ZAIRE: PROSPECTS FOR THE MOBUTU REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R001200090006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Mobutu Regime
Zaire: Proospects for the
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-Key Judgments and Discussion '
fret
NIE 65-86
November 1986
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, and the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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N I E 65-86
ZAIRE: PROSPECTS FOR THE
MOBUTU REGIME
Volume I-Key Judgments
and Discussion
Information available as of 7 November 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
Daunting Economic Problems ............................................................. 11
Domestic Political Pressures ................................................................. 13
Security Concerns ................................................................................. 14
The Dissident Threat .................................................................... 14
Constraints on the Military .......................................................... 14
Foreign Support for Dissidents ............................................................ 15
The Libyan Connection ............................................................... 15
Soviet Bloc Contact ....................................................................... 15
Attitudes of Neighboring Countries ............................................ 16
The Angola Equation ........................................................................... 16
The View From Luanda .............................................................. 16
Zaire's Options .............................................................................. 17
The Foreign Policy Arena .................................................................... 17
Relations With Key Foreign Backers .......................................... 17
Regional Initiatives ....................................................................... 18
Looking to the East ....................................................................... 19
Soviet Intentions and Policies .............................................................. 19
Outlook .................................................................................................. 20
Alternative Scenarios ............................................................................ 21
Significant Policy Changes ........................................................... 21
Mobutu's Death ............................................................................. 21
Military Coup ................................................................................ 22
Implications for the United States ....................................................... 22
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SCOPE NOTE
Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, since coming to power in
1965, has demonstrated a record of support to US regional policy second
to none in Africa. This Estimate will assess Mobutu's prospects over the
next two years and examine the forces working to weaken his political
position. President Mobutu is scheduled to come to the United States on
an official visit soon, and this Estimate looks at his perceived needs and
the possible consequences for US-Zairian relations if his expectations for
increased US support are not met.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
President Mobutu-a staunch friend of the United States-is
facing growing domestic and foreign challenges at a time when the
United States and Zaire's other key Western backers are faced with
declining foreign aid resources. We expect Mobutu's skillful leadership
and pervasive patronage system to ensure the stability of his regime
over the next two years or more, but daunting economic problems and
increasing political pressures are likely to slowly erode his authority
over the longer term.
President Mobutu is arguably unique in Africa in his support of US
national security objectives. He has on several occasions assumed risks in
undertaking efforts that benefited the United States, such as sending
troops and providing support to Angolan factions in 1975, establishing
relations with Israel in 1982, and sending Zairian troops to Chad in
1983. The complete alienation of Mobutu from the United States or his
political demise would have serious implications for the United States
and cost Washington its closest friend in Africa.
wou a iminate a voice or compromise an po itical moderation in
southern Africa and a potential interlocutor for negotiated settlements
in the region.
Mobutu will press hard for increased US economic and military
assistance during his forthcoming visit, justifying his requests on several
grounds-faithful compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF)
programs; a 21-year record of support to US policies, particularly his
current support for UNITA; specific threats against him from Libyan
leader Muammar Qadhafi; and more general threats posed by Soviet
and Cuban-supported radical neighbor states. Although Mobutu has a
penchant for exaggerating security threats to his government, we
believe he nonetheless is one of Qadhafi's primary targets in Africa
because of his close ties to the United States and Israel. Tripoli is
providing limited support to Zairian dissidents in the form of funds and
training in sabotage and terrorism. In addition, Mobutu's discreet
support to UNITA has increased the prospect that the Angolan Popular
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Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime, with Cuban/
Soviet backing, may decide to renew serious support to Zairian Shahan
dissidents with the objective of new attacks on Zaire (such as occurred in
Shaba region in 1977 and 1978), even though the rebels currently are in
disarray.
