CONVENTION BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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1 October 1988
AFIO NEWS COMMENTARY
Most of the intelligence-related developments in the news since we sent
you the last News Commentary were less than dramatic. Soon after an Army
sergeant had been convicted of attempted espionage, a former Navy enlisted
man turned up on Moscow television, obliging his hosts by spreading anti-
American propaganda. A Silicon Valley computer specialist received a prison
sentence for his part in a scheme to sell sensitive data to the Soviets. Former
Navy analyst Samuel Morison, who had given classified material to a British
publication, found the U.S. Supreme Court unwilling to let him stay out of
prison pending further appeal. Canada, meanwhile, closed its doors to a total
of 19 Soviet diplomats for attempted naval espionage, a move which met with
relatively mild Soviet retaliation. There appeared to be no letup in the KGB's
worldwide disinformation campaign, and, as CIA Director William Webster
indicated, Soviet attempts to recruit U.S. sources had been increasing. His
deputy, Robert Gates, also noted that the KGB had not been affected by
current Soviet reform programs.
Terrorist incidents were on the rise on several continents, and Libya's
Qaddafi, seemingly having recovered from the American air raid of April
1986, was believed to be a major helper and instigator. A Greek terrorist
group claimed responsibility for the murder of a U.S. military attache near
Athens - the third such assassination there in recent years. It may be
symptomatic of our era that, after an aircraft explosion had killed President
Zia of Pakistan, the U.S. ambassador and military attache and many others,
few Western observers were ready to exclude the Afghan secret police and its
KGB backers from the list of suspects.
Soviet espionage, and our attempts to cope with it, are among the primary
topics of this issue. The ramifictions of the Soviet-inflicted death in March
1985 of then-Major Nicholson in East Germany, for which the Soviets were
said to have apologized during this year's Moscow summit, are the subject of
a lively discussion. One of our domestic adversaries, the so-called Christic
Institute, gets its share of attention. Several articles deal with the British and
German intelligence systems. Computer security continues to interest our
readers. And we have a new subject: the implications of the drug program.
We thank all our contributors, old and new, for sending us such a rich
supply of material.
Please take note of the attached one-page membership application form.
As you know, our president is greatly interested in membership recruiting.
The form is designed to facilitate it. We hope everyone will try to get at least
one new member!
Hans Moses
Editor, News Commentary
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THE LAST WORD
BY RICHARD STARR
? ".
Shielding KGB's Right to Know
Gennadi E Zakharov, a U.N. official who
moonlighted as a KGB agent, or vice
versa, was arrested in 1986 by the FBI for
purchasing classified documents. The
case is a celebrated one, because it
prompted Mikhail Gorbachev's operatives
to frame an American reporter in Moscow,
Nicholas S. Daniloff. The spy and the journalist were then
traded after Zakharov pleaded no contest in a pro forma trial.
Less celebrated is the story of a college student from
Guyana who moonlighted for 31/2 years as a double agent for
the FBI and did Zakharov in by selling him the documents.
The saga of Leakh Bhoge was told by Michael Daly in
fascinating detail in the April 6, 1987, New York magazine.
Bhoge, a student at Queens College in New York at the time,
went to work for Zakharov in 1983. The KGB agent posed
as a professor with the "Moscow Institute" and at their first
meeting asked Bhoge to do research for him at various
libraries. The student agreed, though he had immediate suspi-
cions. In fact, he contacted the FBI within two weeks of
taking the job. Shortly thereafter, as New York tells it,
"Zakharov asked Leakh to photocopy magazine articles from
the microfiche files at the Queens College library. Zakharov
advised Leakh to take certain precautions. 'He told me to put
wrong name on call slip, wrong Social Security number,' "
the student later recounted.
Bhoge began making more and more photocopies, at
Zalcharov's request. Indeed, the amount was so great that it
attracted attention. He told other students that he was working
on a book and parried the joking comments of a library guard:
"The guard would say, `Here comes the little spy.' I would
GAZETTE TELEGRAPH
Soviets spying
on U.S. libraries,
FBI report says
Associated Press
WASHINGTON ? The 8Iciitiet
Union has directed a massive
espionage operation against U.S.
libraries in an effort to gain sen-
sitive technical knowtedge and
i?ecruit agents, an FBI report .
Said Tuesday. ,
The report said a 26-yetar.So-
Viet operation has targeted the
. Library of Congress, along with
cienti fic and technical sections
bf pub:ic libraries, specialized
tiepartments of university li-
braries and large information
clearinghouses.
smile and laugh a little. I say, 'You must be kidding me.' "
Sometime later the KGB agent asked his young charge to
begin stealing from the library. Bhoge did this and was
eventually given other assignments. Among these was pro-
viding Zakharov with a map of Princeton University's engi-
neering library. In the end, with FBI help, Bhoge obtained
a job with a defense contractor and the documents that
snagged Zakharov.
According to the FBI, the methods the KGB used in hiring
and training Leakh Bhoge are fairly typical. According to
America's librarians and civil liberties experts, the methods
the FBI uses in tracking the likes of Zakharov violate our
constitutional right to privacy and, in the words of Duane E.
Webster, executive director of the Association of Research
Libraries, have a "chilling effect on the life of the mind?'
The proximate cause of outrage is that among those FBI
methods is an effort of several years' standing known as the
Library Awareness Program, which is under investigation on
Capitol Hill and the target of a lawsuit. The FBI's program
involves teaching librarians to recognize possible intelligence
agents from Soviet bloc countries and then volunteer informa-
tion on the activities of these patrons. Unfortunately for the
FBI, such activities collide, head-on with the ethical codes
and self-image of the major associations of professional
librarians. Among other things, the librarians point out that
laws in 38 states require records of patrons' borrowings to
be kept confidential. The official position of the American
Library Association, for example, is that librarians should
provide no information unless the FBI obtains a court order.
Unofficial statements are more interesting. Washington
has a small library, the National Security Archive, on whose
behalf the
was e archive
rr
18 yo fildeclassified docu-
ments, obtained under the Freedom of In-
formation Act. "We want the Soviets to
come in and use our information and find
out about our government:' its director has
said.
Then there was the fascinating exchange
on ABC's "Nightline." An FBI official de-
fended the program as a way of helping to
establish which of the thousands of Soviet
bloc officials in this country are actually
spies. Something is probably amiss, he said,
if an agricultural expert from Bulgaria
spends his spare time poring over technical
publications outside his field. A librarian
responded that she would only draw the
conclusion that this person was interested in
understanding "other aspects of our society?'
At times like this, one wonders if the
joking library guard at Queens College
would have been fired had he reported any
suspicions to the FBI. And one wonders at
the fact that the FBI has been cast as the
morally obtuse party to this dispute.
WEDNESDAY, MAY
None of the information is
classified, but the Soviets try to
recruit some agents at libraries
who are first asked to obtain
public information, and later re-
guested to turn over classified
material, the FBI said. .1,
- The FBI said the Soviet effort
even targets term pgper s nnd
theses written by U.S. stuaents.
? The report, 'The KGB and the
Library Target 1962-Present,"
was released as FBI Director
William Sessions defended the
bureau's Library Awareness
Program ? a counterespionage
operation against the Soviet col-
lection effort.
: The 50,000-member American
Library Association has strongly
criticized the FBI operation, in
which the bureau attempts to
gain the cooperation of librari-
ans in helping identify Soviet
agents. _
AFI0 COMMENT: The FBI's Library Awareness Program '
:las been widely condemned in the national press. We
glad to give you the other side of the argument. '
oth entries on this page were part of the large
volume of clippings received from Henry N. Schladt
of Colorado Springs, CO. You find a related clip- i
ping in today's Comic Corner. Many thanks!)
The Last Word is personal commentary on
issues of the day. Starr is the assistant
managing editor/news of Insight.
- 2 -
INSIGHT / AUGUST 1,1988
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szafre Itoaoliinftton rtmeo EDITORIAL THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1988
The left in Disneyland
47 a
The Christic Institute was one of the because of negative publicity. The taxpayer
lesser stars in the orbit of the American left also took a drubbing, with court costs
until 1986, when it hit the big time with a amounting to about $2 million over the past
lawsuit against 29 individuals, some of whom two years, and the scars on the reputations
were connected to the Iran-Contra business, of some of the defendants may never be
Accusing them of murder, kidnapping, brib- healed.
_try and drug-dealing and of constituting a Aside from the damage done to innocent
sinister conspiracy that came to be known as men, the Christic Institute's fairy tales seem
the "Secret Team," the Washington-based to have been swallowed whole by many of its
foundation got lots of publicity and backing cohorts on the left. As publicity about the suit
? until last week, when a federal judge in mounted, the institute gathered the dona-
Miami threw its bizarre $24 million suit out tions of some leftish high rollers, including
of court. But much of the nation's liberal musician Jackson Browne and actress Jane
establishment seems to remain enamored Fonda, who no doubt will some day apologize.
with the fables concocted by the Christic It forged relationships with such groups as
mystics. ? Americans for Democratic Action, the Na-
The centerpiece of the plot imagined by tional Organization for Women and the
the institute was a supposed covert group of Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
bad guys who it alleged had spent 25 years and its literature now sports endorsements
trying to wipe out communism with assas- from Jesse Jackson and Richard Gephardt.
sinations, to take over U.S. foreign policy and Sen. John Kerry's staff is reported to work
to help arm the Nicaraguan resistance closely with Christic personnel in trying to
through drug trafficking. The "Secret Team," prove that the Nicaraguan resistance is in-
the institute claimed, was a "powerful crim- volved in drug smuggling. The "Secret
inal network, fanatically right-wing, fi- learn" theory, as the left-wing .monthly
nanced by drug profits and closely con- Mother Jones noted, is "fast becoming the
nected to the Reagan administration." official explanation of the Iran-Contra events
Most of the "evidence" for the grand in progressive circles around the country."
conspiracy consisted of what attorney Theo- Historian Richard Hofstadter once wrote
dore Klein, who represented some of the de- about what he called "The Paranoid Style in
fendants, calls "a hodge-podge of dead infor- American Politics:' referring to those politi-
mants, lost witnesses, character actors with cal causes that throughout American history
first names only and assorted shadow fig- have launched crusades against imaginary
ures who shriveled when exposed to the dark forces conspiring against the Republic.
light." All the witnesses named by the in- Hofstadter saw political paranoia as being
stitute recanted or denied statements attrib- largely the property of the right wing, but it
uted to them, and U.S. District Judge James recently seems to have migrated leftward.
