washington.
I have been a special consultant to the Federal Reserve Board, and I
was a member, this last year, of a committee of the budget appointed
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at President Kennedy's request.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you write your book?
Mr. WILMERDING. In 1941?before the war.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand.
Senator MlONDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I have known
Lucius Wilmerding for a long time and he has written another book
called "The Electoral College" which I have read many times and has
come up with some very helpful suggestions as to how we can
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straighten out the electoral college in this country and has provided
some of the background information for Senate Joint Resolution 12
which the chairman and I had joined with other Senators in
introducing.
I haven't read your book on spending but if it is as good as your
book on the electoral college I know it is a fine book.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. WILMERDING. No, sir; I don't have a prepared statement. I
thought I would just talk off the cuff.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.
Mr. WILMERDING. I testified in 1951 on a bill very much like this and
at that time I expressed some doubts that it would meet all the objec-
tives of the committee. I don't want to repeat those doubts now,
though I still feel them. I would rather speak to another point.
Since 1951, I have become much concerned with the acrimonious dis-
putes that go on from year to year between the House and Senate over
their respective rights to originate appropriations bills and the break-
down of legislative procedures which has accompanied those disputes.
I am thinking particularly, of course, of last year's dispute between
Senator Hayden and Representative Cannon. If this were just an
isolated instance it wouldn't make too much difference but this kind of
dispute has been going on since 1789 almost every year and it shows no
signs of stopping, and the thing that I like particularly about this bill
is that it seems to provide some machinery for avoiding such disputes
by bringing together in a single committee the members of the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees.
As I understand the testimony here this morning and as I gather
from the chairman's speech of January 25th the bill itself has got
tangled up in this constitutional dispute. It has been represented in
the House as an infringement on the allegedly exclusive right of that
body to orginate appropriation bills. I think if the air could be
cleared of that difficulty, this bill probably would have no trouble in
passing because I see that a great majority of the Senate are for it
and I presume that an equally great majority of the House would
support it if the vote were taken solely on its merits. Only the con-
stitutional difficulty obstructs its passage.
Senator MUNDT. To fortify your viewpoint it should be said that
the Senate has already acted favorably on preceding legislation, I
think, identical to this, Mr. Reynolds, or very similar.
Mr. REYNOLDS. It has passed the Senate five times.
Senator MUNDT. Five times the Senate has approved this. Five
times the House has said no and I think you put your finger on the
reason, under a false assumption that the Constitution says that ap-
propriation bills originate in the House.
The Constitution says no such thing, it says revenue bills.
Mr. WILMERDING. It says revenue bills?"bills for raising reve-
nue"?and I wanted to discuss that a little bit, not at great length.
I want to show that the history of the clause in the Federal Conven-
tion proves that appropriation bills were not included in revenue bills
but specifically excluded, and I want to show that the practice of the
Senate in the early years was to originate appropriation bills, that
its rules provided for originating appropriation bills, and that the
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dispute about the exclusive right of the House to originate appropria-
tion bills didn't really get underway until 1837.
Up until that time the dispute was generally about bills and whether
the Senate could amend revenue bills in a radical way.
In the Federal Convention a discrimination in the powers of the two
Houses with respect to the origination of bills was first debated on
June 13, 1787. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who was a great
admirer of the British system, proposed that all money bills should
originate in the House of Representatives exclusively.
That motion was debated solely on its merits?the only time it was
so debated?and it was defeated by a vote of eight States to three, the
three being Delaware, New York, and North Carolina (erroneously
reported as Virginia).
The proposal next appeared in connection with the compromise be-
tween the large and small States on representation. In one House the
States were to be represented in proportion to their respective numbers
of inhabitants; in the other they were to have an equal vote. To per-
suade the large States to accept this compromise the small States of-
fered them a price. That price was the exclusive right of the House
of -Representatives (which would be controlled by the large States) to
originate "all bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing
the salaries of the officers of Government." Such bills were to be con-
curred in or rejected as a whole by the Senate ? they could not be altered
or amended. No money was to be drawn from the Public Treasury
except in consequence of appropriations made by the House of
Representatives.
That wag the price offered by the small States for the consent of
the large States to the grand compromise on representation. It waS
not part of the compromise itself.
The large States accepted the compromise but refused the price.
On August 8 the section was expunged from the draft Constitution
by a vote of seven States to four. Subsequent efforts to reinstate it
were defeated. A great majority thought it best to let each House
originate any bill, whether or not it related to money.
The proposition now seemed to be dead, but it came up again in a
much modified form in connection with the compromise on the mode
of electing the President. In that compromise, the large States were
given an advantage over the small in the electoral college and the
small State over the large in the House of Representatives whenever
the election of the President should revolve on that body.
Again the small States offered a price to have this arrangement
adopted and agreed to by the large States but this time the price
offered was such that the large States might, in a spirit of accommo-
dation, accept it.
Gone were the words relating to appropriation bills and salary
bills; only revenue bills, "bills for raising revenue," were to originate
exclusively in the House. Gone were the words restricting the power
of the Senate to alter and amend bills of any kind. On the contrary
the power of the Senate to change revenue bills, as other bills, was
exphcity asserted. The injunction remained that no appropriations
shall be drawn from the Treasury except in consequence of appro-
priations, but the words "made by the House of Representatives,"
were changed to "made by law"?all ? of which proves pretty conclu-
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sively that the appropiration bills were not meant to be included in
the constitutional prerogative of the House but, on the contrary, were
specifically meant to be excluded.
Senator MUNDT. Couldn't that position be fortified and reenforced
by the fact that the Constitution talks only about revenue bills and
says nothing about appropriation bills?
The fact that the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected
proposals to have appropriation bills originate in the House would
seem to me to destroy any basis whatsoever for the assumption that
the Constitution holds appropriation bills must originate in the
House.
Mr. WILMERDING . You could deduce that by just reading the pro-
ceedings in the Convention.
When you go on to read the debates it becomes even clearer it is
spelled out in words of almost one syllable by Madison and James
Wilson and others who talked about this subject. But another re-
enforcing fact is that the members of the Federal Convention who
favored a restriction on the power of the Senate to originate money
bills, knew that they had been defeated and said so.
George Mason was very keen on this restrictive clause and he re-
fused to sign the Constitution on the ground that it allowed the Senate
the right to originate appropriation bills. He put that down specif-
ioally as one of his reasons. The same with Elbridge Gerry. He said:
The right of the House to originate revenue bills has been effectually destroyed
hv the right of the Senate to alter and amend them.
The winners and losers were agreed on what the result was, and the
result was very little. It was just that the House could originate bills
for raising revenue. Even the phrase "raising revenue" was carefully
chosen to repel the objection against "raising money," which might
happen incidentally.
The actual wording came from the Massachusetts constitution, the
words, "money bills" being changed into "bills for raising revenues" so
as to reflect their previous decisions of the Convention on this matter.
So much for the Constitution. Now as to practice. In the first years
of the Government, the Senate frequently originated appropriations
bills. They were mostly for small amounts, private claims and the
like. Perhaps the largest was an act of 1799 making appropriations
for carrying some Indian treaties into effect. But small or large, the
principle was the same. I could also call attention to a rule of the
Senate adopted in 1787, fixing the day in its second session after which,
in courtesy to the House, it would not originate bills making ap-
propriations for the general government or for the military and naval
establishments. This rule clearly shows that the Senate asserted a
right at that time to originate the great appropriation bills of Govern-
ment if it were convenient.
The House never objected to any of these appropriation bills passed
by the Senate. They concurred in them without any comment. The
only disputes arising between their Houses were over the constitutional
interpretation of the phrase "bills for raising revenue." Was a bill
for repealing a salt duty, or a bill to reduce tariffs, or a bill for issu-
ing Treasury notes in anticipation of taxes, a bill for raising revenue?
These questions produced the same kind of inconveniences then as now,
fights and squabbles and acrimonious disputes between the two
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Houses; but it wasn't until much later that the House rejected Senate
appropriation bills on constitutional grounds.
The first instance, I think, was in 1837 when the Senate originated
a military appropriation bill and the House refused to act on it. It
passed a bill of its own in identical language and persuaded the Senate
to accept it. In form the House originated that bill but, of course,
the bill really had been originated by the Senate.
Senator MUNDT. As a matter of fact, even now the Senate originates
appropriations, maybe not appropriation bills, but if, after aHouse
measure appropriation bill has been approved, and sent over here, as
frequently happens, new legislation is passed which involves the neces-
sity for appropriations, we originate the appropriations and send it
back over there for conference.
So, in practice, we are doing exactly what the House says shouldn't
be done. We originate appropriations.
Now, there isn't the word "bill" behind them but it is the same thing;
we sit on it; we act on it; we appropriate the money, and send it to
conference, and they concur or don't concur as they desire to do and
deem best, but as far as your originating precedent is concerned it
operates in the Senate now.
Mr. WILIVIERDING. That is right. A similar remark was made by
Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts in 1879.
He had had very long experience in the House of Representatives
and he remarked that the privilege of originating revenue bills gave
the House no advantage in theory but in practice gave an advantage
to the Senate. Let the House pass a money bill; let the Senate by way
of amendment strike out everything after the enacting clause, sub-
stitute its own plan of finance, and send it back too late in the session
for consideration. The House would reject the Senate amendments
in lump without hearing them read; the Senate would insist, and a
conference would be granted. A conference report must be accepted
or rejected as a whole.
In practice, therefore, said Senator Hoar, the whole power of legis-
lation over Senate amendment was delegated to the conference man-
agers. "Is it not obvious," he asked rhetorically, "that the House has
purchased the empty and barren privilege of origination at the sacri-
fice of its freedom of debate?"
I take it that is much the same thine,'' you are saying now. The
House doesn't really gain anything by the privilege of originating
revenue bills or by insisting on its supposed privileges of originating
appropriation bills. The country loses by the weakening of the
bicameral principle of legislation.
Senator MUNDT. I think you serve a very useful purpose in bringing
this into the hearing because largely it is a mistaken concept on the
part of some members of the House Appropriations Committee about
these constitutional provisions that have served as a roadblock to the
adoption of this joint committee bill.
Mr. WILMERDING. That is the reason I brought it in, and because
it is getting late that is the only thing I want to say about this bill.
I was hoping to suggest that maybe in an appendix to the committee's
report the staff might work up a little historical account of the origin
of this dispute for the information of those Members of the House
who have probably never really studied this question.
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64 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON TH.P., BUDGET
It is too often said that the House has an exclusive right to origi-
nate money bills. Then a great deal of ingenuity and learning is
expended in proving that in 1787 money bills included appropriation
bills, which indeed they did. But the Constitution says nothing of
money bills; it speaks only?and very deliberately?of bills for rais-
ing revenue.
Senator MUNDT. I was a member of that subcommittee of the
Appropriations Committee which was engaged for many weeks as
to whether it was important to hold the conference committee 75 feet
closer to the House or 75 feet closer to the Senate and whether it was
important to have the one man or the other designated as chairman
of the conference.
Actually the chairman of the conference has just one vote. He
doesn't exercise any predominant influence. Certainly the location
might be a matter of convenience on roll calls, something of that kind
of thing, but it would be a shame, in my opinion, to retard a reform
for a sixth time, if it were defeated for a sixth time in the House,
because of an illusion that the Constitution says something which it
does not say at all.
The chairman and I have read an article by Mr. Wilmerding which
he had published some time ago going into this whole history, supply-
ing some of the details he didn't have a chance to supply today. It is
a comparatively short article and I would like to have unanimous
consent to have his article appear as part of his testimony in the
record.
Senator PELL (presiding). Without objection it will be included
in the record.
Senator MUNDT. You have it in mind, I am sure. It was published
in a national publication.
Mr. WILMERDING. I published an article on the Hayden-Cannon
dispute in the Washington Post, on Sunday, January 6 of this year.
SENATOR MUNDT. It was read on Columbus Day by Senator Willis
Robertson on the floor of the Senate.
Mr. WILMERDING. I didn't know that.
Senator MUNDT. We would like to incorporate that as part of your
your remarks, if you will provide it.
(The article referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1963]
HILL HAS BEEN SCRAPPING OVER THE PURSE STRINGS SINCE 1787
(By Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., economist and author)
Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona and Representative Clarence Cannon of
Missouri were reelected to Congress in November. Last summer, these two
venerable and experienced statesmen, chairmen, respectively, of the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees, were engaged in a controversy that brought
the financial business of Congress to a standstill and for a time threatened to
leave the Government without operating funds.
This controversy, begun over the trivial question of the room in which a
conference committee should meet and who should be its chairman, was soon
extended to embrace a constitutional issue: Does the Senate have the right to
originate appropriation bills?
Cannon said no; Hayden, yes. Neither man could convince the other.
Tempers were exacerbated and it is very probable that the return of the two
principals to Congress portends a renewal of their debate.
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At first blush, the point at issue may seem inconsequential. In the United
States, the power of the purse belongs exclusively to Congress, and the purse,
as James Wilson remarked in the Federal Convention of 1787, has two strings,
one in the hands of the House, the other in those of the Senate. The purse
can be untied, whether to put money in or to take it out, only if both Houses
concur in the untying. What conceivable difference can it make which House
looses the first string?
Obviously none, but that the question can be raised makes a great difference.
In the business of Congress, time is a valuable commodity. Controversies that
waste it are always inconvenient. In the present day, with so much to be done
and so little time to do it, they may also be dangerous.
From the beginning of the Government, the right of the Senate to originate
bills dealing with the public revenue and expenditure has been debated, but no
definitive answer has been given. In these debates, the councils of both Houses
have been distracted. Important bills have been lost not because there was
any disagreement as to their merits but because of disputes as to their place of
origin.
At the bottom of the difficulty lies that section of the Constitution which
reads: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other
bills." What does it mean? Do bills for raising revenue include bills reduc-
ing revenue or spending it. May the Senate originate such bills under the
name of amendments? The debates on these and similar questions has been
long, loud, and inconclusive.
There is also a more significant question. What did the framers of the Con-
stitution intend by this discrimination of bills for raising revenue and other
bills? Did they mean to confer upon the House a substantial prerogative or
an immaterial privilege? If the latter, how did they come to put it in the
fundamental instrument?
Fortunately, the records of the, Federal Convention supply the answers to
most of these questions, and in particular to the last.
The story begins June 13, 1787. The Convention was considering a proposition
that each branch of the national legislature ought to possess the right to originate
acts. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved to add the words, "excepting
money bills, which shall originate in the first branch." He would seem to have
offered no other argument than the example of the British Constitution.
The sense of the Convention, however, was decidedly against him. Gentlemen,
it was said, were always following the British Constitution when the reason of
it did not apply. The Senate would generally be a more capable set of men than
the House and ought not to be disabled from any preparation of that part of the
public business which was most important and, in our Republic, worse prepared
than any other.
In England, the discrimination between money and other bills had proved nuga-
tory; the lords had found many ways of avoiding it. The experience of the States
was also against it. In Connecticut, both branches could originate in all cases,
and the practice had been found safe and convenient. In South Carolina, Mary-
land, and Virginia, where the distinction prevailed, it had been a pernicious
source of dispute between the two branches.
Gerry's motion was lost by a vote of eight States to three. This was the only
occasion upon which the idea of a discrimination was debated singly on its merits.
Its subsequent history is illuminated by a note of Madison's:
"Colonel Mason, Mr. Gerry, and other Members from large States set great
value on this privilege of originating money bills. Of this the Members from the
small States, with some from the large States who wished a high mounted Gov-
ernment, endeavored to avail themselves by making that privilege the price of
arrangements in the Constitution favorable to the small States and to the eleva-
tion of the Government."
A first attempt was made in July in connection with the great compromise that
gave each State a representation in the House proportional to its population but
an equal representation in the Senate. If the large States would accept the com-
promise the small States would pay a price. They would consent not only that
money bills should originate in the House alone but that the Senate should have
no right to alter or amend them.
The language of the offer, had it found its way into the Constitution, would
have gladdened the heart of Representative Cannon: "All bills for raising or ap-
propriating money and for fixing the salaries of the officers of Government
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shall originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be altered or
amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury
but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of
Representatives."
But the offer was rejected. Most of the Members from large States regarded
the restriction upon the Senate as either useless or pernicious. The equality
of suffrage in the Senate might be forced upon them, but they would not accept
a compensation which on its own merits rendered the plan of government still
more objectionable.
The small States, finding themselves able to gain their point without a price,
gladly joined with the large ones in expunging it from the draft Constitution.
For a time it appeared that the issue was dead, but there were faces to be saved
and Members to be conciliated. In September, the last remaining chasm in the
Constitution was to be filled up. A grand committee reported a compromise plan
for electing the President. Again a price was offered by the small States to
the large.
If they were allowed an overrepresentation in the Electoral College and an
equal vote in the contingent election of the President by the House, they would
reinstate, against their judgment, the section on origination to which Mason,
Gerry, and others had attached so much importance.
They would modify it, however, in such a way as to meet most of the objections
that had been urged against it. In particular, they would limit the privilege to
one class of money bills, those for raising revenue, and they would impose no
restriction upon the right of the Senate to amend them.
The language suggested was as follows: "All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and
amendments by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law."
The long argument was now at an end. Madison, Wilson, Washington, Butler,
King, Gouverneur Morris, the two Pinckneys and the others opposed to a dis-
crimination, consented in a spirit of 'accommodation to the meaningless
compromise.
in the final draft of the Constitution, the section was divided. The first
sentence was rephrased to conform with the Massachusetts constitution, the
expression "money bills" being changed to "bills for raising revenue." The
second sentence was moved to another part of the Constitution.
The attempt to conciliate Mason and Gerry, however, had failed. The former
refused to sign the Constitution and gave as one of his reasons the right of the
Senate to originate appropriation and salary bills. The latter also refused to
sign and declared that the right of the House to originate revenue bills was
"effectively destroyed" by the right of the Senate to amend them.
Such was the genesis of the constitutional provision that has produced nothing
but difficulty between the two Houses. No sooner had the new legislature met
than trouble began.
In the first Congress, a dispute arose in the House which led Elias Boudinot
to exclaim in words that might apply to every succeeding dispute: "It is con-
tended that the House are relinquishing their right to the purse strings. What
is their right? They can originate a money bill, but the Senate can alter or
amend it; they can negative it altogether; the system of finance is under the
mutual inspection and direction of both Houses. Then why should this branch
attempt, unconstitutionally, to check the cooperating powers of the Senate?"
In 1833, the right of the Senate to originate a bill to reduce tariffs was dis-
puted on the ground that it might operate to increase revenue. In 1837, a
Senate bill authorizing an issue of Treasury notes was denounced in the House
as the greatest breach of its privileges that had ever been perpetrated, though
it was not altogether clear that a bill for anticipating revenue was the same
as a bill for raising it.
Up to this time, little or no difficulty had arisen with respect to appropriation
acts. The Senate, as a matter of course, originated many of them and the
House passed them without demur. Mostly they were for small sums of money?
relief bills and the like. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Senate admitted
no restriction on its right to originate appropriation bills of any magnitude.
In practice, the great appropriation bills originated in the House. The
procedure was natural and convenient, for in those early days the financial
machinery of that body had not yet been disintegrated. It was the function
of the Ways and Means Committee to report both revenue and expenditure
bills. Very sensibly, it considered them together.
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In the course of time, custom might seem, In the minds of many Members,
to have hardened into law. Be that as it may, in 1837, the area of altercation
between the two Houses was extended to take in appropriation bills.
The House refused to act on a military appropriation bill sent down by the
Senate, passed a bill of its own in identical language and persuaded the Senate
to accept it. At the next session, James Buchanan rose t'o protest its being
admitted that the Senate had no right to originate appropriation bills.
In 1856, the Senate considered the advisability of directing its Finance Com-
mittee to prepare and report such of the general appropriation bills as it might
deem expedient. More to avoid a controversy with the other House than be-
cause of any doubts as to the expediency or constitutionality of the proposal,
it was shelved. Such has been the fate of all subsequent proposals along the
same line down to that made by Senator Hayden in 1962.
