NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Foreign
Intelligence Board
24 September 1987
Toa~ret
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Background and Issues that May Arise
The proposal to revise the 1981 guidelines for interagency
intelligence production (1981 version is at Backup Tab #1) surfaced
while shaping our response to NSDD 266 on objectivity and integrity
(your response to the NSC is at Backup Tab #2). At the 1 June 1987
NFIB meeting you chaired, it was noted that some members had
suggested revisions to the guidelines, as one means of addressing
the objectivity and integrity of the process, while potentially
enhancing the quality and relevancy of the product. It was agreed
at that meeting that we would undertake the project.
The Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council met with Community
representatives on 16 June to discuss the earlier suggestions for
revisions and to receive additional contributions they had for new
guidelines. The thrust of these was the need for brevity,
simplicity, clarity, and flexibility in outlining the key elements
of the process. While expressing general satisfaction with the
current process, particular emphasis was placed on the need to
reduce the number and length of estimates produced.
A draft revision was prepared for review internally by the National
Intelligence Officers. It took account of the revisions to your
role outlined in your response to NSDD 266, made in the interest of
assuring independence of the process and fostering NFIB discussion
We continued to make minor adjustments to assure that the draft
would be consistent with other elements of your response to the
NSDD, and to accommodate evolving procedures for our interaction
with you and for your review of the product at various stages. The
special role of the Senior Review Panel as advisory body to the DCI
was taken into consideration and protected.
The NFIB Principals were sent a draft revision of the guidelines on
5 August for comment. The cover letter (at Backup Tab #3)
summarized the distinguishing features of the new guidelines and
requested comments and suggestions for changes before the
guidelines were placed on the NFIB agenda. The only suggestions
for changes came from Treasury, State, and the DIA. All other
organizations concurred in the draft, with laudatory comments on
brevity and clarity. The Treasury and State comments were
incorporated into the final revised draft.
The DIA suggestions were inappropriate for incorporation into the
guidelines because of their level of detail or because they dealt
with issues best handled in other ways. It is possible that the
Director, DIA could raise these issues at the NFIB, but we believe
the rationale for declining their suggested changes is adequately
explained in the exchange of correspondence between the Deputy
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Director of DIA and the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence
Council at Backup Tab #4. At this point, we don't expect anyone,
including DIA, to raise any issues at the meeting.
On 9 September the final draft revision of the guidelines was
forwarded to the NFIB Principals by Deputy Director Gates, with the
indication that the Principals would have an opportunity to discuss
the guidelines at a future NFIB meeting prior to official
publication. That final draft revision, and the summary handout
that Maj Gen Horton plans to use to initiate discussion of the
revision at the 24 September NFIB meeting, is at the "Revised
Guidelines" Tab.
If the NFIB concurs, and you approve, we have prepared a memorandum
for your signature to officially promulgate the new guidelines. It
is the attachment at the back of this book. Propose you sign the
memo at the conclusion of NFIB contingent on NFIB concurrence and
your approval. Upon your return of the signed memo with this NFIB
package, we will ensure prompt distribution to the community.
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NEW GUIDELINES
Objectivity and integrity
Responsiveness and relevancy
Update and strengthen
Clarify and simplify
Aim at senior policymakers
Recognize wider audience
Shorter and focused
Fewer and estimative
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PRODUCTS
High concern
Estimative
or evaluative
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PROCEDURES
Solicitation and anticipation
Screening and vetting
NIO management
Interagency participation
Drafters dedicated
Representatives empowered
Alternative views
Logical flow
DCI review
NFIB views
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wufdngon.D.CZO505
9 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
SUBJECT: Revision of Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence
Production
1. During our review of the integrity and objectivity issues raised in
NSDD 266, many of you had recommended that a revision to the 1981 guidelines
for interagency intelligence production be undertaken. During our
1 June 1987 NFIB meeting we agreed to proceed. In response, the attached
draft was developed.
2. This draft draws upon your contributions to the NSDD 266 response,
as well as our 1 June discussion, the contributions of your representatives
at a 16 June meeting held by the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence
Council, and your subsequent review and comment on an earlier draft. I
appreciate all the efforts that you and your people have made toward
producing the revision.
3. The revised draft guidelines appear consistent with the response to
NSDD 266, a copy of which I sent to you on 31 July. They set out the
principles and criteria for our interagency production process at about the
right level of detail. They will be placed on the NFIB schedule in the near
future, so that we can discuss them prio>~~ficial publication.
Attachment:
As stated
~tix1
25X1
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28 August 1987
GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
This Notice replaces the 27 July 1981 DCI guidelines for interagency
production of national intelligence.
Purpose
These guidelines are intended to strengthen the Intelligence Community's
capacity to support the OCI in producing national intelligence responsive to the
needs of senior consumers while assuring the objectivity and integrity of the
process. The system must be able to anticipate and respond quickly to foreign
trends and developments that create new requirements for estimative intelligence
products. These will be formulated primarily with a view to assisting senior
policymakers at the NSC and Cabinet level, although they normally will have wider
application and receive wider distribution. These products will be predominantly
estimative and usually will address a limited number of policy relevant key
questions. They should generally be short and focused; accordingly they should
contain no more factual arid historical detail than necessary to provide context for
the findings, judgments, and projections.
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Types of Interagency Intelligence Products
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
The NIE provides the most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence
Community on subjects of highest policy concern to the United States. Judgments
and projections will be derived from the most comprehensive intelligence data and
research available but will be presented in a concise form. The main text will
develop the analyses and estimative judgments over the period of the NIE,
evaluating alternative scenarios where appropriate, and identifying indicators
associated with alternative scenarios.
The time projection for a NIE usually will be in terms of years. For most
NIEs the preferred length is in the range of 10 to 20 pages with background data
and detailed discussion carried in annexes. The Key Judgments should be
proportionately brief, in the range of one to four pages. An Executive Summary,
following the Key Judgments, should be considered in the case of unusually
complex or detailed papers. The time allocated for preparation of the NIE will
generally be in terms of months although it may be required within weeks on
occasion. The nomination of topics, the formulation of concept papers and terms
of reference, and the review and coordination process through NFIB discussion will
be more deliberate and thorough than for other interagency products.
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
While the SNIE shares many of the characteristics of the NIE, it differs
from the latter in several significant ways. The SNIE addresses more specific and
urgent problems; urgency is the dominant of these two criteria. The SNIE is an
unscheduled interagency intelligence product while the NIE is scheduled and listed
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in the annual production plan. The time projection for a SNIE usually will be in
terms of weeks or months. The preferred length of a SNIE is less than 10 pages,
with very limited background data or description. Key judgments of SNIEs should
be very brief and normally not exceed two pages. The time allocated for
preparation is days to weeks. The nomination of topics, the formulation of
concept papers and terms of reference, and the coordination process will be
accelerated.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM)
The IIM will address problems of high policy concern to the United States,
although not the highest concerns where the NIE is more appropriate. The IIM
provides an Intelligence Community assessment of data and events, with a
considerable amount of evidential or methodological detail, and usually will be
estimative. It is the appropriate interagency product when the primary objective is
a community judgment on factual matter.
There is no set time horizon for the factual determinations or the estimates
made "in the IIM. There are no prescriptions for length or format beyond
succinctness appropriate to the subject requiring community judgments. The Key
Judgments, and Executive Summary where appropriate, should be proportionately
brief. An IIM usually will be prepared over a period of months. The process of
nominating topics, formulating concept papers and terms of reference, and the
review and coordination will be deliberate and thorough without sacrificing
timeliness. The product usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and
approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
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Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (SIIM)
The SIIM has much the same relationship to the IIM that the SNIE -has to
the NIE. While the IlM usually is scheduled, the SIIM is an unscheduled interagency
intelligence product. It provides an assessment of data and events and usually will
provide a near term projection of the immediate situation. The preferred length of
a SIIM usually is less than 10 pages; the key judgments should not exceed two
pages. The time projection for a SIIM usually is weeks to months. The process
for nomination of SIIM topics and the SIIM coordination process will be
accelerated. The SIIM usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and
approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Memorandum to Holders (M/H)
Any of the interagency intelligence products may be amended by a M/H if
changes in intelligence information or analysis justify a modification but the
changes are not extensive enough to justify a new product. The procedures
followed will be the same as for the basic documents they amend.
The Interagency Process
Topics for interagency intelligence products may be suggested by any
senior officer in the intelligence or policy communities. A request may be made
directly to the Director Central Intelligence or the appropriate National Intelligence
Officer or to them through departmental channels.
