DDCI STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON INF MONITORING RESOURCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R000700350042-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: February 17, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Paul H. Nitze
-urrent
Policy
No. 1034
Following is an address by Paul H.
Nitze, Special Adviser to the President
and the Secretary of State on Arms
Control Matters, before the National
Press Club, Washington, D.C., De-
cember 15, 1987.
Before getting into the future, let me
say a few words about the past.
When I was appointed to head the
U.S. delegation to the INF (intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces] negotiations
at their outset in 1981, I made two
immediate decisions.
First, we would prepare a draft of
the "zero option" treaty we wanted be-
fore the negotiations began.
Second, we would keep an issues
book in which we would enter, day-by-
day, what had been said by either side
on each issue that arose in the talks.
At the end of the first year, there
were 35 issues in our book. Of those 35,
five issues were clearly the most impor-
tant, so we focused on those five. Over
the succeeding years, especially at
Reykjavik, we finally removed the five
Beyond the Summit:
Next Steps in Arms Control
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.
list, and he said there were 35, of
which five were the most important.
I concluded that it is inherent in
the human mind, when confronted with
a very complex situation, to simplify it
to 35 considerations, and then to 5.
Next Steps
During last week's meetings, President
Reagan and General Secretary Gor-
bachev accomplished a lot. They signed
the INF Treaty we had been seeking
for 6 years. They issued a joint state-
ment which.significantly advanced us
toward a stabilizing START [strategic
arms reduction talks) treaty. And they
agreed on language on defense and
space which narrows the issue and
promises to make them more
manageable.
Where do we go from here? There
are many tasks that come to mind; by
rough estimate, about 35. But allow me
to concentrate on the most important
five. These are--
.Ratifying the INF Treaty;
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START
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issues. But having removed those boul- /
ders blocking an agreement, we still treaty;
? Dealing with defense and space
faced a lot of rocks
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Karpov and I were to try to resolve the
remaining issues the next day. I asked Ratifying the INF Treaty
Clearly, our most immediate and im-
portant task is to get the advice and
consent of the Senate in favor of
ratification of the INF Treaty. All of
our other efforts depend on this
outcome.
Why should the Senate so advise
the President? Because this treaty
enhances ,.he security of the United -
States d it ,and it-eent s the
ibTr- measures necessary mon
viet compliance with confidence
and to detect any militarily significant
noncompliance in time for us to respond
appropriately.
To determine how the treaty en-
hances our security interests, one must
recall how the INF issue and the ensu-
ing negotiations arose in the first place.
In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union
began deployment of SS-20 intermedi-
ate-range missiles, greatly enhancing
the nuclear threat to both our Euro-
pean and Asian friends and allies. This
raised concern, particularly among Eu-
ropeans, of a significant imbalance in
the spectrum of nuclear capabilities di-
rectly affecting not only NATO Europe
but also other countries on the periph-
ery of the U.S.S.R.
In its 1979 dual-track decision, the
alliance determined to redress this im-
balance. It decided:
First, to deploy comparable mis-
siles of its own; and
Second, to seek to minimize,
through negotiations, the number of
such missiles either side would deploy.
In 1981, President Reagan proposed
NATO's preferred outcome: the com-
plete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet
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missiles of this class, or the "zero op-
tion." In meeting after meeting since,
the NATO allies, and our Asian allies
as well, reiterated their preference for
this global zero outcome.
This, of course, is what we have
now achieved. With the elimination of
the SS-20s and all other Soviet missiles
of this class, the Soviet Union will no
longer possess INF missiles capable of
threatening targets in Europe from So-
viet soil. This perceived weakness in
the structure of deterrence has been
removed.
In sum, a security threat was iden-
tified, a strategy to address the threat
was conceived and implemented, and an
outcome was achieved that removed
that threat. This is a NATO success
story, enhanced by the fact that the
reductions are decidedly asymmetric in
NATO's favor, leading to an equal end
point. This sets a good precedent for
future arms reduction efforts.
It appears that much of the
ratification debate will center on ver-
ification. In conducting this debate, it
is important to understand the purpose
of verification. We negotiate arms con-
trol treaties to limit the military ca-
pabilities of our adversary. The purpose
of verification is to ensure that the
treaties serve their intended purpose.
That is, we want to be sure that the
other side has not moved beyond the
intended limits in any militarily signifi-
cant way, and, if they do, we want to
be able to detect such violations in time
to respond as necessary.
Of course, our ability to detect and
respond to violations serves to deter
the other side from committing them in
the first place. The type of verification
regime I have described is what the
President has in mind when he calls for
effective verification. And we have it in
the INF Treaty.
You have undoubtedly heard much
about the INF verification regime. Sim-
ply put, we are entitled to onsite in-
spection to count Soviet INF missile
systems and structures, to watch them
being destroyed, to determine that no
more are left after the elimination pro-
cess is completed, and to check the for-
mer INF sites on short notice to make
sure no missiles secretly return. We
also will monitor the output of the pro-
duction facility where SS-20 missiles
were assembled in the past and could
most readily be assembled in the
Lfuture.
Does this mean that we are guar-
anteed that the Soviets cannot hide an
INF missile somewhere on their ter-
ritory? No. Only anytime, anywhere
inspections without a possibility of
refusal would provide hope of such a
guarantee. and we believe that ceding
the same right in the I N F Treaty to
Soviet inspectors on our territory is not
in our own interests.
But if the Soviets were to succeed
in secretly retaining some missiles,
they could not test them, train troops
in their operation, or maintain the bas-
ing infrastructure necessary to support
tFiem, all of which we could detect.
Without these, the Soviets could not
maintain a militarily significant ca-
ap bilit_y. Thus the regime meets the
standard of effective verification.
There is one final point I wish to
make on the subject of INF ratifica-
tion. From both sides of the Senate, we
hear talk these days about the pos-
sibility of attaching reservations to the
treaty, and one reservation often sug-
gested is to delay final implementation
of the elimination of INF missiles until
the conventional imbalance is resolved.
Alternatively, some suggest holding up
a START agreement for this purpose.
I believe that either course of ac-
tion would be most unwise. We have
signed the INF Treaty because it is in
our security interest, as I have ex-
plained. Similarly, the START agree-
ment we are seeking would be in our
security interest. If we succeed in
reaching such agreements, we should
not be barred from putting them into
effect.
The conventional imbalance is a se-
rious matter, but it is not a problem
caused or exacerbated by an INF
agreement. Indeed, one of the forgot-
ten facts about INF is that, prior to
1977, when there was no perceived need
by NATO for INF missiles, NATO
faced a conventional imbalance and a
large force of Soviet INF missiles-
SS4s and SS-5s-for which NATO had
no corresponding systems. After the
INF agreement; we will return to the
pre-1977 situation, except that even the
SS-4s and SS-5s will be gone.
The way to address the conven-
tional force problem is through uni-
lateral NATO programs and at the
negotiating table, and we are working
on both. We and our allies are currently
seeking to establish a mandate for con-
ventional stability talks between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact, and we are dis-
cussing with our allies improvements in
conventional capabilities.