In the meantime, particular appropriation bills were subjected to the same
niggling criticisms as revenue bills. In 1937, for example, two House ap-
propriation bills were combined by the Senate and sent back to the House as
a single bill.
Representative Cannon was enraged.
The right to originate revenue bills, he declared, included the right to originate
appropriation bills, and the latter right included the right to determine the
manner and form in which they were presented. It was in vain that Senator
Glass pronounced every link in this logical chain "ridiculous."
A quarter of a century later, in his controversy with Senator Hayden, Can-
non came within an ace of contending that the alleged right of the House to
originate appropriation bills included the right to determine the room in the
Capitol where conference committees on such bills should meet and who should
be their chairmen.
Not only have such altercations wasted the time of Congress; they have in
large measure nullified one of the basic principles of the Constitution?the
bicameral consideration of money bills.
As long ago as 1879, Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, speaking from
long experience in the other House, remarked that the privilege of originating
revenue bills gave the House no advantage in theory but in practice gave an
advantage to the Senate. Let the House pass a money bill: the Senate would
by way of amendment strike out everything after the enacting clause, substitute
its own plan of finance and send it back too late in the session for consideration.
The House would reject the Senate amendments in lump without hearing
them read; the Senate would insist; a conference would he granted. A con-
ference report must be accepted or rejected as a whole. In practice, therefore,
the whole power of legislation over Senate amendments was delegated to the
conference managers. Was it not obvious, be asked, that the House had pur-
chased the barren privilege of origination at the sacrifice of its freedom of
debate?
It is indeed obvious; but what is to be done? Logically, the proper solution
would be to expunge from the Constitution the clause that has given rise to
the difficulty?a clause intended by its framers to be nugatory and introduced
only as a sop to the feelings of a few men long since dead.
But constitutional amendments are hard to come by. One can only hope that
the leaders of a future House will abandon their pretensions to a wider privilege
than that granted by the letter of the Constitution and adopt the strictest pos-
sible construction of the unhappy clause.
In the meantime, it can do no good to characterize, as the press has done, the
current dispute between Senator Hayden and Representative Cannon as a con-
test for self-aggrandizement between two prideful and stubborn old men. The
fault is in the Constitution. Only an act of statesmanship can remove or
mitigate it.
Mr. WIL1VIERDING. In concluding my statement I would like to re-
mind the committee of a remark made and a question asked by James
Wilson in the Federal Convention with regard to the purse strings.
"The purse," he said, "was to have two strings, one of which was in
the hands of the House of Representatives, the other in those of the
Senate. Both Houses must concur in the untying, and of what im-
portance could it be which untied first, which last."
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Well, it would obviously seem to be of no great importance, but the
fact that the question can be raised at all makes a very great deal of
difference because in the business of Congress time is a valuable com-
modity and controversies that waste it are to be deplored. They are
always inconvenient and unpleasant but in the present day and age,
with so much to be done and so little time to do it, they may also be
dangerous.
Any measure that would reduce the area of altercation between the
two Houses must get my support.
Senator MUNDT. I think that analogy of the purse having two
strings is very appropriate and very effective. I am glad to have it.
Mr. WILMERDING. Well, that concludes my testimony. That is the
only point I wanted to testify to.
Senator PELL. I thank Mr. Wilmerding very much and extend my
own personal welcome to him as an old friend.
Mr. WILMERDING. Thank you, Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. I have no questions.
(The communications and statements placed in the record at this
point, by direction of the chairman, are as follows:)
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
March 11, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR JouN : This is with reference to the hearings on S. 537, which will be
held March 19 and 20 before your committee. While I shall be unable to testify
in behalf of this bill, although I did cosponsor it January 25, I did want to assure
you of my strong support of this concept. You are to be commended for pursuing
the matter and it is to be hoped that expeditious action may be taken on it
subsequent to the hearings. Perhaps this year we may be able to persuade our
colleagues on the other side of the Capitol of the need for this joint committee
and if there is anything I can do in this connection, please let me know.
Warmest regards.
Sincerely yours,
GORDON ALLoTT, U.S. Senator.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE, OF MAINE, SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF S. 537, A BILL To ESTAB-
LISH A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, MARCH 20, 1963
Mr. Chairman, This is the second Congress in which I have joined you in
cosponsoring legislation to establish a Joint Committee on the Budget. With
each passing day I am more convinced that this proposal is sound, necessary,
and urgent. It is my earnest hope that the 88th Congress will approve S. 537
as a vital step in the improvement of our handling of the fiscal requirements of
the Federal Government.
Each year the Congress receives a monumental document from the President,
known as The Budget of the -United States Government. This year's budget,
calling for the expenditure of $98.8 billion, is set forth in 440 pages of the basic
request, plus 1,195 pages of appendix, the additional 64 page budget request for
the District of Columbia, and the thousands of pages of supporting documents
and tables submitted by individual departments and agencies.
The executive branch of the Government devotes thousands of man-hours
each year to the preparation, review, and revision of the budget requests. The
President is aided by the substantial staff of the Bureau of the Budget in
making his final recommendation to the Congress. Whatever we may think
of the details of the final budget, it is obviously the product of painstaking work
and analysis by experts. I, for one, would not want this effort reduced.
Congress, on the other hand, faced with multiple responsibilities and with
overburdened staffs, must cope with mountains of figures from the departments
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69
and agencies, and must assume the final responsibility of appropriating the
necessary funds to carry out the functions of Government which we have
authorized. The Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate, work-
ing independently, endeavor to translate and interpret the appropriation meas-
ures in the light of congressional intent and national needs. The only time the
committees come together is in conference to adjust the differences between the
two bodies on specific appropriation bills. As we have seen in recent years, this
is not a wholly satisfactory system.
Early this year, in an article published in This Week magazine, I called for a
Joint Committee on Appropriations. I believe that this would be a sensible and
practicable solution to our problems. However, in view of the fate of similar
proposals in the past, I doubt that we can expect early action on a recommenda-
tion for a Joint Committee on Appropriations. A Joint Committee on the
Budget would provide many of the technical services needed by both Appropria-
tions Committees and would go a long way toward reducing many of the obstacles
to cooperation between the House and Senate on appropriations measures.
Congress has an awesome responsibility in voting appropriations for the Fed-
eral budget. What we do in this field has a direct and vital impact on the lives
of our constituents. I urge prompt enactment of S. 537 as an important con-
tribution to the fiscal integrity of the Nation.
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
March 20, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: While in past years I have been an advocate, with you
and many others, of an effort to bring the appropriations and the revenues of
our Government more closely in line, I find I am not a sponsor of the bill this year.
However, I am in favor of the setting up of the Joint Committee which is the
subject matter of your hearing. This committee should perform the same general
function for the Appropriations Committee of the House and Senate as the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation performs for the Ways and Means and
Finance Committees
One of the major problems we have in the discussion of appropriations is that
at no fixed time is the interaction between appropriations and revenues discussed.
A few years ago we experimented with one overall appropriation bill. This in
my opinion was not a particularly successful experiment, although I was in favor
of it at the time. I believe your present recommendation for this Joint Commit-
tee is worthy of trial and I hope will be more helpful in working out the funda-
mental problem of a balanced budget.
Recently in a newsletter to my constituents in Massachusetts I said: "One of
the major problems in congressional review and action on Federal receipts and
expenditures is that different committees handle revenue measures and appro-
priations bills, and the total Federal appropriations are broken down into sepa-
rate departmental bills. Congress never votes on the entire Federal budget."
I hope your committee may make a favorable report and I respectfully request
you to insert this letter in the record of the hearing.
Sincerely,
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, U.S. Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN 0. MARSH, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the consideration of the committee in receiv-
ing these brief remarks for the record.
After careful study of its provisions and reference to testimony given on similar
bills offered in previous Congresses, I was glad to join in sponsorship in the
House of a companion measure to H.R. 3695.
The justifications for the bill have been set forth most effectively in the testi-
mony of other witnesses, and I desire merely to add an expression of my convic-
tion that the establishment of a Joint Committee on the Budget would contribute
substantially to the effectiveness of both bodies of the Congress in making
an orderly and economic disposition of the public revenue.
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I see no involvement of constitutional apportionment of responsibility, nor
even any cause for doubt on the basis of precedent. Joint committees have
served the Congress well, notably in the professional staffing provided by the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. It seems no more or less than
commonsense that the Congress should arm itself with as much solid information
when it approaches the appropriation of public funds as when it legislates to
raise these funds.
As the legislation which is the subject of this hearing has bipartisan sponsor-
ship in both bodies, I hope it will have bipartisan support in committee and on
the floor, in order that the Congress as a whole may be able to cope more intel-
ligently and effectively with the problem of recurring deficits?a matter of the
highest importance to the economic strength of the United States in the current
worldwide contest against a political and economic system, the leaders of which
are confident we are heading to an economic collapse which could bring them a
bloodless victory.
MIL JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
U.S. Senate.
MY DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN : Pursuant to your invitation of March 6, and
subsequent discussion with Mr. Reynolds, I am delighted to transmit herewith
a statement in support of S. 357. The establishment of a Joint Committee on the
Budget along the lines contemplated in subject bill, would in my judgment be
very much in the national interest.
I am indebted for your thoughtfulness in permitting me to make a statement
for the record.
Faithfully,
A. T. KEARNEY & CO.,
Washington, 6, D.C., March 18, 1963.
RALPH W. E. REID.
STATEMENT OF RALPH W. E. REID REGARDING S. 537
My name is Ralph W. E. Reid. I am a citizen of Virginia.
I am presently the resident manager in Washington for A. T. Kearney &
Co., a management consulting firm with headquarters in Chicago. From 1955
until 1961 I was assistant director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget. I am
presently a member of two committees of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States with interest in the Federal Budget: the Government Operations
and Expenditures Committee and the Committee for Improving the Federal
Budget, which was established last fall at the request of President Kennedy.
This statement is made, however, in my capacity as a private citizen.
Four concerns lead me to urge approval of legislation along the lines of
S. 537:
(1) As the chairman of your committee pointed out recently before the
Senate, as the cost of operating the Federal Government approaches $100 billion
a year it becomes increasingly important that Congress do everything in its
power and take every action it possibly can to bring about more efficient and
more intelligent appropriations of public revenues. In the light of the com-
plexity of the budget, with its literally thousands of separate line items, and
of the fact that at any given moment in time departments and agencies will be
spending from past appropriations, justifying new appropriations, and planning
for future appropriations, it seems clear that Congress can fully discharge its
constitutional responsibility to our citizenry for appropriating public moneys
only if it is in position fully to examine and comprehend justifications for past,
present, and future spending programs. I am persuaded S. 537 would contribute
to this objective.
(2) As a select committee of the Congress pointed out in urging the creation
of the Bureau of the Budget in 1921, it is imperative in the development of any
Budget that expenditure programs be measured against the state of the
Treasury. What may be desirable and justifiable in one year may be desirable
but unjustifiable in another year, dependent on the state of the revenue. For
example, appropriations for the fiscal year 1963 budget were made last year by
the Congress in the light of the President's estimate that the administrative
budget for fiscal year 1963 would show a surplus of $500 million. The Presi-
dent's latest estimate is that the fiscal year 1963 budget will run a deficit of
$8.8 billion, largely the result of a downward revision of $7.5 billion in estimates
of receipts. Had Congress been able to form its own judgment last year of
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probable receipts, and had it foreseen what was suggested by many independent
observers?that the revenue estimates were too high?there would undoubtedly
have been greater cinctures and restraints on the appropriations process. I am
hopeful the joint committee proposed by S. 537 would be helpful in providing
the Congress with greater independence in the development of revenue estimates.
(3) In a comparable vein, there is the problem of estimating the totality of
annual expenditures which will result from the separate appropriation bills.
A review of Presidential budget estimates over the years will show that in a
large number of instances the actual expenditures at the end of the fiscal years
have been higher than forecast in the original budgets sent to the Congress.
Here again, if Congress were in position to develop its own projections of
probable total spending arising from the appropriations requests, and were able
with authority to forsee instances in which total annual spending would obvi-
ously exceed the executive branch's forecasts, this too would serve to restrain
the size of appropriations. The joint committee called for by S. 537 would
certainly be helpful in this process.
(4) One of the most difficult problems in budgeting derives from the new
program whose first year cost is nominal but whose costs in later years may
tend to increase in geometrical proportion. Without utilizing invidious exam-
ples, I am certain every member of this committee has seen instances in which
this type of growth has occurred and where the argument has later been made
that attempts to hold the program level would merely result in "wasting" the
earlier expenditures. I am convinced that in reviewing both continuing and new
programs Congress must have the staff and facilities for independently project-
ing the long range consequences and likely future cost of such programs and I
believe passage of S. 537 would contribute to this objective.
I have one suggestion to make for amendment of the language of the draft
bill. The proposed section 138(i) would give professional and technical em-
ployees of the Joint Committee, upon the written authority of the chairman or
the vice-chairman, the right to examine certain data available in the executive
branch. As members of this committee will appreciate, Presidents through the
years have been extremely reluctant to make available outside the executive
branch all the documentary materials reflecting the nature of advice given to
them by their subordinates. Furthermore, the draft language may go even a
bit further than intended, since it would seem to suggest at least the possibility
of examination of the funding requirements of the Central Intelligence Agency,
which hitherto Congress has preferred to review in another fashion. Because I
believe so strongly in the philosophy upon which S. 537 is grounded and in the
eminent desirability of establishing the proposed Joint Committee, I would
very much hope that the bill would not be encumbered with language in one of
its parts which might needlessly jeopardize the whole. Utilization of language
comparable to that in the proposed paragraph 138(1), which would give the
Joint Committee the right to make investigations and reports with respect to
any agency, might well represent a suitable alternative.
With this reservation, I strongly support the language of S. 537 and urge its
enactment.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., March 19, 1963.
Mr. WALTER L. REYNOLDS,
Chief Clerk and Staff Director, Committee on Government Operations, U.S.
Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR WALTER: In response to the suggestion in your letter of March 4, I
herewith enclose two copies of a statement in support of S. 537 for inclusion
in the hearings your are holding on that bill.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
ROBERT A. WALLACE,
Assistant to the Secretary.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT ASH WALLACE ON S. 537, A BILL To CREATE A JOINT
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to present the following statement in support
of S. 537, a bill to create a Joint Committee on the Budget. The statement has
drawn heavily on my book Congressional Control of Federal Spending (Wayne
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72 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
State University Press; Detroit, 1960) so I have therefore omitted reference
notes.
The statement represents only my own personal views.
L THE LURRENT CONGRESSIONAL ROLE
The complexity of the Federal fiscal process has for years posed an al-
luring challenge to students of political science. By and large they have met
it with considerable success but especially vexing problems remain in the area
of budget authorizations?the congressional consideration and enactment of the
various appropriation bills. One difficulty has been in the divergent opinions
over what is the proper role of Congress in the spending process. This statement
assumes that since Congress holds the constitutional power over spending, it
ought to control spending. By control is meant the exercise of power on the
basis of relatively predictable results. To put it another way, Congress ought
to resolve spending issues with a maximum possible degree of knowledge and
understanding about the probable consequence of its actions.
Congress does not now have access to nearly as much analytical data about
the budget as does the Executive. Although there is probably a point beyond
which additional information does not help to predict consequences of action,
Congress has not yet reached that point. The present disparity between its in-
formation resources and those of the Executive means that effective control
(using effective as it is in economics when one employs the term "effective"
demand, that is, control in fact) is held in the hands of those who possess de-
tailed information with respect to the various administrative needs and the
adequacy of this or that amount of money for carrying out a particular pro-
gram. Even the Bureau of the Budget, which can acquire more information on
programs for expenditures than any other governmental body, possesses insuf-
ficient staff to assemble and analyze the data necessary to exert complete con-
trol except in terms of lump sums; rather the detailed determination of expendi-
tures is highly decentralized, resting somewhere among the more than 5 million
human beings on the Federal payroll in the some 2,000 component units of the
Federal Government.
Confronted with the magnitude of the budget facing Congress and aware of
administrative difficulties caused by congressional interference, many scholars
recommend that the legislators concern themselves only with the broad policy as-
pects of money issues and leave details up to the Executive. The difficulty with
this conceptual relationship between the executive and legislative branches in
dealing with appropriations may quickly be seen when we try to draw a distinc-
tion between substantive policy and technical details, or separate law-making
aid law-executing. In Luther Gulick's phrase, the governing process is a "seam-
less web of discretion and action." Moreover, Congress employs the annual ap-
propriations process not only to authorize expenditures but also to review existing
legislative policies.
How can the President be responsible for the execution of the laws if Congress
interferes? Certainly Congress should not interfere with the execution of the
laws except by exercising its legislative or appropriations power. When Congress
does enact measures harmful to the details of administration, the President can
hold a press conference and demand appropriate action, or he can privately
threaten or cajole Congressmen with his patronage power.
The idea that Congress should avoid administrative detail is wishful thinking
It has the constitutional power to affect details and experience has shown that
it will exercise it. This being the case, the individual members, functioning both
as members of committees and as units of the whole Congress, should have access
to more information and analytical data in order to ascertain better the conse-
quences of their actions. This is the aim of S. 513.
II. TECHNIQUES OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
Subcommittee hearings develop information about particular expenditures and
programs, but the witnesses almost invariably represent agencies defending the
budget requests or individuals and pressure groups demanding larger expendi-
tures. For example, the 1952 House subcommittee hearings on the civil functions
of the Army appropriations bill (rivers and harbors, and flood control) consisted
of some 500 pages of testimony of Army representatives with another 910 pages
necessary to contain all the testimony of 110 Members of Congress from 35 States,
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73
and 300 organizations or individuals who wanted appropriations for projects in
their areas. While hearings are helpful to Congress and to the subcommittees in
gathering information, suggestions for cuts usually face a barrage of arguments
gathered by men who have been in constant touch with the budget process, and
who have access to those particular facts which will back them up.
Hearings are not the only source of data available to Congress. As a matter
of fact, the information and facilities available to Members of Congress would
astound the unsophisticated. Besides the hearings, these include the budget
document, justification sheets, sideslips (committee staff memoranda), com-
mittee reports, agency reports, special studies, and published articles in the
press and current periodicals. The agencies treat congressional requests for
data or assistance with top priority. Committee and personal staffs assist
Members with advice, analyses, and the processing of constituents' requests.
In short, the Member of Congress can carry out his tasks with adequate assist-
ance in most areas, but there are notable exceptions. Among these is that of
the gathering, analysis, and organization of factual data necessary for render-
ing his independent judgment and offering and defending proposals dealing
with money requests. The reasons for this lack lie not so much with the
Member's general facilities, as with the nature and scope of spending matters
and the lack of specific facilities for dealing with them.
Serious questions naturally arise over the fact that Congress lacks the
facilities for controlling appropriations. The problem goes beyond lack of
control over expenditures, however, because the absence of facilities does not
lead Congress to abandon its attempts to control. Such efforts continue to be
made but they often necessarily involve a grave lack of proper knowledge of
their consequences and play havoc with the existing degree of order and effec-
tiveness of the agencies' operations. The numerous techniques used by Congress
to control spending defy listing. We can classify them as to their general
characteristics, however.
(I) Appealing to legislative conservatism: appeals to precedent, resisting
proposals to increase or lower expenditures as compared with amounts for
previous year.?Joseph P. Chamberlin has stated that "* " in a legislature,
it is normally up to the proponent of legislation to establish his case " * in
the main such a body is conservative and slow to move, except where a case,
already strong, is supported by a preponderant public opinion on the question
at issue." This conservative attitude which Congress takes with respect to
new legislation operates also in the case of departures from established appro-
priations schedules. As a result, the agency which requests the same amounts as
it has spent in prior years will fare better than one which attempts to expand
its operations. Moreover, the same burden of proof is on those persons seeking
reductions below prior year appropriations. Congress feels safer in holding
the line on appropriations enacted in previous years because of a lack of cer-
tainty about the consequences of any changes. A proposal to cut or to
increase must attract wide popular support or have firm justification to
succeed. Congress, generally, has not the information or the facilities to feel
confident of sudden changes, one way or the other.
