TANZANIA: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90R00038R000400420003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of S et
Central
Intelligence
Tanzania: Prospects for Change
NI JIM 86-10012
October 1986
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NI IIM 86-10012
TANZANIA: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Information available as of 18 September 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Nyerere's Legacy of Economic Decline .......................................... 7
Nyerere's Continuing Political Influence ........................................ 10
Potential Challenges for the Regime ............................................... 12
Military Discontent and Other Troubles .................................... 12
The External Dimension .................................................................. 13
A Fading Regional Role ............................................................... 13
Important Relationships: The Soviets and the Chinese ............. 16
Relations With the West: The Search for Aid ............................ 17
Implications for the United States ................................................... 18
ANNEX B: The Tanzanian People's Defense Force ......................... 21
ANNEX C: Who's Who in the Economy ........................................... 23
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SCOPE NOTE
Julius Nyerere's 1985 resignation as President of Tanzania in favor
of his Vice President Ali Hassan Mwinyi significantly altered the
political landscape of that country, which has been dominated by
Nyerere's personality and socialist policies for a quarter of a century. In
this paper, we examine the challenges to Mwinyi, an economic
pragmatist-including the need to reform Nyerere's moribund econom-
ic and political legacy-and how the shifting domestic scene will affect
Tanzania's role in Africa and the Third World, and its relations with
China, the USSR, and the United States. Although this memorandum is
limited to a two-year outlook, it considers problems and possible
developments over a longer term.
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Figure 1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
There will be modest change in Tanzania's socialist economic
policies due to the increasing influence of President Mwinyi and other
pragmatists. But he may not, over the next two years, be able to
overcome leftist propensities instilled during Julius Nyerere's 24-year
rule. Political factionalism, Nyerere's influence in decisionmaking, and
ideological disputes are likely to continue to constrict the government's
effectiveness in addressing needed policy change.
The continuation of Tanzania's leftist views could limit the United
States' opportunities to improve bilateral relations, but Nyerere's resig-
nation will remove his strident and often vitriolic criticism of US actions
from international forums. The similarity of Tanzanian views on Third
World and African issues with those of the USSR, coupled with Dar es
Salaam's continued military dependence on Moscow, will sustain
Tanzania's radical international posture despite cool relations with the
USSR and its professed commitment to nonaligned status.
The near hopeless state of the Tanzanian economy, induced by the
implementation of Nyerere's ambitious socialist Arusha Declaration in
1967, will not be ameliorated significantly during the time of this
memorandum. Nyerere's status and influence as Tanzania's revered
founding father and as a seminal figure of African independence, as
well as the inertia of an entrenched socialist economic system and
ideology, will hamper and may undermine major reform efforts.
Nyerere-chairman of Tanzania's only political party and mentor to
leftist ideologues-will to try to thwart more pragmatic, reform-minded
leaders who hope the transfer of presidential power gives Tanzania new
opportunities for economic reform. Nyerere and leftists, however, will
continue to be checked by the political strength of pragmatic ministers
and the declining popularity of the leftist economic line.
The battle over the recently concluded International Monetary
Fund (IMF) accord sharpened differences between the pragmatists and
Nyerere with his leftist followers, who oppose IMF economic recom-
mendations. Implementation of the IMF recommendations could be
derailed by Nyerere, who exercises power through the party and a wide
network of political loyalists, although the influence of both the party
and leftists is declining.
The likely inability of the Mwinyi government to change signifi-
cantly the structure of the moribund economic system will not generate
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widespread political instability, but it will cause the government to
become increasingly irrelevant to the economic life of most Tanzanians,
many of whom have already turned to the informal sector. Mwinyi's
anticorruption campaign, however, is earning the self-effacing Presi-
dent his first real popular support.
We believe it unlikely that in the next two years civil disorders will
grow to such proportions as to precipitate military intervention. Frustra-
tion with Mwinyi's handling of intractable economic problems and
contagious uncertainty over debilitating political factionalism in Dar es
Salaam could unsettle the generally stable pattern of Tanzanian politics.
In addition:
- Military and urban discontent over new austerity measures is
likely to grow, although Tanzania has virtually no history of
civil disorder.
- Dissatisfaction over the steady decline in military capabilities
and economic constrictions might encourage increased military
unrest, and conceivably even spark a mutiny, but will not bring
down the government.
Although in 1962 Nyerere reclaimed the presidency after having
resigned to build up the party, we doubt he will attempt to return to
power either in person or through a surrogate during the time of this
memorandum. Nyerere would be unlikely to precipitate domestic
tensions by removing the elected president and loath to admit that
constitutional transfer of power was a failure. Although it is unlikely
Nyerere could precipitate Mwinyi's resignation by frustrating his
policies and engineering his replacement by a more pliable figure, such
as Prime Minister Warioba. Even more unlikely, Nyerere could be
induced to seek to reclaim the presidency, however, if he perceives the
government is unable to deal with severe instability or is abandoning
ujamaa in such a way as to humiliate him. His resumption of power
(most likely implying a whole-hearted return to rigidly ideological
economic policies without any promise of reform) would probably
unduly test his popularity and legacy of past accomplishments, and
could well prove provocative to elements within the military, which
expect economic reform.
Nyerere's death or decision to withdraw from political life alto-
gether, however, could significantly change the fortunes of leftists, who
have lost much of their popular appeal and are largely sustained by his
stature and influence. Under such circumstances, more moderate
reformers would gradually be able to assume the upper hand although
competition for power under Mwinyi's leadership would intensify.
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Nyerere's resignation as President, the country's crippling financial
problems, and political infighting will contribute to Tanzania's ebbing
influence in Africa and its ability to project power beyond its borders as
it did in Uganda (1978-81) and in Seychelles (1982-84). Nyerere's legacy
will help preserve Tanzania's leftist orientation, but we expect Mwinyi
will work harder than his predecessor to tailor foreign policy to the
country's internal needs. Nyerere's meddling in selected foreign policy
issues (such as relations with national liberation groups and Zairian
dissidents) may make Tanzania's policies appear contradictory at times.
On issues involving South Africa, Tanzania is likely to hold fast to
its vociferous opposition to white rule, and to US policy. It will continue
to:
- Provide assistance, training, and safehaven for South African
liberation groups, notably the African National Congress (ANC).
- Allow transit of Eastern Bloc arms to these groups, as well as
permit the ANC to once again locate its headquarters in Dar es
Salaam, should the ANC decide to do so.
- Provide military training (limited because of economic restric-
tions) to armies of fellow Frontline and regional states.