But any realistic assessment of
prospects in this area would lead one to
conclude that it will be at least a year
or two before the problem is resolved.
In the meantime, why should we alloy.
the SS-20 threat to Europe and Asia to
remain, and why should we allow the
promising momentum of the START ne-
gotiations to be dissipated?
As we move forward with INF and
START, however, there should be no
doubt that we will maintain the ca-
pabilities necessary to deter Soviet ag-
gression. In Europe, this will include
maintaining, after the elimination of
INF missiles, approximately 4,000 nu-
clear warheads on a variety of delivery
systems, some of which can reach deep
into the Soviet Union.
Trying to resolve all of our security
concerns in one fell swoop is just too
difficult a task. As pieces of the prob-
lem are resolved, those solutions should
be implemented, as long as they do not
exacerbate other problems. Both INF
and the agreement we seek in START
would resolve critical security problems
without aggravating others; we should
move forward on them now.
START
Now let me turn to the START area. In
our talks last week with the Soviet
arms control experts, we emphasized
three groups of START issues: counting
rules, sublimits, and verification. Sig-
nificant headway was made on all three.
Counting rules-that is, the agreed
standards by which the sides determine
how the systems and components to be
limited will be counted against the lim-
its-tend to get passed off as part of
the technical details of arms control,
but these rules can have a profound im-
pact on an agreement's effects.
To agree on rules by which the
number of warheads carried by missiles
and bombers are to be counted is not
an easy matter; an agreement that ap-
peared to be equal could be anything
but if it undercounted the systems pos-
sessed mainly by one side and over-
counted the systems emphasized by the
other.
Last week, we made real progress
on counting warheads on ballistic mis-
siles and ALCMs [air-launched cruise
missiles] on heavy bombers. For the
former, each side has declared the
number of warheads deployed on each
type of existing missile, and the other
side will verify it through agreed pro-
cedures, including onsite inspection of
deployed missiles.
For the latter, the problem is some-
what different because, unlike with bal-
listic missiles, ALCM loads for bombers
are normally less than the theoretical
capacity and can also be changed read-
ily. The Soviets agreed to our idea of
attributing for counting purposes a cer-
tain number of ALCMs to each type of
heavy bomber, regardless of the maxi-
mum number that bomber could carry
2
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and the specific number it might be
carrying at any given time. This ap-
proach reduces verification problems
and takes into account operational
realities.
The sublimit area is one on which
we have been concentrating for some
time. We have emphasized that 50% re-
ductions are not inherently stabilizing;
it is necessary to ensure, through sub-
limits, that a side cannot retain a pre-
ponderance of the most destabilizing
systems.
Previously, the Soviets had agreed
to a sublimit on heavy ICBMs (inter-
continental ballistic missiles], the most
destabilizing systems of all, at 1,540
warheads on 154 missiles, or 50% of the
current Soviet level. Last week, they
agreed to another sublimit, this one on
ballistic missile warheads at the level of
4,900. This sublimit would force a re-
duction of slightly more than 50% in
the warheads on the fast-flying Soviet
ballistic missile force. In .982, Presi-
dent Reagan proposed 5,000 for this
number, so again, we have achieved a
longstanding U.S. objective.
In the verification area, we were
able to build on the foundation provided
by INF. The Soviets agreed that
START would include all of the types of
inspections I mentioned earlier for
INF, as well as, at least in principle,
suspect-site inspections and more ex-
4..,OF tensive monitoring of production facili-
ties. This is necesary in START
because we will be placing numerical
limits on systems rather than banning
them.
So where do we go next? Our nego-
tiators in Geneva have created a joint
bracketed treaty text, just like the one
we had for INF last summer. Wherever
the two sides disagree on an issue,
their positions are included in brackets.
The fact that we are far enough
along to have such a text is promising,
and the document helps to focus nego-
tiating efforts, but many brackets cur-
rently remain, including in the three
areas I have just discussed. We still
need to agree on the number of ALCMs
to attribute to each type of heavy
bomber and to establish procedures for
verifying the number of warheads de-
ployed on each type of existing ballistic
missile. We need to address the U. S.
proposal for a sublimit of 3,300 on
ICBM warheads. And there is much
work to be done in working out the
details of verification procedures.
Beyond these questions, there are
many more issues, such as the U.S.
desire to ban mobile ICBMs, the
number of SLCMs [submarine-launched
cruise missiles] we allow outside the
aggregate ceiling of 6,000 warheads
and how we verify that limit, and the
question of a possible linkage between
defense and space and START.
Despite all the progress we've
made in START, the list of remaining
issues is daunting, and the question
arises of whether it is possible to com-
plete a treaty during this Administra-
tion. My own belief is that it will be
very difficult but not impossible. We
will be pushing forward intensively, and
we will do our best to finish the job.
Defense and Space
Since Reykjavik, the defense and space
area has involved three primary issues:
the length of time during which the
sides would agree not to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty in order to deploy de-
fenses, what happens after the period,
and what happens during the period.
All three issues were discussed in de-
tail last week; the differences remain,
but progress was made on all three.
On the question of what happens
after the nonwithdrawal period, the So-
viets agreed that, unless the sides
agree otherwise, "each side will be free
to decide its course of action." This pre-
serves the right to deploy we seek.
On the question of what happens
during the nonwithdrawal period, we
included language stating that the sides
would observe the ABM Treaty "as
signed in 1972," as well as language
stating that the sides would "conduct
their research, development, and test-
ing as required, which are permitted by
the ABM Treaty." This should take the
sharp edges off the ABM debate, while
assisting in protecting our program to
proceed with SDI (Strategic Defense
Initiative] research, testing, and devel-
opment as a matter of national security
need.
Over the next several months, as
we push forward'in START, we intend
also to continue dealing with the three
main defense and space issues.
Non-Nuclear Arms Control
Our non-nuclear arms control efforts in-
volve primarily conventional forces and
chemical weapons (CW). As I men-
tioned earlier, we are in the midst of
mandate talks for new negotiations on
conventional stability.
These negotiations would involve
the 23 countries of NATO and the War-
saw Pact and would address conven-
tional forces in Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals. Our objective in
the conventional stability talks is a
verifiable agreement that would lead to
a stable balance of conventional forces
at lower levels. This will require far
greater reductions in tanks, artillery,
and other equipment on the Soviet side
to eliminate the capability of the War-
saw Pact for surprise attack and sus-
tained offensive operations and thus to
restore equality and stability in conven-
tional forces.
We hope the mandate talks will
lead to actual negotiations as soon as
possible, perhaps as early as next year.
In the meantime, we will continue our
current efforts with our NATO allies to
put together a sound NATO position
that we can introduce at the outset of
the negotiations.
As for chemical weapons, the
United States remains committed to
achieving a comprehensive global ban,
encompassing all nations with chemical
weapons capability. We tabled a draft
treaty calling for such a ban in 1984 in
the 40-nation Conference on Disarma-
ment in Geneva. Since then, we have
negotiated hard to bring it about.