(2) Meat-ax cuts: general, across-the-board reductions or arbitrary cuts in-
flicted to force lower expenditures and more economic operations.?Members of
Congress who try to cut appropriations on individual items usually find them-
selves blocked by tendencies toward legislative conservatism and also by the
avid proponents of the specific programs affected. In order to avoid the onus
of singling out individual agencies, many have tried the "meat-ax" method
of achieving spending reductions. An "across-the-board" cut, which pares all
agency requests by the same percentage, is called a meat ax because it cuts in a
straight line across a large area. The term is one of opprobrium because such
a reduction hurts both the efficient and the inefficient agencies to the same
degree, and necessary programs suffer to the same extent as all others. The
term is also applied to any reduction proposed for which the consequences, other
than the money reductions are not ascertained.
(3) Attacks on overhead: reductions aimed at operating overhead while
preserving the program, or legislative riders designed to force savings in ad-
ministrative costs.?Congressional attacks on administrative overhead expenses
represent another common category of cuts. They are popular since, on the
record at least, they permit Members to press for economy without seeming
to hurt actual programs. In part, this idea rests on the premise that aarainis-
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74 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
tration does not affect the effectiveness of a program, an obviously erroneous
notion, although overhead operations do tend to enlarge beyond the point of
need because of the natural bias of some administrators who are prone to seek
more staff than necessary.
(4) Legislative standards: use of standards in authorizing legislation in
order to ascertain the results of appropriations actions.?One of the tools
developed in Congress for the consideration of funds for construction projects
has been development of standards and priorities. These have taken into
account the degree of economic justification, national significance, and even local
needs. The establishment of standards and priorities can, in some instances,
permit Congress to appropriate money in any amounts with the assurance that
the highest priority projects will go forward first. This does not prevent
exceptions, but the weight of the evidence before Congress as a whole rests
with the established standards. To the extent that basic authorizing legis-
lation can set standards which will permit Congress to know precisely the
consequences of any appropriations actions it may take in future years, the prob-
lem of congressional control disappears. Although the use of such standards
is subject to certain limitations, much of the search for methods of better
congressional control of spending is actually a search for better methods of
establishing adequate legislative standards.
III. HOW A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET WOULD HELP TO ACHIEVE BETTER
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
Proposals along the lines of a Joint Congressional Committee on the Budget
achieved substance in section 138 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
It required the revenue and appropriations committees of each House to meet
and send to their respetcive Houses not later than Feburary 15 in each regular
session a budget report and concurrent resolution based on the report. Both
the report and the resolution were to contain a determination of anticipated
revenue totals for the ensuing fiscal year and fix the maximum amounts to be
appropriated. If the estimated receipts exceeded the estimated expenditures,
the report was to contain a recommendation for a reduction in the public debt.
If estimated expenditures exceeded estimated receipts, the resolution was
to include a section declaring that it was the sense of Congress that the public
debt be increased by a like amount. Congress made half-hearted attempts to
comply with these requirements but quickly abandoned the effort. The failure
of the system has been ascribed to the unwieldy size of the 102 man committee,
unwillingness of Congress to bind itself, and lack of an adequate staff.
Since the failure of section 138, bills providing for a Joint Congressional
Committee on the Budget have proposed a more generalized joint committee
which, itself, would be relatively unimportant. The real purpose of the pro-
posals is apparently to create a joint committee similar to the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation, with a staff of 25 or 30 experts to help the
Appropriations Committees in their evaluation of budgetary requests. Senator
John McClellan implied this in his explanation of a bill of this type which
he introduced in 1951. He declared that the Appropriations Committees were
"simply not staffed and equipped to adequately examine the budget."
More recently, in 1963, Senator McClellan introduced S. 537, 88th Congress,
to create a Joint Committee on the Budget. In a Senate address, he com-
pared such a committee to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue. "Congress
has wisely created a Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation," he said.
"That committee has been in operation a number of years. Just think of how
much more smoothly and how much more efficiently and how much more
cooperatively the two Houses work together in that field."
Thus, the creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget would con-
stitute a positive step toward increasing congressional control of Federal
etpenditures. It would increase harmony between the House and Senate
Appropriations? Committees and provide Congress with a group of experts
large enough to provide real assistance to its members but not so large as to
create a congressional bureaucracy which would be difficult to manage.
The experience with the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, with
its very able staff and harmonious relationships with both the House and
Senate Tax Committees, serves as a valuable precedent in this regard. The
enactment of S. 537, therefore, would be a welcome step in enabling Congress
to act more effectively in the field of expenditures control.
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NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., March 13, 1963.
HOD. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: I appreciate your sending me, for my comments, the Senate
bill 537 with the accompanying report by your committee. I agree with the
sponsors of the bill and with your committee that the creation of a joint service
committee for examining the Federal budget would be desirable. It would, in
my opinion, increase the effectiveness of the staff members now serving separate-
ly the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, and would avoid duplication
in staff work. The continuing rise in budget expenditures complicates the task
for a congressional review of Executive proposals and every step is welcome
which would improve the organization of staff work and thereby make the
burdens imposed on the members of the Appropriations Committees and on
Congress as a whole more manageable.
I especially welcome the emphasis on a longer term review of develepoment and
grant-in-aid programs. A joint statement issued by the National Planning As-
sociation "The Need for Further Budget Reform" (Planning Pamphlet No. 90,
March 1955) emphasizes particularly the need to consider the budget in a
longer range perspective and recommends that each budget message should
contain a budget outlook covering a number of years. This NPA statement also
recommends that the Economic Report of the President should contain an
economic projection covering the same number of years so that the economic
and the budget projections combined might demonstrate the changes in ex-
penditures, revenue, and debt policy which would be needed to meet the Gov-
ernment's responsibility under the Employment Act and to promote a better
balance in the economy. I think it would be desirable if the proposed Joint
Committee on the Budget would receive the views of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee for an economic evaluation of proposed budget policies.
I was also glad to see in your bill the provision that qualified members of the
staff of the Budget Bureau shall, at the request of the Appropriations Commit-
tees, have an opportunity to explain the content and basis for appropriation pro-
posals. Actually, I believe that the creation of a high-caliber staff under a Joint
Committee on the Budget would facilitate the cooperation between the executive
and legislative branches of Government in budget matters. I believe the experi-
ence with the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation bears out this hope.
Sincerely yours,
GERHARD COLM
AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST CO.
Washington D.C. March 13, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your letter of March 5, regarding S. 537, providing
for the creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget and asking me to appear
before your committee on March 19 or 20, has been forwarded to me here at
Pompano Beach, Fla. I am not planning on returning to Washington before
the middle of April, so will not be available to appear on these dates. Besides,
you realize that it has been 24 years since I was Director of the Budget, and in
view of the growth of the Government and changes made in the approach to
budget matters since then, I question whether I could add anything to what
the more recent Directors have submitted.
However, I believe your bill is a step in the right direction. In the latter
part of my administration as Director, I saw that the Congress was appropriat-
ing public money willy-nilly, it seemed to me, without regard to the potential
revenues under the then existing tax laws. As a matter of fact, the Congress
gave little or no attention to the revenue end of the budget as a whole. I believe
it is fair to say that that attitude has not improved. In order to get the Con-
gress conscious of its responsibility, I conferred with the then chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee and of the Appropriation Committee of the House,
suggesting that there be a joint meeting of the four committees primarily
concerned with the budget, viz: Senate Finance, Ways and Means, and the
Appropriation Committees of the two Houses. I told them that I would gladly
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be the first guinea pig to explain the administration policies behind the budget
and to answer any question I could about the estimates, both appropriations and
revenues, and to supply all information they might need to formulate an
overall policy for the guidance of the Congress and their several committees.
I thought this would be a congressional policy Committee on the Budget as a
whole, not only those recommendations contained in the official budget document
but any subsequent submissions, or any bill, introduced by individual members
of Congress involving expenditures of public funds. I believe that this com-
mittee should report to the Congress early in the session and before any appro-
priation bills are considered by it and ask for approval of its findings and
recommendations. It was my thought that this report should contain a recom-
mendation for an overall limitation on total appropriations for that budget
year (much more important than the present limitation on the public debt),
and indication as to whether it feels the revenue estimates are reasonably in
line with economic expectations and, if a deficit is indicated, whether that
deficit should be financed or eliminated by (1) a reduction in contemplated ex-
penditures, (2) an increase in taxes, (3) an increase in the public debt, or (4) a
combination of these three. If by chance there should be a surplus, the policy
should be decided as to whether it should be used to retire some of the public
debt or to reduce the tax burden, or some of both. Such a report from the
combined efforts of the four committees most concerned with the financial
soundness of the Government and approved by the Congress early in each
session would be a mandate to every committee considering bills which eventually
involve an expenditure of public funds. It would to some degree help to
eliminate the force of pressure groups. It would let the business community
known where the Congress stands and would, I hope, keep the budget from
becoming a political football as it has during the past several years.
I might add that the two chairmen of the committees named indicated that
these were good ideas and I waited for their call, but none ever came.
Without having given a great deal of thought to the matter since then, I do
not now see any reason for changing those views expressed 24 years ago, al-
though I realize that the budget picture has been considerably altered in the
meantime. By this assertion, I do not mean to criticize the approach to the
problem outlined in your bill. It might be just as effective and, as I said
at the outset, it is a step in the right direction.
I hope these random thoughts on the subject of your bill, made many years
before the budget covered everything from the womb to the tomb, will be of
some assistance to your committee.
With best wishes for success in your worthwhile undertaking, I am
Sincerely yours,
DANIEL W. BELL.'
NATIONAL TAXPAYERS CONFERENCE,
Trenton, N.J., March 20, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN : Many of the statewide citizen-research organiza-
tions comprising the National Taxpayers Conference have for years strongly
supported proposals to improve and strengthen the budgetary control procedures
and facilities of the Congress. Now, in lieu of separate statements, these
organizations are availing themselves of the offices of the conference to express
herein their common interest in and support of the purposes expressed in S.
537, introduced by you and cosponsored by more than three-fourths of the
Members of the U.S. Senate.
Accordingly, as chairman of the National Taxpayers Conference, I am au-
thorized to request that this statement, representing the views of the organiza-
tions listed below, be included in the record of the committee's hearings on this
measure.
1 Served in various capacities in the Department of the Treasury from 1911-35. Made
assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury on financial and accounting matters March 1935
to January 1940. Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget 1934-39. Under Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Jan. 18, 1940, to Dec. 31, 1945. Elected president of the American
Security & Trust Co. Retired as chairman of the board June 1962. Now one of directors
of the bank.
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? The interest of these State taxpayers associations in this measure grows out
of their strong conviction, of many years standing, that present congressional
budgetary procedures and facilities are woefully inadequate, with the result
that the Congress has in large measure lost annual control over Federal ex-
penditures.
There have been 28 Federal deficits over the past 33 years. The recently
submitted fiscal 1964 budget moves our Nation into the $100 billion spending
range, while another deficit of $12 billion, or more, is in prospect. Congress
and the taxpayers can no longer afford the luxury of inadequate and outmoded
fiscal procedures and facilities?of acting on $100 billion budgets with prac-
tically the same tools in use when budgets were less than $5 billion.
In short, it is time to call a halt; to insist that the Congress arm itself with
with improved facilities and procedures, sufficient to the tremendous tasks posed
by $100 billion budgets. The organizations listed below, while recognizing it
is no cure-all for the Nation's ills, support S. 537 as a step toward this vital
objective. In particular, they believe that the permanent expert, technical,
objective staff facility which this measure would provide could prove valuable,
both to the Appropriations Committees and to the Congress as a whole and
represents an important phase of the improvement needed to restore congres-
sional control over the national purse.
Sincerely yours,
CARLTON W. TILLINGHAST,
Chairman, National Taw payers Conference.
For the following 30 organizations:
Arizona Tax Research Association.
California Taxpayers Association.
Colorado Public Exepditure Council.
Connecticut Public Expenditure Council, Inc.
Florida Taxpayers Association, Inc.
Georgia Tax Research Foundation, Inc.
Tax Foundation of Hawaii.
Associated Taxpayers of Idaho, Inc.
Taxpayers Federation of Illinois.
Iowa Taxpayers Association.
Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations, Inc.
Minnesota Taxpayers Association.
Missouri Public Expenditure Survey, Inc.
Montana Taxpayers Association.
Nebraska Tax Research Council, Inc.
Nevada Taxpayers Association.
New Hampshire Taxpayers Federation.
New Jersey Taxpayers Association, Inc.
The Taxpayers Association of New Mexico.
North Carolina Citizens Association,,Inc.
North Dakota Taxpayers Association, Inc.
Ohio Public Expenditure Council.
Oklahoma Public Expenditures Council.
Oregon Tax Research.
Greater South Dakota Association.
Tennessee Taxpayers Association, Inc.
Utah Taxpayers Association.
Washington State Research Council.
Public Expenditures Survey of Wisconsin.
Wyoming Taxpayers Association.
COMMITTEE OF Hoovra COMMISSION TASK FORCE MEMBERS,
Washington, D.C., March 15, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLKLLAN,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN : S. 537, introduced by you and cosponsored by 75
other Senators, proposing the creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget, de-
serves the thoughtful support of every citizen who believes in sound fiscal policy
and in responsible government.
96545-63-6
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78 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
The Committee of Hoover Commission Task Force Members, of which I am
privileged to serve as chairman, was encouraged to note that your report on
such legislation in the last Congress stated:
"Its provisions are broad enough to fully effectuate all of the recommendations
of the Hoover Commission by utilization of the authority vested in the proposed
Joint Committee on the Budget, with the further advantage of retaining com-
plete legislative control over the submission of annual budget requests on any
basis desired, and over all appropriations and the expenditures of Federal funds
based upon complete data developed by competent staff."
It is my understanding that the Joint Committee would consider the budget
as a whole and in terms of the over all financial condition of the Government.
It is inconceivable that no congressional committee does this at present. Surely,
such a joint committee, staffed with permanent, full-time, nonpolitical experts
studying all the proposed expenditures in relation to anticipated revenues, could
provide each Member of Congress with the most efficient evaluations and con-
siderations upon which to base his vote on appropriation measures.
? In these days of rising Federal expenditures, conflicting appraisals of what is
needed and mounting deficits, the creation of a Joint Committee on the Budget
would be encouraging to taxpayers as a positive step toward improvement of
congressional surveillance over expenditure of public funds with resulting elimina-
tion of duplication, waste, and excessive appropriations.
Very cordially yours,
CHARLES R. Hook.
CONCORD, N.H., March 5, 1963.
Senator THOMAS J. McINTyak,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
We are still of the opinion first expressed in 1951 that a Joint Congressional
Committee on the Budget is necessary for proper investigation and analysis of
Federal budgets in the interest of efficiency and economy.
NEW HAMPSHIRE TAX PAYERS FEDERATION,
BARRY T. MINEs, Executive Vice President.
Senator PELL. I request the clerk of the committee to have inserted
in the record at the end of these hearings of the staff study similar
to that suggestion proposed by Mr. Wilmerding.
Senator MUNDT. It will be very useful, very constructive.
Mr. REYNOLDS. We have done that on two different occasions.
Senator MUNDT. I know that, but let's update it in view of what
happened last year.
(The following communication from Representative Robert Mc-
Clory, subsequent to the close of the hearing, is inserted in the record
at this point by direction of the chairman.)
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1963.
Hon. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR MCCLELLAN : In reviewing the testimony of Professor Wil-
merding in connection with S. 537, I noted an extensive reference to the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1789.
My impression of the Convention proceedings does not correspond entirely
with that of Professor Wilmerding, although my only source of information has
been a volume entitled "The Making of the Constitution," by Charles Warren.
I am enclosing a memorandum on this subject which I prepared containing
excerpts from Mr. Warren's book and purporting to refer to the Constitutional
Convention proceedings. This material may be helpful in our common effort to
resolve any differences toward establishment of a workable Joint Legislative
Committee on the Budget.
Please call on me if I can be of any further service in connection with this
legislation.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT MCCLORY, Member of Confirm.
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One of the main areas of controversy in the making of our Federal Constitu-
tion was that with respect to originating appropriation and revenue bills. This
issue formed part of what was termed, "The Great Compromise." Indeed, the
compromise recommended by a special committee of the Convention delegates
provided that the House of Representatives should have the exclusive right to
originate money bills with no authority in the Senate to revise or alter them.
The account of this controversy is summarized in Charles Warren's work in
"The Making of the Constitution," as follows:
[Thursday, July 5, 1787, in Convention]
REPORT OF THE COMPROMISE
On this day, Elbridge Gerry brought into the Convention the report of the
committee appointed on July 2. As hoped for, it contained the grounds of a
compromise, founded on a motion made in the committee by Dr. Franklin,
who, as usual, took this opportunity to employ his conciliatory methods. It
recommended three propositions?( a ) that in the first branch of the Legislature,
there should be 1 Representative for every 40,000 inhabitants; (b) that this
first branch should have the power to originate all bills for raising or appro-
priating money and for fixing salaries, not to be altered or amended by the
second branch; (c) that in the second branch, each State should have an equal
vote.
As Madison states, this compromise was regarded as a victory by the smaller
States. * * * Ellsworth, Gerry, and Mason?one from a small State and two
from the large States?urged acceptance of the compromise, though each had
objections to parts of it. Unless a compromise should take place, they said, a
secession would occur; and if "we do not come to some agreement among our-
selves, some foreign sword will probably do the work for us." * * * Paterson,
however, thought that the report yielded too much to the large States and stated
his intention to vote against it. The three great nationalists?Wilson, Madison,
and G. Morris?also opposed the compromise report. Madison stated that if he
must have the option between justice and gratifying the majority of the people,
or conciliating the smaller States, he must choose the former. "It was in vain
to purchase concord in the Convention on terms which would perpetuate discord
among their constituents." * * * G. Morris also thought the whole theory of the
compromise report to be wrong. He said that: "He came here as a representa-
tive of America; he flattered himself that he came here in some degree as a
representative of the whole human race; for the whole human race will be
affected by the procedings of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend
their views beyond the present moment of time, beyond the various limtis of
peace, from which they derive their political origin." We are not here, he said,
"to truck and bargain for our particular States. * * State attachements and
State importance have been the bane of this country. * * * He wished our ideas
to be enlarged to the true interest of man, instead of being circumscribed within
the narrow compass of a particular spot." These views he repeated, later saying
that: "It had been early said by Mr. Gerry that the new Government would be
partly national, partly federal; that it ought in the Arst quality to protect indi-
viduals; in the second, the State. But in what quality was it to protect the
aggregate interests of the whole? Among the many provisions which had been
urged, he had seen none for supporting the dignity and splendor of the American
empire. It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great views of the
Nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views." And again, he said, that
though "the States had many representatives on the floor * * * he feared few
were to be deemed the representatives of America."