The NIO is responsible for advising the DCI on the policy relevance,
importance, and utility of the topics nominated for interagency production. The
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utility of the product for the policy community should be clearly demonstrated, the
requirement for an Intelligence Community judgment should be justified. The NIO
must assist the Intelligence Community in limiting its formal interagency
intelligence production to a clearly articulated need-to-do basis vice anice-to-do
approach. Topics of general interest but not meeting NIE/SNIE criteria might be
more suitable for an IIM or SIIM, or might better be addressed by single agency
production. The NIO recommendation is critical in reducing the time demands on
NFIB principals and focusing the resources of the interagency process on the most
important topics.
The DCI is the approving authority for initiating interagency intelligence
products. Some topics will be approved following NFIB consultation on the annual
interagency production plan. Others will be proposed as the need arises and
approved following such formal or informal NFIB consultation as appropriate.
The appropriate National Intelligence Officer will manage the production of
the interagency product on behalf of the DCI. The NIO is responsible to the DCI to
ensure maximum Intelligence Community participation in the production, balancing
the requirements for timeliness and thoroughness. The NIO, in consultation with
the representatives of the NFIB principals, will modify the attached production
checklist to fit the circumstances.
The NIO will as a rule prepare a draft Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference in consultation with NFIB representatives and policy officers. Policy
community participation is especially important here to ensure relevance of the
final product. The Concept Paper, incorporating Key Questions, and the Terms of
Reference then will be approved in draft by the DCI and will be the basis to
proceed.
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The draft Concept Papers and TORs for scheduled NIEs and IIMs then should
be furnished to NFIB principals for their review and subsequent coordination by
their representatives. For SNIE's and SIIMs, this review and coordination will be
accelerated, depending on the urgency of the paper.
The NIO will consult with NFIB representatives on designating drafters and
contributors. The NFIB principals should relieve drafters of regular duties to the
maximum extent possible until their special assignments to the estimate have been
fulfilled. Participants in developing and coordinating the draft should be aware of
policy community concerns, but NFIB principals must ensure that the integrity and
objectivity of the intelligence process are maintained. The DCI usually will review
draft texts of estimates at the time they are submitted to NFIB representatives for
coordination to confirm that the paper and its key judgments meet the criteria
established by the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference. He will reserve his
decision on the estimate until after he receives recommendations from NFIB.
The NFIB representatives should have sufficient delegated authority to agree
to changes in the text at the coordination meeting such that, except in the most
unusual circumstances, they will be supported by their agencies. Changes
submitted after coordination usually will be reviewed by the representatives before
sending the text to the NFIB principals. For scheduled NIEs, NFIB agencies should
have 10 working days to review final drafts prior to the NFIB meeting. For SNIEs,
agencies should have five working days to review final drafts, except for the most
time-sensitive estimates. Final coordination by NFIB principals may be by
telephone vote, without benefit of an NFIB meeting whenever timeliness dictates or
other factors indicate this as a preferable option.
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Alternative views usually should be succinctly stated in the body of the
Estimate with a concise statement of the reason for the views, but the NIO must
not let the discussion of alternative views distract from the logical flow of the
Estimate.
Attachment: Summary Production Checklist
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A. SCHEDULED ANNUAL PRODUCTION
(most NIEs and IIMs, no
SNIEs or SIIMs)
1. NIO annually solicits
or anticipates require-
ments from intelligence
and policy communities
2. NIC incorporates re-
quirement(s) in produc-
tion plan and seeks
NFIB review and DCI
approval
3. NIO initiates work to
meet projected comple-
tion date
OR B. OUT-OF-CYCLE PROPOSAL
(all SNIEs and SIIMs, some
NIEs and IIMs)
1. NIO continually receives
or anticipates new require-
ments from intelligence
and policy communities
2. NIO reviews new requirements
with NIC and community
contacts on an accelerated
basis for proposed SNIEs and
SIIMs
3. To seek approval for NIE or
IIM, go to step I.A.2. For
SNIE or SIIM, go to step
11.6.1.
II. CONCEPT PAPER (CP) and TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) DEVELOPMENT
A. NORMAL TRACK
(all NIEs and IIMs)
1. N10 develops CP and
TOR in consultation
with community
2. NIO seeks DCI endorse-
ment on CP and TOR
3. NIO seeks NFIB rep
coordination on CP and
TOR
4. NIO distributes
coordinated CP and
TOR to DCI and NFIB
OR B. FAST TRACK
(all SNIEs and SIIMs)
1. NIO develops CP (and
time permitting TOR) in
consultation with community
on accelerated basis
2. NIO seeks accelerated DCI
endorsement of CP (and TOR)
3. NIO seeks accelerated
NFIB rep coordination
on CP (and TOR)
4. NIO distributes
coordinated CP (and
TOR) to DCI and NFIB
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1. N(O works with
drafter to produce pre-
coordination draft
2. NIO provides draft
to DCI while simul-
taneously seeking
NFIB rep coordination
on draft
1. NIO distributes
coordinated draft
to DCI and NFIB
Principals for considera-
tion
2. IIMs approved and
published by C/NIC
unless DCI calls
NFIB meeting
3. NIEs discussed and
approved at NFIB
meeting unless
telephone vote is
called
1. NIO works with drafter to
produce pre-coordination
draft on an accelerated
basis
2. NIO provides draft to DCI
while simultaneously
seeking accelerated
NFIB rep coordination
on draft
1. NIO distributes
coordinated draft
to DCI and NFIB
Principals for
consideration
2. SIIM approved and
published by C/NIC
unless DCI calls
NFIB meeting
3. SNIEs discussed and
approved at NFIB
meeting unless
telephone vote is
called
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The Oinctor of Centel Intcll~gence
~sn.~,noc2osos
NFAC 4652-81
30 July 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Interagency Intelligence Production
The attached `procedures for interagency production, which
we discussed at NFIB on 21 July, are approved and are effective
immediately. When feasible, estimates in progress will be
adjusted to conform. I ask your cooperation in making the new
system work.
Attachment:
Procedures For Production
0 ntera enc me i ence
ssessments, ate u y 1981
tewtQ~~ R~~r?? 1
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON JULY 87
Derived from Multiple
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27 July 1981
PROCEDURES FOR PP.ODUCTION OF
INTER GEN N LL NC S MENTS
This Notice establishes ~ guidelines for production of interagency
intelligence assessments, baand on recentpcritiquesoofaexistingeprocedures.
Intelligence Council (NIC),
Po_~
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs and SNIEs) are the most
important product of the Intelligence Community Theyswilldagainibecomeethe
highest priority by all intelligence agencies.
primary Intelligence Community contribution to the policy formulation
process at the national level. (Interagency Intelligence Memoranda will
continue to be producedins offfactual determinations.thSeeaPageuSt)intelli-
gence task is the reach g
The principal purpose of these changes
--To produce NIEs and SNIEs which are better suited than
are exisiderationmawhileopreservingCtheirtusefulnessmfortion
and cons
other important consumers
--To assist senior policymakers by producing interagency
assessments which are less bulky -- and to do so quicker,
--To improve the substantive?usefulness of such assessments
- to the policy process.
--To enhance sepCira dvthe othernNFI6 principals more~fullyyiny
engaging the
arriving at the judgments set out in these assessments.
Categories of Estimates
Special National Intelligence Estimates will be oriented to a current
event or policy issue. The need for such estimates will normally arise
from the policy formulation process. 7o be useful, they must be brief and
timely. Papers directed at relatively narrow questions and on particularly
short deadlines will normally be produced as "Cat"What wouldIbe?thehreaction
category includes "Contingency" estimates, e.g.,
if the US did X?" There will also be broader "Category B" SNIEs, particularly
in the political andweilnbeicoverned~byhther"fastetrack~~proceduresldnscussed
Production of SNIEs 9
below (page 2)?
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National Intelli ence Estimates will also fall in two Categories.
"Category " NIEs w be those devoted to less pressing policy concerns.
e,g,, Yu oslavia After Tito. Papers in this category will take somewhat
longer to prepare than t ose tied to more immediate issues, and may
include extensive back-up analysis. Production will be governed by more
deliberate procedures (see page 3). The number of Category I NIEs should
decrease in coming months as the number of SNIEs increases. The ma3or
periodic estimates, including the Soviet military series, will be listed
as Category II NIEs. They will be produced on a schedule approved by
the DCI after consultation with NFIB (see page 4).