The key is getting a treaty that is
both effective and verifiable. We are
encouraged by recent Soviet agreement
in principle to mandatory challenge in-
spection with no right of refusal and an
early bilateral exchange of data.
However, there are a number of
crucial issues remaining to be worked
out. We have agreed with the Soviets
to concentrate our bilateral talks on
maintaining security during the de-
struction of CW stocks, protecting sen-
sitive non-CW-related information
during inspections, and the need to
strengthen verification in light of new
technologies, increasing proliferation,
and a dual-capable chemical industry.
The Broader Context
Attaining progress in the various arms
control areas is only part of the com-
plex equation of the difficult U.S.-
Soviet relationship. A long-term, sus-
tained improvement in the relationship
will depend greatly on resolving differ-
ences in other crucial areas.
For 2 years now, we have worked
hard to establish with the Soviet Union
a process that addresses a full range of
issues-what we call the four-part
agenda that encompasses arms reduc-
tions, human rights, regional conflicts,
and bilateral relations. Serious differ-
ences in all of these areas have accumu-
lated over the last four decades, and
they are the source of the profound
mistrust and suspicion that characterize
East-West relations today.
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. We recently have seen greater
Soviet willingness to discuss these
matters in detail, and this has led to
progress in some areas. For example,
agreements reached over the last 2
years have greatly increased the oppor-
tunities for contact between U.S. and
Soviet citizens. President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev have
agreed that the effort to foster greater
cooperation and contact on the basis of
genuine mutual benefit should continue.
In two other areas-human rights
and regional affairs-there remains a
long way to go. We have recognized and
welcomed recent Soviet human rights
steps but have pointed out that human
rights will. remain a source of tension in
East-West relations until the Soviet
Union fully observes its international
human rights obligations. Similarly, we
have made clear that Soviet involve-
ment in regional conflicts-whether di-
rectly, as in Afghanistan,. or through
Bureau of Pudic Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
If address is incorrect
please indicate change.
Do not cover or destroy
this address label. Mail
change of address to
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support for such regimes as Vietnam or
Nicaragua-inevitably will affect West-
ern perceptions of the Soviet Union's
ultimate intentions.
The United States is ready to ad-
dress all the problems candidly and
constructively. In the end, however, the
Soviet Union must demonstrate that it
is willing to deal with its own people
and its neighbors through dialogue, not
intimidation. The burden both sides
will bear for the foreseeable future is to
manage our competition peacefully and
to build a more stable and constructive
relationship.
Conclusion
Thus, we have a very full agenda in the
days ahead. We have no intention of
resting on our laurels; to the contrary,
DOUGLAS GEORGE
1939 VIRGINIA AVE
MCLEAN
we want our success in INF to be the
springboard for progress in other
areas.
If we are to find further success, it
will be because we will succeed in rep-
licating the elements that led to the
INF Treaty: strength, domestic co-
herence, and unity with our allies. With
these assets, and with -patience, we can
take further steps down the road to-
ward a safer and stabler world, with
lower levels of offenses and increased
reliance on effective defenses, should
they prove feasible, and with a less-
ened risk of war. That is our ultimate
goal. ^
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? January 1988
Editor: Cynthia Saboe ? This material is in
the public domain and may be reproduced
without permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
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THURSDAY, 4 FEBRUARY 1988
NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE
Heated Debate Over the INF Treaty
Throwing the Pentagon Into Disarray
BY PETER SAMUEL -
Mne Ya * Q& Tnbw Cw+e100+dwr
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 - Debate over
the Intermediate Nuclear Farces (INF)
treaty has split the top echelons of the
Pentagon and thrown it into disarray.
Last Thursday three top Pentagon
officials met to try and resolve the
intelligence disputes over the DW
treaty, which one contingency argues
concedes the Soviets the right to
maintain a substantial covet missile
force
Meeting in the sears "tank" at the
Pentagon were Defense Secretary Frank
Carlucci, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Admiral William Crowe and the direc-
the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Leonard Paroots. Carlucci and
requested that Peroots reduce
his estimate of the an of the Soviet SS
20 farce, sources say.
The Soviets have dedared they have
650 of these missiles and Secretary of
State George Shultz is an record as
saying he accepts the Soviet number.
Under the terms of the treaty, the
Soviets must destroy their declared
number of 1NF missiles, which will be
included in a data base supplied 30
days after the treaty is fully ratified and
corns into effect.
Trouble for the administration, which
is desperate to get the treaty ratified.
comes in the form of the "majority
agreed oxwe sus National Intelligence
Estimate for 1988," which states that
there are 950 SS-30s in existence. This
means that the Soviets will maintain
the right to save at least 300 of the
3 FEBRUARY 1988
impressive 3-warhead missiles.
The 950 number is contained in the
draft document of the major annual US.
government intelligence assessment,
which has the notation 11-4/88.
The "majority agreed consensus" for
the NIE is the product of long dis-
cussions and compromises among a
number of the top intelligence analysts
in the various agencies that compro-
mise the US. intelligence community.
Arriving at agreed numbers on conten-
tious issues may involve the estimates
of upwards of several hundred of
analysts. The majority agreed estimate
is one acceptable to more than one half
of the analysts to the working group on
that issue.
The intelligence and research div-
ision of the Department of State and the
CIA both estimated last year that there
were between 550 to 600 SS-20 missiles
and they were considerably embar-
rassed when the Soviets derived 650.
State aid CIA have since upped their
SS-20 estimate to 700, indicating a
belief that the Soviets are substantially
honest in their declared number.
The Defense Intelligence Agency
currently estimates that there are be-
tween 1,000 and 1?00 SS-3D missiles
The Pentagon has always reported. that
the Soviets have at asst one refire
missile per launcher, making 800 to 900
deployed in the field, with 200 to 300 in
store
Other DIA estimates have involved
numbers as high as ?250 based an two
separate indications that there is a 5-1
ratio of missiles to launcjem
In the contentious meeting in the
Pentagon tank last Friday, Penmoots
was apparently under pressure to re-
duce his agency's estimate of SS-20
numbers According to one usually
reliable official source, the general was
ordered" to reduce his number and
was told that if he stuck with his
number he could be blamed for severely
embarrassing the administration and
might jeopardize the ratification of the
treaty.
At the least it is clear Penroots was
under pressure to issue an SS-20
estimate more in line with the Soviet
declared numbers.
If the administration can crack the
high number estimates, it can come out
with an "majority agreed" National
Intelligence Estimate of SS-20 numbers
close enough to the Soviet numbers to
undercut those who say the Soviets
have violated the treaty even befort it
has been ratified and who use this as
evidence that the Soviets intend to
maintain a substantial covert missile
fort
Pe roots, the source said, refused to
budge, saying that there was no new
intelligence that cast doubt on the 1,000
to 1,2D0 estimate and his job was to
produce the best intelligence estimate.
The meeting was inconclusive.
Unless a further effort to twist
Peroots' arm succeeds, senators may
have to face up to the likelyhood they
are being asked to sign a treaty that
removes a whole class of American
missiles and leaves the Soviets with a
substantial force in place.