Lawrence King finally dismissed the suit as Conspiracy ideologies such as the Christie
being without merit. Institute's Secret Team theory, as Insight's
The defendants?some of whom now face David Brock has written, attempt to
financial ruin as a result of the institute's "criminalize foreign policy differences!' The
litigation ? included former CIA Deputy Di- far right has used such tactics in the past to
rector Theodore Shackley; Maj. Gen. John portray liberals as tools of the Trilateral
Singlaub, Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, Nicara- Commission or other bogies, while the politi-
guan resistance leader Adolfo Calero and cal left exploits such demonology to try to
? conservative activist F. Andy Messing of the discredit anti-communists in and out of gov-
National Defense Council, among others. A ernment.
later affidavit filed in the case charged Pres- Such radical intolerance is reprehensible
ident Reagan, the late CIA Director William in any form, and is especially dangerous
Casey and Attorney General Edwin Meese when groups use nuisance suits to destroy
III with directing the Secret learn. the lives and wreck the finances of theirpo-
Gen. Singlaub says he has spent about litical opponents. The judge was right to dis-
S500,000 to fight the suit, and Mr. Messing miss the suit and protect a framework of
says some of his group's donors fell away civility for the public discourse.
(A-Yios pretty well summarizes What the Christic I
Institute is all about. With its unsubstantiated allegations, the grOupj
developed a credibility gap even in liberal quarters. it nevertheless
appears to be successful in raising funds, and its spokesmen have won
applause on some college campuses. Its strident assaults on covert ac-
tion, and on the ,people connected with it, make it a subject of our con-1
t inuing interest !and attention. - Many thanks to Capt. J. E. Dolan of It.
Garrett Park, MD, for a wealth of information on this institution. )
-'3
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Star Tribune
Thursday/May 12/1988.
A Soviet murder rampage? Not quite
Like other Americans, we were angered three years
ago when a Soviet sentry in East Germany killed
Arthur Nicholson Jr., a U.S. Army major. The
anger remains. But recent reports suggest that
Nicholson was carrying out an assignment with far
higher risk and far higher stakes than portrayed at
the. time. If those circumstances do not excuse
Soviet conduct, they do help explain how Nichol-
'So.n. became a Cold War casualty.
The gory event.?:Nicholson bled to death ?
alerted Americans to intelligence practices of
which few were -.aware. Under an _ agreement
among World War II victors, Western allies for
four ' decades have maintained military liaison
missions in East Germany; the Soviets have recip-
rocal rights in West Germany. Intelligence officers
of each side use the opportunity to learn what they
can about military installations of the other. Sen-
tries of both sides stop overeager learners who get
too close to restricted areas, but not until 1985 had
a military observer been killed.
?
Further insights come this week from Newsweek
magazine's account of the East-West tank race. It
is :an unending competition to develop stronger
armor, more lethal antitank _ shells to pierce the
_
stronger armor, still stronger armor to resist the
stronger shells. In the 1980s the United States
began producing a new tank, the M-1. Now the
Army evidently is withdrawing its 1,400 M- Is and
4,000 older M-60s from Europe as fast as newer
and more powerful M-1s can be built. The rapid
exchange is necessary, according to the Army,
because of faster-than-expected Soviet develop-
ments. As a result, most U.S. tanks are vulnerable
to new Soviet tank guns and most U.S. antitank
.weapons are unable to penetrate new Soviet ar-
mor. The one-year cost to upgrade American tanks
is about $5 billion.
U.S. officials confirmed in 1985 that Nicholson
had been photographing military equipment. Now
Newsweek says that he had been pressed to deter-
mine whether Soviet T-80 tanks had new armor;
that he had photographed one T-80 from inside it;
that he was shot while breaking into a Soviet tank
garage. In a column on these pages soon after
Nicholson's death, George Will called it evidence
of the Soviet "murder rampage." If Newsweek's
account is correct, different terms would be more
appropriate. Nicholson fell victim to tank-devel-
opment warfare whose intensity 'only now is be-
coming widely known. ./
Star Tribune/Saturday/May 28/1988
Liaison officer's killing unjustified
,Your May 12 editorial concerning
the shooting of Major Arthur Nichol-
"son by a Soviet soldier seems to
imply some possible justification for
the Soviets killing Nicholson. I have
not read the Newsweek article to
Which you refer, but I examined thor-
oughly the complete reports of the
'incident, the reports of our investiga-
ction of the incident and the reports of
the negotiations with the Soviets re-
sulting from the incident.
The plain facts are these:
II Nicholson was a member of the
U.S. Liaison Mission in the Soviet
Zone of Germany. He was in an area
in which he was authorized to be and
he Was doing'what he was adthorized
to do (he was observing Soviet mili-
tary forces) in accordance with our
agreement with the Soviets for the
conduct of the liaison missions. He
.:was not trying "to break into a Soviet
--tank garage" or trying to get into a
:restricted area or trying to do any-
"'thing not permitted by the agree-
? He was shot by a Soviet soldier on
sentry duty and was permitted to
bleed to death while an array of Sovi-
et noncommissioned officers and
commissioned officers kept Nichol-
son's driver and assistant (who, inci-
dentally was a very experienced non-
commissioned officer) from-helping. -?
They seemed to be more interested in
trying to create an excuse for the
incident than in saving a life. In fact,
one senior Soviet officer tried to bad-
ger the U.S. sergeant into admitting
that he had shot Nicholson.
? The Soviet Liaison Mission in the
U.S. zone has been observing U.S.
military operations for the 40 years
the agreement has been in effect. In
typical Soviet fashion, they've
pushed the agreement to the limits
and beyond; they have frequently
been apprehended inside restricted
areas. None of their members has
ever been shot or shot at! The U.S.
Forces, as well as the forces of the
other NATO countries, have the pro-
cedures, training and discipline to be,
able to deal with the Soviet mission
members without killing them, even
when they are not complying with
the agreement.
We may never know whether Nichol-
son's death was a mistake by an
untrained, undisciplined sentry or an
ordered-murder:Just asin the case of
the Korean airliner shot down in the
Far. East, the Soviet authorities
seemed to be unable to face up to the
facts when addressing such incidents
with the rest of the world. One point
is clear: He did not fall victim to
tank-development warfare. He fell
victim to a senseless, unjustifiable
Soviet bullet.
Whatever the Soviet problem, Nich-
olsop's death was a tragic loss. We
are now trying to work out more
complicated interactions with the So-
viets in conjunction with thevINF
Treaty verification measures.-I hope
they can get their act together
Gen. John W. Vessey, Garrison,
Minn. Retired chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
(AFIO 'COMMENT: Many thanks to fellow Member Hugh 0. Strawn of Hopkins, MN, for
sending us the Star Tribune editorial and Gen. Vessey's quick and convincing
reply. One wonders how this attempt to explain the killing ever got started.)
?4
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aII)Norniag
Friday, July 8, 1988
Mum's the
word with
the British
LONDON ? It is always a
curiosity, and usually a learn-
ing experience, to see how
other counties deal with gov-
errunental secrecy. That is
particularly true when Amer-
icans are exposed to journal-
ism in Great Britain, where
SAM our sort of national obsession
with openness often is held
up to ridicule.
And right now it is more interesting, because
even the staid, conservative British government of
Margaret Thatcher, is proposing the elimination of I
some secrecy provisions that date back to 1911. .
Mrs. Thatcher's government won't do away with
the Official Secrets Act, to be sure. Nor would she
have the government adopt a public-access
presumption similar to the federal and state laws
of the United States. But the current Thatcher pro-
posal at least would bring the British statute into
the modern (and real) world.
For a perspective on the difference between ,
current laws in the two countries, one need only
know that the British system is essentially the op-
? posite of ours: Whereas U.S. law generally makes
information about governmental activities public, .!
then lists exceptions, the Official Secrets Act makes '
everything in the nature of governmental informa,
tion confidential. . -
And the further rod up the beck is that not only
is it illegal for a government official to disclose;.
secret information, it also is illegal for a news me-
dium even to receive ? much less publish ? infor-
mation that is covered by the Official Secrets Act
The giver or receiver of secret information can be
sent to prison.
Again, for perspective, one need only know that
even the most trivial information is covered by the
law. As the peppery nmes of London recently
noted, even the color of the carpet in the Foreign
Office and the menu in the Ministry of Defense
cafeteria would be regarded as "official secrets."
And under the current law, even the publication of
information that had been published elsewhere
could be punished under British law.
It is true that the law is not often imposed *on
the news media, except in clear-cut national secur-
ity cases. Legitimate whistle-blowing by civilgerv-
(AFIO COMMENT How has British democracy
The answer is: very nicely. - Many thanks
KINCH JR.
ants is not Usually prosecuted, either:, especially
where the whistle blower is performing a public
service.
But the harshness of the possible penalty for vi-
olation and the all-encompassing breadth of the Of-
ficial Secrets Act combine to make it a formidable
barrier to the free flow- of government-related in-
formation that American society has come to re-
gard as routine.
Some prominent British political commentators
and satirists have suggested, in fact, that far from
suffering under the Official Secrets Act, journalists
have hidden behind it ? as an excuse to avoid
hard-hitting reportage on the inner workings of
kovernment. The law as written is not simply A
censorship tool for after-publication determination
of penalties. It acts as a prior restraint precisely
because it makes an offense out of receiving infor-
mation that is officially secret. .