[Friday, July 5, 1787, in Convention]
POWER TO ORIGINATE MONEY BILLS
? The Convention, at the outset, referred to a special committee that part of the
report of the Compromise Committee, which fixed the ratio of votes in the House
at 1 Member for every 40,000 inhabitants. It then proceeded to consider the
second portion of the proposed compromise, giivng to the House the exclusive
right to originate bills for raising or appropriating money. A curious mixture
of views appeared with reference to this. The proposal had apparently origi-
nated with Gerry. As early as June 13, he had moved to restrain the senatorial
branch from originating money bills, saying that: "The other branch was more
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80 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
Immediately the representative of the people, and it was a maxim that the people
ought to hold the purse strings." Gerry's proposal was in accord with the pro-
visions of most of the State constitutions, viz, those of Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia, in
which power to originate money bills lay exclusively in the lower branch of the
legislature (though Delaware, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire allowed its
senate to alter or amend). Hugh Williamson of North Carolina had favored
the proposal, as "it will oblige some Member in the lower branch, to move, and
people can then mark him." Pierce Butler of South Carolina had said that he
saw no reason for such a discrimination; that though it was borrowed from the
British Constitution, there was no analogy between the Senate and the House
of Lords; and he had then made two curious arguments against it?prophecies,
one of which was never fulfilled, but the other of which showed foresight of a
practice which has been frequently indulged in by the House. "If the Senate shall
be degraded," he said, "by any such discriimnations, the best men would be
apt to decline serving in it, in favor of the other branch ;" and, he continued, "it
will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills."
King and Madison had concurred in opposing, saying that "as the Senate would
be generally a more capable set of men, it would be wrong to disable them" in
this way; and that the proposal if adopted must be extended to amending
as well as to originating money bills. Sherman had said that as the Senate
would bear their share of the taxes, they would also be representatives of the
people; and that the right of both branches to originate money bills had prevailed
in Connecticut and had been found to be "safe and convenient." General Pinck-
ney had said that Gerry's proposed system prevailed in South Carolina, "and
has been a source of pernicious disputes between the two branches; moreover,
it was evaded by the Senate's handing amendments, informally, to the House."
Gerry's motion receiving little support had been rejected, only New York, Dela-
ware, and Virginia voting for it. This action by the Convention had shown
clearly that they regarded the new Senate which they were about to constitute
as a legislative body of an entirely different nature from the Senates under the
State constitutions; for unless this was so, it is unlikely that the Convention
would have failed to follow the provisions of those constitutions.
When the delegates, on this July 6, took up this part of the compromise, they
appeared to be split into five distinct factions: (a) those delegates from the
smaller States who opposed taking this power from the Senate in any event;
(b) those from the smaller States who, though opposed, were willing to vote for
it as a concession or compromise; (c) those from the larger States who regarded
it as an essential right to be possessed by the House since that body as the im-
mediate representatives of the people ought to have control of the people's money,
and since the large States would probably have a majority in the House; (d)
those from the larger States who regarded the right as of no consequence and
hence as constituting no concession whatever on the part of the smaller States;
(e) those from the larger States who regarded the deprivation of the Senate of
this right as fundamentally wrong in theory, and likely to be a dangerous source
of dispute between the two branches. The delegates comprising (b) and (c)
were willing to vote for this provision; those comprising (a), (d), and (e) were
opposed to it. This part of the compromise was debated on July 5; and it was
the first to be adopted, on July 6, by a vote of five States to three (Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and South Carolina voting against it, and Massachusetts, New York,
and Georgia being divided). It was carried, therefore, by North Carolina voting
with the smaller States of Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland.
Reconsideration of this vote was had on July 14, but on July 16, the whole com-
promise, including this provision as to money bills, was accepted (as hereafter
described) by five States to four, with Massachusetts divided?North Carolina
again joining with the smaller States.
Senator PELL. At this point I will close the hearing on S. 537. In
accordance with committee policy, any further statements or letters,
received relative to the proposed legislation will also be inserted in
the record.
(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.)
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APPENDIX
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
Staff Memorandum No. 88-1-27.
Subject: Authority of the Senate to originate appropriation bills.
? During the hearings on S. 537, to provide for more effective evalua-
tion of the fiscal requirements of the executive agencies of the Govern-
ment of the United States, held on March 20,1963, reference was made
to the position of some Members of the House of Representatives that
this bill, which would establish a Joint Committee on the Budget,
might in some manner, infringe on alleged constitutional prerogatives
of the House of Representatives to originate appropriation bills.
Taking note of this issue, the Chairman directed the staff to prepare
a summary and analysis of the debates and actions of the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, with particular reference to the authority
of the Senate to originate appropriation measures.
Since the birth of the Republic, a controversy has existed as to
whether Article I, Section 7, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the
United States vested in the House of Representatives the exclusive
authority to originate appropriation measures.
Article I, Section 7, Clause 1 provides:
All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.
Although no mention is made of appropriations in this clause, the
House of Representatives has, during the entire course of the history
of the Nation, frequently asserted the position that this clause con-
ferred upon it the exclusive authority to originate appropriation meas-
ures. The Senate has, from time to time, contested this position, con-
tending that it has equal authority to originate such bills. However,
for the most part, the Senate has ?acquiesced in the position of the
House and, as a matter of practice and procedure, all appropriation
measures do originate in the House of Representatives. This, how-
ever, is a matter of practice and not of constitutional right.
At this point, it may be stated unequivocally that there is nothing
either in the language of the Constitution or in the debates of the dele-
gates to. the Constitutional Convention of 1787 which, in any way,
lends support to the position of the House. On the contrary, the i
evidence s abundantly clear that various attempts in the Constitu-
tional Convention to vest in the House of Representatives the ex-
clusive authority to originate appropriation bills were defeated on
Several occasions, following extensive debate and discussion.
ApRnr, 3,1963.
81
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62 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
This position is supported conclusively by a statement of George
Mason, delegate from Virginia, author of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, member of the Continental Congress, and one of the three
men who refused to sign the completed Constitution. Mason, who
participated actively in the debates, having spoken 136 times, was
unalterably opposed to vesting any authority over either revenue or
appropriation measures in the Senate. In assigning his reasons for
refusing to sign the Constitution, he said, "The Senate have the power
of altering all money-bills, and of originating appropriations of
money * * * although they are not representatives of the people or
amenable to them." 1
Supporting data will be found in the debates and actions of the
Constitutional Convention, as reported by James Madison and re-
printed in (1) Elliott, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution, (Rev. Ed., Phila., 1861) Vol. 5; (2) Farrand, The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787, (New Haven, 1911), Vols. I, II
and III; (3) Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Ameri-
can States, H. Doc. 398, 69th Cong. (1927) ; and the following ma-
terials, all of which have been carefully analyzed: A report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary entitled, Power of the Senate to
Originate Appropriation Bills (H. Rept. 147, 46th Cong., 3d Sess.,
1881) ; a comprehensive article, entitled, History of the Formation of
the Constitution by John A. Kasson, President of the Constitutional
Centennial Commission, contained in the History of the Celebration
of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Con-
stitution of the United States (Philadelphia, 1889) Vol. I; W. W.
Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (second
edition, 1929), Vol. II; a memorandum submitted by Representative
Robert McClory, based upon Charles Warren, The Making of the
Constitution (Boston, 1937) ; a monograph, entitled, Creation of the
Senate, published as S. Doc. 45, 75th Congress; and the testimony of
Mr. Lucius Wilmerding, authority on the Federal spending power.
See also Seiko, The Federal Financial System (Brookings Institution,
1940). The report of the House Committee was published in the
Congressional Record, daily aditon, July 9, 1962, pp. 12016, ff, and
was also inserted in the appendix to the record of the Hearings on S.
537 as exhibit 1. The pertinent portion of the publication of the Con-
stitutional Centennial Commission is attached hereto as exhibit 2.
The materials submitted by Representative McClory and Mr.
Wilmerding are found in the Hearings on S. 537.
The balance of this memorandum will be devoted to a discussion of
the arguments of the House of Representatives and evidence refuting
these arguments, as contained in the Madison Journal and the other
materials referred to above.
POSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2
The position of the House of Representatives appears to be based
upon (1) the practice of the English Parliament at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, under which the lower House, the House
',Elliott, Debates on the Federal Constitution, (2nd ed., Phila., 1861) Vol. I, p. 494;
Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, New York, 1888, p. 329.
I See, Williams, The Supply Bills, S. Doc. 872, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1912; Report of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, Minority Views, H. Rept. 147, 46th Cong., 3d
Sess., 1881; Luce, Legislative Problems, Boston, 1935, pp. 391, ff.
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83
of Cbmmoris, exercised full and complete control over all money bills,
both appropriation and revenue-raising or tax bills; (2) the termi-
nology of the period, under which the terms "money bills" and "bills
for raising revenue" allegedly referred to and included appropriation
bills; and (3) the alleged intention of the Constitutional Convention
to retain authority over all financial matters in the House closest to
the people.
DEBATES AND ACTIONS OF THE CONSTIruTiONAL CONVENTION OF 1787
Analysis of the debates of the Constitutional Convention clearly re-
futes the position of the House of Representatives. An authoritative
account and analysis of these debates, with special reference to the
right of the Senate to originate appropriations, is found in an article,
entitled, History of the Formation of the Constitution, published in
a two-volume work, entitled, History of the Celebration of the One
Hundredth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Constitution of
the United States, under the direction and authority of the Constitu-
tional Centennial Commission in 1889, and referred to above.
?The article in question was written by former Representative John
A. Kasson, President of the Constitutional Centennial Commission,
and a distinguished lawyer and scholar, who served six terms as a
Member of the House of Representatives from Iowa. In addition,
Mr. Kasson served as First Assistant Postmaster General in President
Lincoln's cabinet, as United States Minister to Austria-Hungary and
Germany, and as United States member and representative at
numerous international conferences and commission negotiations.
In a section of his article entitled The Legislative Bight to Originate
Money Bills (pp. 101-105), reprinted in full as exhibit 2 of this
memorandum, Mr. Kasson reviewed the debates, discussions and votes
of the delegates to the Convention, and demonstrated conclusively (1)
that the delegates considered and rejected the practice of the Eng-
lish Parliament; (2) that they were fully aware of the distinction
between revenue bills and appropriation bills; (3) that they refused to
extend the exclusive power of the House of Representatives beyond
bills to raise revenue; and (4) that they deliberately and expressly
voted to vest in the Senate equal authority with the House over ap-
propriation measures.
In the scheme of government, as originally approved in the Com-
mittee of the Whole, equal power to originate legislation was given
to the two Houses of Congress by unanimous consent. On June 13,
during consideration of the Virginia Resolutions, Gerry moved to in-
sert the words, "except money bills, which shall originate in the first
branch of the national legislature." Butler saw no reason for such
discrimination: "We were always following the British Constitution,
when the reason for it did not apply. There was no analogy between
the House of Lords and the body (Senate) proposed to be established.
If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the
best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other
branch." Madison observed "that the Commentators on the British
Constitution had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on
the House of Lords in money bills. Certain it was there could be no
similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the repre-
sentatives of the people as well as the first branch. If they should
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84 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on
some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be
passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable set of men,
it would be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the busi-
ness, especially of that which was most important, and in our re-
public, worse prepared than any other." He concluded that if the
proposal was to be advocated at all, it must be extended to amend-
ing as well as originating money bills. Sherman stated, "We es-
tablish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particular-
ly needed in the finance business. The Senate bear their share of the
taxes, and are also the representatives of the people." Pinckney said,
"This distinction prevails in South Carolina, and has been a source
of pernicious disputes between the two branches." The motion was
then defeated by a vote of 7 to 3, and both Houses retained equal
rights in all legislation.
Subsequently, during the debate on equality of State representation
in the two Houses, it was urged by delegates from the larger States
that questions of revenue ought to be determined by a proportional
representation, otherwise, a minority of population, represented by a
majority of States, might impose burdens on the majority of both
wealth and population. This led to an offer by the small States that
"all bills for raising or appropriating money * * * shall originate
in the first branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or
amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn
from the public treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be
originated in the first branch." This offer was conditioned upon the
acceptance of an equal vote in the Senate; and a committee, of which
Gerry was chairman, so reported the plan on July 5. This plan was
opposed by Madison, Gouverneur Morris and Wilson, but the clause
was adopted on July 6, by a vote of 5 to 3, with the understanding
that it was still an open question. On July 16, following debate on
the compromise as a whole, which included other matters, the plan
was carried by a vote of 5 to 1, with the understanding that it was
still an open question, and it went to the Committee of Detail, still
unsupported by a majority of the States.
In its report on August 6, the Committee of Detail provided that
"All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the
salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House
of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Sen-
ate. No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pur-
suance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives." In another section of the report, it was provided that
"Each House shall possess the right of originating bills, except in the
cases aforementioned."
When the Convention took this section up for debate, on August 8,
Pinckney moved to strike it out, on the ground that it gave no ad-
vantage to the House of Representatives, and "if the Senate can be
trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted
with that of originating money bills." Gouverneur Morris said, "It is
particularly proper that the Senate shall have the right of originating
money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller num-
ber, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness; and
so as to prevent delay of business in the other House." Mason op-
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85
posed Pinckn'ey's motion to strike out the section stating that the
purse strings should never be put into the hands of the Senate.
Mercer thought that without this power the equality of votes in the
Senate was rendered of no consequence. Madison also favored the
motion, thinking the power to be of no consequence to the House and
likely to involve the two branches in "injurious altercations." Mason,
Butler, and Ellsworth opposed the motion on the ground that it would
add to the already too great powers of a Senate and promote an
aristocracy. Thereafter, the Convention proceeded to vote to strike
out the clause which vested exclusive power over revenue and ap-
propriations in the House by a vote of 7 to 4.
On August 9, Randolph gave notice that he would move to recon-
sider this vote, statinc,. that he thought it was not only "extremely
objectionable", but also "as endangering the success of the plan".
The plan he referred to was a part of the so-called Great Compromise
of July 16, under which the right of the' House to originate all rev-
enue bills had been given as a concession to the large States in return
for equality of representation in the Senate for the small States.
Williamson said that his State of North Carolina "had agreed to
equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should
be confined to the other House, and he was surprised to see the smaller
States forsaking the condition on which they had received their
equality." Mason said that unless this power should be restored to
the House, "he should, not from obstinacy, but from duty and con-
science, oppose throughout the equality of representation in the Sen-
ate:" Gouverneur Morris, on the other hand, considered the section
relating to money bills as "intrinsically, bad"; and Wilson said that
the two large States of Pennsylvania and Virginia had uniformly
voted against it.
On August 11, on a motion to reconsider the vote striking out the
money bill clause, Randolph made an elaborate speech in support of
vesting the power over money bills in the House. It will make the
plan 'more acceptable to the people because they will consider the
Senate as the more aristocratic body and will expect the usual guards
against its influence be provided according to the example in Great
Britain." He thought also that the restraint of the Senate from
amending was of particular importance, and he proposed to limit the
exclusive power to "bills for the purpose of revenue", to obviate ob-
jection to the term "raising money", which might happen incidentally,
not allowing the Senate by amendment to either increase or diminish
the same. Reconsideration was agreed to by a vote of 9 to 1.
On reconsideration, Randolph's motion, made on August 13, was
in the following words: "Bills for raising money for the purpose of
revenue, or for appropriating the same, shall originate in the House
of Representatives; and shall not be so amended or altered by the
Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the
mode of levying it, or the objects of its appropriation."
This motion led to a heated debate. Mason supported Randolph
fully. It was opposed, however, by Wilson, who said, "it would be a
source of perpetual contentions where there was no mediator to decide
them. The President here could not, like the executive in England,
interpose by a prorogation or dissolution. This restriction had been
found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitution
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86 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
(State) had established it. The House of Representatives will insert
other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each
other, destroy the deliberate liberty of the Senate. * * * With regard
to the purse strings (referred to by Mason), it was to be observed that
the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of
the House of Representatives, the other in those of the Senate. Both
Houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be
?which untied first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any
objection to the Senate's preparing the bills, that they would have
leisure for that purpose and would be in the habits of business (re-
ferring again to Mason's remarks). War, Commerce and Revenue
were the great objects of the General Government. All of them are
connected with money. The restriction in favor of the House of
Representatives would exclude the Senate from originating any im-
portant bills whatever."
Gerry stated that "taxation and representation? are strongly asso-
ciated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any
but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses.
In short the acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate
be not restrained from originating Money Bills.' Madison thought
that if Randolph's substitute is to be adopted "it would be proper to
allow the Senate at least so to amend as to diminish the sum to be
raised. Why should they be restrained from checking the extrava-
gance of the other House. One of the greatest evils incident to Re-
publican Government was the spirit of contention and faction. The
proposed substitute, which in some respects lessened the objections
against the section, had a contrary effect with respect to this particu-
lar. It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes between the
two Houses. The word 'revenue' was ambiguous. In many acts,
particularly in the regulation of trade, the object would be two-fold.
The raising of revenue would be one of them. How could it be de-
termined Aich was the primary or predominant one or whether it
was necessary that revenue should be the sole object, in exclusion of
other incidental effects." Madison then went on to show that it is
difficult to determine whether a bill which was sent to the House by
the Senate was or was not an amendment or alteration of a House
revenue bill. He noted further the difficulties in determining what
was an amendment or alteration, and what was the meaning of the
words "increase or diminish". Continuing, he stated, "If the right to
originate be vested exclusively in the House of Representatives, either
the Senate must yield against its judgment to that House, in which
case the utility of the check will be lost?or the Senate will be inflexi-
ble and the House of Representatives must adapt its money bill to the
views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will be of no
avail."
After Dickinson and Randolph had defended further Randolph's
motion, Rutledge stated that "he would prefer giving the exclusive
right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at all. The Senate
being more conversant in business, and having more leisure, will digest
the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect until examined
and approved by the House of Representatives, there can be no possi-
ble danger. * * * The experiment in South Carolina, where the Sen-
ate cannot originate or amend money bills, has shown that it answers
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no good purpose; and produces the very bad one of continually divid-
ing and heating the two Houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of
the amendment of the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink
?at the encroachment; if it be displeasing, then the Constitution is ap-
pealed to. Every session is distracted by altercations on this subject.
The practice now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make
formal amendments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations
which will procure the bill their assent." Carrol said, "the most in-
genious men in Maryland are puzzled to define the case of money bills,
or explain the Constitution on that point; though it seemed to he
worded with all possible plainness and precision. It is a source of
continual difficulty and squabble between the two Houses."
At the close of this debate, three votes were taken. First, on the
exclusive right in the first House to originate money bills; defeated,
4 to 7; second, on originating by the first House and amending by the
Senate: defeated, 4 to 7; and third, on the clause, "No money shall be
drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations
that shall originate in the House of Representatives" ? defeated, 10 to 1.
Warren, in commenting on the action taken by the Convention on
August 13, notes that "the Convention adhered to its vote of August 8;
and thus a victory was again scored by the supporters of the power of
the Senate." 3 Kasson observes that "here, for the first time, appears
a very strong conviction of the Convention that a distinction should
be made between bills for raising revenue and bills for appropriating
money." 4
On August 11, Williamson referred to the money bill section as dead,
but "its ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt us. It had
been a matter of conscience with him' to insist upon it as long as there
was hope of retaining it. He had siva 'lowed the vote of rejection with
reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was said on the other
side was that the restriction was not convenient. We have now got
a House of Lords which is to originate money bills."
On August 15, Strong proposed the following amendment: "Each
House shall possess the right of originating aebills, except bills for
raising money for the purposes of revenue or for appropriating the
same and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government
Which shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases." Mason
seconded Strong's motion, stating that "He was extremely earnest to
take this power from the Senate, who he said could already sell the
whole country by means of Treaties." Gorham said the amendment
was of great importance. "The Senate will first acquire the habit of
preparing money bills, and then the practice will grow into an ex-
clusive right of preparing them." Gouverneur Morris opposed it as
unnecessary and inconvenient. Williamson said, "Some think this
restriction on the Senate essential to liberty, others think it of- no im-
portance. Why should not the former be indulged? He was for
efficient and stable Government but many would not strengthen the
Senate if not restricted in the case of money bills. The friends of the
Senate would therefore lose more than they would gain by refusing
Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1937), p. 435.
4 Kasson, History of the Formation of the Constitution, in History of the Celebration
of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Constitution of the United
States (Phila., 1889), p. 104. ,
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88 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE 1317bGET
to gratify the other side." He thereupon moved- to postpone the
subject until the powers of the Senate had been reviewed, and further
action was then postponed.
