NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL GOALS FOR 1989

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100050004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 17, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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S
The Director of Central Intelligence
W"npon. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #89-00056
17 January 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDirector of eputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz Ermarth
Chairman
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Goals for 1989
In 1989, as in the past, the National Intelligence Council will have
four principal functions:
0 To give you the best possible staff support in your capacities as
advisors to the President and the members of the National Security
Council.
? To prepare National Intelligence Estimates and other Community
products of the highest quality and utility.
? To represent your interests in the Intelligence Community on
selected programming, collection, and analysis issues.
? To stimulate better products from the individual agencies of the
Community.
Our topical goals for the coming year are formulated in the Production
Plan for FY89 which will soon be published. Although necessarily subject to
adjustment as events dictate, this year's Plan shows the increasing
complexity of "traditional" topics, e.g., Soviet domestic and foreign
policy, and the growing importance of novel ones, e.g., global economic
trends. As in the past, individual NIOs will contribute to and in some
cases lead the process of wiring together the efforts of separate agencies
in specific areas, such as counterintelligence, terrorism, and narcotics.
CL BY Signer
DECL OADR
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Goals for 1989
We have chosen to focus in 1989 on five major goals, both substantive
and managerial:
1. To enhance further the utility and impact of national
intelligence products.
We are gratified that the Interagency Production Committee'-s
reagent survey of several hundred intelligence consumers found
National Intelligence Estimates highly appreciated. We have made
progress in shortening many of our products, a must for most
users. But we know more can be done to enhance their quality.
Hence we shall a) sharpen the process of selecting national
intelligence topics, especially for estimates;b) work harder at
producing crisp and vivid judgments, while not obscuring
uncertainties; and c) follow up with marketing measures, e.g.,
briefings by NIOs, to assure our messages get across and to gauge
reactions.
2. To enhance the intelligence advisory role of NIOs in support of
the policy process.
As new officials take their places in the Bush Administration,
NIOs will be active in establishing rapport with their natural
constituencies particularly at the assistant and deputy assistant
secretar level. initially they will strive to e ucate their
customers o e capabilities and limits of intelligence, an how
o use i . At the same time, NIOs will work to identify the
emerging policy agendas and policy review processes of the new
administration to maximize the utility of intelligence support at
the early, formative stages of its planning.
3. To collaborate more effectively with the Intelligence Community
Staff in shaping the Community's overall requirements, strategies, and
programs.
Dick Kerr has specifically commended this objective to us.
For years, the NIC has helped the IC Staff develop programatic
documents, such as the National Foreign Intelligence Strategy, and
to review requirements in specific areas. Often, however, this
help has been perfunctory, with the NIC's perspective on the world
at the front of such documents having little evident connection
with the programatic material that followed. Austere budgets and
greater p ressure to optimize resource allocations across the
Community will force us to improve NIC and to collaboration.
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At the same time, with the IC Staff and the agencies of the
Community, we should do more to identify specific collection and
analysis gaps and strategies for closing them. As yet we do not
have a precise formula for enhancing this collaboration, but
General Heinz and I have begun a dialogue to find one.
4. To recruit NIOs and A/NIOs of the highest quality.
This is, of course, a standing goal. But it deserves special
emphasis because a rather large number of NIC members will be
turning over in 1989 due to retirements and rotations. Having
settled into the job in 1988, I shall have perhaps my greatest
opportunity to shape the performance of the NIC in the years ahead
through recruitment in 1989. Special emphasis must go to
attracting minority and women candidates. I know I can count on
your support in making the jobs of NIO and Assistant NIO appealing
to the potential candidates we want.
5. To rationalize ADP support to the NIC and to equip all members
with PCs.
This seemingly mundane administrative goal is very important.
In this area, the NIC suffers from the "evolutionary disorder" of
the rest of the Agency, and depends on much larger Headquarters
components to chart the course we must follow. Yet ADP is a
powerful force multiplier, especially valuable to a relatively
small and at s a organization. We shall strive to make a
quantum leap ahead in 1989 so that all NIC offices can tap into
electronic data bases and can communicate electronically with one
another.
Achievements in 1988
At TAB A are the NIC's goals for 1988, and at TAB B our mid-year
report. I believe only a few comments are warranted on the past year:
? Relations with policy officials remained largely static during
1988, in large part because the administration was winding down.
Where NIOs had strong ties from earlier years, they remained
strong, while weaknesses were not much improved. In the coming
year of new faces, we shall all have to hustle.
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? In addition to the monthly warning meetings chaired by individual
NIOs, we have called special warning meetings of the Intelligence
Community to assess developments in specific areas. These have
yielded "sense of the Community" memos less formal than estimates
but still useful in capturing Community views. We plan to do more
of these in the future.
0 Although we shall strive for more improvements, in 1988 we did make
progress in strengthening the process of drafting NIEs (especially
shortening) and subjecting most of them to outside review by
consultants. These measures helped gain the positive customer
reactions found by the IPC.
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SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Goals for 1989
C/NIC:FWE:
17 Jan 89)
Distribution:
1 - DC I
1 - D DC I
1 - SA/DCI
1 - ER
1 - Each NIO (w/o attach)
1 - O/C/NIC Chrono
1 - FWE Chrono
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OVERVIEW - NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
The National Intelligence Council, an umbrella organization for the National Intelligence officers, is
headed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman. It includes 15 National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) 19 Assistant
NIOs, a Warning Staff, a Foreign Intelligence Activities Staff, an Analytical Group, and a support staff.
