LAW OF THE SEA: MID-SESSION ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 4, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/11/11 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
MEMORANDUM Mr. Cormack
FYI a the File Since CIA was left out of the loop
altogether on this one (i.e., not on distribution and
not notified by Sheila Lopez), Anne found out via
and called Sheila for the info.
sent someone to State to pick up this paper yesterday
so they did at least have it for the 5:30 meeting.
This_came_i_n_this a.m. via the Operations Center per
I called Sheila whose explanation was
--a pretty flimsy one at that--this paper and meeting
were handled on Sunday and whoever did it was not
aware of all agencies involved and excluded CIA by
mistake. I'm not sure how heard of the meeting,
but it's a good thing he did or we wouldn't have
known anything about it.
Chris
Date
rnRii ? Dervinlie
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
TO OVP
NSC
Commerce I,
fense
Energy
Interior
JCS
Justice
Labor .--
.--Transportation
vTreasury
UNA
April 4, 1982
- Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
- Mr. Michael Wheeler
- Ms. Jean Jones
- COL John Stanford
- Mr. William Vitale
- Mr. Kent Larsen
- LTC Edward Bucknell
- Mr. F. Henry Habicht
- Mr. Robert Searby
- Mrs. Katherine Anderson
- Mr. David Pickford
- Amb. Harvey Feldman
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
S/S
8209185
8209186
8209187
8209188
8209189
8209190
8209191
8209192
8209193
8209194
8209195
8209196
SUBJECT: Law of the Sea: Mid-Session Assessment
The Senior Interdepartmental Group on Law of the Sea
will meet on Monday, April 5 at 5:30 p.m. in room 7219 at
the Department of State under the chairmanship of Under
Secretary Buckley. Attached is a paper setting forth the
assessment of the Chairman of the US LOS Delegation on
the state of the negotiations, and prospects for meeting the
President's objectives.
L. Paul Bremer, III*
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
4;11'
1. Assessment of the Chairman of the LOS De1egation=0
on the State of the Negotiations and Prospects fqA
Meeting the President's Objectives
2. Group of 11 Papers Cj
3. Instructions for the US Delegation to the Eleve h
Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law o
the Sea (with three attachments)
CECRET
GDS 4/4/88
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Drafted by: OES:Oliin:mw
Clearances:
OES:JMalori
EB:MCalingaer licclears except for section on
production limitation)
L:EVervilIV?
T:WSalrnonve,4
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Attachment 1
SECRET
ASSESSMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE LOS DELEGATION
ON THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR MEETING
THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the meeting is to review the status of the
negotiations and the Chairman's assessment as the to pro-
spects for achieving the President's objectives and fulfilling
the delegation's instructions. The Chairman considers that it
may be possible to achieve all of the President's objectives,
but that it will not be possible to fulfill certain detailed
delegation instructions. The SIG should note the Chairman's
assessment that the complete elimination of the production
limitation and the U.S. proposal for affirmative voting are
not negotiable and that continued pursuit of these proposals
could damage our ability to achieve the President's objectives.
The Law of the Sea Conference has now reached a critical
stage. Substantive negotiations with the G-77 will only
begin if the U.S. shows a more flexible approach. We have
until April 23 to complete the principal parts of these
negotiations.
The U.S. proposals included in the "green book of amendments"
have served their purpose very well by acquainting the
Conference with our requirements and accomplishing for us
severed changes necessary to our further participation. At this
point we have achieved the maximum usefulness from the "green
book". We now must be prepared to negotiate.
The G 77 have in essence agreed to commence negotiations with
us subject to our capacity to convince them that:
-our bottom line is closer to the Group of 11 papers
than to the "green book" (G-11 papers attached at Appendix 2)
-their acceptance of the U.S. bottom line will bring
a substantial probability of U.S. signature of the Conven-
tion in 1982
-our bottom line is saleable by the G-77 leadership to
the entire group within the next two weeks
The delegation instructions interpret the President's six
objectives sufficiently narrowly so as to inhibit the prospects for
any continued negotiations with the G-77. However, if the delega-
tion is authorized to construe the President's objectives as set
forth in this memorandum it appears that the prospects for
successful negotiation will be materially enhanced.
SECRET
GDS 4/4/88 (Malone, James)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-2-
It is the view of the Chairman of the Delegation that it will
not be possible to delay the adoption of the Convention at this
session of the Conference unless the Conference believes
that it is near final negotiations which will attract
U.S. signature). Also, unless the U.S. shows more flexi-
bility than it can now do our allies may withdraw their luke-
warm support for our effort and could become quite reluctant to
sign the reciprocating states agreement for fear of criticism
that they helped the U.S. to sabotage the conference and
pave the way for a "mini-treaty". Our allies will be in a
particularly awkward position because the so-called "PIP
Resolution" now goes quite far toward providing broad approval
for the reciprocating states agreement provided it is transitional
to a comprehensive treaty.
Appendix 1 sets forth the view of the Chairman of the Delegation
on:
-the adequacy of the G-77 proposals;
-the extent to which improvements or additions can be
made;
-and the specific areas in which satifaction of the
delegation's instructions now appear impossible.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
APPENDIX 1
TECHNOLGY TRANSFER
After considerable consultation with industry and informed
patent experts within and outside of Government, it is the
view of the Chairman that the G-11 proposals, with certain
relatively minor amendments, can only in a most strained way
be construed to require the mandatory transfer of privately
owned technology. The Article as we could finally expect to
negotiate it would only require that technology be made avail-
able for sale to the Enterprise if: a) used by the operator;
b).the operator is legally entitled to transfer it; c) the
operator makes it available to any other party; and d) the
terms and conditions are freely negotiated. (The operator
may not, however, impose conditions more onerous than those
imposed on the sale to a third party.) Finally, there is no
relationship between the operator's right to obtain a contract
from the Seabed Authority or to carry out his contract in the
event the technology sale does not occur or ends in dispute.
