DCI TESTIMONY ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND ITS SUBCOMMITTEE, THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01243R001400170002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 9, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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(DCL Copy)
DCI TESTIMONY ON
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AND ITS
SUBCOMMITTEE, THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
9 February 1989
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Director of Congressional Affairs
1 February 1989
Judge Webster:
At the time of your prebrief on this
hearing, I will be on the Hill with
Dick Kerr in connection with the confirmation.
of our Senate Division in my
office will assist you at the prebrief and
will accompany you to the hearing next week.
knows Senators Nunn and Glenn very
well. Although they are both on our
Intelligence Committee, this hearing is
being held by Government Affairs.
John A Helgerson
STAT
STAT
STAT
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STAT
STAT
OCA 89-0400
8 February 1989
NOTE FOR: The Director
FROM:
Deputy Director, Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Attached are questions--and suggested answers-- that
have been prepared by staff for Senator Roth to ask you
at Thursday's hearing on chemical and biological weapons.
Attachment
\\\
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THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS SAID LITTLE PUBLICLY ABOUT
COUNTRIES THAT POSSESS OR USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, YET
WE KNOW THAT PUBLIC PRESSURE IS ONE WAY TO DISSUADE
COUNTRIES FROM USING THESE WEAPONS. DO YOU BELIEVE
THAT LEAKS OF INFORMATION ABOUT COUNTRIES WHICH SEEK
OR ACQUIRE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DAMAGES
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?
YES, I DO BELIEVE THAT SUCH LEAKS ARE DAMAGING TO OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EXPLORES ALL
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON NUMEROUS SUBJECTS
RELATED TO NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING THE CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS OF OTHER NATIONS. WHEN ANY
DETAILS--GATHERED BY HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS--ARE MADE PUBLIC, OUR ABILITY TO GATHER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION DECREASES.
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YOUR STATEMENT SAYS CLEARLY THAT FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
PROVIDE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND EQUIPMENT. HOW CAN
YOU TELL THAT THESE FOREIGN SUPPLIERS ARE AWARE THAT
THE BUYERS ARE PLANNING TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS?
AS I HAVE STATED, THE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS NEEDED
TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE
LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS--SUCH AS PESTICIDES OR
PHARMACEUTICALS. BECAUSE THERE ARE CIVILIAN USES OF THESE
MATERIALS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME SUPPLIERS DO NOT KNOW
THAT THEY ARE FURNISHING MATERIALS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAMS.
IN ADDITION, AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY JUDGMENT THAT
A COUNTRY HAS DECIDED TO DEVELOP CHEMICAL WEAPONS
RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION FROM ALL AVAILABLE
SOURCES. IT IS THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE FROM ALL OF
THESE SOURCES THAT ALLOWS US TO MAKE SUCH JUDGMENTS.
ALTHOUGH I CANNOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS THAT LED TO THESE
ASSESSMENTS HERE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS ARE
INVOLVED--I WOULD BE AMENABLE TO PROVIDING THOSE DETAILS
IN A CLOSED SESSION.
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OCA 89-0296
1 February 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM:
Deputy Director, Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your 9 February Testimony on Chemical and
Biological Weapons
1. You are the leadoff witness at this hearing that is
intended to educate the public to the dangers of chemical and
biological weapons. Senator Glenn, Chairman of the
Governmental Affairs Committee, and Senator Nunn, Chairman of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, will co-chair the
hearings. This arrangement results from a dispute within the
Committee over who would hold these hearings, the full
committee or the subcommittee The idea for the sessions
originated with Senator Nunn.
2. Because of the extremely sensitive sources and methods
associated with our knowledge of chemical and biological
weapons, we have carefully scripted your opening statement and
the enclosed questions and answers with the Committee staff.
The staffers have been told what you can and cannot discuss in
open session. They accept our position and have assured us
that Senator Nunn will advise the Members of these constraints.
Senator Nunn will support you if you decline to answer
particular questions in public session. We have not yet
demarched directly with Senator Glenn's staff on this issue,
but we are confident that Senator Glenn also will understand
the need to protect sources and methods.
3. The hearings are scheduled for 9 and 10 February. Key
Administration witnesses are General William Burns of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Allen Holmes, Assistant
Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, and
Major General Arnold Schlossberg, Mr. Holmes' deputy.
General Burns will testify on the recent Paris conference and
arms control issues as they pertain to chemical and biological
weapons. Assistant Secretary Holmes will describe talks with
the Soviet Union and the Administration's reaction to pending
legislation. These Bills are included in the final tab. These
Adminstration witnesses will testify on 10 February. They have
been provided copies of your opening statement.
STAT
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Senator John Glenn and Senator Sam Nunn are the Chairmen of
the full committee and subcommittee respectively. Senator
William Roth is Ranking Minority Member of both. Senators
Glenn and Nunn are both members of the Armed Services and
Intelligence Committees. Senator Roth rotated off the
Intelligence Committee at the end of the last session.
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? _ ,
Georgia - Senior Senator
Sam Nunn (D)
Of Perry ? Elected 1972
Born: Sept. 8, 1938, Perry, Ga.
Education: Attended Georgia Institute of Technology,
1956-59; Emory U., A.B. 1961, LL.B. 1962.
Military Career Coast Guard, 1959-60; Coast Guard
Reserve, 1960-68.
Occupation: Farmer; lawyer.
Family: Wife, Colleen Ann O'Brien; two children.
Religion: Methodist.
Political Career Ga. House, 1969-72.
Capitol Office: 303 Dirksen Bldg. 20510; 224-3521
In Washington: Early in 1987, much of
the defense community in Washington was
preoccupied with debate over President Rea-
gan's efforts to reinterpret the 1972 anti-ballis-
tic-missile treaty. For several weeks, Nunn
avoided taking a position on whether the treaty
allowed, as administration officials argued,
tests of a space-based anti-missile system.
Then, one day in March, Nunn began a
series of three speeches outlining his views on
the issue. In a subdued voice, he laid out a long,
detailed analysis (in printed form, it stretched
to 98 heavily footnoted pages) of the history of
the negotiation and ratification of the pact.
The administration's reinterpretation was
''fundamentally flawed," Nunn said, conclud-
ing that the intent of the treaty had been to
ban the kind of tests Reagan sought.
The speeches ran like an electric shock
through the network of defense experts in the
capital. Within a few days, it was clear that the
administration would have great difficulty get-
ting its view of the treaty accepted in Congress.
Analysts agreed that Nunn had single-
handedly reshaped the course of debate over
the strategic defense initiative and arms con-
trol in general.
That incident was a perfect symbol of
Nunn's awesome influence over congressional
defense policy. His prestige is so great, and his
expertise on the issues so unchallengeable, that
he can exert a decisive influence in a dispute
the moment he offers an opinion. Becoming
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, as
Nunn did at the start of the 100th Congress,
represented only a small increase in the power
he had already held in the minority; his impor-
tance has always come more from his knowl-
edge and reputation than from his position.
Nunn's central role is all the more impres-
sive in that it has been achieved without the aid
of any notable flair for oratory or a telegenic
350
personality. While he does not neglect behind-
the-scenes maneuvering or subtle cultivation of
useful allies in the Senate, his chief strong
point has always been pure mastery of the
subject. He has become a power by the simple
expedient of knowing what he is talking about.
Perhaps even more remarkable is the way
Nunn's Senate reputation propelled him onto
the national political stage. As the 1988 cam-
paign began, a variety of factors ? notably the
importance of the South to Democratic presi-
dential hopes and the contrast between Nunn's
diligence and President Reagan's lackadaisical
management style ? worked to focus attention
on Nunn as a presidential candidate. Interest
in him was so strong that even his refusal to
campaign for the nomination did not quell
interest in his candidacy.
Nunn will have to cope with a serious
political problem if he does seek the presidency
in 1988 or thereafter: He is well to the right of
the national Democratic Party. But his differ-
ences with the Democratic mainstream have
narrowed in recent years, particularly on de-
fense issues. "I'm still more conservative than
most people in the Democratic Party," he says.
"But it's not as wide a gap as it used to be, and
I like to think that's because they're coming
towards the middle."
As chairman of Armed Services, Nunn
derives much of his day-to-day power from his
detailed knowledge of individual weapons pro-
grams and his ability to work out a consensus
on the hundreds of small decisions that go into
each year's defense authorization bill. He has
also established himself, however, as an impor-
tant thinker on more fundamental questions
underlying U.S. strategy in a nuclear world.
An advocate of increased defense spending
long before Reagan became president, Nunn
generally has supported the defense buildup
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undertaken by the Reagan administration. But
he has sharp criticisms of the way the adminis-
tration has managed that trillion-dollar re-
armament program.
Nunn argues that the administration's pro-
gram has lacked strategic coherence. Too much
has been spent on nuclear weapons, he feels,
and not enough on maintaining sufficient con-
ventional military strength to prevent a war in
Europe or elsewhere from escalating into a
nuclear conflict. Moreover, in Nunn's view, the
administration has been inordinately hostile to
arms control agreements even if they have the
potential to impose significant restraints on
Soviet military power.
A key point of Nunn's critique is that the
mditary spending increases under Reagan have
hsen more than matched by an expansion in
defense commitments. He worries that even the
beefed-up armed forces would not be able to
meet all the military demands potentially im-
posed on them by the administration's overall
defense strategy.
Typical of that view was Nunn's opposi-
tion to Reagan's military involvement in Leba-
non. He was a leading opponent of the 1983
War Powers Resolution that permitted Reagan
to maintain a Marine contingent in Beirut for
up to 18 months, arguing that "it is an abso-
lutely absurd military mission. We .are setting
up an unlimited mission ... with very, very
limited military power."
Nunn also has problems with the way the
administration has spent the increased defense
funding at its command. Calling the Pentagon
under Caspar W. Weinberger "a Department of
Procurement, not a Department of Defense,"
he argues that spending plans have focused too
much on complex new weapons systems, and
not enough on the spare parts, ammunition and
maintenance projects needed to keep the
armed forces in day-to-day fighting trim.
"It is clear that in the past six years our
pocketbooks have been exercised," Nunn has
said. It is less clear whether our minds have
kept pace."
One very serious flaw in defense policy,
Nunn argues, has been the rivalry and lack of
coordination among the separate branches of
the military. Nunn's longstanding ideas about
the weaknesses of the Pentagon's internal
structure were a key factor in the 1986 passage
of legislation reorganizing the military com-
mand system. The bill, which was opposed by
much of the Pentagon hierarchy, gave added
bureaucratic clout to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and lessened the independence
of the separate services.
NATO nations have been another target of
Sam Nunn, D-Ga.
Nunn's critical scrutiny; he feels that the
United States' European allies do not bear
enough of the cost of maintaining common
defense against the Soviet Union and its War-
saw Pact allies. He sponsored a key amendment
in 1984 that would have withdrawn up to
90,000 U.S. troops from Europe unless NATO
countries met their longstanding commitment
to increase ammunition stockpiles and build
certain air base facilities. While the amend-
ment was rejected ? after intensive lobbying
opposition from top administration officials ?
its relatively strong showing signaled a broader
congressional dissatisfaction with allied efforts.
As his stand on the ABM treaty illus-
trated, Nunn has also become deeply involved
in recent years in debate over the strategic
defense initiative 'SDI). Nunn has not always
pleased liberal critics of SDI the way he did in
early 1987 ? he has voted against deep cuts in
research funding for the project.
But Nunn has not been much comfort to
the administration on SDI either. His basic
position, developed along with ally William S.
Cohen, a Maine Republican, was reflected in an
Armed Services Committee policy statement on
SDI in the 1986 defense authorization bill.
Although the goal of an effective anti-missile
defense system deserves study, the two argued,
it is probably an impossible goal. Instead of
pursuing what Nunn has called the "grandiose
and unrealistic- goal of protecting the entire
United States from missile attack, they urged
that efforts be directed toward the more mod-
est goal of defending U.S. nuclear weapons
against a surprise Soviet attack.
Nunn also was deeply involved in the bat-
tle over the MX missile. He was a key player,
along with Republicans Cohen and Charles H.
Percy, in the 1983 negotiations that secured an
administration pledge to pursue serious arms
talks with the Soviets. in -return for congres-
sional support of the MX.
But Nunn has not been an especially en-
thusiastic backer of the missile. at least since
Reagan decided in 1981 to abandon Carter's
"race-track" basing mode. When the MX came
under increasing attack in 1984. Nunn did not
rush to its defense. He took no part in floor
debate on an amendment that came within one
vote of killing the project.
But Nunn helped push a major change in
MX policy through the Senate in 1985. Arguing
that it would be a mistake to deploy more
missiles in existing silos, where they could be
highly vulnerable to Soviet attack. Nunn
rounded up strong floor support for an amend-
ment to limit deployment to 40 missiles ? less
than half of what Reagan wanted ? until a
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Georgia - Senior Senator
new, more secure hosing mode could be de-
vised. Nunn and Reagan later agreed to a
compromise amendment limiting deployment
to 50.
Earlier in his career, Nunn focused most of
his attention on military manpower issues. He
remains the most forceful and persistent critic
of the volunteer Army and lobbyistfor a return
to the draft. He would revamp conscription
procedures to eliminate past inequities. but he
insists that the current Army could not win a
war. "Present military manpower problems are
so severe:' Nunn said in 1979, that our armed
forces would not be capable of meeting a na-
tional security emergency that required a rapid,
major increase in present force levels."
When he took over at Armed Services,
Nunn was continuing a Georgia Democratic
tradition ? he is the grandnephew of Carl
Vinson, longtime chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, and he occupies
the Senate seat once held by the revered Rich-
ard Russell, who chaired Senate Armed Serv-
ices.
Nunn did not leave the matter of commit-
tee assignments to chance when he came to
Washington. He teamed up with his great-
uncle Vinson, who by then had retired, and
visited all the major Senate power brokers.
starting with Armed Services Chairman John
C. Stennis of Mississippi. Nunn got the Armed
Services assignment. and he also made a favor-
able impression on Stennis and the late Henry
M. Jackson, another senior committee member.
Both men helped Nunn over the years.
Nunn inherited some of his great-uncle's
skill at bringing defense dollars home to Geor-
gia. He waged a bruising 1982 battle against
Jackson over whether to use some of the money
currently allocated for C-5 transport planes.
built in Georgia. to buy Boeing 747s, built in
Washington. Jackson's personal lobbying
gained an initial victory on the Senate floor,
but Nunn won in the end, preserving job-
creating contracts for his constituents.
On non-defense issues. Nunn's dominant
concern has been in fighting organized crime.
As chairman and ranking Democrat on the
Governmental Affairs Committee's Permanent .
Subcommittee on Investigations, Nunn has fo-
cused on uncovering corruption among union
leaders.
Nunn's investigations led directly to two
significant pieces of legislation ? one to crack
down on criminal abuse of the workers com-
pensation program for longshoremen, the other
to increase penalties for union officials found
guilty of corruption. While the two measures
died due to House opposition in the 97th
352
Congress, modified versions of each became law
in the 98th.
At Home: Georgia's dominant Democratic
figure. Nunn not only is secure in his own
office, but also has the clout to assist others, as
he demonstrated by helping Rep. Wyche
Fowler Jr. defeat GOP Sen. Mack Mattingly in
1986. With Nunn's imprimatur, Fowler was
able to mitigate his liberal reputation and cap-
ture crucial rural and suburban votes.
True to his history of caution, Nunn inter-
vened in the Senate contest only after carefully
weighing the variables. By working actively for
the Atlanta-based Fowler, Nunn risked losing
the conservative image that had earned him
hiportisan support and an overwhelming 1984
re-election. But the Senate race also provided
Nunn with an opportunity to play a Demo-
cratic leadership role ? one that would earn
him respect from more liberal party activists
and enhance his appeal if he sought higher
office.
By mid-1955. Nunn had quashed rumors
that he would quietly support Mattingly. And
though Nunn made no endorsement in the
Democratic Senate primary, he got behind
Fowler right after the nomination was settled
and campaigned vigorously for him. Nunn cut
commercials that portrayed Fowler as an urban
representative who looked out for rural voters,
especially farmers. Fowler's frequent dropping
of the senior senator's name generated a joke
that someone named "Wyche Nunn" was run-
ning for the Senate.
Fowler told audiences that his election
could ensure a Democratic Senate majority,
which would elevate Nunn's status. "A vote for
Wyche Fowler is a vote for Sam Nunn to be
chairman of the Armed Services Committee,"
Fowler said. Fowler edged Mattingly, Demo-
crats took the Senate and Nunn got his chair-
manship.
Nunn was a dark horse himself when he
first decided to run for the Senate in 1972, but
he turned out to be an ideal candidate against
David H. Gambrell, the wealthy and urbane
Atlanta lawyer whom Gov. Jimmy Carter
named to the Senate after Russell's death.
Nunn also was a lawyer and state legisla-
tor, but his central Georgia roots and kinship
with Carl Vinson allowed him to run as an old-
fashioned rural Democrat. He called Gambrel]
a "fake conservative" who backed Democratic
presidential nominee George McGovern, de-
spite Gambrell's denials of any such link.
Though Gambrell finished first in the pri-
mary, he was forced into a runoff with Nunn,
who intensified his attacks, all but saying
Gambrell's wealthy family had bought the seat
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by contributing to Carter's gubernatorial cam-
paign. It was enough to sink Gambrel!.
The focus shifted in the general election,
when Nunn encountered GOP Rep. Fletcher
Thompson. This time, it was Thompson who
used the McGovern issue. But Nunn countered
by obtaining the blessing of Alabama Gov.
George C. Wallace, then a conservative icon.
Despite his criticisms of busing and "wel-
fare loafers," Nunn also got the support of
black leaders, who claimed Thompson had not
spoken to a black audience in four years, even
though 90 percent of his Atlanta district was
!ion-white. Further big-name help for Nunn
-sine from Democratic Sen Herman E. Tal-
madge, at the time an institution in state
Sam Nunn, D-Ga.
politics, whose critical support in rural areas
helped Nunn offset his opponent's strength in
the Atlanta suburbs. Nunn won by 93,000
votes.
Six years later, Nunn's fiscal conservatism
and support for the military put him in such
good position that no serious challenger
emerged. The luckless Republican candidate,
former U.S. Attorney John Stokes, had little
money and ran a near-invisible campaign.
Nunn's 83 percent was the highest vote any
Senate candidate in the country received that
fall against a major party opponent. In 1984, in
a banner year for Republican candidates in
Georgia, Nunn dropped some -- to 80 percent
of the vote.
Committees
Armed Services (Chairman)
Governmental Affairs (3rd of 8 Democrats)
Fermanent Subcommiitee on Investigations (chairman): Federal
Spending, Budget and Accounting.
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and
the Nicaraguan Opposition (3rd of 6 Democrats)
Select Intelligence (3rd of 8 Democrats)
Small Business (2nd of 10 Democrats)
Export Expansion; Rural Economy and Family Farming.
Elections
1984 General
Sam Nunn (D) 1,344,104 (80%)
Jon Michael Hicks (R) 337,196 (20%)
1984 Primary
Sam Nunn (D) 801,412 (90%)
Jim Boyd (0) 86,973 (10%)
Previous Winning Percentages: 1978 (83%) 1972 (54%)
1984
Nunn (0)
Campaign Finance
Receipts Expend-
Receipts from PACs itures
$1.292.637 $381,914 (29%) $729,843
Year
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
Voting Studies
Presidential Party
Support Unity
Conservative
Coalition
S 0 S 0 S 0
58
58
69
64
70
59
39
42
29
33
29
31
50
57
44
49
57
59
43
41
55
48
41
39
75
88
83
84
82
84
S = Support 0 = Opposition
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (19861
Impose sanctions on South Africa 09861
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU APL-CIO CCUS
1988
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
30
30
35
40
45
35
55
57
73
28
68
47
47
43
45
35
64
32
50
59
74
42
67
72
16
10
17
11
16
15
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Ohio - Senior Senator
John Glenn (D)
Of Columbus ? Elected 1974
Born: July 18, 1921, Cambridge, Ohio.