Content of NIEs and SNIEs
In preparing estimates, Principals, Chairmen, and drafters shall
assure that drafts:
--Are as directly relevant to ongoing policy concerns as
possible, within the ground rules of appropriate discussion
by intelligence officers. They should be written in aware-
ness of the US role in the given situations, analyze the
degree to which these situations may be susceptible to the
influence of the US or its friends, and address the
significance of various outcomes for US interests.
--Contain as much estimative thrust as possible, including
. where appropriate possible alternative future developments.
--Integrate political, military, economic and other factors--
especially with respect to economic forces and to the broader
political purposes of military power.
--Avoid secondary issues and unnecessary detail.
--Contain, as has been the practice, any alternative or
dissenting views.
--Indicate the validity of the intelligence supporting the
estimate.
Fast-Track Procedures for SNIEs
Initiation: Preparation of SNIEs may be proposed to the DCI by any
senior o ~cer, although the concerned NIO is expected to anticipate the
need for such estimates through his participation in the policy formulation
process. If the DCI approves a proposal, the Chairman NIC will immediately
notify NFIB Principals by telephone or LDX, designating an NIO as Chairman
of the estimate and requesting that each Principal name a single qualified
officer fully empowered to represent him in the coordination process.
Representatives should have access to and be able to speak for their Principal.
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Te~ fo Reference (TORS)/Conceal Pacers: The Estimate Chairman
will immediately prepare draft TORS and a concept paper, check them out
with the requester and the DCI, and coordinate them with the representatives
by telephone and LDX. For Category A SNIEs, these steps should take no more
than 24 hours. for Category B, no more than 3 days.
Orafting Resconsibilities: The Chairman will in the course of
establishing TORS negotiate with the representatives to identify drafters
and contributors who are both qualified and available. It will be the
responsibility of the Principals to free assigned drafters and contributors
from conflicting duties until the draft is completed. For Category A this
should regularly require no more than 2 days, for Category 6. 5 days.
F rma The SNIE will regularly run no more than 5 pages for
Category A and 10 for Category B. Where essential, annexes may be appended.
Coordination: When the Chairman has a satisfactory draft, he will
distribute it to the representatives for coordination, normally by LDX.
Representatives should immediately seek the views of their Principals.
for Category A SNIEs, the Chairman will, when time permits, convene a
representatives meeting to coordinate the paper, but in extreme cases will
coordinate by .telephone. In any case the time required should not be more
than 2 days. For Category B, representatives will normally meet, and
coordination should be complete in no more than 5 days.
NFIB Consideration: SNIEs will normally be reviewed by the DCI at
this stage. Concurrence of the Principals in Category A SNIEs will then
be obtained by telephone or through a special NFIB meeting within the next
24 hours. Category B SNIEs usually will be considered at a regular NFIB
meeting if conveniently scheduled, or at a special meeting; no more than
3 days should be required. .
Category I NIE Procedures
Initiation: NIEs in Category I will normally be proposed by the NIC
and schedu ed well in advance, although any NFIB Principal or senior policy
officer may request one. The schedule will be considered by NFIB quarterly
and approved by the DCI. Should an addition to or deletion from the
schedule be proposed, Principals will be given an opportunity to comment
prior to a decision by the DCI. before work begins on a paper, the Chairman,
NIC is responsible for designating an NIO as Chairman and notifying the
Principals. Each Principal in turn will designate a single qualified officer
fully empowered to represent him in preparation of the estimate.
Terms of Reference/Conce t Pa er: The Estimate Chairman will prepare
draft Rs an a concept paper. a will assure that before they are sent out
to the agency representatives, these papers have been checked out with the
policy officers concerned and have been submitted to the DCI for his review.
Once these papers go out to the representatives, the latter will be expected
to review them with their Principals before the representatives come to the
coordination meetings. The usual time to be given for such review, prior to
the meetings of the representatives, will be one week. In cases where.
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circumstances warrant significant changes in the initial purpose, scope,
concept, or TORS of a given paper. the Chairman will ensure that these
changes have the approval of the DCI and the NFIB Principals. .
Draftin Res onsibilities: The Chairman will, in the course of
prepay ng an coor gnat ng Rs. negotiate with the representatives to
identify drafting officers and arrange for contributions from individual
agencies. It will be the responsibility of each Principal to ensure that
contributions assigned to his agency are delivered on schedule. Drafts
should regularly be completed within one month.
Format: Each draft Category I NIE will normally consist of the basic
estimate and a shorter Key Judgments section. Both will be coordinated
by the Agency representatives. When published, the first volume of the NIE
will contain only the Key Judgments. Volume I should be no more than 10
printed pages in length. The basic estimate will be published as back-up
analysis in an accompanying Volume II. There will, of course, be occasions
where the length or complexity of the estimate will necessitate variations
on this concept.
Coordination: When the Chairman has a satisfactory draft, he will
distr ute t to the representatives. The latter will be given 2 weeks
to consult with their respective Principals on the content of a draft
before the representatives meet for coordination with the paper's Chairman.
The representatives will meet on consecutive working days for as long as
necessary to complete coordination. Discussion at these meetings will
center on ironing out questions of fact, examining the principal assessments
of the given paper, and identifying main areas of agreement or disagreement/
dissent. If mayor revisions are necessary, there can be a clean-up meeting
to review the final text; new issues will not be raised at clean-up meetings.
Any ma3or issues not resolved at representatives' meetings will be examined
at NFIB by the DCI and the Principals.
NFIB Consideration: Volume I as coordinated by the representatives
(that s, Key udgments, together with any dissents or unresolved issues)
will go to the DCI for approval and distribution to the Principals, who wil l
be given at least 7 working days to review the final draft. It will be
scheduled for the next regular meeting of NFIB thereafter. At NFIB, discussion
will center on the estimate's ma3or questions, with any necessary editorial
or minor fixes to be done subsequently under the direction of Chairman, NIC
and the paper's Chairman, as directed at NFIB by the DCI. The Chairman will
also be responsible for conforming a coordinated Volume II to Volume I.
Volume II will be published within one month after Volume I.
Category II (periodic) NIE Procedures
The procedures outlined above for Category I NIEs in general apply also
to Category II. These papers are likely to be longer (sometimes more than
two volumes) and more complex than those in Category I, and arrangements for
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their production may involve an elaborate structure of working groups and
subgroups, DCI Committees, etc. They will also take more time to prepare.
Nonetheless, every effort will be made to move than along expeditiously,
and to keep Volume I concise and policy-oriented. Present production of
periodic NIEs should not be significantly changed under these procedures.
Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM
The IIM will be prepared in accordance with SNIE or NIE procedures
as appropriate to the issue addressed, except that it will be coordinated
in the Community at the NFIB representatives level and issued by the
Chairman, NIC. Representatives may, of course, seek the approval of their
Principals. An IIM may be referred to NFIB and issued by the DCI if he so
decides. or if requested by a NFIB Principal.
General
These procedures should provide a maximum of one week for the production
of Category A SNIE's, three weeks for Category B SNIE's, and three to four
months for the production of Volume I of Category I and most Category II
NIE's. Principals will, of course, retain their right of dissent in all
cases and categories of estimates, including IIM's.
After NFIB discussion of an SNIE or NIE, the estimate Chairman will
convene, the representatives fora review of and follow-up to the NFIB
proceedings. This meeting should also focus on identifying gaps in
collection or analysis for future emphasis. The Chairman will be responsible
for initiating further action through appropriate channels to fill such gaps.
These procedures may be abridged by C/NIC when an estimate is needed
more quickly than they will permit. The only essential conditions are that
each agency have an opportunity to dissent, and that the DCI approve the
final product.
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The Director of Central Intelligencc
vws~~nacpsos
31 July 1g8~
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Frank,
This report is in response to the President's instruction in NSDD 266 to
review the established procedures for producing national foreign intelli-
gence estimates. These procedures were reviewed to determine if we were
achieving our goal of maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the
process and the products.