- Give verbal, if not physical, support to the concept of an
Organization of African Unity (OAU) military wing.
Tanzania's similarity of views on the Third World and African
issues with the USSR and military dependence on the Soviet Union is
unlikely to change significantly despite cool relations. Strain resulting
from Dar es Salaam's dissatisfaction with the quality and amounts of
Soviet economic and military assistance, and of Soviet meddling in
Tanzanian politics long have been evident. Soviet unresponsiveness to
Tanzanian complaints reflects, in our judgment, Moscow's recognition
of Tanzania's declining influence in the Third World and a probable
decision that curtailed Soviet interests there can be secured by a static or
even reduced investment.
China's once prominent role in Tanzania has withered since the
1970s. Mwinyi has tried to revitalize ties, with some success, but we do
not expect China to provide over the next two years sufficient military
or economic aid to reduce Tanzanian dependence on Moscow, as Dar es
Salaam might hope.
Western countries provide the only real opportunity to Tanzania
for halting its economic slide through multilateral financial assistance
and debt rescheduling but prospects for further aid hinge almost
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entirely on Dar es Salaam implementing a major economic reform
program in cooperation with the IMF. Unless Mwinyi is able to
implement the recent agreement with the Fund-a very questionable
prospect-most Western aid patrons are likely to provide only small
amounts of assistance, which will do little more than stave off collapse
of the official economy.
Tanzania's policy relevance for the United States is likely to remain
modest during the time of this memorandum. Tanzania's behavior as a
diplomatic irritant will be softened, because Nyerere is now exempted
from leadership positions in multinational organizations, where he
expressed often vitriolic anti-US sentiment and was able to strengthen
anti-US stances. Bilateral relations between the United States and
Tanzania have the potential to improve during the course of this
memorandum because of debt rescheduling and a possible slight
increase in US aid. Tanzania's leftist orientation and often diverging
views on global issues, especially regarding South Africa, work against
any significant change in posture toward the United States, even though
some of the emerging leaders might be amenable toward an improve-
ment in ties and a resumption of assistance. The United States is
unlikely to benefit in any tangible way from a static or even reduced
Soviet influence in Dar es Salaam.
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DISCUSSION
1. Julius Nyerere, founder of Tanzanian independ-
ence and one of Africa's most famous statesmen,
continues to be a potent force in Tanzanian politics,
despite his decision in late 1985 to retire in favor of his
vice president, All Hassan Mwinyi. Nonetheless, politi-
cal power is shifting away from Nyerere and his
supporters toward a pragmatic group led by President
Mwinyi. Nyerere's decision to relinquish leadership
was motivated in large part by the increasingly un-
avoidable fact that his blueprint for Tanzanian devel-
opment was failing and that his broader visionary
policies (widely copied throughout Africa and so domi-
nant in all aspects of Tanzanian society) were faltering
badly at home and elsewhere. Nyerere's decision has
been a qualified one, however, and he has been
unwilling to give up his influence or his policies
altogether and continues to wield considerable power
over the country by virtue of his revered stature and
his leadership of Tanzania's only political party.
2. Nyerere's position has inhibited Mwinyi, a prag-
matic administrator who successfully instituted eco-
nomic and political reforms while President of Zanzi-
bar, Tanzania's partner in a troubled 22-year union.
Mwinyi faces far greater challenges in reversing the
mainland's ruinous economic decline, however, and
has yet to demonstrate that he has developed a base of
support sufficiently strong to override Nyerere or to
cope with the failing economy and the political disaf-
fection it is causing.
system of parastatals to control virtually all production
and distribution, and virtual elimination of private
enterprise through regulation and nationalization.
4. The inadequacies of the ujamaa system have
produced a number of serious dislocations in the
economy over the decades:
- A large and costly bureaucracy has failed to
manage the system and has become largely a
breeding ground for graft and corruption, espe-
cially within parastatal organizations.
- Discouraged agricultural workers have increas-
ingly returned to subsistence farming and an
uncontrolled, informal economy has developed
to provide for most basic consumer needs.
- The government's declining ability to purchase
vital imports has caused deterioration in the
country's underdeveloped infrastructure, thus
further hampering the performance of virtually
all sectors of the economy.
- Decades-long reliance on foreign assistance (Tan-
zania's external debt now approaches $3 billion)
has created an attitude of "dependence"
throughout the Tanzanian elite that has stifled
serious efforts to reform or to find domestic
Nyerere's Legacy of Economic Decline
3. Tanzania's unique system of state-directed social-
ism, introduced in 1967, has never come close to
achieving the idealistic goals that Nyerere envisioned.
The system, known as ujamaa,' is so central to
Nyerere's ideology, however, that it has been a way of
life in Tanzania for almost 20 years, despite its
increasingly obvious flaws and its near ruinous effects
on agriculture, which employs 80 percent of the
population and is the country's chief foreign exchange
earner. Prominent features of "ujamaa socialism"
included relocation-sometimes forced-of rural
peasantry into agricultural collectives, creation of a
solutions to economic problems.
5. The country's financial difficulties reached crisis
proportions in the late 1970s when a variety of
external factors-high oil prices, falling commodities
prices, harsh weather, and the collapse of the East
African Community-further exacerbated the disloca-
tions caused by Nyerere's policies. His failure to
restrain expansionary fiscal policies, maintain realistic
exchange rates, support agricultural prices, combined
with Tanzania's costly invasion of Uganda in 1978
(which was in response to a Ugandan incursion into
Tanzania), sent the economy into a serious downward
spiral, causing a steady and serious degradation in
living standards for the average Tanzanian.
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Since the proclamation of Nyerere's famous Arusha
Declaration in 1967, Tanzania has developed a wholly
state-run economy, ineptly administered by an over-
blown and ever more corrupt central bureaucracy. The
economy, planned in accordance with the dictates of
socialism and Nyerere's concept of African brother-
hood, with little thought for the vagaries of the market-
place, offers almost no incentive for producers or
investors. Strict currency and import/export controls
have restricted Tanzanian trade. Private initiatives,
seldom allowed, are usually strangled by an excess of
redtape. Tanzanians have come to rely on a thriving
black market and subsistence farming for the necessities
of life, and the government strictly controls the impor-
tation of luxury items, guaranteeing an austere life for
all but the most privileged. Under Nyerere, the govern-
ment long resisted any change in the moribund eco-
nomic system-including devaluation-preferring to
blame Tanzania's troubles on the greed of developed
nations and international economic crises.
Government interventionist policies have been the
major damper on production. Artificially low producer
prices, set periodically by the government, are major
disincentives for farmers. The low producer prices
provide negative real returns to farmers who supply the
state-run organizations, thus discouraging production.
