STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780010-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 11, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/24 CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780010-7
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SECRET -WITH
Z.0XL-SEeRET-7TTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
%7Illy 11, 1985
System II.
90085
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF, STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ,
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT. AND BUDGET
,THE DIRECTOR OF'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Modernization (U)
The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on the Strategic Forces Modernization
Program. (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachment
NSDD-178
SECRET WITH
Tor SECRET ATTACHMENT
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Robert C. McFarlane
TS 850145
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System II
90085
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE 178
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 10,1985
STRATEGIC FORCES. MODERNIZATION -(U)
NSDD-12 dated October 1, 1981 outlined the overall U.S.
Strategic Modernization Program. .NSDD-12 was supplemented by
NSDD-91 dated Apri1.19, 1983, The following guidance supersedes
both NSDD-12 and NSDD-91, and supplements NSDD-119 which sets
out the Strategic Defense Initiative and NSDD-78 which relates
U.S. force structure to the START negotiations. (U)
The modernization program outlined inthis.directive will guide '
the continued high priority long-term modernization of .our
strategic forces. The objective of this directive is to ensure
that our national technological 'resources are fully utilized to
develop and deploy strategic systems which ensure the endurance
of our national Strategy to deter nuclear War and to provide for
strategic stability. (U)
1. Strategic Communications. :The improvement of our strategic
command, control and communications continues to be the
first priority of our modernization program. Strategic
Connectivity that can survive and endure before, during and
after all conditions of severe stress including nuclear
attack is essential. Low-cost, backup systems will be
funded and deployed. . Particular emphasis should be placed
on the development and deployment of warning systems which
can provide timely and unambiguous Warning to national
command authorities of 'strategic attack by ICBMs,.
SLBMs, air and-sea-launched cruise missiles, and manned .
aircraft. Connectivity to the SLBM force will be
modernized as rapidly as Practical through the deployment
Of E-6A aircraft. (S)
2. .Bomber Forces. Continue modernization of our bomber force
through the development and deployment of the B-1B, the
Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), and the Advanced Cruise
Missiles. The B-1B will have the capability to launch both
ALCMs and Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM). -One hundred
B-lBs will be deployed with the first squadron to be
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operational in 1986. During the:deVelopMent of the ATB,
design options will be preserved to ensure that the ATB
could ultimately have the :capability in conjunction with,
:other national assets to locate and attack relocatable
'targets within the Soviet :Union and other potential adver-
saries. Also, the ATB should have the Ability to deliver
'both nuclear and conventional weapons. The numbers of ATBs
?and Advanced Cruise Missiles to be deployed and their .
initial operational capability (IOC) dates are set forth in
Ampex One to this NSDD. The ACM should be produced and
deployed on B-52Hs,as rapidly as practical. Bomber modi-
fications and rotary launcher schedules should be developed
to Support this schedule. :.NSDD-78 established 350 heavy
bombers as a lower limit on the bomber fOrpe structure for
purposes of the START negotiations. Previous force
Structure projections have, not been compatible with this
level. The Department of Defense should recommend an
appropriate heavy bomber forcestructure plan to the
National Security Council by December 1, 1985. (TS)
3. Sea-Launched Missile Forces. Continue the Trident II (D-5)
and' Trident submarine programs. The D-5 will be developed ?
and deployed so that', he first 1375/Trident SSBN will be
deployed no later than 1989. While the final force
structure of Tridents and D-5's is not determined At this
'time, acquisition.of Tridents should occur at .the rate of
at least one every year until a, final force structure
decision is made. (S)
4. Land-Based Missile Deployment
a. The Peacekeeper. Program--Phase I. Continued develop-
Ment and production of the Peacekeeper missile will be
accomplished on a priority basis. Sufficient missiles
and associated ground support equipment will be
produced to support an operational deployment of 100
missiles. At least 50 of these .100 Missiles will be
deployed in existing Minuteman silos in Wyoming,
supported by Francis E. Warren Air Force Base. ?
Specifically, the first 50 missiles will replace the
Minuteman missiles in !,the .400th Strategic Missile
Squadron (SMS). If the second 50 are deployed in
Minuteman silos,. they will replace Minuteman missiles
in the 319th SMS, in WyOming.and Nebraska. The IOC of
the Peacekeeper missile in this basing plan will be
achieved in 1986. 'The full operational capability of
the 100 missiles will be achieved as soon as possible
thereafter depending on the basing mode selected for.
