SAMPLE LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401910002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 16, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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SAMPLE LETTER TO GEN
SCS 0002H/86
July 16, 1986
GORBACHEV (S/S)
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I have taken careful note of the
negotiators made during the c
continued to ponder our dis
our subsequent corresponden
earlier exchanges, I heartil
in your recent address to the C
need to "search for new approaches
the road to a reduction of nuclear
most urgent task before us.
esting proposals your
in Geneva. I have also
va last November and
y have guessed from our
the statement you made
entral Committee about the
to make it possible to clear
arms." That is certainly the
In Geneva, you expressed to me the concern that one side
might acquire the capability to deliver a disarming first strike
against the other by adding advanced strategic defenses to a
large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons. I agree that the
"new approach" you have called-far ?should address this problem
directly. Neither side shouldhaVt-first strike capability.
The issue of advanced sy em 'et:rategic defense is one on
which we have both focused in on with a "new approach."
Research and exploration as the feasibility of such advanced
strategic defenses is a subjegtty641eve discussed with each
other. I want to address it new, athe Wry outset of this
letter, because I am aware that the itsue-is a matter of great
concern to both of us. We bot1. agree that neither side should
deploy systems of strategic defense simply to augment and enhance
its offensive capability. 1:*.have assured you that the United
States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage in this
area. To ensure that neither of?us-is in a position to do so, we
would be prepared to immediately conclude an agreement
incorporating the following limits:
(a) Both sides would confine themselves for a period of ae--litit
ess than ive years, through 1991, to a program of research and
associated tes ing to determine whether, in principle, advanced
reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible.
Such research could include testing necessary to establish
feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such
testing, the other side shall havotd*beKight to observe the
tests, in accord with mutuallyfagreed pi6cedures.
j7,17.2
(b) Following this period of research or at some later
future time, either the United States.--;Qr the Soviet Union may
determine that advanced reliai temkpf strategic defense are
technically feasible. Theref -e, e erIparty may then desire to
r u ?
proceed beyond research and associated testing to development and
related testing of an advancegAptraXicpefense system. In
anticipation that this may octiit,_w ould be prepared to sign a
4r
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IUP SELINE.i
traa-ty now which would require
to develop an advanced strateg
benefits of such a system wit
mutual agreement to eliminate he of
both sides. The details of the shari
elimination of offensive ball c m
of negotiations for a perio
that decides to proceed
ystem to share the
oviding there is
ballistic missiles of
angement and the
would be the subject
an two years.
(c) If, subsequent to t fter either side has
offered a sharing plan, the Unite States and Soviet Union have
not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy
unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given
to the other side.
I would also be prepared to have our representatives discuss
additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space
of advanced weapons designed to inflict mass destruction on the
surface of the earth.
I would expect that you would agree= that significant
_
commitments of this type with Kfsp,9ek,t9, strategic defenses would
make sense only if made in congin on with the implementation of
immediate actions on both our wd :jbegin moving towards our
commonly shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Towards this goal, I believe we:;alsO;shaie the view that the
process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the
offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the
Soviet Union.
In the area of strategic offensive, nuclear forces, I remain
concerned about what we perceive as a first-strike capability
against at least a portion of our retaliatory forces. This is a
condition that I cannot ignore. ? I continue to hope that our
efforts in pursuit of significant reductions in existing nuclear
arsenals will resolve this problem. We remain committed to the
immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent
reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing
strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.
The central provision should be reduction (up to 50 percent) of
strategic ballistic missile warheads. [However, we are prepared
to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an
interim measure.] In this con *e prepared to limit
long-range air-launched cruise niss esto well below our current
plan, and to limit the total nUrribeof-ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy
bombers to a level in the range suggested by the Soviet side.
(These reductions should be completed tqd,plin an agreed period of
time A-for-mamplg!,_five_year6 4. ratIz
,
At the same time, we could deal with the question of
intermediate-range nuclear miqiles l agkeeing on the goal of
eliminating this entire class:ofJapai-baed, LRINF missiles
world-wide, which is consisfent w1-t1; thjp#total elimination of all
nuclear weapons, and by agreeing on imthediate steps that would
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lead toward this goal in eithe
series of steps. Your commen
nuclear missile systems sugge
right direction last November hen we
interim INF agreement. An imme iate
elimination of long range INF sil
the rest of the world as we
it is not immediately possi
the complete elimination of t
interim approach may prove the mos
early reductions in these systems.