On September 5, the Committee of Eleven' to which had been re-
ferred certain portions of the proposed Constitution upon which action
had been postponed, filed a report recommending, among other things,
that "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments
by the Senate; no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in con-
sequence of appropriations made by law."
Gouverneur Morris moved to postpone consideration, noting that
"it had been agreed to in the Committee on the ground of compromise,
and he should feel himself at liberty to dissent to it, if on the whole
he should not be satisfied with certain other parts (of the report) to
be settled." Sherman "was for giving immediate ease to those who
looked on this clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their con-
currence in other proper measures." Morris' motion carried by a
vote of 9 to 2 and the matter was postponed.
It should be noted, at this point, that here, for the first time, we
have an official recommendation from a special committee, directed
to report with respect to matters which had been postponed, which
retains in the House exclusive authority to originate measures for
raising revenue, while authorizing the Senate to alter or amend such
measures, but which eliminates the exclusive power in the House to
originate appropriations. It is perfectly clear, from the previous de-
batet that the elimination of the exclusive power in the House to
originate appropriation bills was not accidental, inadvertent, or due to
any lack of understanding on the part of the delegates as to the dif-
ference between bills to raise revenue and bills to appropriate funds.
In fact, the vote on August 13, previously described, makes it quite
clear that the distinction between revenue and appropriation measures
was well understood. What is reflected in the proposal of the Special
Committee is an attempt to reach a compromise which would placate
those who wanted to see more power vested in the Senate and who had
opposed the origination of revenue measures in the House exclusively.
Commenting on this proposal of the Special Committee, Warren
states that "this new compromise satisfied some of the delegates from
the smaller States and some from the larger States, who had hitherto
opposed the origination of revenue bills in the House; *
On September 8, the postponed proposed section was again con-
sidered. After adopting an amendment to the first clause which in-
corporated the language of the Massachusetts Constitution, the sec-
tion was adopted by a vote of 9 to 2. As amended and adopted, it
read as follows: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments, as in other bills. No money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in consequence of appropriations made bylaw."
On the same day, a committee of five was appointed "to revise the
style of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to * * *",
referred to as the Committee on Style and Arrangement.
On September 12, the Committee on Style and Arrangement made
its report on a final and revised draft of the Constitution. Section
5 Warren, The Making of the Constitution, op. cit., p. 670.
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89
7 of this final draft contained the provision: "All bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Sen-
ate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." The
last clause of the version adopted on September 8, forbidding money
to be drawn from the treasury except in consequence of appropriations
made by law, had been removed from section 7 and appeared as
clause 6 of section 9.
SUMMARY OF DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Summarizing the debates, it appears (1) that originally each House
was to have full and equal authority to originate all bills; (2) an
attempt to except money bills and require them to originate in the
House of Representatives was rejected; (3) as a result of a compro-
mise between delegates from the small and large States, all States were
given an equal vote in the Senate, in return for vesting in the House
of Representatives exclusive power to originate both revenue and
appropriation measures, and this was tentatively approved on two oc-
casions ; (4) subsequently, a provision to vest exclusive authority in
the House over both revenue and appropriation bills was proposed by
the Committee on Detail and rejected on two occasions; (5) this
rejection was in three parts; one rejected the exclusive authority in the
House to originate money bills; the second rejected the exclusive au-
thority in the House to originate, with amendment by the Senate; and
the third rejected exclusive origination of appropriation measures
in the House of Representatives; (6) subsequently, a special commit-
tee, in an attempt at conciliation, recommended that the House have
exclusive authority to originate revenue measures, with amendment
by the Senate, and exclusive authority to originate appropriation
measures was dropped; and (7) finally, the Convention adopted the
language now contained in the Constitution, except that the clause
requiring appropriations made by law prior to drawing money from
the Treasury was moved to another section of the Constitution, prob-
ably in order to avoid the confusion and misunderstanding generated
by the earlier language, and as a matter of style.
Kasson, commenting on the final product, says, "It thus appears
by express votes the Convention refused to extend the exclusive power
of the House beyond bills for raising revenue, and by express vote
decided to leave in the Senate an equal power to originate bills mak-
ing appropriations of public money * "." 6
REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
46TH CONGRESS ( 1 8 8 0 )
Further substantiation for this view is found in the report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, made in 1881, referred to above
(H. Rept. 147, 46th Cong., 3d sess.). It appears that a Senate bill,
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase certain land,
and further authorizing the appropriating of funds therefor, had
passed the Senate and was referred to the appropriate House commit-
tee which reported it favorably. Having determined that the matter
involved the making of an appropriation, it was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to inquire into the right
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90 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
of the Senate under the Constitution to originate appropriation bills.
This committee made a searching examination of the entire question
and concluded that the Senate had such authority and that the power
to originate appropriation bills is not exclusive in the House of Rep-
resentatives.
After reviewing the British Parliamentary practice at the time of
Constitutional Convention, the House Committee observed, "* * * if
they (the Founding Fathers) had intended to secure to the House
the sole right to originate appropriation bills * * * it is but reasonable
to suppose that they would have done so in perfectly plain and
unequivocal terms."
Following an examination of a portion of the debates in the Con-
stitutional Convention, the House Committee stated:
From this brief summary it will be seen that the proposi-
tion was more than once presented to the convention to vest
in the House of Representatives the exclusive privilege of
originating "all money bills" co nomine, which was as often
rejected. It would seem obvious therefore, that the framers
of the Constitution did not intend that the expression "bills
for raising revenue", as employed by them, should be taken
as the equivalent of that term as it was understood in English
parliamentary practice; for, if they had so intended, they
would surely have used that term itself, which had already
received a fixed and definite signification from long and
familiar usage, instead of the one they chose to employ.
Thereafter, the House Committee observed that it could not be said
that the framers of the Constitution acted under any misapprehension
or want of proper deliberation. Not only did they specifically reject
language which would have vested in the House of Representatives
the exclusive privilege of originating appropriation bills, but
No provision in the entire Constitution was more elabor-
ately discussed or more carefully considered. The policy of
investing the House of Representatives with the exclusive
privileges exercised by the English House of Commons in
relation to 'money bills' was persistently and ably urged by
? such distinguished and patriotic statesmen as George Mason,
Elbridge Gerry, and Benjamin Franklin; and the impro-
priety of making any discrimination whatever between the
two Houses as to their power to originate any bills was forc-
ibly presented by Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Oliver Ells-
worth, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman.
Continuing, the House Committee states:
To say that the illustrious men who composed the Federal
Convention were incapable of declaring in clear and unmis-
takable language that the House of Representatives should
have the sole right to originate appropriation bills, if such
had been their intention, would be an insult to their intel-
ligence, which, in view of the precise and perspicuous terms
used in the resolution reported by Mr. Gerry, the substitute
offered by Mr. Randolph, and the amendment proposed by
Mr. Strong, could only stultify the person who might hazard
such an insinuation; and it would be no less an imputation
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upon their integrity and candor, as well as a gross abuse of
construction, to suppose that they intended to be understood
as meaning precisely what they repeatedly refused to say in
plain words, especially when such a meaning cannot be in-
ferred by any possibility from the language they actually
employed, if that language is taken according to its natural
and ordinary import.
The House Committee came to the conclusion that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to withhold the power of
originating appropriation bills from the Senate, and that this was
clearly shown from the language used in the instrument and the cir-
cumstances under which that language was employed.
Concerning the argument that usage and customs should govern,
the committee said:
" * if the Senate was ever invested with that power by
the Constitution, it cannot be said to have lost it by nonuser.
Fortunately for us, that is not the way in which our consti-
tutional provisions are changed, nor can they be altered by
mere parliamentary practice. They must remain in the plain
words in which they are written until amended by the con-
current votes of two-thirds of each branch of Congress and
the legislatures of three-fourths of all the States in the Union,
and while they remain they must be construed according to
the simple and well settled rules of interpretation applicable
to all other written language.
If the mere practice of the two Houses or of either of
them can be said to affect in any way a clear constitutional
principle, instances in which the House has passed, without
objection, appropriation bills which have originated in the
Senate, might be adduced in sufficient numbers to fill a
volume.
In concluding its report, the committee stated:
With the policy of such a provision your committee has
nothing to do. That was a matter to be considered and
determined by the convention which framed the Constitution
and the States which ratified it. And whether they acted
wisely. or unwisely in that regard cannot alter the fact that
there is nothing in the language of the Constitution to indi-
cate an intention on their part to withhold from the Senate
the power to originate bills for the appropriation of money
or that they repeatedly rejected a proposition to confine that
privilege to the House of Representatives, although presented
hi the most emphatic and unequivocal terms. (Italic sup-
plied.) Believing, therefore, from the plain letter of the
Constitution, as well as from all the circumstances surround-
ing the adoption of the provision in question, that the Senate
had the clear right to originate the bill, they report it back to
the House, with the recommendation that it be referred to the
Committee on Appropriations, and that the following resolu-
tion be adopted:
Resolved, That the Senate had the constitutional power to
originate the bill referred, and that the power to originate
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92 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
bills appropriating money from the Treasury of the United
States is not exclusive in the House of Representatives.
This report, which was accompanied by Minority Views, was recom-
mited. The Minority Views contained the usual arguments advanced
in support of the contention that the House of Representatives has
exclusive power to originate appropriation bills.
VIEWS OF COMMENTATORS AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
The precise question of the right of the Senate to originate appro-
priation bills has never been passed upon directly by the courts.
However' it has been the subject of comment by several commentators
and has been treated indirectly in several decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Story, writing in 1833, in his famous Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States, stated: 7
* * * What bills are properly "bills for raising revenue",
in the sense of the Constitution, has been a matter of some
discussion. A learned commentator supposes that every bill
which indirectly or consequently may raise revenue is, within
the sense of the Constitution, a revenue bill. He therefore
thinks that the bills for establishing the post-office and the
mint, and regulating the value of foreign coin belong to this
class, and ought not to have originated (as in fact they did) in
the Senate. But the practical construction of the Constitu-
tion has been against his opinion. And, indeed, the history of
the origin of the power already suggested abundantly proves
that it has been confined to bills to leu taxes in the strict
sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to
bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create
revenue. * * *
More recently, an equally eminent authority on the Constitution,
W. W. Willoughby, in his definitive work, The Constitutional Law of
the United States stated: 8
The Constitution provides that 'all bills for raising rev-
enue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other
bills.'
This provision has given rise to frequent controversies be-
tween the two Houses of Congress, but has but seldom been
passed upon by the courts. No formal definition of a revenue
measure has been given by the Supreme Court, but in Twin
City National Bank v. Nebeker' the court, in effect, held that
a bill, the primary purpose of which is not the raising of
revenue, is not a measure that must originate in the House,
even though, incidentally, a revenue will be derived by the
United States from its operation.
Concerning appropriations acts, Mr. Willoughby stated: 9
It would seem that the Senate has full power to originate
measures appropriating money from the Federal treasury.
7 Vol. 2, iv. 342-343.
8 (2nd ed., 1029), Vol. II, p. 656.
Ibid., p. 657.
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This right has at times been denied by certain members of
the House, but the House has not itself formally adopted this
negative view.
In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker," the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the validity of a statute providing a national currency
secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States and imposing a tax
on the notes in circulation of the banking associations organized under
the statute, in furtherance of that object and to meet the expenses
attending the execution of the act. It was contended that since the
act imposed a tax, it was a revenue raising measure; and that since
the amendment which imposed the tax originated in the Senate, it was
void. The Court held that this was not a revenue bill "which the
Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives."
In disposing of this contention, Mr. Justice Harlan (202-3) stated:
Mr. Justice Story has well said that the practical construc-
tion of the Constitution and the history and origin of the con-
stitutional provision in question proves that revenue bills are
those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are
not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create
revenue. * * *
BASES FOR THE POSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The position of some Members of the House of Representatives,
that the Constitution vests in that House exclusive authority to
originate appropriation bills, appears to have received its principal
support from Asher Hinds and Representative Clarence Cannon, both
former House Parliamentarians, and a considerable amount of ma-
terial on the subject is found in Hinds and Cannon's Precedents.
Additional material is found in Luce's Legislative Problems, and in the
Minority Views attached to the report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary (H.Rept. 147, 46th Cong.), referred to above. How-
ever, the major work purporting to support this position is found
in an article by former Senator John Sharp Williams, written in
1912 and published as Senate Document 872 (62nd Cong., 1912).
In this article, Mr. Williams, after reviewing briefly the debates
in the Convention, arrives at the events of September 8,1787. Noting
the adoption by a vote of 9 to 2 of the language "All bills for raising
revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments, as in other bills. No money
shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by Law", he says, "no discussion. Evidently nobody thought
that it made a difference from previous drafts. Why? Because the
phrase 'raising revenue' was equivalent to the phrase 'raising money
and appropriating the same'."
In coming to this conclusion, Mr. Williams ignored completely the
fact that on two occasions a provision by the Committee on Detail
to vest exclusive authority over both revenue and appropriation bills
was rejected. Furthermore, at the time of the second rejection, a
vote was taken on the following language: "No money shall be drawn
from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations which
10167 U.S. 196, (1897).
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94 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
shall originate in the Hou,se of Representatives"; and it was defeated
by a vote of 10 to 1.
How Mr. Williams was able to conclude after that action and the
debate surrounding it that the phrase " 'raising revenue' was equivalent
to the phrase 'raising money and appropriating the same'" is not
readily apparent and is merely based upon his own personal views
and interpretations, rather than on historical facts and events.
Mr. Williams also made much of the fact that the final draft, which
omitted any reference to "appropriations", was the work of the
"Committee of Revision of Style", concluding that it "seems still
evident that to 'raise revenue' meant to raise money and appropriate
it". He made no reference to the fact that this committee moved the
last clause of the version adopted on September 8, dealing with ap-
propriations, from section 7 of the final draft to section 9 of the final
draft. It is certainly just as valid to assume that the committee took
this action in order to separate, once and for all, the appropriation
provision from the revenue provision, in order to avoid the conflict
and misunderstanding which existed throughout a considerable por-
tion of the debate. Mr. Williams' implication, that the omission of
any reference to "appropriations" was purely one of style and ar-
rangement, certainly finds no justification in the facts reviewed, and
must be treated as mere conjecture on his part.
Mr. Williams proceeded to review the debates in some of the State
Conventions on the ratification of the Constitution. His references
to the language used, however, are inconclusive, since all or most of
them are to "money bills", a term which, although used in the debate
by the framers, was later discarded in favor of the more precise
term?"bills to raise revenue", and "appropriations". By tortured
interpretations of the terms, "money bills", "revenue bills", and "sup-
ply bills", he attempts to show, without any noticeable basis, that they
really mean "appropriation bills".
Mr. Williams states further that "if you will read the proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia very carefully, you
will find that the whole argument there was whether the Senate
should or should not have the right to amend. There never was one
moment spent in discussion as to whether the House should or should
not have the right to originate". [Italic in original.]
It is apparent that Mr. Williams did not read the debates with the
care he requested of others. As early as June 13, 1787, when Gerry
moved to change the equal right in both Houses to originate all legis-
lation, so as to except money bills "which shall originate in the House
of Representatives," Butler, Madison, Sherman and Pinckney took
issue with him. Madison specifically observed that "the Senate would
be the representatives of the people as well as the first branch", and
"as the Senate would be generally a more capable set of men, it would
be wrong to exclude them from any preparation of the business, espe-
cially of that which was important, * * *." Sherman said, "We
establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is par-
ticularly needed in the finance business. The Senate bear their share
of the taxes and are also representatives of the people." Pinckney
noted that this distinction in South Carolina has been a source of
"pernicious disputes between the two branches." After the debate,
erry's motion was defeated by a vote of 7 to 2.
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Subsequently, on August 6, the Committee on Detail, in its report,
provided for the origination in the House of Representatives of 'all
bills for raising or appropriating money * * *. In the debate on
this provision on August 8, Gouverneur Morris said, "it is particularly
proper that the Senate shall have the right of originating money bills.
LItalic supplied.] They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller
number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness;
and so as to prevent delay in the other House." Following further
debate, the provision was rejected by a vote of 7 to 4. In further
debate, several days later' Wilson said that "the purse was to have
two strings, one of which was in the hands of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the other in the Senate. Both Houses must concur in un-
tying, and of what importance would it be which untied first, which
last. He could not conceive "it to be any objection to the Senate's
preparing the bills", and "the restriction in favor of the House of
Representatives would exclude the Senate from originating any im-
portant bills whatever".
In the light of the foregoing, it certainly cannot be said with any
degree of accuracy, that "there never was one moment spent in dis-
cussion as to whether the House should or should not have the right
to originate."
Finally, we have the clear statement of George Mason, a delegate
from Virginia who gave, as one of his reasons for refusing to sign the
Constitution, the fact that "the Senate shall have the power of altering
all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money * "".11
CONCLUSIONS
As stated at the outset of this study, an examination of the debates
of the framers of the Constitution and of the principal commentators
and authorities on the subject reveals, beyond any doubt, that the Sen-
ate has constitutional authority to originate appropriation bills. This
conclusion is based upon the following findings:
1. The language of the Constitution itself makes it perfectly plain
that the exclusive authority of the House of Representatives refers
only to "bills for raising revenue" which term means "levying taxes".
If the delegates to the Convention had desired to vest sole authority
over appropriations in the House of Representatives, it may be as-
sumed, in the light of their intellectual capacities and stature, that
they would have done so in plain and unequivocal terms, particularly
in view of the fact that attempts to confine that authority to the House
were rejected repeatedly. This position is further supported by the
refusal of Delegate George Mason to sign the Constitution because it
crave the Senate power to originate appropriations, quoted in the
preceding paragraph.
2. The practice of the English Parliament, at the time of the Con-
stitutional Convention, under which the House of Commons controlled
both revenue-raising and appropriation bills, was well-known and
understood by the delegates. The question of vesting the same powers
in the House of Representatives was thoroughly debated and was ulti-
mately rejected as inapplicable to the situation at hand, since the
Senate bore no resemblance whatever to the hereditary House of Lords.
See, supra, mote 1.
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3. The framers of the Constitution deliberately discarded the term
"money bills", used in English parliamentary practice, because of the
confusion generated by this term. Furthermore, they understood
fully the distinction between revenue-raising measures and appropri-
ation measures, and, at no time was it intended that the term "bills
for raising revenue" was to include bills for appropriating money.
4. Originally, each House was given equal authority to originate all
bills, and an attempt to except money bills and require them to origin-
ate in the House of Representatives was rejected.
5. As the result of a compromise between the small and large States,
all States were given an equal vote in the Senate in return for vesting
in the House of Representatives exclusive power to originate both
revenue and appropriation measures, and this was tentatively ap-
proved on two occasions.
6. Subsequently, a provision to vest exclusive authority in the House
over both revenue and appropriation measures was proposed and re-
jected on two occasions. This rejection was in three parts: one vote
rejected the exclusive authority in the House to originate money bills;
the second rejected the exclusive authority in the House to originate,
with amendment by the Senate; and the third rejected exclusive origi-
nation of appropriation measures in the House of Representatives.
7. Having reached an impasse on this question, a special committee,
in an attempt at conciliation, recommended that the House have ex-
clusive authority to originate revenue measures, with amendment by
the Senate, and exclusive authority to originate appropriation meas-
ures was dropped, in order to placate those delegates who resented the
attempt to exclude the Senate from a matter of such importance as
appropriations.
8. The Convention finally adopted the language now contained in the
Constitution, except that the clause requiring appropriations made by
law prior to drawing money from the Treasury was moved to another
section by the Committee on Style and Arrangement. It is obvious
that this action could not have been inadvertent, since the committee
in question had no authority to make substantive changes. Therefore,
their action in dropping any reference to appropriation measures from
Article 1, Section 7, Clause 1, was done deliberately in order to carry
out the desires of a majority of the delegates, and to eliminate any pos-
sible confusion which had been generated by the earlier language.