THE ACCESS SYSTEM -- AWARD OF CONTRACTS
The G-11 proposal is a fully workable access system which
fulfills the President's objectives as expressed in subpara-
graphs (b) and (c) of NSDD-20 and reduces the difficulties in
the negotiation of the Council decision making system. It
adopts virtually all of the U.S.-proposal in the "green book"
except for the voting majority needed to reject an applicant,
the qualifications for membership on the Legal and Technical
Commision and its composition. If the composition and
qualifications issue could be remedied, the voting question
would not be considered a serious problem. The Chairman
believes these additional changes are negotiable.
POWERS OF THE ASSEMBLY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
The G-11 proposal is a duplicate of the U.S. proposal. It
limits and reduces the power of the Assembly. If it is coupled
with satisfactory Council composition, powers, and functions,
it would greatly reduce the role of the one-nation, one-vote
Assembly thus establishing an institution that is controlled
in a manner that reflects the economic and political interests
represented. It sets a desirable precedent for global
institutions and should alleviate or eliminate a key Capitol
Hill criticism of the Convention.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-2-
THE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY
The G-11 proposal does not accommodate the most essential U.S.
requirement which is the avoidance of amendments being adopted
without the advice and consent of the Senate. However the G-11
proposal does move in our direction in some very important ways
and the Chairman believes that we can sucessfully negotiate the
additional necessary protections.
GRANDFATHER RIGHTS (PREPARATORY INVESTMENT PROTECTION-PIP)
The G-11 proposal on this matter has now become a proposal of
the President of the Conference. While it moves a long way to-
ward meeting our requirements and could serve as a basis for
negotiation, it contains serious defects which would need to be
corrected. On the plus side, it achieves a number of vital U.S.
objectives. First, it endorses the approach and timing of the
Reciprocating States Agreement -- thus giving the RSA political
approbation and hopefully making ft much easier for France and
Japan to join at an early date. Second, it guarantees access for
all U.S. companies who have already made substantial investments.
Third, it requires the Seabed Authority to issue a contract
for exploration and exploitation as soon as the Convention
enters into force without the exercise of discretion.
Fourth, it could allow for at least nine PIP operators to
include the four existing consortia, Japan's national mining
project, the USSR, the French project and one each for Brazil
and India. In addition, since the so-called "banking system"
would apply, nine additional sites would be banked for the
Enterprise.
This is important because all economic indicators point to a
very slow beginning for seabed mining with very slow growth.
The eighteen mine sites provided for under the PIP Resolution
may be all that can be absorbed in world metal markets for
the next 30-40 years or longer. In short, one of our primary
objectives -- guaranteed access to strategic minerals -- may,
in practice, essentially result from the PIP Reolution alone.
At the same time, we must recognize the inadequacies of the
PIP Resolution. The main defect -- and one it will be diffi-
cult, but not impossible, to overcome -- is that it places the
Soviet Union, potential LDC miners (e.g., Brazil and India) and
possibly Japan on the same footing as the pioneer consortia.
Further, it contains a number of provisions inconsistant with
our domestic legislation, and the RSA -- one site per applicant,
full banking of sites, prohibition on exploitation, mine-site
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-3-
size limitation and expiration of PIP rights if the Convention
does not enter into force within five years. The solution
of these defects will not, of course, resolve all problems
we have with the Treaty.
PRODUCTION POLICIES OF THE AUTHORITY
The G-11 paper (in its proposed change to draft Art. 150)
only hints at a possibility of re-orienting the Authority's
production policies toward fostering production. Nevertheless,
considering that this proposal comes from a group of countries
which include the world's largest nickel producer, it is a sign
that more can be done. Thus the delegation believes that addi-
tional efforts can and should be made to secure a treaty
provision which would require the Authority to favor production
whenever the treaty provisions create ambiguity.
PRODUCTION LIMITATION
The G-11 papers do not offer any proposal on this subject. The
U.S. instructions and the "green book" propose the elimination
of the production limit in the treaty. It is the assessment
of the Chairman that elimination cannot be achieved. It is even
unlikely that any significant change can be made to the produc-
tion ceiling. (However, in the Guidelines for Seeking Improve-
ments in the Draft Convention para 2 provides for " ? ? ? elimin-
ation or relaxation of . . . production limitation. . . .) The
U.S. delegation may be able to make some progress on this
issue by implying that if all else is satisfactory in the
final treaty package this issue may not be a stumbling block.
If we follow this course, toward the end of the negotiation
we may be able to get some additional concessions by making
them the price of final agreement. In order to get into the
negotiation at this stage, however, it will be necessary in
the judgement of the Chairman to indicate to influential G-77
leaders that we will not insist on the complete elimination
of the production ceiling.
BENEFIT SHARING FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
The G-11 papers do not address this point because it is the
widespread view at the Conference, including the President
of the Conference, that the present text contains a satis-
factory solution to the U.S. problem. The Chairman considers
that the present text will be adequate if the U.S. is guaranteed
a seat on the Council, since the present text provides that
benefits can be paid only pursuant to rules and regulations and
any member of the Council can veto the rules and regulations.
The current U.S. affirmative voting proposals would change the
the Council voting system(changi?so as to make the adoption
of rules and regulations easier and, in doing so, would of
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-4-
course give up the veto in the present text. Under this
proposal, the U.S. would have to insist on the elimination
of the reference to benefit sharing for liberation movements.
COUNCIL COMPOSITION
The G-11 papers, in substance, provide for a guaranteed seat
for the U.S. and enchanced protection for our allies. Moreover,
our allies appear to believe that in practice their seats will be
guaranteed anyway. For this reason they have put the U.S. in a
somewhat awkward position -- insisting on guaranteed seats for
others who do not insist themselves. Nevertheless the'Chairman
believes that we should continue to make efforts to obtain
guaranteed seats for the western allies; however, the delegation
might want to further address this situation at a later point if
our allies will not support us.
It should be understood that the guaranteed U.S. seat is
accomplished by inserting a formula -- the world's largest
consumer. The proposal does not designate the U.S. by name.
Nevertheless the Chairman believes this solution appears to
be adequate for the foreseeable future.
COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING .
The G-11 papers do virtually nothing on this issue to accommodate
stated U.S. requirements. The USSR is fighting on every front
possible at the Conference to prevent us from renegotiating
any of. our concerns in seabed mining because they fear that
we will obtain changes to the decision-making article which
would give us either blocking power not available to the USSR
or give us the power to adopt decisions without reliance on the
USSR while they would not have equivalent power. Our instructions
make it impossible to meet this overriding USSR concern and they
are making it impossible for us to successfully negotiate our
objectives at the Conference.