We believe the national intelligence estimates process does achieve
objectivity in the many interagency products issued by the Intelligence
Community. We find that there is integrity and independence on the part of
the people and the process. Nonetheless, we have taken steps to reinforce
the safeguards already built into the system. These include
-- reemphasized with the National Intelligence Officers their
responsibilities to assist me in maintaining the integrity of the
process
held special meetings with NFIB Principals and their
representatives reviewing and reaffirming the requirements of
objectivity, integrity, and quality of the estimates
initiated a revision of the Intelligence Community's guidelines for
interagency production to bring currency and more clarity to the
guidelines for process
made changes in the DCI role to assure myself that the independence
of the intelligence process is maintained at several key points and
to foster full discussion of national estimates by the members of
the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
All portions Secret
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The attached report lays out in greater detail the results of the review
directed by the President. The review included solicitation of the .views of
each National Foreign Intelligence Board member on the issues of integrity
and ob3ectivity in the production of our national foreign intelligence
estimates. The NFIB members provided thoughtful responses, including
consideration of the relationships between their intelligence organizations
and the policy cortununity. These responses were included in the review
conducted by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the
National Intelligence Officers who manage the interagency production on my
behalf. The review also included a special session of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board where the members discussed their views and
recommendations for strengthening the independence of the intelligence
process in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the product.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Enclosure
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THE INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
SUMMARY
We believe the current practices of the Intelligence Community do
preserve the integrity. objectivity and independence of the process for the
production of national foreign intelligence estimates. The integrity,
quality, and objectivity of the personnel involved in estimative work is at
least as important as the process itself. Some further changes in the DCI's
role have been made to reinforce further the independence of the process.
The guidelines for the process of interagency production are under NFIB and
DCI review and will be republished.
The integrity of Estimates is safeguarded principally through:
-- Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the
process.
-- The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a
context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
-- The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination
process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
-- The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in
the development and coordination of estimates from concept through
final drafting.
-- The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in
recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the
unpredictability of some events.
-- Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the
Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
-- The right of any community member to explicity dissent from any or
all parts of estimates.
-- Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent
views on selected issues.
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-- Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation
of new ones as the cycle continues.
-- The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to
publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of
policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs
to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's
consensus views.
The independence of the estimative process from policymaker preference,
however, is not an absolute end in itself but rather involves a number of
trade-offs
NIO's must maintain close contact with the policy community to
ensure they are aware of US policy goals and the details of its
implementation. Analysis conducted without knowledge of the US
role on the international scene will inevitably be skewed.
There inevitably exist areas in which policy and intelligence
cannot and should not be surgically separated--each has something
to offer the other in insight; nearly all participants in both the
policy and intelligence communities are engaged in some facet of
the other's work at some time.
Senior review within the Intelligence Community should bring
advantages of wisdom, experience and perspective to the
analysis--but is also possibly open to the charge of "politicizing"
analysis written at the working level.
Consensus cannot be allowed to eliminate sharpness of judgment.
Evidence can serve to buttress Community judgment, but the relative
absence of evidence cannot be allowed to stifle creative insight
where evidence may not be immediately available.
Recent changes in the DCI's role in the process should serve to
reinforce further the objectivity of his key role:
-- The DCI will no longer approve draft estimates prior to
coordination by NFIB representatives, but will review them to
ensure that they conform to goals set in the Terms of Reference.
-- The DCI will no longer approve post-coordination drafts, but will
bring his own comments and any suggestions for change to the NFIB
table.
-- The DCI will seek the judgment and advice of NFIB members before
deciding on the disposition of draft estimates.
Further, the DCI has directed the revision of the 1981 guidelines for
interagency production in order to provide currency and clarity to this
process.
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DISCUSSION
1. As the President has stated, it is an important goal of the United
States intelligence effort that the integrity and objectivity of the
intelligence process be maintained, demanding critical differentiation
between foreign intelligence and policy advocacy. This is a particularly
important and sensitive goal as applied to the production of national
estimates. It requires critical and constant attention especially by the
Intelligence Community but also by the Policy Community. This must be
considered side by side with another important goal, emphasized by the SSCI
in a draft report last year, that the utility and relevance of the
intelligence product be sustained, demanding cognizance of policy concerns
in the production of foreign intelligence. This dual objective of assuring
policy relevance while assuring against policy prescription makes two basic
demands.
-- First, while input to the estimative process is to be sought from
the Policy Community, it should be as to the questions asked, and
not as to the answers provided. And the Policy Community should
not be the only source of these questions.
-- Second, while the output of the estimative process should outline
the general implications of the Intelligence Community's judgments
for US interests, it should not cross the line to the advocacy of
particular policy proposals. That must be deferred to the
consumers in the Policy Community.
It should be recognized that the search for perfection in the estimative
process inevitably involves a process of tradeoffs between faithful
observance of the full bureaucratic process and the intellectual vigor of
the final product. As more people and more opinions become Involved, many
of the sharp edges of insight can be lost; process can be observed but the
product can be pallid, and the message to the policymaker can be
unenlightening. The Intelligence Community must strive to strike a balance
between often conflicting goals of timeliness and deliberation, between
crispness of judgment and full consideration of alternative views, between
safe consensus and boldness of insight, between policy relevance and policy
neutrality.
2. The estimators must interact with policymakers, but maintain their
independence from them. They must provide not only what the policymaker
wants to know, but also what he needs to know. While the estimators need to
focus on a policymaker's topic, they need to place it in proper context,
which may well provide an estimate not anticipated by the policymaker. An
estimate must examine the conventional wisdom on an issue, but also
challenge it. Estimators must examine all the evidence on an issue, but,
when evidence is lacking, they must not shrink from offering the insights
the Community may nonetheless be able to offer. Complicating the process is
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the Impact of US activity on the event to be analyzed while the outcome of
an estimate may influence future choices of action. The estimators must
assess both risks and opportunities for the US, and here they will march up
to the fine line short of policy prescription. They owe it to their readers
to engage in prediction, including which outcomes are most likely. But they
owe it also to their readers to make their uncertainties clear and to
provide alternative scenarios.
3. We have reviewed the national estimates process in terms of three
basic elements--personnel, process, and products. This facilitates
highlighting areas where vulnerabilities exist and safeguards help,
especially noting where senior officers directly affect the process.
Personnel
4. The most critical element in ensuring the integrity and objectivity
of the estimative process is people. Without individual integrity and
objectivity at all levels, particularly at the top, no process will work;
with it, nearly any process will be successful.
-- The Natlona~ Intelligence Officer system is designed to select
experienced, skilled officers who will manage the estimates process
on behalf of the DCI. These NIOs are assigned to the Office of the
DCI where they can be relatively free of pressures from the policy
arms of government. The NIOs, selected from different parent
agencies and backgrounds, also bring a variety of Intelligence
Community perspectives to the estimates.
-- Additionally, Assistant NIOs, drafters, and Agency repre-
sentatives--themselves representing different parent agencies and
backgrounds--bring additional range of perspective to the analytic
process. If the NFIB agencies fail to provide their best talent,
the process will not provide the best product.
-- There are balances that each of these players must strike. The
NIOs manage the production of estimates for the DCI and serve as
guardians of the Community process. Drafters need to be able to
utilize their agency background and at the same time rise above it
and take on the community mantle. Representatives need to
represent their agencies ably and responsibly, while being capable
of setting aside parochialism in the interest of producing the best
possible Community product.
-- And finally there are the intelligence principals, who need to be
involved throughout the process, initially through their
representatives and ultimately at the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, to bring to bear their broader perspective and to help
protect the intelligence process against undue policy pressures. A
key to the success of this endeavor is the NIOs keeping the
representatives informed, so that they in turn can keep their
principals informed and involved.
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The Process
5. The Request for the Estimate. Any executive office can request an
estimate, but most are generated by State, DoD, or NSC. The DCI~also calls
for estimates, as do other senior intelligence officers, although the
greatest number of nominations come from the NIOs. The NIOs usually suggest
that an Estimate be written because they have learned--from their contact
with the policymakers and their knowledge of the intelligence--that such an
estimate will be timely and relevant to a policy decision; sometimes one
that has not yet captured the policymakers' attention.
-- The NIO is routinely in contact with other members of the
Intelligence and Policy Community in his area of expertise. He
needs to be well aware of current US policy to anticipate both the
intelligence needs that the policy might spark as well as the
foreign policy repercussions of prospective US action. Those
contacts are a constant and common source of ideas for new
estimates--a boon for policy relevance and legitimate support to
the policy process. but carrying with it the danger of skewing
production to topics formulated only to support, and not to
illuminate, policy.
-- To guard against this, the NIOs, and other intelligence officials
generate estimates where policy attention is needed, to tell the
policymaker what the Intelligence Community feels the policymaker
needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. And second.
each request for an estimate is reviewed by the NIO with the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and must be approved
by the DCI. Disapproval is infrequent--never because of
uncongeniallty to the Policy Community--and only because of limited
resources, conflicting priorities, or appropriateness--especially
if a topic appears to be of a limited interest or too narrow or
- parochial in its focus for a national level estimate. The NFIB
members' periodic review of the interagency production plan assures
that they are well informed and can advise the DCI. The NIOs also
maintain a continuing dialogue within the Intelligence Community
and with the DCI to ensure that the production plan remains up to
date and relevant.
