YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS FUTURE ORIENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005700010001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 3 1/1-5 5
19 May 1955
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 31/1-55
(Supersedes NIE 31-55)
YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS FUTURE ORIENTATION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 19 May 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intel-
ligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation., abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
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YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS FUTURE ORIENTATION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Yugoslavia over the next few years, with
special emphasis on its future orientation.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The currently unresolved state of Ti-
to's relations with both the West and the
Sino-Soviet Bloc makes it impossible to
chart future Yugoslav foreign policy with
any great degree of certainty. In fact,
Tito himself is probably anxious to await
further developments before adopting
any firm line of action. Nevertheless, the
dominant concerns of his regime will al-
most certainly remain those of insuring
its own survival and avoiding foreign
domination. To this end, it will probably
make increasing efforts to achieve a ben-
eficial relationship with both power
camps with a minimum of commitments
to either. And since Tito clearly recog-
nizes that general war would seriously
threaten the continued existence of his
regime, he will lay great stress on efforts
to avert such a conflict. (Paras. 24-25)
2. Despite its desire to be independent of
both blocs, the Tito regime recognizes its
need for further Western aid and would
probably wish to maintain some security
ties with the West even if such aid were
substantially curtailed. To this end it
will probably continue limited military
collaboration with its Balkan allies.
(Paras. 29-30)
3. However, the Tito regime presently be-
lieves that the risk of Soviet aggression
has at least temporarily declined and that
some form of "peaceful coexistence" may
now be possible. Tito apparently believes
that the West has now achieved a rough
military equilibrium with the Soviet Bloc
and that there is consequently no need
for rapid further progress in strengthen-
ing -joint defenses against the USSR.
Therefore, Yugoslavia will probably con-
tinue to resist any moves toward develop-
ment of even a limited,degree of informal
joint planning with Italy and NATO,
even at the risk of curtailment of military
aid. It is unlikely that Yugoslavia could
be pushed into ?such move even by
threatened loss of economic aid as well.
(Paras. 23, 30-31)
4. Yugoslavia will probably continue to
take advantage of opportunities to de-
velop more friendly relations with the
Bloc, which some elements within the re-
gime probably hope will lead to Yugo-
slavia's realignment with the Bloc. How-
ever, we estimate that it will not return
to the Bloc at least so long as Tito re-
mains in power. (Paras. 26-27, 40-41)
5. Yugoslav leaders will continue to de-
sire an Albanian regime under their in-
1
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fluence if not under their direct control,
and will oppose any Western proposals
regarding Albania's future which might
prejudice these ambitions. However, Yu-
goslavia is unlikely to undertake un-
ilaterally any major intervention in Al-
bania, except in the event of a serious
governmental crisis in that country, for
fear of arousing strong opposition both
from the USSR and from interested West-
ern powers. (Para. 32)
6. The Djilas-Dedijer affairs reflects ma-
jor differences in view within the party,
and some degree of political ferment will
almost certainly continue. However, Ti-
to is still clearly the undisputed boss, and
we foresee no major threat to internal
stability so long as he is alive. (Paras.
38, 41-42)
7. Tito's death would be a serious blow
to the regime. Even if the transfer of
power were to take place without diffi-
culty, it is uncertain whether any suc-
cessor could develop a comparable degree
of control over the party machinery and
government. At least at the outset, a
successor regime would probably seek to
carry out Tito's policies. However, Yu-
goslavia's orientation would be uncertain
if there were a disruptive struggle over
the succession or a subsequent deteriora-
tion of the regime's strength and unity.
(Paras. 43-44)
8. Assuming a continuation of some ex-
ternal aid and credits and reasonably
good harvests, Yugoslavia's longer-term
economic prospects appear favorable. In
the short run, however, Yugoslavia will
continue to face the basic problem of how
to balance its foreign accounts while pur-
suing an ambitious development program
and making heavy defense outlays.
(Paras. 54, 56)
2
9. The Tito regime will probably continue
to rely on foreign aid, as well as on in-
creased production for export and fur-
ther rescheduling of foreign debt pay-
ments, to meet this problem. It probably
estimates that Yugoslavia's strategic im-
portance will compel the US to continue
aid. Curtailment of this aid would thus
make serious readjustments necessary,
and even though it would probably not
critically endanger the Yugoslav economy
except in the event of further droughts,
the political repercussions might affect
Yugoslavia's internal and foreign policies.
(Paras. 56-57)
10. Despite heavy economic strain and
the current lessening of Yugoslav appre-
hension about Bloc aggression, the Tito
regime will almost certainly continue its
efforts to build up its armed forces. Pro-
vided that substantial Western arms aid
continues, Yugoslav defense capabilities
will continue to improve. Yugoslavia's
military position has been benefited by
the coordination developed, particularly
with Greece, under the Balkan Alliance.
(Paras. 60, 63, 66)
11. The possibility cannot be excluded
that secret arrangements may have been
made or may be made, between top Yu-
goslav Communists and the USSR, de-
signed to insure Yugoslavia's eventual re-
turn to the Bloc or at least its neutrality
in time of war. There have been persist-
ent though unsubstantiated allegations
that a secret Moscow-Belgrade deal has
already taken place. We believe that
such allegations cannot be wholly dis-
counted but that it is highly improbable
that they are true. (Para. 21)
12. We believe that the present Yugoslav
regime would prefer to remain neutral in
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the event of a general war. However,
if Yugoslavia itself were attacked it
would almost certainly resist. More=
over, if Greece and European Turkey were
attacked, and NATO resistance had
started or was clearly forthcoming, Yu-
goslavia would probably feel obliged be-
cause of the imminent threat to its own
position to fight alongside its Balkan
allies. On the other hand, if the Soviet
Bloc attacks against the Balkan Alliance
3
were confined to Asiatic Turkey, Yugo-
slavia might be reluctant to honor its
commitments. Finally, if Greece and
Turkey were not invaded, it would prob-
ably elect to remain neutral as long as
the international situation would permit.
Tito's willingness to participate in co-
ordinated wartime military operations
would probably be limited by preoccupa-
tion with maintaining his regime in the
central mountains.'
DISCUSSION
I. YUGOSLAVIA'S PRESENT
INTERNATIONAL POSITION
13. Since June 1948, when Yugoslavia was ex-
pelled from the Cominform for its resistance
to Soviet domination, its international posi-
tion has been anomalous. At first reluc-
tant to believe that its ostracism from the
Communist world was more than tempor-
ary, Yugoslavia was finally forced by Soviet
hostility and by its own economic difficul-
ties into closer relations with the West. In
1950 it accepted Western assistance rather
than face economic collapse. Since then it
has slowly but steadily built up its economic,
military and diplomatic ties with the Western
Powers, capitalizing skillfully on Western in-
terest in keeping it free of Soviet domination.