Although CIA houses and provides administrative support, the Council is an Intelligence Community
organization and the NIOs report to the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community.
The NIOs are divided among regional and functional accounts that reflect the major analytical elements
of the Intelligence Community. The NIOs have four functions. They provide staff support to the Director
and Deputy Director on substantive intelligence issues. This may take the form of preparing memoranda on
significant subjects, offering briefings, or assisting the Director in improving Community performance.
Second, they help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities. To this end, they meet with
analysts and supervisors in the Community, represent their interests and identify weaknesses for
correction. Third, they manage the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and other coordinated
interagency products. Their job is to insure that these products represent the absolute best the
Intelligence Community has to offer and that they accurately reflect the coordinated views of the entire
Community. Finally, they help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs of policymakers. Their
daily interaction with policymakers and their knowledge of opinion outside the Intelligence Community
enables them to test the relevance and accuracy of the Community's agenda.
To accomplish these tasks NIOs are required to have experience, seasoning and a broad view. Most are
drawn from the Intelligence Community, but some come from policy agencies or academic institutions and think
tanks. They are generally recognized experts in their field. They circulate both inside and outside the
Intelligence Community and maintain contacts outside the Government.
The base level would permit the National Intelligence Council to perform its basic functions of previous
years, but would not permit directed improvements in DCI advisory panels, quality improvements in National
Intelligence Estimates, full strength as called for in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1985 or
replacement of obsolescent ADP equipment.
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Ccntrrl Intelligence
MSdrnix,.D C 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Council
.4p,, 1.9fC
1. Effective 3 December 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence
authorized the establishment of the National Intelligence Council as the
principal organization in CIA charged with fulfilling that Agency's
responsibilities in producing national intelligence estimates and other
interagency assessments. The NIC will report to the Deputy Director,
National Foreign Assessment, and through him to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
2. Organization: The National Intelligence Council is chaired by
Richard Lehman, who will also serve as National Intelligence Officer for
Warning. The other principal members are:
Associate Chairman: Vacant
National Intelligence Officer/Africa: L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer/Chi.na and East Asia:
Amb. John H. Holdridge
National Intelligence Officer/General Purpose Forces:
MGen. Paul E. Gorman, USA
National Intelligence Officer/Latin America: Jack Davis
National Intelligence Officer/Near East and South Asia:
Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs: Howard
Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer/USSR and Eastern Europe:
Arnold L. Horelick
National Intelligence Officer/Western Europe: Joe L. Zaring
(4) National Intelligence Officers-at-Large: Hans Heymann, Jr.
(3 vacancies)
(Three former NIO accounts -- Nuclear Proliferation, Political-Economy,
and Special Studies -- will from now on be handled at a different level.)
Other elements of the NIC will include the Assistant NIOs, who will con-
tinue to work under and, as necessary, substitute for their principals,
and a relatively small Analytic Group. This will be made up of officers
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CONFIDENTIAL
with broad substantive and regional expertise and proven writing skills,
drawn from NFIB agencies and to some extent from outside government. Its
numbers in general will serve with the NIC on rotational assignments-of
two or three years. The Analytic Group's principal function will be to
draft national intelligence estimates* and other assessments under the
guidance of the appropriate NIOs
3. Purpose: The primary purpose of the National Intelligence
Council is to improve the quality of national-level intelligence assess-
ments. Formation of the Analytic Group, whose resources will be wholly
dedicated to and trained in the production of such assessments, will
reduce our need to call upon the other NFIB agencies of CIA/NFAC for
drafting assistance from their frequently overburdened staffs. The
creation of the Analytic Group should also help reduce delays in the
production process. Further improvement should stem from the regular
collegial review of each assessment that will be a principal function
of the four new National Intelligence Officers-at-Large, each of whom
will bring to bear a wide range of substantive strengths on the critical
review of drafts.
4. Community Role: Another important purpose in creating the NIC
is to make it possible to enhance each individual NI0's role as sub-
stantive adviser to and surrogate for the DCI within his own field of
expertise and as the Intelligence Community's manager of national in-
telligence production in that field. Each NIO will continue to work
directly with and represent the DCI as before. The NIO also continues
to be the principal mechanism for ensuring that national intelligence
production is relevant to the consumers' needs. Creating the NIC and
providing it with its own staff structure should make it easier for
each NIO to perform these important Community-related roles than in
recent years. It is important to note that while the NIC reports to
the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment and must necessarily
draw heavily upon NFAC resources, it is an Intelligence Community-
related organization with a national role and is not a unit of NFAC F-
5. What we seek to establish is, in sum, a fortified NIO system
with somewhat more structural coherence, with modest analytical re-
sources of its own, and with a charter that permits and encourages
the NIOs to work more closely with their associates in the intelligence
and national security policymaking communities. To that end, we solicit
your cooperation and support, and we invite your comments. In particular,
we invite you to nominate officers possessing broad substantive expertise
and first-rate drafting ability as candidates for rotational assignment
to the Analytic Group.
STANSFIELD TURNER
*Most military estimates, however, will continue to be produced by
interagency teams, and other estimates and assessments will on
occasion be drafted by non-NIC officers when the best or most
appropriate drafters ate to be found outside the NIC.