Shortages of foreign exchange, caused by shrinking
output, have restricted expansion in all sectors and have
required periodic downward adjustments of the govern-
6. President Mwinyi and other pragmatists in
his government believe Tanzania's only hope lies
in securing help from the International Monetary
Fund. An IMF agreement is in turn expected to
ensure increased amounts of aid from donors who
are withholding funding while insisting on re-
forms consistent with terms for an IMF accord.
Mwinyi faces formidable obstacles in carrying out
the reforms required by the August 1986 IMF
standby agreement:
- Nyerere unsuccessfully opposed an IMF-support-
ed program. He regards the Fund as a tool of
Western nations and an intolerable interference,
and as chairman of Tanzania's sole political
party, he can still sabotage reform efforts by
directing the actions of his clique of loyal, leftist
supporters still in senior government positions.
- Tanzania must convince foreign donors that it
will be able to implement the new accord (Tan-
zania did not follow through on a 1981 agree-
ment) in order to obtain their continued financial
cooperation.
ment's budget. Government pricing policies have en-
couraged black-market activity, and state-run business-
es are unable to meet consumer demand, especially in
the larger cities.
The government-owned enterprises, which control
almost all legal trade, have long been one of the biggest
drains on the economy. Their ever-spiraling operating
costs have traditionally absorbed rising percentages of
profit. These businesses have frequently not paid farm-
ers at all for their crops, although producer prices are
fixed by law.
An overvalued currency has made Tanzanian com-
modities considerably less competitive on the world
market. Thus, Tanzania finds it difficult to earn hard
currency for purchases of oil, chemicals, seed, and
machinery and is unable to pay debts to oil suppliers
and international aid donors. Nyerere's continued resis-
tance to devaluation was the major obstacle to an IMF
standby agreement in 1985.
A growing faction in the government and in the
educated portion of the population is favoring a more
realistic approach to economic planning. Tired of the
privations that have been caused by Nyerere's socialist
program, these pragmatists are anxious to see practical
applications to economic problems. For the most part,
they believe an IMF agreement, long considered by
Nyerere to be intolerable interference in internal af-
fairs, is necessary for economic survival.
- The accord will require a steeper devaluation of
the country's currency, increases in producer
prices, wage cuts for the bureaucracy, and major
overhaul of the parastatal system, all of which
will meet strong resistance.
7. Although Mwinyi has been in office less than one
year, he has been moving, albeit slowly and cautiously,
to mobilize those who recognize the necessity of
serious reform into an effective political front. He has
undertaken some stopgap measures, has negotiated an
IMF agreement despite Nyerere's opposition, and has
waged a widespread and popular campaign against
bureaucratic corruption.
8. Tanzania's economic prospects are nevertheless
bleak under any circumstances. Even in the event that
Nyerere's influence wanes more rapidly than antici-
pated and a serious reform program can be set in
motion soon, the magnitude of the country's problems
indicates a long and difficult recovery. We believe
that Nyerere and his legacy will continue to hamper
structural reform efforts through the period of this IIM
and that the country's economic problems are unlikely
to improve substantially.
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Figure 2 Figure 4
Tanzania: Total Debt Tanzania: Structure of Production
Figure 3
Tanzania: Value of Total Exports (f.o.b.)
Tanzania's socialist budgets have rarely reflected the
importance of the agricultural sector. Agriculture
employs over 80 percent of the population and
accounts for over 75 percent of the country's foreign
exchange earnings. The budgets have emphasized
310562 9-86 disproportionately the mining and manufacturing
sector. This sector relies on agriculture and foreign
aid donors for hard currency needed to purchase raw
materials and machinery. Agriculture's ability to
earn foreign exchange, however, has seriously
declined because of government neglect, rigid
socialist policies, and built-in disincentives to
farmers.
Increasingly scarce foreign exchange and the
relatively high cost of imports have made Tanzanian
industrial enterprises poor investments. Often the
finished product is cheaper to import than to
produce in-country. Even industrial processing of
agricultural commodities and the producing of
import substitutes (such as cigarettes, cement, and
paper) have suffered indirectly from the lack of
foreign exchange. Inadequate supplies of spare parts
and packaging materials, transportation halts, and
the general decline of Tanzania's frail infrastructure
all exist, in part, because of the shortage of foreign
exchange.
Virtually all services are provided by the
government, causing a major drain on slimming
government revenues.
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Table 1
Tanzania: Economic Indicators
Real GDP growth, 1978-85 (average annual) 0.8 percent
Consumer price inflation, 1985 26 percent
Total foreign debt, 1985 US $3.1 billion
International reserves US $12 million
Foreign debt service obligation, 1985
Debt service ratio, 1985 (scheduled)
Actual debt service ratio, 1985
US $136 million
53 percent
19 percent
9. Most of Tanzanian society is used to living in
deprivation. This will mitigate the political conse-
quences of continuing austerity, and the chances of
widespread civil unrest or economic-inspired dissi-
dence are not great. As long as the government
remains a captive of Nyerere's legacy-and we expect
it will-it will remain largely irrelevant to the eco-
nomic life of most Tanzanians, who are likely to
engage in commercial activity outside the socialist
system.
Nyerere's Continuing Political Influence
10. We believe that former President Julius
Nyerere's far-reaching influence will continue to af-
fect the character of Tanzanian politics over the next
two years, despite his decision to resign as chief of
state. As chairman of Tanzania's sole political party,
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM or Revolutionary
Party), Nyerere still holds key decisionmaking power
that can undercut the government's authority and give
continuing influence to his proteges and followers.
11. Despite his public declaration to resign as party
chairman in mid-1987, Nyerere may well stay on
through the period of this memorandum, possibly until
the next party conference in 1992. We believe he is
reluctant to relinquish real power to the reform-
minded Mwinyi and will try to revamp the party and
establish its dominance over the government. Nyerere
is only sixty and in relatively good health; his decision
to resign as President was clearly difficult for him and
in the ensuing months he apparently has had second
thoughts about truly giving up power, abandoning his
socialist vision for Tanzania, and about the course
Mwinyi and other pragmatists are likely to pursue. As
long as he can continue to influence Mwinyi, we
believe Nyerere is unlikely to reclaim the presidency
or force Mwinyi's dismissal.
Ali Hassan Mwinyi:
Reluctant Leader
On 4 November 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a former
schoolteacher, succeeded Tanzania's first and only Pres-
ident since independence in 1961, Julius Nyerere.