Education: Muskingum College, B.S. 1962.
Military Career Marine Corps, 1942-65.
Occupation: Astronaut; soft drink company executive.
Family: Wife, Anna Margaret Castor; two children.
Religion: Presbyterian.
Political Career Sought Democratic nomination for
U.S. Senate, 1970; sought Democratic nomination
for president, 1984.
Capitol Office: 503 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-3353.
In Washington: When he took over as
chairman of the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee at the start of the 100th Congress, Glenn
decided it might be necessary to expand the
panel's workload beyond its traditionally small
agenda. But in keeping with his personality and
style, he warned against expanding it too far.
"Fhe problem," he said, "is to make sure you
don't have too many balls in the air."
That is a problem Glenn has never had to
worry about in his own Senate career. He has
spent more than a decade focusing on a handful
? a very small handful ? of issues with the
single-minded intensity he displayed as a mili-
tary pilot and astronaut earlier in life.
The preoccupation of Glenn's career, pre-
venting the spread of nuclear weapons to other
nations, is an unquestionably important goal
shared by most of his fellow senators. But
Glenn has pursued it to the frequent exclusion
of other issues, both foreign and domestic, that
would round out a comprehensive Senate
record. He is the polar opposite of the typically
ambitious legislator struggling to get his finger
into every pie. Colleagues who admire Glenn's
character and dedication wonder whether he
might have accomplished more if he had not
been so narrowly focused.
To a great extent, Glenn's career has been
restricted because that is the way his mind
works. He is not a man who takes readily to
new concepts, or easily shifts his tactics in mid-
course if circumstances warrant. But once he
gets an idea into his head, he sticks to it with
an unbending tenacity.
The obstacles posed by Glenn's style were
evident in his 1984 presidential campaign. Ad-
vertised for months as the main competitor to
Walter F. Mondale for the Democratic nomina-
tion, he made weak showings in a succession of
primaries and caucuses and quickly dropped
out of the race. Poor at public speaking and
1154
unable to draw much audience attention. Glenn
found himself portrayed increasingly often as
the astronaut candidate ? something that only
weakened his credibility.
Glenn has been no more exciting on the
Senate floor than he was in his presidential
campaign. His tendency to read speeches in full
? even when no one is listening ? can drive
his colleagues to distraction.
He is no horse-trader. When he is seeking
to muster support for an amendment, he
merely explains the facts and hopes they will
prove persuasive. Often that is not enough.
Glenn is the acknowledged expert in Con-
gress on the nuclear non-proliferation issue and
the author of key laws designed to prevent the
United States from being the source of nuclear
weapons capabilities.
In 1976, Glenn successfully pushed an
amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to countries
that exported or imported nuclear reprocessing
equipment or materials ? technology that can
be diverted into nuclear weapons production.
He was the chief sponsor and floor manager of
the 1978 act that placed controls on the U.S.
export of nuclear materials.
Glenn's anti-proliferation efforts have
brought him into frequent conflict with the
Reagan administration. He has sought to block
foreign aid to nations not complying with inter-
national efforts to control the spread of nuclear
weapons. In 1981, Glenn persuaded the Senate
to approve a provision threatening to cut off
aid to India or Pakistan if either detonated a
nuclear device. "If we can't draw the line there,
then we are incapable of ever drawing the line
anywhere," he said. The Senate agreed 51-45.
Glenn kept up his efforts in 1984, winning
initial Foreign Relations Committee approval
of an amendment barring military aid to Paki-
stan unless the president certified it was not
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trying to develop nuclear weapons. Under
heavy pressure from the administration, how-
ever, the committee later switched and ap-
proved a much less stringent substitute ?
spurring an uncharacteristic outburst from
Glenn. who denounced it for "waffling, knuck-
ling under and giving in" to the administration.
The next year, Glenn took on the adminis-
tration's proposal to sell nuclear-power materi-
als to China. Although the resolution approving
the sale called for efforts to prevent the Chi-
nese from transferring nuclear weapons tech-
nology to other countries, Glenn argued that
more protections were needed. The Senate ap-
proved his amendment requiring the president
to certify that all nuclear exports to China were
covered by aternational standards ensuring
peaceful use. But the administration quickly
mounted an all-out effort against the provision,
and it was dropped in conference.
At the start of the 99th Congress, Glenn
opted to leave the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, where he had spent his whole Senate
career, for Armed Services. He seemed eager to
move beyond nuclear proliferation issues to
broader questions of global defense.
Over Most of his career, Glenn has tilted to
the hawkish side on national security matters.
"No one has ever accused me of being soft on
the Soviets," he says. But he has disagreed with
much of Reagan's arms buildup.
In 1982, for example, Glenn offered a floor
amendment to stop development of the MX
missile. He argued instead for a smaller missile
that could be hauled around on trucks using
civilian highways ? an argument that had
serious political drawbacks. His amendment
was rejected 65-29.
When the Reagan administration proposed
selling AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia,
Glenn was willing to listen to the idea that the
Saudis needed advance warning protection for
their oil fields. But he insisted that the planes
should be delivered only on the condition that
American personnel accompany Saudi pilots on
their missions ? an idea that reflected his
concern over the possible loss of U.S. technol-
ogy to other countries. It was unacceptable to
the Saudis, and Glenn voted against the sale.
Glenn has backed the administration on
some key weapons systems, however. He is an
ardent advocate of the B-1 bomber, working in
the 99th Congress to add funds to make possi-
ble continued production of the plane in case
proposed development of a radar-evading
"stealth" bomber proved unfeasible. Glenn also
has supported "binary" chemical weapons.
Glenn's love for detail played an even more
irnnortant role in the debate over the SALT II
John Glenn, D-Ohio
treaty. He became the foremost Senate expert
on "verification," the procedures for monitor-
ing Soviet compliance with the treaty.
While the Carter administration prepared
to bring the treaty before the Senate, Glenn
was holed up in the archives of the Intelligence
Committee. studying the extreme complexities
of the verification problem. After the fall of the
Shah and the consequent loss of U.S. monitor-
ing stations in Iran, Glenn decided that ade-
quate verification was impossible, and the
treaty unacceptable ? a position that nearly
drove the Carter White House to despair. With
the onset of the Reagan administration. how-
ever, Glenn warmed to SALT II and to further
arms control efforts.
At Horne: Not long after he became a
national hero as the first American to orbit the
earth, Glenn returned to Ohio to challenge 74-
year-old Sen. Stephen M. Young in the 1964
Democratic primary. His space career had
brought him into close contact with the Kenne-
dys, and he was influenced by them to make his
political career as a Democrat. But he did not
get very far in 1964. A bathroom fall injured his
inner ear, and he had to drop out.
Following that, Glenn's political energies
subsided. Instead of attending party functions,
he immersed himself in business interests. He
served on the boards of Royal Crown Cola and
the Questor Corp., oversaw four Holiday Inn
franchises he partly owned, lectured and filmed
television documentaries.
In 1970. with Young retiring, Glenn de-
cided to run for the seat, competing for the
Democratic nomination against Howard M.
Metzenbaum, then a millionaire businessman
and labor lawyer. Initially a strong favorite,
Glenn found that his frequent absences from
Ohio over the preceding six years had hurt him
politically, giving him the image of an outsider
among state Democrats. Metzenbaum had the
support of the party establishment and a su-
perb and well-financed campaign organization.
Through saturation television advertising,
Metzenbaum erased his anonymity. And Glenn,
whose celebrity status was bringing out large
crowds, was overly confident. On primary day,
Glenn carried 75 of the state's 88 counties but
was badly beaten in the urban areas. He lost
the nomination by 13,442 votes.
Metzenbaum was beaten himself in the
general election by Republican Robert A. Taft
Jr. Three years later, however, he made it to
the Senate as an appointee, chosen by Demo-
cratic Gov. John J. Gilligan to fill a vacancy.
Metzenbaum immediately began campaigning
for a full term in his own right, and Glenn
decided to challenge him for the nomination.
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John Glenn, D-Ohio
The Metzenbaum appointment outraged
Glenn, and gave him an issue during their
rematch in the 1974 primary. Glenn rejected
Gilligan's offer to be his running mate as lieu-
tenant governor and denounced the governor as
a "boss" who practiced "machine politics."
The underdog Glenn of 1974 proved to be
much tougher than the favored Glenn of 1970.
With a reputation of impeccable integrity in a
year dominated by Watergate, he pointed to
Metzenbaum's long legal battle with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, although Metzenbaum
had never been charged with any wrongdoing.
A Metzenbaum countercharge ? that Glenn
didn't pay a state levy on his securities for one
year ? failed to halt Glenn's momentum.
This time, Glenn did much better in Metz-
enbaum's base of Cuyahoga County (Cleve-
land). Coupled with his customary strength in
rural areas, this allowed him to achieve a
91,000-vote primary victory.
In the fall, Glenn crushed a weak Republi-
can opponent, Cleveland Mayor Ralph J. Perk,
who was disorganized and underfinanced. Six
years later, he had only nominal opposition for
a second term.
In 1986, Glenn drew a slightly stiffer chal-
lenge from GOP Rep. Thomas N. Kindness, a
better-financed and more aggressive opponent
than the sacrificial lambs the GOP had offered
against Glenn before. Kindness pounded away
at what he saw as Glenn's main weakness ? a
lingering multimillion-dollar debt from his un-
successful 1984 presidential campaign.
Glenn had worked hard to mend fences
with Ohio voters in the wake of his failed White
House bid, making dozens of appearances
across the state in 1984 to boost both the
Democratic ticket and his own political stock.
But he was unable to erase the debt, which
included $1.9 million worth of loans from four
Ohio banks. (:Glenn did not reach an agreement
with the Federal Election Commission on pay-
ing off the debt until 1987.) Kindness main-
tained that Glenn received preferential treat-
ment from the banks, which the average
Ohioan would not get. But Kindness was un-
able to drive home the point. Not well known
outside his conservative southwest Ohio dis-
trict, he lacked the money to mount a statewide
media blitz that might have shaken Glenn's
image.
Kindness lost in a landslide, although he
did have the consolation of carrying nearly a
dozen counties. None of Glenn's previous GOP
challengers had carried more than one.
Committees
Governmental Affairs (Chairman)
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Armed Services (8th of 11 Democrats)
Manpower and Personnel (chairman); Conventional Forces and
Alliance Defense; Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
Special Aging (2nd of 10 Democrats)
Campaign Finance
Receipts
Receipts from PACs
Expend-
itures
1986
Glenn (D) $2,088,191 $637,186 (31%) $1,319.026
Kindness (R) $664,227 $172,648 (26%) $657,908
Voting Studies
Presidential
Support
Party Conservative
Unity Coalition
Year S 0 S 0 S 0
1906
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1156
42
42
'39
39
35
53
52
56
43
35
45
42
74
79
55
57
67
74
23
18
25
12
17
21
S = Support 0 = Opposition
29
42
28
20
26
34
70
57
51
52
51
66
Elections
1486 General
John Glenn (D)
Thomas N. Kindness (R)
1986 Primary
John Glenn (D)
Don Scott (0)
1,949,208 (62%)
1,171,893 (38%)
678,171 (88%)
96,309 (12%)
Previous Winning Percentages: 1980 (69%) 1974 (65%)
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL-CIO
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
65
75
65
65
70
80
30
27
5
16
28
7
87
86
67
93
87
68
CCUS
44
34
38
31
65
44
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Delaware - Senior Senator
William V. Roth Jr. (R)
Of Wilmington ? Elected 1970
Born: July 22, 1921, Great Falls, Mont.
Education: U. of Oregon. B.A. 1944; Harvard U., M.B.A.
1947, LI-1-3. 1949.
Military Career Army. 1943-46.
Occupation: Lawyer.
Family: Wife, Jane Richards; two children.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career U.S. House. 1967-71; Republican
nominee for Del. lieutenant governor, 1960.
Capitol Office: 104 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-2441.
In Washington: Roth is a legislator who
likes grand ideas ? massive tax cuts, huge new
savings plans, new Cabinet departments. He
has devoted most of his Senate career to pro-
moting one of these ideas after another, with
one notable success and a string of less-publi-
cized failures. When he is not drumming up
support for one of his schemes, he sometimes
has trouble making an impact; he is not a
senator who maintains an intense interest in
the day-to-day chores of legislative life.
Roth did have a season in the national
spotlight as the original co-author of President
Reagan's 1981 tax cut. He had to settle for
second billing, however. He calls the legislation
he sponsored "Roth-Kemp," but virtually ev-
eryone outside his Senate office refers to the
income tax cut ? 25 percent across the board
over three years ? as "Kemp-Roth," after the
younger and more dynamic co-author, Republi-
can Rep. Jack F. Kemp of New 'York.
Actually, the two tax-cut sponsors are not
identical in their economic views. Kemp has
never felt that. the level of the federal deficit
was a crucial issue as long as taxes were low
enough. Roth has always worried about the
effect of a massive tax reduction on the deficit
and the economy.
When the Senate Finance Committee was
gearing up in 1986 to produce a bill overhauling
the federal tax code, Roth liked the Reagan
administration's idea that taxes on individuals
and corporations should be reduced, but was
concerned that the revenue lost be recouped.
and in a way that would preserve incentives for
savings and investment. He proposed a "busi-
ness transfer tax." a kind of value-added tax on
gross business receipts. that would have raised
somewhere between $70 billion and $115 billion
over five years.
Roth wanted to use that revenue to finance
haver tax rates and a no we generous business
274
depreciation schedule than even Reagan had
proposed, and to pay for letting taxpayers
establish tax-sheltered "Super Saver Accounts"
with none of the withdrawal restrictions that
characterize Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs). The importance of personal savings has
been a recurring theme throughout Roth's con-
gressional career.
But the idea of a major new tax did not
appeal at all to Reagan. and critics complained
that businesses would simply pass on the tax to
consumers, hurting low-income people the
most. Roth's idea was not a factor in the
Finance Committee's deliberations.
In fact, after Finance Chairman Bob Pack-
wood pushed a streamlined tax-overhaul bill
through his committee in May 1986, Roth had
his hands full just trying to save the deductibil-
ity of IRA contributions. "I am concerned that
we are not doing more to promote savings,"
Roth said. "We should not be backing off
IRAs."
When the tax bill was being considered by
the full Senate. Roth attempted to marshal
support for several revenue-gaining proposals
that would offset the cost of allowing either a
tax deduction or a tax credit for IRA contribu-
tions. But the Senate heeded Packwood's pleas
to keep his committee's bill basically intact, so
Roth was reduced to lobbying for passage of a
"sense of the Senate" resolution that instructed
the chamber's conferees to assign "highest pri-
ority to maintaining maximum possible tax
benefits for IRAs."
That resolution passed 96-4. with Roth
hailing it as a measure that "will preserve
IRAs" and promising that as a conferee, "I will
fight to preserve the IRA." But in the House-
Senate conference on the tax bill, neither the
resolution nor Roth's pleas carried great
weight. Some low- and middle-income taxpay-
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ers were allowed to continue deducting IRA
contributions. but higher-income individuals
and employees with pension plans were not.
Roth voted by proxy against the confer-
ence report on the tax hill. Later he opposed an
amendment to pay for a tax credit for IRA
contributions by raising the corporate and indi-
vidual minimum tax rate.
In his six-year stewardship of the Govern.
mem Affairs Committee. Roth concentrated on
instituting a new retirement system for federal
employees, looking at new ways to organize
federal agencies and reforming federal procure-
ment procedures.
After three years of work in committee and
six months of conference negotiations, Con-
gress in 1986 finally approved a new retirement
system for all federal employees hired since
Jan. I. 1984. IA separate system covers those
hired earlier.) The battle was protracted be-
cause the administration was bent on reducing
the cost burden of federal retirement benefits,
while congressional defenders of federal em-
ployees resisted changes that would take
money away from workers.
The compromise that was reached tilted to
the workers advantage ? it cut the govern-
ment's costs by 2 percent, whereas the adminis-
tration had sought a 5 percent cut. But after
flirting briefly with a veto threat, Reagan went
along. The new system contained one feature
with the clear stamp of Roth ? an optional
tax-deferred savings plan that allowed workers
to contribute up to 10 percent of their before-
tax salary to a fund, to be matched by a federal
contribution of up to 5 percent.
Roth was ultimately unsuccessful in one of
his major reorganization efforts at Government
Affairs ? overhauling the structure of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Saying, "We're not satisfied with the 'M' " in
0N1B, Roth in 1986 won unanimous committee
approval of a bill creating new positions and
lines of authority at OMB with an eye to
improving federal accounting, procurement and
internal control systems.
But the unanimity of the committee's vote
reflected more a consensus for reform than
support for the method chosen by Roth. When
0N1B Director James C. Miller III objected to
the plan, and the agency made some policy
adjustments to address specific concerns of a
few senators, momentum for Roth's overhaul
evaporated.
To no greater effect, Roth tried to use his
committee chairmanship to promote his long-
standing goal of creating a Department of In-
ternational Trade and Industry. He argued that
creation of the Cabinet 'levelagency, composed
William V. Roth Jr., R-Del.
of the Commerce Department, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative and other federal
agencies concerned with international trade,
would help the l'nited States to compete better
in world markets. Roth's efforts were rewarded
in late 1984 when Reagan indicated his support
for a trade department. but that endorsement
did not help the proposal budge in the 99th
Congress.
The administration's own government-re-
organization proposals did not fare well in
Roth's committee. Although Roth supported
abolition of the Energy Department, the panel
was unable to reach a consensus on dismantling
legislation. Roth opposed the administration's
call to eliminate or downgrade the Education
Department, although he agreed to consider
ideas for streamlining it.
At Home: A mild-mannered man, Roth
has never been able to generate a great deal of
emotion among Delaware voters. But he has
been doggedly attentive to state interests, and
he has been rewarded for that service with
nearly two decades in statewide office.
Born in Montana and educated at Har-
vard, Roth came to Delaware to work as a
lawyer for a chemical firm and got involved in
politics. After narrowly losing a 1960 bid for
lieutenant governor, he became state Republi-
can chairman.
Running for Delaware's at-large U.S.
House seat in 1966. Roth entered the race
against veteran Democrat Harris B. McDowell
Jr. as a decided underdog. He talked about
Vietnam ? backing U.S. efforts there but
berating the Johnson administration for not
explaining the situation more fully ? and
about open-housing legislation, saying he was
opposed to it but willing to endorse state GOP
convention language in favor of it. Riding the
coattails of GOP Sen. J. Caleb Boggs and a
national Republican wave that brought 47 GOP
freshmen to the House in 1966. Roth pulled off
an upset.
McDowell tried for a comeback two years
later. But he had alienated members of the
state Democratic hierarchy by deploring their
"old and tired leadership." Buoyed by his first-
term record of strong constituent service, Roth
pushed his margin of victory to nearly 60
percent of the statewide vote.
With the retirement of Republican Sen.
John J. Williams in 1970, Roth became the
uncontested choice of the party against the
Democratic state House leader, Jacob W.
Zimmerman. A Vietnam dove, Zimmerman had
little money or statewide name recognition, and
the contest was never much in doubt.
In 1976 Roth had a strong Democratic
275
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C.
William V. Roth Jr., R-Del.
challenger ? Wilmington Mayor Thomas C.