6. Preparation and Coordination of TORS. In conjunction with the
proposal for an estimate, the NIO presents a Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference (TOR), drawing on suggestions from the Intelligence Community and
the relevant policy people to define the scope and mayor themes of the
estimate.
Usually the office requesting the estimate will set forth the main
questions which it hopes to see answered. The NIO views any
intelligence questions posed as legitimate and will respond to
them. The NIO and his Intelligence Community colleagues will not
necessarily limit the scope of a proposed estimate strictly to the
questions and issues posed by the requester, however. Answering
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only those questions posed by the requester, without considering
the broader context could give a misleading impression regarding
policy implications. .
The NIO maintains contact with the requester to insure that he
understands the specific interests and purposes of the questions
posed in an estimate, and to insure that the requester's
intelligence needs are met. Although this is a practice long
followed, it is worth noting that the SSCI in a September 1986
draft study also urged that NIOs remain in close contact with
policymakers during the estimative process to ensure that relevant
issues are addressed.
A critical part of the TOR is the Key Questions. This section sets
forth the few central questions which the NIO believes to represent
the heart of the intelligence problem.
The TOR also should clearly highlight the specific policy-related
questions posed by the requester. Responses to these should also
be highlighted in the estimate itself to catch policymaker
attention.
The TOR also includes a retrospective look at previous estimates on
the same subject. This process helps remind the Community of past
discussions on the topic and provides opportunity for minority or
alternative views to be tested against subsequent events.
The draft TOR also is seen by the Senior Review Panel (SRP) for its
independent comment to the DCI and the NIO. The SRP is made up of
retired senior diplomats, military officers, and scholars and
reports directly to the DCI. Other independent DCI or NIO
consultants or panels may also be asked to comment.
The NIO then will make changes in the Concept Paper/Terms of
Reference as he believes are necessary. The TOR is then sent to
the DCI with a cover memo indicating how informal Community inputs
and SRP comments were or were not accommodated.
The DCI views the proper formulation of the TOR as a key element in
developing a good estimate. Further, he uses the TOR as the first
step in his personal supervision of the process to ensure
objectivity and integrity of the product.
The Intelligence Community representatives then meet with the NIO
to review the TOR, suggest changes for content, clarity, and
comprehensiveness, and coordinate for their agencies. The revised
TOR is sent to the DCI and Community principals as the formal,
coordinated TOR for the Estimate.
This process of TOR review almost invariably adds to the scope of
the paper. Rarely, if ever, are questions or issues dropped in the
course of such review, except when deemed outside the purview of
intelligence.
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7. The Drafting Process. The NIO will select a drafter for the
estimate, from within the Intelligence Community. The drafter thereafter is
responsible to the NIO for the estimate. The drafter seeks ideas and
contributions from the Intelligence Community and outside experts as he
develops the estimate.
-- The drafting process, however, is sometimes influenced by the
drafter's parent organization biases. The drafter--whatever his
parent organization--will usually submit his draft for review at
least to his own immediate superior and possibly higher reviewing
officials before the draft goes to the NIO. This is not always the
case, and usually is prompted by a desire to improve the writing
through peer review.
-- This review by the drafter's parent organization usually does
contribute in terms of clarity, style and accuracy, but it also can
affect the position taken by the drafter. In the real world,
however, any drafter will be in part influenced by his own
bureaucratic culture whether he undergoes his own in-house review
or not..
The NIO will review the draft closely and critically. He has
license to make any changes he feels are necessary in the interest
of clarity, style, length, comprehensiveness, focus, sharpness and
accuracy of judgment. Initial drafts often require extensive work
to insure that they are terse and estimative in character. The
NIO's changes in the draft reflect a balance of his own best
substantive judgment and an awareness that he will have to
coordinate the text with the Intelligence Community and that he has
an obligation to reflect their significant views in the main or
alternative text.
The draft estimate will then go to the SRP for independent review
and comment. The NIO wilt accommodate as much of the SRP
suggestions as he believes is appropriate. In most cases, SRP
suggestions for change and improvement are incorporated. The
revised draft is then sent to the DDCI and the DCI with a cover
memo indicating how the SRP comments were accommodated. In a "fast
track," this may occur after initial DCI review and simultaneous
with informing the DCI and NFIB principals of the results of
Community draft coordination.
DCI review at this point is intended primarily to ensure that the
draft meets the goals set forth in the TOR and to ensure sharpness
of judgment. The DCI may offer comment on substance as well but
prefers to reserve his comments until after he has heard from the
NFIB principals. Simultaneous with DCI review (this does not imply
his approval yet), the paper is sent to NFIB representatives for
review and staffing.
The NIO and the NFIB representatives take care throughout to ensure
that the policy community should not have impact on the conclusions
of the draft estimate. Policymakers do not attend the coordination
process.
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8. Draft Coordination. The role of the NIO at the coordination meeting
is a crucial one. He is responsible to the DCI to produce the best possible
estimate he can along the lines agreed upon in the TOR, and 1s responsible
to the Intelligence Community to assure that alternative views are
adequately expressed.
-- The estimate must reflect the best Community judgments but must not
be allowed to deteriorate Into the "lowest common denominator"
consensus. It must reflect important alternative views while
avoiding the pitfalls of becoming a Christmas tree of endless
possibilities that destroy clarity of the judgment.
-- The NIO cannot simply be an "honest broker" among contending
parties; his role involves a greater degree of leadership--more
akin to that of fudge and manager who must ultimately arbitrate
conflicts of view and serve as catalyst to ensure judgments are
considered and far-reaching. The NIO must avoid foreclosure of
debate or refection of certain viewpoints by having recourse to
statements such as "the DCI has special interest in this issue," or
"the Secretary of wants," which can serve to
intimidate some representatives. The NIO should encourage
expression from all representatives of the Community, avoiding
dominance of the process by any one element or person.
-- Organizations and their representatives presenting dissenting
viewpoints have a special obligation to present a coherent and
significant alternative view that enriches the document--rather
than simply noting dissent or blurring the judgment.
9. Final DCI Review. The DCI receives an information copy of the
post-coordination draft as it is forwarded to all NFIB principals for review.
DCI comments or criticisms of the paper usually will be withheld
until after full discussion at NFIB with the principals. This is a
change from previous practice, in which DCI-proposed changes
usually were inserted prior to NFIB. This change is meant to
encourage a more free-flowing and active discussion of alternative
views at NFIB.
10. Final Review in the Intelligence Community. Following distribution
to NFIB principals, most agencies will submit the estimate to further
in-house review. Certain problems can arise in the course of this process.
-- Some Intelligence Community working level representatives may not
fully represent their agency and their principal at coordination
meetings--because of unresolved differences within the agency,
inability to get the view of the agency's principal, or lack of
empowerment. As a result, a commitment by a working level
representative at the pre-NFIB coordination meetings may not be
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supported by the NFIB principal, sometimes over lesser issues.
Getting the NFIB principals Into discussions at the table is a
positive development in most cases, but sometimes the discussion is
over issues that could have been more efficiently handled by
effective representatives working with the NIO at pre-NFIB meetings.
-- Intelligence organizations attached to departments with
policymaking responsibility face other complications. Their
working level intelligence representatives sometimes commit their
NFIB principal to an intelligence judgment in the estimate that is
seen as unwelcome by the policy side of the department. This
places a special responsibility on the heads of INR, DIA, and the
Service intelligence organizations to insulate the intelligence
process from undue policy influence.
-- For whatever reason, we find that even after completion of working
level coordination and pre-NFIB distribution, representatives
sometime report back to the NIO that new changes are being sought
by their Agencies. This part of the process is vulnerable to
charges of politicization. These issues can be resolved,
however--pre-NFIB brokering for routine adjustments, and deferral
to NFIB hearing for those of greater significance.
11. NFIB. The National Foreign Intelligence Board represents the final
forum for adjudication of estimates. The DCI and the principals are free to
propose changes in the work of the Community representatives. It falls to
the DCI to stimulate discussion, to elicit explanations of disagreements, to
accept footnotes or alternative language. or to remand the estimate for
further work. The dissent procedure at NFIB is one of the important
mechanisms available to ensure that each intelligence agency has an
opportunity to express its views if they have not already been adequately
reflected earlier. Finally, it is the DCI who approves the document.