To date it has received from the West more
than $700 million in economic grants and
credits and close to $1 billion in military aid.
It has reoriented its foreign trade, in 1948
more than 50 percent with the Bloc, into an
overwhelmingly Western pattern. It has re-
solved a number of outstanding differences
with the Western Powers, including the Tri-
este dispute with Italy. It has even gone so
far as to enter into mutual defense commit-
ments with Greece and Turkey.
14. At the same time Yugoslav cooperation
with the West has been subject to significant
limitations. Yugoslav leaders have consist-
ently emphasized their continuing dedication
to Communism and have not hesitated on oc-
casion to range themselves alongside the oth-
er Communist powers in' criticism of various
Western institutions and practices. They
have been grudging and suspicious in their
dealings with the West and have further un-
derlined their unwillingness to identify them-
selves completely with the capitalist world by
efforts to cultivate socialist parties and such
neutral countries as India, Burma, and Swe-
den.
15. These apparent inconsistencies in Yugo-
slav foreign policy have been intensified in the
period since Stalin's death in March 1953 and
especially within the last year. On the one
1 The Director of Intelligence, USAF, and the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence, would prefer the
following paragraph be substituted for Para-
graph 12:
"In a general war situation the present
Yugoslav regime would prefer to remain neu-
tral. Concern for the survival of the Tito re-
gime would probably be an overriding factor
in any Yugoslav assessment as to the courses
of action required in response to Soviet Bloc
military moves in the Balkans. If attacked by
Bloc forces Tito would almost certainly fight.
However, in the absence of such an attack,
Tito might, in his judgment, believe that by
remaining militarily uncommitted in a big
power conflict, even at a time when Greece
and/or Turkey were invaded, Yugoslavia would
be afforded the opportunity of preserving in-
tact its own military and political strengths
and eventually emerging from a general war
relatively unscathed. Under these circum-
stances, there is no assurance that Yugoslavia
would necessarily feel compelled to fight Bloc
forces in support of Greece and/or Turkey."
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hand, growing Yugoslav cooperation with the
West culminated in the replacement of Yugo-
slavia's February 1953 friendship pact with
Greece and Turkey by a formal defensive
alliance in August 1954 and in Yugoslavia's
final abandonment of its objections to a West-
ern-backed solution of the Trieste dispute two
months later. These developments were par-
alleled, however, by the progressive restora-
tion of "normal" relations between Yugoslavia
and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, following a series of
conciliatory Soviet moves such as: (a) the
abandonment of the USSR's virulent propa-
ganda campaign against Tito; (b) special
gestures acknowledging the contribution of
Tito's partisans to Yugoslavia's wartime liber-
ation and hailing the Trieste settlement;
(c) private admissions that Yugoslavia had
been wrongly treated in 1948; and (d) an
apparent curtailment of Soviet support for
Cominformist Yugoslav emigres and other
anti-Tito subversive activities. "Normaliza-
tion" of Yugoslav-Bloc relations, which is now
largely complete, has included the resump-
tion of full diplomatic relations with the USSR
and the Satellites, the establishment of such
relations between Yugoslavia and Communist
China, the reopening of communications
across the Yugoslav borders, the restoration
of Yugoslav-Bloc trade in nonstrategic ma-
terials, improvement of Yugoslavia's position
in the Soviet-dominated Danube Commis-
sion, and exchanges of cultural and sports
delegations. Arrangements have also been
made for reciprocal visits of Yugoslav and
Soviet parliamentary delegations, and a sim-
ilar exchange may take place with Hungary.
16. Yugoslavia was initially cautious about
these steps toward "normalization," which
were taken almost entirely at Soviet initia-
tive. However, the Yugoslays have been in-
creasingly outspoken in welcoming renewed
contacts with the Soviet world. Although
Tito and his key associates have voiced con-
tinuing skepticism about ultimate Soviet ob-
jectives and have taken pains to reassure the
West that they "will never go back," they have
hailed the new Soviet tactic as a demonstra-
tion that the Kremlin's new leadership has
realized the bankruptcy of the old Stalinist
policy. They have clearly been impressed by
the reversal of Bloc behavior toward Yugo-
slavia and by what they consider to be the
parallel indications that a less dominating
Moscow attitude toward the Satellites was
possibly in the making.
17. Recently, moreover, Yugoslav leaders have
displayed increased interest in the possibili-
ties of "peaceful coexistence" and the achieve-
ment of a more neutral position and appear
to be placing correspondingly less importance
on development of their defense ties with the
West. Yugoslav spokesmen have argued with
increasing insistence that moves toward rap-
prochement with Yugoslavia represent part
of a general slackening of Soviet militancy,
that the urgency of developing defenses
against aggression has accordingly declined,
and that at least some resolution of existing
international tensions may now be possible.
Although the Yugoslays appear to have co-
operated reasonably well in some aspects of
Balkan Alliance defense planning (particular-
ly with respect to the Greek-Yugoslav "com-
mon area") , they have tended to interpret
other obligations narrowly and have persist-
ently rebuff ed tripartite US-UK-French and
Turkish efforts to develop some form of
planning link between the Balkan Alliance
and NATO. Yugoslav relations with the US
have been further strained by an accumula-
tion of irritations over the administration of
US military and economic aid.
18. Indications of a readjustment in Yugo-
slavia's international outlook have become
more pronounced in recent weeks under the
double impact of the developing Soviet diplo-
matic offensive in Europe and a series of West-
ern efforts to resolve outstanding difficulties
and uncertainties in relations with Yugoslav-
ia. In recent talks with the UK and US am-
bassadors and Turkish Premier Menderes in
late April and early May, Tito strongly ad-
vanced the view that the West was placing un-
due emphasis on the purely military aspects of
security. He hailed the Soviet decision to
press for an early Austrian treaty as a major
step toward peaceful stabilization of the sit-
uation in Europe, expressed new misgivings
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about the policy of arming West Germany,
and even suggested to the Bristish ambassa-
dor that Western security interests might best
be served by creation of a neutral belt com-
prising Yugoslavia, Austria, a reunified Ger-
many, Sweden, and possibly other states.
He stubbornly held to the position that the
development of even informal planning ties
with NATO was both unwise and unnecessary
at this time, and finally proposed that the
manifest differences in Western and Yugoslav
views be discussed at greater length at a
meeting of US, UK, French, and Yugoslav
representatives in Belgrade some time during
June. Despite Tito's intimation that prob-
lems in administering aid could probably be
worked out, the Yugoslays have continued to
be disputatious and unbending in subsequent
negotiations on the subject. Finally, there
has come the dramatic announcement on 13
May that a top-level Soviet delegation headed
by Khrushchev and Bulganin would visit
Belgrade at the end of May to confer with
Yugoslav leaders.