Maloney. But Roth's efforts against busing had
given him an excellent issue to run on, and
Maloney was hurt by the coolness of organized
labor, which was upset over the mayor's frugal
approach to municipal pay raises. One state
labor leader openly called Maloney a "union
buster.- Roth's margin was down from 1970.
but he was too strong in the suburbs for
Maloney to have any chance to beat him.
Running for a third term in 1982, Roth
faced his most difficult Senate test. As cospon-
sor of the supply-side tax cut. Roth was a
visible target for complaints about the economy
? and, like other industrial states, Delaware
had felt the effects of recession.
David N. Levinson, Roth's hard-charging
Democratic opponent, encouraged voters to
link Roth to Reaganomics and the woes he
claimed it had produced. Parodying John
Steinbeck's novel about the Great Depression.
Levinson branded the administration's eco-
nomic blueprint "The Grapes of Roth."
The incumbent did not shy away from his
legislation; billboards advertising his candidacy
read, "Bill Roth. the Taxpayer's Beit Friend."
But he was careful to offer evidence of his
concern for Frost Belt economic needs. When
the Senate took up Reagan's first package of
spending cuts in 1981, Roth voted against re-
ductions in three programs important to Dela-
ware: the Conrail transportation system, trade
adjustment assistance to unemployed workers
and energy subsidies for the poor.
Levinson was an aggressive candidate, but
he was also one with serious flaws. A wealthy
real estate developer, he had made his fortune
in the St. Louis area, not in Delaware, which
Roth focused on in radio spots, suggesting the
Democrat had come into the state just to
challenge him.
Levinson campaigned for the seat for over
two years: his efforts garnered him endorse-
ments from labor and most of the other impor-
tant groups Democrats need to be competitive
statewide. But that was not enough. Roth lost
Wilmington, but more than made up the differ-
ence in suburban New Castle County and in the
rural territory south of the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal.
Committees
Governmental Affairs (Ranking)
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (ranking).
Finance (3rd of 9 Republicans)
International Debt (ranking): International Trade; Taxation and
Debt Management.
Select Intelligence (2nd of 7 Republicans)
Joint Economic
Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy; Economic
Growth. Trade and Taxes; International Economic Policy.
Elections
1982 General
William V. Roth Jr. (R)
David Levinson (0)
105.357
84,413
Previous Winning Percentages: 1976 (56%) 1970
1968* (59%) 1966' (56%)
? House elections.
1982
Roth (R)
Levinson (D)
276
Campaign Finance
Receipts
Receipts from PACs
(59%,
Expend-
itures
$841.146 $354,744 (42%) $794,210
$876,577 $184.172 (21%) $861,584
Voting Studies
Presidential Party Conservative
Support Unity Coalition
Year S 0 S 0 S 0
1986 83 16 83 13 80 17
1985 84 16 81 19 72 27
1984 74 18 85 10 83 15
1983 76 22 80 18 77 20
1982 77 20 76 22 83 16
1981 75 24 72 26 75 24
S = Support 0 = Opposition
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (19851
Weaken gun control laws:'985)
Reject school prayer (1985i
Limit textile imports (1985:
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (19.96
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL.C10 CCUS
1986 15 78 13 82
1985 20 70 14 83
1984 10 73 10 83
1983 30 56 13 50
1982 50 47 27 67
1981 20 67 32 78
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luatualvls 2uTuado
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SENATOR GLENN AND SENATOR NUNN AND MEMBERS OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND MEMBERS OF THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, I AM HONORED
TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TO DISCUSS THE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM
OF THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IS PART OF THE
DISTURBING TREND OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES. CURRENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT AS MANY AS 20
COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AND WE
EXPECT THIS TREND TO CONTINUE, DESPITE ONGOING
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO STOP THEIR PROLIFERATION.
A MAJOR QUESTION WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING IS WHAT
LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED FROM THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR, THE
FIRST WAR SINCE WORLD WAR I THAT INVOLVED SUSTAINED USE
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS OUTLAWED BY THE SIGNERS OF THE
1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD WAR II--EVEN DURING
THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES--BOTH SIDES REFRAINED FROM
USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS--WEAPONS THAT WINSTON CHURCHILL
REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."
1
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THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY HAS EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN,
TOO, EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND
READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY
BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS
THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR PRESIDENT
HAS SPOKEN OUT STRONGLY ABOUT THIS PROBLEM/AND A
SUREADILHAVE?READ?MANY?ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE
AND, EFFECTS OF -C1-1E-MtCAL?WEAPONS.
MANY COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING MUSTARD GAS, A
TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I. IT IS A FAVORITE
CHEMICAL AGENT FOR SEVERAL REASONS--ITS RELATIVE EASE OF
MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND ON THE
BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE WHO ARE
EXPOSED TO IT.
SOME COUNTRIES ARE ALSO DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS.
THESE AGENTS, THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN
CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND
2
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NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONS MAY USE COMMON
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE.
CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE
PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE
LUNGS.
ALONG WITH THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
TWO EQUALLY DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS ARE THE PROLIFERATION
OF BOTH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES.
WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS BEEN BREACHED. AT LEAST 10
COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO PRODUCE BOTH PREVIOUSLY KNOWN
AND FUTURISTIC BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS--INCLUDING TOXINS--ARE MORE POTENT THAN THE MOST
DEADLY CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, AND PROVIDE THE BROADEST
AREA COVERAGE PER POUND OF PAYLOAD OF ANY WEAPON
SYSTEM.
THE EQUIPMENT USED TO PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS IS TRULY DUAL?USE IN NATURE. WITH CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN BE
PRODUCED AT SUCH A RATE THAT Iti'TOCKPILES ARE NO LONGER
NECESSARY. THERE ARE NO PRECURSOR CHEMICALS OR
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EQUIPMENT THAT CAN BE USED ONLY FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS. ACTUALLY, ANY NATION WITH A
MODESTLY DEVELOPED PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CAN PRODUCE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, IF IT CHOOSES.
FINALLY, BY THE YEAR 2000, AT LEAST 15 DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES WILL BE PRODUCING THEIR OWN BALLISTIC MISSILES.
BALLISTIC MISSILES CONVEY IMPORTANT NEW POLITICAL AND
MILITARY STATUS TO THOSE WHO ACQUIRE THEM. MANY
COUNTRIES WHERE THESE MISSILES ARE BEING DEVELOPED ARE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST.
ALL OF THE THIRD WORLD MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
RELY ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TO SOME DEGREE. BUT MUCH OF
THIS CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY IS ALREADY DIFFUSED THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD, IS AVAILABLE FOR OTHER PURPOSES, OR CAN EASILY
BE DIVERTED. THERE IS ALSO EXTENSIVE SHARING OF TECHNOLOGY
AMONG THIRD WORLD MISSILE COUNTRIES, AND THEY ARE
INCREASINGLY POOLING THEIR RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL KNOW?
HOW.
WITH THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD
WORLD, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MUST BE ALERT TO
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ATTEMPTS BY THESE NATIONS TO ARM MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL
OR BIOLOGICAL WARHEADS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE U. S.
POLICYMAKERS WITH TIMELY AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE
CAPABILITIES OF COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE BALLISTIC
MISSILES AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
LET ME NOW DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE TROUBLED
MIDDLE EAST, THE CURRENT CENTER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION.
THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFFECTS THE
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN ARE IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN, AND LIBYA--NATIONS
THAT HAVE EITHER USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR HAVE BEEN
ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
IRAQ HAS PRODUCED CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS SINCE THE
EARLY 1980S, WITH SYRIA AND IRAN BEGINNING CHEMICAL AGENT
AND MUNITION PRODUCTION SHORTLY AFTERWARD. LIBYA IS
NEARLY READY TO BEGIN LARGE?SCALE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL
AGENTS AND MUNITIONS.
IRAQ, SYRIA, AND IRAN ARE STOCKPILING A VARIETY OF
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS FOR VARIOUS BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS.
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STOCKS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN OFTEN BE STORED
FOR A PERIOD OF 10 TO 20 YEARS.
THESE SAME COUNTRIES ARE ALSO QUIETLY PRODUCING AND
AMASSING A VARIETY OF MUNITIONS THAT CAN BE USED AS
DELIVERY SYSTEMS FOR CHEMICAL AGENTS. BOMBS, ARTILLERY
SHELLS, ARTILLERY ROCKETS, AND--IN SOME CASES--BATTLEFIELD
MISSILES HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH CHEMICAL AGENTS.
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAQ, IRAN, SYRIA,
AND LIBYA HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMON TRAITS:
? ALL HAVE BEEN GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY BY THEIR
GOVERNMENTS AND HAVE BEEN CLOAKED IN SECRECY.
? THE PRODUCTION COMPLEXES HAVE BEEN ACCORDED
STRICT SECURITY; IN MANY INSTANCES, ATTEMPTS
HAVE BEEN MADE TO CONCEAL THEM AS LEGITIMATE
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.
? ASSISTANCE BY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS HAS BEEN CRUCIAL
TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT.
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ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY FOREIGN SUPPLIERS--MANY OF
WHOM WERE FULLY WITTING OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST COUNTRIES TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS--HAS BEEN
THE KEY ELEMENT THAT HAS ENABLED THESE NATIONS TO DEVELOP
A CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WITHIN ONLY A
FEW YEARS. AND, WITHOUT THIS ASSISTANCE, THESE MIDDLE EAST
COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. FOREIGN SUPPLIERS HAVE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
TYPES OF ASSISTANCE:
? TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONS EXPERTISE
? CONSTRUCTING PRODUCTION FACILITIES
? SUPPLYING PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
? SUPPLYING PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
? SUPPLYING PARTS FOR MUNITIONS
? TRAINING PERSONNEL.
I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME DETAILS
ABOUT THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS OF IRAQ, SYRIA, IRAN,
AND LIBYA.
IRAQ
THE WAR WITH IRAN PROMPTED IRAQ TO ACCELERATE ITS
PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY. IRAQ
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HAS PRODUCED CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS SINCE THE
EARLY 1980S. THE MAIN CHEMICAL WARFARE COMPLEX, LOCATED
SOME 70 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF BAGHDAD NEAR SAMARRA,
AND A NUMBER OF OTHER PRODUCTION FACILITIES, HAVE
PRODUCED SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS.
FROM THE PROGRAM'S INCEPTION, FIRMS AND INDIVIDUALS
FROM WESTERN EUROPE WERE KEY TO THE SUPPLY OF CHEMICAL
PROCESS EQUIPMENT, CHEMICAL PRECURSORS, AND TECHNICAL
EXPERTISE. WEST EUROPEANS REMAINED AT SAMARRA EVEN AFTER
IT BEGAN OPERATIONS. BUT AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
IN PRODUCING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IRAQ'S WELL?ESTABLISHED
EFFORT NOW IS FAR LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
AT SAMARRA, BAGHDAD PRODUCES THE BLISTER AGENT
MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND SARIN. SEVERAL
TYPES OF WEAPONS--INCLUDING BOMBS, AND ARTILLERY SHELLS
AND ROCKETS--HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH THESE AGENTS.
IRAQ FIRST MADE MILITARY USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN
1983 AND 1984, WHEN IT BEGAN TO USE MUSTARD AND NERVE
AGENTS AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES. BAGHDAD CONTINUED TO USE
CHEMICAL AGENTS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DURING THE WAR.
MORE RECENTLY--AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE CEASE?FIRE WITH
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IRAN--IRAQ USED LETHAL AND NON?LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS
AGAINST KURDISH CIVILIANS.
DESPITE THE CURRENT CEASE FIRE WITH IRAN, IRAQ
CONTINUES TO PRODUCE AND STOCKPILE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MOREOVER, IT IS EXPANDING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY
AND IS TAKING FURTHER STEPS TO MAKE ITS PROGRAM ENTIRELY
INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
SYRIA
SYRIA BEGAN PRODUCING CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND
MUNITIONS IN THE MID-1980S AND CURRENTLY HAS A CHEMICAL
WARFARE PRODUCTION FACILITY.
SYRIA HAS NERVE AGENTS IN SOME WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
DAMASCUS CONCEALS ITS PROGRAM--IT IS QUITE CLOSELY HELD--
AND, MUCH LIKE ITS MIDDLE EAST NEIGHBORS, IS LIKELY TO
CONTINUE TO EXPAND ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IN
ALLOWING SYRIA TO DEVELOP ITS CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY.
WEST EUROPEAN FIRMS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN SUPPLYING THE
REQUIRED PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND EQUIPMENT. WITHOUT THE
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PROVISION OF THESE KEY ELEMENTS, DAMASCUS WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
IRAN
IN THE MID-1980S--AFTER NUMEROUS IRAQI CHEMICAL
ATTACKS--IRAN BEGAN TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL AGENTS AND
MUNITIONS, LATER USING THEM IN RETALIATION AGAINST IRAQI
TROOPS. IRAN'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY IS
LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF TEHRAN.
IRAN PRODUCES THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD, BLOOD
AGENTS, AND NERVE AGENTS AND, LIKE IRAQ, HAS FILLED BOMBS
AND ARTILLERY WITH THESE AGENTS.
REPEATED CHEMICAL ATTACKS BY IRAQ AGAINST IRANIAN
TROOPS PROMPTED TEHRAN TO SEEK FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO
QUICKLY ESTABLISH ITS OWN PRODUCTION PROGRAM. WEST
EUROPEAN AND ASIAN FIRMS RESPONDED BY PROVIDING CHEMICAL
PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS. DESPITE
THE CEASE?FIRE WITH IRAQ, IRAN IS CONTINUING TO EXPAND ITS
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM.
LIBYA
LIBYA'S RESOLVE TO HAVE A CHEMICAL WARFARE
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IS ABOUT TO BE ACHIEVED. A LARGE
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ILLEGIB
COMPLEX IN A REMOTE AREA ABOUT 80 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST
OF TRIPOLI, NEAR RABTA, HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED FOR THIS
PURPOSE. WHEN THIS SITE IS FULLY OPERATIONAL, IT MAY BE THE
SINGLE LARGEST CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT PRODUCTION PLANT
IN THE THIRD WORLD. BECAUSE IRAQ HAS A NUMBER OF
PRODUCTION SITES, HOWEVER, ITS TOTAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY
WILL CONTINUE TO EXCEED LIBYA'S.
LIBYA'S CHEMICAL AGENT PLANT IS EXPECTED TO SOON
BEGIN LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION OF MUSTARD AND NERVE
AGENTS--POTENTIALLY TENS OF TONS PER DAY. THE PLANT HAS
ALREADY HAD AT LEAST ONE SERIOUS TOXIC CHEMICAL SPILL AND
SUCH PROBLEMS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.
AN ADJACENT METAL FABRICATION FACILITY IS EQUIPPED
WITH THE PRECISION MATERIALS TO MANUFACTURE COMPONENTS
FOR A VARIETY OF BOMBS AND ARTILLERY. OTHER FACILITIES ARE
INVOLVED WITH FILLING AND STORING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR LIBYA TO
HARNESS THE TECHNOLOGIES NECESSARY TO BUILD AND OPERATE
SUCH A FACILITY WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN
COMPANIES AND PERSONNEL FROM SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN AND
ASIAN COUNTRIES. IWEST GERMAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN
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EXTENSIVE AT THE CW PRODUCTION PLANT. JAPANESE FIRMS HAVE
AIDED IN CONSTRUCTING THE METAL FABRICATION AREA. MANY
OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS HAVE ALSO BEEN INVOLVED,
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, IN CONSTRUCTION AND SUPPLY OF
MATERIALS FOR THE ENTIRE COMPLEX.
LIBYA'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN LARGE?SCALE CHEMICAL
WARFARE PRODUCTION WILL, IN LARGE MEASURE, DEPEND ON
CONTINUED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. OVER TIME, TRIPOLI WILL GROW
LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, BUT, FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WILL REMAIN DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN
SUPPLIERS TO PROVIDE CHEMICAL PRECURSORS AND EQUIPMENT.
ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS
ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES WE NOW
FACE.
BECAUSE MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PRODUCE
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE
LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, ANY PHARMACEUTICAL OR
PESTICIDE PLANT CAN BE CONVERTED TO PRODUCE THESE AGENTS.
A NATION WITH EVEN A MODEST CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COULD USE
ITS FACILITIES FOR PART?TIME PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENTS.
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LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI, IN A SPEECH DELIVERED IN
OCTOBER, CLAIMED THAT THE FACILITY AT RABTA IS INTENDED TO
PRODUCE PHARMACEUTICALS--NOT CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS--
AND HE PROPOSED OPENING THE COMPLEX FOR INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION. BUT WITHIN FEWER THAN 24 HOURS, IT WOULD BE
RELATIVELY EASY FOR THE LIBYANS TO MAKE THE SITE APPEAR TO
BE A PHARMACEUTICAL FACILITY. ALL TRACES OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PRODUCTION COULD BE REMOVED IN THAT AMOUNT OF
TIME.
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS SITE, HOWEVER, IS CLEARLY
CHEMICAL WARFARE PRODUCTION. THE SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT,
BUILDING DESIGN, AND SECURITY THERE FAR EXCEED THE
REQUIREMENTS OF A COMMERCIAL PLANT.
THIS CONCLUDES MY OPENING REMARKS ON THE
PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. I WISH
TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY KEEPS THE
ADMINISTRATION, AS WELL AS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF
THE SENATE AND HOUSE, FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
THIS AREA.
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION. I WILL NOW TRY TO
ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE, ALTHOUGH PLEASE
UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE CONSTRAINED BY THE NEED TO
PROTECT HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS.
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?
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CAN A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY BE VERIFIED?
IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO
MONITOR THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALL OF THE
EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS CAN
ALSO BE USED TO PRODUCE INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, AND ANY
PHARMACEUTICAL OR PESTICIDE PLANT COULD BE EASILY
CONVERTED TO CW PRODUCTION. IN ADDITION, THIRD WORLD
NATIONS OFTEN SHROUD THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS IN THE STRICTEST SECRECY, FURTHER COMPLICATING
OUR ABILITY TO ASSESS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE
CAPABILITIES. FINALLY, THESE COUNTRIES DEVELOP ELABORATE
MECHANISMS TO CIRCUMVENT EMBARGOES THAT ARE CURRENTLY
IN EXISTENCE.
ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE IT WOULD BE EXTEREMELY DIFFICULT
TO VERIFY A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY, THE U.S. IS WORKING
DILIGENTLY AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA TO
ENSURE THAT VERY STRINGENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE TREATY BEING NEGOTIATED. ALTHOUGH STRICT
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WILL HELP ENHANCE OUR CONFIDENCE
THAT THE TREATY WILL BE ADHERED TO, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO
IDENTIFY THOSE FACILITIES THAT ARE NOT DECLARED, AND EVEN
MORE DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE
TREATY.
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HOW DO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES VIEW NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN?
MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE MADE
PROPORTIONATELY LARGE INVESTMENTS IN THEIR CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THEY VIEW THESE WEAPONS AS THE MOST
EXPEDIENT MEANS OF ATTAINING A WEAPON OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FOR USE AS A STRATEGIC DETERRENT AGAINST
POWERFUL ENEMIES.
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN MUST BE LINKED TO A NUCLEAR
fl WEAPONS BAN TO PROVIDE A TOTAL BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION. IN THIS REGARD, MANY OF THE ARAB NATIONS MAY
BE UNWILLING TO GIVE UP THEIR CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS LONG AS
THEY BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
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DO THE SOVIETS SHARE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROLIFERATION?
BOTH THE US AND USSR HAVE MADE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
STATEMENTS CONDEMNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.
THE US HOLDS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
YEARLY ON THIS SUBJECT. THESE MEETINGS FACILITATE THE
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON A SUBJECT ABOUT
WHICH BOTH THE US AND USSR ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED. THESE
MEETINGS ARE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO THE MULTILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FOR A
WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL BAN.