12. After NFIB. The NIO and the drafter accommodate changes directed
by the DCI as a result of NFIB deliberations. Usually, these changes will
be coordinated only by the NFIB representatives but any agency can request
further NFIB principal review depending on the nature of the changes.
13. Feedback. There is a feedback process that enables the DCI to
determine customer satisfaction. The DCI meets frequently with his senior
readers; the President and the Cabinet-level consumers. The NIOs meet with
sub-cabinet consumers on a daily or weekly basis. The interaction of senior
intelligence officers with intelligence consumers in the interagency
meetings occurs on a daily basis. All of these contacts afford the DCI the
opportunity to gauge consumer satisfaction with the product.
14. Competitive Analysis. While the community has no formal mechanism
to force competitive analysis, it does in fact exist. In addition to the
expression of alternative views in the estimates themselves, each agency in
the Intelligence Community is free to--and usually does--provide its own
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in-house and contract studies and estimates which usually gain broad
dissemination. These (sometimes) alternative vlews are brought to bear in
coordination of National Intelligence Estimates or even after publication.
These individual Agency studies keep competitive analysis available to
policymakers.
15. The Problem of Evidence. Uncertainty needs to be clearly
identified in the text whenever judgments are made that are based more on
Informed insight than abundant evidence. Appendices can buttress arguments
for positions taken in the text but meager evidence also cannot be allowed
automatlcally to bar a judgment. A judgment on an Issue can sometimes be
sustained by insight into and experience with an area even when intelligence
is skimpy or ambiguous. This is especially true in areas involving
clandestine or covert activity by another party. In short, the drafter and
the Community likewise must not be so mesmerized by absence of indicators,
or by a misplaced faith in the most likely outcomes that it leads to
automatic refection of judgments based on intuitive feel for behavior of the
players. Thus, on the evidentiary problem the Community is called to walk a
fine line between establishing a legal brief and accepting a position based
on circumstantial evidence and intuition in the absence of any certain
knowledge.
16. The Dilemma of Senior Level Review. The review of draft estimates
by the DCI and NFIB principals and their suggestions for changes can evoke
charges of politicization of the intelligence process. These individuals,
and their subordinate senior managers in particular, are closer to the
policy process than are the intelligence analysts who draft the estimates
and they bring a different outlook to the Intelligence process. Differing
senses of international realities can be identified mistakenly as a
politlcally partisan view. The benefit of senior level review of estimates
is that it often brings to bear a broader view of the international order
and _the character of international conflict. These views inevitably
influence the assessment of the likelihood of certain events. It is
important for all parties involved to distinguish between a legitimate
critique of a narrow, ill-formed or naive conception of politics or the
international order, and the advocacy of preferred political views on how to
deal with the nature of the international conflict. In short, the higher
the level of generalization about how certain situations will evolve, the
more one's own unspoken philosophical sense of how the world works is
involved. Searching critiques of Community estimative views by senior
officials need not represent "politicization" of the process. But, the
senior reviewer must be careful that his critique is not in fact politically
driven or broadly perceived by the Community as such.
Products
17. Out of this process come four types of formal estimative products.
-- National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence
Estimates, or NIEs and SNIEs, go through all steps of the process
dust outlined. As they bear the NFIB imprimatur and DCI slgnature,
they have the greatest weight. As a general rule NIEs deal with
broader subjects than SNIEs, deal with anticipated events, look
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further ahead, and more time is given to their preparation. The
SNIE usually treats with unanticipated events, more narrow
questions, and over a shorter period. SNIEs further differ from
NIEs in that they go through some of the steps in parallel rather
than in series, to expedite production of high priority and
time-sensitive requirements, but they stilt involve the key
players, the NFIB is still the final forum for adjudication, and
the DCI is still the final approval authority.
Interagency Intelligence Memoranda and Interagency Intelligence
Assessments, or IIMs and IIAs, differ from NIEs and SNIEs in that
they are less estimative in nature and do not necessarily go
through NFIB or bear the DCI's signature. But all agencies (in the
case of IIAs at least all those with a substantive interest) still
have the opportunity to coordinate, and agency representatives
still have the opportunity to bring their principal's point of view
to bear in the coordination process. Like the SNIEs, the IIAs go
through some of their steps in parallel. Where the issues emerge
as important enough, or the controversy surrounding them becomes
great enough, IIMs in particular can be and sometimes are elevated
to NFIB for consideration.
It should be noted that there are other intelligence products which
the NIOs work with the Community to produce, which are not formal
estimates and do not go through the formal coordination process.
Key among these are warning products, generated by discussions at
specially convened meetings between NIOs and Intelligence Community
representatives and then produced by the NIOs on a particular
issue, or combined by the NIO for Warning from all the NIOs for a
global review. The former are done on an as needed basis; the
latter are done monthly for the DCI and further distribution.
These warning products reflect Community views, often make note of
alternative views, but are not formally coordinated Community
products.
Further, the NIO, as senior staff advisor to the DCI in his
assigned area, fulfills a number of roles in which he does not have
any responsibility to represent the Community. In these roles,
such as producing talking points for DCI meetings or memos done as
think pieces for the OCI or wider distribution to stimulate
discussion, the NIO brings his own best judgment to bear. In these
cases, it is imperative that he make explicit the fact that his
views are his own, and he is not speaking on behalf of the
Intelligence Community, even though his views will have been formed
in the context of his interaction with that community.
18. In summary, the estimative process has some vulnerabilities in
terms of meeting everyone's sense of objectivity and integrity, but it also
contains many safeguards. These safeguards, consistently applied by all the
players in the process, from drafters and agency representatives through
NIOs and the NFIB principals, will provide the objectivity and integrity we
seek. To summarize these safeguards, they are:
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o Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the
process.
o The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a
context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
o The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination
process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
o The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in
the development and coordination of estimates from concept through
final drafting.
o The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in
recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the
unpredictability of some events.
o Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the
Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
o The right of any community member to explicitly dlssent from any or
all parts of estimates.
o Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
o The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent
views on selected issues.
o Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation
of new ones as the cycle continues.
o The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to
publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of
policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs
to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's
consensus views.
o The DCI reviews the estimate at key points in its development to
ensure that the lntegrity and ob~ectlvity of the process is
maintained.
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The Director of Ccntral Intclligcncc
W~shmpon. D.C. ?0505
National Intelligcnce Council
5 August 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Revision of Guidance for Interagency
Intelligence Production
REFERENCE: My memo, same subject, 8 June 1987
1. Your representatives met with me on 16 June and provided valuable
written and oral suggestions for revisions of our procedures for interagency
production. Those suggestions were incorporated into several drafts of
revised procedures that have been discussed with the National Intelligence
Officers.
2. Several distinguishing features have emerged in this revision.
a. The procedures are much simpler, shorter, provide guidelines to a
logical sequence of activity, and emphasize Community participation.
b. Rigid production timelines have been eliminated in favor of having
the NIO establish timelines for each product in consultation with
your representatives.
c. Emphasis upon DCI policy to seek NFIB counsel before he approves an
interagency product.
d. Clarifies policy that any senior intelligence or policy official
can request an interagency product, either directly to DCI or NIO
or through departmental channels.
e. Stresses NIO responsibility to assist in reducing number of topics
brought before NFIB, his responsibility to apply criteria of policy
relevance and need for Community judgment to interagency production
proposals, and the objective of more succinct interagency papers.
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f. Simplified nomenclature to Estimates and Memoranda. The National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE)~pectaT Nationa ntelligence Estimate
(SNIE), Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) are essentially
unchanged. We propose dropping the term Interagency Intelligence
Assessment (IIA) in favor of Special Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum (SIIM).
3. Copies of the proposed revisions also have been sent to your
representatives who attended the 16 June meeting. Please provide your
comments and suggestions on the attached proposal by 19 August. Then, I
plan to have a final draft ready for NFIB discussion by the end of the month.
H. F. Hutchi~+son,JJr.
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As stated
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The Director of Central Intelli~eence
1Y~a, D.C. 20505
f
National Intelli~enoe Council
24 August 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT: Procedures for Interagency Intelligence Production
REFERENCE: DIA Memorandum, C-0199/DE, same subject, 20 Aug 87
1. Your support of the major changes incorporated into the 5 August 87
draft is appreciated. Many of those changes were suggested by DIA and the
Services. We have sought to construct broad guidelines without indulging in
all the varying detail that must be dealt with by different agencies and
their representatives in the interagency production process.