Attempts have been made in the past to open up
some of that information. The last Labor govern-
ment, then on its final political legs, tried a decade
ago. And in 1979, Mrs. Thatcher's initial reform at-
tempt floundered largely because it would have'
allowed
allowed government ministers (akin to our Cabi-
net members) to decide whether disclosures could
be made _about matters within their own depart-
ments.
In its latest configuration, the Thatcher pro-
posal more nearly approaches the current law in
federal and state governments in the States.
The mere receipt of unauthorized information 'no
longer would be an offense. A judge and jury
would decide whether informants and publishers
threatened national security or otherwise would'
harm the public interest. And the burden would be ?
on the prosecution to show that the informant and
publisher knew or should have known the harm
that could be caused.
Further, the information covered by the
catchall clause of the Official Secrets Act would
be reduced to specific categories covering de-
fense, security and intelligence, international re-
lotions, information useful to criminals, etc.,
Those categories are broader than but similar to
those in US. federal la*. (The US. Supreme Court
ruled in the Pentagon Papers case that pre-publi-
cation restraint, even in the name of national se- ,
curity, is unconstitutional; that concept is for- '
eign to British law.)
London newspapers did not greet the newest Of-
ficial Secrets Act reform proposal with uniform en-
thusiasm, obviously. There is not, for example, a
public-interest exception for a civil servant leak-
ing to the news media information about internal
government misdeeds. And it clearly is not a pro-
posal that would guarantee public access to govern-
mental information as, with statutory excep-
tions, federal and state laws in the United States
routinely guarantee.
But the Thatcher government's Official Secrets
Act proposal is an interesting development to
watch in the country from which many of our laws.
and political traditions came.
Sam Kinch Jr. is editor of the political newsletter '
Texas Weekly in Austin and a regular contributor
to Viewpoints.
survive U without First Amendment protection?
to our most generous Dallas, TX, contributor.)
-5
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THE (LONDON) SUNDAY TIME
WEEK IN REVIEW
May 15 1988
Espionage: boom business
e secrets
MOST OF the charismatic anti-)
, heroes of late 20th century es-,
pionage a, dead. So, too, are many
of their contemporaries, the spycat-
chers from MI5, MI6 and the CIA,
the friends and assorted lovers who
were essential sources in the cre-
ation and evolution of enduring leg-
ends, writes Simon Freeman.
Blunt, Burgess, Maclear., and
now Philby, are history, closing
another chapter, albeit intriguing
and evocative, in the long and dis-
honourable story of spying. The
business, however, is booming.
Superficially at least, espionage
bears little resemblance to the
world of eccentric double-agents
which Philby joined nearly half a
century ago. Computer and sat-
ellite technology allows the Ameri-
cans to eavesdrop on the car phone
conversations of a Soviet Politburo
member general in Moscow, or the
Soviets to read the insignia on uni-
forms of troops exercising on US
military bases.
But, a? spy pundits constantly
remind us, nothing is ever quite as
it seems in_ "the world of mirrors".
Intelligence 'agencies still vane the
services of the :human ages*, the
person who can steal a document or.
describe the atmosphere of:a'
scientific publications or books- or
level meeting, above-the .p_hoto-.` it is so obvious that tbe Kremlin
graph which reveals .the :, eiact
range of a missile. The sprawling
bureaucracies of the intelligence,
community ? the CIA', FBI; KGB,
GRU, MI6 et al ? have been
forced ' over the years '. to -rely: 1
increasingly on electroniesurveil-,
lance. But they remain, at heart,
traditionalists, convinced that a hu-
man spy on the ground is worth
many satellites in space. :
' Nobody is sure how many people
are involved in espionage . world-
- wide, but one recent estimate puts
the figure at nearly 1.5m: Nor is
anyone sure how much it all costs.
Ten billion pounds annually is a
conservative guess. The? biggest '
spenders are the Americans and
the Russians, although Countries
such as Britain, anxious to retain
their own independent agencies, '
spend hundreds of millions of
. pounds. ? '
...Critics of the Western intelli-
gence agencies ? argue ? that it is
mostly wasted effort. They contend
'that there are only a few genuine
secrets ?such as the routes used by
The 'West's nuclear submarines or
)Nato's battle plan.' ,
The rest is either known through
,the:Westm media, specialist and
already knows it.
Few members of 'the i Cast-West
intelligence community would ag-
ree. Western agents argue that the i
Russians are as committed as ever
to ? undermining capitalist* F,The
Russians areinsatiable; they want
to know everything because, they
believe information is power.
The Kremlin, for its part, is still
haunted by the fear that the West-
ern agencies are'plotting revolution
In Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
?
Union.' And both sides agree that in
regional conflicts' ;'-;, such as Al-I
ghanistan; Central America, or the
Middle 'East ?old-fashioned spy71
ing pays dividends. 47 -' ? ?
' The f undamentali of espionage:
might',''not!) have':' changed since
Philby. firsilearnt his craft. What
has changed, without doubt, are the
sort of peoplewho become' the
? pawns and the Victimshi the game.
There are few ideological traitors
? in the West. In,4merica, the 1980s
have seen 'a spate of espionage
tri-
als, but all those 'convicted of spy-
ing for 'thea Soviet Union were
motivated solely by money and/or a
perverted sense?of adventure. '
' Many of these spies'were middle
!
or low-grade technicians in the
Military or inclustry,-, proof of the
Russians appetite for technological
Information and -the shrewd re-
alisation that the most likely trai-
tor is not the fulfilled, highly-paid
person at the top of an organisation
but the resentful subordinate."
The British can, at least, claim a
spy in the ignoble tradition of)
? Philby. 'Michael Bettaney was a I
..senior MI5 officer who decided to
?betray his country because he no
longer believed in the West. But
Bettaney, who is now serving a 23-
year'jail sentence in near-total
isolation, was a sad, rather than a
dramatic figure, described in court
as "puerile", who seems unlikely to
',warrant more than a footnote in the
'history of espionage.
" In Wept Germany the espionage
business is even more depressingly,
low-key." Although there was a
briefkilurry or excitement in the
early '1980s with the defection of
Hans4oaChim Tiedge, a heavy-
'drinking senior officer in the West
Gerinan intelligence service, most
'Soviet spies turn out to be spinster
secretaries seduced into giving in-
formation by male agents in the
guise of,' lovers. Only the Israeli'
,Mossad continues the traditions of
flamboyant and dramatic covert
operations.' '
' The future for spy enthuasists
looks bleak.- ?
: On May 11 1988, when Moscow announced the death of british-born KGB spy Kim Philby,
AFIO member Irene U. Boubli4 of McLean, VA, happened to be in England and picked up stacks of Phil-
by-related news coverage. The item selected offers _a broader perspective than most.)
-DAIJAS MORNING NEWS Spy
'NEST 27 August 1988
Maximum penalties must be pressed
Once again, Americans are reminded tlicif
_
spies are real creatures, not just the fig. The Conrad flap should first remin
ments of fiction writers' imaginations. We, eVerY American that the smiling face o
&lasnost notwithstanding, there are enemi
in the world who are prepared to do us an
our allies harm_
also are reminded that spies usually do no
d'pme with the classic trench coat, or wit
James Bond wit and style. The United States
latest alleged traitor is basically middle-?'- The ? Conrad Hari Also. raises the questiod for the coin of their civilization: money. 1
American, former Army Sgt. 1st Class Clycil 'as to how a low-level, noil:commiSli.ukied of l The death penalty is not used in Germany,1
Lee Conrad. incer could.iumegotteriaccess td-super-sensi where Conrad is being charged, so if found
Mr. Conrad's alleged activities appear to: cive files for so long withoul his cOpduc uilty, he will not have to forfeit his life for
have included passing secrets that could se! . being . regularly monitored by intellige6ce'eopardizing the life and safety of millions.1
riously compromise the ability of the Northildgencies. e military
bureaucracy h at's regrettable. The Conrad case is a re-1,
Atlantic Treaty Organization to defend Eu allen down on the job. -, inder that the death penalty should be ap-
rope against a Soviet invitation. He ili Above all, the C#1 wad flp, raises the ques licable in peacetime as well as during a de-
accused of selling the location of NATO mis- tion of why a prbfessional military ma
lared war. The world is a precarious place
siles, the route of a super-secret pipeline and would betray his country. The answer a ven during peacetime; having tactical and
plans for blunting a Warsaw Pact thrust into pears to have been handsome sums ofstrategic information sold to potential ene-,
central Germany. ,. _ 1, money. If so. iLtuay serve as fresh evidencemies makes peacetime all the more fragile.
(AFIO COMMENT: A-hard-hitting editorial, sent in by our anonymous source in Dallas, TX. Many thanks:)i
I
that the United States hes become too wor-
shipful of dollars, and too condescending
toward patriotism, honor and duty. If a man
lacks the respect of his countrymen for the
job he does, he may feel free to betray them
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L0pON IFINANCI,AL_TIM ES WEDNESDAY AUGUST 3 1988
David Mar?h interVieWs the head of West
German's counter-intelligence service
An open door
to secrecy
In Britain, Mr Gerhard Boedeni
would - officially at least - sim-
ply not exist. The stocky, 63-year? ,
old head of West Germany's count-
er-intelligence agency, the Bundesaint
fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), is, how-
ever, alive and well and can be inter-
viewed in his well-protected office
building in Cologne.
Mr Boeden is in charge of the West ;
German equivalent to Britain's MI5,.
which is wrapped in official secrecy like !
MI6, the foreign arm of the UK intelli-
gence services. Britain's Parliament has.
been debating - a recent government
White Paper that would shroud the
security service in even greater secrecy.
In the Federal Republic, as a reaction
against the crimes of the Third Reich,
the intelligence services set _up by the
post-war state are discreet, but open to
scrutiny. In fact, they insist on it.