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uoTluiajT Toad
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WHY DO SO MANY NATIONS NOW HAVE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAMS?
THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
BEGAN IN THE l_g_ULS, WITH THE IRAN?IRAQ WAR PROVIDING THE
IMPETUS FOR THE RECENT RAPID GROWTH OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAMS.
ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES HAD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AVAILABLE
IN WORLD WAR II, NEITHER SIDE USED THEM. PERHAPS THIS
RESTRAINT WAS A RESULT OF THE MEMORY--STILL FRESH IN THE
MINDS OF MANY--OF THE HORRIBLE EFFECTS CAUSED BY CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN WORLD WAR I. THAT RESTRAINT ENDED WITH THE
IRAN?IRAQ WAR.
LIMITED PUBLIC OUTCRY OVER THE USE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, COUPLED WITH IRAQ'S SUCCESSFUL USE OF CHEMICALS
ON THE BATTLEFIELD, MAY ACTUALLY SPUR OTHER NATIONS TO
DEVELOP AND USE THEIR OWN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
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CAN YOU PLEASE TELL US WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS?
AS I HAVE STATED, OVER 20 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO
DEVELOP CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. THOSE COUNTRIES
INCLUDE THE U.S., THE U.S.S.R, IRAQ, IRAN, SYRIA, AND LIBYA. FOR
INTELLIGENCE REASONS--SOURCES AND METHODS--I AM NOT AT
LIBERTY TO IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL NATIONS.
REGARDING THE AT LEAST 10 NATIONS WHICH ARE
DEVELOPING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES, I CAN ONLY
STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
PROGRAM.
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WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT TERRORISTS MAY
DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM
PROLIFERATING NATIONS?
WE CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT SUCH AN
EVENT COULD TAKE PLACE. WE ARE MONITORING CLOSELY THE
ACQUISITION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
CAPABILITIES BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CURRENT
OR PAST SUPPORTERS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS. WE
ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
DELIBERATE OR INADVERTENT TRANSFER OF THESE CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS TO THESE GROUPS. TO DATE,
HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT ANY SUCH TRANSFERS
HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
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WHY IS BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION A PROBLEM?
BALLISTIC MISSILES PROVIDE THIRD WORLD NATIONS WITH
THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE WELL BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD. THUS
EVEN A SHORT?RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE CAN PROVIDE MIDDLE
EAST COUNTRIES WITH A TRULY STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM.
ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAT COULD DELIVER
CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS HEIGHTENS THE ALREADY TENSE
SITUATION IN THE TROUBLED MIDDLE EAST. AND FEAR OF A
STRIKE?PRE?EMPTIVE OR OTHERWISE--WITH THESE WEAPONS
ONLY SERVES TO INCREASE THE INSTABILITY OF THE REGION.
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CAN YOU PLEASE COMMENT ON ANY OF THE RECENT
MEDIA STATEMENTS ABOUT IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE PROGRAM?
AS I HAVE STATED, AT LEAST 10 NATIONS ARE WORKING TO
DEVELOP BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. I CAN NEITHER
CONFIRM NOR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF AN IRAQI BW PROGRAM. I
CAN ONLY STATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE NATIONS
WITH A BW PROGRAM.
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STAT
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sulaTcloid TatluoD
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HOW EFFECTIVE ARE EMBARGOES OF PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS AT STOPPING CW PROLIFERATION?
THE US MEETS TWICE A YEAR WITH THE OTHER 18 MEMBERS
OF THE AUSTRALIAN SUPPLIERS GROUP TO DISCUSS
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON SHIPMENTS OF CHEMICALS THAT
CAN BE USED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. AS A
RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
HAS SLOWED, BUT NOT STOPPED.
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS HAVE CAUSED COUNTRIES AND
COMPANIES TO SET UP CIRCUITOUS ROUTES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
THE MATERIALS THEY REQUIRE.
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WHAT FUTURE ACTIONS BY THE US CAN EITHER STOP OR
SLOW CW PROLIFERATION?
THE RELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH ANY NATION CAN ACQUIRE A
CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY MAKES THIS A COMPLICATED
QUESTION. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE
ILQNS THAT WILL LEAD TO AN EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE
WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN THAT WILL BE SIGNED BY
ALL CHEMICAL CAPABLE NATIONS. WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN,
HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE IDENTIFIED ALL CHEMICAL WARFARE
PRODUCTION FACILITIES BECAUSE THE EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES
USED TO MAKE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN HAVE MORE THAN ONE
USE. THIS DIFFICULTY ALSO MAKES LIKELY THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THERE ARE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE NOT
YET IDENTIFIED.
THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD DIRL_M_MtS WITH BOTH
OUR ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS ON CURTAILING FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO THIRD WORLD CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS.
FINALLY, THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT INTERN_ATIONAL
EFFORTS TO EMBARGO PRECURSOR CHEMICALS.
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WHAT SORTS OF CONTROLS OR -EMBARGOES WOULD BE
EFFECTIVE AT STOPPING BW PROLIFERATION?
THE EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE NEEDED TO
PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS ARE TRULY DUAL?USE IN
NATURE. THERE ARE NO ITEMS COMPARABLE TO PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
AGENTS. BECAUSE ALL OF THESE MATERIALS HAVE LEGITIMATE
USES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL INDUSTRY, TRADE IN
THESE ITEMS IS UNRESTRICTED. NOR WOULD WE WANT TO DENY
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE CHANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR
HEALTH BY RESTRICTING THE TRADE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
EQUIPMENT. BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY LEGITIMATE MEDICAL
USES OF THIS EQUIPMENT, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO AGREE ON AN EMBARGO. AND
WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AN
EMBARGO WOULD HAVE VERY LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS.
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HAVE ANY U.S. FIRMS BEEN INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING
MATERIALS TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS?
AS YOU KNOW, IT IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO MONITOR ANY U.S. ACTIVITIES.
HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE FBI AND US
CUSTOMS SERVICE AND TO BE ALERT FOR ANY INDICATION THAT A
U.S. FIRM WOULD BE INVOLVED IN CW PROLIFERATION. ONLY BY
MAINTAINING THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP CAN WE HOPE TO
DISCOVER AND LEGALLY PROSECUTE ANY FIRM THAT IS INVOLVED IN
SUCH DEALINGS.
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WHY DO COMPANIES CONTINUE TO SUPPLY MATERIALS
TO CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS IN SPITE OF LAWS
BANNING THEIR SALE?
MOST OF THE COMPANIES THAT SUPPLY PRECURSOR
CHEMICALS, EQUIPMENT, AND EXPERTISE TO CHEMICAL WARFARE
PROGRAMS DO SO WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF EMBARGOES, THE MARKET FOR THESE
MATERIALS IS QUITE LUCRATIVE.
AND ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE FORMAL DIALOGS WITH OTHER
GOVERNMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT, YOU MUST REALIZE THAT OFTEN
INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT PROVIDE LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF
WRONGDOING.
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apua2malui jo oTou
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HAVE WE SHARED INFORMATION WITH OUR ALLIES ON
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THEIR COMPANIES IN CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION?
WE ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING THIS APPROACH WITH OUR
ALLIES, AND HAVE PROVIDED BRIEFINGS TO A NUMBER OF THEM.
WITH THE INFORMATION WE HAVE PROVIDED, WE ARE HOPEFUL
THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL PURSUE THEIR OWN LEGAL
MEANS OF INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING COMPANIES AND/OR
INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE PROVIDED MATERIALS TO VARIOUS
CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE DIALOGS
ON THIS SUBJECT.
,
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WHAT EFFORTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE
THAT THE U.S. HAS ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION?
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S 1985 CHEMICAL WAREAREREVIEW_COMMISSION, I CAN
ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE INCREASED OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE
ACCURATE AND TIMELY REPORTING ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE PROLIFERATION. WE ARE AWARE OF THE HIGH LEVEL OF
INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT, AND CONSISTENTLY EXPLORE ALL
AVAILABLE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS
WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUIRE.
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CBW LEGISLATION
Three bills have been introduced in the Senate to control
the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons. The bills
would impose sanctions ?on certain countries that have used
chemical or biological' weapons, or companies that have -aided
those countries in the production of those weapons. The bills
also require the President to make reports to Congress on
efforts by certain countries to produce chemical or biological
weapons and foreign companies that have assisted in the
production of those weapons.
Attached for your information is a brief analysis of the
bills, along with a copy of the bills themselves. We have also
included a suggested answer to a question on what your position
is on the legislation.
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STAT
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R
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LO_Ls.t. CONGRESS
1 St SESSION
NoruIr. n11 Wank I net exrert
thnse (or the date. nt.m,
I r. rrnre et( hII)
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Nft. .. Pell Lfor himself and Mr. Helms, Kerry,
McCain, Gore, Simon
Boschwitz, Dodd, Kassebaum,- .Burdick, Humphrey, Sanford, Bidgn,
r_ Harkin, Dole, Stevens, Murkowski, and Lugar
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
A BILL
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989
.0mnrItitle,,rbi!lher0
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control Act of 1989."
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
Section 2. The Congress finds that --
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(a) chemical weapons were employed in the recent Iran-Iraq
war and by Iraq in attacks against its Kurdish minority;
(b) the use of chemical or biological weapons in
contravention of international law is abhorrent and
requires immediate and effective sanctions;
(c) United Nations Security Council Resolution 620,
adopted on August 26, 1988, states the intention of the
Security Council to consider immediately "appropriate and
effective" sanctions against any nation using chemical and
biological weapons in violation of international law;
(d) the Declaration of the Paris Conference on Chemical
Weapons Use demonstrates the resolve of most nations to
reaffirm support for the 1925 protocol banning the use of
chemical and bacteriological weapons and to press for
attainment of a ban on the production and possession of
lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons;
(e) a growing number of nations, including Libya and
Syria, have or are seeking the capability to produce
lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons;
(f) the further spread of chemical or biological- weapons
capabilities would pose a threat of incalculable
proportions to friends and allies and undermine the
national security of the United States;
(g) the United Nations should create an effective means of
monitoring and reporting regularly on commerce in
equipment, materials, and technology applicable to the
attainment of a chemical and biological weapons
capability; and
(ll) every effort should be made to conclude an early
agreement banning the production and stockpiling of lethal
and incapacitating chemical weapons.
PURPOSE
Section 3. It is the purpose of this Act to mandate
United States sanctions and to encourage international
sanctions against nations that use chemical or biological
weapons in violation of international law; to require
semi-annual presidential reports on efforts by Iran, Iraq.
Libya and Syria and other developing nations to acquire the
materials and technology to produce and deliver chemical and
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biological weapons; to urge cooperation with other supplier
nations to devise effective controls on the transfer of
materials, equipment, and technology applicable to chemical or
biological weapons production; to promote agreements banning
the transfer of missiles suitable for armament with chemical or
biological warheads; to encourage an early agreement banning
the production and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating
chemical or biological weapons; and to seek effective
international means of monitoring and reporting regularly on
commerce in equipment, materials, and technology applicable to
the attainment of a chemical or biological weapons capability.
AUTOMATIC SANCTIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Section 4. In the event any foreign country shall use
chemical or biological weapons in violation of international
law or against its own citizens, the sanctions listed below
shall take effect against such country.
(a) The United States Government shall not sell the
sanctioned country any item on the United States Munitions
List.
(b) Licenses shall,not be issued for the export to the
sanctioned country of any item on the United States
Munitions List._
(c) The authorities of section 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the
export to the sanctioned country of any goods or
technology on the control list established pursuant to
section 5(c)(1) of that Act.
(d) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial
or technical assistance to the sanctioned country by
international financial institutions in accordance with
section 701 of the International Financial Institutions
Act.
(e) The United States shall not provide any military or
economic assistance (except for urgent humanitarian
assistance) to the sanctioned country.
(f) The United States shall not import any good,
commodity, or service from the sanctioned country.
(g) The United States shall not provide the sanctioned
country any credit or credit guarantees through the
Export-Import Bank of the United States.
(h) Regulations shall be issued to prohibit any United
States bank from making any loan or providing any credit
to the sanctioned country.
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(Th
(i) Landing rights in the United States shall be denied to
any airline owned by the government of the sanctioned
country.
WAIVER
Section 5. The President may waive some or all of the
sanctions listed above for a period not to exceed nine months
following the illegal use of chemical or biological weapons if
he determines that such waiver is in the national interest of
the United States and so reports in writing to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate. In making such a report,
the President shall present a detailed explanation of the
national interest requiring a waiver. In no event shall the
President have authority under this act to issue a waiver for
that country that would remain in effect beyond nine months
following the initial illegal use of chemical weapons.
NOTIFICATION
Section 6. Not later than five days after sanctions
become effective against a country pursuant to this section,
the President shall so notify in writing the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
CONTRACT SANCTITY
Section 7. The President may not prohibit or curtail the
execution of any contract or agreement (except for an agreement
to provide military assistance or to sell military equipment)
entered into prior to the date on which Congress is notified of
the imposition of sanctions against a country pursuant to this
section.
REMOVAL' OF SANCTIONS
Section 8. The President may waive any sanctions imposed
pursuant to Section 3 of this Act if the President determines
and so certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that the nation under sanction --
(a) has eliminated facilities for the production of
chemical or biological weapons and existing stockpiles of
?such weapons;
(b) has renounced the use of chemical or biological
weapons in violation of international law and provided
reliable assurances to that effect; and
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(c) has made satisfactory restitutior to those affected by
its earlier use of chemical or biological weapons in
violation of international law.
PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS
Section 9. Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this bill, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate a report on efforts by Iran, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria and other developing nations to acquire the
materials and technology to produce and deliver chemical and
biological weapons, together with an assessment of such
countries'-present and future capabillity to produce and deliver
such weapons.
to
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS
Section 10. The President of the United States is urged --
(a) to continue close cooperation with others in the
19-nation Australian Group in support of its current
efforts and in devising additional means to monitor and
control the supply of chemicals applicable to weapons
production to Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya -- nations that
currently support or have recently supported acts of
international terrorism
(b) to work closely with other nations also capable of
supplying equipment, materials, and technology with
particular applicability to chemical or biological weapons
production to devise the most effective controls possible
on the transfer of such materials, equipment, and
technology;
(c) to seek agreements with nations that produce ballistic
missiles suitable for carrying chemical or biological
warheads that would prevent the transfer of such missiles;
and
(d) to take the initiative in pressing for early
conclusion of an international agreement banning the
production and stockpiling of lethal and incapacitating
chemical or biological weapons.
UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
Section 11. The President is urged to give full support
(a) the United Nations Security Council, in furtherance of
Security Council Resolution 620, adopted August 26, 1988,
in developing sanctions comparable to those enumerated in
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Section 3 of this Act to be imposed in the event any
nation uses chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law;
(b) the creation by the United Nations of an effective
means of monitoring and reporting regularly on commerce in
chemical equipment, materials, and technology applicable
to the attainment of a chemical or biological weapons
capability.
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January .2j, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
can colleagues in introducing S. 7, a
ennipaiim finance pi mm propo.ial
v,hich is the most sueephig and tom-
prelicnsive ever int rooucecl in the
Senate. If ever there was a foundation
for a bipartisan approach to remedy-
ing many of the most troubling prob-
lems with the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, S. 7, the Dole-McConnell-
Stevens bill, is the foundation. I
strongly urge my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to take a hard look at
this bill. If true, bipartisan campaign
finance reform is the goal of the
Senate, S. 7, can be the starting point.
To the majority of Senators who do
desire solutions to the problems of
campaign finance, let me say that
there is only one avenue to that goal,
the road marked "bipartisanship." If
the Senate learned anything at all
from the extended debate on S. 2. it is
that Republicans view Democrat-de-
signed spending limits and the taxpay-
er financing of congressional cam-
paigns as an actual threat to the very
survival of Republican candidates.
Today's reintroduction, by the majori-
ty, of a bill which can only be de-
scribed as the "son of S. 2," does little
to reassure me that my friends on the
other side of the aisle have understood
our absolute rejection of the kind of
reform envisioned by S. 2. We will not
be a party to reforming ourselves out
of existence.
After all of. the hours, days, and
weeks, not to mention cloture votes
too numerous to recall, which were
spent on -S. 2 during the 100th Con-
gress, skeptics of campaign finance
reform are entitled to wonder whether
there is any basis for hope in 1989. Mr.
President, / am an optimist by nature.
My sense of optimism has not been
dampened, despite the course of
debate on campaign finance reform
proposals during the last Congress. I
remain convinced that men and
women of good will in the Senate can
reach agreement on a package of cam-
paign reforms which will benefit de-
mocracy without adversely effecting
any of the national political parties.
Yet to begin the process which will
lead to an agreement, someone must
make the first move. Today, I offer S.
7 as the first step on what we all real-
ize will be a long road. I urge all of my
colleagues to review this proposal very
seriously.
Many of the elements of the Con-
gressional Campaign Reform Act of
1989, the Dole-McConnell-Stevens bill,
have been ideas which I have long
championed. In fact, my own involve-
ment. in campaign finance law and
reform efforts goes back a long way,
Mr. President. including service as a
conferee on the bill which became the
Federal Campaign Act in 1971. Many
of the ideas which I've advanced in the
18 intervening years are included in S.
7, most notably, the dernocratintion
of political action committees, a sub-
stantial enlargement In the role of the
national political parties, and a recon-
figuration of the contribution limits
for individuals and PAC's so that indi?
ilital contributions will count for
more than %kill the contributioriS of
Political action commit tees.
As to the latter provision, Mr. Presi-
dent. I think that it is important to
note that while I do support a recon-
figuration of contribution limits. I do
not agree with those who believe that
political action committees exert a
pernicious influence in the political
process and should be abolished. On
the contrary, PAC's have played a
very constructive role in electoral poli-
tics and I challenge the notion that
PAC's exist solely to exert undue in-
fluence. My experience as a Member
of the Senate for 20 years and as the
former chairman Cf the National Re-
publican Senatorial Committee tells
me that such charges are without sub-
stantiation.
Mr. President, the Dole-McConne117
Stevens bill consists of nine very care-
fully crafted reform proposals. Each
provision stands on its own as a maior
advance toward bipartisan?campaign
finance reform. Taken as a whole S. 7,
is the most comprehensive campaign
finance proposal offered In this body
since I began my Senate service in
1968. I commend this bill to my col-
leagues and I ask unanimous consent
that a factsheet explaining each sec-
tion of the bill be, printed in the
RECORD at this point. Thank you.
There being no objection, the fact-
sheet was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Tam CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN REFORM Acr
or 1989
MAJOR PROVISIONS: RESTRICTIONS ON
POLITICAL ACTION COMMIz LLa
Lower the PAC contribution limit to
$1.000 from $5,000 per candidate per elec-
tion.
Require PACs to give their members the
names and addresses of all federal candi-
dates and the national political parties: and
require PACs to let their members "ear-
mark" their contributions for particular
parties.
RAISED INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMIT IN
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Increase the Individual contribution limit
for Congressional candidates to $2,000 from
$1,000 per election.
BROADCAST DISCOUNT/CAMPAIGN COST
REDUCTION
Allow Presidential and Congressional can-
didates to purchase non-preemptible time at
the lowest unit charge for precmptible time.
In the last 45 days before the primary and
the last 60 days before the general election.
FULL DISCLOSURE OF "SOFT MONEY" SPENDING
Require corporations, PACs. labor organi-
zations, and non-profits to report all spend-
ing for the purpose of Influencing a federal
election" through soft money activities, in-
cluding voter drives, telephone banks, and
membership communications.