19. These developments have again raised the
spectre of Yugoslavia's realigning itself with
the Soviet Bloc. "Normalization" of Yugoslav
relations with the Bloc has almost certainly
been particularly welcome to the Yugoslav
leaders who as Communists had fought to
overturn capitalism in Yugoslavia and look
forward to its eventual disappearance else-
where. They have been uncomfortable at
being debarred from friendly contact with
other Communist nations and at being forced
to consort largely with capitalist nations
whose institutions and policies they distrust
and whose preference, they recognize, would
be for a non-Communist Yugoslavia. They
are hopeful that circumstances are forcing
the Soviet leadership toward a liberalization
of the Soviet regime and a relaxation of So-
viet domination over the Satellites, thus facil-
itating the spread of Titoist concepts and in-
fluence within the Communist world. More-
over, they are almost certainly flattered by
the fact that the USSR, which so long treated
Yugoslavia as a disobedient underling, is now
prepared to send its top leaders to confer with
Tito in his own capital.
5
20. Thus far, however, we do not believe that
such considerations are leading toward a Yu-
goslav return to the Bloc. Despite Yugoslav
elation over the recent turn of events, there
appears to be no slackening in the spirit of
stubborn independence and pride which led
Tito and his associates to follow their own con-
cept of Communism despite the Cominform's
displeasure, nor in the emphasis on the re-
gime's self-interest which has marked its dip-
lomacy since June 1948. Yugoslav spokesmen
have characteristically depicted Soviet will-
ingness to meet in Belgrade as a victory for
the policy of firmness which Western support
has enabled Yugoslavia to display toward the
USSR and have portrayed the conference it-
self as a test of Soviet willingness to accept the
principles of full equality and non-interfer-
ence in Yugoslav internal affairs on which
Yugoslav foreign policy was based. They
have meanwhile insisted that their policies
toward the West remained unchanged.
21. There has probably been greater prelim-
inary coordination between Yugoslavia and
the USSR than the Yugoslays will admit, and
the possibility cannot be excluded that there
has already been a secret Belgrade-Moscow
deal calling for Yugoslavia's eventual return
to the Bloc or for at least its neutrality in time
of war. Such Yugoslav commitments to the
USSR, however, would appear inconsistent
not only with Tito's professed foreign policy
objectives but also with important aspects of
Yugoslav self-interest. Indeed, the extent to
which the USSR is seriously counting on such
results is uncertain. Although the Yugoslays
have repeatedly asserted that Moscow had
continuing illusions about Yugoslav willing-
ness to return to the Bloc, the USSR almost
certainly regards the impending Belgrade con-
ference as an integral part of a diplomatic
campaign designed to affect the entire Euro-
pean situation and would probably consider
the conference successful even if it did no
more than add to the momentum of that
campaign. Although persistent past allega-
tions of a secret Belgrade-Moscow deal cannot
be wholly discounted, they are unsubstan-
tiated and we consider it highly unlikely that
they are true.
ET
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22. In sum, we consider Yugoslavia's recent
actions to be adequately explained by its de-
sire for a position of greater freedom of action
vis-a-vis both power blocs and by its belief
that its opportunities for accomplishing this
end had improved. The consequences of the
sudden rupture of Yugoslavia's relations with
the Soviet Bloc, on which it was almost en-
tirely dependent for trade, economic support,
military guidance and supplies, and scientific
and cultural contacts, provided Tito with an
impressive lesson in the dangers of exclusive
cooperation with a single power grouping.
Yugoslavia's subsequent relationship with the
West has been far less restrictive, but it has
still placed Yugoslavia in a position of eco-
nomic dependence on the West and has con-
fronted the Yugoslays with the necessity of
considering the impact of their actions on
Western official and public opinion. Thus
Tito has welcomed "normalization" not only
as restoring the channels through which con-
tacts with the Communist world can be re-
sumed but also as alleviating Yugoslavia's
one-sided dependence on the West and in-
creasing its bargaining power.
23. Of at least equal importance in the Tito
regime's present outlook is its belief that the
risk of Soviet aggression has at least tem-
porarily declined and that some form of
"peaceful coexistence" may now be possible.,
Tito apparently believes that the West has
now achieved a rough military equilibrium
with the Soviet Bloc and that there is con-
sequently no need for rapid further progress
in strengthening joint defenses against the
USSR. In fact, he had displayed increasing
concern lest Western defense preparations,
having served their primary purpose as a de-
terrent, may now tend to discourage the USSR
from further efforts to relax tensions and may
foreclose the possibility that some fairly last-
ing adjustment of outstanding differences be-
tween the two power blocs might be worked
out. At the same time, Yugoslavia probably
continues to recognize the need for at least
some form of military ties with the West.
II. YUGOSLAVIA'S FUTURE ORIENTATION
AND FOREIGN POLICIES
24. In view of the currently unresolved state
of Tito's relationships with both the Western
Powers and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it is impos-
sible to chart the future course of Yugoslav
foreign policy with any great degree of cer-
tainty. In fact, we consider it probable that
Tito himself is uncertain as to precisely what
course to follow and is anxious to await fur-
ther developments before committing himself.
Nevertheless, we believe that certain funda-
mental considerations will continue to govern
Yugoslavia's outlook. The dominant concerns
of the Tito regime will almost certainly re-
main those of insuring its own survival and
avoiding foreign domination. For this rea-
son, the practical requirements of maintain-
ing power will continue to override purely
nationalistic or ideological considerations.
25. The Search for a Middle Position. The
Yugoslav regime probably believes that its
own best interests in the present international
climate lie in avoiding too close an association
with either great power bloc. Although it will
probably continue to feel a need to retain
some specific ties with the West, it will wish
to continue fence-mending with Moscow, and,
in fact, will probably increasingly attempt, so
long as international conditions permit, to
achieve a beneficial relationship with both
camps with a minimum of commitments to
either one. And since Tito clearly recognizes
that an all-out war between the capitalist and
Communist blocs would seriously threaten the
continued existence of his regime, no matter
how thorough his military and diplomatic
preparations had been, he will lay great stress
on efforts to avert such a conflict. Yugo-
slavia will probably continue increasingly to
feel a certain identity of interests and outlook
with India and Burma. Tito apparently
hopes that cooperation with such powers will
help to reduce tensions, promote peace, over-
come Yugoslavia's isolation, and increase
Yugoslav prestige. In the event that the
threat of Soviet aggression in Europe should
increase, however, Tito probably would feel
compelled to strengthen his ties with the
West.
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26. Policy toward the Bloc. In pursuit of the
above objectives, we believe that Tito will con-
tinue to take advantage of opportunities to
develop more friendly relations with the Bloc.