We believe Mobutu's high expectations for increased Western
assistance are unlikely to be met. As a result, his current unhappiness
with what he sees as stingy levels of US aid and doubts about
Washington's reliability will be exacerbated, placing Zairian-US bilater-
al relations under as much stress over the next two years as at any time
since Mobutu came to power in 1965. In our judgment, however, his
pro-Western world view and long-term dependence on US, Belgium,
and French support leave him little room to maneuver. Consequently,
we believe he is unlikely to make any radical foreign policy changes
that could jeopardize his strong ties to the West. He nonetheless might
well take measures damaging to immediate US interests to further
register his disappointment should his forthcoming Washington visit not
result in increased support. Such measures might include previously
tried "attention getters" such as expelling the US Ambassador, or
Embassy, Agency for International Development (AID), or Peace Corps
staff. Moreover, he probably would implement some of the recent
proposals by the ruling party's Central Committee, such as limiting debt
service payments or reversing liberalization measures, that would
seriously jeopardize the IMF-supported reform program.
Mobutu's unhappiness probably will lead him to marginally im-
prove relations with Moscow in an effort to elicit more US aid, diversify
his sources of assistance, and improve his nonaligned credentials. To this
end, he may visit Moscow, agree to some limited economic or military
aid, and take other symbolic moves to improve ties.
Any rapprochement will be limited by Mobutu's deepseated
mistrust of the Soviet Union and his need to retain essential financial
and security relationships with the United States and other Western
backers. Although unlikely, a serious and prolonged rift in relations with
the United States over aid levels, particularly if combined with growing
security problems, could tempt Mobutu to make concessions to Moscow
such as assuming a more genuinely nonaligned posture or reducing
support to UNITA in return for military and security assistance
For its part, Moscow has two short-term goals in Zaire: improving
bilateral relations that went into a deep freeze after Mobutu suspected
the USSR of complicity in a 1984 Kinshasa airport bombing incident,
and driving a wedge between Zaire and the United States on the
question of material support to UNITA. The Soviets, however, are likely
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to continue to respond cautiously to Mobutu's overtures because they
are wary of being used by Mobutu solely to elicit increased Western as-
sistance, and are likely to only offer token economic and military aid
unless Mobutu shows clear signs of distancing himself from the West.
Zaire has taken several positive steps over the last three years that
have halted the country's economic decline and improved the potential
for economic growth, including:
- Allowing its currency to decline to a market-based exchange
rate.
- Lowering government budget deficits by cutting subsidies,
implementing parastatal reforms, and undertaking a variety of
other budget stringencies.
- Reducing government corruption, particularly in Gecamines,
the huge mining state enterprise.
At the same time, Mobutu-in a marked departure from the past-has
met rescheduled external debt obligations on time and has successfully
completed two IMF standby arrangements.
Despite these very positive steps, Mobutu has been unable to show
that significant economic progress and prospects for the next two years
are equally unfavorable largely because of factors beyond his control:
- Declining prices for Zaire's major exports-copper, cobalt, and
petroleum.
- A debt service burden that takes 25 percent of export earnings
and over 50 percent of the government's budget revenues.
- Continued reluctance of foreign investors to put new money in
Zaire because of both the lack of infrastructure and concerns
that Mobutu's three-year-old reform program may only be
temporary.
As a result of these factors, we estimate that real gross domestic product
(GDP) growth for 1986 will be about 2 percent compared to an IMF tar-
get of 4 percent; barring a major upturn in commodity prices, we
believe Zaire will experience only slow economic growth and a
continuation of the 10-year decline in per capita gross national product
(GNP) through the end of the decade.
Zaire's endemic corruption and Mobutu's strong need to assert
centralized control continue to be a drain on the economy, in our view,
while at the same time serving as a factor for stability. Although IMF
and World Bank fiscal reforms have significantly reduced diversions of
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funds into the pockets of the ruling elite, government officials still
regularly siphon off public money for personal gain. From Mobutu's
standpoint, allowing elites some access to public funds is critical to
maintaining his patronage system, while at the lower levels it serves as
an essential supplement to the meager salaries of public employees.