Union Vice President and President of Zanzibar only
since 1984, Mwinyi conspicuously lacked a base of
support on mainland Tanzania, his predecessor's charis-
ma, and international recognition, and is still viewed by
the military as a remote and unfamiliar figure. Suspi-
cions that Mwinyi would be wholly deferential to
Nyerere have been somewhat assuaged by his crack-
down on bureaucratic corruption-which has markedly
increased his grassroots popularity-but he remains
careful about challenging Nyerere over sensitive issues.
His successful support of an IMF agreement, however,
has been in sharp contradiction to Nyerere's longstand-
ing objections to such a reform program. We believe
that he will continue to maintain a low political profile
throughout his presidency, however, out of genuine
respect for Nyerere and because he is uncomfortable
with the scope and responsibility of an office he did not
seek.
A diffident and modest man more interested in
results than in ideology, Mwinyi is an experienced
politician with a reputation for capable administration
and party loyalty. His string of political appointments
and educational credentials include Zanzibari Minister
of Education, Ambassador to Egypt, Party Vice Chair-
man, and the chairmanship of a number of service-
oriented parastatal boards.
Many observers are waiting for Mwinyi to initiate the
same type of liberalization measures that he successfully
implemented while President of Zanzibar. Although he
was forced to walk a thin line between Nyerere-who
had unceremoniously ousted the previous President of
Zanzibar-and rising secessionist sentiment, Mwinyi
instituted a series of pragmatic reforms, including
export liberalization, streamlining parastatals, and lift-
ing restrictions on the use of foreign exchange to import
much-needed consumer goods. He also introduced a
more liberal constitution that sucessfully eased seces-
sionist tensions.
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Julius Nyerere:
Nationalist and Visionary
Affectionately called "Mwalimu" (teacher) by the
Tanzanian people, Julius Nyerere was the founder of
his country's independence movement and President of
Tanzania for almost a quarter of a century. As Chair-
man of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM-Revolutionary
Party), the country's sole political party, he still strongly
believes that socialist ideology is the best basis for
economic and political decision making. On the basis of
his statements and actions throughout his career, we
believe that Nyerere considers himself a man with a
mission and hopes to build socialist institutions and
attitudes that will endure beyond his lifetime.
Nyerere's honesty, dedication, and intellect-com-
bined with his considerable political skill-have pre-
served his national preeminence, enhanced his prestige
abroad, and given Tanzania a leading role in the Third
World that its limited power and wealth would not
otherwise warrant. He identifies strongly with the have-
nots of the world and is an avid supporter of a new
international economic order that would allow develop-
ing nations to increase their share of the world's fixed
resources at the expense of developed countries. We
believe it is partly this viewpoint that led him to adopt a
socialist development strategy at home and to take an
aggressive stance toward the West on international
economic matters.
Nyerere's patriarchal image and legacy as Tanzania's
founding father will be slow to fade in the hearts and
minds of Tanzanians, despite growing dissatisfaction
with the end result of his socialist policies. An impres-
sive man both publicly and privately, he maintained
political stability and unity while projecting Tanzania
onto the world stage. In 1981 he received the Dag
Hammarskjold Pax Mundi (awarded for contributions
to international understanding) and the Third World
Prize. He was named 1981 Man of the Year by the
French magazine Le Point. His retirement as President
in 1985 coincided with his leaving the chairmanships of
the Organization of African Unity and the Frontline
States organization
12. Nyerere has tremendous support as the
founder of Tanzania's independence and socialist
system-including a remarkable network of edu-
cation and social services-and he is still mentor
to many national and local leaders. Although
Nyerere and his most cherished ideologies are
losing popularity in the face of decline economic
conditions, association with Nyerere is a critical
source of strength for many leftists. Some Cabinet
and many party members are willing to be used as
a conduit for Nyerere's ideas and influence. Prime
Minister Warioba, who is from Nyerere's native
Musoma district, frequently acts on Nyerere's
behalf. Party Secretary General Kawawa and
Minister for Local Government and Cooperative
Unions Ngombale-Mwiru spearhead the party's
most radical left wing but their power within the
government is marginal.
13. Nyerere's activism behind the scenes is largely
responsible for the growing factionalism gripping the
government. For example, the party seriously ham-
pered the government's negotiations with the IMF and
may be able to undermine major structural economic
reforms. Nyerere has also brought the party into the
foreign policy arena, making it responsible for oversee-
ing relations with insurgent groups such as the African
National Congress (ANC) and Zairian dissidents. In so
doing he has taken over many of the responsibilities of
the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and hurt
Mwinyi's attempts to improve relations with Zaire.
14. We do not believe Mwinyi has the political
strength or temperament to publicly challenge
Nyerere's authority but privately has stood his ground
on selected issues and has won some concessions from
Nyerere. Mwinyi was a compromise choice for the
presidency, selected by Nyerere in the eleventh hour
after a power struggle between then Prime Minister
Salim and Party Secretary General Kawawa threat-
ened a showdown between their backers in the mili-
tary and party, respectively. Mwinyi appears uncom-
fortable in the shadow of Nyerere's impressive
reputation; he clearly cannot match his predecessor's
keen political instincts. Moreover, as a Zanzibari,
Mwinyi is a minority on the Tanzanian mainland and
within the island-mainland Union government, and
thus without a strong ethnic constituency. He is only
beginning to build popular support but seems intimi-
dated by the overlapping lines of authority between
the presidency and party chairman.
15. Under Mwinyi's leadership, competition for
power and factionalism are likely to flourish, as more
aggressive Cabinet ministers take advantage of the
President's self-effacing style. Leftists, however, will
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continue to be checked by the political strength of
pragmatic ministers and the declining popularity of
the leftist economic line.
16. Several key Cabinet members favor Mwinyi's
version of reform, but do not appear to be acting in
concert with the President-often because of a lack of
presidential direction. They each have strong, but
individual, bases of support. Defense Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister Salim is increasingly popular
with the military establishment and his previous posts
at the United Nations have earned him considerable
international recognition. Minister of Finance Msuya,
the strongest proponent of IMF-sponsored reform, is
widely respected within the government bureaucracy
and banking circles.
17. Nyerere's efforts to prop up Tanzania's ailing
left, Mwinyi's timidity, and the uncoordinated actions
of strong ministers are likely to hamper government
decisionmaking and obstruct any significant reversal
of economic decline. Although grumbling over the
economy will increase, and isolated outbreaks of un-
rest are possible, traditional passivity is likely to
prevent serious social disorders. The rapid growth in
recent years of an uncontrolled informal economy has
made official government policy less important to the
average Tanzanian in any case.