Had this action been taken, merely as a matter of style, it would have
exceeded the authority of the committee, and the Constitution would
never have been ratified in that form.
9. Since the power to originate appropriation measures was clearly
vested in the Senate by the Constitution, the fact that the Senate, as a
matter of practice and procedure, has permitted the House of Repre-
sentatives to originate general appropriation bills over a long period
of time, cannot operate to divest the Senate of this important constitu-
tional power. If this is desirable, it must be done by an amendment to
the Constitution as prescribed by that document.
ELI E. NOBLEMAN,
Professional Staff Member.
Approved:
WALTER L. REYNOLDS,
Staff Director.
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97
EXHIBIT 1
[46th Cong., 3d sess., House of Representatives, Rept. No. 147]
POwEll OF THE SENATE To ORIGINATE APPROPRIATION BILLS
The House having referred to the Committee on the Judiciary the bill (S.
1157) entitled "An act authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase
additional lots of ground adjoining the new building for the Bureau of Engrav-
ing and Printing," with instructions to inquire into the right of the Senate under
the Constitution to originate bills making appropriations of money belonging to
the Treasury of the United States, and said committee having considered the
same, beg leave to submit the following report:
The principal if not the only question submitted to your committee in this
instance is whether the Senate has the power to originate bilis for the appro-
priation of money, and its correct solution depends solely upon the proper
construction of the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the
Constitution, which contains the only restriction to be found anywhere upon
the authority of that body to originate bills of any kind or description whatever.
That clause provides that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amend-
ments, as on other bills." And if the words in which it is expressed are to be
taken in their ordinary acceptation, as required by the primary canon of legal
interpretation, it is difficult to conceive how there could possibly be two opinions
as to the idea they were intended to convey, for certainly the distinction between
raising revenue and disposing of it after it has been raised is sufficiently obvious
to be understood by even the commonest capaCity.
It is true, nevertheless, that from the time the Constitution was framed to
the present there has been an impression, more or less general, that this clause
has a much broader signification than its terms imply. There have been many,
indeed, whose utterances have usually received the most respectful considera-
tion, and among them some who figured conspicuously in the framing and ratifica-
tion of that instrument, who seem to have regarded the expression "bills for
raising revenue," as here employed, as synonymous with the term "money bills,"
which at the time of the adoption of our Constitution had become quite familiar
in the parliamentary language of the mother country. Mr. Madison was evidently
of that impression when he referred to "the equal authority that would subsist
between the two Houses on all legislative subjects except in originating money
bills" (Federalist, No. LVIII ), as was Mr. Grayson, of Virginia, when he de-
nounced the provision in the clause just quoted which authorizes the Senate "to
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills" as "a departure from that
great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people
only should interfere with money bills" (Elliot's Debates, vol. 1, p. 375). James
Wilson, of Pennsylvania, a member of the convention which framed the Constitu-
tion, and subsequently one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in one of his lectures on law, delivered in Philadelphia in 1790-91,
says: "By the Constitution of the United States money bills originate in the
House of Representatives" (1 Wilson's Works 445) ; and in another, speaking of
the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania, he says:
"They have on this head adopted the parliamentary law of England in part;
but they have not adopted it altogether. They have directed that all money bills
shall originate in the House of Representatives, but they have also directed that
the Senate may propose amendments in these as in other bills." (2 Wilson's
Works 161.)
Mr. Webster, in the debate which took place in the Senate on Mr. Clay's cele-
brated compromise tariff bill, in 1833, said:
"If it was a money bill, it belonged to the House of Representatives to originate
it. * * * The constitutional provision was taken from the practice of the British
Parliament, whose usages were well known to the framers of the Constitution,
with the modification that the Senate might alter or amend money bills, which
was denied by the House of Commons to that of the Lords." (Congressional
Debates, 1832-33, vol. ix, p. 722).
And Mr. Justice Story, in his "Commentaries on the Constitution," published
about the same time, after quoting the clause under discussion, says:
"This provision, so far as it regards the right to originate what are technically
called money bills, is, beyond all question, borrowed from the British House of
Commons." (1 Story Const., see. 874.)
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He seems, indeed, to have had a decided preference for the term "money bills,"
as he repeatedly employs it in his subsequent comments on the same provision
as a substitute for the phrase used in the Constitution, which, taken according
to its natural and obvious import, could give rise to neither doubt nor confusion.
Citations from the speeches and writings of other distinguished statesmen and
jurists similar to those already adduced might be multiplied almost indefinitely,
and it is probable that the frequent use of the term "money bills" by such per-
sons, as the equivalent of the expression employed in the Constitution, may have
created the impression which seems to prevail with many, that the latter em-
harces every variety and description of bills affecting the revenue, whether for
the purpose of raising it by taxation or disposing of it by appropriation. It
should be observed, however, that there is, and long has been, a wide difference
of opinion as to what is embraced in the definition of the term "money bill," even
as employed in English parliamentary practice.
Mr. Homersham Cox, in his work on the "Institutions of the English Govern-
ment" (p. 198), defines "money bills" to be tax bills, bills of supply, and bills of
the appropriation of supplies, and his definition has been approved and adopted
by Mr. Todd in his treatise on the "Parliamentary Government of England" (p.
525). Bouvier, in his "Law Dictionary," defines them as "bills or projects of
laws providing for raising revenue, and for making grants or appropriations of
the public treasure"; and Mr. Cushing, in his work on the "Law and Practice
of Parliamentary Assemblies," speaks of them as "those which grant a supply
or make an approprition of money" (sec. 2369), and says, in another place, that
"the term 'money bills,' as used in the constitutions of New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts, is broad enough to include both the raising and the appropration of
money" (sec. 2304). Mr. Seward was also of a similar opinion. In his remarks
in the Senate, in 1856, on Mr. Hunter's resolution to instruct the Committee on
Finance to prepare and report such of the general appropriation bills as they
might deem proper, he said:
"By money bills were understood, as now understood in Great Britain, equally
bills for raising money and bills for the paying moneys for the support of the
Government. Here in modern times we have come to a distinction between bills
for raising moneys and bills for appropriating money or appropriating revenue;
but in the British system the principle prevailed then, as it yet prevails, that the
House of Commons, regarded as the representatives of the people, had the ex-
clusive power of originating bills for the raising and for the expenditure of
revenue. It was this power which Carried the Commons of Great Britain
through this revolution in which they saved the cause of national liberty and
of constitutional freedom when it was in danger of being overborne by the
influence and power of the executive and of the House of Lords." (Congres-
sional Globe, 1st sess., 34th Cong., p. 376.)
Mr. Story, from one section in his work on the Constitution, seems to incline
to the same opinion, although another section on the same subject and in the
same volume leaves an entirely different inference. Speaking of the power vested
in the Senate to propose amendments to bills for raising revenue, which has
always been stubbornly denied to the British House of Lords, he says:
"There would be no small inconvenience in excluding the Senate from the
exercise of this power of amendment and alteration, since, if any, the slightest
modification were required in such a bill to make it either palatable or just,
the Senate would be compelled to reject it, although an amendment of a single
line might make it entirely acceptable to both Houses. Such a practical ob-
struction to the legislation of a free government would far outweigh any sup-
posed theoretical advantages from the possession or exercise of an exclusive
power by the House of Representatives. Infinite perplexities, misunderstand-
ings, and delays would clog the most wholesome legislation. Even the annUal
appropriation bills might be in danger of miscarriage on these accounts, and
the most painful dissensions might ensue" (sec. 877).
On the other hand, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries were pub-
lished 10 years before the Declaration of Independence, and were perhaps more
extensively read in America than in England at the time of the adoption of our
Constitution, pretermits all mention whatever of appropriations in his definition
of money bills. He says:
"First, with regard to taxes, it is the ancient indisputable privilege and right
of the House of Commons that all grants of subsidies or parliamentary aids do
begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them; although their grants are
not effectual, to all intents and purposes, until they have the assent of the other
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99
two branches of the legislature. The general reason given for this exclusive
privilege of the House of Commons is that the supplies are raised upon the body
of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the right of
taxing themselves. This reason would be unanswerable if the Commons taxed
none but themselves; but it is notorious that a very large share of property is
in the possession of the House of Lords; that this property is equally taxable
and taxed as the property of the Commons; and therefore the Commons, not
being the sole persons taxed, this cannot be the reason of their having the sole
right of raising and modeling the supply. The true reason, arising from the
spirit of our Constitution, seems to be this: The Lords being a permanent, heredi-
tary body, created at pleasure by the King, are supposed more liable to be in-
fluenced by the Crown and when once influenced to continue so, than the Com-
mons, who are a temporary, elective body, freely nominated by the people. It
wduld therefore be extremely dangerous to give the Lords any power of framing
new taxes for the subject; it is sufficient that they have a power of rejecting,
if they think the Commons too lavish or improvident in their grants. But so
unreasonably jealous are the Commons of this valuable privilege, that herein
they will not suffer the other house to exert any power but that of rejecting;
they will not permit the least alteration or amendment to be made by the Lords
to the mode of taxing the people by a money bill; under which appellation are
included all bills by which money is directed to be raised upon the subject for
any purpose or in any shape whatsoever, either for the exigencies of the govern-
ment, and collected from the kingdom in general, as the land tax, or for private
benefit, and collected in any particular district, as by turnpikes, parish rates,
and the like. (Blackstone's Commentaries, book 1, ch. 2, pp. 168, 169.)
And Sir Thomas Erskin May, although he offers no definition of the term
"money bills," referring to a bill introduced in the House of Lords in 1860, for
the repeal of the duty on paper, says:
"Nor was this strictly and in technical form a money bill. It neither granted a
tax to the Crown nor recited that the paper duty was repealed in consideration of
other taxes imposed." (1 May's Const. Hist., 448.)
From which it has been inferred that in his opinion that term refers alone to
bills for raising revenue, notwithstanding he says in another place that?
"The Lords have no voice in questions of expenditures save that of a formal
assent to the appropriation acts. They are excluded from it by the spirit and
forms of the constitution." (Ibid., 444.)
A similar inference as to the opinion of Judge Cooley may perhaps be drawn
from a paragraph in his admirable work on constitutional limitations. Speak-
ing of the equal dignity and powers of the two Houses of legislative assembly, he
says:
"This is the general rule; but as one body is more numerous than the other and
more directly represents the people, and in many of the States is renewed
more often by elections, the power to originate money bills, or bills for raising
revenue, is left exclusively by the constitutions of some of the States with this
body, in accordance with the custom in England, which does not permit bills of
this character to originate with the House of Lords." (Cooley's Const. Limita-
tions, 130.)
The whole subject, has, however, been recently reviewed by the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts in an elaborate opinion by Chief Justice Gray, concurred in by
the entire bench, and remarkable for the extraordinary learning and labor ex-
hibited in its preparation. In pursuance of a provision in the constitution of
that Commonwealth, authorizing such a procedure, the Legislature of Massa-
chusetts in April 1878, submitted to the supreme judicial court for its opinion
substantially the following question: "Whether a bill appropriating money from
the public treasury, and not providing for the levying of such money on the people
by tax or otherwise, is a money bill which must originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives under the provisions of chapter 1, section 3, article 7 of the State
constitution, which declares that 'all money bills shall originate in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on
other bills.'" To this the court, after the most careful and laborious examina-
tion of every available source of information, returned the following answer:
"First. The Senate can, under the provisions of chapter 1, section 3, article 7,
of the constitution, originate a bill or resolve appropriating money from the
treasury of the Commonwealth.
"Second. The Senate can, under these provisions, originate a bill or resolve
involving directly or indirectly the expenditure of money from the treasury, or
imposing a burden or charge thereon.
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"Third. That the power to originate a bill appropriating money from the
State treasury is not limited by the constitution to the House of Representatives,
but resides in both branches of the legislature." (126 Mass. Rep., supplement
pp. 557-602.)
Whatever may be the true scope of the term "money bills," however, as em-
ployed in British parliamentary practice, and understood at the time of the
adoption of our Constitution, it cannot be denied that for a long period of time
the Commons of England had asserted and maintained their exclusive privilege
of originating all acts for the appropriating and expenditure of the public
money with the same vigilance and pertinacity with which they had claimed
the sole right to originate bills for raising it. They would brook no interference
on the part of the Lords with either. As far back as 1678, they resolved:
"That all aids and supplies ought to begin with the Commons, and that it is
the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in
such bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and quali-
fications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House
of Lords" (May's Parliamentary Practice, pp. 506, 507).
And in 1691, when the Lords had amended a bill for appointing commissioners
to state the public accounts, they promptly rejected the amendments, declaring
that "the disposition as well as the granting of money by act of Parliament hath
ever been in the House of Commons; and these amendments relating to this
disposal of money to the commissioners added by the amendments do intrench
upon that right." And again in 1702, the Lords having amended a bill for the
encouragement of privateers, the Commons disagreed to the amendments because
they "altered several duties granted to the Crown, and likewise disposed of
several sums of money arising therefrom, and other public moneys, for that
the allowing of duties and the granting and disposing of all public moneys is the
undoubted right of the Commons alone, and an essential part of their constitu-
tion" (3 Hatsell, pp. 124, 132, and app. 11). So jealous, indeed, were they of
this privilege that they rejected an amendment proposed by the Lords substitut-
ing lead for copper in a bill for covering the cupola of St. Paul's; averring as
their reason "that the money for building the said cathedral was granted by
the Commons, and therefore the application thereof belonged to them" (3 Hat-
sell, 132).
It should be observed, moreover, that for more than a century before the
adoption of our Constitution, it had been the practice of the English Parliament,
as it has been ever since, to embrace the provisions for raising revenue and for
appropriating it in the same bill; and perhaps a want of proper attention to the
mode of procedure in that regard may have led to the apparent discrepancies of
opinion in relation to the nature of "money bills," already noticed. A brief
outline of the method of proceeding in Parliament in relation to the raising and
expenditure of money for the uses of the Government may, therefore, be some-
what useful here in elucidating the point under consideration.
For reasons into which it is unnecessary for the purposes of this report to
inquire, bills for granting supplies to the Government, as well as those providing
the methods for raising them, could only originate in the House of Commons,
which, as said by Sir William Blackstone, has always been so "unreasonably
jealous" of its privilege in that particular that it has never permitted the other
House?at least for centuries past?to make the slightest alteration therein,
limiting the Lords to the naked alternative of accepting or rejecting them.
Prior to 1667, proposition for granting aids and supplies to the Crown were
frequently referred to select committees, and the money when raised was as
often diverted to other purposes than those for which it was voted. In pur-
suance of a standing order made during that year, however, and which has
remained substantially the same to the present time, the House, at the beginning
of each Parliament, constitutes itself into what is known as the Committee of
Supply, to consider the amounts of money to be voted for the uses of the
Government for the current year, and to which are referred all demands for the
public service which are laid before the House by direction of the Crown.
When the Committee of Supply has reported, and the report has been agreed
to by the House, a day is appointed for the House to resolve itself into a com-
mittee "to consider of ways and means for raising the supply granted," or, as it
is familiarly styled, the Committee of Ways and Means. The business of this
Committee, as its title implies, is to determine the modes of raising the money
which the House (upon the resolution reported by the Committee of Supply and
agreed to) has granted to the Crown, being limited by rule to the amount thus
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101
granted. The Committee of Ways and Means, therefore, proceeds to determine
and report to the House the various methods by which the amount determined
upon shall be raised, whether by loan or tax, and by what descriptions and
rates of taxation.
When the Committee of Supply and Ways and Means have finished their
sittings, the House passes a bill known as the consolidated fund bill, or more
generally as the appropriation bill, in which the several grants made on recom-
mendation of the Committee of Ways and Means by land tax, paper tax, malt
tax, etc., are recapitulated, and directed to be applied to those services which
have been voted during the session in the Committee of Supply; specifying the
particular sums granted for each service and appropriating the money that shall
be paid into the exchequer for their discharge; and directing that said supplies
shall not be applied to any other than the purposes mentioned in the bill. By
this act, which completes the financial proceedings of the session, the supply
votes originally passed by the Commons only, receive full legislative sanction
(3 Hatsell, 192-200; 1 Todd's Parliamentary Government, 525-526; Cox's Insts,
English Government, 199 ; May's Parliamentary Practice, 538).
Prior to the restoration it had not been the practice to make specific appropria-
tions of supplies to the purposes for which they were granted, although it was
done in some instances as early as the reigns of Edward III and Richard II.
The extravagances of Charles II, however, and the various pretexts used by that
dissolute monarch for obtaining supplies for extraordinary services, which, when
secured, were immediately squandered in defraying the expenses of a licentious
court, suggested the necessity of some such expedient in order to secure to the
public use the money granted and raised for that purpose. But the idea thus
originally conceived as a mere restriction upon those who had the management
of the public revenue was at the revolution made a part of the system of govern-
ment then established for better securing the rights, liberties, and privileges of
the English people; and since that era all grants made by the Commons for the
service of the Government for the current year have been strictly applied and
appropriated to specific purposes for which they were intended in the acts of
Parliament which have carried these grants into effect, and heavy penalties have,
been denounced by law upon officers of the exchequer and others who should di-
vert or misapply the moneys thus levied and appropriated to any other purpose
than those for which they were granted (3 Hatsell, 202-206; Cox Inst. Eng.
Govt., 200; 1 Todd's Parliamentary Government 526-529).
It appears from the foregoing that according to English parliamentary prac-
tice, as it existed at the time of the formation of our Constitution and still pre-
vails, the appropriation of the public revenue was a mere incident to measures by
which it was granted to the Crown and brought into the exchequer; that the
House of Commons claimed and maintained the exclusive right to determine the
amount to be raised, the methods by which it should be raised, the services to
which it should be appropriated, and the manner in which it should be expended;
that these several features were usually incorporated and received legislative
sanction in the same act; and that they would countenance no interference with
either of them by the other House on any pretense or for any purpose whatever.
Assuming, therefore, that the framers of the Constitution were familiar with
the practice of the British Parliament in this regard, as well as with the prin-
ciples upon which it was founded, and that they had it in immediate view when
the provision under discussion was adopted, as the most cursory examination of
the debates and proceedings in relation to it will show to be true, the question
recurs as ?to the extent to which they intended to incorporate it in our own
system of Federal legislation; and if that intention were to be gathered alone
from the simple and unambiguous language in which they chose to express it,
there would be, as has already been intimated, but little if any difficulty involved
in the inquiry, for the unlimited power of alteration and amendment vested
in the Senate certainly deprives the House of the exclusive privilege of deter-
mining either the amount of revenue to be raised or the methods by which it is
to be provided; and if they had intended to secure to the House the sole right to
originate appropriation bills, for which the Commons had contended with their
characteristic pertinacity for more than two centuries, it is but reasonable to
suppose that they would have done so in perfectly plain and unequivocal terms.
It has been claimed, however, that questiohs of constitutional construction are
in a great degree historical, and not to be determined by a mere interpretation
of the language employed in the instrument. A brief review of the proceedings
of the convention which resulted in the adoption of the provision under considera-
tion may therefore be somewhat serviceable in elucidating its meaning.
96545-63-8
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On the 29th of May 1787, two propositions in relation to the matter were
presented to the convention: One by Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, "that each
branch of the legislature ought to possess the right of originating bills"; and
the other by Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, that "all money bills shall
originate in the house of delegates, and shall not be altered by the senate" (4
Elliot's Debates, pp. 41; 44; The Madison Papers, pp. 732, 787). Conceding
the term "money bills" to include those making appropriations as well as those
for raising revenue, this covered the entire scope of the privilege, with respect
to such matters, which was claimed by the English House of Commons.
? On the 31st of the same month the proposition of Mr. Randolph was agreed to
in Committee of the Whole unanimously without debate (The Madison Papers,
759), and on the 13th of June Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, seconded by Mr.
Pinckney, of South Carolina, moved to amend it by adding the words "excepting
money bills, which shall originate in the first branch of the national legislature."