In this stalemate the Chairman has reexamined more closely
the need for all elements of our instructions on Council voting
and considers that we must pursue somewhat less comprehensive
solutions if we are to achieve the President's objectives.
Specifically it is proposed that the U.S. explore first with the
USSR and then with the G-77 the following:
a) a voting system in the Preparatory Commission for the
adoption of rules and regulations which would give significant
influence to the sponsoring states of those who are given
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-5-
grandfather rights under the PIP Resolution.
b) a chambered voting system in the Council for
blocking power which would provide, as in the "green book,"
that a specified group of important decisions be made by a
three-fourths majority of the Council which majority would
also have to include a majority in each of the special interest
categories of the Council. In addition, to meet the concern
of the USSR, we would also require a majority of each of the
regional groups represented in the Council
C) retention of the present consensus voting formula
for the adoption and amendment of rules and regulations and
the present text of Article 308 (4) providing for provisional
application of the initial rules and regulations promulgated
by the Preparatory Commission pending adoption or amendment
by the Council.
Analysis: The net impact of these proposals would be to give
easy blocking power to virtually every group on the Council
thus ensuring that virtually all decisions of the Council
are the product of negotiation. At the same time we would
have a relatively easier time getting the first set of rules
and regulations adopted by doing it in the Preparatory Commission
under special voting rules. In the judgement of the Chairman
such a voting system would adequately fulfill the President's
objectives, particularly when seen in the context of other
changes to the powers of the Assembly, the separation of
powers-, and the contract approval system.
FINANCIAL CONTROL OF THE ENTERPRISE
The essence of the U.S. objective is to gain some control over
terms and conditions of the financing of the Enterprise and
over the Enterprise itself if it is in danger of financial
lailure so as to enable its principal creditors to protect their
assets. This issue is politically sensitive at the Conference and
not on the list of the President's objectives (only in 3(m) of
the Instruction). Protections may also be found in the present
text to the extent these matters will be specificially covered
in the rules and regulations over which we have a veto. In the
judgement of the Chairman, it may not worth trading significant
negotiating leverage to achieve specific provisions on this issue.
AVOIDANCE OF MONOPOLY POWERS BY THE ENTERPRISE
The treaty gives the Enterprise a number of advantages not
available to other operators. Taken together, these tend
to put the Enterprise in a potentially monopolistic position.
The principal U.S. concession in these negotiations, however,
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-6-
is to leave the parallel system untouched and not to disturb
the politically sensitive and symbolically important Enterprise.
This puts us in a dilemma. If we attack the advantageous
position of the Enterprise we are likely to make further
negotiation impossible and ensure the adoption of the draft
convention by April 30.
The Chairman believes that it may be possible to negotiate
one crucial amendment which would signficantly reduce the
monopoly powers of the Enterprise without stripping it of
its major advantages. We might be able to obtain agreement
that if the Enterprise does not use banked mine sites within
a stated period of time they would revert to the general
pool of unreserved sites--thus avoiding hoarding of prime quality
mine sites.
OTHER SEABED MINERALS
As now drafted the treaty text does: not permit exploration or
exploitation of minerals without the adoption of rules and
regulations by the Authority. It is clear that enough is known
about manganese nodules to allow for the drafting of these
rules and regulations immediately. In any case under the
PIP Resolution these activities can go on until the Authority
adopts its rules and regulations.
Other minerals may turn out to be far more important than nodules,
we simply do not know, as yet. Scientific research to date has
been limited but has revealed interesting potential.
Developing countries are equally concerned about these minerals
because many of them whose economies are not affected by nodule
production cannot be sure that other minerals which are
eventually discovered and possibly exploited will not adversely
affect their own land-based production.
This issue could raise severe treaty ratification problems
in the Senate if not satisfactorily resolved, it has received
little attention at the Conference and while potentially
disruptive may be capable of resolution as a practical
problem.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-7-
There are some possible solutions to the problem which would
require special voting rules for the adoption of rules and
regulations allowing the U.S. disproportionate influence.
Another possibility is to allow only exploration and the
equivalent of PIP treatment once the Authority adopts
rules and regulations. A third possibility would be a
moratorium as is the case in the present draft treaty which
would be automatically lifted if the Authority had not
adopted rules and regulations by a date certain.
The Chairman believes that too little attention has been
given to this subject at the Conference to date to justify
any new recommendations at this time. He believes more
exploratory discussion is justified while recognizing full
well the potential this issue has for affecting our access
to new sources of strategic raw materials and ratification
of the treaty in the Senate.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
?`'
Attachment 2
WG.21/Informal Paper 21/Add.1
25 March 1982
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
CHANGES SUGGESTED BY THE HEADS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRALIA,
CANADA, DENMARK AND NORWAY ON BEHALF OF A GROUP OF TEN HEADS OF
DELEGATIONS
Addendum
Article 158
Organs of the Authority
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 as in L.78
4. /The principal organs and the Enierprise7 Each organ shall fiacg
be responsible for exercising Fhose7 the powers and functions which have
been conferred upon it RherW. /In exercising such powers and functions
each/ No organ shall 5Void taki47 take any action /Which may derogate/
that ..rogates from or impedes the exercise of specific powers and functions
conferred upon another organ.
??
Article 160
Powers and Functions
Add at the end of paragraph 1 the words:
"Nothing in this paragraph shall derogate from the provisions of article 15S,
paragraph 4".
82-07559
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
%'.2l/Informal Paper 21
25 March 1982
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
CEANGES SUGGESTED BY THE EEADS OF TEE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
DENMARK AND NORWAY ON BEHALF OF A GROUP OF TEN HEADS OF DELEGATIONS
Article 150
Policies relating to activities in the Area
Insert the following new subparagraph before subparagraph (a) and reletter the
subsequent subparagraphs accordingly:
(a) the development of the resources of the Area:
Existing subparagraph (a) should be changed to read:
(b) orderly, safe and rational management ...