After a long career in the police.force,
anti-terrorism and counter-espionage
work, Mr Boeden took over the Cologne
agency in April last year. Set up in 1950,
the BfV's name literally means "Office
for the Protection of the Constitution".
Its task is to collect information on for-
eign spies :and on left- and right-wing
extremists. These are all people deemed
to represent a threat to the country's
1999 Basic Law or constitution and thus
to the stability of the country. ,
. Apart from foreign spies, the agency
has to keep tabs, at the latest count, on
62,000 members of extreme left-wing
organisations, above all the German
Communist. Party, and 25,200 radical
right-wingers grouped in neo-Nazi and
other organisations. The figures' are
given annually in public reports, nearly
always accompanied by self-congratula-
tory pronouncements from the Interior
Minister that democracy during the"
year in question "remained stable". .
? Mr. Boeden wants to be thought - of
more as a kindly uncle rather than big
brother. He says it is "terribly impor-
tant" that his agency, which employs
about '2,300 people and comes under the
jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry,
should have "a human face". Indeed, i
his job is partly one of public relations. I
He needs to convince West ,Germans !
mindful of the Nazis' misuse .of power,'
that the BfV is not, as he says, full of'
"shady characters. in slouch-hats and!
dark glasses who 'want to keep every-1
one under control". . 1
Against this unique German back-
ground, the BfV's work is becoming
more challenging and complicated.
East-West detente and the much greater
flow of East Europeans travelling to
West Germany increase the opportuni-
ties for4East bloc spying. At the same '
? time; pstr Kam ow ,the. longer term the 1
..t.., rece-dinEthreat to the Federal Republi ,
...? .,,, caused by the manifest ebbing of th
' . Cold War could lower public support fo ?,A
the agency's work. ,
- . Yr 13oetlen-iz adamant about the pepd .
(AFIO-GOMMgNT: Many thanks to Col. Richard L. Temple of Santa Barbara, CA, for sending us this
- to' learn from the lessons of the past.
"Our citizens should know that this
institution was founded, after our bitter
experiences, to protect one of the most
liberal constitutions that Germany has
ever had from-a situation where politi-
cal forces - either from the right or the
left - could try to abolish parliamen-
tary democracy," he says.
The BfV is answerable to a Parlia-
mentary Control Commission to check
sensitiye cases and operations. A spe-
cial committee of the Bundestag has to
approve interception of mail and tele-
phone tapping since this contravenes
Article 10 of the Basic Law.
- There are two other arms of the intel-
ligence service. The foreign arm is the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or Fed-
eral Intelligence Service, run by Mt
-Hans Georg Wieck, a high-powered dipl
lomat. The Militaerischer Abschirmi
dienst ?(MAD) or Military Intelligence
Service is responsible for security
_within the armed forces. None of the
t three have police powers. BfV officials
cannot Arrest k,interrogate suspects or
search premises, but instead have to
hand over these-matters .to the federal
- -police-or publiclirosecutor.
- ,Thei WV even Tuts out a brochure,
.carefully translated into English, on the
-basic tenets oOts operations. Under
!'intelligence methods", it informs read-
ers .that these include: "The 'infiltration
or recruitment and handling of agents
in extremist- oretterrorist organisations;
the stuveillanc of suspects; secret pho-
tography; interception of post and tele-
communications; other measures to
, conceal certain BfV operational activity
by the use of non-attributable vehicle
? registration numbers or identity cards
with cover names."
,It is hard:to,lmigine MIS being so
helpful, even if heOfficial Secrets Act
, was abolished. 1%1: ,
Mr Boeden talks with almost exagger-
ated politeness !about the people he is
up against. Most espionage in West Ger-
many is carried 'out by the East German
:.Ministryftir State Security. Not surpris-
; ingly,;Mr Boeden.lhas never met Mr.
,? Erich -Mielke, the legendary 80-year-old
East ,German--Minister .for State Secu-
rity; who has been East' Berlin's chief
spymaster for more than 30 years.
? "I know him very well," says Mr Boe-
den, "and I imagine he knows me too. ,
This has always been my method, also I
??? its ,rls
hoaorm7eylircet to
opponentunderstand officer i-s . totryThis ani sdt o evaluate necessary.f ind out.
? him better." ?
Perhaps as many as 3,000 eastern
"agents" of various kinds may be oper-
ating on West German soil. This would
range from professional spies to a much
larger number of small-fry "collectors"
of information. "Eastern services, in
our experience, in times of detente have
a special desire for information. They
want to know more, and they want to
know it earl,' says Mr Boeden.
Additionally, opportunities for spying
tend to increase at a time of political
thaw. This year, about 160,000 German-
national emigres from the Soviet Union ?
and eastern Europe are expected to set-
tle in West Germany. Although the i
Bonn government welcomes the sharp
increase in arrivals, the emigre stream I
also provides. a golden. opportunity for
the East bloc to bring in spies. 1
"We have a system, although it is not
perfect, for registering when emigres f
have been approached and asked about"
procuring information," says Mr Boe-1
den. "The numbers have been growing.
"We cannot and do not want to say'
that each German-origin emigre is sus-.
pect. The people who come to us are!
German by constitutional right. This:':
gives us a special problem comparedi?
with other western counter-intelligence?
service's." -
Although he says that not too much
meaning should be attached to the
increase; 34 -people -were arrested in
West- Germany up to mid-July on auspi-1
cion of spying. This is the same numberk
as in the whole Of last year. ?,
The most spectacular coup this year
was the detention of seven Men. inj
_
; March on suspicion of working for the
KGB. Charges have yet to be preferred..
ThP first court case comes up later this
! month. Several of the suspects are
Soviet emigres who had settled in- the
I Federal Republic. .
The spate of arrests has helped
"underpin the BfV's claim that it . has
succeeded in making good damage done
by the defection to East Germany in
-1985 of one of its top apylhunters, Mr
?Hans-Joachim Tiedge. Mr 'fledge fled
.after the INV failed to help him sort out
his.drink and debt problems. Mr Boeden
says he has introduced a system under
,which any employee in similar personal
'difficulties can come in and talk things.
over. He sees about three people a week
on this basis. "It is inevitable that in-an
institution like ours, -employees can
have problems," he says. . -
The KGB clamp-down in March came
a week after the BfV was reminded of
another constant preoccupation, with
the arrest in Bonn of Ms Elite Falk,' a
43-year-old secretary working for the
Development Ministry. Ms Falk is
alleged to have passed on information
from her jobs in various government
offices to a "romeo" East German Agent
with whom she fell in love,. About a
dozen "secretary affair" .have come to
light in the past 10 years, confirming
Mr Mielke's passion for setting loose his
agents on single, middle-aged . Bonn
women.
Mr Boeden says these cases are
"tragic". He uses the Falk affair to
underline a security point. He says it
confirms the need for a new vetting
system introduced this summer which
allows the intelligence services to inves-
tigate the personal friendships of gov-
ernment workers.
"If it had been possible to investigate
Frau Falk's man-friend, we would have
established that he had a false identity.
At the beginning of the affair, that
would have saved Frau Falk a lot of
pain - and the state a lot of damage."
revealing article on German intelligence, a subject not often disouated hereabouts. While the
author no mnares German with British intelligence, you might view it in the context of our system.)
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June 26. 1988
Post on guard against
colinputertamperin4
Viruses, hackers can be stopped
but spies pose another question
BRODIE FARQUHAR
Staff Writer
- _
Computer espionage, viruses, sabotage ? these are the
ongoing concern a of Col. Preston Holtry, deputy chief of staff
for Intelligence' at at the U.S. Army Information Systems destroy the virus before it can spread through the system.
Command at Fort Huachuca. i;
All software is kept underlock and key, "booted up" on in-
Holtry and his staff have devised a formidable system to, dividual machines, then locked back up. Since no copying or
protect the Army's worldwide information management and
communications systems.
While -university, business and government computer
systems around the world have been attacked by skillful
hackers, malcontent eniployees and even spies, Holtry notes
there are,significasit differences in security between his
organizatiw alit) Qthe17s. '
ould-be spy. -
?
? Personnel procedures. "As we develop greater technical
roficency, we become more dependant on personal trust
nd accountability. People are our greatest strength and
eakness,'.' said Col. Holtry.
ISC places a great deal of emphasis on personal account-
ability, so that each individual is responsible for what hap- !
ens to or with his personal computer. While Holtry has not
g ntubri )1i -R.taff f mrn ennimunicatine with comuuter bulletin
boards, they know the risk of picking up a hidden virus, and I
have the software and procedures to detect, quarantine and
According to Associated Press reports, -viruses hay
within the last year, "infected" computers at NASA, the Na
tioual Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,informatio
-systems on Capitol Hill, George Washington University. an
Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
Tactics that can he used to disrupt computer operations
Include : , "
- ? Viruses, which are 'essentially small programs that can
hide' in the computer's operatng system, giving orders that
range from a relatively benign message that flashes on the
screen to destruction of data files or erasure of disks. A virus
differs from other sabotage in that it, ,clones itself and
spreads.
? "Trojan horsei,"%prokramS that look'aiid aCt like norma
ones but contain hidden comniands 'that eventually take ef
fect and cause havoc.
? "Logic bombs," small sets of instructions surreptitiousl
entered into other software. 'where they remain undetecte
bootlegking of software Is allowed, the spread of. viruses is ,
kept to a minimum.
Given the -above set of defenses, Col. Holtry-believes the
ISC enjoys "an acceptable level of risk.". -
"There is no such animal as 100 percent protection. Given ,
the -resources, any *Stem -can be penetrated. I sleep very I
well at night, because I think we're -99 percent secure, using a
very expensive, coniplex..abciirity; system. The ,question, is,
how much are you willing to'Spend to get that extra 1 per-
cent? that could cost again; What We've spent already," said
oltry.
While hackers occasionally "knock on the front door, rattle
he windows and try the back door," said Holtry, no one has ,
ver gotten hito "the inner sanctum".