He almost certainly hopes that the USSR can
thus be brought to commit itself more firmly
to a policy of accepting Yugoslavia's inde-
pendent existence and probably also believes
that any moves in this direction will en-
courage the development of over-all Soviet for-
eign policy along peaceful lines. Moreover,
the Tito regime will probably remain inter-
ested in improvement of Yugoslavia's stand-
ing with the Bloc as affording opportunities
for influencing Bloc policies and stimulating
morale within the Yugoslav Communist move-
ment. However, further relations between
Tito and the USSR cannot but be affected by
a continuing distrust and suspicion on both
sides. Tito almost certainly would not accept
significant Soviet influence over Yugoslavia,
even if he were assured of becoming a favored
Satellite. Moreover, Tito will probably con-
tinue to conduct his relations with the Bloc
with a wary eye to the Western reaction.
While he may feel that such moves as the
Soviet-Yugoslav top level conference may
actually have a salutary effect on the West
by impressing it with the necessity of re-exam-
ining the possibilities of "peaceful coexist-
ence," he will probably seek to avoid steps
which, in his judgment, would gravely
threaten to alienate the West. In the present
instance he is probably prepared to join the
USSR in some form of pronouncement re-
nouncing aggression and endorsing "peaceful
coexistence." However, we consider it unlike-
ly that he would make commitments which
specifically clash with his present defensive
obligations to Greece and Turkey under the
Balkan Alliance or which he considers to be
inconsistent with his continued receipt of
Western military and economic aid.
27. We estimate that Yugoslavia will not re-
turn to the Soviet Bloc at least as long as Tito
remains in power. We believe that the Tito
regime would be suspicious of any Soviet at-
tempts to offer it a Bloc status materially
different from that of the other Satellites and
would consider such an offer a subterfuge. In
determining his response to such an offer Tito
would have to consider Soviet willingness to
make political, economic, and military conces-
sions, the disadvantages of losing Western
support, and the internal situation within
Yugoslavia. In our view the Tito regime
would be likely to realign itself with the Bloc
only in the event that the USSR had already
basically revised its policy toward the Satel-
lites to such an extent as to convince Tito
that Moscow was really committed to the con-
duct of intra-Bloc relations on a basis of
equality. We believe such a basic and dem-
onstrable alteration in Soviet policy to be un-
likely during the period of this estimate.
28. While we believe that the likely imme-
diate successors to Tito would at the outset
be disposed to follow the same policy, we
cannot predict the course of Yugoslav policy
in the event of his death, especially if there
is a struggle for power over the succession.
29. Relations with the West. So long as the
Yugoslays continue to believe that the Bloc
constitutes a potential threat to their inde-
pendence, we 'believe that they will continue
to desire some countervailing Western sup-
port. However, they will regard this relation-
ship as strictly a marriage of convenience.
They believe that the West needs them and
will support them in its own interest and, for
their part, they recognize their need for fur-
ther Western military and economic aid in
building up their own strength. In his re-
cent conversation with the US ambassador,
Tito took pains to emphasize his continued
interest in US military aid. Even if such
assistance were substantially curtailed, Tito
would probably still wish to maintain some
security ties with the West.
30. To these ends the Yugoslays will prob-
ably continue limited military collaboration
through the Balkan Alliance and will other-
wise endeavor to remain on good terms with
the West. They probably recognize that some
degree of joint planning and coordination
with their Balkan allies is essential to effec-
tive development of their own defensive po-
tential. They also probably estimate that the
West will insist on some degree of cooperation
as the price for continued aid. However,
Yugoslavia will probably continue to resist
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any moves toward development of even a lim-
ited degree of informal joint planning with
Italy and NATO. In any event, Yugoslavia's
willingness to engage in Western defense
planning would probably be limited by the
special character of its own military problems
and by the desire to avoid undue identifi-
cation with the West. The Tito regime will
almost certainly continue to oppose member-
ship in NATO or other formal military ties
with the West.
31. It is highly improbable at this time that
Tito's desire for Western support could be
effectively used to extract concessions from
him, except possibly in the unlikely event of a
flareup of old animosities at the impending
Yugoslav-Soviet conference. A threat to cut
off economic as well as military aid would
pose a severe problem for Yugoslavia, since a
loss of economic aid would necessitate serious
internal readjustments. It appears likely,
however, that the Yugoslays would stubbornly
refuse to be swayed, on the ground that basic
questions of national sovereignty were in-
volved and that even if the West were not
bluffing, any revival of the Soviet military
threat to Yugoslav independence would com-
pel the West to seek out Yugoslavia again.
Tito might anticipate that the USSR would
offer some economic support. Tito would al-
most certainly accept the elimination of mili-
tary aid rather than go forward with any
significant extension of his defense commit-
ments at this time.
32. Regional Interests and Ambitions. Yugo-
slavia will retain certain special interests and
ambitions in the Balkan area, but the Tito
regime's pursuit of these ambitions will prob-
ably be restrained by the requirements of its
over-all policies. Yugoslav leaders almost cer-
tainly desire to have an Albanian regime re-
sponsive to their influence if not under their
direct control, despite their public proclama-
tion of interest in having Albania free and
independent. To this end, they will continue
to support certain Albanian emigre and re-
sistance elements, will endeavor to neutralize
the efforts of such powers as Italy, Greece, the
UK, and the US to build up similar influence,
and will oppose any Western proposals which
might prejudice Yugoslav ambitions, particu-
larly proposals involving partition of Albania
or the establishment of a non-Communist
regime there. However, Yugoslavia will prob-
ably soft-pedal its propaganda efforts to un-
dermine the present Albanian regime so long
as the "normalization" policy appears to be
producing favorable results. Moreover, it is
Unlikely to undertake unilaterally any major
intervention in Albania, except in the event
of a serious governmental crisis in that coun-
try for fear of arousing strong opposition both
from the USSR and from interested Western
Powers. For similar reasons, Yugoslavia is
unlikely to revive its propaganda claims to
Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia so long as
the exigencies of the international situation
require the avoidance of friction with these
two powers.
III. CHARACTER AND STABILITY OF THE
REGIME
Present Situation
33. Internally, Yugoslavia remains a Com-
munist dictatorship dominated by the com-
manding personality of Tito. Power is con-
centrated in the hands of Tito and a small
group of men personally loyal to him who
hold interlocking positions in the government,
the party, the armed forces, the secret police,
and the mass organizations. There is no evi-
dence of significant rivalry among these
groups. The rank and file of the party are
chiefly important as providing the driving
force for carrying out the regime's programs.