Article 155
The Review Conference
1. (as in L.78)
2. (as in L.78)
3. The Review Conference shall establish its own rules of procedure. The
decision-making procedure applicable at the Review Conference shall be the same as
that applicable at the Third United Nations Oonference on the Law of the Sea unless
otherwise decided by the Conference. The Conference shall make every effort to
reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus and there should be no voting
on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
82-07488 0112u (E) /...
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
2 -
4. (a) If, five years after its commencement, the Review Conference has not
reached agreement on the system of exploration and exploitation of the resources of
the Area, it may decide during the ensuing twelve months to adopt and submit to the
States Parties for ratification or accession such amendments changing or modifying
the system as it determines necessary and appropriate taking into account the
experience gained as to the effectiveness and the viability of the system as laid
down in article 153, paragraph 2.
(b) The amendments shall enter into force twelve months after the date of
deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by two thirds of the States
Parties. Exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area shall
thereafter be governed by this Part and the relevant Annexes as amended.
(c) A State Party which has not ratified or acceded to the amendments shall
nevertheless continue to enjoy the rights and perform the obligations of the other
provisions of this Convention.
5. (as in L.78)
Article 161
Composition, procedure and voting
Reverse the order of paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) and add the following to the new
paragraph 1 (a):
as well as the largest consumer
Add the following paragraph after paragraph 1 (e):
Accordingly, the Council shall consist Of nine members from the group of
Western Europe and others,* three members from the Eastern (Socialist) European
group and twenty-four members from the African, Asian and Latin American groups.
Article 161
Composition, procedure and voting
In paragraph 7 (c), delete the reference to article 162, paragraph 2 (g)** and
add as paragraph c (bis):
* N.B. For the purpose of this paragraph, the Western European and other
States Group shall include, inter alia, Japan and the United States of America.
** N.B. paragraph (g) reads: submit the budget of the Authority to the
Assembly for its approval;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
-3-
(c) (bis) Decisions on questions of substance arising under article 162, paragraph
2 (g), shall be decided by a majority of three fourths plus one of the members
present and voting provided that such a majority includes a majority of the members
of the Council.
ANNFX III
Fasic conditions of prospecting, exploration and exploitation
Article 1
Title t0 minerals
Title to minerals shall pass to the operator upon recovery of the minerals
from the Area in accordance with this Convention.
(no change)
Article 2
Prospecting.
Article 3
Exploration and exploitation
1. The Enterprise, States Parties, and the other entities referred to in article
153, paragraph 2 (b), of Part XI of this Convention, may apply to the Authority for
approval of plans of work covering activities of the Area. Upon approval of a plan
of work, any such entity shall be referred to as an "operator" for the purposes of
this Convention.
?
2: (as in L.78)
3. (as in L.78)
4. Every plan of work approved by the Authority shall:
(a) be in strict conformity with this Convention and the rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority:
(b) include the following undertakings by the applicant:*
* Consequently, article 17, paragraph 1 (b) (iii) should be redrafted as
follows:
(iii) performance requirements including assurances pursuant to article 3
r,tre,fre..4h 4;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
-4-
(i) to accept as enforceable and comply with the applicable obligations
created by the provisions of Part XI, the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority and the decisions of the organs of the
Authority in force at the time the plan of work is approved, and the
terms of his contracts with the Authority;
(ii) to accept control by the Authority of activities in the Area, as
authorized by this Convention;
(iii) to provide the Authority with a written assurance that his obligations
under the contract will be fulfilled in good faith;
(iv) to comply with the provisions on the transfer of technology set forth in
article 5.
(c) (as in L.78)
5. (as in L.78)
Article 4
Qualifications of applicants
1. Applicants, other than the Ehterprise, shall be qualified if they have the
nationality or control and sponsorship required in article 153, paragraph 2 00, of
Part XI of this Convention and if they follow the procedures established by the
Authority by means of rules, regulations and procedures and meet the following
qualification standards:
(a) financial and technical capability including the capacity to generate
internally or to raise funds necessary to comply with the minimum annual
expenditures for exploration established in the rules, regulations and procedures
of the Authority)
(b) except for the Enterprise and State Party applicants, the provision of a
.. ? ?
satisfactory financial guarantee to assure performance of the obligations under the
proposed plan of work in the amount of 50 per cent of minimum annual expenditures
for the first three years of explorations
(c) any additional qualifications as may be determined by the Authority in
its rules, regulations and procedures.
2. (as in L.78)
3. (as in L.78)
4. (deleted)
5. (deleted)
6. (deleted)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Article 4 (bis)
Certification of applicants
1. A State Party or States Parties which sponsor an applicant, or in the case of
the Enterprise, the Authority, shall provide the Legal and Technical Commission
with a certification that the applicant which it sponsors in accordance with
article 153, paraaraph 2, is in full compliance with article 4 and the rules,
reculations and procedures of the Authority concerning qualification standards for
apnlicants.
2. A State Party shall not be subject to certification requirements but shall
conply with article 4 and the rules, reaulations of the Authority concerning
cualification standards for applicants.
Article 5
Transfer of technology
1. (as in L./8)
2. (as in L./8)
3. Every contract for the conduct of activities in the Area entered into by the
Authority shall contain the following undertakings by the contractor:
(a) to co?operate with the Authority in the acquisition by the Enterprise on
fair and reasorw-ble commercial terms and conditions of the technology necessary for
the carrying out of its activities in the Area;
(b) to make available to the Enterpriser.if and when the Authority shall so
request, the technology which he uses in carrying out activities in the Area, which
he is legally entitled to transfer and which he has made available or is willing to
make available to third parties. This should be done by means of a licence or
other .appropriate arrangements which the operator shall negotiate with the
Enterprise and shall be on terms and conditions no less favourable than the terms
and conditions under which the operator has made or is willing to make the
technology available to third parties;
(c) to acquire, if and when requested to do so by the Enterprise and
whenever it is possible to do so without substantial cost to the contractor,
a right to transfer to the Enterprise any other technology than that mentioned
in subparagraph (b) which he uses in carrying out activities in the Area;
(d) to assist, if and when the Authority so requests, the Enterprise in
obtaining on the free market efficient and useful technology through purchase,
licensing, leasing or other appropriate agreement or arrangement on fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
-6-
(e) to take the same measures as those mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (d)
for the benefit of a developing State or group of developing States which have
applied for a contract under article 9, provided that these measures shall be
limited to the exploitation of the part of the Area proposed by the contractor
which has been reserved pursuant to article 8.