University or even,. government ,research computer
ystems- are much easier to get into and sabotage, simply
edause they are in a knowledge sharing business. The Army
s a "need to know" organization, so the security is more ,
omplex, noted Holt*. '
"Hackers keep us on our toes, ' even though they are an ir-
ritant," said Holtry. What he deeply worries about, is not the
show-off hacker, but the insider who has sold out his country,
for money.- "This guy is deadly, because we- don't know he's
there, accessing information and selling it," said Holtry.
Spies such as the Falcon and the Snowman or John Walker
have taught the defense establishment that espionage is now
and inactive -until the computer arrives ata certain result
normal computation. a growth industry, in which Americans with access to mill-
duringtary information are now seeking out the enemy and selling'
secrets to make a buck. , '
"We've learned that we have 'to look more carefully, and
more frequently, at .our personnel. We're not Big Brother,'
? 44Time bombs," which go into action at a set date and
time.
The supersecret National Security Agency, based at Fort
Meade, Md., is responsible for safeguarding the security of
the Na- with cameras in every room, but we are emphasizing securi-
U.S. government computer systems.. It has set up
ty awareness. If you see a janitor driving a Mercedes, you!
tional Computer Security Center at Fort Meade to help the
should do more than wonder about it," said Holtry.
military, defense contractors and other private companies
Col. Holtry is well-equipped to deal with the technical and
tope with software warfare and other threats to vital com-
puter systems. 't the human aspects of computer system security. A graduate
of Virginia Military Insitute and Boston -University, Holtry
At ISC, Col. Holtry's computer system protections include:
? Passwords and password controls. has a liberal arts education and is a career military in- '
, telligence officer.
? Software Control frnm, the vendor to customer. "Some-
times, vendors will leave a 'trap door' for future updates and' "I've had to become technically adept in order to ask the
right questions and make sure I was getting the right an-
maintenance. The trouble is, if a vendor built it, a hacker can
swers," said Holtry. He recognizes his own limits in corn-
find and open it. This is why control is so important to us. We
puter science, yet credits his liberal arts background as he
exhaustively analize all software so there are no surprises,
deals with the human equation.
All our software can deny access and has an audit trail ca-
For Col. Holtry, the ISC security systems are not a corn-
pacity, soil someone tries to get into the system, we know
when it happened," said Holtry. Plete answer to the challenges of hackers and spies. "We
have no answers to some questions, and we don't even have
? Hardware devices. ISC security includes dial back delay(
and filtering systems. If someone makes even a small pro- all of the right questions. Technology is evolving faster than
our ability to secure it," he-said, emphasizing again that se-
cedural error in getting into a system, security can monitor,
curity is a people problem.
trace or, even feed phony Information to the hacker or
Many
thanks to
-fellow member Edmund C. Jilli of Sierra Vista, AZ, for sending us this inforlative follow-up.)
(AFIO COMMENT: Our last Is-sue'included two items on computer security problems.
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ready for Soviet spies
, June 27, 1988
That's precisely what the Soviets will . I
attempt to do, U.S. intelligence officials
say. The Soviet teams will inchicle'agents
from the military-intelligence agency,
known as the GRU, and they are certain
most sensitive military installations, to have been instructed to collect other .
gaining access to the innerniost recesses, ? military and industrial intelligence at and '
where they snoop eagerly for secrets. near the base. High on the Soviet priority
The twist? This time, the Soviet spies are list will be the location of major research-
invited by Washington. ,Any reputable and-development facilities, the configu-
publisher would reject such a plot out of rations of sensitive weapons systems?
hand as just too implausible. Yet start- and even mere confirmations of their
ing July 1, a team of highly trained Sovi- existence. "The Soviets will be expertly
et agents, under the aegis of their Penta- trained," says Peter Zimmerman, a for-
gon hosts, will be swarming all over U.S.i mer official of the Arms Control and
bases. The Soviets have been given this Disarmament Agency, "to look at what
right, just as U.S. teams will have the they're not supposed to see."
right of access to Soviet missile bases, , tti bugs and body searches. The risks for
under terms of the Intermediate-Range the U.S. go way beyond what the Soviets
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed re- might see here, however; intelligence offi-
cently in Moscow by Ronald Reagan cials say that, regardless of the Precau-
and Mikhail Gorbachev. but now the . tions taken, the value of on-site visits
U.S. must make sure the Soviets who I cannot be overestimated. The Soviets will
come here don't walk away with more I be allowed to bring into the U.S. a few,
And despite official Pentagon protesta-
than was bargained for. 1 measuring and detection devices, subject
; to American inspection and control.
tions to the contrary, there are serious Though all Soviet luggage can be
questions about how ready the Defense checked, American officials will not be
Department is, according to the findings .allowed to conduct body searches. Offi-
of a U.S. News inquiry. To prepare for cially, the Pentagon has been playing
Soviet arrivals, the Pentagon has run a down the threat, but counterintelligence
series of 30 mock inspections over the specialists within ' the Pentagon say it
past four months at U.S. missile sites, would not be impossible for the Soviet
with "Soviet" teams played by Russian- inspectors to plant small bugging devices
speaking U.S. inspectors. The exercises or delay-activated equipment that could
be triggered months or years later to spy
on workshops or other sensitive areas. i
Whenever the Soviet monitors are visiting :
such sensitive areas, precautions will have ;
to be taken to prevent them even fiom i
making physical contact with sensitive
materials, especially things like coatings'
on advanced weapons systems. "Unless)
they have gloves on," says Zimmerman,
"the Soviets will be able to collect intelli-
gence through their fingernails."
White a specialized Army
unit, the classified Offensive
Counter-Intelligence Opera- ,
tions Program, can handle
some of the load, a program I
that is critical to it lacks nec-
essary manpower, Pentagon
REEORT
intelligence units U S NEwS & WORLD overseas. Pentagon
sources say they need at least 30 TSCM
agents to provide adequate security for
the Soviet monitors here, but it's unclear
where they'll come from: It takes at least
eight months to train new TSCM agents.
Another problem, defense sources say,
involves a sensitive, and very costly, op-
eration to camouflage and transfer sever-
al major weapons and research programs
not pertaining to INF on military sites
without triggering Soviet satellite disclo-
sure. Though mutual satellite reconnais-
sance of each country's bases is accepted
as a key method to assure compliance ,
with the INF Treaty, defense experts are
deeply concerned , about the extent to
which Soviet inspectors, through obser-
vation on the ground, could enhance or
refine' intelligence?on areas other than
INF?collected by satellite reconnais-
sance. San. retired Col. Calvin Sasai, a
veteran military-intelligence officer and
president of RDR, Inc., a firm that spe-
cializes in pinpointing vulnerabilities
and designing security systems for gov-
ernment programs: "The Soviet visual
inspections will easily be able to analyze
our R&D [research and development]
and military capabilities."
The threat is more acute at some sites
than others. Redstone Arsenal, a missile
base in Huntsville, Ala., is not only home
for an elaborate research-and-develop-
ment project for future battlefield nuclear
weapons but it is also the headquarters
for production and launch plants of the
National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration. A third program involves the
testing and replication of secretly ob-
tained non-American weapons systems.
Though the Soviet monitors will have no
rights under the INF Treaty to view
areas housing any of these programs?
and are entitled to see only a minute
fraction of Redstone's 38,000
acres?the anxiety among
U.S. officials is understand-
ably high that no slipups occur
that could result in a breach of
security. Reporters shown the ,
inspection at Redstone last I
week saw no security lapses.
If there is any consolation
for the U.S., it is that the So-
viets?who are required to
open five times as many sites
as the U.S.?are going to face
the same type of problems as
the Americans. U.S. inspec-
tors no doubt will be just as
aggressive there as their Sovi-
et counterparts here in col-
lecting intelligence. "At least
their headache," says one De-
partment of Defense special-
ist, "is just as big as ours." II
? Devotees of espionage fiction no
doubt would recognize it as the only plot
that hasn't been spun out yet in paper-
back: Soviet agents infiltrate America's
have been mostly successful, though
some mistakes?not entirely ..upexpect-
.ed?have occurred.
Nine hours' noUce. The 0-reparation, ,
for the Soviet visit are being orchestrate(
by specialists from a brand-new Penta-
gon outfit known as the On-Site Inspec-
tion Agency. It is the job of these hastily
assembled experts to coordinate the U.S.'
inspection of some 133 Soviet-bloc mis-
sile sites and oversee the Soviet inspec-
tion of 26 sites in the United States and
Western Europe. To say that the agency
has its work cut out doesn't begin to get
it: The logistics of its job are nightmar-
ish. The Soviets, like the Americans, will
be permitted to station permanent teams
of 30 inspectors. But scores of other in- sources say. The program,
spectors will be allowed to make adch- called the Technical Surveillance
tional visits?on as little as 9 hours' no- . Counter-Measures Program?TSCM in
tice?at missile facilities around the U.S. ' the Pentagon's acronymic parlance?has
With so little time to prepare, the U.S. been cut back so severely in recent years
may not be ready for the Soviets just yet. that it may take up to a year before an
It was only in the past few weeks that the adequate technical counterintelligence
On-Site Inspection Agency completed its operation is safely in place. For years,
final selection and training of the 200 TSCM agents have conducted electronic
inspectors who will travel to the Soviet countersurveillance at U.S. military in-
Union. But there are potentially greater stallations to protect them against pene-
problems for the estimated 400 agents tration by hostile intelligence agencies.
who will escort the Soviet monitors com- But in the past six years, government
ing here. Although the escorts will have officials say, the number of TSCM
to deal with every possible contingency, agents has been cut back from 160 to 32.
ranging from defection ,to accidents, one Fewer than 10 are in the U.S. today, the
of their most important tasks will be to rest having been assigned to military-
make sure the Soviets do not see any more
than they're allowed under the treaty.