Another major problem is that the
administration has so rushed into the
INF treaty that it has conducted no
systematic staff studies of its associated
verification problems - despite Presi-
Pg. 6
dent Reagan's frequent heavy emphasis
on how unprecedented are the measures
for verification.
The Arms Control and Disarmament
Act of 1961 as amended at the initiative
of then-Congressman Ed Derwinski in
1977, section 37 says that the Director
otter Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency shall report to Congress the
degree to which each element of any
significant arms control proposal can be
verified
The report must assume that
measures of concealment will be em-
ployed that the US. surveillance and
inspection will have to overcome.
The Republican leader of the Senate
Foreign Relations committee, Jesse
Helms, has written chairman Claiborne
Pell, drawing his attention to this so.
called Derwinski Amendment Helms
raised the lade of a legally required
verification report on the INF to the
directordesignate of ACDA, Gen.
William Burns during his confirmation
hearings fast week. Burns agreed one
was needed and said it was underway
and would be expedited.
Helms in a letter to Pell today
suggested that the completion of INF
Treaty hearings and markup be de-
feted until an adequate verification
report is received from ACDA.
Most major internal assessments
done to date have concluded that with
present and planned satellites and other
sensors, the United States has a very
small capability for discovering mobile
missiles the Soviet Union wishes to
conceal.
Conservative senators may use the
inadequacy of verification - in the face
of evidence of a substantial covert
missile force - as a flag around which
resistance to the treaty can be rallied.
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 -ne 1vasr-ingior
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The Washington Times
The Wan Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor ?3
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
INF Treaty specfts *tW
can and can't be kegt
Od W is
be iNbO"d
SOVIET UNION
U4 (170 wi - ____
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erector, Isurch sesrd, piopsM~R tantc
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Week
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U TED STATES
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Maw.
,3 Fica 49 48
ITreaty critics aim
beyond r '
anfication
s I nnQP rl7 ati r nh, s-;,,.s . ~.. ?1,. .. TACT - -
could frame the debate over cuts in
long-range nuclear missiles.
By Peter Grier
,'ar f, ,e, _ -,e s, an ice^ce uor lo,
Washington
Critics have come out swinging
in the opening rounds of Senate
hearings on the L'S-Soviet treaty
banning medium-range missiles.
The Reagan administration and
Senate arms control proponents
have clearly been put on the de-
fensive by the arguments of Sen.
Jesse Helms l R l of North Carolina
and other conservative opponents
of the pact.
Senator Helms's complaint that
the treaty would not literally de-
stroy warheads received so much
attention that Secretary of De-
fense Frank Carlucci, on Monday,
felt compelled to bring missile
models before the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to demonstrate
what would and wouldn't be
scrapped. .
The intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) treaty itself still
seems headed for relatively easy
Senate ratification. Critics appear
to be using the IN T hearings as a
soapbox from which to influence
crucial national defense decisions
that will be made after treaty
ratification.
In particular. they seem to be
aiming ? at the current strategic
arms reduction talks (START) in
Geneva on 50 percent cuts in long-
range nuclear arsenals. "The right
wing ought to be trying to kill
START through INF." says a con-
gressional aide who follows arms
control.
Conservatives deny they are
trying to stop strategic talks out-
right. Among positions that INF
pact critics have taken:
? There should be no reductions
in strategic weapons without
agreement to reduce conventional
arms in Europe. In making this
point Monday. retired Gen. Ber-
nard Rogers. former military chief
of NATO, complained that the
United States "should have at
least tried" to link conventional
reductions with the INF treaty.
? A strategic weapons treaty
should have even stricter verifica-
tion provisions than the INF pact.
Defense Secretary Carlucci has
agreed with this point, saying that
any START treaty would have to
include a provision allowing US
inspectors to visit any suspect So-
viet missile site they want to.
? The US ought to be prepared
to withdraw from the INF pact if
the Soviets cheat. "Some kind of
language to that effect" ought to
be in the treaty. General Rogers
said.
Rogers has long said bluntly
that the INF treaty gives him "gas
pains." His successor as NATO
commander. Army Gen. John Gal-
vin. said the treaty will not under-
cut the alliances ability to main-
tain peace in Europe.
"The treaty, if ratified, will still
allow me to carry out my mission,
which is to maintain deterrence,"
General Galvin told the Senate
Armed Services Committee yes-
terday. Galvin said NATO needs
to improve its conventional forces
but said they present "a real de-
terrent to the Warsaw Pact."
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Z.
Rogers's criticism of the treaty was praised by
conservatives such as Sen. Dan Quayle (R) of Indiana
and Sen. Steve Symms (R) of Idaho.
Helms, however, has clearly led the treaty opposition.
From his seat on the Foreign Relations Committee he has
gleefully badgered administration witnesses.
One of his primary charges has been that the Soviets
are already violating the pact concealing between 165
and 300 SS-20 missiles. This charge is based on a past
estimate of the arsenal produced by the Defense
to ence Agency Adnu ustration othcials
countered that the Central
Intelligence Agency had a
lower estimate of
numbers, and therefore be-
lieves that the number t Fe
Soviets say they possess is
accurate.
Carlucci said that in any
case. the USSR would not be
able to test missiles from
such a hidden cache. and
thus they would quickly lose
any military effectiveness
Helms also garnered
much publicity for com-
plaining that the treaty does about missile warheads
not require destruction of
actual warheads. Thus nuclear explosives could be re-
moved from SS-20s and simply rebolted onto new weap-
ons aimed at the US. he charged.
Administration officials admit that the INF pact does
not literally require warhead destruction. Though
launchers. missile boosters, and nose cone shrouds
would be shredded. important interior portions - radars.
warhead packages containing fissile material, and gwd-
ance systems - can be kept intact.
First of all, Carluccs said. destruction of fissile
material is a "virtual impossibility." Second of all. he
said, it is in the US interest to keep these interior
portions around. as it is much easier for the Soviet Union
to produce crucial uranium and other radioactive
elements.
Finally, it is not true that SS-20 components can
simply be screwed on to other missiles, Carlucci said
"This could not be done without some redesign and some
testing," the defense secretary said.
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"asnington limes
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science vor-ic,
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Trit-une
Lk PI
Date .,~ F E L3
L`F gets broad dip_dr.,atic, ..___tary backing
By 0;, Z?iA wALK-
WAS:-EN 1 N (U-PT) The =atder, a key ambassador and five
_`orr-ler U.S. defense secretaries are endorsing the D7 treaty under
review by the Senate, b t reservations about guarding
against Soviet decection. y
L-i the second week cf -earires on t -e intermediate
`n'uclear Forces accord,
en. ^, lvi ssador Richard Burt and
ex-?e-taecn chiefs tc=-e.ators t.ey generally s.:pport !:e pact
;T gat ^g suPercower -L z w:tn ranges of 300 to 3,400 miles,
1
-costly dep~oyed in F`.:_ ote .
However, the witnesses acrepc `.esday, past Soviet cheating on
treaties is deserving of Senate attention and warrants a specific U.S.
response plan.