4. Disputes concerning the undertakings required by paragraph 3 between the
contractor and the Authority and between States Parties and the Authority shall be
subject to compulsory dispute settlement in accordance with Part XI as
appropriate. Disputes arising under subparagraph (b) may be submitted by either
party to commercial arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
or other arbitration rules as may be prescribed in the rules, regulations and
procedures of the Authority.
5. In order to comply with the policy of Part XI, the States Parties undertake to
ensure that the Enterprise is able to become a viable commercial entity and to
engage successfully in the operations referred to in article 170. To this end,
State Parties which engage in activities in the Area or which sponsor an entity
referred to in ar*icle 153, paragraph (2), subparagraph (b) shall take effective
measures to ensure that the provisions of paragraph 3 are brought into effect and
shall take appropriate measures consistent with national law to prevent persons
subject to their jurisdiction from emaging in a concerted refusal to supply
technoloqy to the Enterprise on'commercial terms and conditions.
6. (as paragraph 5)
7. (as pa.?graph 6)
6. (as paragraph 7)
Article 6
Approval of plans of work
1. The Legal and Technical Commission shall take up for consideration and
recommendation to the Council, as expeditiously as possible, proposed plans of work
in the order in which they are received.
2. When considering an application for approval of a plan of work with respect to
activities in the Area, the Commission shall presume that the requirements of
article 4 have been met in the case of applicants which have been certified
pursuant to article 4 (bis) unless the Commission decides otherwise by a
three-fourth majority of its members. In such a case, or in the absence of any of
the commitments and assurances referred to in article 3, the applicant shall be
given .45 days to remedy any deficiencies.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
-
3. The Commission shall recommend for approval the plans of work submitted by the
Enterprise, State Party applicants and applicants which have been certified by
State Parties pursuant to article 4 (bis) and whose applications have hot been
rejected pursuant to paragraph 2, unless:
(a) it determines by a three-fourth majority of its members that the plan of
work does not conform to the Convention and the requirements established by the
rules, reaulations and procedures of the Authority:*
(b) (as in
(c) (as in
(d) (as in
4. (as in L.78,
to paragraph
5. (as in L.78,
to paragraph
subparagraph
subparagraph
subparagraph
(a) of
(b) of
(c) of
with the exception
3 (d).)
L.78)
L.78)
L.713)
that references
to paragraph 3 (c) should be
with the exception that references to paragraph 3 (a) should be
3 (b).)
Article 17.-
Pules, regulations and procedures
Add the following new paragraph (1) (b) (xv):
(xv) exploration for and exploitation of resources of the Area other than
polymetallic nodules)
* Article 163, paragraph 11, should, consequently, read as follows:
(11) Without prejudice to Annex III, article 6 (2) and 3 (2) the decision
making
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
A/CONF . 62/C. 1/L. 30
Eng 1 ish
Annex II
Page 1
Annex II
DRAFT RESOLUTION GOVERNING PREPARATORY INVESTMENT IN
PIONEER ACTIVITIES RELATING TO POLDIETELLIC NODULES
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Having this day adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
"Convention"),
Having this day also established by resolution the Preparatory Commission for
the International Sea-bed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (the "Commission") and directed it to prepare such draft rules, regulations
and procedures as it deems necessary to enable the Authority to commence its
functions, as well as to make recommendations for the early entry into effective
operation of the Enterprise,
Desirous of making provision for investments by States and other entities made'
in a manner compatible with the international regime set forth in Part XI of the
Convention and the annexes relating thereto, prior to.the entry into force of the
Convention,
Recognizing the need to ensure that the Enterprise will be provided with the
funds, technology and expertise necessary to enable it to keep pace with the States
and other entities referred to in the preceding paragraph, with respect to
activities in.the Area,
Decides as follows:
1. For the purposes of this resolutiori:
(a) "pioneer investor" means a.signatory of the Convention or any State
entity or natural or juridical person which possesses the nationality of such State
or is effectively controlled by it or its nationals, or any group of the foregoing
which, prior to 1 January 1983, has expended at least SUZ 30 million (United States
dollars calculated in constant dollars relative to 1982), or, relative to a
developing State, such smaller amount as the Preparatory Commission shall determine
to be substantial, in pioneer activities and has spent no less than 10 per cent of
that amount in the locaton, surveying and evaluation of a specific portion of the
Area:
(0) "pioneer activities" means undertakings, commitments of resources,
investigations, findings, research, engineering development, and other activities
relevant to the identification, discovery, and systematic analysis and evaluation
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11 : CIA-RDP10M02313R0001nn79nnn9_a
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/11/11 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
avcol:F.6 2/C. 1/1. 3(1
EnCliSh
Annex II
Pace 2
of polymetallic nodules and to the determination of the technical and economic
feasibility of exploitation- Pioneer activities include:
(i) any at-sea observation and evaluation activity which has as its objective
the establishment and documentation of;
a the nature, shape, concentration, location and grade of polymetallic
nodules;
b the environmental, technical, and other appropriate factors which must
be taken into account prior to exploitation;
(ii) the taking from the deep sea-bed of polymetallic nodules with a view to
the designing, fabricating, and testing of equipment which is intended to
be used in the exploitation of polymetallic nodules;
(c) "certifying State" means a signatory of the Convention standing in the
same relation to a pioneer investor as would a sponsoring State pursuant to
Annex III, article 4, and which certifies the level of investment specified in
subparagraph (a);
(d) "polymetallic nodules" means one of the resources of the Area, consisting
of any deposit or accretion on or just below the surface of the deep sea-bed
consisting of nodules which contain manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper;
(e) "pioneer area" means an area allocated by the Commission to a pioneer
investor for ;i.oneer activities pursuant to this resolution. It shall not exceed
150,000 square kilometres;
(f) "Area", "Authority", "activities in the Area' and 'resources" shall have
the meanings assigned to those terms under the Convention.