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CONF I DENT I Al
4 National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: The Coinnunity and the
(to be given to NFIB Exec. Sec.)
Distribution DCI
Orig DDCI
1 _ ER
DD/I '
l _ C/NIC
_ NFAC Registry
, r ' % ' %TIAt
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KEY JOB ELEMENTS
1. Provide analytical judgments and advice to the Director and Deputy
Director on substantive issues. Represent the Director and Deputy Director
as requested in interagency fora.
2. Manage the drafting and coordination of national estimates and
intelligence memoranda.
3. Organize, provide leadership to and acquire a working knowledge of
appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
4. To assure the relevance of Intelligence Community production sample
views at universities, think tanks, corporations and in the policy community
regarding the priority and significance of major foreign policy issues.
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NIC #00074-89
23 January 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David D. Gries
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Council Checklist
The NIOs are among the principal officers reporting to you and the
Deputy Director who concentrate on the capabilities of the Intelligence
Community to collect, analyze and produce intelligence for customers at the
NSC, State, Defense and other national security organizations. As a result,
the NIOs can assist you in making the Intelligence Community more responsive
to customers and more effective in using resources. What follows is a
checklist of NIO capabilities.
The NIOs represent you to the Intelligence Community. Because they know
the Community's strengths and weaknesses, they can help you improve its
performance. The can advise you on:
- views of member agencies on issues
- strengths and weaknesses of agencies
- Community requirements and evaluation system
- Community resource issues
- talking points for your meetings with Community leaders
national estimates and other Community papers
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The NIOs spend a substantial amount of their time in the policy
community. They represent you at the Interdepartmental Group level and
enjoy cordial relationships with appropriate assistant secretaries and NSC
officers. Therefore, they can inform you on:
- the state of play in various interdepartmental groups
- policy positions and agendas of key assistant secretaries
- intelligence requirements of the policy community
- feedback from the policy community on Intelligence Community
performance
- policy trends on major issues
The NIOs also maintain contact with key military customers, especially
the CINCs. They can advise you on relationships between these military
customers and the Intelligence Community, including:
intelligence requirements of military customers
- feedback on intelligence support to the military
scope and function of military intelligence organizations
talking points for your meetings with senior commanders
Although the NIOs concentrate on issues within the Intelligence
Community, their interaction with CIA's DI, DO and DS&T position them to
advise you on issues that involve more than one directorate. Some of these
are:
cooperation, competition and disputes between the directorates
- disconnects among the directorates on particular issues
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The NIOs are expected to identify trends and anticipate major
developments. Travel to their areas and consultation with American academic
and business leaders help to sharpen these forecasting skills. They help
you assess:
- long-term trends
- integrated (political, military, economic) views about the future
- impact of trends on Intelligence Community requirements and
resources
- attitudes towards the Intelligence Community in academic and
business circles
David D. Gries
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Notes used in preparing for discussion with DCI Webster -- discussed with
DCI and DDCI on 18 December 1987; discussed with NIOs 13 January 1988
What do NIOs do
You are familiar with NIOs' most visible responsibility--managing the
national estimates process on your behalf.
Today, I wish to discuss what the NIOs do in order to prepare themselves
for that task.
My starting point is that the NIOs are your personal staff officers and
they are working on your behalf, with respect to your broadest interests.
Their activities are to be in support of your policies, in support of you,
responsive to your needs.
The principal focus, the mission of the NIO, is to know everything in
their assigned portfolio that the DCI would know if he had the time to
indulge in that detail available to the NIO, who does have the time.
Let's put this in historical context and discuss what Schlesinger and
Colby had in mind when we formulated the personal staff concept and
translated it into the NIO system.
Their view has not been the only one but it has been the centerpiece of
the concept as individualized by succeeding DCIs.
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The origin of the NIO concept was not in the estimates process; it grew
out of a concern that the CIA is fragmented along the lines of analysis,
human collection and covert action, and technical collection. Further,
there are significant barriers to the cross-flow of information within those
three directorates. Thus, if a DCI turns to one of those DDs, he will not
receive a fully informed, well thought out view of an activity. At the
least, he needs to ask all three DDs and assimilate the information
himself. A formidable task for any DCI.
In the broader responsibilities of the DCI, this problem is multiplied
in terms of the other organizations: the NRO, the services, DIA, NSA, etc.
The personal staff officer concept was developed:
o to have senior, experienced officers; rank equal to senior managers
anywhere in CIA or Community (SIS-4);
o assigned a specific portfolio, functional or geographic, and to
know everything in it in the detail the DCI would if he had the
time; everything the DCI may need to know;
o NIO should work the policy community/military command level at the
Assistant Secretary/JCS Deputies/CINC levels to know the policy,
the issues, the problems, and the perceptions.
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o NIO should work intelligence production community at CIA/DI office
level, NSA group level, INR office director; he should know what
has been produced, what is being produced, and what will be
produced. And why, and why not.
o NIO should work with collectors at the DO Division level, NRO
program, collection requirements staffs, NSA group chiefs, Director
of Attaches, and INR and bureaus.
The NIO now is in a position to counsel; first of all his responsibility
is to keep the DCI informed, across the range of his portfolio, of
significant events across the full breadth of DCI interests. Also, the NIO
is prepared to exhort, urge, suggest, recommend to policy people the
intelligence support they need; ditto to producer of intelligence and to the
collector.