STRENGTHENED DISCLOSURE OF PARTY FINANCE'S
Require complete disclosure by all nation-
al political party committees of receipts. ex?
pvndi tures, and soft money activi:ies in
Presidential and Congressional elections.
ENLARGING THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Increase the limit on "coordinated es-
pcmliture.s" by national political parties to
$0.05 from $0.02. multiplied by the voting
S 213
RI' population of each slate. and 0) $25.000
0-oio Si0,000 for lit?presvntativhs Iron
sla,e! \kith 0100 than ohe Reprevin a:
PH01:11CTIC)N AOAINST nymn.3).0;
Prohibit all bundling of contribetioils,
except by political party committees.
CONTPOLS ON INDEPENDENT EN PENDIV:riEs
Define "independent expenditures" to
prohibit consultation with a candidate or
his agents and require the FEC to hold a
hearing within three days of any formal
complaint of collusion between an independ-
ent expenditure conunntee and a caiididate.
Require all independently-financed politi-
cal communir.alions, to disclose the pPrson
or organization financing it: require that
disclosure be complete and conspicuous; and
require timely notice to all candidates of the
communic..a:ion's placement and content.
CONSTRICT THE "MILLIONAIRE'S tooexot.s"
Require Presidential and Congressional
candidates to declare upon filing for an elec-
tion whether they intend to spend or loan
over $250.000 in personal funds in the race;
raise the individual contribution limit to
$10,000 from $2.000 for all opporients of a
(-Indictee who declares such an intention.
Prohibit candidates from recovering per?
sena) ftintifz or loans put into their race from
contribution; raised after the election.
The eifeeti?e date of this legislation shall
be No?ernber 7. 1989 ?
By Mr. DOLE (for himself. Mr.
GAHM. Mr. HEINZ, Mr. DODD,
Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. KASTEN, Mr.
::'JE/TORDS, Mr. ROTH, Mr.
Bosorwin, and Mr. Coir):
S. 8. A.bill to amend the Export Ad-
ministra,tion Act of 1979 to impose
sancti,p1s against companies which
aided and abetted the prOlifera-
tion of chemical or biological weapons,
and for other purposes; to the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL
At7r
Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, I rise
today to introduce the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control Act?a bill
aimed at stemming the flow of chemi-
cal and biological weapons-related
technology and material to such irre-
sponsible and _dangerous states as
Libya. I am pleased that, a number of
distinguished Senators have already
joined me as cosponsors: Senators
GARN, HEINZ, DODD, MCCAIN, KASTEN,
JLIFFORDS, ROTH, BOSCHwiTz. and
COHEN. Senators GARN and HEINZ have
been the principal coauthors of this
legislation; they and their staff de-
serve much of the credit for what we
all believe to be a good product. In ad-
dition, I want to take note of Senator
DODD'S cosponsorship. This is truly a
bipartisan matter, and all of us look
forward to working with him?and
hopefully many others from both
sides?to move this bill.
I don't think anyone doubts the seri-
ousness and the urgency of this prob-
lem. The unchecked spread of chemi-
cal weapons is the most immediate
threat to regional peace and American
interests in the real world of 1989.
That is not. rhetoric, but reality.
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S 213 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
If the capacity to create, store, and
deliver chemical weapons finally falls
into the hands o! lunatics like Qadhafi
or fanatics like Khomeini, then we \\II
truly be in not a l)rave, but a scary,
new world. The capacity of rational
P n d responsible states to deter war wilt
be vastly diminished; the temptation
to war, or political blackmail, by Irra-
tional and irresponsible states will be
as t I y increased.
Last year, when I and others intro-
duced legislation very much like the
bill I am introducing today, I said that
the evil genie of chemical weapons had
already escaped from the bottle.
Today?as the headlines verify?that
genie is more out of control than ever.
Then. it was already clear that Iraq
had, and had used, chemical weapons.
?and that Iran. Syria, and Libya were
hell-bent on matching or exceeding
Iraq's capability. Now, we know
beyond question that Libya is on the
verge of achieving a massive chemical
weapons production capacity, and?as
this week's news reports attest?
moving ahead feverishly to develop
the capability to deliver such weapons
far beyond its own borders.
The genie is out of the bottle. And
this?these next months?represents
our last real chance to get it back
under control. This bill will not do the
job, by itself. But I and my cosponsors
are convinced -that this bill encom-
passes an approach that must?must?
be part of any serious, effective effort
to bring these terrible weapons of
mass destruction under the control of
some kind of international regime. .
The ultimate goal must be an inter-
national regime, in which all the na-
tions of the Earth join to wipe out all
chemical weapons, and establish an ef-
fective control mechanism to insure
they will never reappear. In the
medium term, we must aim at an
international regime to halt the
spread of chemical weapons capability
to all nations?but especially those
?.vhose pattern of international con-
duct has been patently irresponsible
and dangerous.
My bill makes clear we must bend
every effort to these ends, through
multilateral and bilateral diplomacy,
and the full force of influence and le-
verage we can bring to bear around
the world.
But, even as we pursue those goals,
there is something that we can, and
must, do now?and, at the outset, at
least, do unilaterally. Something that
will have a real impact; and something
that will send a powerful signal
around the world of American serious-
ness and resolve.
A chemical weapons capability is not
a home grown product in Libya or any
of the other countries of major con-
cern?the expertise, and much of the
equipment and material, must be im-
ported. Those imports can come from
only two sources?the East bloc states,
and the private sector of the Free
World. In fact, while their record is
far from perfect, it now appears that
the Soviets and their East bloc at
may be waking up to the danger that
the proliferation of chemical we pons
re;;Ivsetits to them, as well as to us.
Though there Is a long way to go,
there is some hope that they might
join us in an effective, international
control regime.
Meanwhile, though, we must cope
with this sad and dangerous fact: that
some Free World companies are not
only capable, but willing, to make a
buck by peddling chemical weapons-re-
lated technology and material to Libya
and other states of its ilk. We mast do
everything we can to stop the flow of
that technology and material, before
it is too late.
Our bill, which will amend the
Export Administration Act, attacks
both halves of the problem?the real
world fact that foreign firms are ?.al-
ready aiding and abetting Libya and
other nations acquire a chemical
weapons capability; and the potential
that American firms, perhaps inadver-
tantly, might, too.
In regard to the foreign firms?
which are beyond the direct reach of
our laws and export control systems?
we rely upon the powerful leverage of
the marketplace and economic reality.
Our bill will require a report from the
President on which foreign companies
are aiding and abetting the spread of
chemical weapons to target coun-
tries?those whose possession of chem-
ical weapons would raise a clear and
present danger to their neighbors and
regional stability, and might well con-
template their first use. Listing of any
firm will trigger sanctions against that
firm, totally shutting it out of the
American market for a long time?in
most cases, at least 2 years. even
should it stop its activities with the
target country immediately upon pub-
lication of the report.
The leverage we have and propose to
use is real. The experience we have
had with the so-called Toshiba case is
one bit of evidence to that effect. In
addition, we know of one major for-
eign firm which severed its ties with
Libya, largely because of just the in-
troduction of our similar bill of last
year. The message is loud and clear to
board rooms around the world?do
buisness with the likes of Qadhafi, and
you can kiss goodbye to the American
market. That threat might not be rele-
vant to some very small firms, or those
which think themselves smart enough
to hide their activities?again, we are
not claiming this is the whole answer.
But we think logic and the track
record to date indicates this approach
can work, in many important cases. It
can scare some people out of this unsa-
vory business; and it can keep a whole
lot more from being tempted to get In-
volved in the first place.
I should also add that our bill pro-
vides strong safeguards, to insure that
the Presidential report need not com-
promise any sensitive intelligence ac-
tivities, or undermine any other ef-
-
n u a ry 19,0
forts to halt the proliferation of diem
ical weapons.
The oilier half of the bill makes sure
that we have our own house in order,
too. That is important In its own right,
and important to insure that our
signal to our allies, and to foreign
firms, is credible. The bill will estab-
lish a new, tough control regime on
our own exports of technology and
material that is directly relevant to a
chemical weapons capability?to
insure that no such exports go from
American firms to target countries. It
will require the President to identify
the relevant technology and material.
and the target countries, and then re-
quire licenses for the export of any
listed technology/material to any
listed country. Penalties would be of
the same kind as exist under other sec-
tions of the Export Administration
Act?fines, and even imprisonment, for
violators.
That is the essence of the legisla-
tion. A more detailed summary of its
Provisions is included at the end of
this statement.
Let me again stress that we are not
proposing an American go-it,-alone or
ally-bashing approach. We must con-
tinue the effort, manifest in the Aus-
tralia group discussions and the Paris
Chemical Weapons. Conference, to es-
tablish an effective international
regime to stop the spread of chemical
weapons. We must use our diplomatic
skills and political influence to enlist
the voluntary support of both our
allies and adversaries in this effort.
Meanwhile, however, this bill can
both buttress and add teeth to that
effort, while having some real impact
on the problem in the immediate
future. This bill can spur other na-
tions to act responsibly, and can back
up any international regime which is
established.
The problem is very serious; the
hour is very late. It is time for us to
act. I hope all Senators will join me
and my cosponsors in this important
act, by joining us in sponsoring and
passing this vital piece of legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the bill and an analysis of
the bill be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 8
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United Slates of
America in Congress assembled,
sEcnoNI. SHORT TM.E.
This Act may be cited as the "Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control Act".
sEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that?
(1)proliferation of the material and tech-
nology to produce and deliver chemical and
biological weapons threatens American na-
tional security interests and regional stabili-
ty:
(2) reliable reports of Libya's attempt to
acquire a chemical weapons production and
delivery capability, et forts by Iran and Syria
to do likewise. and Iraq's use of chemical
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January 25, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
capons again.,i i-; Kiirds,h minorit y, are of
gra.:e concern to the ot her states of the
Ka,t Porsian Go I re! ,ion and to the
United States.
(3) any effort.: by Communist-bloc coun-
tries to aid and abet the production or use
of chemical or biological weapons, or the de-
velopment and deployment of delivet y sys-
tems for chemical or biological weapons, by
any state are deplorable:
(4) there are iiicreasing reports that major
corporations in certain non-Communist
countries have aided and abetted the report-
ed efforts of.Libya, Iraq. Iran, and Syria to
acquire chemical weapons production and
delivery capabilities and, if true, any such
activity by those companies is deplorable
and represents a threat both to American
security interests and the peace and stabili-
ty of the Middle East/Persian Gulf region:
(5) the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade recognizes that national security con-
cerns may serve as a legitimate basis for
constricting free and open trade; title XXI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade states that "(nlothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed ... to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests ....":
and
(6) international cooperation has so far
been unable to stem the trade in materials
essential to produce chemical weapons and
their industrial inputs.
sku. 3. POLICY.
(a) IN GENERAL?It should be the policy of
the United Slates to take all appropriate
measures?
(1) to discotirage the proliferation of the
material and technology necessary and in-
tended to produce or deliver chemical or
?logical weapons:
(2) to discourage Communist-bloc coun-
tries from aiding and abetting any states
from acquiring such material and technolo-
gy:-
(3) to Implement a United States control
regime to prohibit the flow of United States
materials, equipment, and technology that
would assist countries in acquiring the abili-
ty to produce or deliver chemical or biologi-
cal weapons; and
(4) to discourage private companies in
non-Communist countries from aiding and
abetting any states in acquiring such mate-
rial and technology.
(b) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.?The
United States should seek to pursue the
policy described in subsection (a) to the
extent practicable and effective through
multilateral diplomacy, including through
efforts such as the efforts of the so-called
"Australia Group" and the recently con-
cluded Paris conference on chemical weap-
ons-
(C) UNILATERAL ACTIONS.?The United
States retains the right to and should take
unilateral actions to pursue the objectives
in subsection (a) until such multilateral ef-
forts prove effective and, at that time, to
support and enhance the multilateral ef-
forts.
sKt. DEFIXITI(INS. ---
Section 16 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 24151 is amend-
ed?
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and
a) as paragraphs (9) and (10), respectively;
and
(2> by inserting after paragraph ) the
-(7) the term weapons' refers
to?
"(A) mirrobal or other biological agents or
toxins, v. hatever their origin or method of
prodortion. of t ypes and in quantities that
hays, no justif,eation for prophylaotic. pro-
f yet iVe, or (it or peace( ill purposes: and
-113) weapons, equipment, or means of de-
livery designed to use such agents or rosins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;
"18) the term "chemical weapons" refers
to?
"(A ) toxic chemicals, including supertoxic
lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals.
other harmful chemicals and their precur-
sors, including key precursors, except such
chemicals intended for poa(eful purposes as
long as the types and quantities involved are
consistent with such purposes; and
'113) munitions and devices specifically de-
signed to cause death or other harm
through the toxic properties of such toxic
chemicals which would be released as a
result of the employment of such munitions
and devices:".
SEC. 5. ANIENIIIIENT TO THE EXPORT ADMINIsTRA,
TION 5474W 1975.
Section 6 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App 2405) is amend-
ed?
(1) by redesignating subsections (k)
through (o) as subsections (1) through (p),
respectively: and
(2) by inserting after subsection iii the
following:
?k) Cnetencst WEAPONS.?(I) The Secre-
tary, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall establish and maintain, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of subsection
(m)-
-(A) a comprehensive list of goods or tech-
nology, whether military or dual-use items,
that would assist a country in acquiring the
ability to produce or deliver chemical or bio-
logical weapons; and - -
-(B) a list of those foreign countries
which are pursuing or expanding such abili-
ty, as determined by the President.
"(2) The Secretary shall require a validat-
ed license for any export of goods or tech-
nology listed under paragraph (1)(A) to a
country listed under paragraph (1)(B). The
Secretary shall deny any application for
such a license if the Secretary has reason to
believe that the goods or technology will be
used by a country described in paragraph
(I)(B) in producing or delivering chemical
or biological weapons or will otherwise be
devoted to such purposes. Issuance of a li-
cense by the Secretary shall be the only ap-
proval required for the shipment of goods or
technology on the list.
"(3)(A) Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of this Act, a determination of the Sec-
retary to approve or deny an export license
application for the export of goods or tech-
nology under this subsection may be made
only after consultation with the Secretary
of State, subject to subparagraph (B). In
any case where the Secretary of Commerce
proposes to take an action under this sub-
section without the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of State, the matter shall be referred
to the President for resolution.
-(B) in any case where an application sub-
ject to this subsection involves a military
item, a determination to approve or deny
such an application may be made only after
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense
and State. In any case where the Secretary
of Commerce proposes to take an action
under this subsection without the concur-
rence of the Secretary of Defense or State,
the matter shall be referred to the Presi
dent for resolution.".
SEC. 5. REpoRT.
Section 14 of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 '50 U.S.C. App. 24(31 is amend-
ed?
t 1) by striking the section heading and In-
serting "REPORTS";
12) by striking "Corin.Nrs" ill subsection
and insert Mg -ANNi, it. Ilt:PoRTs-, and
S 215
by adttnig at the end t o? folios
? et lierorri s ON AND But o..I(
WEAPONS MAT:ERS.?(1) Not later th.,.? 90
tiaN s after Ow date of eliartment of 1lUs
subsection, and every ltio (lays thereifier.
the President shall submit to the Speaker of
t he House of Representatives, the Minority
Leader of the House of Rupresentath.e.s, the
Majority Leader and Minority Leader ol the
Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on
Iinelligence and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representat it e; and
the Select Committee on Intelligence. I he
Committee on Foreign Relations, and t he
Committee on Banking. Housing, and Lit ban
Affairs of the Senate a report on the eliforts
of all foreign countries to acquire the mate-
rial and technology to produce and deliver
chemical and biological weapons. together
an assessment-of the present and
future capability of those countries to
produce and deliver such weapons.
"t2) Each report under this subsection
shall include an assessment of whether and
to what degree any Communist-bloc country
has aided or abetted any foreign country in
its efforts to acquire the material and tech-
nology described in paragraph (I).
'*3) Each SUn'll report shall also list-
-rA) each company which in the past has
aided or abetted any foreign country in
those efforts: and
"(B) each company which continues to aid
or abet any foreign country in those efforts.
as of the date of the report.
"14) Such report shall also include an as-
ses?iment as to whether any company listed
in paragraph (3)(A) or (3)(B) was aware that
the assistance provided was for the purpose
of developing a chemical and biological
weapons production and delivery capability.
"(5) Each report under this subsection
shall provide any confirmed or credible in-
telligence or other information that any
non-Communist country has aided or abet-
ted any foreign country in those efforts,
either directly or by facilitating the activi-
ties of the companies listed in paragraph
(3)(A) or (3)(B). or had knowledge of the ac-
tivities of the companies listed in paragraph
(3)(A) or (3)(13). but took no action to halt
or discourage such activities.
"(6) Nothing in this section-
-(A) requires the disclosure of informa-
tion in violation of Senate Resolution 400 of
the Ninety-fourth Congress or otherwise
alters, modifies, or supersedes any of the au-
thorities contained therein; or
"(B) shall be construed as requiring the
President to disclose any information
which, in his judgment, would seriously?
"(i) jeopardize the national security of the
United States:
-(ii) undermine existing and effectite ef-
forts to meet the policy objectives outlined
in section 4; or
"(iii) compromise sensitive intelligence op-
erations, with resulting grave damage to the
national security interests of the United
States.
"(7) If the President, consistent with para-
graph (6)(B), decides not to list any compa-
ny in that part of the report required tinder
paragraphs 13) and- (5) which would have
been listed otherwise, the President shalt in-
clude that fact in that report, with his rea-
sons therefor.".
syr. 7. SANCTI? FoRF:IHN ('oSIVysigs.
The Export Administration Act of 1.179 is
amended by inserting after section 11A the
following:
-CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL
VIOLATIONS
SEC. 1111. la) DETERMINATION BY VIE
PPISIDENT.--The President, subject to sno-
w. tr), shall apply sanet ion.s under sob-
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S 216 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
section (b) If the President determines
that?
"( I ) any foreign company has in the past
aided or abetted a country on the country
list prepared pursuant to section 6(k)(1)(B)
of this Act in acquiring goods or technology
that were used in producing or delivering
chemical or biological weapons or were oth-
erwise devoted to such purposes; or
"(2) any foreign company continues to aid
or abet a country on the country list pre-
pared pursuant to section (kk)(1)(B) of this
Act in acquiring goods or technology that
are being used in producing or delivering
chemical or biological weapons or were oth-
erwise devoted to such purposes.
"(b) Sam-ri0ri.?(1) Before October 1.
1990, the United States Government shall
not procure, or contract for the procure-
ment of, any goods or services from any
company referred to in subsection (a)(1).
-12) The United States Government shall
not procure, or contract for the procure-
ment of, any goods or services from any
company referred. to in subsection (a)(2).
The provisions of the preceding sentence
shall cease to apply upon the expiration of 2
years after the President certifies to the
Congress that?
'(At conclusive intelligence or other infor-
mation demonstrates that such company
has totally ceased to aid or abet any -foreign
country In its efforts to acquire goods and
technology described in section e(k)(1)(A);
and
"(B) in the President's judgment, it would
be in the national interest of the United
States to again procure, or contract for the
procurement of, goods and services from
such company.
"(3) The importation into the United
States?
"(A) before October I, 1990, of products
produced by a company referred to in sub-
section (a)(1), and
"(B) before the close of the 2-year period
described in paragraph (2), of products pro-
duced by a company referred to in subsec-
tion (a)(2) with respect to which a certifica-
tion under paragraph (2) was made,
is prohibited.
"(c) ExceerioNs.?The President shall not
apply sanctions under this section?
"(1) in the case of procurement of defense
articles or defense services?