2. We will carry out some of the changes you recommended in your
20 August memorandum (attached), but we believe that it is inappropriate to
incorporate them in these procedures.
a. We agree with your para l.a. and l.b.; we have made
arrangements within the National Intelligence Council and to NFIB
Secretariat to do that; but, this is too detailed for inclusion in the
Procedures.
b. Your para 2.a. deals with an issue best treated separately from
these Procedures. We have sought mutual understanding of these problems
and agreements on solutions for some time now. The issue is broader
than the interagency products and we believe that we should address the
broader issue in another channel.
c. We agree with your para 2.b. that the NIO and the NFIB
representatives should consider a recommendation for foreign
dissemination of the interagency product before the approval stage. The
NIOs have been reminded.
d. Your para 3 deals with a DoD procedure that we believe is best
dealt with internally. We do not wish to interfere with DoD
requirements that the DIA validate requests for estimates from
Department of Defense components. On the other hand, we do not wish to
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erect barriers to communications between NIOs or the DCI and the
senior intelligence and policy officials or military commanders.
In any case, the Defense Intelligence Agency would be consulted, as
would all NFIB members, concerning a proposal for an interagency
product. Further, we respect your preference that DIA endorsement
for production be addressed to the DCI rather than the NIO. On the
other hand, we do not wish to make any change in the Procedures
that would interfere with the preference of other NFIB members to
address these issues to the NIOs who will deal with them on behalf
of the DCI.
3. We hope that your concerns have been accommodated by the actions
described above. If you would like to discuss some of these issues further,
I would be pleased to drop by at your convenes
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As stated
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C-0199/DE 20 August 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VIC-c CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Revision of Gee for Interagency Intelligence
Production u
Reference: NIC memorandum, 5 Aug 87, subject as above.
1. ~ DIA has reviewed the proposed draft change to the 27 July 1981
gui a Ines for interagency production of national intelligence.
a. 0 DIA notes that many of the major suggestions proposed
earlier have been adopted. These modifications will significantly shape
the thrust and content of the national estimates program. They include
a reduction in the scheduled number of national estimates to be produced
each year to allow for the inclusion of ad hoc fast-track estimates; a
tight focus on policy-relevant questions in each estimate, and fewer
text pages; and most importantly, the providing of 10 working days for
final review of regular products and 5 working days for fast-track
estimates prior to NFIB.
b. 0 In the revision of procedures, there are, however, some
that would materially promote production efficiency and support the
objectivity and integrity of the process. DIA's proposed
recommendations are at the enclosure.
2. ~ DIA looks forward to receiving the next draft revision for NFIB
consi eration.
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
1 Enclosure
DIA Recommendations
1 cy
//rws//
ROBERT W. SCHMITT
RADM, USN
Deputy Director
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1. DIA recommends the following changes:
a. ~ The issuance of the NIC Production Schedule will be in July of
each year to acilitate Agency member production planning and scheduling.
b. 0 The use of the Wang ADP system is mandatory for the transmission
of all fast-track estimates (SIE/SIIM) from the Concept Paper/TOR stage through
approval and publication.
2. ~~ We note the omission of revisions for the dissemination process. We
recommend the following be added to the checklist:
a. The dissemination of national estimates will be made by DIA to
the Unifie pecified Commands as well as to the SHAPE U.S. military commands.
b. NIO recommendations for release of an estimate to "x" countries
will be ma a-when the estimate is considered by NFIi3, not later as a separate
administrative action.
3. TWe also recommend the clarification of Para l.c. which states as
policy that "any senior intelligence or policy official can request an
interagency product, either dir~ectl~ to DCI or NIO or through departmental
channels." Within DoD, initiate~`on oi? requests for estimates are forwarded to DIA
for validation and/or satisf action by DIA, or endorsed to the DCI for production
consideration. This centralized procedure provides for a more orderly
evaluation by DIA of the requirement for such an estimate and, in the case of
the U&S Commands, is required by JCS regulation. DIA also believes that Agency
endorsement for production is more appropriately addressed to the DCI, not to
the NIO.
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A
a
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FY 88 PRODUCTION PLAN
Background and Issues That May Arise
The draft FY 88 Production Plan is on the agenda for discussion
with NFIB Principals on 24 September. While we can expect some
comment, we do not expect any significant controversy because an
earlier draft of the Plan was sent to the Community in August for
comments and we prepared this version with those comments in mind
(see Backup Tab for these comments). What we included from these
comments, and what we excluded and why, were generally noted in the
package we sent to NFIB Principals in advance of the upcoming
meeting (see Revised Draft Plan Tab for the cover memo and new
draft plan).
To elaborate, while the latest version does not incorporate every
suggestion made, it accommmodates most of them, focusing on
reducing the total number of scheduled items. In the process we
combined some products, shifted others from NIE to IIM status
thereby removing the requirement for NFIB consideration, deferred
still others for possible consideration later, shifted yet others
out of the plan for NIC Memo or single agency production, and
eliminated some pieces altogether where there appeared to be no
real policy interest.
Those suggestions not totally accommodated, as explained in our
memo to the Principals, were primarily unscheduled fast-track
products that under our new draft guidelines are not included in
the annual production plan. All their suggestions, or any others
they care to make, will be considered over the course of the year
as circumstances dictate that the subjects should be addressed.
Some of these may be raised for discussion at the meeting.
One other suggestion not accommodated that might arise was DIA's
proposal to prioritize the items in the Plan in accordance with a
rigid, formal scheme. A similar attempt to systematically
prioritize production under the old guidelines fell into disuse,
and was consciously excluded in the new draft guidelines. In our
view, a formal priority system would be too rigid and
counterproductive. Our priorities need to be informally and
flexibly applied and revised on a case-by-case basis as policy
needs shift, and not be bound by any pre-set system based on a
subject matter typology or consideration of the source of the
original idea.
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-- Regarding the DDCI's general comments, which lead off the Backup
Tab and which refer to the SRP comments which immediately follow,
we of course will be continually considering fast-track unscheduled
papers (SNIEs and SIIMs) to complement the annual plan. Some of
these will no doubt address the INF agreement and Summit (for
example, the SNIE on Post INF Europe now in work), the
Iran/Iraq/Gulf situation as it develops, and emerging Central
American and Pakistan/Afghanistan issues. We will be vetting these
widely, seeking your approval when they appear ready for
initiation, and tracking these along with the scheduled items in
the weekly status report on interagency products sent to each NFIB
agency.
Latin America area and will consider others over the course of the
year. The NIOs Europe, GPF, and SP are considering additional
European issues that may require interagency treatment. For
example, in .addition to treatment of increased European security
cooperation and Warsaw Pact doctrine and forces we have already
scheduled, we are certain that we must deal with other aspects of
the changing context for NATO strategy. We will be considering the
key political, military, and economic factors that have changed
since the current NATO strategy was formulated and judge how they
are likely to change in the next few years with particular concern
for implications for the NATO strategy.
Our memorandum to the NFIB Principals forwarding the revised plan
for NFIB consideration invites their further comment at the meeting
and concludes with the notation that suggestions for a few
deletions or additions can be handled at the working level and
probably will not require further attention at NFIB. Any further
proposals you may have to modify the plan could be handled in the
same way prior to its publication. And, of course, revisions can
and will be made as necessary as the year progresses.
Vice Chairman Fred Hutchinson will initiate the discussion and is
prepared to field questions about why any particular subject is or
is not in the Production Plan.
Recommend you read the 18 September memo to Principals and peruse
the attached plan at the next Tab. Time permitting, also recommend
you peruse the comments on the earlier version of the draft plan at
the following Tab.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Nathin~ion.D( ?0505
National lntel!igence < ouncii
18 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: FY 88 Production Plan
1. The attached Production Plan is for your consideration and
discussion at a future NFIB meeting, currently scheduled for 24 September.
2. This plan is a transition document. It reflects interagency
intelligence production begun under the old production guidelines as well as
proposals under the new proposed guidelines. Your thoughtful comments on
the earlier draft plan we forwarded to you on 28 August were helpful to us
and we appreciate the assistance. We have accommodated many, if not most,
of the suggestions. A few, however, proposed to add certain time-sensitive
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) or Special Interagency
Intelligence Memoranda (SIIMs) to the schedule. Per the new draft
guidelines, we have not listed SNIEs or SIIMs in the annual production plan
given their unpredictaoility as to appropriate scope and timing. We will
consider proposals for unscheduled production, however, at any time
circumstances indicate a requirement. These will continue to be tracked as
they are today along with scheduled production in computer products we
provide regularly to your office.