The sum of:
o knowledge of policy concerns
o production
o collection
o knowledge of DCI concerns and responsibilities
o equals full preparation for managing estimates on behalf of the DCI
o providing counsel to the DCI
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We should note here that the development of this concept of a senior
personal staff for the DCI in 1973 arose from his need for a mechanism to
integrate the Agency and the Community. The concept was deemed also to be a
solution for a moribund process of producing estimates. It was an excellent
single solution to two separate but related problems.
What is the point of this recitation? So what? There are several
points to make:
o there are good, defensible, necessary reasons for DCI senior
personal staff to be fraternizing with policy people and military
commanders, the Tower Commission notwithstanding.
o these NIOs are available to you, they are your staff
representatives, they and their utterances carry considerable
weight, they can provide you the best single-stop shopping for
details across CIA offices and directorates and across the whole
Community.
o the NIOs need access to you to glean concerns, priorities, and to
i nform.
o the NIOs should be selected by you, or on your behalf, for the
qualities necessary to fill the described role.
Having discussed the origin of the NIOs, and the original concept, we
should underline that they have been used differently by each DCI. All the
described functions have been in play but the emphasis has varied.
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Common to all DCIs though is what the NIO is not:
he has no command authority, he is a staff officer; traditional
distinctions between staff and line
the NIOs are not a unified, integrated office; they function
largely as separate and independent accounts
the National Intelligence council is not a council in the usual
sense; the NIOs meet as a council only for their internal support
functions
the NIC, the NIOs collectively, is not an independent center of
analysis; it is not an analytic center at all
The NIO does manage, on your behalf, as a staff officer, the Community
production of national estimates.
The NIO does analysis, on his own, for you; confidential advice usually;
the counsel of a senior staff officer.
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Director o Central Intelligence
N ashington. D.C ?0505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David D. Gries
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT:
How Your NIOs Can Help You
NIC #00596-88
16 February 1988
1. During a conversation before Christmas, you asked for ideas on how
the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) could save you time, keep you
informed, and extend your reach in the Intelligence Community. I think you
might get some good ideas from a brief review of how your predecessors used
their NIOs. Afterwards, I will offer a few recommendations.
Origin of the NIO System
CIA Director Colby put the system into place in 1973, but it was
actually Dr. Schlesinger's idea, conceived while he was still at the Office
of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as
Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.
Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because
analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only
critic:
President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting
enough control over the Intelligence Community.
Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost
their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
Directors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the
Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.
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Colby himself saw the need for improved staff support on substantive
issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his
time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented
in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):
"I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to
serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for
example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's
politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well
as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would
tell no one else. . ."
To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior,
experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational
effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and
special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.
Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO
system while imposing their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and
portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's
concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet
flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.
The NIOs Under Colby
Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):
To provide staff support to the Director on substantive
intelligence issues. Better one immediately accessible NIO on
China than as roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs
variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings,
unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on
trips abroad.
To help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities.
o by realized that the DCI was to take Charge o the
Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to
have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas
of specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They
were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players
in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals,
strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any
weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
To manage the preparation of Estimates and other coordinated
interagency products. in particular, Colby wanted the s to
ensure that these products represented the absolute best the
Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately
reflected the views of the whole Community.
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-- To help make intelli ence products more relevant to the needs of
the o is ma ers. Colby wanted the NIOs to a his eyes and ears.
He directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in
the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify
the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in
what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence
collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.
The NIOs Under Bush
Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system,
though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the
above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's
control over their activities.
The NIOs Under Turner
Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more
structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote
collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National' Intelligence Council
structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:
Provide support to the Director. Turner met frequently with
selected groups of NIOs to discuss intelligence topics; these
meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the
discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation.
He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.
Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Turner installed the
NIOs as key players in various Community groups that examined
requirements, gaps, and critical problems.
Supervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing
the production of Estimates was the key function of the NIOs, and
he stresses presentation of competitive viewpoints in Estimates.
Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in
footnotes as rarely helpful to policymakers. He insisted that
dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts
with access to the same information should come up with
different conclusions. As he wrote in Secrecy and Democracy
(page 244), The most valuable NIEs are those that present
differences of substance clearly."
-- Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the
NIOs to ensure that Community production addressed the needs of the
policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the NIOs to make
outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby
did.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
The NIOs Under Casey
Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence
Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change.
Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs he found
congenial and helpful. He once remarked to the others that, "I don't see
you very often, and that's your fault." Though Casey greatly increased the
workloads of the NIOs, he allowed only a modest increase in their number:
he wanted a small, hard-hitting cadre to whom he could relate personally.
Despite considerable changes in style, the NIOs continued to:
-- Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant
expertise from his N 10s, the ability to produce on demand a three-
or four-sentence update on any issue within their purview.
-- He frequently telephoned or met NIOs to ask questions. They
became his reference library for quick response items that
came up during the day. He often asked for topical briefings
before meetings of the National Security Council or other
senior-level groups.
-- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on
subjects they believed he should address--he specifically
welcomed dissenting views and offbeat approaches that might
illuminate an issue from a new angle.
-- He continued Turner's practice of taking NIOs on many of his
foreign trips.