"(A) under existing contracts or subcon-
tracts, including the exercise of options for
production quantities to satisfy United
States operational military requirements:
"(B) if the President determines that the
person or other entity to which the sanc-
tions would otherwise be applied is a sole
source supplier of essential defense articles
or services and no alternative supplier can
be identified; or
"(C) if the President determines that such
articles or services are essential to the na-
tional security under defense coproduction
agreements:
"(2) to?
"(A) products or services provided under
contracts entered into before the date on
which the President notifies the Congress of
the intention to impose the sanctions:
"(B) spare parts:
"(C) component parts, but not finished
products, essential to United States prod-
ucts or production:
"(D) routine servicing and maintenance of
products: or
"(E) information and technology: or
"(3) to companies which in the President's
assessment provided so-called "dual-use"
material or technology, and were unaaare
that the intended use of that material or
technology was the development of a chemi-
cal weapons production or delivery system.
-(d) Ftrvir.w or RELAT/ONS.- The United
States Government should review the full
range of its security, political, economic, and
commercial relations with any country
named in a report submitted under section
ltitg) for the purpose of paragraph (2) or (5)
of such section.
"(e) DErirtirloals.?For purposes of this
section?
"(1) the term 'component part' means any
article which is not usable for Its intended
functions without being imbedded in or in-
tegrated into any other product and which.
if used in production of a finished product,
would be substantially transformed in that
process;
"(2) the term 'dual-use', when used in the
context of chemical materials or technolo-
gy, means chemical material or technology
which may be utilized both in the produc-
tion or delivery of chemical weapons and in
the production or application of chemicals
for other uses:
"(3) the term -finished product' means
any article which is usable for its intended
functions without being Imbedded or inte-
grated into any other product, but in no
case shall such term be deemed to include
an article produced by a person other than
a sanctioned person that contains parts or
components of the sanctioned person if the
parts or components have been substantial-
ly transformed during production of the fin-
ished product: and
"(4) the term 'sanctioned person' means a
person, and any parent or successor entity
of the person, upon whom sanctions have
been Imposed under this section.".
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL
Acr .
Findings on efforts by Libya. Syria and
Iran to acquire weapons; Iraq's use of chem-
ical weapons; reports of assistance from
Communist states and major Western cor-
porations; and the failure of international
cooperation to stem the problem.
POLICY
To discourage proliferation of materials
and technology necessary to produce or de-
liver chemical/biological weapons:
To discourage assistance to these coun-
tries by Communist countries and Western
companies;
To implement a U.S. control regime for all
US. technology that could assist this capa-
bility:
To pursue multilateral efforts to control
these weapons; and
To take unilateral actions, where neces-
sary, to pursue these objectives.
Definitions of biological and chemical
weapons.
D.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
New subsection of the Export Administra-
tion Act creating a chemical/biological war-
fare control regime, including a comprehen-
sive list of controlled materials/technologies
and controlled countries.
Shipments of controlled technologies
would require licenses, with presumption of
denial to "problem projects."
Commerce would license in cooperation
with State and DoD, as appropriate.
Penalties for violations by companies sub-
ject to U.S. law would be those under the
EAA (administrative penalties, denial of
export privileges, fines and imprisonment).
Report due semiannually on?
Proliferation of material and technology
to produce and deliver chemical/biological
weapons; and
Assistance from Communist states and
Western companies in providing these capa-
bilities.
Bill provides for protection of classified
information and Presidential discretion not
January 2,5, 1989
to name companies if this would 1eopardir.?
national security. Intelligence sources or ef-
forts to meet objectives of the law.
SANCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES
If the President finds that a foreign com-
pany is aiding or abetting the chemical/bio-
logical warfare capability of a country listed
under the Cif3 warfare control regime In
the EAA, sanctions shall be Imposed?In the
case of companies that have provided assist-
ance In the past. denial of the privilege to
import goods Into the United States or par-
ticipate in USG procurement through Octo-
ber 1, 1990: In the case of companies con-
tinuing to provide assistance, import and
procurement sanctions for a period of two
years after the President certifies such as-
sistance has stopped or that it is in the na-
tional interest to resume USG procurement.
USG review of all security, political, eco-
nomic and commercial relations with coun-
tries aiding and abetting such proliferation:
Waivers for certain defense procurement:
space and component parts: routine service
and maintenance: and for companies the
President determines were unaware of the
intended use 'of "dual use" materials and
technology provided.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President. I be-
lieve that we are taking actions today
that will have a major impact on the
future of our Nation and the world.
The threat of chemical and biological
weapons is ultimately as serious as the
threat of nuclear weapons. While such
weapons may not be as lethal, they are
far easier to acquire and far cheaper
to use, and biological weapons open up
the spectre of genetic engineering and
a long-term threat to the existence of
our race.
I strongly support the efforts of the
Reagan and Bush administrations to
attack the problem of the prolifera-
tion of chemical and biological weap-
ons by strengthening the Geneva pro-
tocols, and the 1972 treaty on biologi-
cal weapons. I believe that we need to
press all nations to ratify such treaties
and agreements, that we need to move
toward international inspection, and
that we need to halt or minimize any
"defensive" research whose true pur-
pose could be the production of chemi-
cal and biological weapons.
At the same time, treaties will never
be enough. Anyone can sign or ratify a
treaty that involves no punishments,
and no inspection and verification.
Anyone can pass laws that appear to
block the sale of equipment and trans-
fer of technology. The entire history
of arms control tells us that agree-
ments without teeth are worse than
meaningless: They bury the problem,
rather than solve it. They withdraw
the problem from public attention
without halting the threat to peace
and to humanity.
We already have firm evidence that
these problems will reoccur in the case
of chemical and biological weapons.
Countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and
Syria have already signed the agree-
ments and treaties dealing with chemi-
cal and biological weapons. Nations
like West Germany and Japan have re-
peatedly assured the United States
they would never knowingly sell the
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January 25, 1989
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
equipment to dekelop and produce
chemical weapons.
It is painfully clear that the world
has heads of state whose word is
nearly worthless, and whose signature
on new agreements will be equally
worthless. We know all to well that
Iran and Iraq have used chemical
weapons. We know that all their
recent statements and assurances have
done nothing to slow down the produc-
tion of more weapons, or the restruc-
turing of their forces to use them. We
know that Libya and Syria are actively
following in their footsteps.
We also know that Iran, Iraq, and
Syria have long been interested in pro-
ducing biological weapons, and we
have growing reason to suspect that
Iraq is actually producing such weap-
ons. Further, we know that Iraq has
already misused international agree-
ments to obtain tularemia virus from
the United States. This Iraqi action is
particularly important because this
disease is nearly 10 times more lethal
in weapon form than anthrax, and be-
cause the United States obtained this
culture from the U.S.S.R., which
seems to have developed it for weap-
ons purposes in the period before the
1972 treaty We have every reason to
assume that Iraq may soon weaponize
two of the three most lethal biotox-
ins?anthrax and tuleremia?and it
may well be on the way to weaponizing
the third?equine encephelitis.
Further, we know that we cannot
trust even our closest allies to make
honest efforts to halt the sale of tech-
nology, feedstock, and equipment. We
have tried since the early 1980's to
persuade Western European States
and Japan to come to grips with the
problem of .the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction. The result
has been promises and lies.
We have seen the Government of
Japan and Japanese companies repeat-
edly deny their involvement in activi-
ties like the chemical weapons plant in
Libya when they either continued to
support proliferation or deliberately
Ignored the warnings of the United
States. If there is any honor or "face"
within the Japanese Government on
this issue, it certainly is not apparent
to me.
Worse, it is becoming all too clear
that the most senior officials and min-
isters of the West German Govern-
ment have known since the early
1980's that West German firms were
contributing to the proliferation of
chemical, biological, and nuclear weap-
ons. My good friend Senator HELMS
has already issued a roll of dishonor
listing the companies that have publi-
cally been associated with the prolif-
eration of chemical and biological
weapons. My office has updated and
expanded that list, and there are now
34 German companies on this list.
Let me also be blunt, I know that
the West German Government is de-
nying that it knew what was going on
in Libya, and that its Foreign Minister
is claiming to be shocked by what hap-
pened. The problem with these state-
ments is that it is clear that the West
German Government first denied
what it already knew to be the truth,
and that it has known for half a
decade that West German firms have
been assisting nations like Iraq and
Syria to produce their chemical weap-
ons.
It is inconceivable, that the Foreign
Minister of West Germany could
really be shocked by what happened in
Libya. In 1983 and 1984, and long
before the current investigations of
what happened in Libya. the West
German Government and the West
German Foreign Office were warned
in great detail that West German
firms were already involved in the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
It is inconceivable the United States
intelligence data that was then provid-
ed to West Germany did not-reach the
Foreign Minister. It is inconceivable
that the West German Government
ever really made the efforts it prom-
ised to make to investigate what was
happening and to halt such prolifera-
tion, and it is inconceivable that it did
not at least tacitly tolerate what was
happening. In fact, if West Germany
conducted even half the investigation
of West Germany's contribution to nu-
clear, chemical, and biological prolif-
eration that we in the United States
conducted of the Iran-Contra scandal.
I believe that Foreign Minister
Genscher would be forced to resgin.
In short, it is painfully clear that we
cannot place our trust in treaties and;
good intentions alone. We have to find
means of enforcing these treaties, and
we have to make it clear that we
Intend to fight proliferation with
something more effective than quiet
warnings and polite diplomacy. It has
to be clear that the foreign govern-
ments and companies have a clear.
choice: They cannot support or toler-
ate proliferation and maintain close
relations, or do business with, the
United States.
This is why I am happy to cosponsor
the legislation being proposed today
by Senator PELL and Senator DOLE.
While these two bills differ in scope,
they shape the range of action we
must take during the coming session.
At a minimum, they will establish seri-
ous sanctions against any use of such
weapons and will expose the govern-
ments and companies that aid prolif-
eration.
I hope, however, that we can go fur-
ther, and make it clear that any com-
pany that assists in the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction will
not be allowed to do business in the
United States.
I also must state that this is one case
where I believe that the evidence indi-
cates that such companies must be
judged guilty until proven innocent.
We have heard excuse after excuse,
and denial after denial. We have seen
companies use fronts, Swiss companies
S 217
and banks, and any form of plausible
deniability they can think of.
This country has no obligation to
excuse firms that aid proliferation, re-
gardless of their excuse. We cannot
excuse our own firms, and our support
of free trade has never meant the sup-
port of a free trade in death.
Firms are going to have to learn that
they cannot sell any element of chetni-,? -
cal or biological weapons without our
making every effort to drive them out
of business, whether or not their acts
are deliberate or were fully understood
by every member of the board. To put
it bluntly, I hope that we can agree on
legislation that has only one message:
One strike and you're out!
In summary, I believe that this is
one of those times when a combina-
tion of firm diplomacy and firm legis-
lation can really help avert a global
tragedy. We have already lived under
the threat of nuclear war for far too
long. The threat posed by the prolif-
ernjion of chemical and biological
weapons is equally dangerous, and we
must have the courage to deal with
that threat before it comes to shape
the world we live in.
THE "ROLL OF' DmHonoa-
Companies reported to be assisting in the
proliferation of biological, chemical, and nu-
clear weapons,
CNEA 'ARGENTINA'
(Supports Iranian nuclear efforts directly
related to the effort to develop a bomb,
Washington Times, April 22. 1987 and Econ-
omist Foreign Report. April 2, 1987.3
WORMOLD 'AUSTRALIA'
(Firefighting and security equipment for
Iraqi chemical warfare facilities, USN&WR.
Jan. 1989.3
IPLAEKT IBELOitim)
(Libya?cooling tower for chemical weap-
ons, Washington, Times, Jan. 16, 1989.3
CROSS LINK IBELGIUMI
[Libya?freight forwarding aiding pro-
curement of chemical weapons capability.
Stern. Jan. 12, 1989, Washington. Post, Jan.
14, 1989.]
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM 'BELGIUM'
(Sold 500 tons of thiodiglycol to Iraq for
use in production of nerve gas, Wall Street-
Journal. Sept. 16, 1988.3
J.C. TRADING itIR/TAINI
(Libya?freight forwarding -aiding pro-
curement of chemical weapons capability.
Stern, Jan, 12, 1989.
IHSAN SARBOUT/ INTERNATIONAL 'BRITAIN'
[Libya?general contractor siding in devel-
opment of chemical weapons, Washington
Times, Jan. 16. 1989.3 '
SARECO INTERNATIONAL LIAISON OPPICE
'CANADA
(Front Office for Iraqi effort to buy chem-
ical weapons. USN&WR.3
DISA .DENMARK'
ILibya?foundry equipment affecting
chemical weapons production. Washington,
Times, Jan. 16. 1989.1
PieMe note that these names come front ;nib.
sources and that there is no claim for istInli?
y.
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S218
1-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
DE DIETR lot (FRANCE(
(Libya-supplied glass-lined caldrons for
chemical weapons. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1. 19891
ALFRED TEVES GMBH (W. GERMANY(
(Libya-industrial cooling equipment for
chemical weapons, Wall Street Journal. Jan.
18.1989.)
BISCHOFF 4W. GERMANY)
(Libya-tools and machinery for chemical
weapons, Stern. Jan. 12. 1989.)
DEUTSCHE BANE (W. GERMANY)
(Libya-banking services for chemical
weapons. Stern, Jan. 12, 1989.1
FRANKFURT ZINK 1W. GERMANY(
(Libya-gas burning equipment for chemi-
cal weapons, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989: AP Jan.
13. 1989.)
GESELLSCHAFr FUR AUTOMATION 1W. GERMANY)
(Libya-computers, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989.1
HAMMER (W. GERMANY)
(Air conditioning for Iraqi chemical weep-
ons facilities, USN&WR, Jan. 1989.)
. HEBENGER BALI .W. GERMANY/
(Libya. chemical weapons-The Times.
London. Jan. 7, 1989.)
HERB/GER (W. GERMANY)
(Erected many buildings for Iraqi chemi-
cal weapons plants, USN&WR, Jan. 1989./
HUNNEBACK 1W. GERMANY)
(Libya-building materials for chemical
weapons. Stern, Jan. 12. 1989.)
I.B.I. ENGIN-Emma G.M.B.H. 1W. GERMANY)
[Libya-Contractor for Libyan chemical
weapons plant. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16,
_ 1989.l
IIIHAUSETI AND IMHAUSEN-CHLMIV G.M.B.H. (W.
GERMANY)
[Libya-precursor chemicals, Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 18, 1989; Washington. Post,
Jan. 14. 1989; New York Times, January 14,
1989.]
INTEC TECHNICAL TREADING LOGISTIC (W.
GERMANY)
.[Libya-air-to-air refueling. Stern, Jan. 12,
1989.)
KARL. KOLB 1W. GERMANY)
(Iraq -chemical warfare plant. Klaus
Frenzel, head of the Baghdad office sup-
plied laboratory equipment to the Iraqi
office that pioneered the development of
chemical weapons. Christian Science Moni-
tor. Dec. 13. 1988: Wall Street Journal, Jan.
14. 1989.1
? HONE 1W. GERMANY)
(Libya-overhead cranes for chemical
weapons, Washington Times. Jan. 16, 1989.)
KRAFTWERKE UNION (KWU) 1W. GERMANY)
(Works to support Iran in its nuclear
weapons effort using the Argentine Nuclear
Power Agency, as a cut out. Washington
Times, April 22. 1987 and Economist For-
eign Report. April 2, 1987.)
(CRESS CND KIEFER (W. GERMANY(
(Libya-stress engineering for chemical
weapons, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989.)
KRAUSS KOPF 4w. GERMANY)
(Iraq. chemical -weapons-International
Herald Tribune, Jan. 7-8, 1989.)
(CRESS AND KIEFER (W. GERALANy?
(Engineering firm that calculated stress
-----on Libyan chemical weapons plant, Reuters.
Jan. 1. 1989.1
LINDE (W. GERMANY)
I Libya-oxygen unit for chemical weap-
ons, Washington Times. Jan. 16. 1989.)
E. MERCK (W. GERMANY.
(Libya-Industrial cooling equipment for
chemical weapons. Wall Street Journal. Jan.
18. 1989.1
?ICKES! 1W. GERMANY)
(Depleted Uranium pins for Iraqi nuclear
reactors.)
OSTRAG 4w. GERMANY)
(Libya-ballistic missiles, Stern, Jan. 12,
1989.1
QUAST 1W. GERMANY)
(Reactor vessels, piping and centrifuges
for Iraqi chemical weapons plant.]
PAWLING AND HARNISHCHTEGER 1W. GERMANY)
(Libya-mobile cranes for chemical weap-
ons, Washington Times, Jan. 16, 1989.1
PILOT PLANT (W. GERMANY)
(A subsidiary of Karl Kolb. Helped Iraq in
building a chemical warfare plant. Christian
Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988.)
part:wan (W. GERMANY)
(Libya-water purification system for
chemical weapons, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989.)
QUAST (W. GERMANY)
(Iraq-corrosion-resistant alloy parts for
chemical weapons, and helped provide Iraq's
SEPP with two million pound pilot plant.
Reactor vessels, piping, centrifugres of has-
talloy. Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13.
1988 and USN&WR, Jan., 19893
RAAB KARCHER (W. GERMANY) ? ' _
(Libya-building materials for chemical
weapons. Der Spelgel. Jan. 15, 19893 '
ROHSTOF EINPUHR G.M.B.H. (W. GERMANY)
(Heavy water for nuclear proliferation to
India. Pakistan. and South Africa. Wall
Street Journal.)
SALZGIITER INDUSTRIEBAU GMBH (W. GERMANY)
(Libya-industrial planning for chemical
weapons, Washington Post, Jan. 17. 1989;
Washington Post., Jan. 17, 1989.1
.1. SARTORIUS (W. GERMANY)
(Libya-construction materials for chemi-
cal weapons. Stern, Jan. 12. 19893
SCH4Y17 GLASSWEREE (W. GERMANY)._
(Syria-corrosion-resistant glass pipes for
chemical weapons, Wall Street Journal.
Sept. 16, 1988.1
FRITZ WERNER (W. GERMANY)
(Support to Iraqi and Iranian chemical
weapons effort, USNSeWR. Jan.. 1989.) .
W.E.T. G.M.B.H. (W. GERMANY)
(Heavy duty pumps and chemicals for the
Iraqi chemical weapons effort, USN&WR.)
VER STAHLBAU (E. GERMANY)
(Libya-steel fabrication for chemical
weapons, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989.)
PEN ?SAO ISATERIA-MEDICA-CENTER. LTD. (HONG
KONG)
[Libya-document handling affecting
chemical weapons. Associated with Imhau-
sen, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989; Wall Street Jour-
nal. Jan 17, 1989.3
DR TRADING 1HONG KONG)
[Involvement in Lybian chemical and bio-
logical weapons. Associated with Imhausen.
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 17, 1989.1
JAPAN STEEL WORKS (JAPAN)
(Libya-bombs and production equipment
for chemical weapons. Mainichl, Sept. 15.
1988.)
MARVREHI ,JAPAN#
Libya-equipment for chemical weapons,
Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988.1
January 25, 1989
(cRS HOLI NND H V. TRADING COMPANY
N Fill ER LA N DS
(Bought thiodlgiyeol from Belgian chemi-
cal plant. in Tessanderloo Belgium. a subsid-
iary of Phillips. BBC Panorama.)
MELCHEMIE HOLLAND B.V. INETHERLANDS4
(Iraq-chemical precursors for nerve gag.
Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988.)
IMPRESSARIOS ACUPADOS USPAINt
[Involved in a consortium with
Kraftwerke Union and CNEA in supporting
the Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. Wash-
ington Times. April 22, 1987 and Economist
Foreign Report, April 2. 1987.]