3. Under the new guidelines, we have worked toward a smaller number of
scheduled interagency papers in the plan, both National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIMs), as a result
of rigorous application of the criteria of high importance, policy
relevance, and the clear need for Community judgments. Under the old
guidelines and practices, we have had a longer production plan which
contained many items of a general research nature that were either not of
high policy interest or truly policy relevant. This production plan
contains a residue of the latter, most of which are nearly complete and will
be issued by January. We propose to leave them in the plan; many have been
redesignated as Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM).
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4. As a result of your comments and our winnowing out, this Production
Plan contains 56 separate pieces; 27 NIE, 25 IIM, and 4 Memoranda to Holders
(MTH). Forty-one percent, or 23 pieces, should be completed by January and
almost all of them were initiated under the old procedures. Thus, there are
33 pieces (16 NIE, 15 IIM, 2 MTH) in the FY 88 Production Plan that truly
fall under the criteria in the new guidelines. We particularly invite your
attention to the 20 pieces in the Production Plan on which no work has been
done. An asterisk indicates that work is underway; thus, you will find 20
titles without an asterisk. Those items should fit the new criteria more
closely than other groupings within the plan.
5. We have proposed to the Director Central Intelligence that this
FY 88 Production Plan be entered on an NFIB agenda soon; it is currently
scheduled for 24 September. Further, we have suggested that the Principals
discuss it at the meeting and that the DCI approve the-Plan for publication
if there is general agreement. A suggestion or two for additions or
deletions could~be handled with your representatives later without further
NFIB discussion. In any case, it should be noted that we view the
production Plan as something to be adjusted whenever US interests or the
international environment dictates.
Frank B. Horton III
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SECRET ER 3167X/1 87
14 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Draft FY-88 Production Plan
- 1, I've reviewed the draft Fy-88 Production Plaendorsefthe
my specific comments below. In general, however,
comments of the Senior Review Panel, particularly in paragraphs
2d, 2e, and 3. While I believe it is not possible to reissue
-?- the plan at the end of the first quarter FY-88 as the SRP
'~ oints they note are important. It seems
suggests, the turning p
~~ to me, however, that we can project those turning points and
incorporate them into the program. For example, an INF
Agreement and a Summit seem nearly assured; Iran/Iraq/Gulf
situation will continue; trouble looms for the Resistance in
Nicaragua and thus all of Central America; and Pakistan aid is
going to be awould favor~theooutcomeseindicatedaabovetandtwes
but the odds
should proceed accordingly.
~"" ~2. I have made some notes on specific papers in the
~~ program but would offer the following specific comments:
-?= -- There are several papers such as the "Chemical Warfare
~' Use in the Iraq-Iraq Conflict" that seem to me not to
~' require interagency examination. There are a few
others I have marked this way as well.
I question whether a couple of the papers listed by NIO
Europe are, in fact, the key longer range issues in
Europe for the year ahead.
-- Similarly, for General Purpose Forces, the program
seems too focused on narrow specific papers. At a time
when it appears there are some sweeping doctrinal,
political, and economic changes in train that ht~le
enormous implications for conventional forces in Europe
on both sides, I do not feel that we have addressed
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that issue at all. I have the sense that we are in a
period of considerable change in approaches to
conventional forces and this list of papers does not
put us out in front of that.
-- I share the SRP's view that the two papers on Latin
America do not seem adequate, even taking into a'~count
the large number of ad hoc papers that will undoubtedly
be required. Are there no more important issues or
developments on a regional basis that we should try and
capture in a national estimate?
-- I think the Soviet program looks pretty good.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
WasAinQion. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03635-87
28 August -1~7
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM? Maj Gen Frank 6. Horton III, USAF
? Chairman
SUBJECT: Draft FY 88 Production Plan
1. The attached draft Production Plan has been forwarded to NFIB
Principals and the Senior Review Panel for their comment by 10 September.
.~ It has benefited from earlier inputs from the working level across the
Community and from the SRP.
2. With an eye to focusing the Community's resources on the key
estimative issues, several estimates that had previously been scheduled or
proposed have been dropped, while a few others have been modified or added.
The net effect has been to reduce the plan to half its earlier length,
leaving more room for unscheduled proposals, notably fast tracks, over the
course of the year.
._._ - 3. We believe we are now much closer to the smaller, more highly
selective and policy relevant plan we have sought, but solicit any thoughts
_~,;^., you may have for further refinements. We plan to have a final draft to you
for your consideration later in September, with NFIB discussion and official
_~ ' publication to follow.
V/R,
-=`~?.~
a k~ B. Horton II I
Attachment:
As stated
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NIC #03636 8]
28 August 1~~7
SUBJECT: Draft FY 88 Production Plan
DCI/NIC/C/NIC:FBHorton:bha(27 Aug 87)
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI .
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC(GF)
1 - NIC/PO
1 - VC/NIC(ER)
1 - 0/C/NIC Chrono
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wuhintton. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
28 August l~az7
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: Maj Gen Frank 6. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: FY 1988 National Intelligence Council Production Plan
1. The attached draft Production Plan is provided for your review and
comment. We would like the opportunity to consider your comments before
sending the final version of the draft to the DCI. We will ask the DCI to
reserve some time for NFIB discussion of the final draft Plan prior to its
official publication.
2. There have been changes in our approach to the annual Production
Plan:
a. The NIC has converted back to a fiscal year plan, to be issued
in October each year. We understand that many agencies are working
their plans on this basis; the objective of our change is to allow
better coordination between our Production Plan and those of the rest of
the Community.
~ b. Toward this end, we intend to circulate an early draft of
~_-~- future revisions in July each year. This year we are running late
:_ because of the change to a fiscal year basis and because of new criteria
!- for interagency products. Even so, considerable informal dialogue has
taken place between NIOs and the Community at the working level in
shaping the current draft.
c. The criteria enunciated in our new procedures for interagency
intelligence production have been used in developing the draft,
resulting in reducing the Plan to half its earlier length. We have
attempted to move away from research topics and peripheral issues and
focus on the truly estimative and relevant. We have also attempted to
leave room for the propensity of particular NIO accounts to be required
to produce unscheduled fast-track items over the course of the year.
1
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d. The transition to a smaller, more highly selective Production
Plan is still evolving, and we solicit your thoughts on where any
further cuts might beneficially be made. We are, of course, also open
to proposals for modifications or additions which would enhance the
overall relevance of what we would propose to produce, but would ~ bok to
a net effect of maintaining or preferably reducing the total on the?list.
e. Finally, we always welcome any further inputs you may have for
additions, deletions, or modifications over the course of the year; the
production Plan is not meant to remain static once published.
3. Your response to and any, comments on the attached should be received
by 10 September, in order to consider them prior to sending the final
version of the draft Production Plan to the DCI.
~~
rank B. Horton III
Attachment:
As stated
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
NEADOUARTERS AM iO11CE INTELLIGENCE fERVN:E
FORT /ELV0111, VNIOINIA 220Wf7iE
REPLY TO
~TTN OF I A
SUB.IECT F'y 1988 National Intelligence Council Production Plan
(Your Memo, 28 Aug 87)
To Chairman, National Intelligence Council
CLASSIFIED BY: DCI
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1. ~~ In response to your request for comments on the FY 1988
draft Production Plan (NIFB 14.2/41), we believe the projected list
of issues for interagency production adequately covers the appro-
priate concerns.
2. ~ We are particularly pleased with the dramatic reduction in
the number of estimates scheduled for production. We have long
been proponents of a careful scrutiny of the requirements for
estimates and for a reduction in the number of projected products.
Concentrating on issues which are "truly estimative and relevant"
and moving away from peripheral issues will provide better focus
to NIC production efforts.
EVAN H. PARROTT JR, Calonef, USAf
Depu~r Commander for As~essmants
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON. OC 20350-2000
009Y/7C363391
~. 18 Aug 87
?.
y r
MEMORANDUM FOR VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Subj: REVISION OF GUIDANCE FOR INTERAGENCY
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
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Ref: (a) NIC memo dtd 5 Aug 87
1. 0 Navy has reviewed and concurs with the proposed revisions
to subject guidance forwarded by reference (a).
James M. Eglini( ~,
Captain, U.S~Nsvy
Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence
(Analysis)
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