-- He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions
with NIOs on subjects within their competence. Sometimes he
would assign work during such discussions; more frequently he
just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his
own knowledge.
Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Casey was less
interested than his predecessors in this function, and he tended to
rely on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep
him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry
about gaps in collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the
Community current on anticipated collection needs.
Supervise interagency production. Casey was determined to increase
both the quantity and quality o Estimates. The number of
Estimates produced more than doubled, with NIOs deeply and
personally involved at every stage of the process.
4
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CONFIDENTIAL
-- Casey further upgraded the importance of dissenting views.
Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes
received nearly as much prominence as the majority view.
Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of
alternate potential outcomes.
-- He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in
collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take
the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
Help make intelligence relevant. Even more than Colby and Turner,
Casey was determined to make ntelligence Community products
address the issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways
that would help them make informed decisions.
-- Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers.
In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both
in Washington and on foreign trips.
-- Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time
attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State,
Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting
corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged
for more NIO briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the
President and Vice President.
Casey believed that through such close and continuing
interaction with the policy, business, and academic
communities, NIOs would be able to identify subjects that
needed analytical attention and help set priorities for
Community analysis.
Recommendations
The NIOs are uniquely positioned to save you time, keep you informed,
and extend your reach.
What the NIOs can do for you:
-- Identify the few really important issues in each of their areas (so
that you do not waste your time searching them out yourself) and
then track these issues on your behalf. They can be your eyes and
ears.
Provide you with one-stop shopping. The NIOs are just a phone call
away whenever you need oral or written analysis of an issue. They
can usually get it to you faster and more authoritatively than
anyone else, and in whatever form you want. They can provide a
Community viewpoint to complement or supplement the CIA viewpoint,
and they are usually more aware of the views of the policymakers
than anyone else.
5
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CONFIDENTIAL
Represent you at various Intelligence Community and national
security meetings.
Help you improve your ties with important outlying intelligence
customers such as the regional military commanders.
Add to your intellectual capital in various ways, for example,
through frequent discussions of developing problems in major issue
areas.
Identify and help you focus on and rectify problems within the
Intelligence Community, especially gaps in collection and
weaknesses in analytical capabilities.
Serve as your principal agents in enforcing your standards of
objectivity, creativity and usefulness in the Community's
analytical activities.
Help you bridge the philosophical and structural gaps among the
CIA's four directorates and among the various agencies that
comprise the Intelligence Community. Community positions are often
disparate, conflicting. When you need a single view, a bottom
line, the NIOs can help you.
What you can do for the NIOs:
If you are to get the most from your NIOs, you will need to spend some
time with them. You should make it easy for an NIO to get on your schedule
for a brief discussion of something the NIO thinks you should know. You
might ask an NIO for a quick and dirty update on something you are about to
discuss with the Secretary of State or Defense at a White House meeting.
Over time, you will learn which NIOs provide the best value in return for
modest investments of your time and attention. With them you can then work
out your own comfortable, informal, efficient, give-and-take arrangements.
David D. Gries
6
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: How Your NIOs Can Help You NIC #00596-88
VC/NIC:DDG
(16 Feb 88)
Distribution:
1 - DC I
I - DDCI
1 - SA/ DC I
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/ICS
1 - AC/NIC
1 - PO/NIC
16 - Each NIO
1 - SRP
1 - VC/NIC File
1 - O/VC/NIC Chrono
7
CONFIDENTIAL
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. CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Central Intellieence
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Council
0-54 JAP"
1. Effective 3 December 1979, the Director of Central Intelligence
authorized the establishment of the National Intelligence Council as the
principal organization in CIA charged with fulfilling that Agency's
responsibilities in producing national intelligence estimates and other
interagency assessments. The NIC will report to the Deputy Director,
National Foreign Assessment, and through him to the Director of Central
Intelligence.
2. Organization: The National Intelligence Council is chaired by
Richard Lehman, who will also serve as National Intelligence Officer for
Warning. The other principal members are:
Associate Chairman: Vacant
National Intelligence Officer/Africa: L. Gray Co.:an
National Intelligence Officer/Chi.na and East Asia:
Amb. John H. Holdridge
National Intelligence Officer/General Purpose Forces:
MGen. Paul E. Gorman, USA
National Intelligence Officer/Latin America: Jack Davis
National Intelligence Officer/Near East and South Asia:
Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer/Strategic Programs: Howard
Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer/USSR and Eastern Europe:
Arnold L. Horelick
National Intelligence Officer/Western Europe: Joe L. Zaring
(4) National Intelligence Officers-at-Large: Hans Heymann, Jr.
(3 vacancies)
(Three former NIO accounts -- Nuclear Proliferation, Political-Economy,
and Special Studies -- will from now on be handled at a different level.)
Other elements of the NIC will include the Assistant NIOs, who will con-
tinue to work under and, as necessary, substitute for their principals,
and a relatively small Analytic Group. This will be made up of officers
CONFIDENTIAL
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3. Purpose: The primary purpose of the National Intelligence
Council is to improve the quality of national-level intelligence assess-
ments. Formation of the Analytic Group, whose resources will be wholly
dedicated to and trained in the production of such assessments, will
reduce our need to call upon the other NFIB agencies of CIA/NFAC for
drafting assistance from their frequently overburdened staffs. The
creation of the Analytic Group should also help reduce delays in the
production process. Further improvement should stem from the regular
collegial review of each assessment that will be a principal function
of the four new National Intelligence Officers-at-Large, each of whom
will bring to bear a wide ranee of substantive strengths on the critical
guidance of the appropriate NIOs.