The amendment was opposed by Mr. Madison, Mr. Butler, Mr. Sherman, and
General Pinckney, and was? finally voted down, three States voting for, and seven,
including Massachusetts and South Carolina, against it (4 Elliot's Debates, 69;
Madison Papers, 857-858), on the 19th of June it was reported to the House from
the Committee of the Whole, and on the 26th following it passed unanimously
(Madison Papers, 973).
The question of representation in the two branches of Congress having come
up for consideration, a conimittee consisting of one member from each State was
selected by ballot on the 2d of July, with Mr. Gerry from Massachusetts at its
head, to consider the resolutions relating to that subject, and on the 5th of July
that committee reported to the convention the following propositions:
"1. That in the first branch of the legislature, each of the States now in the
Union be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description
reported in the seventh resolution of the Committee of the Whole House; that for
each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member; that all bills
for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of
the Government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the
legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that
no money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury but in pursuance of appro-
priations to be originated by the first branch.
"2. That, in the second branch of the legislature, each State shall have an equal
vote" (Madison Papers, 1024).
This report gave rise, it seems, to considerable discussion, and finally, on the
question as to whether the clause relating to money bills should stand as part
of the report, the vote stood five States in the affirmative, three in the negative
and three divided (ibid. 1045). The first part of the proposition had been pre-
viously referred to a select committee.
On the 16th of July that committee submitted a report embodying the whole
subject of representation and money bills, fixing the number of Representatives,
providing that representation ought to be proportioned to direct taxation, giving
each State an equal representation in the Senate, and containing the following
provision:
"That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries
of the officers of the Government of the United States, shall originate in the
first branch of the legislature of the United States, and shall not be altered or
amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the
Public Treasury but in pursuance or appropriations to be originated by the first
branch."
Which was agreed to as a whole, five States voting in the affirmative, four in
the negative, and one divided (ibid., 1107).
On the 26th of July all the propositions previously adopted were referred to
the committee on detail, which, on the 6th of August, reported a draft of a con-
stitution in which the resolution just quoted appeared as section 5, article 5
(ibid., 1228) ; which, on motion of Mr. Pinckney, was striken out on the 8th by
a vote of seven States against four (ibid., 1268). This vote was reconsidered,
however, on motion of Mr. Randolph, who, on the 13th of August, moved to
amend the clause so that it would read:
"Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue, and for appropriating the
same, shall originate in the House of Representatives; and shall not be so
amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be
raised or change the mode of levying it, or the object of its appropriation" (ibid.,
1305-1306).
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? It will be observed that this was in exact accordance with the practice in the
English Parliament, and covered the entire ground a privilege in that regard
which was claimed by the House of Commons. The question on this proposition
being divided, the vote stood on the exclusive origination of money bills in the
House, ayes 4, noes, 7; and on excluding the Senate from the right to alter or
amend, ayes 4, noes 7; and on the exclusive origination of appropriation bills in
the House, ayes 1, noes 10 (ibid., 1316).
On the 15th day of August Mr. Strong moved to amend section 12 article 6,
so as to read:
"Each House shall possess the right of originating all bills except bills for rais-
ing money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same, and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government, which shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amend-
ments as in other cases."
The consideration of that article was, however, postponed, and on the 5th of
September the committee reported a substitute for the section in the following
words:
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,
and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate; no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
law."
The proposition was taken up on the eighth, and the first member of the clause,
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,"
was agreed to by a vote of nine ayes and two noes. It was then moved to strike
out the second branch, and insert the words used in the constitution of Massa-
chusetts, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other
bills," which was agreed to nemine contradicente, and the provision as thus
amended became the first clause of the seventh section of the first article of the
Constitution as it now stands, while the last clause, "no money shall be drawn
from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law," was
transferred to the ninth section of the same article. (The Madison Papers, 1330,
1494, 1530.)
From this brief summary it will be seen that the proposition was more than
once presented to the convention to vest in the House of Representatives the
exclusive privilege of originating "all money bills" co nonaine, which was as
often rejected. It would seem obvious, therefore, that the framers of the Con-
stitution did not intend that the expression "bills for raising revenue," as em-
ployed by them, should be taken as the equivalent of that term as it was under-
stood in English parliamentary practice; for, if they had so intended, they would
surely have used that term itself, which had already received a fixed and definite
signification from long and familiar usage, instead of the one they chose to
employ.
But it may be said that they declined to use the term "money bill" because, as?
was argued by some in the convention, it was an indefinite expression, which
might give rise to doubt, discussion, and difficulty, especially as to whether it
was sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the appropriation as well as the raising
of revenue. This, however, would place the matter in no clearer light, for, as
has been shown, the proposition was made in the plainest and most unequivocal
language to confer upon the House of Representatives the exclusive privilege of
originating all bills for appropriating money, which was also rejected.
Nor will it do to say that this was done under any misapprehension or from
any want of proper deliberation. No provision in the entire Constitution was
more elaborately discussed or more carefully considered. The policy of investing
the House of Representatives with the exclusive privileges exercised by the
English House of Commons in relation to "money bills" was persistently and ably
urged by such distinguished and patriotic statesmen as George Mason, Elbridge
Gerry, and Benjamin Franklin; and the impropriety of making any discrimina-
tion whatever between the two Houses as to their power to originate any bills
was as forcibly presented by Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Oliver Ellsworth,
James Wilson, and Roger Sherman. To say that the illustrious men who com-
posed the Federal Convention were incapable of declaring in clear and unmis-
takable language that the House of Representatives should have the sole right
to originate appropriation bills, if such had been their intention, would be an
insult to their intelligence, which, in view of the precise and perspicuous terms
used in the resolution reported by Mr. Gerry, the substitute offered by Mr. Ran-
dolph, and the amendment proposed by Mr. Strong, could only stultify the person
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who might hazard such an insinuation; and it would be no less an imputation
upon their integrity and candor, as well as a gross abuse of construction, to
suppose that they intended to be understood as meaning precisely what they
repeatedly refused to say in plain words, especially when such a meaning cannot
be inferred by any possibility from the language they actually employed, if that
language is taken according to its natural and ordinary import.
It is true that in 1856 Mr. Seward, Mr. Sumner. and Mr. Wilson opposed the
origination of certain general appropriation bills by the Senate, upon the
grounds that although the exercise of such a power was within the letter it
would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and a departure from usage;
but in the judgment of your committee neither of those positions was tenable.
That it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to withhold
the power of originating such bills from the Senate, they think has already been
shown both from the language used in that instrument and the circumstances
under which that language was employed; and surely if the Senate was ever
invested with that power by the Constitution, it cannot be said to have lost it by
nonuse. Fortunately for us, that is not the way in which our constitutional
provisions are changed, nor can they be altered by mere parliamentary practice.
They must remain in the plain words in which they are written until amended
by the concurrent votes of two-thirds of each branch of Congress and the legisla-
tures of three-fourths of all the States in the Union, and while they remain they
must be construed according to the simple and well settled rules of interpreta-
tion applicable to all other written language.
It is true, moreover, that the general appropriation bills whi& originated in
the Senate in 1856 were laid on the table by the House; but that circumstance
proves nothing to the purpose of this inquiry, for it will be seen by reference
to the recorded history of that transaction that the reason assigned for that
disposition of them was not that the Senate had no constituional right to
originate them, but the fact that similar bills had already passed the House and
been concurred in by the other branch of Congress. On the contrary, if the
mere practice of the two Houses or of either of them can be said to affect in any
way a clear constitutional principle, instances in which the House has passed,
without objection, appropriation bills which have originated in the Senate,
might be adduced in sufficient numbers to fill a volume.
With the policy of such a profyision your committee has nothing to do. That
was a matter to be considered and determined by the convention which framed
the Constitution and the States which ratified it. And whether they acted wisely
or unwisely in that regard cannot alter the fact that there is nothing in the
language of the Constitution to indicate an intention on their part to withhold
from the Senate the power to originate bills for the appropriation of money,
or that they repeatedly rejected a proposition to confine that privilege to the
House of Representatives, although presented in the most emphatic and unequiv-
ocal terms. Believing, therefore, from the plain letter of the Constitution, as
well as from all the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the provision in
question, that the Senate had the clear right to originate the bill, they report it
back to the House, with the recommendation that it be referred to the Committee
on Appropriations, and that following resolution be adopted:
Re8olived, That the .Senate had the constitutional power to originate the bill
referred, and that the power to originate bills appropriating money from the
Treasury of the United States is not exclusive in the House of Representatives.
VIEWS OF THE MINORITY
The minority of the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred
Senate bill 1157, present the following views:
The question presented by the reference of these bills to this committee is,
Has the Senate the right to originate bills appropriating money from the Treas-
ury of the United States? It is conceded that all bills may originate in the
Senate as well as in the House, except the bills referred to in section 7 of article
1 of the Constitution, which provides that "All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives."
The decision of the question above stated depends, therefore, upon the deter-
mination a the further one. "Are bills appropriating money bills for raising
revenue?" For, manifestly, if they be, they can originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives only. We shall, therefore, address ourselves at once to the con-
sideration of this question, and endeavor to establish that bills appropriating
public money are bills for raising revenue.
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105
First. This appears from the original and approved meaning of the term
"revenue." At the beginning, it is well to understand the precise signification of
the terms we shall employ in this discussion. An appropriation bill is one
which sets aside for spocific public use money which has been collected by the
authority of the Government. A bill raising revenue is one which makes or
creates revenue. Revenue is the annual income of a State, derived from taxation,
customs, excises, and other sources, and appropriated to the payment of the
national expenses.
This definition is approved by many of the best authorities, and is not incon-
sistent with that given by any.
? Webster defines "revenue" to be "the annual produce of taxes which a nation
or state collects and receives into the treasury for public use."
The mere collection and receiving into the public treasury, by this definition,
are not sufficient, but it must be such collection and receiving as are for the
public use. It is, therefore, that money only, collected and received into the
treasury, which bias been made available for the public use which constitutes
the revenue for the State; for unless the public can use it, it is not revenue.
Worcester defines "revenue" to be "The income of a nation or States derived
from duties, taxes, and other sources, for the payment of the national expenses."
The same criticism which has been made upon the definition of Webster may be
made here, but what is more significant in determining the sense intended here
to be given to the word is found in the reference in Worcester to Brande's
Dictionary of Science and Art as authority, than which there is none higher in
the language.
Brande defines "revenue" to be "the name given to the incomes of a State de-
rived from the customs, excises, taxation, and other sources, and appropriated to
the payment of the national expenses."
Brande's Dictionary, volume 8, page 269.
This definition is approved in the Imperial Dictionary, the present standard
dictionary of Great Britain, in the following words: "Revenue is the annual
income of a State, derived from the taxation, customs, excises, and other sources,
and appropriated to the payment of the national expenses."
Nor could any other definition have been given by those who had considered the
sources of the royal revenue in English history. The revenue of the Crown
of England is ordinary and extraordinary; the former is attached to the Crown
by hereditary right; the latter is specially granted by Parliament as a supply for
national purposes. (Chambers, vol. 8, 222.) As the ordinary revenues became
less and less valuable in progress of time, those extraordinary were raised to
take their place and provide for the necessary expenses of the Government. The
following references will show that this revenue was the supply or subsidy voted
or granted by the Commons to the King:
Chambers, volume 8, 222.
Constance on Constitution, 168.
May, volume 1, 193.
Blackstone, revised edition, volume 1, page 274.
Millar's English Government, page 27.
Money, therefore, to be revenue to the King, must have been granted to him.
It is true, for many years he had the privilege of spending it as he pleased, but
he could not spend it until it had been granted. The levying of the tax, the col-
lection of the taxes, was not sufficient to make it royal revenue; these were
merely the preliminary steps. The essential act to constitute it revenue was the
grant, without which not one dollar could have been used for the national ex-
penses. As will be seen hereafter, the appropriation grew to be an -essential
part of the grant, so that at the time of the establishment of our Constitution
there could have been no revenue in England for the Crown which had not been
appropriated for the national expenses by the House of Commons. The term
"revenue" in the Constitution must have been used in its universally accepted
sense, and therefore, in section 7 of article 1, bills raising revenue must include
bills appropriating money to the use of Government as well as bills providing
for levying and collecting taxes.
Second. The proceedings in the constitutional convention show very clearly
that the term "revenue" was intended to be used in its ordinary sense of appro-
priating as well as collecting money for uses of the Government.
The first provision on this subject in that convention appeared in the plan of
Mr. Charles Pinckney as follows:
"All money bills of every kind shall originate in the House of Delegates, and
shall not be altered by the Senate." (Madison's Papers, p. 129.)
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After debate had proceeded for some time in convention, it was found that
great differences of opinion had arisen, which it was proposed to refer to a
committee of compromise. The committee was appointed, with Mr. Gerry as
chairman, who reported a recommendation to the convention which, upon this
point, contained the following provisions:
"All bills for raising or appropriating money * * * shall originate in the first
branch of the legislature, and shall not ?be altered or amended in the second
branch." (Madison's Papers, p. 274.)
The report was in substance adopted in convention, and provided that?
"All bills for raising or appropriating money shall originate in the first branch
of the legislature, and shall not be altered or amended in the Senate." (Madison,
p. 316.)
In the same phrase it was referred to the committee On detail (Madison, p.
375), who reported it back to the convention in the following form:
"Sec. 5, art. 4. All bills for raising or appropriating money * * * shall origi-
nate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended in
the Senate."
Upon first consideration this section was stricken out by a vote of 7 States tu 4.
Afterward it was reconsidered, and Mr. Randolph moved to amend so that
it would read:
"Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the
same shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be amended
or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised or change
the mode of levying it or the object of its appropriation." (Madison, p. 414.)
A further amendment was proposed by Mr. Strong. (P. 427.)
"Each House shall possess the right of originating all bills except bills for
raising money for the purpose of revenue and appropriating the same, which
shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as in other cases."
The committee of eleven reported the final draft as follows:
"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the Ho'use of Representatives
and shall be subject to alteration and amendment by the Senate."
This was at last adopted with an amendment striking out the last clause and
inserting "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as in other
bills."
The committee of eleven, in considering and reporting the clause in its present
form had before them all the propositions which had been submitted to the con-
vention. These were "all money bills of every kind," "all bills for raising or
appropriating money," and "all bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue
and appropriating the same." For all of them they substituted the phrase "all
bills for raising revenue." What did they intend by this change? Certainly they
intended more than merely raising money, for with that phrase in so many
propositions before them they could have easily adopted it if nothing more had
been meant. What then, more than merely raising money, was intended? Mani-
festly as much more more than that as may be included in the meaning of the
word "revenue."
Only two theories can be maintained as to the action of the convention on this
subject, either that they excluded from the power of origination by the House
bills appropriating money, or that they included them in the term "bills for
raising revenue." Every proposition upon the subject, in the early days of
the convention, provided that bills appropriating money should be originated
in the House; the bills named in the proposition were called money bills generi-
cally in the debates before the committee made their report; the bills provided
for in the report of the committee were called money bills in the convention after
the report had been made, clearly implying that in substance the report as made
was intended to include the same propositions upon this point which had been so
often before the convention and so frequently discussed. If the report had been
intended to provide only that the House should originate bills for raising money,
would it not have been easy to have said so? If the power of appropriating
money which has always been so indispensable a part of money bills had been in-
tended to be omitted, would the "bills for raising revenue" have been called
money bills in the subsequent debates, and would not the omission have naturally
occasioned some criticism and opposition in the convention on the part of those
who so strenuously insisted, as Dr. Franklin put it, "that it was important that
the people should know who had disposed of their money and how it had been
disposed of."
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The evident desire of the promoters of this proposition to have the House of
Representatives originate money bills, as did the House of Commons; the per-
sistent application of the term "money bills" to the bills referred to, both before
and after the provision was adopted in its present form; the fact that every
proposition included the idea of appropriating money; the silence on the part
of the advocates of the proposition as to the clause as finally reported, which is
inexplicable if the most important power in the origination of money bills, to
wit, bills appropriating money, were to be excluded; the use of a new phrase,
which means more than bills for raising money, all make it clear that when the
phrase "bills for raising revenue" was employed it was intended to express the
thought which was included in the words "money bills," which was set forth in
every proposition presented to the convention, and which is included in the
word "revenue," viz, that bills appropriating money shall originate in the House
as well as those which provide for its collection and receipt into the Treasury.
Right at this point we desire to say a few words as to the recent remarkable
decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
Under the constitution of that State, a question was submitted to that court
for decision, substantially as follows: "Whether a bill appropriating money
from the public treasury, and not providing for the levying of such money on
the people by tax or otherwise, is a money bill which must originate in the house
of representatives, under the provisions of the State constitution, which declare
that? "All money bills shall originate in the house of representatives; but the
senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills."
The court decided that "the power to originate a bill appropriating money from
the Public Treasury is not limited by the constitution to the House of Repre-
sentatives; but resides in both branches of the legislature." In other words, the
court held that a bill appropriating money was not a "money bill."
This decision rests upon two propositions, which we will state in the words of
the court:
"The right asserted by the House of Commons in the resolution of 1678. to
which we will hereafter refer, is that a granting aid and supplies to the King,
and originating bills for such grants, and of specifying in such bills the object to
which and the modes in which the money granted by these bills shall be applied.
But nothing is there said as to the right of the Lords, when money has once been
granted by the Commons without specific appropriation, to originate or amend
a bill appropriating it to particular uses or purposes."
This proposition proceeds upon a total misapprehension of the power of appro-
priation as exercised in the British Parliament. Prior to the reign of Charles II,
grants to the King were seldom accompanied by specific directions as to the
method of expenditure. During that reign the Commons insisted that the money
granted should be used for a particular purpose, and provided in express terms
that it should not be used for any other purpose. In Tod's "Parliamentary Gov-
ernment" ( vol. 1,526), it is said:
"The constitutional rule that the sums granted and appropriated by the Com-
mons for any special service should be applied by the executive power only to
defray the expense of that service, although not wholly unrecognizable in earlier
times, was first distinctly enunciated and partially enforced after the restoration.
But it was not until the resolution of 1678 that this great principle was firmly
established and incorporated into the system of parliamentary government."
The office of the appropriation clause, as it is termed in the English system,
was to prevent supplies from being directed from the objects for which they were
granted. This clause was annexed to the supply bill, usually at the end of the
session of Parliament. The procedure was as follows: The rate of expenditure,
or the ways and means, were first fixed in the tax bills; the money thus -raised
was granted for particular purposes in the supplying bill. After all the grants
had been made, a bill enumerating them and the purposes for which they had
been voted was proposed, with a clause as follows:
"That the said aids and supplies shall not be issued or applied to any use,
intent, or purpose other than those before mentioned."
This bill was the appropriation bill. From this it is clear that an appropriation
bill is a part of the supply bill, an incident to the grant to the King. It could
not, therefore, from the very nature of the case, originate anywhere else than in
the House of Commons, where only the grants themselves could originate. Of
course, there was nothing said as to the right of the Lords, when money has been
once granted by the Commons without specific appropriation, to originate or
amend a bill appropriating it to particular uses or purposes; and for the mani-
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fest reason that the appropriation was part of the grant, and there would have
been as much sense in saying that the House of Lords could originate the one as
the other.
Another statement, as remarkable as the one just considered, is made further
on in the opinion:
"The result of the review of this branch of the subject is that it cannot be con-
sidered to have been settled in England before 1780, when the constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts was adopted, that the appropriation to particu-
lar objects of moneys in the? treasury or exchequer of the sovereign belonged
exclusively to the House of Commons, and that bills for such appropriation
must originate in the House."
From what has already been said, it must appear that as soon as it was settled
that there should be bills of appropriation it was also settled that they must
originate in the House of Commons. This principle of appropriation was, as
already stated, incorporated into the English Constitution during the reign of
Charles II. It was asserted in 1678 in the following resolution of the Commons:
"That all aids and supplies, and aids to His .Majesty in Parliament, are the
sole gift of the Commons, and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the
Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such bill the ends, purposes, considera-
tions, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not
to be changed or altered by the House of Lords" (Cox, British Cons., 104).