18. We doubt that Tanzania will change its leftist
foreign policies. Given Nyerere's departure and the
country's perilous economic state, Tanzania's influ-
ence in the region and in the international community
will dwindle. Over the next two years, political in-
fighting is likely to be the main feature of the
government; but, as long as Nyerere remains on the
scene, even the most assertive critics of his policies are
unlikely to be able to challenge the regime or mobilize
popular discontent to force real change.
19. In the less likely event that Nyerere actually
retires in 1987 or passes from the scene, the prospect
for significant change in Tanzania would improve
markedly. We do not believe Mwinyi, even under
these circumstances, is likely to be the driving force
behind a serious economic and political transition but
will fully support such initiatives. One of the more
powerful members of the government-probably
Deputy Prime Minister Salim-might marshal suffi-
cient support for major economic reform but would be
unlikely to change the direction of Tanzanian foreign
policy.
20. Although in 1962 Nyerere reclaimed the presi-
dency after having resigned to build up the party, we
doubt he will attempt to return to power either in
person or through a surrogate during the time of this
memorandum. Nyerere would be unlikely to precipi-
tate domestic tensions by removing the elected presi-
dent and loath to admit that constitutional transfer of
power was a failure. Even more unlikely, Nyerere
conceivably could precipitate Mwinyi's resignation by
frustrating his policies and engineering his replace-
ment by a more pliable figure, such as Prime Minister
Warioba. Nyerere could also be induced to seek to
reclaim the presidency, however, if he perceives the
government is unable to deal with severe instability or
is abandoning ujamaa in such a way as to humiliate
him. His resumption of power (most likely implying a
whole-hearted return to rigidly ideological economic
policies without any promise of reform) would proba-
bly unduly test his popularity and legacy of past
accomplishments, and could well prove provocative to
elements within the military, which expect economic
reform.
Potential Challenges for the Regime
Military Discontent and Other Troubles
21. Tanzania has no history of serious civil disorder.
In the decades since independence Nyerere has been
able to foster a sense of national unity that largely
overrides ethnic and tribal differences, and the habit-
ual poverty in which most Tanzanians live has kept
popular expectations extremely low. The military, in
the British tradition, has been schooled as a profession-
al, apolitical force. A preempted coup plot against
Nyerere in 1983 that involved military elements, and
an Army mutiny over low pay in 1964 are largely'
anomalous events in the generally quiescent pattern of
Tanzanian life. The widely held perception that the
Nyerere era is beginning to come to an end is a major
new variable, however, that raises the possibility of
challenges to the new regime, especially in light of
rising dissatisfaction with the mishandling of the econ-
omy and falling hopes that Mwinyi might reverse the
country's decline.
22. Tanzania's military has become a less predict-
able institution as the country's declining fortunes
have eroded its capabilities. We believe keener mili-
tary attention to political developments and growing
dissatisfaction in the lower ranks of the armed forces
a significant problem for the new
23. While protected in the past from privations
suffered elsewhere in Tanzanian society, the military
is now feeling the effects of the crisis more directly.
Operational readiness, training, and weapons systems
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have been significantly degraded as the government's
ability to shield the armed forces from economic
hardships has weakened. Living conditions for junior
officers and enlisted men have slipped to subsistence
levels. Senior officers, while better off in part because
of personal profiteering and corruption, are concerned
about restiveness in the ranks.
24. Reports of coup plotting over the past few years
have been infrequent and sketchy, and we have no
evidence of organized dissident activity at this time.
Nevertheless, the level of discontent in the lower ranks
and the degree of concern over the economic crisis
among senior officers indicate a growing possibility
that disaffected elements might take action against the
government during the period of this memorandum.
We believe a coup is unlikely. However, the following
groups are the most likely to be motivated to challenge
the regime:
- Lower ranking officers and enlisted men, lacking
clear ideological goals, might mutiny over their
economic plight. Delays in receiving food or
other basic items could trigger a spontaneous
uprising in the barracks. Such an event would
probably be an isolated event and unlikely to
bring down the government.
- Officers who are alarmed by what they view as
Nyerere's adverse influence, and Mwinyi's inac-
tivity in the face of economic crisis, could at-
tempt to install a government that would take
immediate reform measures.
- Officers from Nyerere's Musoma district-pri-
mary recipients of preferential treatment-fear a
dwindling of their perquisites and exposure of
their rampant corruption under Mwinyi. These
officers are especially concerned because of the
possible retirement of their patron, Army Com-
mander General Musuguri, who condoned their
corrupt practices and protected them from pros-
from the economic dislocations that have plagued
other parts of the country. However, crippling food
and fuel shortages, a cholera epidemic, floods, and an
erosion of city services have substantially degraded
living conditions. We expect that the government will
give priority attention to the situation in Dar es Salaam
and thus avert trouble there; a good harvest will
alleviate prolonged food shortages such as those that
occurred in late 1985 and early 1986. Tanzania's
inability to maintain a steady oil flow to urban areas,
however, despite sharply declining oil prices could
unsettle the situation. Barter arrangments in 1986
(coffee for oil) left Tanzania paying more than double
the spot market prices, and Dar es Salaam recently
defaulted on an oil agreement with Kuwait.
27. Resentment toward Dar es Salaam among Zan-
ziharis is a more intractable problem. Separatist senti-
ment has festered in the islands of Zanzibar and
Pemba since the inception of the Union with the
mainland in 1964 and erupted seriously in 1983,
requiring the use of mainland troops to quell unrest.
Many islanders object to the loss of autonomous con-
trol in key areas such as finances and security, resent
perceived favoritism toward mainlanders in the bu-
reaucracy, and chafe under the dominance of a sole
political party. Although the symbolism of Mwinyi's
assumption of the presidency has helped smooth over
mainland-island friction, we believe Mwinyi's diplo-
matic skills will be seriously tested as he tries to
manage Zanzibari demands without appearing to
neglect or hurt mainland interests. (See figure 5.) E:
28. We believe it is possible, although highly un-
likely over the next two years, that civil disorders will
grow to such proportion as to precipitate military
intervention, leading to military control of the govern-
ment for an indeterminate length of time. Acute
unrest within junior military ranks will probably be
less predictable, however, and could lead to a volatile
situation if combined with civil disorders, a protracted
cabinet crisis, or strains in the Zanzibar-mainland
ecution.
25. We believe that most senior officers are reluc-
tant to assume the burden of governing Tanzania. This
hesitancy coupled with their general professionalism
and regard for the legitimacy of the current govern-
ment will inhibit most officers from considering a
military takeover.
26. Antigovernment sentiment in the broader popu-
lation would be most threatening if it developed either
in Zanzibar or the mainland capital, Dar es Salaam.