2. As soon as the Preparatory Commission begins to function, any signatory
of the. Convention may apply to the Commission on its own behalf or on behalf of any
entity specified in subparagraph 1(a) hereof, for registration as a pioneer
investor and for allocation to it of the pioneer area specified in the
application. The Commission shall register the applicant as a pioneer investor and
allocate to it the pioneer area applied for if the application:
(a) in the case of a signatory, is accompanied by a statement certifying the
level of expenditure made in accordance with subparagraph 1(a); and, in the case of
any other entity specified in subparagraph 1(a), a certificate concerning such
level of expenditure issued by the signatory of which it is a national; and
(b) if it is otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this resolution.
The Commission shall notify the applicant forthwith of such registration.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11 CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
A/CONF. 62/C. 1/L. 30
English
Annex II
Page 3
3. (a) Every application shall cover a total area, which need not be a
single continuous area, sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated commercial
value to allow two mining operations. The application shall indicate the
co-ordinates of the area, defining the total area and dividing it into two parts of
equal estimated commercial value and contain all the data available to the
applicant with respect to both parts of the area. Such data shall include, inter
alia, information relating to mapping, sampling, the density of nodules and the
composition of metals in them.
(b) Within 45 days of receiving the data required by paragraph 3 above, the
Commission shall designate the part of the area to be reserved in accordance with
the Convention for the conduct of activities by the Authority through the
Enterprise or in association with developing States. This designation may be
deferred for a further period of 45 days if the Commission requests an independent
expert to assess whether all data required has been submitted to it. The other
part of the area shall be allocated by the Commission to the pioneer investor as a
pioneer area.
4. NO pioneer investor may be registered in respect of more than one pioneer
area.
5. (a) Certifying States shall ensure that areas in respect of which
applications are made do not overlap with one another or with areas previously
allocated as pioneer areas. The certifying States concerned shall keep the
Commission currently and fully informed of any efforts to resolve conflicts with
respect to overlapping claims, and the results thereof;
(b) Certifying States shall ensure that pioneer activities are conducted in a
manner compatible with the Convention prior_to its entry into force.
6. A pioneer investor registered pursuant to this resolution shall, as from
the date of such registration, have the exclusive right to carry out pioneer
activities in the pioneer area allocated to him.
1. (a) Every applicant for registration as a pioneer investor shall pay to
the Commission a fee of $US 500400.
(b) Every registered pioneer investor shall agree to incur expenditures of
not less than $US 1 million each year with respect to the pioneer area allocated to
it, until approval of its plan of work pursuant to paragraph 8. The financial
arrangements undertaken pursuant to such plan of work shall be adjusted to take
account of payments made pursuant to this paragraph.
8. (a) After the entry into force of the Convention and certification by
the Commission in accordance with paragraph 11 hereof of compliance with the
npdassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.30
English
Annex II
Page 4
provisions of this resolution, the pioneer investor so registered may apply to the
Authority for a plan of work for explorationand exploitatin accordance with
the Convention. The Authority siiiII?ipprove such application;
(b) When an application is made by an entity other than a State, pursuant to
subparagraph (a), the certifying State shall be deemed to be the sponsoring State
for the purpose of Annex III, article 4 of the Convention, and shall thereupon
assume such obligations.
9. In the allocation of production authorization, in accordance with
article 151 of the Convention and Annex III, article 7, the pioneer investors who
have obtained approval of plans of work for exploration and exploitation shall have
priority over all applicants other than the Enterprise as contained in
paragraph 2(c1' of article 151. In the event of a competition between two or more
pioneer investors for production authorization, the provisions of Annex III,
article 7 shall apply unless they agree to some other arrangement.
10. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 8, the Authority may not
deal with any application for approval of a plan of work made, or deemed to be
sponsored by, a State which, at the time the -application is taken up for
consideration has not ratified the Convention'. If such State fails to ratify the
Convention within six months after it has received a notification from the
Authority that an application by it, or sponsored by it, is pending, its status as
a pioneer investor or certifying State as the case may be, shall terminate, unless
the Counci:..by a majority of three-fourths of its members present and voting shall
decide to postpone the terminal date by a period not exceeding six months)
(b) Nothing in this resolution shall preclude a pioneer investor from
altering its nationality and sponsorship from that prevailing at the time of its
registration as a pioneer investor. The pioneer investor shall give the Authority
six months' notice in writing of any such alteration;
(c) Alteration of nationality and sponsorship pursuant to this paragraph
shall not affect any right or priority conferred on a pioneer investor pursuant to
paragraphs 6 and 8 of this resolution.
11. The Commission shall:
(a) provide pioneer investors with the certificates of compliance with the
provisions of this resolution referred to in paragraph 6 hereof; and
(b) incorporate in its final report provided for in paragraph 10 of
resolution No. of the Conference, details of all registrations of pioneer
investors and allocation of pioneer areas pursuant to this resolution.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
A/COUF.62/C.1/L.30
Englich
Annex II
Page 5
12. In order to ensure that the Enterprise is able to carry out activities in
the hrea in such a manner as to remain in step with States and other entities, any
registered pioneer investor shallt
(s) carry out exploration at the request of the Commission in the area
rccarved purusant to paragraph 3 of this resolution in connexion with its
cpplication for activities by the Authority through the Enterprise or in
association with developing States, on a cost-re-imbursable basis;
00 provide training at all levels for personnel designated by. the Commission;
(c) be prepared, prior to the entry into force of the Convention, to perform
the obligations prescribed in the provisions of the Convention relating to transfer
of technology;
(5) ensure that the necessary funds are made available to the Enterprise in a
timely manner in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
13. The Authority and its organs shall:be governed by the terms of this
resolution. .
14. If, five years after the date of its adoption, the Convention has not
tntered into force, the effect of the provisions of this resolution and all rights
thereunder shall terminate.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Attachment 3
SECRET
Instructions for the US Delegation to the Eleventh
Session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
March-April 1982
I. BACKGROUND
In December 1981, the Senior Interdepartmental Group
on Law of the Sea submitted to the President an options paper
on law of the sea. On January 29, 1982 the President signed
National Security Decision Directive Number 20 (Attachment I).