On this subject May says, in volume 2, 469, of his "Parliamentary History";
"For centuries they [the Commons] had resented any meddling of the other
House with matters of supplies, and in the reign of Charles' II they successfully
maintained their exclusive right to determine as to the matter, the measure, and
the time of every tax imposed upon the people. In the same reign they began
to scrutinize the public expenditure, and introduced the salutary practice of
appropriating their grants to particular purposes." Mark the words, "they
appropriated their grants."
In Hearn, British Government, 343, it is said:
"From that time (Dutch war of 1665) the appropriation of parliamentary
supplies became an undisputed principle. It was reognized by frequent though
not uniform practice during the reign of Charles and of James, and from the
time of the Revolution has been invariable."
It is useless to cite further authority. The writers all concur in the state-
ments upon this point, which show that it was settled in England for more than
a century before 1780, when the constitution of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts was adopted, that the public moneys should be appropriated to particu-
lar objects, and that bills making such appropriations should originate in the
House of Commons.
Tod, in his work above referred to, volume 1, page 525, says, "Money bills are
of three kinds, tax bills, bills of supply, and bills of appropriation."
We accept the definition of money bills given by this philosophical writer,
whose work from which it is taken is one of the ablest and most exhaustive
treatises on English parliamentary government ever written, rather than the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, based as it is upon gross errors
as to the nature of English appropriation bills, and as to one of the most patent
facts of English history.
Third. The speeches in the conventions of the different States called for the
consideration of the Constitution, the writings of the friends of that instrument
published for the purpose of securing its adoption, the expressions of members
of the Constitutional Convention, and the opinions of the ablest commentators
upon the Constitution, all show that the phrase "bills for raising revenue" was
the equivalent of "money bills," which in the English Government at the time Of
the framing of our Constitution included bills of appropriation.
In Massachusetts, Mr. Parsons said:
"Under the Constitution, an equal representation immediately from the people
is introduced, who, by their negative and the exclusive right of originating money
bills, have the power to control the Senate, where the sovereignty of the States
is represented." (3 Elliott's Debates, p. 108.)
Pennsylvania (3 Elliott's Reports, 418), Mr. Wilson said:
"Money bill must originate in the House of Representatives."
In North Carolina (4 Elliott, 144) , Mr. Iredell said:
"Yet, under these disadvantages, they (the Commons) having the sole power
of originating bills, it has been found that the power of the kings and lords is
much less considerable than theirs. * * * If, under such circumstances, such
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109
representatives, mere shadows of representatives, by having the power of the
purse and the sacred name of the people to rely upon, are an overmatch for the
king and lords, who have such great hereditary qualifications, we ,may safely
conclude that our own representatives, who will be genuine representatives of
the people, and having equally the right of originating money bills, will at least
be a match for the Senate, possessing qualifications so inferior to those of the
House of Lords in England."
Mr. Madison said, in the First Congress:
"The Constitution places the power in the House of originating money bilis."
Mr. Hamilton says, in the 58th number of the Federalist:
"The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose,
the supplies requisite for the support of the Government. They, in a word, hold
the purse, that powerful instrument by which we behold in the history of the
British constitution an infant and humble representative of the people, gradually
enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far
as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches
of the Government. This power over the purse may in fact be regarded as the
most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
? immediate representatives of the people for obtaining a redress of every grievance
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."
In Tucker's Appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries, volume 1, page 215:
"The exclusive privileges of the House of Commons and of our House of Rep-
resentatives with some small variations, are the same. The first, relating to
money bills, in which no amendment is permitted to be made in the House of
Lords, is modified in our Constitution so as to give the Senate a concurrent right
in every respect except in the power of originating them."
In Wilson's Works (vol. 1, p. 445), it is said:
"By the Constitution of the United States, money bills originate in the House
of Representatives."
It would be a waste of time to cite further quotations. It is sufficient to say
that almost without exception every person who has discussed this subject in
Congress, and every commentator upon the Constitution, speaks of bills for rais-
ing revenue as "money bills." In addition to what has already been said as to
the meaning of the latter phrase, we will here cite the definition of Cushing in
his work on Parliamentary Law, section 2369:
"Money bills are those which grant a supply or make an appropriation."
An extract on this point from the inaugural address of President Washington
will not be inappropriate:
"To the preceding observations I have one to add which will be most properly
addressed to the House of Representatives. It concerns myself, and will, there-
fore, be as brief as possible. When I was first honored with a call into the service
of my country, then on the eve of an arduous struggle for its liberties, the
light in which I contemplated my duty required that I should renounce every
pecuniary compensation. From this resolution I have in no instance departed,
and, being still under the impression which produced it, I must decline, as
inapplicable to myself, any share in the personal emoluments which may indis-
pensably be included in a permanent provision of the executive department, and
must, accordingly, pray that the pecuniary estimates for the station in which
I am placed may, during my continuance in it, be limited to such actual expendi-
ture as the public good may be thought to require."
What significance was there in his addressing this part of his message to
the House of Representatives, relating, as it did, to matters of appropriations,
if it had not been his opinion that the House had the power of originating
appropriation bills? And does it not signify that such was the current opinion
of that time?
Fourth. From the time of the 1st Congress, appropriation bills have, with
few exceptions, originated in the House. These exceptions are unimportant,
either in number or amount, and on that account the House, without objection,
has permitted the bills included in such exceptions, which have originated in the
Senate, to become laws. They are not of sufficient consequence to be regarded
as precedents to establish the right in the Senate to originate such bills when
confronted with the unvarying usage that all general appropriation bills have
originated in the lower branch of Congress. On one occasion, in 1857, the
Senate did originate a general bill of appropriation which it sent to the House,
but the later body entirely ignored it, and originated, as usual, its own bill.
With this exception, the Senate has uniformly awaited the action of the House in
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originating bills of appropriation and confined itself as in other bills of revenue
to the proposing of amendments to them.
The first appropriation bill provided in its opening section the sources from
which the money should be drawn, and afterward directed the purposes to which
it should be applied. In one of the first bills for the imposition of duties, it was
provided that out of the proceeds a sum of $600,000 should be set aside annually
for the public expenditure, and in almost every general appropriation bill until
1813 it was declared that out of that $600,000 the sums set aside for particular
purposes should be paid. These enactments were in manifest analogy to similar
legislation in the British Parliament and show plainly that the early opinion was
universal that the House of Representatives possessed the same power over
money bills which belonged to the House of Commons.
Fifth. The Constitution itself, in conferring the power of appropriation and
in providing the method of its exercise, confirms the position here maintained.
The power of raising money and of appropriating money is conferred in the
same phrase. Section 8, article 1, provides that?
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excise to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States."
The first part of the sentence confers the power of raising money, the second
the power of appropriating it. They are inseparably connected. The power of
appropriation seems to be a part of the first power, granted to complete and
perfect it. Whatever therefore affects the one must affect the other. What-
ever limitations are put upon the first must extend to the second, because the
second only exists as incidental to the first. The taxes are levied to pay the
debts of the United States. The money is raised to be appropriated to the
public use. As this provision relates to the raising of the revenue, it authorizes
the enactment of all proper laws upon the subject. As part of the bills for which
it provides must originate in the House, there seems to be no reason that other
bills authorized by its provisions relating to the same subject, kindred in nature
and necessary to the complete execution of the powers conferred, should not
likewise originate in that body.
President Monroe, in his message respecting the bill for the repairs of the
Cumberland Road (May 4, 1822), in speaking of this section, said:
"That the second part of this grant gives a right to appropriate the public
money, and nothing more, is evident from the following considerations:
"1. If the right of appropriation is not given by this clause it is not given at
all, there being no other grant in the Constitution which gives it directly, or
which has any bearing upon the subject, even by implication, except the two
following."
Which we will hereafter consider.
"2. This part of the grant has none of the characteristics of a distinct and
original power. It is manifestly incidental to the great objects of the first
grant, which authorizes Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises. * * * Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, im-
posts, and excises for what purpose? To pay the debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States. An arrangement and
phraseology which clearly show that the latter part of the clause was intended
to enumerate the purposes to which the money thus raised might be
appropriated."
Further on President Monroe says:
"The right of appropriation is therefore from its nature secondary, and inci-
dental to the right of raising money, and it was proper to place it in the same
grant and same clause with that right."
And still later he says:
"If we look to the second branch of this power, that which authorizes the ap-
propriation of money thus raised, we find that it is not less general and un-
qualified than the power to raise it. More comprehensive terms than to 'pay
the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare' could not
have been used. So intimately connected with and dependent on each other are
these two branches of power that, had either been limited, the limitation would
have had a like effect on the other. Had the power to raise money been condi-
tional or restricted to special purposes, the appropriation must have corre-
sponded with it."
Upon this point it is unnecessary to say more. The power to raise money, it
is conceded, is limited and conditioned to this extent, that bills raising it must
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111
originate in the House; the bill appropriating money, it results from the opinion
of this great authority, must correspond with it.
In passing, we desire to call attention to the two provisions of the Constitution
in which appropriations are expressly mentioned.
In section 8 of article 1 it is provided that "no appropriation of money to that
use"?the Army?"shall be for a longer term than two years." Section 9 of
article 1:
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appro-
priations made by law."
The only remark we desire to make as to these provisions in this discussion
is that if the word "revenue" in section 7 of that article has the restricted sense
which is claimed for it in the report of the subcommittee, it would have made
the phraseology of the Constitution more consistent with itself to have said in
these sections: "No appropriation of revenue shall be made to that use," and
"no revenue shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appro-
priations made by law."
Lastly. The consequences from the adoption of the view of the subcommittee
would be destructive of the objects sought to be accomplished by the section
under consideration. The purpose of this provision was to give the immediate
representatives of the people the control of the purse. That power is of little
consequence if it can be exercised only to put money into the Treasury. The
control of the expenditure is of, by far, the greater importance. To give to
the House the power of raising money and to the Senate the power of expend-
ing it would be to control the grants of the former through the debts of the latter.
To give to the House the power to originate bills to raise money, and the Senate
the power to originate bills to spend it would be, in like manner, to permit the
latter to govern the discretion of the former as to the origination of tax bills. It
may be said that Senate bills appropriating money could not become laws with-
out the consent of the House, so that no appropriation could be made without the
permission of the latter. But the reply is that it is the power of originating bills
which was thought to be of such value in this connection. This power of origi-
nating bills for raising money can accomplish but little if the discretion of the
body invested with it can be affected by the originating power of another body
a-s will certainly be the case if the Senate can originate appropriation bills, as
has been claimed.
Again, it must be remembered that a bill levying taxes or imposing duties for
raising money is passed only once in every 10 or 15 years. Few amendments
are made to it afterward, until a new system is adopted. To confine the power
of origination to such bills would be to deprive the Representatives for the
greater part of the time of any control of the purse under this section, for after
the tax bills have been passed and the money from them has been gathered
annually into the Treasury, the Senate, under the views of the subcommittee,
would have equal power with the House over the money collected.
When we remember the practices as to money bills in the English Parliament,
and the purposes of the framers of the Government in adopting this principle,
we cannot believe that they intended to grant to the House such an idle and
barren power as that would be of originating bills to raise money without power
of originating bills to expend it.
There were several reasons combining to secure the adoption of this provision
in the Constitution. Some desired it because it gave to the people the control
of the purse, some because it would operate as a restriction upon the Senate,
but he most, chiefly because the proviso was part of a compromise made be-
tween the great and small States. The Senate was composed of representatives
from the States which stood equally in that body. It confirmed appointments,
and, with the President, made treaties. To satisfy the larger States, which ob-
jected that the smaller States should be equal with them in so important a body,
this section was adopted to give to the representatives of the people, who were
chosen according to a basis of population, the power over the revenue. Without
this provision is it improbable that the Constitution would have ever been
adopted. It was the compromise of which it is a part that made the adoption of
that instrument possible. We think it is one of the highest duties of the House
to maintain this compromise in its fullest meaning, and even if it were doubtful
whether the House possessed the power to originate appropriation bills, we think
the doubt should be resolved, at least by this House, in favor of its possession
of the power.
We think with Mr. White who, in the first Congress, said: "The Constitution
having authorized the House of Representatives to originate money bills places
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an important trust in our hands which, as their protectors, we ought not to
part with."
We therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the seventh section of article 1 of the Constitution, which
provides that 'All bills for raising revenue shall originite in the House of Repre-
sentatives,' confers exclusive power upon the House to originate bills appropriat-
ing money from the public treasury.
"Resolved, That the Senate bill which has been referred to this committee
be returned to the Senate of the United States with a copy of these resolutions."
FRANK H. Huan.
JOHN F. HOUSE.
JOHN W. RYON.
E. G. LAPHAM.
CHARLES G. WILLIAMS.
EXHIBIT 2
[Extract from volume I, "History of the Celebration of the One-Hundredth Anniversary
of the promulgation of the Constitution of the United States" (pp. 101-105)])
HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF THE CAUSES WHICH
LED TO ITS ADOPTION
(By John A. Kasson)
THE LEGISLATIVE RIGHT TO, ORIGINATE MONEY BILLS
In the scheme of government, as originally approved in the.Committee of
the Whole, equal power to originate legislation was given to the two Houses
of Congress by unanimous consent. While the Virginia resolutions were under
consideration on the last day in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. Gerry moved
to insert, "except money bills, which shall originate in the first branch of the
National Legislature." Mr. Butler saw no reason for it: "We were always
following the British Constitution, when the reason of it did not apply. There
was no analogy between the House of Lords and the body now proposed to be
established." Mr. Madison said, "The Senate would be the representation of
the people, as well as the first branch." Mr. Sherman observed, "We establish
two branches in order to get .more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the
finance business. The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the
representatives of the people." General Pinckney said, "This distinction prevails
in South Carolina, and has been a source of pernicious disputes between the
two branches." The motion was then defeated by all the States except New
York, Delaware, and Virginia, and both Houses retained equal rights in all
legislation.
When the long and exasperating debate occurred upon equality of State
representation in the two Houses, it was urged on the part of the great States
that questions of revenue ought to be determined by a proportional representa-
tion. Otherwise, a minority of population, represented by a majority of States,
might, contrary to all correct principles, impose burdens on the majority of
both Wealth and population. This palpable injustice led to an offer on the side
of the small States that "all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government of the United States, shall
originate in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or
amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the
Public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the
first branch." This offer was conditioned upon the acceptance of an equal vote
in the Senate. A committee, of which Mr. Gerry was chairman, so reported the
plan on July 5.
Mr. Madison regarded this as no valuable concession to the great States.
"Experience proved that it had no effect. If some States in the upper branch
wished a bill to be originated, they surely might find some Member from the
same States in the lower branch who would originate it." As for amendments,
they "could be handed privately by the Senate to Members of the other House.
Bills could be negatived, that they might be sent up in the desired shape."
Governeur Morris and others warmly opposed the plan. Mr. Wilson shrewdly
remarked, "If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence
which should say yes or no first, which last." It would be better to reverse
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113
the order, for "it was a maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for
deliberation?the most numerous for decision." The question was taken on this
clause; and for it voted Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and
North Carolina (live). Against it were Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina
(three), with Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia divided. Although only
5 States out of 11 voted for it, under their rules it stood as affirmed. But it was
well understood that it was still an open question.
On the 16th of July, after references of the compromise to special committees
and much debate, the question was taken on the compromise as a whole, includ-
ing the equal vote in the Senate, the proportional vote in the House, and the
clause in question; and it was carried by the same five States in the affirmative
against the same three States and Georgia in the negative, with Massachusetts
divided and New York absent. In this form it went to the Committee of Detail,
but still unsupported by a majority of the States.
Again, upon the report of this committee, it came into debate, and Mr. Pinck-
ney moved to strike out the clause, and was supported by Gouverneur Morris,
Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Madison. Mr. Mason, Mr. Butler, and Mr. Ellsworth
thought it had better stand as a compromise. Mr. Gorham was in favor of
originating the bills in the House, but giving power to the Senate to amend. The
clause was struck out by the votes of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia (seven), against New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina (four), without disturbing the
equality of States in the Senate. But Mr. Randolph gave a notice of a motion to
reconsider, and Mr. Mason, with some others, still regarded it as necessary to
adhere to the compromise, although the large States had disclaimed its supposed
value and the small States were willing to adhere if the large States desired it.
Upon the reconsideration, Mr. Randolph proposed to limit the exclusive power
to "bills for the purpose of revenue," to obviate objection to the words "raising
money," which might happen incidentally, not allowing the Senate by amendment
to either increase or diminish the same. His motion was in the following words:
"Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue, or for appropriating the
same, shall originate in the House of Representatives; and shall not be so
amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised,
or change the mode of levying it, or the object of its appropriation."
Mr. Mason renewed his arguments in its favor. Mr. Wilson again opposed it
with warmth. He said "it would be a source of perpetual contentions when
there was no mediator to decide them. The President here could not, like the
executive in England, interpose by a prorogation or dissolution. This restriction
had been found pregnant with altercation in the eight States where the consti-
tutions had established it. The House of Representatives will insert other
things in money bills, and, by making them conditions of each other, destroy
the deliberate liberty of the Senate." And he recited a remarkable case of this
misuse of power by the House of Commons. Gouverneur Morris thought its
proposed advantages illusory, because the "Senate could tire out the other House
and extort their concurrence in favorite measures as well by their negative or
withholding their assent as by adhering to a bill introduced by themselves. In
respect to the Representatives 'holding the purse strings,' both Houses must
concur in the untying; and of what importance could it be which untied first,
which last?" Mr. Madison made a full argument on the same side. Mr. Read
would follow the example of many of the States, retaining the exclusive authority
In the first House, but giving the Senate liberty to amend. Mr. Carroll said
the clause in the Maryland constitution was "a source of continual difficulty
and squabble between the two houses."
At the end of this searching debate (August 13) three votes were taken.
First, on the exclusive right in the first House to originate money bills: the
ayes were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina (4) ; the
noes were Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South
Carolina, Georgia (7). Second, on originating by the first House and amending
by the Senate: the vote was the same?noes seven, ayes four. Third, on the
question of no appropriations of money except those originating in the first
House: Massachusetts alone voted aye (1), the other 10 States voting no.
Here, for the first time, appears a very strong conviction of the Convention
that a distinction should be made between bills for raising revenue and bills for
appropriating money.
Two days later Mr. Strong, of Massachusetts, moved to insert in another place
the same clause of Mr. Randolph which had been voted down on the 13th.
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114 CREATE A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
It was thought best to postpone the question for the time and consider other
matters, which was done. Subsequently a committee of 11 was appointed to con-
sider various old and new questions of detail in the Constitution as reported,
and on the 5th of September Mr. Brearley reported from this committee, among
other clauses, the following: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives, and shall be subject to alterations and amendments
by the Senate; no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence
of appropriations made by law."
Again it was postponed on motion of Gouverneur Morris, who said it had been
"agreed in the committee on the ground of compromise," and he wished to
await the disposition of other clauses. Though opposed, this motion was car-
ried by nine States against two. On the 8th of September the long dispute was
ended. After a verbal amendment, which was made unanimously, the clause
was adopted as it now appears in the Constitution, except that the Committee
on Style, in their revision, transposed the last clause to another place. The
final vote shows its acceptance by all the States except Delaware and Maryland.
Among the published objections of George Mason, on account of which he refused
to sign the Constitution, was this, that "the Senate have the power of altering
all money bills and of originating appropriations of money."
It thus appears that by express votes the Convention refused to extend the
exclusive power of the House beyond bills for raising revenue, and by express
vote decided to leave in the Senate an equal power to originate bills making
appropriations of public money, and that only a minority of the Convention at-
tached constitutional importance to the former provision.
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