Galvin and NA-.&--nat:o~ s.:cn as Burt, t: e ambassador to west
Germany, were asked to restate t.e:r cases today before the Senate
Foreign Relations Corr-ttee, _on heard fear, the fcr-ner defense
secretaries Tuesday. y~ `
Four ne bers of t'~e ~_ ate`s of Staff, meanwhile, were s"7-rcned
by the Arned Services Co-T-:ttee one day after Galvin and Burt testified
here. CFA Director W11-la- ?:e_s-er was to d-s.:ss
today with the Senate ` she treaty priva*e_
Burt told the defense one one L^?F d 'e co ate constitutes l `
"a bathe
or ".e soul of "rope' ' re2 of ? _ ~t ` ~.. she :,act or adoption of any
killer
we have ` - the allies over seven
an years.''
He explain that one _-ea- reflects the - Fa=c^ of Z:roFean allies,
~strong cppos_-ice: cy the peace mcveT-e- their countries, that
ne ~
United States depicted _ts ?ersn n 2 and c ~_se missiles : n ^ ? 1
~.: rope
in 1983 as a way to get he Scv:ets n-e negctia --
t bI
` g to tee.
The for-her defense secretaries Caspar we~serder, Harold Brown,
James Schlesinger, Robert M Na -aranand - hat
teat ^~..~ea;t =----C` ~ ____. dscn s:pported
a_., by er n~,hasiz:. d the Soviet fear of 2 -:
Kre-tin leaders are ? nordinate-y afra:d of ones?e c 2'' y-es.
because from, a launch in :D-rope _t could rsn.g 2
neadq uarters , Brown sa:..
Soviet leader Mtkha:l :~ rbac~e. no sl=ed one L.'= treaty
w; th
President Reagan two o ; a~ y
_o , a dives-7 ?.:p
~-te a ~ c' to get one
thing that he urge^.t_: ,ants, sa_d ;:ems hercer, eferr - ~to the
Pershing removal. V -
The Soviets would lore : -ss?ies ca are! to f
-8 - r
United States under ~e a~-~ h o the
- -1 st be rcved
by two-t
of the Senate. --~-
The numbers reporter: t .e nave by treaty s main critic, Se~ . Jerre
difference in CIA and __ _ -- -e R-~.~^. , .~^o `; _-aces a
_.te:_-Dense Acency estt aces cf hero non.
CcaWued
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Pa, e 2
Soviet SS-20s exist.
weinberger addressed `hat concern. -esday I:t echoes t-:e state*-ents
of other exaerts who have sat.. the -treaty wot,:'d na:~ce i? so tol:c . to
-_
any hidden r ssiles without ,ett~.,ca:g^*_ ha` they soon would ben
~ itar ly unreliable.
I don't know whether they nave 2 O -acre r^iss~les or not,
Weinberger told HeL'rs. one nas claimed that he verification is
percent perfect.''
Agreeing with He,-.s that specific resocnse c_a^.s are warranted;
Weinberger said, Theres been 3 1--t of Scv:et cneat_.g in. the
Their definition of t^atyn ... is __ ___- e^_ they.
er` frog ours. wee
expect they
will cheat-11
I think t-hey'll cheat ys_ to stay in practice, -ie.rs retorted.
Schlesinger expressed the -cst reser-,at:cns ar-cn7 the former
Pentagon ch.iefs, warring na_ one new accord has Strained --he wester
alliance and that danger Lies _-.'-sing its ver:f:cc at_or easu~ es as
' Precedent for more ca_ren~~s _ .?e =. -ire a;ree-ends , s.:cn: as a treaty on
for der-range strategic weacris.
The conclusion is stear, Sc.lessu:der said. Caution is the -
watc."word. ''
E t re verification rte::rte-~-. were expected to re addressed
today in a study by the n-er:=3n tero~ se' st a conservative
research and policy cr-=n,o3t .:..cseyres:yen: scnotars i ?a ^
clu,.e f.,r-)er
...N. A7rbassador .;eane fog--per Defer-se Secre:aV-:
':chard Perle.
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 QueeLLMLNIAL: wr,uNt:JUAY, Z/ JANUARY 1y06 / II I-EGIB
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OPINION
9=11 LM7~ I I
P; -111 lit'-of
qI.A.T. ~ , - 0A I
Pg. 5
The Case Against the INF Agreement
for the removal of nuclear weapons.
President Reagan and his senior advisers are promoting the
agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) as a major
'breakthrough" in arms control. It includes on-site inspec-
tions inside the Soviet Union and permanent monitoring of
Soviet compliance. The agreement will cut four times as
many Soviet warheads as American, eliminating a whole cate-
gory of nuclear missiles. Moscow's accurate SS-20 mobile
missiles will be banned worldwide.
With all those benefits, what can be wrong with this agree-
ment? Here are a few things:
is The Soviets are continuing to violate existing agree-
ments, including the ABM treaty.
? It eliminates the weapon the Soviets fear most, the Per-
shing If medium-range fnissile.
? It bans non-nuclear ground launched long-range cruise
missiles, in which U.S. technology is superior.
? It begins the denuclearization of Western Europe.
? It leaves in place the huge Soviet and Warsaw Pact con-
ventional forces that threaten Western Europe.
? The Soviets can simply retarget some of their SS-25
ICBMs on the SS-20's targets.
? It promises the impossible: effective verification of small
mobile missiles in the huge Soviet land mass.
? It is a long legal document with numerous ambiguities,
and could easily be undermined by Moscow.
? It creates a new, unrealistic arms control euphoria that is
leading to a new detente.
? The administration has no program to enforce Soviet
compliance with the agreement.
? The administration is doing nothing to strengthen
NATO's non-nuclear defenses.
These are serious concerns that deserve consideration.
The Soviet violation of existing agreements must come
first. Six times in the last four years Ronald Reagan has issued
reports of Soviet violations of arms control agreements, in-
cluding significant violations of the anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) treaty. It is generally acknowledged that soviet com-
pliance with existing agreements should be a prerequisite of
any new agreement, yet the administration has failed to insist
on a prior resolution of these issues.
The INF agreement is popular in Moscow because it elimi-
nates the Pershing 11, the one weapon in Europe that can
strike Soviet territory with great accuracy in just 10 to 12
minutes. Moscow has tried for eight years to kill the Pershing
11. The INF agreement finally accomplishes that goal.
The agreement removes the most effective deterrent to the
Soviet forces that threaten Europe, where two conventional
wars this century have killed tens of millions. Nuclear weap-
ons, however. have protected Western Europe for over 40
years and steps leading toward their elimination will restore
the spectre of conventional war to the continent.
The denuclearization of Europe has long been a principal
goal of Soviet policy. Now, Moscow and Bonn are eager to
eliminate the short-range tactical missiles that will remain
after the INF agreement. This could lead to a nuclear-free
Western Europe open to intimidation by the Red Army, a
Germany drifting toward neutrality, and the gradual dissolu-
tion of NATO. It gives a huge boost to the radical left in
Europe, which opposes U.S. policy and has long demonstrated
6 41
Then is an inclination to say that our European allies
brought this on themselves, by relying on the United States to
provide much of their defense, and by refusing to make the
hard decisions needed to defend Western Europe against the
50,000 Soviet tanks and other conventional forces that
threaten it. But does the United States really want a neutral
Western Europe more subject to Soviet pressures?