, or, if you prefer, in a
intermediate range
we were heading in the
sed the idea of an .
ent leading to the
ms in Europe and in
possible outcome. If
to reach agreement on
es, then a partial, i.e.,
ruitful path to achieving
Both sides have now put forward proposals whose ultimate
result would be equality at zero for our two countries in long
range INF missile warheads. If we can also agree that such
equality is possible at a level above zero, we would take a major
step towards the achievement of an INF agreement.
Finally, I agree that we a ou_14;Taeek to achieve an interim
outcome without delay. I wouldkbe inteAsted in any specific
suggestions that you may wish to o i towards this end. Once
again, however, we should agre't 4?tions begin immediately
and that significant progress ed within an agreed period
of time.
Of course, I would hope tgat we Could also agree now that
once we have achieved a fifty percent reduction in the U.S. and
Soviet offensive nuclear arsenals and the progress we seek in
eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, we would
continue to pursue negotiations for further reductions in
strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, inviting other nuclear
powers to participate. Such negotiations could focus on the
reduction of the size of nuclear arsenals then held by the
negotiating powers. The overall aim should be the ultimate
elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Associated with the program to reduce and eliminate nuclear
weapons, we would be prepared to agree to a parallel program to
achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately
eliminating nuclear testing in step-by-step fashion. This
program could begin by our prompt agreement on verification
procedures to permit ratificatipitehtreaties signed in
and 1976. Upon ratification of these treaties, we could then
etablish_a---process of furtherredUaTbris in the number of
nuclear testa which each side would be permitted to-conduct
annually._JFor example, we could-d-grreao reduce, from that
the number of nuclear tests in. ionLp to the scale of
'reductions in strategic_nucle4r-arctully implemented.
With regard to conventio941 andik-lemAcal forces, I fully
agree that the existing fora:-and!,chiThelsf should be used more
actively. These areas diffet, in -S'eVeralPWays from nuclear
matters. As you have pointed t a arjor difference is the
1974
y 114,?A0-147.
time, -
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number of relevant states --
and, potentially, in chemical
could, however, envision frui
us at the level of experts, a
would suggest that such discu
preliminary exchanges to clar
experts' meeting. When our
preliminary progress, we mig
respective ambassadors to MBFR
in capitals for bilateral exchange.
in both conventional
an the nuclear area. I
ial exchanges between
lare of publicity.
irst profit by
the agenda of such
een able to make some
to consider our
the CD getting together
Mr. General Secretary, I hope that you will notice that I
have tried explicitly to take into account the concerns you
expressed to me in Geneva and in our correspondence, as well as
key elements of your most recent proposals. I believe you will
see that this approach provides) p?tt111ff?ce that neither
country would be able to exploit? esearcb on strategic defense to
acquire a disarming first-strike capability, or to deploy weapons
of mass destruction in space.'
alemework I propose should
permit us to proceed immedi*ely to reduce existing nuclear
arsenals as we have agreed is 4,?si and to establish the
conditions for proceeding to f th r reductions toward the goal
of total elimination.
With respect to those jasp9Apks4-6fothe^,,above subject to
negotiation at the Nuclear and Space Talks, I will be instructing
our negotiators to present this proposal, along with appropriate
implementing details, when the next round of negotiations begins
in Geneva in September. I hope that your negotiators will be
prepared to respond in a/positive and constructive fashion so
that we can proceed promptly to agreement. We also look forward
to the beginning of expert level discussions on the related area
of nuclear testing.
aA
Sincerely yours,
ToP SECRET/SAGE T n r n rr nri
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LANGUAGE CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON TESTING
"With respect to nuclear testing, as you know, we believe a
safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent requires testing.
Thus, while a ban on such testing remains a long-term United
States objective, we are unable under present circumstances
to contemplate a proposal for a complete ban on such tests or
other limitations beyond those involved in existing treaties in
this area. We are, however, hopeful that, with the initiation
of discussions between our respective experts, we can make prog-
ress toward eliminating the verification uncertainties which
currently preclude ratification of the TTBT and PNET."
MP SECRET SAGE
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