CONFIDENTIAL
with broad substantive and regional expertise and proven writing skills,
drawn from NFIB agencies and to some extent from outside government. Its
numbers in general will serve with the NIC on rotational assignments-of
two or three years. The Analytic Group's principal function will be to
draft national intelligence estimates* and other assessments under the
4. Community Role: Another important purpose in creating the NIC
is to make it possible to enhance each individual NIO's role as sub-
stantive adviser to and surrogate for the DCI within his own field of
expertise and as the Intelligence Community's manager of national in-
telligence production in that field. Each NIO will continue to work
directly with and represent the DCI as before. The NIO also continues
to be the principal mechanism for ensuring that national intelligence
production is relevant to the consumers' needs. Creating the NIC and
providing it with its own staff structure should make it easier for
each NIO to perform these important Community-related roles than in
recent years. It is important to note that while the NIC reports to
the Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment and must necessarily
draw heavily upon NFAC resources, it is an Intelligence Community-
related organization with a national role and is not a unit of NFAC. F
to the Analytic Group.
5. What we seek to establish is, in sum, a fortified NIO system
with somewhat more structural coherence, with modest analytical re-
sources of its own, and with a charter that permits and encourages
the NIOs to work more closely with their associates in the intelligence
and national security policymaking communities. To that end, we solicit
your cooperation and support, and we invite your comments. In particular,
we invite you to nominate officers possessing broad substantive expertise
and first-rate draftini ahilit as candidates for rotational assignment
STANSFIELD TURNER
appropriate drafters ate to be found outside the NIC.
*Most mfftary estimates, however, will continue to be produced by
interagency teams, and other estimates and assessments will on
occasion be drafted by non-NIC officers when the best or most
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: The Community and the National Intelligence Council
Distribution:
Orig - DCI (to be given to NFIB Exec. Sec.)
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - C/NIC
1 - NFAC Registry
-4-
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
(Effective 28 January 1982)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102, the National Security Act of 1947, and
Executive Order 12333, there is established a National Foreign Intelligence Council
(NFIC).
1. Mission
The NFIC will serve as the senior Intelligence Community advisory instrumental-
ity to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on national intelligence issues, other
than the substantive aspects which are the responsibility of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
2. Functions
The NFIC will advise the DCI on:
a. Priorities and objectives for the National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget.
b. Such other matters as may be referred to it by the DCI.
3. Composition and Organization
The NFIC will be chaired by the DCI or the DDCI, or in their absence, by their
designated representative.
The membership is as follows:
Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice-Chairman
Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Intelligence Division)
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Energy
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (National Security)
Senior representatives of the military intelligence services
Senior representatives of the Department of Defense special reconnaissance
programs
Senior representative of the Secretary of Defense
Senior representative of the Attorney General
Senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce
Senior representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
Interagency intelligence production of the country's National
Intelligence Estimates is centered in the National Intelligence Council
(NIC). The NIC serves the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in his
role as head of the US Intelligence Community not as Director of the CIA.
The NIC is comprised of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 16 National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their staffs, and a supporting Analytic
Group. Each NIO acts as the DCI's senior substantive officer in the
Intelligence Community, for either a geographic region of the world, a
transnational issue, or a specialized functional issue. There are six
regional NIOs plus ten NIOs for functional or transnational issues such as
Soviet strategic programs and science and technology. They serve as special
advisors to the DCI, and his representatives to the Community. They are
responsible for the development of all interagency intelligence estimates in
their area. They oversee the objectivity and integrity of the process that
produces these estimates.
Although the NIC is located at CIA Headquarters, its officers are drawn
from throughout the Intelligence Community (DIA, CIA, NSA, State, the
military services, etc.) as well as academia, outside think tanks, and the
business world. The Chairman of the NIC (C/NIC) is at present an Air Force
general officer. The role of the NIC, in particular its NIOs, is to work
with the Intelligence Community to produce quality, timely estimates
relevant to key questions affecting national security; these estimates look
ahead several months to several years and attempt to predict developments of
key importance to the United States.
The NIC, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community, produces five
types of coordinated Intelligence Communty papers:
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). NIEs deal with issues of
fundamental importance; ey are fully coordinated within the
Intelligence Community and issued by the DCI upon the recommendation of
the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). SNIEs can have the same
characteristics as N s, but they are more urgent and accomplished in a
shorter period of time. They are usually specially requested by a
policymaker and produced in a matter of weeks or days.
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum JIM. IIMs deal with more detailed
and focused topics than Nits and SNIE5. They are produced by working
level representatives of NFIB agencies and generally do not require
formal NFIB review. They are normally approved by C/NIC.
Interagency-Intelligence Assessments IIA . IIAs are short estimates
produced very quickly wen a more oraper is inappropriate,
possibly involving less.than all the NFIB agencies. They are approved
for publication by C/NIC.
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Memorandum to Holders (M/H). M/Hs to any of the products above are
updates where extensive reconsideration is not required. M/Hs are
managed by the same procedures as their parent papers.