34. The Tito regime, by its own admission,
is still confronted with underlying hostility
on the part of most of the people toward Com-
munism, although Tito himself appears to
have won widespread respect for his vigorous
leadership and defense of Yugoslav national
interests. The peasantry, comprising two-
thirds of Yugoslavia's 17,000,000 population,
continues to regard Communism with suspi-
cion and dislike, despite the current relaxa-
tion of forced socialization in the countryside.
The regime's efforts to control and discipline
the Roman Catholic and Orthodox clergy and
Moslem religious leaders have made the
church a continuing symbol of popular op-
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position to the regime, even outside the ranks
of the devout; although the Yugoslays are not
particularly religious, church attendance has
remained consistently high. , While animosi-
ties and grievances among the various minori-
ty groups in Yugoslavia appear to be quiescent
at present, regional jealousies and rivalries
probably contribute in some measure to dis-
satisfaction with the policies of the present
government. The low standard of living re-
mains a countrywide source of grumbling.
Under Tito's dictatorship, however, popular
opinion has little effect on the regime's stabil-
ity and is important only insofar as it affects
economic productivity.
35. Prior to its 1948 break with Moscow, Yu-
goslavia consciously imitated the govern-
mental patterns of the USSR. Since 1950,
however, Tito and his associates have made a
series of efforts to develop a more flexible,
efficient, and popularly acceptable system of
economic and political controls than that of
the USSR, which Yugoslav theoreticians have
criticized as stifling initiative, encouraging
bureaucratic excesses, and alienating popu-
lar opinion. In recognition of the strength
of peasant opposition, the drive for collec-
tivization of agriculture has in effect been
reversed, with the result that only slight-
ly over two percent of the farm land is now
under collective or cooperative control, as
against nearly 20 percent in 1951. At the
same time the onerous system of crop de-
liveries has been abandoned and greater pro-
duction incentives have been provided in the
form of credits and higher prices. Decentral-
ization of planning and supervision has taken
place under the economic development pro-
gram.
36. These changes in the economic sphere
have been paralleled by a series of "democrat-
ic reforms," including the introduction of
workers' councils, decentralization of govern-
mental administration, moves to combat bu-
reaucratic lethargy and to stimulate greater
rank-and-file ?enthusiasm and initiative in
Communist Party affairs, and the inaugura-
tion of a somewhat less arbitrary exercise of
police authority. These concessions, however,
have to a large extent been illusory. Although
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Tito appears to have seriously intended to
liberalize the regime to some extent, he was "
evidently unprepared to face the dissipation
of administrative authority and control, and
the confusion and dissatisfaction among many
old-line party functionaries, which these re-
forms entailed. The bold program for de-
mocratization and reinvigoration of the Com-
munist Party adopted at the Sixth Party
Congress in November 1952 was sharply cur-
tailed at a Central Committee plenum at
Brioni the following June. The heaviest criti-
cism was levelled at those guilty of relaxing
party discipline, spreading of "petty-bour-
geois-anarchist ideas of freedom and de-
mocracy," and failure to suppress "foreign
and antisocial manifestations."
37. The Djilas-Dedijer Affair. Strong senti-
ment for revival of the liberalization program
has nevertheless persisted among some mem-
bers of the ruling circle. In the fall of 1953
Milovan Djilas, one of the principal advocates
of the 1952 program and at the time the No. 3
man in the regime, launched a series of
articles charging the party bureaucracy with
despotism, sterility of dogma, and self-aggran-
dizement, and advocating that the Leninist
doctrine of party dictatorship be dropped and
the party apparatus allowed to "wither away"
in the interest of "true democracy." In Jan-
uary 1954, after a particularly provocative
final article accusing the wives of high party
officials of petty bourgeois snobbishness and
cliquishness, Djilas was stripped of his party
functions and forced into retirement by Tito.
However, the whole problem came up again
in December 1954, when Vladimir Dedijer,
Tito's official biographer, flaunted party
efforts to discipline him for backing Djilas
and instead took his case to a Western news-'
paperman. Djilas in turn gave an interview
to another Western journalist which indicated
that he remained even more convinced of the
need for greater democracy in ' Yugoslavia.
Both were tried and given light suspended
sentences.
38. Although the Djilas-Dedijer affair has
apparently had little effect on the stability of
the regime, and its outcome indicated that
Tito is still undisputed boss, the affair reflects
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major differences in view between the more
liberal and the more authoritarian elements
in the party. While Djilas has no organized
support, he remains the only Yugoslav Com-
munist other than Tito with any significant
degree of popular appeal and his stand has
almost certainly evoked favorable reactions
among some party members and portions of
the general public. This sympathy for Djilas
probably extended into the upper echelons of
the party, although few if any would endorse
his sharp rejection of Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples regarding the central role of the party
in the state. Dedijer even claims that Vice-
President Kardelj and Rankovic, head of the
secret police, were among those who privately
agreed with Djilas' articles but were afraid to
quarrel with the "old man." Tito himself has
appeared to lean toward the Djilas viewpoint
in the past. '
39. However, Tito and Kardelj obviously con-
cluded that Djilas had gone too far and that
steps would have to be taken to reaffirm the
authority and prestige of the party and gov-
ernmental bureauracy and to restore party
discipline. In this, they were almost certain-
ly supported by most of the party bureaucra-
cy. Some of these party functionaries were
probably motivated primarily by personal re-
sentment of Djilas' onslaught on the party
leadership and by concern for the preserva-
tion of their rank and authority. However,
there are almost certainly others who regard
Djilas not merely as a difficult and irresponsi-
ble troublemaker but as a dangerous dissenter
from Communist orthodoxy. This doctrin-
aire element is presumably dissatisfied at least
to some degree with the dilution of Commu-
nism under Tito and even more uncomfort-
able in the company of the West than other
Yugoslav Communists.
40. As such, they might be particularly sus-
ceptible to the lure of realignment with the
"first land of socialism" now that Stalin's
vindictive policies toward Yugoslavia appear
to have been reversed. There are presumably
also some Soviet agents and secret sympa-
thizers within Yugoslavia. However, there
appears to be no organized Cominform resist-
ance to the Tito regime at present and no
RET 10
firm evidence of organized pressure for a re-
turn Of Yugoslavia to the Soviet Bloc.
Probable Developments
41. Although the immediate result of the
Djilas-Dedijer episode will probably be a
tightening up of party discipline and a sup-
pression of open controversy, some degree of
political ferment in Yugoslavia will almost
certainly continue. Basic issues are still un-
resolved with respect to the form which Yu-
goslav Communism will ultimately take, Yu-
goslavia's position in world affairs, and the
management of economic affairs. Orthodox
elements in the hierarchy will probably press
for the strengthening of dictatorial controls
over the party, the government, and the econ-
omy, and possibly also for the establishment of
closer relations with the Soviet Bloc and more
distant ones with the West. On the other
hand, there will also be continuing sentiment,
probably shared to some extent by Tito him-
self, for the development of a political system
which will harness the country's energies on
behalf of the regime more effectively and will
also serve as an example to other Communist
countries.