ORD* A.G. (SWITZERIANDI
[Involved with Rohstof Einfuhr. G.m.b.H.
in supplying heavy water to India. Pakistan.
and South Africa, Wall Street Journal.)
ENERGOINYEST (YUGOSLAVIA)
(Libya-power substation supporting
chemical weapons facility, Washington
Times. Jan. 16, 1989.)
Mr. GARN. Mr. President, I rise
todar to join the Republican leader
and my other colleagues to put forth a
bill intended to stop the spread of
chemical weapons and delivery sys-
tems to terrorist states.
As you know, during my 14 years in
the U.S. Senate, it has been a primary
goal of mine to stop the transfer of
Western weapons and technology into
the arsenals of our adversaries, experi-
ence has shown that whjle technology
security is vital, it is extremely diffi-
cult to achieve and protect. We are at-
tempting to control the spread that, in
many cases, is relatively unsophisticat-
ed, but still deadly.
This bill we are offering, attempts to
ensure that we do not arm terrorists
or terrorist states with weapons capa-
ble of mass destruction. This bill also
ensures that we stop the transfer and
spread of weapons that the civilized
nations agreed not to use at the 1925
Paris Conference. This was reaffirmed
by 149 nations at the Paris Conference
last month.
Use of sanctions is sure to raise
voices of protest from governments
and industry. But, just as in the Toshi-
ba-Kongsberg case, we must send the
signal to the world realize that there
are some crimes the United States will
not tolerate. We must stand ready to
take unilateral action to stop the
export of such destructive technology-
I welcome the opportunity to co-
sponsor this proposal and look for-
ward to working with my colleagues
who are searching for a solution to
this threat to world peace.
Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, today the
United States is faced with a moral
and political crisis that may very well .
alter our entire concept of internation-
al relations. Through an almost uni-
versal consensus, nuclear weapons and
effective delivery systems have been
limited to the United States. the
Soviet Union, and a handful of other
nations. To a large degree, the close
control of these weapons has been re-
lated to the relative peace of the last
44 years. This is not to imply that
many long and bloody wars have not
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January 25, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
been fought, but rather that they
have not been allowed to escalate into
a superpower confrontation. Equally
Important, the belligerents have not
been able to drag each other into nu-
clear oblivion.
The spread of biological and chemi-
cal weapons may change this situa-
tion. The use of chemical weapons as a
"poor man's nuke" will upset the cur-
rent international balance of power
and will enable irrational countries,
such as Libya, to conduct terrorism at
a much more dangerous and grisly
level. It is our duty to prevent this
from happening.
Chemical and biological weapons
have a long, infamous history. During
Ghengis Khan's march into Europe he
herded disease-infected peasants and
animals ahead of him to spread conta-
gians in order to aid his conquest. Sev-
eral hundred yeais later, the Turks
flung plague infested bodies into Con-
stantinople during the siege. The 20th
century, however, has seen the most
extensive use of such weapons. World
War I was characterized by the devel-
opment and use of chlorine, phos-
phene, and mustard gas, all of which
were developed during the war. In
spite of the 1925 Geneva protocol
.Which banned the use of chemicals as
iveapons, the practice continued. The
Italians and Japanese used chemicals
during the 1930's in their attempted
subjugation of Ethiopia and China, re-
spectively.
The 1970's and 1980's have seen even
more use of these hideous devices. The
Soviets have used the most contempo-
rary chemical weapons in their occu-
pation of Afghanistan. The Iranians
and Iraqis gassed each other, and their
own people, in spite of international
condemnation. In Southeast Asia
there have been numerous instances
of yellow rain and several chemical at-
tacks conducted by the Vietnamese
against the Cambodians. In addition,
the Journal of Defense and Diplomacy
has reported many cases of chemical
use in Africa. The Libyans have used
chemicals many times against Chadian
forces. Furthermore, the Marxist re-
gimes of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mo-
zambique have each used a variety Of
chemical devices against anti-Commu-
nist resistance movements.
The result of all these cases, espe-
cially the Iraqi one, has been the es-
tablishment of precedent. Each time a
country gets away with this intention-
al outrage, it becomes easier for it to
happen again. The Iraqis ignored the
international community and used a
variety of chemical systems against
poorly protected Iranian forces. Iran,
with a population three times that of
Iraq, was stalemated. Regardless of
the fact that it possessed a 3-to-1 supe-
riority, which in military circles is the
requirement for a successful attack,
Iran was forced to the negotiating
table. The use of chemical weapons by
Iraqi forces wa.s a major factor in their
success. Furthermore, what was previ-
ously considered an unacceptable
weapon was used in massive propor-
tions In spite of the public outcry.
Thus, what was once considered to be
an extravagant luxury only for the su-
perpowers may soon be considered a
necessity for Third World nations,
In order to prevent the rampant
spread of chemical weapons, especially
to unstable, irrational, or morally devi-
ant nations, the United States must
act now. It is for this reason that I
join Senator DOLE, Senator GARN, Sen-
ator DODD, and others in sponsoring
the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control Act. The primary goal of the
bill is to discourage the proliferation
of technology and materials necessary
to produce chemical and biological
weapons and their delivery systems. In
order to facilitate this, the bill also
creates a domestic control system by
which U.S. technology and material
are controlled to problem countries.
Mr. President, this bill is designed to
Impact only on those who choose to
aid morally deviant nations. Essential-
ly, It creates a three-tiered system for
domestic controls. Any company who
follows these guidelines will have no
difficulty whatsoever. Only those
firms who choose to violate this proc-
ess will face repercussions.
The first tier is a list of countries, to
be compiled by the President, who
have either attempted, or are 'current-
ly attempting, to acquire material and
technology utilized in biological or
chemical weapons.
The second tier is a list of materials
which are unique or particular to the
production of such substances or to
their delivery systems. Items on this
list are to be considered controlled ma-
terials requiring a special license for
export and may not be sold to any of
the nations listed in the first tier.
The third tier is comprised of ordi-
nary items which are considered to be
dual use in that they are utilized int
the production of both ordinary items
and chemical-biological weapons.
These items are not to be controlled in
most circumstances, unless they are
sold; first, to nations listed in the first
tier; second, in conjunction with items
listed in the second tier; or third, they
are sold to nations who are currently
receiving shipments of components
from the second tier but not from the
same company who is selling the dual
use items. In these cases exports of
dual use items must be subject to li-
cense for export.
Mr. President, this bill differs from
other measures which put a blanket
halt on American goods as a tactic of
foreign policy, as President Carter's
1980 grain embargo and President
Reagan's 1982 pipeline embargo did.
These measures only hurt American
firms while barely affecting the Soviet
Union. This bill will only limit trade to
certain countries in a few particular
items. Furthermore, we hope that our
friends and allies will follow our lead
in this area and will help to place an
effective quarantine on undesirable
nations lo keep them from acquiring
S 219
chemieal 'apons capabilities. It
would be ideal if all countries would
accept the responsibility of ensuring
that their businesses adhered to the
same moral standards by which na-
tions are judged. Companies like To-
shiba and Imhausen would then be
much less inclined to put profits
before the people of the world.
Nevertheless, should others shrink
from their responsibility, the bill pro-
vides for action against foreign compa-
nies who violate these standards.
While the United States can neither
fine nor imprison violators, sanctions
can be imposed by the President. Such
companies can be denied the privilege
to import goods into the United States
or to participate in U.S. Government
procurement procedures. While we sin-
cerely hope that such measures will
not have to be taken, they will be if
businesses refuse to accept their moral
and social responsibilities.
Mr. President, it is well known that I
am not one to join country of the
month movements. I do not see how
such improvised schemes further the
role and the respectability of the
United States and its Congress. Yet
sometimes they contain the roots of
the, problem, and if refined can be a
useful and responsible solution. This
bill is an outgrowth of such a move-
ment. It has evolved from focusing on
four specific countries to addressing
the proliferation of biological and
chemical weapons world-wide. It has
been honed and refined to meet both
current and future needs of the
United States, criteria that all legisla-
tion should be expected to maintain.
The threat is very real, very present.
Maybe not today, not tomorrow, or
possibly not even next month, but
soon. Sooner than we all wish, irre-
sponsible nations will be threatening
civilized society and holding chemical
and biological weapons over each
others' heads. We must act now to
bring some sense into this most dan-
gerous situation.
DOLE (for himself, Mr. ARM-
STRONG, Mr. KASTEN, Mr.
SYMMS, Mr. WILSON, Mr.
DURENBERGER, Mr. LUGAR, Mr.
HELMS, and Mr. Rom):
S. 9. A bill to amend title II of the
Social Security Act to phase out the
earnings test over a 5-year period for
individuals who have attained retire-
ment age, and for other purposes; to
the Committee on Finance.
LIBERALIZATION or SARNINGS =ST PROVISIONS
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, President
Bush in his inaugural address called
for a rebirth of personal activism,
saying, "we must bring in the genera-
tions, harnessing the unused talent of
the elderly ? ? ?."
Mr. President. the best way to har-
ness the unused talent of the elderly Is
to repeal the very law that discourages
senior citizens from using their talent,
the Social Security earnings limit.
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S 678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tithe and would devastate the depend-
ent communities in southeast Ala.-3)(a.
Administration of the Tonga.ss Na-
tional Forest has been far from per-
fect. Problems have been Identified
with excesses in the expenditure of
funds and the preparation of timber
beyond what was demanded in the
down market period. I believe that
subjecting the timber program to the
annual appropriations process will
answer these problems without dis-
turbing the delicate land use balance
of multiple use and wilderness in the
Tongass National Forest.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of the bill be print-
ed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the bin
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S.237
Be it enacted bp the Senate and the House
of Representatives at the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act (Public Law 96-487. as amended) is
amended by striking Section 705(a) and in-
serting in lieu thereof the following subsec-
tion:
Sec. 705. (a) Subject to available appro-
priations, the Secretary of Agriculture is au-
thorized and directed to carry out a pro-
gram of intensive management of the com-
mercial forest land of the Tongass National
Forest in order to assure the availability of
a sufficient supply of timber to achieve an
allowable sale quantity of 4.5 billion board
feet per decade. For each fiscal year the
Secretary of Agriculture shall prepare and
offer for sale or release timber volumes on
the Tongass National Forest based upon his
estimate of the annual demand of the de-
pendent industry and the sustained yield ca-
pacity of the forest. The Secretary of Agri-
culture shall base his annual estimate upon
projections of future Umber demand.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise
today to cosponsor a bill with my col-
league from Alaska which we hope will
put to rest a dispute which threatens
the economy of a region of our State.
Management of Alaska's Tongass
National Forest has repeatedly been a
bone of contention during my career
In the Senate. During the mid-seven-
ties it was injected into the Alaska
lands debate. The issue then was how
much of the Tongass should be set
aside in wilderness.
Alaskans saw the problem as how we
were to overcome the economic costs
of wilderness withdrawals. Timber
harvesting was and is a mainstay of
southeast Alaska's eCODOnly. We recog-
nized that as the wilderness proposals
increased in size, the amount of the
forest remaining for multiple use?in-
cluding timber harvesting?would
shrink.
The wilderness proponents came for-
ward with a compromise which was in-
corporated into the Alaska Lands Act
in 1980. A third of the forest went into
wilderness, and to make up for the lost
timber base a permanent appropria-
tion was established to guarantee
funding for intensive management of
the remainder of the forest. That set-
tled the issue for little more than 5
years. But in that compromise was the
source of the current diz,pute, which
has been brewing now for nearly 4
years.
Timber markets slumped in the
early eighties. Nationwide, the timber
Industry went through a devastating
recession. Looking only at Alaska, this
led to several related problems.
Stumpage rates?the amount compa-
nies pay for logs harvested from the
National Forests?dropped to a few
dollars per thousand board feet. This
happened because stumpage is calcu-
lated backward from the market value
of the wood products, subtracting har-
vesting costs. As the value of wood
products dropped, so did stumpage.
Higher stumpage rates would have
forced companies to either operate at
a loss, or set their prices above the
market rate?with a resulting loss of
sales.
Even with low stumpage rides, the
? market became so poor that harvest
rates in Alaska dropped to less than
half their previous levels. The system
did not respond to lower demand for
timber in Alaska. The Forest Service
was required to prepare timber for sev-
eral years as if harvests had continued
at their higher level. ,
By 1985, these combined factors put
Alaska's timber industry at the bottom
of a deep hole. Several mills were shut
down, Federal timber receipts were
low, and there was a large backlog of
timber prepared but unsold, or sold
but =harvested. Over the next few
years, the seriousness of the problem
became clear as statistics for this
period were finalized.
The same groups which had called
for wilderness in the Tongass in the
1970's seized on this snapshot of Alas-i----BY Mr. HELMS (for himself, Mr.
ka's timber industry and spent the last PELL, Mr. DOLE, and Mr.
few years trying to convince us that it( Boscnwirz):
no longer made sense to harvest \ S. 238. A bill to amend the Arms
timber from the Tongass. Fortunately 'Export Control Act to impose sane-
for the people of southeast Alaska, tions agai.st firms involved in the
they were and are wrong. transfer?of chemical and biological
After hitting rock bottom, the agents or their related production
demand for Alaska timber began to equipment or technical assistance to
improve after 1985. When the value of Iran, Iraq. Syria, and Libya. and for
the yen began to climb, the markets other purposes; to the Committee on
shot. UP, and harvest rates began to Foreign Relations.
improve. After several years of re- ? CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
newed growth, Alaska's timber indus- PREVENTION ACT
try has climbed out of the hole and ? Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, today I
appears headed for steady ground. am introducing the Chemical and Bio-
Now, what about that grim picture logical Warfare Prevention Act of
painted in 1985? Mills have reopened 1989. The aim of the bill is aptly de-
and industry employment has climbed scribed by the title: with the passage
steadily for the last few years. Stump- of this legislation, I hope to prevent
age rates have increased, and will con- the mass murders which take place on
tinue to do so as the market price for an unprezedented scale when poison
Alaskan wood products improves. This gas and biological weapons are used.
means Federal receipts are increasing. The chairman of the Senate Foreign
As for the backlog of timber pre- Relations, Mr. PELL, first brought this
pared by the Forest Service, it has issue of chemical weapons prolifera-
been effectively eliminated. Based on tion to the attention of the Senate last
projected harvest levels, most of Alas- summer. At that time, I was proud to
ka's mills have less than 2 years cosponsor his legislation placing sane-
supply under contract and available tions on Iraq for its use of chemical
for harvest. This is right on target? weapons against its own citizens. Al-
the Forest Service tries to maintain 2 though our legislation passed the
to 3 years supply under contract. And Senate three times, difficulties with
January 25, 1980
on the Tongass the volume prepared
but unsold is now minimal.
The timber supply on the Tongaas
was brought back in line through work
done by the Appropriations Commit-
tee. Each of the last 2 years, we deter-
mined the amount of new timber
volume which should be prepared
after a careful review of the volume
outstanding and of the projected har-
vest- This has not been a pleasant
process, primarily because we have
had to parry rhetorical attacks on the
timber program itself at the same
time.
There remains strong sentiment?
particularly in the House?that some-
thing should be done to change the
Tongass Timber Fragrant, At the
heart of the complaints I have heard
has been a dissatisfaction with the ex-
isting permanent appropriation. Some
believe that it is a subsidy for Alaska's
timber industry which is not justified
in these austere economic times. They
are wrong to characterize it in this
way. If anything is subsidized by the
fund it is the 1980 wilderness with-
drawals.
However, I recognize that this fund
may have outlived its usefulness. It
has been used by those who object to
timber harvesting to twist perceptions
of the Tongass Timber Program. It
has become the focus of controversy,
and it does not provide enough bene-
fits to offset these negatives. And fi-
nally, returning the Tongass to annual
appropriations will remove a barrier to
oversight needed to assure that the
Forest Service's timber preparation
does not again lose sight of timber
demand.
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January 25, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
the House of Representatives and the
State Department prevented its enact-
ment.
The problem posed by the prolifera-
tion of chemical and biological weap-
ons is grave and the situation grim.
With the critical assistance of Western
Industrial firms, four of the most radi-
cal regimes in the world are acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them.
The world's press has discovered an
International conspiracy of supposedly
legitimate industrial concerns that has
been profiting handsomely by provid-
ing the capability to produce chemical
and biological weapons to some of the
most irrational, unstable, and anti-
Western regimes in the world; Libya,
Syria, Iran. and Iraq.
According to newspaper articles and
TV reports, the. conspiracy involves
chemical companies, major electrical
firms, construction and engineering
firms, ?major banks, transportation
agents, and various suppliers-all of
them foreign.
Some of the names that are rolling
out of the press reports are small- and
medium-sized firms, but others are
well-known foreign multinationals in-
cluding Siemans, the German electri-
cal giant, and Deutsche Bank, one of
the biggest banks in the world. If the
rumors flooding Washington are any
- indication, other large firms may well
have serious exposure.
The most serious implications of this
scandal are the allegations of involve-
ment by government officials of one of
our closest allies, the Federal Republic
of Germany. According to today's
issue of Der Stern. Colonel Qadhafi's
poison gas plant was actually designed
by a German state-owned engineering
firm and the purpose of this plant was
an "open secret." Just this morning,
the German Press Agency reported
that the German Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee had been informed of the in-
volvement of a second German Gov-
ernment-owned firm.
Further, the involvement of German
firms in poison gas production in the
Middle East was revealed in a front
page New York Times story on March
30, 1984, almost 5 years ago. For 10
years, Foreign Minister Genscher's
party has controlled the West German
Economics and Foreign Ministries. If
he now says that he did not know
what was going on, it is because he did
not want to know.
Mr. President, my legislation would
amend the Arms Export Control Act
to place sanctions on suppliers of ma-
terials and technology for the produc-
tion of chemical and biological warfare
agents by Third World nations. Sanc-
tions would also be placed on those
who provide the means to deliver such
weapons.
The bill directs the President to pre-
pare a list of controlled materials and
technology. Sanctions are triggered on
firms which export from this list to
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, or any other
country which has used chemical or
biological weapons In the past 5 years.
There is clinical data to suggest that
Cuban forces in Angola have used
chemical weapons during this period
as well as evidence that chemical
weapons are being stockpiled in
Angola for use against Jonas Savimbi's
UNITA forces.
I am also pleased to join as a cospon-
sor of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control Act of 1989 which is
being introduced today by Mr. PELL.
This bill would place sanctions on
countries which violate international
law and use these weapons on their
neighbors or even there own citizens.
Up to now, there has been no inter-
national penalty for countries to vio-
late the 1925 Geneval Protocol on
Chemical and Biological Weapons.
With the passage of Senator PELL'S
legislation there will be such a penal-
ty.
Mr. President, I believe that both
approaches, sanctions on suppliers and
sanctions on users are not in conflict.
Rather, they are complementary. The
Congress will examine both proposals
and will see that both are needed if we
are to control the proliferation and
use of these weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a list of firms named by the
press as participating in the, chemical
weapons trade be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks, along with the text of the legis-
lation I am introducing today.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
CHEMICAL Waitrons Twig
Siemens, W. Germany [Libya-telecom-
munications equipment, der Spiegel. Jan.
23, 1989].
Deustche Bank, W. Germany [Libya-
banking services, Stern Jan. 12, 19891.
Inihausen-Chemie. W. Germany (Libya-
chemical warfare plant. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1989].
E. Merck, W. Germany [Libya-precursor
chemicals. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18,
1989].
Alfred Teves GmbH, W. Germany
(Libya-industrial cooling equipment, Wall
Street Journal. Jan. 18, 19891.
Pawling and Harnishchfeger, W. Germany
(Libya-mobile cranes, Washington Times,
Jan. 16, 1989].
Kone, W. Germany [Libya-overhead
cranes, Washington Times, Jan. 16, 19891.