Dar es Salaam has the highest concentration of a
politicized middle class in the country. Until recently,
the government had been able to safeguard the city
union.
The External Dimension
A Fading Regional Role
29. Tanzania's standing in the region and the inter-
national community will be markedly diminished as a
result of Nyerere's reduced leadership role and con-
tinuing economic troubles. His deeply entrenched
legacy and his continuing guidance of the country's
political party will be sufficient to sustain Tanzania's
leftist, global orientation, but its inflated importance
on the African stage, which was due largely to
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Figure 5
Zanzibar and Pemba
Somali;
Indian
Ocean
1964 Zanzibar merges with mainland Tanganyika
to form United Republic of Tanzania.
Economies remain separate; Zanzibar
maintains autonomous state government.
1977 Zanzibar and mainland political parties
unite to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi,
Tanzania's sole political party.
1983 Mainland elements of the military are
rotated to duty on Zanzibar in an
effort to quell rising separatist sentiment.
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Nyerere's charisma, aggressiveness, and reputation,
has already begun to subside. Nonetheless, Tanzania as
a member of the Frontline States organization and an
active supporter of southern African liberation move-
ments, will retain some clout on regional issues.
30. Mwinyi's government is likely to be preoccu-
pied by domestic concerns and will try to pursue a
more flexible foreign policy more tailored than
Nyerere's to meet Tanzania's internal needs. Although
Dar es Salaam will remain a vocal critic of South
Africa, the international economic system, and US
policy in Africa, its posture will have less impact and
its activist role in the region will be diminished.C
31. Nyerere, at different times chairman of the
OAU and the Frontline States, enabled Tanzania to
play a larger role than the country's economic status or
strategic position otherwise would have allowed. In
addition, a combination of external and internal fac-
tors will further reduce Tanzania's voice in African
politics:
- Confusion over who speaks for Tanzania will
persist until Nyerere retires as party chairman. In
addition to bringing the party (and himself) into
policymaking regarding national liberation
groups, the former President reportedly has also
taken the lead in formulating official responses to
international events, and his actions have hin-
dered Mwinyi's efforts to establish a firm footing
among his African peers. Defense Minister
Salim's stature, which rivals Mwinyi's, further
complicates the leadership picture.
- Nyerere's departure from regional organizations
has allowed Zambian President Kaunda, the new
Frontline States Chairman, Zimbabwean Prime
Minister and Nonaligned Movement Chairman
Mugabe, and Kenyan President Moi to take over
Nyerere's role as preeminent regional statesman.
- Dar es Salaam will find it more difficult to back
up strident rhetoric with military force as it did
in Uganda (1978-81) and in Seychelles (1982-84).
Low morale, drastic budget cuts, lack of training
and fuel, and inoperable equipment have re-
duced the military's ability to deploy and main-
tain forces outside Tanzanian borders. Dar es
Salaam will be hard pressed to increase its train-
ing commitments to Mozambique and is unlikely
to make good-unless someone else helps pay for
it-on its pledges of military support to Angola
and Uganda.
Mobutu and Moi whose personal animosity and ideo-
logical differences with Nyerere strained relations. We
believe Mwinyi will stress greater regional trade and
military cooperation and will avoid the confrontation-
al posturing of the past. Mwinyi has already begun
cooperating more closely with Kenya; he made a
successful state visit in mid-1986 that involved restora-
tion of economic links.
33. Mwinyi, however, does not have full control of
certain foreign policy issues that still hold Nyerere's
attention. Interference by Nyerere and his clique will
cause Tanzanian regional policies to be inconsistent-
torn between Mwinyi's conciliatory gestures and
Nyerere's interventionist stances. Tanzania's contra-
dictory actions toward Zaire-Nyerere is championing
increased support for Zairian rebel groups but Mwinyi
is hoping to improve relations with Kinshasa-is the
best illustration of this problem.
34. We do not expect Tanzania to soften its vocifer-
ous and emotional opposition to South Africa. Assis-
tance and safehaven to South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO), ANC, and Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC) liberation fighters will continue at
current or increasing levels, especially if ANC head-
quarters are shifted to Dar es Salaam, despite increas-
ing acknowledgment of Tanzania's vulnerability to a
South African attack. In addition, Dar es Salaam will
continue to permit Eastern Bloc arms for South Afri-
can liberation groups to transit its territory.
35. Frontline States still using South African-con-
trolled shipping routes may look to Tanzania as an
alternate transport route in the event of South African
regional countermeasures. Tanzania, whose present
transportation systems are rudimentary and in disre-
pair, will over the period of the memorandum be
unable to expedite additional goods through the coun-
try despite the likely injection of funds from Western
donors to offset South African countersanctions. Gov-
ernment redtape will discourage private ventures to
improve conditions and the unwieldy bureaucracy is
unlikely to be able to cope with the increased demands
on its resources. Operations will be primarily hindered
by the poor condition and sporadic operation of the
Tazara railway, an important link of the Northern
Corridor route. Further impediments include the dete-
riorated and congested state of port facilities at Dar es
Salaam, the country's inability to maintain basic ser-
vices such as electricity, and the lack of handling and
shipping companies to service the influx of additional
32. Mwinyi has begun to take a more conciliatory
approach toward his neighbors, especially Presidents
goods.
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Important Relationships: The Soviets and the
Chinese
36. In the 1960s, close Tanzanian-Soviet relations
developed because of the similarity of their views on
Third World and African issues. In later years rela-
tions were solidified by Moscow's efforts to counter
China's significant role in the country and Moscow's
willingness to facilitate the Tanzanian Army's expan-
sion by providing arms on concessional terms.
Tanzania's radical international posture has continued
since then and has sharpened Dar es Salaam's ideologi-
cal opposition to the so-called imperialism of devel-
oped nations.
37. Mwinyi has inherited problems with Moscow,
however, over military supply and training agree-
ments that form the cornerstone of bilateral relations.
Tanzanians have been increasingly frustrated with the
poor quality and cost of Soviet military equipment
and training, the token amounts of economic assistance
they have received, and with Soviet meddling in
domestic issues. Moscow attempted, for example, to
influence presidential elections by providing financial
backing for an improbable leftist candidate, and un-
successfully used the KGB's official links to the Tanza-
nian intelligence service to direct the outcome of the
succession. As a result Dar es Salaam broke the
intelligence relationship, reduced the number of Sovi-
et military advisers, and took steps to limit Soviet
actions in Tanzania to their training and maintenance
responsibilities.