42. Despite such political ferment, Tito will
continue to dominate the Yugoslav situation
and we foresee no major threat to Yugoslav
internal stability so long as he is alive. He
is admired, respected, and feared even by such
extreme dissenters as Djilas. It is unlikely
that any members of the hierarchy would
openly oppose him and extremely unlikely
that they could do so successfully. Although
Tito's actions will continue to be circum-
scribed to some degree by requirements of po-
litical expediency, the major decisions in the
last analysis will continue to be his own.
43. Tito's death would be a serious blow to
the regime. Though there is at present little
evidence of serious rivalry among Tito's as-
sociates, a disruptive struggle over the suc-
cession may take place, particularly since
Tito's death would almost certainly revive the
basic differences revealed in the Djilas affair.
Even if the transfer of power were to take
place without difficulty, none of Tito's poten-
tial successors possesses his personal magnet-
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ism and prestige, and it is uncertain whether
any successor could develop a comparable de-
gree of control over the party machinery and
government.2
44. At least at the outset, a successor regime
would probably seek to carry out Tito's pres-
ent domestic and foreign policies, including
its probable unwillingness to return to the
Soviet Bloc. However, if there were a dis-
ruptive struggle over the succession or a sub-
sequent deterioration of the regime's strength
and unity Yugoslavia's orientation and poli-
cies would be uncertain.
IV. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
45. Following World War II the Tito regime
made vigorous efforts to reorganize the Yugo-
slav economy and force the pace of economic
development along Soviet lines. It national-
ized nearly all sectors of industry and em-
barked on an overambitious industrialization
program designed to capitalize on Yugo-
slavia's fairly sizeable but undeveloped sup-
plies of many of the basic resources needed
for industrial expansion?coal (mainly brown
coal and lignite), iron ore, water power,
bauxite, and nonferrous ores.
46. Despite these efforts, Yugoslavia remains
a poor and predominantly agricultural coun-
try, although considerable industrial progress
has been made. Its economic development
program has run into serious difficulties.
These arise from a combination of factors,
among them: (a) a shortage of capital, cap-
ital equipment, and industrial and scientific
know-how; (b) the regime's own inexperience
and doctrinaire rigidity resulting ?in ineffi-
ciency and mismanagement; (c) the regime's
need completely to reorient its trade relations
following the 1948 break with Moscow and the
subsequent Bloc economic blockade; (d) the
2 The most prominent candidate for the succession
is Vice-President Kardelj, a distinguished Marx-
ist theorist who is the real architect of Yugo-
slavia's so-called new socialist democracy, has
taken an active role in Yugoslav foreign policy,
and has been a sort of alter ego to Tito. Other
potential candidates are Rankovic, head of the
secret police; Gosnjak, who heads the defense
establishment; and Vukmanovie-Tempo, the
economic czar of the country.
SE
11
concurrent economic drain of extremely high
defense outlays; and (e) a lag in agricultural
production occasioned largely by obsolete
methods, by peasant distrust of the regime,
?and by a series of disastrous droughts.3
47. In 1950 these factors confronted Yugo-
slavia with economic collapse, from which it
was saved only by inauguration of large-scale
Western aid. This dependence has continued,
and up to June 1954 the US, UK, and France
have extended some $464 million in grant
economic aid, including about $360 million
from the US. (Plans for FY 1955 call for an
additional $149 million, including $140 million
from the US.) Yugoslavia also received ex-
tensive loans and credits which, combined
with comparatively small prewar debts,
amount to over $400 million. Servicing of
these loans and credits has contributed to
serious balance of payments difficulties.
48. The Yugoslav leaders were also forced to
abandon their overambitious Five Year Plan
(1947-1951) They began gradually decen-
tralizing the rigid economic planning and con-
trol system and substituted for the Five Year
Plan a looser series of annual "Social Plans."
These set forth the general framework in
which the economy is to operate and specify
annual production targets. Outlays for heavy
industrial development were reduced slightly
below the levels originally planned and were
concentrated in some 150 "Key Projects," (ore
processing plants, power plants, development
of mines, oil refineries, etc.) which were
chosen as being the most likely to make an
early improvement in the balance of payments
position. The regime also shelved its agricul-
tural collectivization program and has per-
mitted the peasants to withdraw from the col-
lective farms.
49. Despite its more realistic economic pro-
gram, Yugoslavia has continued to face seri-
ous problems. In part these arise from the
continuation of a large part of the ambitious
industrialization program and heavy defense
expenditures, which claim the high propor-
In the seven years since the Cominform break,
there have been three droughts. The prewar
level was approximately one drought year in
three.
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ton of 25 percent and 16 percent of GNP re-
spectively. Although the over-all index of in-
dustrial production has risen from 157 in 1949
(1939=100) to 209 in September 1954, many
of the "Key Projects" are considerably behind
schedule. Moreover, agricultural output has
continued to lag seriously, owing largely to
peasant resistance to the regime and to the
serious droughts in 1950, 1952, and 1954.
50. As a result of these factors Yugoslav eco-
nomic growth has been severely retarded.
GNP fell sharply in FY 1953 and despite a
subsequent recovery it is estimated that GNP
for the present fiscal year will be only two
percent over the FY 1952 figure. The best
available estimate of total GNP is $3.7 billion
in 1953-1954 as compared to $1.8 billion for
Greece and $5.4 billion for Turkey. Per capita
GNP is roughly comparable in all three coun-
tries. However, the percentage of Yugoslav
GNP devoted to consumption is lower than
that of any Western European country, and
the Yugoslav standard of living is little if any
higher than before the war.
51. Yugoslavia's need to import foodstuffs
during the drought years, its imports for de-
fense and capital investment programs, and
the difficulty of reorienting its trade from the
Bloc to the West have led to severe balance of
payments difficulties. It has been able to
balance its foreign accounts only through
Western grants and loans. Largely because
of these loans Yugoslavia is burdened with a
foreign debt as of 31 August 1954 of almost
$400 million, which it is finding difficult to
service. However, its over-all balance of pay-
ments deficit has declined from $213 million
in 1952-1953 to $145 million in 1953-1954.
52. During 1954 a revival of Yugoslav trade
with the Soviet Bloc took place largely on Bloc
initiative, and trade agreements, mostly for
short periods, were concluded with all Bloc
countries except Albania and Communist
China. So far in 1955 ,annual agreements
have been concluded with four of these coun-
tries. If these agreements are fulfilled, the
trade would approximate 13 percent of total
Yugoslav foreign trade. Negotiations are in
progress with other Bloc countries and this
figure will probably increase. The compar-
12
able prewar figure was 15-20 percent and for
1948 was 50 percent: Yugoslavia has a clear
economic basis for welcoming such trade,
since the Bloc can supply fuels, raw materials,
and even capital goods which must otherwise
come from hard currency areas. The Yugo-
slav Government has assured the US that it
will not ship strategic materials to the Bloc.