Somewhat offsetting this, Mobutu reportedly has used significant
amounts of his own personal funds this year to help the government
meet IMF performance targets and to improve living conditions in
military barracks. Mobutu's centralized control probably is a disincen-
tive to greater producer efforts and will be an obstacle to moving the
country toward more market-oriented policies.
Zaire's economic problems would be seriously compounded if
events in southern Africa disrupted rail transportation to South African
ports. Over 40 percent of Zaire's annual mineral exports and three-
fourths of the essential imports needed in the economically vital Shaba
region are shipped through South Africa via Botswana, Zimbabwe, and
Zambia, making Zaire hostage to the actions of numerous actors in
southern Africa. Although some trade could be rerouted at sharply
increased costs, current alternate transport routes would be unable to
handle substantial increases in volume, resulting in immediate lost
export earnings, longer term production problems in the critical mining
sector, and possibly even political tensions in Shaba region. Mobutu is
increasingly concerned by Zaire's vulnerability to South African coun-
tersanctions and to pressure from Frontline States such as Zambia and
Zimbabwe over his support to UNITA, and he may well promote
increased Western and US support to the Voie Nationale, Zaire's
internal rail/river transportation system, as a means to reduce Kinsha-
sa's vulnerability during his forthcoming Washington visit.
Mobutu-like most Zairians-is becoming
increasingly frustrated with the slow results of the economic reform
program. Although reports from a variety of sources suggest that he is
still committed to reform, we believe he increasingly sees the costs of
the IMF program outweighing the actual benefits. His frustration was
evident in his recent decisions to demote Prime Minister Kengo-
widely identified as the IMF's strongest advocate-and to tentatively
endorse proposals by the ruling party's Central Committee for econom-
ic policy changes that, if implemented, would derail the IMF and
World Bank programs in Zaire.
On balance, we believe the chances are only about even that Zaire
will successfully complete the current standby arrangement that runs
through March 1988. Although Mobutu is unlikely to make any
economic policy changes this year, he will be increasingly inclined to
backslide or even abandon the program in 1987 if the IMF and Zaire's
Western backers do not agree to significantly relax conditionality and
debt servicing terms.
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In our view, Mobutu's intolerance for competition precludes any
significant political reform in the next two years. We believe Mobutu's
political authority will be increasingly-but still unsuccessfully-chal-
lenged as he keeps the lid on discontent over painful economic reform
and the lack of political freedom. Although the domestic opposition
remains small and unorganized, it is gaining support among intellectuals
and lower ranking government and military officials.
Although Mobutu will first use co-optation and the veneer of
compromise to stifle dissent, we believe he would not hesitate to resort
to force, despite the condemnation this would bring from his Western
backers. Greater repression, however, risks undermining confidence in
his rule among the domestic elites, foreign backers, and military
leadership, in our view
Although externally based dissidents will pose no direct threat to
the Mobutu regime over the next two years, we expect them to carry
out occasional small-scale attacks that upset Mobutu and complicate his
ability to deal effectively with other internal problems. In our view, the
dissidents will continue to fail at forming a viable military force or
mobilizing internal support, resulting in little improvement in their
operational capabilities or ability to attract substantial amounts of
external support
Mobutu's support to UNITA and growing Libyan influence along
Zaire's eastern border, however, may lead some neighboring states to
begin direct support to anti-Mobutu rebels, thereby improving their
ability to mount sporadic small-scale, cross-border attacks. Although
Zairian military capabilities have improved considerably since the late
1970s, the armed forces are still beset with problems that limit their
ability to respond to even small-scale rebel attacks.