In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with the
topics that are relevant and timely, and must reach the right officials
before key decisions on the particular issue are made. Estimative topics
are generated in several ways. A policymaker or the DCI may ask the
Intelligence Community to take a thorough look at an issue; or the C/NIC or
an NIO--trying to anticipate policymakers' needs--may initiate an estimate.
Following the identification of the estimates to be produced, the key
stages in the estimative process are:
Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP indicates the
estimate's origin and purpose and ass key questions to be answered; the
TORs outline in greater detail the central or pivotal issues to be
addressed in the estimate. The CP/TOR are reviewed by the Community;
representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) agencies
meet to discuss and amend them, and they are then approved by the DCI.
Writin of Estimates. The NIO supervising the draft selects a drafter
from the NIC, or from the analytic offices of the CIA or one of the
other agencies of the Intelligence Community. When the draft is
completed, it is reviewed by the NIO and the NIC's front office, and by
the DCI's Senior Review Panel (SRP)--whose members include former
ambassadors, general officers, and academicians. When possible,
estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community to
provide fresh perspectives. Estimates accommodating these comments as
appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation that they be sent
out to NFIB agencies for formal coordination.
Coordination. Formal coordination meetings with representatives from
the me igence Community are held, in which any differences are either
resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are
significant. Such dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates
as alternative language or footnotes.
NFIB Approval. Once an estimate has been so coordinated, the DCI
reviews the paper. If he is satisfied with the quality of the product,
he submits it to NFIB principals for final coordination. NFIB,
comprised of the heads of the government's intelligence agencies,
reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its Judgments and adds
additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the
DCI approve or remand it.
Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is
sought rom the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis.
Further retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared
for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have
changed and why.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Last year the NIC produced 86 NIEs; this year the number will be about
75. Some of these are programmed ahead of time by the NIC, guided by the
NIOs' knowledge of the policymakers consumers' needs; although about half of
the NIEs now being produced are fast-track studies, especially requested by
the DCI or senior Policymakers, usually to fit crisis or fast-moving
situations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Origin of the NIO System
CIA Director Colby put the system into place In 1973, but It was
actually Dr. Schlesinger's Idea, conceived while he was still at the Office
of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as
Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.
Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because
analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only
critic:
-- President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting
enough control over the Intelligence Community.
-- Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost
their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
i,irectors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the
Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.
Colby himself saw the need for Improved staff support on substantive
Issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his
time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented
in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):
'I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to
serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for
example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's
politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well
as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would
tell no one else. .
To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior,
experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational
effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and
special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.
Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO
system while imposing their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and
portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's
concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet
flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.
The NIOs Under Colby ?
Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):
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To provide staff support to the Director on substantive
Intelligence issues. Better one immediately access b e NIO on
h no than a roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs
variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings,
unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on
trips abroad.
To help the Director coordinate Intelligence Community activities.
no by realized at the VC1 was to take charge of e
Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to
have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas
of Specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They
were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players
in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals,
strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any
weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
?o manage the preparation of Estimates and other coordinated
n eragency products. in particular, Colby wanted e s to
ensure that these products represented the absolute best the
Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately
reflected the views of the whole Community.
To help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs. of
the o c ma ers. o by wanted the s to oe his eyes and ears.
Re-directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in
the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify
the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in
what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence
collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.
The NIOs Under Bush
Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system,
though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the
above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's
control over their activities.
The NIOs Under Turner
Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more
structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote
collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National Intelligence Council
structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:
Provide support to the Director. Turner met freouently with
selected groups of s to scuss intelligence topics; these
meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the
discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation.
He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.
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Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Turner installed the
salomunity groups that examined
s as key players indvarious
requirements, gaps,
Su ervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing
the pros pr of-Estimates
of competitive the
he stressed ed presentation
Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in
footnotes as rarely helpful to policymekers. He insisted that
dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts
with access to the some information should come up with
different conclusions. As he wrote in Secrecy and Democracy
(page 244), The most valuable NIEs are those that present
differences of substance clearly."
Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the
s to ensure that-Community production addressed the needs of the
policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the N10s to make
outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby
did.
The NIOs Under Casey
Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence
Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change.
Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs1iedfoundsee
congenial. and helpful. He once remarked to the others that,
you very often, and thahes alyour lowedaonly a modest reatinly
workloads of the NIOs,
in style, to could personally.
he wanted a small, hard-hitting
Despite considerable changes
Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant
expertise ro,the bissue produce mand three-
or four-sentence update on any
He frequently telephoned or met N10s to ask questions. They
became his reference library for quick response items that
or otherbriefings
Counciltopical
come up during the theday.
b
Nationaloften
Securityfor
bef fore meetings of
senior-level groups.
-- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on
approaches specifically'
offbeat address--he
subjects they nting views and should
that might
welcomed dissenting
illuminate an issue from a new angle.
-- He continued Turner's practice of taking N10s on many of his
foreign trips.
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He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions
with NIOs on subjects within their competence.
would assign work during such discussions; more frSometimes
equentlyhhe
just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his
own knowledge.
Coordinate Intelli ence Communit activities. Casey was less
interested then s predecess
ors
rely n t s unction, and he tended to
on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep
him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry
about gaps In collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the
Community current on anticipated collection needs.
Supervise intern enc roduction.
oth a auant ty and Casey was determined to increase
e ntelligence Community products
address the Issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways
that would help them make informed decisions.