A major concern with the INF agreement is its lack of
effective verification and compliance. The president boasts
that the agreement has the most effective verification ever.
That is undoubtedly true. But even the best verification is still
inadequate when the things being verified are small and mo-
bile. What good is it to inspect agreed upon sites with dili-
gence when Moscow may be violating the agreement at other
locations? What good is it to ban SS-20s when Moscow is
building SS-25s that can strike the same targets? The small
mobile missiles covered by this agreement can be hidden
under any roof and cannot be seen by satellites. They can be
moved rapidly to new locations. And the numbers of Soviet
weapons have been provided by the Soviets themselves.
The Soviet SCUD B is a battlefield missile with a range of
300 kilometers.- It will be permitted under the INF agree-
ment. The 500 kilometer range SS-23, however, will be
banned. What is to prevent the Soviets from extending the
range of the SCUD B or building a follow-on to it with greater
range? How would the West know the range of such a weapon
if the Soviets did not test it at its full range?
But even more serious than verification is compliance. The
United States has been able,to verify many Soviet arms con-
trol violations, but the government has been unable or unwill-
ing to take the next step-to try to make the Soviets comply
fully with the agreements they have signed. Without effective
compliance, even the best verification is meaningless.
One would expect the Western Alliance to move promptly
to improve its conventional defenses to compensate for the
elimination of the Pershing Its and cruise missiles. An impor-
tant step would be to deploy anti-tactical ballistic missile
defenses as soon as possible, both to protect NATO against
the short-range ballistic missiles that will remain and to pro-
vide insurance against Soviet cheating on the INF agreement.
Another option would be to increase Western offensive weap-
ons. such as sea-launched or air-launched cruise missiles. But
today neither the administration nor the NATO allies are
willing to take the steps needed to strengthen the alliance.
Probably the most serious deficiency of the INF agreement
is the atmosphere it creates. It promotes the illusion that
Western security can be assured cheaply and easily by arms
control agreements rather than defenses. It encourages the
Western allies to cut their defense budgets, neglect the need
for defenses against ballistic missiles and to disarm, even as
the Soviets maintain and modernize the military forces they
use to intimidate opponents and advance their goal of global
expansion. This agreement is no panacea.
Authoritative figures, including Henry Kissinger, have said
the INF agreement is badly flawed, but it must be ratified
anyway or the US. will undermine its NATO allies. This is an
argument for national irresponsibility. The Senate is responsi-
ble under the Constitution to give the agreement full and
careful consideration, and to amend or reject it if it does not
serve the interests of U.S. national security. The Senate owes
it to the American people to do no less.
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SUPPLEMENTAL: WEDNESDAY, 27 JANUARY 1988
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
Pg. 150
Rules, Timetables: What the Pact Would Do
The U.S.-Soviet treaty banning intermediate-range
nuclear-force (INF) missiles would eliminate a total of
859 U.S. missiles and 1,836 Soviet missiles, according to
data exchanged by the two governments when the treaty
was signed Dec. 8.
The number of nuclear warheads that would be
removed from the front lines cannot be directly calcu-
lated from those totals, since they include missiles that
are not deployed and that carry no warheads.
According to an estimate by the staff of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the treaty would remove
from front-line service nearly four times as many Soviet
warheads as U.S. warheads: 1.667 Soviet weapons com-
pared with 429 U.S. ones. One-third of the Soviet mis-
siles covered by the accord are SS-20s carrying three
warheads each. The treaty.
? Requires elimination within three years of all U.S.
and Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges be-
tween 1.000 and 5,500 kilometers (roughly 600-3.300
miles). These include the U.S. Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM) and the Soviet SS-4.
SS-5, SS-20 and SSCX-4 missiles.
? Requires elimination within 18 months of all
ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and
1.000 kilometers. These include the U.S. Pershing IA
(no longer, deployed in Europe) and the Soviet SS-12
and SS-23 missiles.
? Requires removal from Europe of U.S. nuclear war-
heads earmarked for use on West German Pershing IAs.
The West German missiles are not explicitly mentioned.
? Specifies in great detail the procedures by which
the barred missiles and associated launchers must be
destroyed. For instance, it provides that GLCMs (which
are small, robot jet planes) must be cut in half, separat.
ing the wing section from the tail section.
? Permits removal of the guidarfce systems and nu-
clear warheads from the banned weapons before they
are destroyed. While the warheads might not fit other
missiles, the nuclear fuel they contain could be salvaged
and used to build new warheads.
? Permits destruction of up to 100 missiles by launch.
ing them, rather than cutting them up.
? Bars all further manufacture or flight testing of
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
? Requires each country to provide an inventory of all
missiles covered by the treaty (and their associated
launchers and support equipment) together with a list of
all sites where such missiles and equipment have been
manufactured, repaired, tested, deployed or stored. In
the "memorandum of understanding" containing these
data, the Soviet Union listed 128 sites and the United
States listed 30 sites.
? Provides that either country may withdraw from
the treaty on six months' notice, if it decides that events
related to the subject of the treaty jeopardize its "su-
preme national interests." This is a standard clause in
security-related treaties.
? Bars either country from "assuming international
obligations or undertakings" that would conflict with
the treaty.
The treaty specifies in considerable detail the pro-
cedures by which each country can monitor the other's
compliance. Like earlier U.S.-Soviet agreements limit-
ing longer-range "strategic" weapons, the pact forbids
interference with reconnaissance satellites and other
"national technical means" for each country to verify
the other's compliance with the treaty.
Moreover, to prevent testing new missiles under
cover of disposing of old ones, it forbids the encoding of
data transmitted from the 100 missiles that can be dis-
posed of by launching. But the most widely touted as-
pect of the treaty's verification regime is its extensive
provision for "on-site" inspection of each country's com-
pliance by officials of the other. The treaty permits:
? Teams of inspectors from each country to visit all
designated sites in the other country at the start of the
treaty period to verify the data concerning the number
of missiles, launchers and other components at each site.
? A "close-out" inspection of each designated site
after the INF missiles have been removed and the re-
lated facilities razed.
? On-site observation by each country of the other's
destruction of INF missiles and equipment.
? Each country to station a team of 30 resident in-
spectors for 13 years at the gates of one missile assembly
plant in the other country, empowered to inspect all
shipments from the plant to ensure that none contains
forbidden missiles. The Soviet facility is a plant in
Votkinsk, near the Ural Mountains, where SS-20s were
manufactured and where the SS-25 intercontinental
missile currently is manufactured. The SS-25 is not
covered by the treaty, but sections of it are very similar
to the SS-20. The corresponding U.S. facility, where
Soviet inspectors will man the gates 24 hours a day for
13 years, is a plant in Magna. Utah. Pershing Its once
were built there; now the plant builds part of the Tri-
dent II sea-launched missile.