The President directed that the US continue to participate
in the negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference. The
President directed that the United States objectives will be
a treaty that:
(a) will not deter development of any deep seabed
mineral resources to meet national and world demand;
(b) will assure national access to these resources by
current and future qualified entities to enhance US
security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the
resources by the operating arm of the International
Authority and to promote the economic development
of the resources.
(c) will give the United States a decision-making role
in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and
effectively protects its political and economic
interests and financial contributions;
(d) will not allow for amendments to come into force
without United States approval, including the advice
and consent of the Senate;
(e) will not set other undesirable precedents for
international organizations; and
(f) will be likely to receive the advice and consent of
the Senate. (In this regard, the convention should
not contain provisions creating serious political
or commerc ial d if f ic ul tie s includ ing provisions
for the mandatory transfer of private technology
and participation by and funding for national
liberation movements.)
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-2-
Fulfillment of these objectives shall be considered
mandatory in the negotiations. It is understood that the
United States negotiating effort will be based on the guide-
lines set forth in the interagency review (Attachment 2).
The President directed that the Senior Interdepartmental
Group, including all relevant agencies, develop detailed
instructions for achieving the objectives set forth above
after consultation with key allies and, as appropriate,
other major participants in the conference. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group and its agency representatives are
to oversee the Law of the Sea negotiations. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group shall be kept fully informed of all
developments in the negotiations and all US amendments to the
text shall be transmitted to interested agencies prior to their
submission. Generally, where time permits, consultation with
interested agencies should take place before revised amendments
are supported. Consultations among the agency representatives
on the delegation must be conducted on a frequent, open and
supportive basis to ensure full participation by all relevant
agencies. The Delegation is not to accept an ad referendum
draft convention pending the President's decision on a report
to be submitted by the Senior Interdepartmental Group on its
acceptability in terms of satisfying United States objectives.
The SIG working group on Law of the Sea prepared a
document setting forth alternative solutions to the problem
identified by the Senior Interdepartmental Group in Part XI
of the draft Law of the Sea treaty. The US delegation has
held extensive consultations with US allies, the Soviet
Union, the Law of the Sea Conference leadership and spokesmen
for the Group of 77 on problems with Part XI and possible
solutions to these problems which would satisfy US objectives.
II. Instructions for the March 1982 Session of the Law of
the Sea Conference.
1. The US Delegation shall make clear what aspects of
the current draft convention are unacceptable to the United
States. The US negotiating strategy shall be designed to
achieve those changes necessary to fulfill all US objectives
and, pending that, to avoid a move by the conference to
complete its work and open a convention for signature. At the
same time, the Delegation shall minimize the risk that any
detrimental changes are made to the non-seabed provisions of
the text. Trade offs between the seabeds and non seabeds
provisions are not authorized.
2. The US Delegation shall seek improvements in.the
non-seabed provisions of the draft treaty consistent with
United States interests if opportunities arise and if this
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
-3-
can be accomplished without risk to the military, navigation
and overflight and other important United States interests.
3. In Part XI (Deep Seabed Regime) the Delegation shall seek
the objectives set forth in NSDD No. 20. It is recognized
that there may be various changes in the text which can
achieve the same result. The Delegation is authorized to
explore different approaches to achieve the mandatory results.
The US Delegation shall seek changes in the text of Part XI
which ensure the following results:
A. The US and the principal nations which share deep
seabed mining interests (UK, France, FRG and Japan) will
always be members of the Council.
B. The Council decision-making system will be such that:
- The United States, acting with four or five Western
industrial nations which share US deep seabed mining interests,
will have affirmative voting power for:
(1) the adoption and amendment of the Authority's rules
and regulations; and (2) the procedure for deciding which
category - majority, qualified majority and/or distributed
majority - in which a question for decision by the Council
falls.
- The United States, acting with two or three o
Western industrial allies, will be able to block all
Council decisions (Attachment 3). At the same time,
be comparatively more difficult for other groups (e.g
G-77) to block important Council-decisions.
C. The broad policy-making powers of the Assembly will
be curtailed by ensuring that the Assembly cannot set impor-
tant policies of the Authority, override Council decisions,
or interfere in seabed mining.
f its
important
it should
., the
D. The United States must not be bound by amendments to
the treaty without its consent.
E. To reduce the risk that qualified applicants will be
denied contracts, the US and its allies will be able to take
affirmative action on contract approval in the Legal and
Technical Commission or there will be an automatic mechanism
for contract approval based on certification by a Sponsoring
State that an applicant meets specified qualifications.
F. TO reduce the potential for abuse of the Authority's
discretion to regulate seabed mining, the United States,
acting with two or three other allies, will be able to block
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
?4?
regulatory interference by the Authority or will be able to
ensure appropriate affirmative action.
G. The application of the Treaty will be restricted to
manganese nodules or the treaty will explicitly grant Parties
the right to develop minerals other than manganese nodules
pending adoption of regulations by the Authority.
H. Provisions requiring the forced sale of private
technology to the Enterprise and/or developing countries.
will be removed.
I. The ceiling on seabed mineral production will be
eliminated.
J. Participation by the Seabed Authority in commodity
arrangements will require US consent and the Authority will
at most represent only Enterprise production.
K. The production policies enumerated in Article 150
of the draft treaty will be recast: to be consistent with a
free-market orientation.
L. The major contributing countries to the Enterprise
will be able to exercise adequate control over the terms and
conditions of the financing, including the amount, call-up
schedule, repayment schedule, and default procedures.
M. The major contributing countries will be able to
protect their contributions to the Enterprise, preferably by
enabling them to form an Emergency Board to run the Enterprise
in case of its default on debt c7bligations.
N. To avoid monopolization of the Area by the Enterprise,
the decision over whether or not the Enterprise can retain an
excessive number of reserve sites should be made by an organ
of the Authority in which the US has sufficient influence to
implement US policy objectives.
0. Grandfather rights will provide for US pre-convention
explorers assured access to deep seabed minerals under reason-
able terms and conditions which will enable such explorers
to continue their operations without new significant economic
burdens beyond those resulting from domestic law and regulations
with the effect of preventing the continuation of such operations
on a viable economic basis.