Libyan leader Qadhafi, who opposes Mobutu's close ties to the
West and Israel, has been the dissidents' main source of materiel
support since their invasions of Shaba region in the late 1970s. Tripoli
provides small amounts of arms and training, and we believe its backing
probably will remain limited unless the rebels overcome their internal
disarray. To date, numerous Libyan attempts to unite various factions
have failed, and, in our judgment, Tripoli is becoming increasingly
frustrated and has stepped up pressure on the dissidents to carry out ef-
fective military operations or risk losing support. Libya is likely to
continue its efforts to unite Zairian dissidents over the next two years,
but ethnic divisions, personal rivalries, and corruption probably will
undermine Tripoli's attempts to create a viable insurgency capable of
threatening the Zairian Government. Libyan training of dissidents will
continue, raising the prospect of new isolated acts of sabotage and
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terrorism in Zaire over the next two years. We cannot rule out Libyan-
sponsored attempts to assassinate Mobutu, either using Zairian or other
The traditionally mistrustful relationship between Angola and
Zaire is unlikely to improve over the next two years as the issue of sup-
port to each other's dissidents remains contentious. Luanda appears to
be pursuing a policy of diplomatic and psychological pressure in the
hope that Kinshasa would reduce its support to UNITA while also
encouraging other Frontline States to grant covert support to anti-
Mobutu dissidents in their countries. Should this prove ineffective in
intimidating Zaire, Luanda might take some limited military moves
such as limited cross-border operations into Zaire with its own troops or
small units of Zairian dissidents designed to shake Mobutu and disrupt
economically important mining facilities. In the event, however, of a
dramatic increase in UNITA activity in northwest Angola, especially in
Cabinda; serious Angolan military setbacks in the overall struggle
against UNITA;
we believe Luanda, with Cuban and Soviet backing,
may eci a to rearm Angolan-based Zairian dissidents for larger scale
incursions that would threaten the economically vital Shaba region and
perhaps weaken Mobutu's political position.
We believe Mobutu will continue to discreetly help UNITA
infiltrate into Angola and facilitate the transfer of materiel to Savimbi's
forces because of Zaire's own national security interests and because he
sees it as an opportunity to gain additional aid for Zaire. Mobutu's
willingness to support Savimbi more openly, however, will be con-
strained by fear of Angolan retaliation and concern that he will become
more isolated in the region because support to Savimbi would tie him to
South Africa in the eyes of many black African leaders. Should UNITA
suffer military setbacks during the next two years, we fudge that
Mobutu probably would come under pressure from Savimbi and South
Africa to provide increased support to UNITA in the form of staging
areas inside Zaire. Without specific security guarantees from his
Western backers, however, we doubt that Mobutu would risk such
visibly increased support.
In our view, the unique support offered to US security objectives
by Mobutu over the years derives in large part from his idiosyncratic
perceptions, as well as his unchallenged political position, which almost
certainly would not be carried over to a successor. Mobutu perceives
that the United States has repeatedly responded to his needs when he
has been faced with major threats to his government, and he sees this as
a special relationship. Mobutu also has used his power as an absolute
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leader to commit his government quickly to support US objectives. In
our judgment, a successor, even if well-disposed to the United States and
aware of Zaire's dependence on Western economic assistance, would
not have the depth of personal commitment to the relationship, nor, in
the first few years of rule, the sufficient authority to commit Zaire to
support US requests. Thus, even in the most favorable succession
scenario, we expect considerable loss to the United States in terms of
quick and decisive Zairian support to US requests. Kinshasa probably
would reduce its support for US policies in Angola and Chad, adhere
more closely to mainstream black African rhetoric on South Africa, and
be more cautious in allowing the United States use of its territory in sup-
port of US security interests.
Mobutu's death-especially if it were sudden-would greatly
increase the potential for serious upheaval, and a troubled transition
period would open greater opportunities for Soviet inroads and intensif y
Libyan meddling. On balance, we believe the chances are only about
even that, in the event of Mobutu's death, Zairian leaders will be able to
implement a transition that does not require military intervention or
lead to serious social unrest. We believe all of the identifiable contend-
ers for power would continue apro-Western policy. It is possible, but
we believe unlikely, that elements
such as lower ranking military officers who harbor anti-
Western views-could gain authority in a period of intense political
infighting among elites.
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Zaire's Rail Links With Its Neighbors
Zaire's Export
Economy and
Regional Divisions
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