(AFIO COMMENT: Thanks to Henry N. Schladt, Colorado Springs, CO, and Howard E, Steen, Au?
rora, CO, for this timely article, slightly abridged here. Also see chart on next page.)
by Steven Emerson with Orli Low
- 9 -
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72 BUSINESS WEEK/AUGUST 1, 1988
COVER STORY
HOW UNCLE SAM'S CLOAK-AND-DATA BOYS ARE FIGHTING-BACK
Breaking into computer systems
might be a lark for hackers. But
penetraltion of government com-
puters?particularly military sys7.-
terns?is a deadlY- serious mater for
the National Security Agency (NSA) and
for 'Counterintelligence _agents at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. After
all, who's to say whether a break-in is
s hacker's harmless prank or an at-
tempt by Soviet spies to
steal defense _secrets?
"The superseciet NsA,t.
_ _ _ _
an arm of _the Pentagon
that icirjmanyi years,
didn't
-didn't even -exist Official-- F:
ly, has, ?Jouble-edged
mission -It gathers :elee:-
tronic intelligence
the Soviet blo-c-hydriten?
cepting ..and decoding
-1,elecoinniuniCationsitraf-'-_-;
- fie, _including isgnal senf-'5,
from spy.isatelliteslAnd
to ,preV-entAforeigq,viSS
tionsfn- ?_`,.?-?41-oing
same to the
NSA spends Aintold Mil-
portant clue. That's why the Soviet
missions in Washington, New York,
and San Francisco bristle with anten-
nae. They pick up phone conversations
and data transmissions relayed by cel-
lular -radio and microwave links. In
Cuba, a giant KGB-operated dish pulls
in signals beamed down from satellites
to any point in the lower 48 states. And
Soviet snoop ships monitor both coasts
communicating with ships or planes. So
the NSA has developed elaborate cryp-
tographic ciphers for turning English
into digital gibberish. These codes are
so convoluted that-any given string of
characters, such as this sentence,
would never yield two identical series
of encoded characters. The cipher is
changed frequently, so that the digital
code for an "e" in one word might
mean "k" in the next.
To decode such
sage, you need the key:
the starting =cipher plus
the formula for Switching
to .the next variant. For.
computers :that -handle -
the most sensitive infor-
mation, crypt?, keys are
created ,in pairs, then_de-
? livered by courier to the.
_twoLeoinputer -sites., So
even if .the _key:for- the
-linkhetwew the -Yenta?-
gon:and spartietilar base --
copied, it won't help de-.
code:traffic between any
alier
lions devising.sophisticat-,wAsajamoN nothing offers to- '
r
ed cryptographic codes ? ? 4aLprotection. Just as pri-_,
. .
and trustworthy computer systeml,
,.._ ? . . inl just Outside' U; S. -territorial wa- vat,eLsector- computer rcrime is-,:isuallz--:-.-
Protecting governmenteomputer. 1ters." One intelligence expert estimates .," traced i to?.-employtes;;;the-.NS400korst
systems as-hecoming,inCieaSinglyAax that the Soviets listen in on more than fearls:that;turneoits will Sell,,-*ypio-_ ,
ing. Intelligenc4Organizations, the mil: half of ''all 'T. S. 'telecommunications '
_ '_- ,,.. graPhie,sec_reti:.Pl,rypto tetail's'A-re-SO
itary, and er federal agencies -now traffic, one or_another s? cret, at eventhe names ;.used , to..
'
operate, more.- '-SFOOK-PROOF., Because, almost any classifTtheni_ire-classified.j.That's why,:
sites?most with ',multiple jcomputers ' transmission runs a high risk of being federal officials say that former Navy
and ComniunicatiOnsAinks,31any thou- . intercepted,- Washington goes to great radiomen Jerry A.:..Whitworthand John'
sands ofidditionaliComputers used hy ., lengths to protect its secrets. Its most A. Walker. Jr.,. who, years. passed -
defense contractorsand high-tech man- secure lines are fiber-optic cables bur- top-secret czyPtO.;:paterials to the KGB, '
ufacturers hold,dati"..that the?,:',Adminis-, led deep below the surface and sealed did more harm than any other spies in
tration doesn't want leaked., : ',in_ gas-filled pipes. There are no connec- decades.:$01ficials?*stimate ,.., that :the
The Soviets leave no stone unturned : iltions to outside phones, so no hacker Kremlin used its ill-gotten gain to de- .
in their hunt for:, the-thiiestlnoriels of. .:.' can gain access. If a spy cuts a pipe to code il Jnillionoilitary,pessageti': That,.
information:". Even a.routhielelectronic ' ? tap the cable, the drop in gas pressure Could make A the coniputer!crime?.of-'
mail message ibetween: s. defense sup,- Anstantly sounds an 'alarm. - : ., . the century?so 40 - -fari,
.,
plier And ,a bank 'tnight:piovide'an im- : But buried cables are of no use in - ,? !:?,:.,ciLlfi,,Ryi.p.2.,i8:poitata: ork ? .
..., ,
-_,.....-..44.-.....-- - ---...---, - ... ----9---_
AFIO COMMENT: Many thanks to Capt. John R. Lengel of Strongsville, OH, for ant.herl__
follow-up on computer security.)
(AFIO COMMENT: This chart
came with the U.S. News &
World Report article titled
"Getting ready for Soviet
Spies," printed in abridged
form on page 9 of this issue.)
KEEPING TABS ON THE SOVIETS
U.S. bases the Soviet monitors will visit. Some sites have other sensitive
Installations that the Soviets will have to be prevented from seeing
1. San Diego, Calif. 2. Magna, Utah:
63 United States firms working on
defense contracts in the Immedi-
ate area; production site for mis-
sile-guidance systems. 3. Dugway
Proving Ground, Utah. 4. Davls-
Monthan AFB, Arlz.5. Fort Hua-
chuca, Ariz.: Army Intelligence
base and Army Communications
Command. 6. Pueblo Army Depot,
Colo. 7. Fort Sill, Okla:. Army field
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artillery headquarters. 11. Longhorn
Army Ammunition Plant, Tex.
9. Redstone Arsenal, Ala.: Re-
search-and-development center
for battlefield nuclear weapons;
production site for National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration.
10. Middle River, Md. 11. Titusville,
Fla. 12. Cape Canaveral, Fla.:
Launch sites and assembly facili-
ties for military test flights. ? 10 -
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ihralIa Ponting)fielwg
Monday, June 6, 1988
DRUG BATTLEs
United States must take lead
International drug trafficking is fast which the United States has minimal relal
shoving communism aside as the world's tions and provides no aid. I
most destabilizing influence. It is not just na- The National Drug Policy Board has emi
tions that are threatened with the instability phasized eradication programs in drug-pro-
created by multibillion-dollar drug cartels. ducing countries. But they have had virtu-
The international banking system is af- ally no effect. When an eradication program,
fected by the massive sums of money being was undertaken last year in Peru, whose'
laundered. Panamanian banks alone laun- crop for cocaine is believed to be the world's
dered $275 million emanating from the Co- largest, only 850 of the 100,000 acres were de-
lombian cocaine trade in three years. The stroyed.
money laundering points out a systemic The administration now faces an even '
problem in that nation, where the drug in- more embarrassing issue. How much should 1
dictment of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega is it expect impoverished countries to sacrifice
just One element in the entangled web of when the administration's efforts to era& been helped by polls showing that_the public!
Panamanian drug dealing. cate marijuana growing in the U.S. have feels the Democrats are handling this prob-
'The Reagan administration has succeeded flopped? Legislation to require U.S. compa? lem more effectively than are Republicans, a
in interdicting more illegal shipments than nies 'to license chemicals used in cocaine matter of no little importance now that the
any, _other administration. Its reward, how- Manufacturing is held up in Congress while drug issue -has emerged_ as :the public's
ever,: has been increasing sophistication of the State Department is pressuring other na? choice as the country's most pressing prob-
tions to draft laws that would do the same. lem. .
-U.S. drug policy is not working. In the Vice President George Bush wisely has/
United States alone, estimates of the gross begun distancing himself from the presi-;
revenue generated by all narcotics sales dent's efforts to drop drug charges against'
range from $60 -billion to $120 billion. The Gen. Noriega in return for his leaving Pani
White House can be faulted for focusing toe ama. And Mr. Bush has beefed up his anti-
Otteh?onitildirdictFon and tot 'enough on do drug positions by proposing that businesses
mestic demand 'for drugs. But Congress als( establish programs t6discourage drug use in
has emphasized tougher stances agains the work place, a hemispheric drug summit,
n( an international drug-eradication task force
drug-producing nations while offering
coherent statement on domestic drug use and wider testing of people responsible for
Similarly, a recent New York Times/CBS ?1public safety. He also has supported the use,
of the military in combating drug dealers
found the public believes, 50 to 35 percent
that government should concentrate more and capital punishment for dealers of lethall
on reducing the supply of drugs than on get?
ting people to stop using illegal drugs. But we need more debate on how to re-
ting people
drug war will not be won through duce the demand side of the equation. Do we,
?
The drug problem,
quite rightly, has be-
come one of the hot-
test issues of the presi-
dential campaign,
thanks largely to the I
emphasis Jesse Jack-
son has given the is-
sue.
Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis has
the traffickers. ,
, First lady Nancy..
Reagan has become a
leading anti-drug"(
crusader, motivating
the ' formation of
nearly:10,000 clubs for
kids learning to with-'
stand
stand peer pressure
for drug use. But nei-
ther the administra-
tion nor Congress,
which has made a $2
billion budget com-
mitment to law en-
forcement this year,
can hide the fact that
orug
even small victories facile initiatives, excess melodrama and the we improve more effective anti-drug
nee tional
can na
have been elusive. The State Department P 'whiff of hypocrisy suggested by such pro os- *
cently -reported that the production of coca als as sending in the Marines to destroy c programs in public schools? Do we need a,
marijuana and opium poppies in most drug crops in Latin America while imposing no cabinet-level "drug czar"?
producing countries has grown substan such action to get rid of California's man- If the United States is to retain its position
tially this past year. Juana crop. as a global leader, it must evolve a compre-
a a year in t e Reagan hensive policy on drugs. Curbing the de-
The White House has been rightly criti Th still
cized for acting too lethargically in the past, term; it is not too late to press a firmer fed- mand for drugs must take on a greater sig-
on evidence of drug trafficking, especially' nificance than attempts to solve the problem
among friends and allies.
