FORTHCOMING BOOK: FACING THE BRINK: AN INTIMATE STUDY OF CRISIS DIPLOMACY BY EDWARD WEINTAL AND CHARLES BARTLETT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600030030-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 6, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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6 March 19 67
MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Forthcoming Book: Facing The Brink:
An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy
by Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett
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1. This memorandum is for information only to invite your
attention to a forthcoming book entitled Facing the Brink: An Intimate
Study of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967).
It is written by two well-known journalists, Edward Weintal, diplomatic
and chief European correspondent for Newsweek and Charles Bartlett,
whose close relationship with President frainnedy is well known.
2. Facing the Brink, written with all the prescience of hind-
sight, discusses the handling of certain of the foreign crises which
faced the Kennedy-Johnson administration (with some throwbacks to the
Eisenhower administration) such as Cyprus. the Yemen ("Komer's War"),
the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam. Commentary on the government's
methods in meeting crisis situations runs throughout the book.
3. President Kennedy and his associates, of course, receive
high marks. In attempting to guess at the major sources for Facing the.
Brink, this reviewer is inclined to believe that Walt Roetow must have
been a major contributor, and it would appear that Paul Nitae also is a
source of some of the material.
4. Special attention is called to Chapter Eight entitled "--But
not the Secretary of State." This chapter is the most concentrated per-
sonal attack on Secretary Rusk which this reviewer can recall. The
authors pull together many of the adverse comments which one can
presumably hear on the cocktail circuit and evidently in the halls of
the Department itself (and State people are quoted in the book). It is
alleged that Secretary Rusk's concept of his role "is to communicate
his views only to the President and not to air or debate them with the
Cabinet or the White House staff." (p. 150). For this reason, it is
alleged that Rusk refused to sit as a member of the Excom during the
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Cuban missile crisis. It is also stated that Rusk opposed the Bay of
Pigs, "but never in strong or convincing terms." (p. 149). The general
tenor of this chapter is that Secretary Rusk has never expressed an
original idea or a convincing position on any matter, and that he has
bad no impact in making American foreign policy. The authors conclude
that "Rusk has succeeded admirably in making his tenure of office dull
and commonplace." (p. 166). Also included here is the story that
President Kennedy proposed to shift Rusk out of State in his second
term because of "the failure of the Secretary and his department to
initiate or produce foreign policy ideas, and the lethargy with which
the Secretary and the department moved ... ." (p. 153).
5. Chapter Seven ("Diplomat in Chief") deals in considerable
measure with President Johnson's handling of diplomatic and crisis
situations. The chapter includes all the usual allegations of the Presi-
dent's initial dislike for foreign affairs and mistreatment of ambassadors
and foreign dignitaries. While President Johnson comes out fairly well
n some respects, the chapter reflects Bartlett's well-known antipathy
to this Administration.
6. There are a few references to CIA in Facing the Brink.
In the first chapter, Mr. McCort* is quoted as telling President Johnson
shortly before the 1964 election that, in view of his tremendous forthcoming
majority, it would be a good time immediately after election to review all
aspects of our foreign policy. As a result, a meeting of the President's
advisory panel on foreign affairs and senior government officials in the
field was convened. The meeting was allegedly turned into a shambles
by ono of the non-government participants and "McCons'a well-meant
initiative collapsed." (pp. 1-2).
7. In Chapter Four on the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. McCone's
foresight and "honeymoon cables" draw high marks from the authors.
While the authors feel that "intelligence estimators were guilty of missing
the logic of the Soviet ploy as it unfolded." (p. 60) the Agency receives
considerable praise for its work during the crisis and "on balance the
intelligence community had many reasons to take pride in its
performance.' (p. 63).
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8. In Chapter Five on Vietnam, it is alleged that when
President Eisenhower was considering using U. S. military power at
Dienbien.phu, the most vehement protest came from Senator Johnson.
The recommendations made by Mr. McComb following his 1964 trip to
Vietnam with Secretary McNamara are noted, but when these recom-
mendations (calling for the immediate bombing of North Vietnam and
Inviting the Nationalist Chinese Army to enter the war) were in conflict
with those of McNamara, President Johnson is alleged to have ordered
them to work out their differences. As a result, "McCone, aware that
his role as intelligence adviser did not entitle him to give policy advice
to the President, said he would withdraw his recommenda
added, however, that his report on the situation in Vietna
intelligence estimate and would have to stand unchanged."
Ions. He
was an
(P. 2)?
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In this chapter, the authors also state that "Johnson distr sted covert
operations" (p. 77) and quote him (as Vice President) as laying "I
don't believe in this cloak and dagger stuff. (p. 87). In this chapter.
Roger Hilsman's role as a principal source of leaks to the press on
Vietnam is given chapter and verse; he does not emerge %fiery favorably.
Hilsman's call to Mr. Helms in regard to the famous 24 August 1963
cable of instructions to Ambassador Lodge is also mentioned with the
comment that neither Mr. Gilpatric nor Mr. Helms was in the position
to question it, because Hilsman stressed that the inetructions had
already been approved by the President. (Actually, it is Our recol-
lection that the call came from Governor Harriman, not Hilsman).
9. In Chapter Nine, which deals in the main w1th the role
of Under Secretary Ball, it is stated that the State Departneut still
regards CIA as its rival, and that after President Kennedfrs order
giving primacy to the ambassador at each post, "CIA Chi f IvicCone had
to travel around the world to direct his 'station chiefs' to Icomply with
the order." (p. 176). This is, of course, a considerable exaggeration,
presumably from State sources.
10. This authors allege that, in 1958. President Eisenhower
ruled against the policy of a preemptive missile strike be ause "no
intelligence was sufficiently foolproof to avoid mistaken 14t.rpr.tations
of enemy intentions." (p. 209). President Kennedy also 4dopted the
same positions on the basis that no President could "ever be certain
that his intelligence estimates were accurate. (p. 210).
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11. Facing the Brink is well written in journalistic prose.
Th?CAUSIO the press normally accepts the work of its fellow members
as "highly competent" and "authoritative, " this controversial volume
stands a good chance of receiving considerable publicity and probably
will get good marks from many reviewers because of its "candor."
However, because it is so controversial, reviewers may tend to
choose up aides, depending on whose friend is praised or attacked
in its pages.
Walter Pforsheirner
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection
Distribution:
Orig & I - Addressee wibook
1 - DDCI
1- Ex. Dir
1 - Asst. to Dir. (Mr. Goodwin)
1 - DCl/N1PE (Mr. Bross)
1 - OGC
1 - 1G
1 - DDP
1 - DD1
1 - DDS
1 - D/OC1
1 - DiSec (
1 - Cl Staff
1- CA Staff
2 - HIC
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