Such, small shipments as have occurred are
probably attributable to weaknesses in control
of transshipments.
53. Yugoslavia's exports to Western Europe
have declined from a high of 77 percent of
total exports in 1952 to 69 percent for the
first half of 1954. Exports to North America
have also declined. This trend is due primari-
ly to the difficulty the Yugoslays have in mar-
keting their exports (particularly new manu-
factures) in these areas. The difference has
been mainly made up in increased trade with
the Middle East and Latin America. Thus,
while Yugoslavia continues to be dependent
on dollar imports, its dollar earnings and
earnings of convertible Western European
currencies are declining.
Economic Prospects
54. Assuming a continuation of some external
aid and credits and reasonably good harvests,
Yugoslavia's rate of economic growth should
gradually increase and its longer-term pros-
pects appear favorable. Industrial produc-
tion will probably continue to increase as more
of the "Key Projects" come into operation,
and should lead to greater exports. Suffi-
cient agricultural improvement to permit
maintenance of a substantial export program
is almost certainly a long-term matter and
any further crop failures would involve the
need for emergency food imports. The gov-
ernment will probably modestly increase in-
vestments in agriculture but it is unlikely
that these investments will be sufficient to
lead to any substantial short-term increases
in production.
55. Barring droughts, Yugoslavia will prob-
ably be able to effect further gradual reduc-
tions in its foreign trade deficit, but there is
little prospect that it can achieve a balance
in its payments over the next two or three
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years. Moreover, it is now in the period when
its foreign debt requires the largest annual
servicing, ranging from $37 million to $48
million in 1955-1957. Some additional re-
scheduling of this debt may be possible but
even a complete moratorium could not by it-
self eliminate Yugoslavia's payments deficit,
which will continue to stem in the first in-
stance from an adverse trade balance.
56. In the short run therefore, Yugoslavia is
still faced with the same basic problem it has
had ever since its break with the Cominf orm
? how to balance its foreign accounts while
pursuing an ambitious development program
and making heavy defense outlays. We be-
lieve that the Tito regime will remain unwill-
ing to cut defense expenditures and reluctant
to cut capital investment significantly, but
will continue to pursue a policy of relying on
foreign aid, increased industrial and raw ma-
terial exports, and further rescheduling of
Yugoslavia's foreign debts to reduce its pay-
ments imbalance. Tito probably estimates
that the strategic importance of Yugoslavia to
the West is such that the US will feel com-
pelled to continue some military and economic
aid.
57. Curtailment or elimination of foreign eco-
nomic aid would force Yugoslavia to make
significant adjustments in investment, de-
fense, or consumption. In the absence of
further serious droughts, such adjustments
would not critically endanger the Yugoslav
economy, but the political repercussions might
affect Yugoslavia's internal and foreign poli-
cies. We are unable to estimate which ad-
justments the government would make, since
a cut in any sector would entail serious dis-
advantages.
58. In view of the desperate need to increase
agricultural production and of the peasant
distrust of the regime, we do not believe that
the government will revert to the Soviet-type
farm collectivization program which it aban-
doned in 1952-1953. While the government,
because of its need to control agriculture,
probably retains the ultimate aim of social-
izing the countryside, it will probably ap-
proach this through cooperatives in which
the peasants will continue to own their land,
SE
but will cooperate on purchasing, marketing,
credits, etc.
59. Trade between Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Bloc will probably increase so long as political
considerations on both sides favor it. The ex-
tent to which this trade will approach or ex-
ceed prewar levels will depend both on the
Bloc's economic and political incentive to ex-
pand this trade and Yugoslavia's fear of be-
coming seriously dependent on the Bloc. It
is unlikely that this trade would again ap-
proach the level of 1948 or that trade consider-
erations alone could impel Yugoslavia to re-
turn to the Bloc.
V. MILITARY TRENDS
60. Despite heavy economic strain, the Tito
regime is continuing its intensive efforts to
build up Yugoslavia's armed forces. Defense
outlays in the past three years have been
some 16 percent of GNP. Imports of mili-
tary supplies (over and above US military
aid) also have contributed to Yugoslavia's
foreign trade deficit. Despite the current
lessening of Yugoslav apprehension about
Bloc aggression, however, we believe that the
regime is unlikely to make any significant
reduction in the Yugoslav military establish-
ment.
61. The Yugoslav military forces and the se-
curity police constitute the major elements
in the regime's control of the country. Re-
cognizing the importance of the support of
the military, the regime has favored the
armed forces; most of the officer corps has
received some tangible evidence of the re-
gime's interest in its welfare. Although
there has been some evidence of Cominform-
ism in the officer corps in the past, there is no
reason to believe that the officer corps is dis-
loyal to the regime.
62. By far the most important factor in the
improvement of the Yugoslav armed forces
over the past few years has been US military
aid, which since 1951 has amounted to near-
ly $1 billion (the figure for FY 1955 is rough-
ly $150 million). Yugoslavia's armaments
industry is now producing some small arms
and light artillery as well as ammunition for
these weapons. Yugoslavia also has a mod-
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est shipbuilding industry. However, it re-
mains dependent on outside sources for all
other types of equipment and ammunition.
Therefore, a cutting-off of US arms aid (un-
less replaced from other source) would in
time markedly reduce the combat capabili-
ties of the Yugoslav forces, particularly the
air force.
63. The Yugoslav Army of 300,000 men is
organized into 26 rifle and three armored di-
visions. It is considered well-trained up
through regimental level, and two-thirds of
the divisions are considered combat ready.
The army is currently deployed to meet
threats from the Satellites. There are also
35,000 Border Guards. By M+90 the army
could be expanded to 1,200,000 men and 44
divisions, but the reserve units would lack
heavy weapons and supplies. Yugoslav sol-
diers are well-trained, tough, and intensely
patriotic. The army's chief weaknesses are:
shortage of both heavy and communications
equipment; heterogeneity and obsolescence
of much of the equipment on hand; the in-
experience of senior officers in handling large
forces in combined operations, including air
support of ground forces. Assuming con-
tinued US aid, the capabilities of the army
will continue to improve.
64. The Yugoslav Air Force, whose primary
mission is ground support, is now in the pro-
cess of conversion to jet aircraft. Principal
operational aircraft include approximately
115 F-84G's, 140 F-47D's, and 100 5-49's,4 all
utilizable in a fighter or fighter/bomber role.