The certification process by which Presi
dent Reagan determines which major drug
producing or -trafficking countries are coo
erating to fight drugs and are therefore eli
gible for aid has been severely criticized:
The administration has tended to decertt
only countries like Iran and Syria, wit mg. to ft.
(AFIO COMMENT: An intelligent discussion of a problem that is both difficult and important.
are obliged, once again, to our fellow member from Dallas, TX, who does not wish to be named.)
drugs.
pp a strictly through halting trafficking.
would escalate educa- The world is looking to the United States
tion as a means of for leadership in a war as destructive is any
curbing domestic de- that have menaced the globe in this uncer-
mend for drugs while
continuing law en-
forcement efforts
against drug traffick-
tain nuclear age. Given the destructivel
power of illegal drugs to wear down the in
stitutions of a country, the US. cannot afford,
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Noalo news March/April 1988
3
FOR HEAVEN'S SAKE ,ACT!
Earlier this year, the Toronto Star ran a
series of articles about Trinidad and
Tobago's role in the immensely profitable
international drug trade. The gist was
nothing new: that this country, like many
others in the region, is now being csed as
a trans-shipment point for heroin and
cocaine on its way to North America, and
is developing as a drug market in its own
right. But the Canadian paper was able to
send two reporters into Trinidad to
interview people who they identified as
drug barons, photograph them, quote
them, describe their homes and the arms
they were carrying and the bodyguards
they had around. And in spite of this
publicity, nothing happened.
Well, not quite nothing. The Prime
Minister denounced the articles in
Parliament for giving us a bad name. He
said discussions had been going on,
collaboration was occurring with North
American police forces, an expert was
arriving to advise us on white collar
crime. The local press reported that a
special team of police had gone
"underground" to crack the drug
business, that "top-level" -meetings had
been taking place. The Defence Force
plunged heroically into the bush to burn
marijuana trees, taking some adventurous
journalists with them.
But nobody touched the man who
graciously granted an interview to the
Canadian reporters; he boasted that
nobody could touch him, and he was
right. An investigation by the Sunday
Express produced the same boast from
plenty of other dealers. The reason is
obvious, and there's no point glossing it
over. The drug trade produces so much
money, and therefore so much power,
that it can buy off silence, intimidate, or
in the last resort eliminate anyone who
seriously stands up to it. It can pay
producers far more to grow marijuana or
coca or whatever than to produce mere
food; it can pay pilots and sailors far
more than they could dream of earning
from airlines and fishing; it can buy the
protection of police and the power of
judges; it ,:an buy whatever high
technology is necessary to keep a
hundred jumps ahead of ill-equipped
police forces. In Colombia, one of the
three main cocaine producers, the death
tally includes 62 judges, a Justice Minister
and an Attorney General.
In Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and
Mexico, production cannot be controlled
with any real success; the appetite of the
outside world is simply too big. The US
market is said to be worth US$110 billion
a year. When the New York cops closed
in on a modestly successful Jamaican
operator this year ? it took 40 of them,
wearing bullet-proof vests he was said
to be grossing $100,000 a day; 12 year
old kids in New York get US$150 a day
as lookouts. In the US, one in six
Americans is now a drug user; there is
scarcely a family which is untouched by
addiction ? broken parents, battered
kids, whole neighbourhoods terrorised by
the cocaine gangs, executions, urban
violence at an all-time high. The police
won an emergency grant of $1.7 billion
and have been arming themselves with
hot pursuit jets, machine guns,
helicopters, high-speed patrol boats, radar
balloons.Last year, US authorities seized
35,000 kilos of cocaine, an increase of
1,800% in six years, and barely a quarter
of consumption.
The Caribbean has been sucked into
this war because its poorly policed and
often under-populated islands make
perfect way ? stations for entry into the
US. Government officials from several
regional countries have been jaded ?
Belize, Suriname, the Chief Minister of
the Turks and Caicos Islands ? and
plenty more have been accused (Cuba,
the Bahamas, Haiti). Jamaican
businessmen are screaming for better
policing before their US trade is mortally
wounded; Air Jamaica has paid millions
in fines because of smuggling, BWIA has
slapped an extra charge on passengers for
more rigorous security, the Cayman-
based Kirk shipping line was fined
US$103 million for a haul of ganja.
But the region is essentially
unpoliceable; and the drug barons are
generously paying their dealers in kind, so
that the Caribbean becomes a market as
well as a transit area. In this country,
cocaine arrests soared from 3 in 7978 to
619 in 1985, and seizures from an eighth
of an ounce to 16 kilos, but it mode no
impact. Thousands of people know who
the big dealers are and how the drugs are
moved; but nobody can touch them.
Meanwhile the stories multiply --. kids in
school, contaminated sno-cones, laced
drinks at kids' parties, amusing games like
Blue Star using tattoos soaked in LSD.
There are heroic efforts by such
bodies as New Life Ministries and Samoan
House; but so far the response of those
authorities with any real power has been
utterly pitiful. The Scott Drug Report
came and went; there are sporadic ganja
raids, a few minor arrests, periodic
official assurances and flurries of top-level
meetings. But the big boys go about their
business confident that they are
untouchable. In the US, the Customs
Department is clamouring for the
confiscation of the passport of any
American merely found carrying a joint;
slowly it is dawning on people that this is
a national security threat far more
dangerous than communists, and that
America's huge appetite for drugs
guarantees that production will continue
to expand. US grants to the big three
cocaine countries for anti-drug
programmes last year was merely $48.8
million, less than half the Contras got.
Here at home, we talk earnestly about
changes in bail regulations, the legality of
property seizures, ways of cutting out
court delays. We fiddle while the country
burns, while the kids are entangled, while
the pay-offs multiply. This is no party or
partisan Issue; it's a national emergency
with widespread support for a return to
law and order. Mr. Attorney General, Mr.
Police Commissioner ? for heaven's sake,
for pity's sake, some real action!
(AFIO COMMENT: The intelligence connection in this case is indirect, but nonetheless real:
Not only is the narcotics trade a subject of interest to various intelligence agencies, but
adversaries have frequently tried to link our intelligence personnel to narcotics traffic.
This outcry in a Caribbean publication deserves our attention. Many thanks to the sender,
who does not wish to be named.) - 12 -
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THE BOSTON GLOBE
14 May 1988
CENTERPIECE
Trying to put the CIA on '88 agenda
By Leonard Bushkoff
Special to The Globe ? '
CAMBRIDGE ? Something is miss-
ing thus far from the presidential
campaign: the CIA. ;
Even Jesse Jackson has shunned
an issue over Which rival candidates have,
either stumbled or soared since the mid-
1970s. In 1976. Carter proposed a reformed
and restrained CIA; in 1980, Reagan de-
manded an aggressive and unleashed CIA;
and in 1984, Mondale used the contra con-
flict to denounce C1A-sponsored undeclared
wars. By contrast this election promises
bipartisan discretion on the _intelligence
front.
It won't last if John Stockwell and the
other members of ARDIS (Association for
Responsible Dissent) have their way. They
see the CIA as the operational arm of an
"invisible government" whose members,
they allege are running American foreign
policy as they choose, independently of
Congress and the public.
Stockwell, an ex-Marine officer and for-
mer CIA case officer in sub-Saharan Africa,
contended in a recent interview while in'
Cambridge for a speaking engagement that
"the CIA poses theultimate threat to de-
mocracy, and should be dismantled for the
good of the United States and the world."
He does not exempt CIA intelligence-gather-
ing: "It is necessary and legitimate, but is
tainted by the association with covert oper-
ations, which continues to dominate the
CIA."
Stockwell served in the CIA for 13 years;i
he perceives it now as a self-perpetuating'
power elite, dedicated to controlling the
Third- World, and ? in some cases ?' to
... ..
feathering its own nest. He cites retired CIA
bigwigs who immediately Join companies
they have backed while in the agency, and
others who allegedly dip into the till:
"When you're involved in a really big
operation ? as I was in Angola in 1975 ?
there's a lot of money floating around, all
in cash. Say you have family problems, and
one way out is a psychiatrist, or a big vaca-
ijOrl, or a fancy Swiss boarding school for
the kids. It's pretty hard not to Cake some of
that cash, which you're handing out any-
way to crooked provincial chiefs or officers
who just scribble an illegible receipt in re-
turn."
One answer ? of sorts ? is the lie detec-
tor, but Stockwell has doubts. "The Soviets
and Cubans have courses in how to beat
the box, and I've seen perfectly innocent
people who were so nervous that they
threw it out of whack. When I was a case
officer, I sweated to get my accounts abso-
lutely right, because I never knew when I
was going to be 'boxed.' But you just don't
'box' a top guy with 30 years service. It's
,the old liouble standard: the higher you go.
Ihe-less-flief'check-on ' -
So Stockwell and ARDIS are working to
get the CIA ? especially covert operations ?
back on the political agenda. "We've been
going to states where primaries were under
way, trying to get candidates to publicly
discuss the CIA," said Stockwell.. "All the
Republicans have refused, though the staff
people were willing to talk with us."
The Democrats were somewhat more re-1
sponsive. "Gore and- Gephardt were
against contra aid, but wouldn't commit
themselves on the CIA; they wanted a case-
by-case approach. The Simon people sent a
staffee to several public forums in New
Hampshire, and his position was that the
covert action mechanism should be pre-
served, but used very sparingly." The Jack-
son camp refused to commit itself, citing
the need to reinforce its moderate image.