Linde, W. Germany (Libya-oxygen unit,
Washington Times, Jan. 16. 19893.
Karl Kolb, W. Germany [Iraq-chemical
warfare plant, Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 13, 19883.
Pilot Plant, W. Germany [Iraq-chemical
warfare plant, Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 13, 1988].
Preussag, W. Germany (Libya-water pu-
rification system, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989].
Hebenger Bau, W. Germany (Libya-The
Times, London, Jan, 7. 19891.
Krauss Kopf, W. Germany (Iraq-Inter-
national Herald Tribune, Jan. 7-8, 19891.
Ludwig Hammer, W. Germany (Iraq-
International Herald Tribune, Jan. 7-8.
1989).
Quest, W. Germany Graq-corrosion-re-
sLstant alloy parts, Christian Science Moni-
tor. Dec. 13, 19881. -
S679
Salzgitter Indust rlebau GmbH, \V. Germa-
ny (Libya-industrial planning, Washington
Post, Jan. 17, 1989).
OSTRAO, W. Germany (Libya-ballistic
missiles, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989).
Zink, W. Germany [Libya-gas burning
equipment. Stern. Jan. 12, 1989].
Gesellschaft fur Automation, W. Germa-
ny (Libya-computers, Stern, Jan. 12, 19891.
Krebs und Kiefer, W. Germany [Libya-
stress engineering. Stern, Jan. 12, 1989].
.1. Sartorius, W. Germany [Libya-con-
struction materials, Stern, Jan. 12, 19893.
Bischoff, W. Germany [Libya-tools and
machinery, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989].
Hunnebeck, W. Germany (Libya-building
materials, Stern, Jan. 12. 19897.
111TEC Technical Treading Logistik, W.
Germany (Libya-air-to-air refueling, Stern.
Jan. 12, 1989).
Raab Karcher, W. Germany (Libya-
building materials, Der Speigel, Jan. 15.
19893.
Schott Glasswerke, W. Germany (Syria-
corrosion-resistant glass pipes, Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 16. 1988).
Rhema-Labortechnik, W. Germany
(Libya-laboratory equipment. der Spiegel,
Jan. 23. 19891.
Stietzel and Diedrich, W. Germany
(Libya-flight technology, CBSN, Bonn. W.
Germany, Jan. 23, 1989].
Joseph Mulbauer Machine, W. Germany
[Libya-prevision technology, CBSN, Bonn.
W. Germany, Jan. 23. 1989].
Becker Kabel tuid Larnper, W. Germany
(Libya-surveillance cameras. Stern. Jan. 19.
1989E
Rhenus, (Libya-transport firm.. Stern.
Jan. 19, 1989].
'FEB Stahlbati, E. Germany [Libya-steel
fabrication. Stern, Jan. 12, 19897.
Schweizerischen Kreditanstalt zu eroff-
nen. Switzerland [Libya-banking services
in Zurich. der Spiegel, Jan. 23, 1989).
Japan Steel Works, Japan [Libya-bombs,
Mainichl, Sept. 15, 19881.
Marubeni, Japan (Libya-Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988).
Melchernie, Holland [Iraq-chemical pre-
cursors, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13,
1988).
De Dietrich, Prance (Libya-supplied
glass-lined caldrons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1989].
Pleekt. Belgium [Libya-cooling tower,
Washington Times, Jan. 16, 1989).
Cross Link, Belgium [Libya-freight for-
warding, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989].
J.G. Trading. Britain (Libya-freight for-
warding, Stern. Jan. 12, 1989].
Ihsan Barboutt International. Britain
[Libya-general contractor, Washington
Times. Jan. 16, 1989].
DISA. Denmark [Libya-foundry equip-
ment. Washington Times. Jan. 16, 1989].
Energoinvest, Yugoslavia [Libya-power
substation, Washington Times. Jan. 16,
1989].
Pen Tsao, Hong Kong [Libya-document
handling, Stern, Jan. 12, 1989).
'Please Note: This list is nothing more
than a compilation of newspaper stories.
There is no assertion of validity attached to
it.
S. 238
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION I. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Chemical
and Biological Warfare Prevention Act of
1089".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that-
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S 680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE January 25, 1989
(1) the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade recognizes that national security con-
cerns may serve as a legitimate basis for
constricting free and open Uncle; title 71:X1
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade states that "nothing In this Agree-
ment shall be construed. . . to prevent any
contracting party from taking any Action
which it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests . .";
(2) the essential security interests of the
United States require an immediate end to
an trade in chemical and biological weapons,
and transfers of technology and delivery
systems for chemical and biological weep-
-
ons. to certain destinations:
(3) four countries of the Middle East.
Iran. Iraq. Libya, and Syria, either support,
terrorism as a national policy or have done
so in the recent past;
(4) Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are either
Producing chemical weapons or on the verge
of doing so;
(5) chemical weapons have been used by
Iraq against Its own citizens:
(6) chemical weapons represent a grave
new threat to friendly countries of the
Middle East and ultimately the United
States itself;
(7) Free World industrial firms have been
Instrumental in the development of chemi-
cal weapons in these and other countries:
(8) any efforts .by Communist-bloc coun-
tries to aid and abet the production or use
of chemical or biological weapons, or to de-
velop and deploy delivery systems for such
weapons, by Inc., Libya, or any other nation
of the Middle East/Persian Gulf region are
deplorable;
(9) international cooperation has so far
been unable to stem the trade in chemical
and biological weapons and their industrial
inputs; and
(10) in order to Inhibit the trade In chemi-
cal and biological weapons and their indus-
trial inputs. severe sanctions must be ap-
plied to individuals and firtns which export
prohibited items and technology to pro-
scribed destinations.
SEC.& POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United
States to take all appropriate measures?
(I) to discourage the proliferation of the
material and technology necessary and in-
tended to produce or deliver chemical
weapons;
(2) to discourage all states from acquiring
such material and technology:
(3) to discourage Communist-bloc coun-
tries from aiding and abetting other coun-
tries from acquiring such material and tech-
nology; and
(4) to discourage private companies in
non-Communist countries from aiding and
abetting other nations from acquiring such
material and technology.
REC. 4. AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CON.
TROL ACT.
The Arms Export Control Act is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following
new chapter:
?CHAPTER 7?SANCTIONS AGAINST FIRMS
TRANSFERRING CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO
TERRORIST COUNTRIES
SEC. 71. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS.
"(a) PR0litatTi0N.?(1)(A) No item on the
list prepared by the President under para-
graph 2) which is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or which is export-
ed by a person subject to the Jurisdiction of
the United Stales may be exported to a
country described in subsection (b).
"(13) Subparagraph (A) does not apply to
any export pursuant to a contract entered
into before the date of enactment of this
section.
"(2) The President shall prepare a list of
chemical and biological agents, production
equipment, and technical assistance the
export of which would materially assist a
country in attaining a chemical or biological
warfare capability or systems for the deliv-
ery of chemical or biological weapOns.
"0) DasTneATIOtta or ExPORTs.?The
countries referred to in subsection (a) and
section 73(5)(1) are Iran. Iraq, Libya, Syria
or any country which has used chemical or
biological weapons in the past five years or
use such weapons after date of enactment of
this Act, except that any of these countries
shall be excluded, for purposes of applying
such provisions, beginning 30 days after the
President requests such exclusion by sub-
mitting the name of such country to the
Congress.
"SEC. 72. REPORT.
"(a) Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this section, and every 90
days thereafter, the President shall submit
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, it report on
efforts by Iran. Iraq, Libya, Syne and any.
country which has, during the five years
prior to the report used chemical or biologi-
cal weapons, to acquire the material and
technology to produce and deliver chemical
weapons, together with an assessment of
such countries' present and future capabil-
ity to produce and deliver such weapons.
"(b) Such report shall also include an as-
sessment of whether .and to what degree
Communist-bloc countries have aided and
abetted the government any country report-
ed upon pursuant to subsection (a) in Its
effort to acquire the material and technolo-
gy described in subsection (a).
"(c) Such report shall further list?
"(I) those companies in non-Communist
countries which in the past have aided and
abetted the government of any country re-
ported on pursuant to subsection (a) In that
effort; and
"(2) those companies in non-Communist
countries which continue to aid and abet
the government of any country reported on
pursuant to subsection Ca), in that effort, as
of the date of the report.
"(d) Such report shall provide any con-
firmed or credible intelligence or other in-
formation that any non-Communist country
has aided and abetted the government of
any country reported on pursuant to subsec-
tion (a) in that effort, either directly or by
facilitating the activities of the companies
listed in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(c) or had knowledge of the activities of the
companies listed in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (c), but took no action to halt or
discourage such activities.
"(e) Nothing in the section requires the
disclosure of information in violation of
Senate Resolution 400 of the Ninety-fourth
Congress or otherwise alters, modifies or su-
persedes any of the authorities contained
therein.
'SEC, 73. MANDATORY SANCTIONS MR FUTURE
VIOLATIONS.
"(a) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.?
The President. subject to subsection (c),
shall apply sanctions under -subsection (b)
for a period of 3 years. if the President de-
termines that, on or after the date of enact-
ment of this section. a United States or for-
eign person has exported any item In viola-
tion of section 71(a). ?
"(b) Ssivertoes.?The sanctions referred
to in subsection (a) shall apply to any
person committing the violation, as well as
to any parent, affiliate, subsidiary, and suc-
cessor entity of the person. and, except as
provided in subsection (c), are as follows:
-(1) a prohibition on contracting with,
and procurement of products and services
from, a sancUoned person, by any depart-
ment. agency, or instrumentality of Vise
United States Government.
-(2) a prohibition on importation into the
United States of all products produced by a
sanctioned person, and
-(3) a suspension of partent rights, as de-
scribed in section 75.
"(e) EXCEPTIONS.?The President shall not
apply sanctions under this section-
-a) in the case of procurement of defense
articles or defense services?
"(A) under existing contracts or subcon-
tracts, including the exercise of options for
production quantities to satisfy United
States opereational military requirements:
-(13) if the President determines that the
person or other entity to which the sanc-
tions would otherwise be spotted Is a sole
source supplier of essential defense articles
or services arid no alternative supplier can
be identified; or
-(c) if the President determines that such
articles or services are essential to the na-
tional security under defense coproduction
agreements; or
"(2)1,0'?
"(A) products or services provided under
contracts entered into before the date on
which the President notifies the Congress of
the intention to impose the sanctions;
"(B) spare parts;
"(C) component parts, but not finished
products. essential to United States prod-
ucts or production;
"CD) routine servicing and maintenance of
products; or
"(E) information and technology.
"(d) Derutrrunts.?Por purposes of this
section-
-(1) the term 'component part' means any
article which Is not, usable for its intended
functions without being imbedded in or in-
tegrated into any other product and which,
If used in production of a finished product,
would be substantially transformed in that
process;
"(2) the term 'finished product' means any
article which is usable for its intended func-
tions without being irnbedded or Integrated
into any other product, but in no case shall
such term be deemed to include an article
produced by a person other than a sanc-
tioned person that contains parts or compo-
nents of the sanctioned person if the Parts
or components have been substantially
transformed during production of the fin-
ished product; and
-(3) the -term 'sanctioned person' means a
person, and any parent., affiliate, subsidiary,
or successor entity of the person, upon
whom sanctions have been imposed under
this section.
"SEC. 74. PENALTIES.
"(a) IN GENERAL.?Whoever knowingly vio-
lates or conspires to or attempts to violate
section 71(a) shall be fined nor more than
five times the value of the exports involved
or $50,000 whichever is greater, or impris-
oned not more than 5 years, or both.
"(b) CIVIL PENALTIES: ADMINLITRATIVE
SANCTIONS,?I) The Secretary of Commerce
(and officers and employees of the Depart-
ment of Commerce specifically designated
by the Secretary) may impose a civil penalty
not to exceed $10,000 for each violation of
section 71(a), either in addition to or In lieu
of any other liability or penalty which may
be imposed.
"(2)(A) The authority under law to sus-
pend or revoke the authority of any United
States person to export goods or technology
may be used with respect to any violation of
section 71(a).
ID Any administrative sanction (Includ-
ing any civil penalty or any suspension or
revocaUon of authority to export) imposed
under section 71(a) may be imposed only
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January 25, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
after notice and opportunity for an agent,'
hearing on the record in accordance with
sections 554 through 557 of title 5. United
States Code.
",:EC. /A SUSPENSION OV PATENT RIGHT'S.
"(a) The term of a patent granted pursu-
ant to title 25. United States Code, for any
chemical agent or production equipment,
produced by a sanctioned person, including
any subsidiary of such person, under section
73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act., shall
be suspended for a period of 3 years.
"(b)(1) No fights under title 35, United
States Code, shall be derived from any
patent described In subsection (a) during
the period of any such suspension.
"(2) Any suspension of patent rights im-
posed DOM= to the provisions of this sec-
tion shall not extend the term of any such
patent. ?
"(e)(I) Within 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act. the Commissioner of
Patents, after a determination has been
made regarding which companies have vio-
lated the provisions of this Act, shall recom-
mend the suspension of the appropriate pat-
ents.
"(2) The Commissioner shall notify the
holder of such ,patent within 30 days after
the date of such determination and shall
publish in the Federal Register a notice of
such determination, together with the fac-
tual and legal basis for such determination.
Any interested person may request, within
the 60-day period beginning on the date of
publication of a determination, that the
Commissioner making the determination
hold a hearing on such determination. Such
a hearing shall be an informal hearing
which- is not subject to section 654, 556, Or
557-0l title 5, United States Code. U such a
request is made within such Period. the
Commissioner shall hold such hearing not
later than 30 days after the date of the re-
quest., or at the request of the Person
making the request, not later than 80 days
after such date. The Commissioner who is
holding the hearing shall provide notice of
the hearing to the company involved and to
any interested person and provide the
owner and any interested person an oppor-
tunity to participate in the bearing. Within
SO days atter the oornpletion of the hearing.
such Commissioner shall affirm or revise
the determination which was the subject Of
.the hearing and shall publish such affirma-
tion or revision in the Federal Register. .
"(d) The Commissioner may establish
such fees as are appropriate to cover the
costa of carrying oat his duties and func-
tions under this section.
"(e) The Commissioner shall Make the de-
termination that a patent is suspended and
that the requirements of subsection (c) have
been complied with. If the Commissioner
determines that the patent is suspended, he
shall issue to the owner of record of the
patent a certificate of suspension, under
seal, stating the length of the suspension,
and identifying the product and the statute
under which regulatory review occurred.
Such certificate shall be recorded in the of-
ficial file of the patent and shall be consid-
ered as part of the original patent. The
Commissioner shall publish in the Official
c;arette of the Patent and Trademark
Office a notice of such susperislon.".
According to the Health Care Ft-
By Mr. RIEGLE: nancing Administration (HCIPAI, in
S. 239. A bill to amend title XVUI of
the Social Security Act to waive the
late enrollment penalty under Medi-
care part B for any disabled individual
who was covered under his own or his
spouse's private employment-related
health insurance: to the Committee on
Finance.
WAIVER OP ENROLLMENT PENALTY IPOR DISABLED
SPOUSES
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President. today I
am introducing, a bill which will elimi-
nate an inequity which exists in the
Medicare Program for Social Security
disability insurance ISSDI) benefici-
aries. I first introduced a similar bill in
the 99th Congress, S. 1604, as well as
S. 176 In the 100th Congress, designed
to accomplish the same objective.
There is a small number of SSDI bene-
ficiaries who are eligible for Medicare
but who have failed to enroll because
they have health coverage through
the extension of their work related
health insurance or a spouse's employ-
ment related health care plan. If these
Individuals ever need to enroll in the
Medicare part B. program, they will be
? subjected to a 10-percent annual pen-
alty for their delayed enrollment. This
bill will address this persistent inequi-
ty.
Mr. President, as you know Medicare
is a program first enacted in 1965 as
title VIII of the Social Security Act to
provide financial access to vital health
care services to our elderly population.
In 1973. Medicare coverage was ex-
tended to disabled individuals entitled
to Social Security disability insurance
for 24 months or more. Since its incep-
tion, the program has experienced an
enormous growth. In 1987, it is esti-
mated that 28 million elderly and 3
million disabled individuals will re-
ceive benefits in the Medicare Pro-
gram. It is estimated that Medicare ex-
penditures will reach $83.9 billion. It is
clear that this program is serving a
vital source of access for our seniors
and disabled individuals.
When Medicare was first enacted in
1965. a 10-percent. annual surcharge
was assessed against those who de-
layed their enrollment In the volun-
tary Part B?supplemental medical in-
surance?of Medicare. This provision
was enacted to create a disincentive
for individuals who were planning to
delay enrollment until they became ill
and in need of health care services.
This was a provision based on sound
actuarial accounting and was designed
to assure a sufficient amount of premi-
ums to assist in the funding of the
program. At that time, there was a
maximum of a 30-percent penalty be-
cause the enrollment period for the
part B of Medicare was limited to 3
years. In 1972, the limited enrollment
period was abolished. However, Con-
gress failed to repeal or cap the part B
surcharge. We now have a small popu-
ation of individuals who have in-
ed a substantial penalty for their
late enrollment.
1983. 169 seniors were paying a 150-
percent penalty and 18 seniors were
paying a 160-percent penalty. This
penalty is an add-on to their monthly
premium payment. There are situa-
tions where this surcharge is not only
unfair and inequitable but is penaliz-
ing American citizens who are actually
?
S681
saving the Federal Government signif-
icant Medicare outlays.
Congress recently addressed this
problem and rectified a similar circum-
stance where old age and survivors
beneficiaries were being inappropriate-
ly penalized. Included in Public Law
9'7-248, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 ITEFRAl was
the "Working Aged" provisions which
made Medicare the "Secondary Payer"
for certain elderly workers. The provi-
sions amended the Federal Age Dis-
crimination Employment Act [ADEA1
to require employers to offer their em-
ployees aged 65 to 69 and their de-
pendents the equivalent health care
coverage as their younger employees.
It became clear that it would be inap-
propriate to penalize these individuals
and subject them to the part B premi-
um surcharge if enrollment in the part
B program would simply duplicate
their work-based health care coverage.
This inequity was rectified with the
passage of Public Law 98-369, the Def-
icit Reduction Act of 1984 [DEFRAI
which exempted these individuals
from the surcharge.
The bill I am introducing today
would address another circumstance
where individuals are being inappro-
priately penalized. A small number of
disabled individuals who are qualified
for Medicare as a result of their eligi-
bility for SSD!, receive their health
care coverage through a spouse's em-
ployment related health care plan or
through the continuation of their own
work-related health plan. They are
saving the Federal Government health
care dollars by their utilization of an
employment related plan to cover the
expenses of their disability and health
care needs and they should not be pe-
nalized for their efforts. This bill will
eliminate the part B premium penalty
for the disabled person and/or dis-
abled spouse who are enrolled in a
group health care plan provided by
the beneficiary's former employment
or a spouse's current or former em-
ployment.
I urge all my colleagues to support
this piece of legislation and help to
eliminate this inequitable and unfair
situation. We must persist in our ef-
forts of making Medicare affordable,
accessible and fair in its design and im-
plementation.
Mr. President. I ask unanimous con-
sent that this bill be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in the
FtScoRia, as follows:
8.231
Be U enacted by the Senate and Haase of
Representatives of Ste United States of
Amenta in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. EL1M1WATION OP LATE ENROLLMENT
PENALTY trNDITR PART B OE METH.
CARS POR CERTAIN MARLED OW.
V I Luz.
(a) IN ?Mr/JAL?The second sentence of
section 1839(b) of the Social Security Act Is
amended by striking the period at the end
thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the fol.
npriassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/16: CIA-RDP90M01243R001400170002-7