? Each country to conduct "short-notice" inspections
of up to 20 designated sites (except for missile produc-
tion facilities) during the first three years after the
treaty takes effect. Inspection teams would be permitted
to fly into designated entry points without announcing
in advance which site they intend to inspect. Once they
had landed and declared their destination, the country
being inspected would be obliged to transport the in-
spectors to that site within nine hours.
? Up to 15 such short-notice inspections in the five
years beginning three years after the treaty takes effect.
? Up to 10 short-notice inspections in the following
five years.
The treaty also requires the Soviet Union to take
certain steps to facilitate U.S. verification that SS-20s
are not deployed at certain sites where the similar but
larger SS-25 is deployed. Six times annually during the
first three years the treaty is in effect. the United States
can demand that the Russians expose to the view of
reconnaissance satellites all missiles and launchers at
any SS-25 base. Normally, the missiles and launchers
are concealed in "garages."
-By Pat Towell
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E very week in "Outposts," Outlook examines contemporary ideas
that are changing our lives and expanding our intellectual frontiers. This
week, John A. Adam looks at new verification technologies
necessitated by arms-control agreements. Adam is an associate
editor of IEEE Spectrum, the monthly journal of The
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ARMS CONTROL.
Verification: Keeping Ivan Honest
By John A. Adam
WHEN THE SENATE
begins hearings Mon-
day on the INF arms-
control treaty, a cru-
cial issue will be
whether-and how-the United States
can detect potential Soviet violations.
The subject is critical because both
the INF accoard and the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) now
being negotiated in Geneva will require
unprecedented verification technolo-
gies. Unlike previous arms accords,
which involved watching large struc-
tures such as fixed missile silos and
bombers, INF and START would re-
strict individual small missiles.
Consequently, America's traditional
monitoring systems-surveillance sat-
ellites and electronic intelligence-will
not be sufficient. Extensive cooperative
measures will be needed Trucks and
railroad cars must be inspected; plant
gates, grounds and fences watched;
small weapons examined for nuclear
content. And the INF pact requires
new systems for continuous monitoring
of missile-production facilities.
Exactly what kind of sensors the
United States will place on Soviet soil is
still being decided. But U.S. research
on on-site inspection systems-involv-
ing tamper-resistant fiber-optic seals,
video alert and data-encryption sys-
tems, infrared surveillance arrays and
more-is already well underway, much
of it at Sandia National Laboratories in
Albuquerque, which AT&T runs for
the Department of Energy.
Overcoming Mutual Mistrust
problems abound when working in
an adversary's territory. The
Verdii.ation nvstam m,iat ane?rs
of the on-site data, producing a para-
dox: The Soviets must be assured that
information. gathered is for verification
only-not espionage-and that it
agrees with the facts. Thus, data can-
not be encrypted. But the United
States must be confident that streams
of data, traveling through open chan-
nels in Soviet territory, are not forg-
eries. Thus some form of encrypted
authentication code must be used.
Cracking that puzzle falls to Sandia's
Gustavus J. Simmons, a mathematician
with a foot-long beard and a flattop coif
who has been solving such brainteasers
for 20 years. Simmons and his col-
leagues are perfecting a data system
that guarantees integrity. The tech-
nique that the United States will p.o-
pose to the Soviets is the least sophis-
ticated of Simmons' schemes. [See
box.] But it has already passed the
scrutiny of codebreakers at the Nation-
al Security Agency and was discussed
with the Soviets in the '70s during the :
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks.
Moreover, it has proven reliable at re-
mote U.S. seismic stations in Norway
that glean data from Soviet under-
ground nuclear tests.
The system works by autonhatically
attaching an authentication "word" to
the output of a monitoring device such
as a camera. The output, in the form of ~
a long binary sequence (strings of Os
and is), is fed into a computer, which
breaks the data up into small blocks of,
say, 64 bits. The first block is en-
crypted with a secret key which pro-'
duces a 64-bit cipher held in the com-
puter's memory. As the second block of'
data arrives, each element in the cipher .
is matched with its corresponding el-
ement in the second data block. If the'
two elements are alike, a 0 is recorded;
if different, a 1. This produces a new:
64-bit number, which replaces the first'
cipher and is in turn encrypted with the
key. This new cipher is then matched
that each side can trust the authenticity against the contents of the third block data- One It-q- official called it a "good
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of data, which begets yet another new
cipher and so forth. The end result,
after processing an entire data stream
thousands of bits long, is a final 64-bit
cipher incorporating information about
each bit of data in the whole stream.
This final cipher, or authentication
word, is appended to the unencrypted
monitor output and sent.
Nothing in the process prevents the
Soviets from scrutinizing the data while
it is sent. And the United States can
verify the result by running the re-
ceived data through the same encrypt-
ing procedure using a copy of the se-
cret key. If the final cipher generated
matches the one that was appended to
the original monitor output, then the
data are genuine. Just as increasing the
number of grooves in a housekey
makes it harder to pick the lock, the
more variables there are in a cipher
key, the less the likelihood of cracking
the code.
Shortly before the 1986 summit in
Reykjavik where the Soviets.
agreed to U.S. proposals regard-
ing on-site INF monitoring, Roger L.
Hagengruber, vice president of sys-,
terns analysis at Sandia, got a phone
call from the Pentagon. DOD wanted a
full-scale test facility built to examine
schemes for continuous monitoring of a
Soviet weapons-production plant. It
also wanted a working model of the
site. The project was given top priority.
Within two months, the Sandia team
produced a tabletop model showing
the section of a typical Soviet missile
factory which includes the main portal.
[See illustration.) The Pentagon dis-
played the model to officials from the
White house, State Department and
Congress, demonstrating how a mis-
sile-carrying truck triggers a suite of
sensors to record weight and other
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/17: CIA-RDP90M00551 R000700350042-0
VGTON POST
SUNDAY, JANUARY 24, 1988 C3
marketing toot that helped policyrnak-
ers visualize potential problems.
Both the United States and the So-
viet Union have agreed that INF mon-
itoring systems for the exits will in-
dude "weight sensors, vehicle sensors,
surveillance systems and vehicle di-
mensional measuring equipment." In
addition, "non-damaging image-
producing" gear will be installed to ex-
amine contents of shipping containers
and launch canisters. The goal is to
devise a system that automatically col-
lects and records data 24 hours a day.
The monitoring system must be accu-
rate enough to detect potential viola-
tions but work fast enough so traffic
flow is not unduly impeded. And be-
cause deployment within Soviet bor-
ders precludes use of trade-secret
equipment, engineers must create
highly reliable systems composed main-
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
One such device is a verucat ana
horizontal array of infrared sensors to
measure rapidly the length and profile
of various vehicles leaving the plant.
Like radar, the system would sendout
its own energy beam to sense objects
day or night and in adverse weather.
For weighing, Itagengruber says com-
mercial scales can be modified to assess
a moving truck or to weigh loads on
freight trains. Railroad cars in some
respects are easy to monitor because
they are constrained to tracks, have a
fixed geometry and uniform velocities.