Also there are about 125 Mosquitos and 200
obsolete IL-2's, and PE-2's available for re-
connaissance, light bombing, and attack pur-
poses. Personnel strength totals nearly
28,000 including about 1,000 qualified pilots.
Largely as a result of US aid and training
this air force has improved rapidly during the
past three years and, as long as such aid and
training are continued, air force combat ca-
pabilities will further improve over the next
few years. By mid-1956 it is planned to have
nine fighter-bomber squadrons (F-84G's) and
three interceptor day fighter squadrons (F-
An obsolete piston single engine fighter of Yu-
goslav manufacture.
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14
86's). As these aircraft, radar, and com-
munications equipment are received, the air
force should also develop a limited air defense
capability. During this same period eight
airfields will be available for the handling of
these jet aircraft, including five airfields con-
sidered to be fairly secure from initial ground
force attack.
65. Yugoslavia's Navy is a 27,000-man coastal
force of four coastal destroyers, one subma-
rine, 95 patrol craft including 79 motor tor-
pedo boats, 30 mine vessels, 48 landing craft,
and some 200 other types including 35 sta-
tioned on the Danube. Although it has a
weak logistical system, the Navy's combat
readiness appears to be high. However, its
capabilities are limited to coastal dgense,
blockading Albania, and supporting small am-
phibious attacks against that country. With
continued Western aid, the effectiveness of
the navy should improve, but it will almost
certainly remain a minor force with limited
capabilities.
66. Yugoslav Capabilities and Intentions in
Event of War. Yugoslavia's military position
has been benefited by the coordination devel-
oped, particularly with Greece, under the Bal-
kan Alliance. However, if confronted by a
coordinated Satellite attack logistically sup-
ported by the USSR, we believe that Yugoslav-
ia would be forced to give up the plain of
northeast Yugoslavia. It would be able to
withdraw sizeable organized ground units in-
to the mountains. After such a withdrawal
some organized resistance could probably be
maintained with prompt and substantial mil-
itary support from the West. Guerrilla act-
ivity would probably continue as long as the
Yugoslav people retained a hope of libera-
tion by the West. However, under the im-
pact of defeat and the dispersion of the army,
the opportunities for popular and unit defec-
tion would increase. In those circumstan-
ces, pro-Western anti-Tito guerrilla forces
might be formed.
67. We believe that the present Yugoslav re-
gime would prefer to remain neutral in event
of general war. However, if the Soviet Bloc
initiated major operations in southern Eu-
rope, Yugoslavia would probably be invaded,
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since it lies athwart the area's main in-
vasion routes. In this case it would almost
certainly fight. Even if Soviet-Satellite
moves in the Balkans were initially confined
to attacks on Greece and European Turkey,
The Director of Intelligence, USAF, and the Di-
rector of Naval Intelligence would prefer that
the following paragraph be substituted for para-
graphs 67, 68, and 69:
"In a general war situation, the present Yugo-
slav regime would prefer to remain neutral.
Concern for the survival of the Tito regime
would probably be an overriding factor in any
Yugoslav assessment as to the courses of action
required in response to Soviet Bloc military
moves in the Balkans. If attacked by Bloc
forces Tito would almost certainly fight. How-
ever, in the absence of such an attack, Tito
might, in his judgment, believe that by re-
maining militarily uncommitted in a big power
conflict, even at a time when Greece and/or
Turkey were invaded, Yugoslavia would be
afforded the opportunity of preserving intact
its own military and political strengths and
eventually emerging from a general war rel-
atively unscathed. Under these circumstances,
there is no assurance that Yugoslavia would
necessarily feel compelled to fight Bloc forces
in support of Greece and/or Turkey."
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15
if NATO resistance had started or was clear-
ly forthcoming Yugoslavia would probably
feel obliged because of the imminent threat
to its own position to fight alongside its Bal-
kan allies.5
68. It is less likely, however, that Yugoslavia
would freely honor its Balkan Alliance com-
mitments if Bloc operations against the Al-
liance were limited to Asiatic Turkey.6 Fi-
nally, if Greece and Turkey went to war as a
result of their NATO commitments but were
not invaded, Tito would be obliged only to
"consult" with them, and he would probably
elect to remain neutral as long as the inter-
national situation would permit.
69. In any event, Tito's willingness to parti-
cipate in coordinated wartime military oper-
ations would probably be limited by preoccu-
pation with maintaining the security and au-
thority of his regime in the central moun-
tains.
See Appendix for a summary of the Balkan
Alliance.
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ET 16
APPENDIX
THE BALKAN ALLIANCE
The "Treaty of Alliance, Political Coopera-
tion, and Mutual Assistance" between Yugo-
slavia, Greece, and Turkey was signed at Bled,
Yugoslavia on 9 August 1954. It was moti-
vated, according to its preamble, by a resolve
to "ensure in the most effective manner the
territorial integrity as well as the political in-
dependence" of the contracting parties and
by the desire to "widen and reinforce" the
benefits of their February 1953 Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, which had "al-
ways been considered an initial step toward
an alliance."
The key provisions of the treaty are con-
tained in Article II, which defines the obli-
gations of the contracting parties in the event
of armed aggression against one or more of
them, and Article VI, which is designed to
cover the situation which would arise if
Greece and Turkey were called upon to go to
war in fulfillment of their NATO commit-
ments.
a. Under Article II "The Contracting Par-
ties agree that any armed aggression against
one or more of them in any part of their ter-
ritories shall be considered an aggression
against all the Contracting Parties, who ..
shall jointly and severally go to the assistance
of the Party or Parties attacked by taking im-
plediately .... any measures, including the
use of armed force, which they deem neces-
sary for effective defense."
b. Article VI provides that "In the event of
an armed aggression against a country to-
ward which one or more of the Contracting
Parties has . . . . obligations of mutual assist-
ance [e.g., NATO], the Contracting Parties
will consult each other regarding the meas-
ures which should be taken . in order to
meet the situation thus created in their area."
Immediate consultation with a view to exam-
ining the situation and determining their at-
titude is also called for in the event of any
serious deterioration of the international sit-
uation.
Other articles of the treaty provide for:.
establishment of a Permanent Council to
meet at least twice a year; a full-time Per-
manent Secretariat to perform its functions
at other times; continuation of General
Staff cooperation; and mutual assistance in
strengthening their respective defensive capa-
cities. It also contains the customary pro-
visions that the signatories agree not to con-
clude a separate peace with an aggressor with-
out unanimous consent or to participate in
any coalition directed _against the others.
The treaty does not affect the rights and ob-
ligations of Greece and Turkey under NATO
and is designed to be consistent with the ob-
ligations of the signatories as members of
the U.N. The treaty is to be in effect for
twenty years with the provision that if not
denounced one year before its expiration it
shall automatically be extended indefinitely
for one year periods.
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