P. National liberation movements will not be able to
become a party to the treaty or share in the economic or
financial benefits.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 20
WASH I NGTON
January 29, 1982
ri
Z:ClL 1 0
UNITED S=ES LAW OF THE SEA POLICY
I have reviewed the interagency report on United States Law
of the Sea issues, along with the agencies' recommendations,
and have decided that:
o The United States will continue to participate
negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference.
o United States objectives in these negotiations
a treaty that:
will not deter development Of any deep seabed
mineral. resources to meet national and world
demand; (U)
will assure national access to these resources by
current and future qualified entities to enhance
U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization
of the .resources by the operating arm of the
International Authority and to promote the economic
development of the resources; (U)
(c) will give the United States a decision-making role
in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and
effectively protects its political and economic
interests and financial contributions; (U)
will riot allow for amendments to come into force
without United States approval, including the
advice and consent of the Senate; (U)
?
in the
(U)
will be
will not set other Undesirable precedents for
international organizations; and (U)
will be likely to receive the advice and consent
of the Senate. (In this regard, the convention
should not contain provisions creating serious
pglitical or commercial difficulties, including
SECRET
Review?on 1/21/2001
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313Rnnn1 nn79nnno_o
-7 ? ??
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET 2
provisions for the mandatory transfer of private technology
and participation by and funding for national liberation
movements.) (U)
o Fulfillment of these objectives shall be considered
mandatory in the negotiations. It is understood that
the United States negotiating effort will be based on
the guidelines set forth in the interagency review. CS)
o United States negotiating strategy will make Clear what
aspects of the current draft convention are unacceptable
to the United States and will be designed to achieve
those changes necessafry to fulfill all U.S. objectives
and, pending that, to avoid a move by the conference to
complete its work and open a convention for signature. (5)
Improvements consistent with United States interests in ?
other areas shall be sought if opportunities arise and if
this can be accomplished without Fisk to the military navigation
and other important United States interests. (C)
The United. States willcontinue active negotiations with
other countries interested in deep seabed mining with a view
to concluding a reciprocating states agreement as ..early as
possible on recognition of deep seabed mining licenses. (U)
?the United States will also continue to exercise its rights
with respect to navigation and overflight against claims
that the United States does not recognize in accordance with
established procedures and review for that program. (C)
The Senior Interdepartmental Group, including all relevant
" agencies, shall develop detailed instructions for achieving
the objectives set forth above after immediate consultation
with key allies and, as appropriate, other major participants
in the conference. Any agency differences shall be forwarded
for my consideration by February 15, 1982. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group shall also oversee the Law of the
Sea negotiations. The Delegation will not accept an ad
referendum draft convention pending my decision on a report
to be submitted by the Senior Interdepartmental Group on its
acceptability in terms of satisfying United States objectives. (C)
Pw..?
EZCRET
av4.9.6.
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10KA02313R0601-00720002-9
SECRET
Guidelines For Seeking Improvements In The Draft
Convention To Satisfy The US Objectives Enumerated
in Section II(k)(1) above.
The IG has agreed that the following guidelines should
be used as the basis for the US negotiating effort. The IG
realizes, however, that all of these guidelines cannot be
satisfied to the fullest extent and has, therefore, estab-
lished priorities among them. The IG believes that if the
priority guidelines were substantially satisfied and progress
made in the other areas listed, the Convention which emerged
could meet the five objectives set forth above.
The following six guidelines indicate the kind of
improvements to which the group attaches the highest priority:
1. The procedures and decision-making system of the
Authority should enable the US, in concert with a few allies,
(1) to ensure that qualified deep seabed miners of manganese
nodules and other deep seabed minerals, current and future,
receive contracts and are allowed to mine; (2) to achieve
acceptable rules and regulations applicable to development of
all deep seabed minerals; (3) to insulate deep seabed miners
from politically motivated interference from the Authority;
and (4) to block adverse decisions on important financial/
budgetary questions concerning the Authority and the Enterprise.
The attainment of this objective would not only repair many
of the defects outlined in the previous sections, but could
also facilitate the attainment of:most of the following
objectives.
2. The production policies of the Authority should be
amended by elimination or relaxation of those production
limitations which discourage production by private enterprise
of deep seabed mineral resources and which could artificially
stimulate competition among potential deep seabed miners.
3. The technology transfer provisions should be revised
to eliminate the mandatory nature of the transfer of private
technology.
4. The provisions on the review conference should be
revised so that any amendment to the deep seabed provisions
of the treaty must have the the consent of the US before
entering into force.
5. National liberation movements should not be parties
to the treaty nor share in any revenues controlled by the
Authority.
6. NIE0 precedents should be minimized.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIAIRDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
SECRET
Beyond these, the group attaches considerable importance
to the following areas:
-- establishment of separation of powers between the
Assembly and Council to minimize. the possibility that
the Assembly can interfere with the Council's exercise
of power entrusted to it;
-- minimization of the possibility that the Authority
may expand or abuse its powers;
-- substantial reduction or elimination of discriminatory
privileges of the Enterprise;
-- reduction of financial burdens on the US government
and private operators.
'
SECRET
;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9
Attachment
SECRET
Important Council Decisions
Important Councildecisions include:
-- exercise of "ccntrol" over seabed mining activities;
-- exercise of residual powers of the Authority (unless
Art. 162 is made a "closed-end list" of powers with residual
powers being dealt with in rules and regulations);
-- supervision and implementation of the seabed mining
reg ime;
-- approval of the annual budget of the Authority;
-- issuance of emergency orders to suspend or adjust
operations to prevent environmental harm;
-- initiation of cases before the Seabed Disputes Chamber;
-- measures to carry out judgment rendered by the Seabed
Disputes Chamber, including suspension of privileges and
rights of membership for gross and persistent violation of
Part XI;
-- management of the inspector corps;
.11=.1111?
terms and conditions of Enterprise financing (Annex
IV, Art. 11(1)(c);
-- borrowing powers of the Authority (Art. 174)
-- approval and adoption by the Council of "technical
amendments to Part XI (Article 314);
-- issuance of directives to the Enterprise;
-- recommendation of candidates for the governing board
r?!?
of the Enterprise;
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100720002-9