Stockwell finds that Dukakis strongly
opposes big covert operations such as over-
throwing the Guatemalan government in
1954 and conspiring against Allende in
Chile during the early 1970s, "Dukakis
was a student in Peru in 1954," Stockwell
said, "and he felt the backlash from the
Guatemalan coup." And Dukakis position
papers demand strict control and account-
ability for all intelligence operations, with'
prosecution for anyone breaking the law.
Stockwell.- who-has- been publicly- criti-1
cizing the CIA since he resigned in 1977,1
wrote- "In Search of Enemies," an autobio-
graphical account of CIA operations in,An-
gola, and went on the lecture circuit. He
speaks to about 100 audiences a year, pri-
marily at universities, but also to business
and other groups in central Texas. where
I he lives.
"I had a lecture in 1984 before an Air
Force group, about 50 or so pilots and oth-
ers," he remembers, "and I thought they
were going to eat me alive: you know. for-
mer CIA guy turned lefty. So they started
throwing tough questions at me, and
threw answers right back, and we kept at
It. went on for hours, and some of those fel-
lows said I really made them think, gave
them a different view of things. And that
it-lade me feel great." ? ?
The birth of the Association for Respon-
sible Dissent in June 1987, resulted from
Stockwell's lecturing, "You go around the
country, and you meet people, and they say
to you, 'John, you really should help get
people together, do something about the
contras and the AngqIa fighting.' So I final-
ly did." ?
4:1; tylx-
Stockwell appro foe:groun of 30
well-known politica *fists, many of
whom had been part of Ihe foreign policy
system but had turned against it: Daniel
Ellsberg; David MacMichael, a former CIA
analyst; Charles Clemens, a Vietnam veter-
an-turned-doctor in El Salvador; Brian
Willson, who gained national prominence
when struck by a military train while pick-
eting in California; Wilbur Crane Eveland,
a government Middle East specialist in the
1950s and after; and Philip Agee, the high-
ly controversial ex-CIA officer. Stockwell of-
fers no apologies for backing Agee, whose
close Cuban connections disturbed some
ARDIS members.
ARDIS also has attracted 1,500 support-
ing members, particularly after a well-re-
ported press conference in Washington
during late November that brought inquir-
ies from more than 100 former CIA officers
who have been questioning their service.
(AFIO COMMENT: This interview/article is unintentionally revealing. Stockwell has now been
on his anti-CIA crusade for eleven years. While he continues to preach to the choir in aca-
demic institutions, the political winds have shifted direction, and no serious political fig-
ure will have anything to do with him. So, having no other place to go, he remains at the
fringes of political discourse. - Many thanks to the sender, Lt. Col, W. W. Buhl, Syracuse, NY.
- 13 -
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Note:
:.rtist Rejects Commission
DENVER POST ?
2 July 1988
The detail i are' sinrseeret, but -
what's known is that the CIA is ex-
panding its headquarters in north-
ern Virginia, with new offices cov-
ering 1 million square feet. The
CIA agreed to commission art for
the new digs7-7'_one?artist to adorn
the new lobby, one to beautify the
grounds outside. _
. But Mullican approached the is-
sue just as an artist would ? which
is to says Impressionistically. "It's
like, when think CIA, I think
Wherr.J..7qt I see a .g1W*4reak out.
. (AFIO COMMETIT His brush
.)yrobably wasn't bullet -
proof . - Thanks to How-
ard E. Steen of Aurora,
CO, and Rinehart S.
Potts of Glassboro, NJ.
"Whispery" Secret
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL
26 July 1988
WASHINGTON ? Psst! Tucked
away on the sixth floor of a down-
town Washington office building is
a bookstore for spies where you,
can learn how to change your
identity, determine if your tele-
phone is bugged, look inside the,
KGB or get some self-help guidance,
on becoming an agent.
But you almost have to engage inj
espionage to find the National In-
telligence Book Center, which
specializes in books, magazines,
computer software and tapes on
spies, cryptography, surveillance,
the CIA, the KGB and spooks of all
kinds.
It is one of Washington's secrets, '
this whispery one-room shop.;
(AFIO COMMENT: Not onryt ,
did they discover the "se-
crdt" book center, but the
director and her customers
were interviewed and pic-
tures were taken. Such
genius! Well, we hope it
helps busihess. - We can't
hame all contributors; the
clipping we used came from
Lt. Col. William F. Frick
of Tucumcari, NM, and Lt.
Col. A. Lipp of Sao Paulo
sent a Portuguese version!
LCOMIC CORNER/
All items on this page are excerpts.
From a Letter to A Soviet Editor -
NEW YORK TIMES
12 June 1988 .
"A permanent commission concerned with internal
affairs and state security should be organized in the
Council of Ministers. It would be required to conduct ,
mandatory reviews of the Ministry of internal
Affairs and the Committee for State Security (the
K.G.B.).
"Democratic Perestroika Club" Komsomolskaya
Pravaa, June 7.
(AFIO COMMENT: The sender, Joseph C.
Goulden of Washington, DC, wonders
If we alight be seeing the first stir-
-rings of a "Churchski Committee." IC::
'a delightful thought. Supporters of
pur Church Committee should sign on!)]
Libertarian Librarians
_
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
25 August 1988
LIBRARIES may be for sleeping, but they certainly are
not for. spying. - _ _
It never occurred 03 the millions of us who charged out of
the schoolhouse door daily to enter these portals of pensive-
ness that sleuths and saboteurs lurked around the Dewey
decimal system.
We now are told, however, that in this modern world of
microfiche and retrieval systems, the Russians are coming,
the Russians are coming. They are coming to absorb, copy,
photograph, recruit, subvert ? and anything else stack
operatives do.
No less an austere body than the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is asking librarians to keep a sharp eye out for
suspicious-looking characters, to monitor what they read
and checkout, and then to tell all to the bureau.
Judith Krug, director of the American Library Associa-
? tion's Office for Intellectual Freedom, says this type of FBI
request is in direct contradiction to what the Library
Association stands for." She adds that it is a misuse of
library records, which are private and confidential. Krug
points out that 38 states have statutes making it illegal for
librarians to make public the names of individual users and
what materials they are using.
(AFIO COMMENT : We've wondered when it
would come to this: Telling the FBI is
the same as telling the public! - Thanks
to our top contributor, Henry N. Schladt
of Colorado Springs, CO.) _
, Penetrating Nicaraguan
1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
20 May 1_988_
MANAGUA, Nicaragua (AP) --The -government
newspaper quoted Interior Minister Tomas Borge
yesterday as saying a Nicaraguan journallit penetrat-
ed the CIA as a Sandinisth agent. ?
The reporter was identified as Marla Lourdes Pal-
lais Checa, a graduate of Columbia University in New
York. She is a niece of the late Anastasio Somoza, the
Nicaraguan dictator overthrown by the Sandinistas in
' July 1979.Barricaa, the Sandinista newspaper, quoted Borge)
as saying Pallais was "a counterintelligence aged
who worked in enemy ranks." It said he made th
remarks Sunday during a tour of Nicaragua's remot
? Caribbean coast.
(AFIO COMMENT: What about the re-
) putation of Nicaraguan journalism?
Doesn't anybody care? - Again, many
thanks to Howard E. S teen. )
-Wi---ightfully Bored
PUNCH MAGAZINE
22 April 1988
Anyway, my friend Mr Dickin-
son who runs the Bear Hotel in
Devizes, the finest watering-hole in
the West, secreted me a copy of Spy- .
catcher the other night, having .
smuggled it hack from Australia '1
(we're way behind the times down
here in Wiltshire) and I've come to
the conclusion after just a few pages '
that old Peter Wright and company
are just as boring as the spies they
never seemed to catch.
(AFIO COMMENT: He's
got a point. - Thanks
again to Howard E.
Steen of Aurora, CO.)(
Where was George?
DALIAS TIMES HERALD
20 July 1988
WASHINGTON -- A'Teportl
that Vice President George
Bush worked for the Central
Intelligence Agency in the,
early 1960s as an operative ap-
pears to be a case of mistaken
identity, the CIA said Tues-
day.
The agency has identified a
George William Bush, who
worked at CIA headquarters
during that period and who is
apparently the one mentioned
in a recently discovered FBI
memorandum, said ,..CIA
spokeswohiln- Sharron' Baso.
(AFIO COMMENT: Good
.thing the other Bush
was only CIA Director:
Many thanks to our a-
nonymous Dallas, TX,
contributor . )
?
A Book -Review
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
1 August 1988
This book is highly tendentious; its.
data is shaped and manipulated to
bolster Casey's rationale for strong
intelligence systems, and pot to in,
vestigate what the OSS actually ac-
complished.. .
(IO COMMENT: In making
a case for strong intel-
ligence, Casey was clear-
ly out of line - Thanks ;
,to Rinehart S. Potts of
IGla ssboro , NJ.)
- lil -
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FROM THE PRESIDENT OF AFIO
It is my pleasure to invite you to join the Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Our
Association was organized in 1975 by David Atlee Phillips and former intelligence personnel
from the Federal military and civilian agencies.
AFIO:
Provides a forum for former intelligence people to continue to serve.
Promotes public understanding of the need for strong U.S. intelligence.
Has about 3400 members nationwide and 20 local chapters.
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provides over 90 college professors with the opportunity to receive books and
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Distributes a quarterly journal news, views and book reviews related to
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groups.
Responds to press queries and suggests participants for radio and TV
programs on intelligence and national security issues.
Holds an annual convention with distinguished speakers and panelists.
As an educational foundation it is tax expemt [IRS 501(c)(3)]. Annual dues
($25.00) and donations are tax deductible.
MEMBERSHIP
Full Membership is available to U.S. citizens who have served with any U.S. Government
intelligence or counterintelligence organization. Only full members have the right to vote.
Associate Membership is available to U.S. citizens who have not served as intelligence
personnel but do support the aims of AFIO.
Life Membership is available for Full and Associate members for $250.00 and is tax deductible.
AFIO Directors and Officers
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APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
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