.the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. 'fFull operational'
capability for the first'50 Peacekeeper Missiles in
silos will be. accomplished by the end'of calendar year
1988. 'The Department Of Defense should ensure.that
the production of Peacekeeper missiles is not
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interrupted until the 100 Peacekeeper missiles and
associated test missiles and spares are produced. (S)
.. The Peacekeeper Program--Phase II. The DOD should
develop a plan for determining the, best -basing mode:
for the second 50 Peacekeeper Missiles. The plan
should include an orderly .process for identifying a .
preferred basing mode or modes for the second 50
Peacekeepers as soon as possible baSed on the military
requirement, considering the unique capabilities of
both the Peacekeeper ,and Small ICBM, the technology
advancements achieved since the President's Commission
on Strategic Forces report in early'1983 and,
developments in the Soviet ICBM forte 'structure. The
plan should include a proposed rationale .for
developing the consensus necessary to gain required .
funding for the second, 50 Peacekeeper missiles and
ground support equipment. The DOD should provide a
report on the proposed plan to the President by
September 15, 1985 and a progress report on the status
of the plan by November 15, 1985. The progress report
should be consistent with the assessment of specific,
actions, that could be taken to respond to Soviet
noncompliance directed by National Security Decision
Directive 173-, but should be separate from it. The
DOD should ensure that sufficient progress has been
made by January 1986 'so that the Secretary of Defense
'can recommend a proposed, new basing mode or modes for
further' research or to enter full scale development,
if required, 'in fiscal year 1987 for the Second 50
Peacekeeper (S)
c. Small ICBM. Continue,, ,the engineering design of a
small, single warhead', ICBM. Such a missile should be
ready for full scale development in .1987 and potential
deployment in the early 1990's,. Special emphasis will
be given to development of low-cost components
designed to reduce the life cycle cost of mobile
'systems. The Department of Defense should establish a
baseline program for the small ICBM by July 15, 1986
and should report this baseline with associated cost
and progress, made to date on low-cost basing concepts
for the small ICBM, to the National Security
Council.'(S)
d. Survivability Enhancements'. Continue programs to
resolve uncertainties regarding silo and shelter .
hardness applicable to Peacekeeper and small missiles,
studies of fratricide effects, and investigation of
'different types of land-based vehicles and launchers,"
particularly hardened' vehicles. Research on Deep
Underground Basing will continue because of its.
application to a secure reserve force, and its.
potential for survivable C3. Particular emphasis
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should be placed on the study, of combinations of
.superhard Silos and other survivability enhancements
,as possible alternative. future basing Modes for
land-based ICBMs. ::Research should Also continue on
Ballistic Missile 'Defense systems compatible with .
:.other survivability enhancements 'for land-bated ICBMs.
'Allis research should draw from and be Closely ,coor-
dinated with research conducted on the Strategic
Defense Initiative program. (S)
5. Strategic Defense. Guidance on the Strategic Defense
Initiative program is provided in NSDD-11.9. Increased
attention should be placecLon separate research to ensure
that defenses against manned aircraft and. cruise missiles
are developed concurrently with defenses against ballistic
-missiles being developed by the SDI program.' This research
should allow for a possible future deployment decision for
.defenses against advanced low observable air-breathing:
threats to occur in the same timeframe as A possible
:deployment decision for defense against ballistic
missiles. (S)
6. ICBM/SLBM Penetration Aids. Given the intensity of Soviet
,development of ABM technologies, A program will be pursued
to develop penetration aids, decoys, and maneuverable RVs
for U.S ICBMS and SLBMs.. 'These programs should be
.structured so as to allow the deployment Of penetration
aids and decoys by the early 1990s and MARVs'as soon, as
practical thereafter if required. (S)
77 Capability to Attack Relocatable Targets. On an urgent
basis, develop a program to provide a.capOility to attack
relocatable.targets with U.S. strategic forces, The
Department 'of Defense should recommend to the National'
Security Council by April 2, 1966 an apprOpriate=program to
develop as soon as possible the sensors, C3I assets, and
strategic force structure, required .to attack relocatable
targets. (S)
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