Estimates produced more4ILY OT ILS1 of
uthen doubled,mwith.
NIOsedeeplyrand
,personally involved at every stage of the process.
-- Casey further upgraded the Importance of dissenting views.
Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes
received nearly as much prominence as the majority view.
Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of
alternate potential outcomes.
He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in
collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take
the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
Hel make Intelli ence relevant.
asey was a e Even more than Colby and Turner
r.-
r m n-,. o ma
Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers.
In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both
In Washington and on foreign trips.
Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time
attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State,
Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting
corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged
for more NI0 briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the
President and Vice President.
.Casey believed that through such close and continuing
interaction with the policy, business, and academic
communities, NIOs would be able to identify subjects that -
needed analytical attention and help set priorities for
Community analysis.
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Origin of the NIO System
CIA Director Colby put the system into place in 1973, but it was
actually Dr. Schlesinger's idea, conceived while he was still at the Office
of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as
Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.
Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because
analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only
critic:
President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting
enough control over the Intelligence Community.
Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost
their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
tDirectors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the
Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.
Colby himself saw the need for improved staff support on substantive
issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his
time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented
in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):
"I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to
serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for
example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's
politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well
as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would
tell no one else. . ."
To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior,
experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational
effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and
special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.
Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO
system while imposing. their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and
portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's
concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet
flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.
The NIOs Under Colby
Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):
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intelligence issues. etter one Immediately accessib a NIO on
China than a roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs
variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings,
unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on
trips abroad.
To help the Director coordinate Intelligence Communit activities.
o y realized at the OCI was to take charge of the
Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to
have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas
of specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They
were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players
in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals,
strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any
weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
'To manage the preparation of Estimates and other coordinated
To rovide staff support to the Director on substantive
nteragency products. In particular, Colby wanted the s to
ensure that these products represented the absolute best the
Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately
reflected the views of the whole Community.
To help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs-of
the o is makers. Colby wanted the N s to oe his eyes and ears.
e directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in
the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify
the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in
what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence
collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.
The NIOs Under Bush
Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system,
though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the
above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's
control over their activities.
The NIOs Under Turner
Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more
structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote
collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National Intelligence Council
structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:
-- Provide support to the Director. Turner met freouently with
selected groups of s o discuss intelligence topics; these
meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the
discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation.
He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.
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Coordinate Intelligence Communit activities. Turner installed the
s askey players in various Community groups that examined
requirements, gaps, and critical problems.
Supervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing
the production of Estimates was the key function of the NIOs, and
he stressed presentation of competitive viewpoints in Estimates.
-- Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in
footnotes as rarely helpful to policymakers. He insisted that
dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts
with access to the same information should come up with As he different conclusions.
NIEs areSecrecy and cy
valuablewrote
that present
"The
(page 244),
differences of substance clearly."
Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the
s to ensure Wat Community production addressed the needs of the
policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the NIOs to make
outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby
did.
The NIOs Under Casey
Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence
Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change.
Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs he found
congenial. and helpful. He once remarked to the others that, "I don't see
you very often, and that's your fault." Though Casey greatly increased the
workloads of the NIOs, he allowed only a modest increase in their number:
he wanted a small, hard-hitting cadre to whom he could relate personally.
Despite considerable changes in style, the NIOs continued to:
-- Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant
expertise from his N 10s, the ability to produce on demand a three-
or four-sentence update on any issue within their purview.
-- He frequently telephoned or met NIOs to ask questions. They
became his reference library for quick response items that
came up during the day. He often asked for topical briefings
before meetings of the National Security Council or other
senior-level groups.
-- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on
subjects they believed he should address--he specifically
welcomed dissenting views and offbeat approaches that might
illuminate an issue from a new angle.
-- He continued Turner's practice of taking NIOs on many of his
foreign trips.
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-- He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions
with NIOs on subjects within their competence. Sometimes he
would assign work during such discussions; more frequently he
just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his
own knowledge.
Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Casey was less
interested than his predecessors in this function, and he tended to
rely on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep
him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry
about gaps in collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the
Community current on anticipated collection needs.
Supervise interagency production. Casey was determined to increase
both the quantity and Quality of Estimates. The number of
Estimates produced more than doubled, with NIOs deeply and
personally involved at every stage of the process.
Casey further upgraded the importance of dissenting views.
Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes
received nearly as much prominence as the majority view.
Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of
alternate potential outcomes.
-- He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in
collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take
the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
Help make intelligence relevant. Even more than Colby and Turner,
Casey was determined to make ntelligence Community products
address the issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways
that would help them make informed decisions.
-- Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers.
In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both
in Washington and on foreign trips.
-- Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time
attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State,
Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting
corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged
for more NIO briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the
President and Vice President.
-- Casey believed that through such close and continuing
interaction with the policy, business, and academic
communities, NIOs would be able to identify subjects that
needed analytical attention and help set priorities for
Community analysis.
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Confidential ' ..
The Intelligence Community
Depae` cent of Defense
Elements
Departmental Intelligence
Elements (Other than DoD)
^ Independent Agency
Confidential
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National
Intelligence
Council
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Confidential
National Intelligence Council
March 1987
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Regional
Transnatlonal / Functional
Confidential
Admin Officer
Production Officer
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