38. Moscow's unresponsiveness to Tanzanian com-
plaints, in our judgment, reflects Soviet recognition of
Tanzania's declining stature and a probable decision
that Moscow's interest there can be sustained with a
static or reduced investment. The Soviets will want to
preserve Tanzania as a venue for Soviet support to
African liberation groups and as a source of backing on
international issues, but will probably continue a low-
cost approach to relations. Recent Soviet actions have
involved lobbying Dar es Salaam for support on issues
concerning the Five Nations Peace Initiative, and
cultivating senior Tanzanian defense officials so as not
to let the military supply relationship lapse.
39. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies,
including Cuba, will continue to attempt to spread
influence and carry out active measures in Tanzania-
usually directed against the United States-during the
time period of this memorandum but their capabilities
have declined somewhat from their stronger position
during the 1970s. We believe subversive Bloc activity
Soviet ability to carry out active measures-such as a
whisper campaign against US personnel, insertion of
pro-Soviet and anti-US articles in local press, and
credence for disinformation circulated at high levels of
the Tanzanian Government-is still strong but it has
declined since the 1960s and 1970s when Soviet actions
were able to seriously damage US-Tanzanian relations.
These Soviet active measures have the help of the
Cuban and East German services, which maintain a
liaison with the Tanzanian intelligence service. These
activities apparently have not been greatly disrupted by
the severing of the Tanzanian-KGB intelligence liaison
in 1985, and there is no evidence to suggest the
The CCM party is the primary channel of Soviet
influence and greatest source of Soviet support in
Tanzania. The USSR and its allies, especially Bulgaria,
will continue to cultivate CCM party members, espe-
cially through the youth and labor union organization,
and sponsor many delegations, conferences, seminars,
and film festivals each year. Party stalwart and youth
leader Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, known as the "Red
Ideologue" for his excessively leftist and pro-Soviet
views, will remain the focal point for the Soviet influ-
ence within the party, but we believe most Tanzanian
leaders, including Nyerere and Mwinyi, will continue to
be suspicious of Soviet motives.
Tanzanian students with Romania, Yugoslavia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Cuba providing 10-20 apiece.
Approximately 600 students are presently studying in
the USSR, and the total number of Bloc-educated
students is over 3,000. Eastern Bloc degrees are not held
in high esteem, and students-who must often take
qualifying exams upon their return to Tanzania-prefer
Western education. Dar es Salaam will continue to
accept Soviet scholarships, however, because they are
low cost and provide much-needed technical training.
At present, no graduate of Soviet or Bloc institutions
holds a significant position in the government or party;
senior officials are older than the average graduate, and
we expect it will be some time before these graduates
move into positions of authority.
will probably remain at present levels, as the Mwinyi
government maintains Tanzania's traditionally sympa-
thetic world views but the declining political fortunes
of Tanzanian leftists close potential new subversive
channels.
40. The Soviets are unlikely to offer anything that
might lead Dar es Salaam to draw closer to them, such
as sharply increased economic aid or substantial mili-
tary debt relief. A continued Soviet Bloc presence
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Secret
FILE COPY
CLOT GIVE OUT
oil MAR Oil
Erratum Notice to recipients of Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: Tanzania: Pros-
pects for Change, NI IIM 86-10012, Secre October 1986.
25X15X1
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Figure 6
Donor Flows: Declining Aid Levels'
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`' ( SECRET
Table 2 1984 (million US $)
Major Donors
Total
Commitments
49.9
46.4
40.8
31.6
appears certain, however, in view of Tanzania's need
for military advisers, spare parts, and Eastern Bloc
assistance in other service areas.
41. China's once-prominent role in Tanzania has
withered since the 1970s but we believe Mwinyi, who
traveled to China last year, is interested in revitalizing
ties. The Tazara Railroad, which opened in 1976, was
the centerpiece of a Chinese aid program that once
included extensive agricultural, health, and military
assistance in the 1960s and 1970s. Relations faltered,
however, as a result of Nyerere's objections to China's
support of rebel factions in Angola's independence
struggle and of Zairian President Mobutu during the
Shaba crisis of June 1978. Relations appear to be on
the upswing due to Mwinyi's efforts; he visited China
before his inauguration, and praised new economic
initiatives. Tanzania probably hopes-unreasonably in
our view-that Chinese military aid, while enhancing
military readiness, will also eventually pave the way
for reduced dependence on Moscow.
Relations With the West: The Search for Aid
42. Mwinyi faces the daunting challenge of trying
to recapture the high levels of aid-primarily from
Western donors-that propped up the Tanzanian
economy during the early years of the Nyerere era.
Since the 1970s, Tanzania's foreign policy has been
preoccupied with obtaining greater amounts of assist-
ance, new aid donors, and easy credit terms for oil. As
its own agricultural production has declined, food
imports have also become necessary. The general
reduction in Western aid, which began under Nyerere,
and the recent denial of funds by several multilateral
organizations are likely to force the Mwinyi govern-
ment to redouble its efforts. Renewed overtures to new
minimal amounts of aid.
or former donors (especially India, which recently
agreed to provide military goods, and China, whose
new economic initiatives impressed Mwinyi) are likely
to produce beneficial trade agreements, but only
43. Western donors, who have traditionally buoyed
the Tanzanian economy with soft-term loans, outright
donations, debt forgiveness, and development projects,
have now linked aid levels to Tanzania's obtaining an
IMF agreement or, at the least, implementing IMF-
sanctioned reforms. The Scandinavian countries re-
main Tanzania's most generous patrons but have
joined Great Britain, West Germany, the EEC, and
the World Bank in reducing their commitments while
urging an accord with the IMF. This pressure-which
had little effect until recently despite the fact that aid
from other sources, including the Eastern Bloc, China,
India, and the Middle East is negligible-stems from
donors' lost confidence in the Tanzanian bureaucracy's
ability to administer effectively further aid and the
donors' view that Tanzania's lack of cooperation and
infrastructure handicaps development projects. At pre-
sent, most aid donors are waiting to see if the new
government can win the political battle to institute
major reforms, and, if so, if the Tanzanian system can
successfully implement them.
44. Tanzania recently negotiated a US $75 million,
three-year standby accord with the IMF and in June
Figure 6
Donor Flows: Declining Aid Levelsa
Million US $
10
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SECktET '
received a pledge of US $130 million from the World
Bank, with the prospect of another US $100 million.
Major Western creditors rescheduled Tanzania's offi-
cial debts to them in September. These developments,
which will probably be leveraged to obtain additional
funds, may provide a short-term boost to the economy,
but Tanzania's ability to meet accom an ' commit-
ments remains questionable.
Implications for the United States
45. Tanzania's policy relevance for the United
States is likely to remain modest during the time
period of this memorandum. Tanzania's behavior as a
diplomatic irritant will be softened, because Nyerere is
now exempted from leadership positions in multina-
tional organizations where he expressed often vitriolic
anti-US sentiment and was able to strengthen anti-US
stances. Unexpected instability in Tanzania could be
of concern to the United States, however, if it threat-
ened to spill over to neighboring countries sharing US
interests (such as Zaire and Kenya) or, equally unlike-
ly, if a radical leftist government gained power, giving
the Soviets an enhanced opportunity to meddle in
Tanzania and the region.
46. Bilateral relations between the United States
and Tanzania have the potential to improve slightly
during the course of this memorandum, because of
debt rescheduling and a possible slight increase in US
aid. Tanzania's ingrained leftist orientation and di-
verging views on global issues, especially South Africa,
work against any significant change in posture toward
the United States, even though some of the emerging
leaders might be amenable toward an improvement in
ties and a resumption of assistance. The United States
is unlikely to benefit in any tangible way from a static
or even reduced Soviet influence in Dar es Salaam.
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ANNEX B
The Tanzanian People's Defense Force
The 40,000-man Tanzanian People's Defense Force
(TPDF) includes an Army, Navy, and Air Force. As
President, Mwinyi is Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. He exercises this authority through
Defense Minister Salim Ahmed Salim, who concur-
rently heads the party Commission on Defense and
Security, and TPDF Commander Gen. David Musu-
History
The TPDF had its origins in the British Colonial
Army and the King's African Rifles. In the years after
independence in 1961 it continued to perform internal
security and ceremonial duties. In January 1964,
however, a large number of soldiers mutinied over low
pay and lack of promotional opportunities. Forced
into temporary hiding, Nyerere reluctantly called on
British marines to quell the rebellion and was after-
ward convinced of the need for a politically reliable
force.
At about the same time, Nyerere sought new sources
of military assistance, looking primarily to Canada and
the United Kingdom. During the 1970s, however,
Chinese and Soviet willingness to sell arms on con-
cessional terms facilitated a major expansion of the
TPDF. By 1978, on the eve of Tanzania's war with
Uganda, the Army was a 20,000-man force and quick-
ly expanded to over 50,000.
Tanzania's military has been a regionally active
force. Tanzania supported African liberation move-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s with the provision of
military training. As early as 1977, TPDF units were
deployed to Mozambique to provide rear area support
to Mozambican forces in their counterinsurgency ef-
forts and to help block raids from Rhodesia. In 1978-
79, the Army-supported by Ugandan expatriates-
invaded Uganda and routed Ugandan Government
and Libyan forces, ultimately leading to the end of Idi
Amin's reign. The TPDF also had a limited (and not
exceptionally sterling) occupation and peacekeeping
role that ended in 1982. Additionally, a TPDF contin-
gent of up to 200 men helped maintain general
security and provided infantry training in Seychelles
(1982-84). The TPDF is seeking to maintain this
regional role-despite severe economic dislocations
and resulting erosion of capabilities-by providing
training to African National Congress fighters, Mo-
zambique, and Uganda.
In consonance with its status as a regional actor, the
TPDF is capable of repelling an invasion by modern
African forces of comparable size and of conducting
limited cross-border operations. It would not be able to
supply and maintain a large task force beyond its
borders as it did in Uganda, however, because of
current economic constraints.
TPDF Goals and Objectives
TPDF energies will be expended on two priorities
over the next two years: augmenting border defense
and rehabilitating equipment. Unit deployments to the
west reflect Tanzania's increasing fear of possible "hot
pursuit" incursions by Zaire after dissidents operating
from base camps in the area. Reorganization of TPDF
southern units and a continuing effort to improve
early warning radar capabilities in the south indicate
Tanzania's acknowledgment of its vulnerability to
South African raids.
Probably less than 50 percent of military equipment
is in working order and the effectiveness and morale
of all units is correspondingly low. Lack of spare parts,
poor or no maintenance, and untrained users are the
major causes of the declining percentage of operable
equipment.
Soviet Military Assistance
Tanzania must import almost all of its military
material, and the Soviet Union is the primary supplier
of military equipment and training to the TPDF.
Total Soviet assistance is valued at over $400 million
since 1975. Deliveries have included jet fighters, ar-
mored vehicles, rocket launchers, early-warning radar,
surface-to-air missiles (SAM), artillery, and trucks.
Attempts to diversify sources of military assistance
through approaches to India and China have resulted
in only modest returns.
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ANNEX C
Who's Who in the Economy
Various influential figures in Tanzania, including President Mwinyi, favor progres-
sive economic reform and an IMF agreement, but Nyerere's powerful network of
loyal followers continues to resist any departure from rigidly ideological socialist
policies. Many senior government officials, however, have sought to remain out of the
developing political fray or are waiting for the power struggle to be resolved before
taking a position. Although the situation remains fluid, we believe the following is an
accurate breakdown of present political alignments:
Faithful to Socialist Prescriptions
In Favor of Reform and an IMF Agreement
Party Chairman Julius Nyerere
Tanzanian Union President Ali Hassan Mwinyi 2, 3
Prime Minister and First Union Vice President
Warioba 2, 3
Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Salim
Ahmed Salim 2, 3
Party Secretary General Rashidi Kawawa 2, 3
Minister of Local Governments and Cooperatives
Minister of Finance Cleopa Msuya 2, 3
Minister of Agriculture Paul Bomani 2,
3
Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru 2, 3
Mi
i
t
f St
f
t
bi
C
Aff
i
d I
Minister of Communications and Works Mustafa
n
er o
s
a
e
or
a
net
a
rs an
nterna-
tional Cooperation Kighoma Malima 3
Nyang'anyi 2, 3
Minister of Labor and Manpower Daudi
Mwakawago 2, 3
Commander of Defense Forces David Musuguri
Principal Secretary in the President's Office
Timothy Apiyo (retired but politically active)
Presidential Private Secretary for Security Affairs
Joseph Butiku (currently suspended from office)
Bank of Tanzania Governor Charles Nyirabu (s NF)
Minister of Water, Energy, and Minerals Al-Noor
Kassum 3
President of Zanzibar and Second Union Vice Presi-
dent Idris Wakil 3
Principal Secretary in the, Ministry of Finance
Gilbert Rutihinda
Zanzibar Chief Minister Seif Sharif Hamad 3
2 Cabinet member.
9 Member of the CCM National Executive Committee.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/08: CIA-RDP90R00038R000400420003-3