But they also pose special problems
because they may weigh much more
than their freight and the cars may
come in a mix of gondolas and box cars.
To skirt this problem, Hagengruber
says they may negotiate that only cer-
tain types of train cars are allowed into
the plant.
If a vehicle is Large and heavy
enough to be carrying a prohibited mis-
sile, its cargo will be examined by non.
destructive imaging, most likely by X-
ray sensors tuned to appropriate inten-
sities. X-rays can take measurements
and determine material composition
and are generally hard to deceive.
Manufacturers of rockets routinely use
them to inspect solid propellants for
cracks. For verification, however, the
scans must occur faster than industrial
applications, and probably be less in-
trusive too, says Hagengruber.
Sandia is also examining tamper-re
sistant seals that would reliably indicate
if enclosures had been breached. In one
such device, a loop of multistrand plas-
tic fiber-optic cable is cut to desired
length in the field. Its ends are put into
a one-piece seal body which contains a
serrated blade that randomly severs a
portion of the cable fibers. The result is
a unique "signature" of the uncut fibers.
That pattern is photographed. If the
fiber-optic loop is later released, the
blade is designed to cut additional fibers
and change the signature. During in-
spection, a second Polaroid shot is ta-
ken for immediate comparison with the
original signature.
Warheads and Holograms
Authorities note that it is much
easier to verify a ban than a re
sidual force of, say, 100 missiles.
Consequently the START pact, be-
cause it seeks to halve levels of stra-
tegic warheads, will requite more strict
measures.
In addition, the two superpowers are
discussing in Geneva how to limit nu-
clear-tipped cruise missiles on ships
and submarines. Such controls pose
special monitoring problems because
the missiles are much smaller than oth-
er strategic weapons and because some
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i CS d IICla I""' ...??.?? ?.???.?????--?e
techniques to "tag" concealable mobile
nuclear weaponry. The challenge is to
design a system that permits counting
for verification but does not allow tar-
geting by the military.
Fred Holzer, deputy leader of ver-
ification at Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, outlined further con.
straints during a 1986 interview. The
tags must be tamper-proof and impos-
aible to duplicate; and they must in no
way interfere with the missile's oper-
ation, he explained. Moreover they
must be designed so they cannot be
used-or even be perceived to be us-
able-as a homing device.
Numerous schemes exist. For new
missiles, tags might be installed at the
production line. One possibility is to
make a special mold with an intricate
surface pattern for producing a tag.
After the required number were pro-
duced, Holzer said, the mold could be
broken. Another possibility, for new or
existing weaponry, is to make a pho-
tornicrograph or acoustic hologram of a
small patch on the missile. Each weap-
on examined could then be checked
against a database of the fiber patterns
of "legitimate" missiles.
Yet another option is to use a micro-
chip tag that could be queried on in-
spection. The basic technologies that
might be used are. being employed by
auto manufacturers including BMW,
Fiat and Honda. BMW's assembly line
uses chips coded to contain such infor-
mation as paint color, options to be
installed and so forth for each chassis.
The chip is queried during assembly
stages and the specified actions taken.
Honda uses an intrinsic property, like
fiber grains, to guard against piracy in
spare auto parts. Other scenarios are
akin to existing methods of satellite
tracking of caribou. A U.S. satellite
monitors free-roaming herds fitted with
radio transmitters in northwestern
Alaska to an accuracy of 0.8 kilome-
ters. Holzer says that "these kinds of
techniques are being developed rather
rapidly." A senior administration official
observes, however, that despite all the
studies no practical tagging schemes
have yet emerged.
START verification might include a
plan to designate assembly areas to
make missile production more trans-
parent to surveillance satellites. But
satellites cannot provide the sort of
information that Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev mentioned in his summit
farewell speech, when he shocked
many observers by declaring that the
Soviets had a technique that would re-
motely "identify not only the presence,
but also the capacity of the nuclear
warheads" aboard mobile vessels.
If it exists, such a device probably
emits a pulse of high-energy neutrons
to induce a small amount of fission in
any nuclear warhead. The pulse would
have to be weak enough to prevent the
degradation in the reliability of the nu-
clear weapons but strong enough to
produce a recognizable signature of
gamma rays or neutrons. But because
of the rapid degradation of this signa-
ture in the atmosphere, such measure-
ments must be made from close range.
Moreover, shielding by lead or water
could foil the inspection. More detailed
schemes must be fielded for effective
START verification.
A November 1987 report by the
House Intelligence Committee was
unanimous in saying that the Execu I L L E G I B
Branch provides "no central direction
and prioritization of research and de-
velopment to improve arms control
monitoring capabilities." It placed the
blame largely on the intelligence com-
munity.
Indeed many technologies for use in
the INF treaty were developed for oth-
er purposes. Participants say some an-
alyses, such as whether inspections of
suspect sites should be allowed, were
done hastily.
Although INF negotiations began in
November 1981, money for the major
INF monitoring program started flow-
ing several years later. The Depart-
ment of Defense was the surprising
source, including the international se-
curity policy branch formerly headed
by Richard N. Perle, popularly known
as a bete noire of arms control.
In spite of budget constraints, Con-
gress supplemented administration re-
quests for verification research for fis-
cal 1988. Whether that results in in-
novative techniques for monitoring the
strategically sensitive START pact
remains to be seen.
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Secrets and Ciphers
T HE DRAWBACK in the simplest version of Gus Simmons'
scheme is that the Soviets would not know everything
being sent. But the secret key used to authenticate old
messages would be periodically supplied to the Soviets, who could
then exactly reconstruct the authentication words to determine
whether espionage information existed. The Soviets could also dis-
mantle a similar piece of authentication gear to discern its intelli-
gence potential.
In that simple approach, the same key is used to encrypt and de-
crypt a message. In 1976, however, a different method emerged.
Called public-key cryptography, it uses one key to scramble a mes-
sage and a different key to unscramble it. Hence the ability to de-
crypt a message does not also permit one to make forgeries.
Such a scheme is ideal for verification work, for it allows authen-
tication without secrecy, and it can prevent some convoluted ways
of cheating. The United States would encrypt the entire message
and share the decrypt key with the Soviets and any other third par-
ty. All parties could decipher the data as it was transmitted. Sim-
mons' group at Sandia uses the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm
where the encrypting party bases its key on a pair of prime num-
bers P and Q that are kept secret and are so large that factoring N
= PQ is beyond all projected capabilities of computers. The United
States would be confident that the data were genuine because it
would be practically impossible, even with supercomputers, to de-
termine the encryption key in time to alter the data.
But under that scheme, the party doing the encryption could
send a forgery. Because of that ability, the Soviets could disavow
any incriminating message, telling the United Nations, for example,
that U.S. data indicating a trainload of illegal SS-20 missiles was a
fabrication. So in 1980, Simmons' group devised a method whereby
the United States and the Soviet Union would collaborate in the en-
cryption. i
But several years ago, it was realized that unilateral action of ei-
ther party-saying its secret encryption key had been compro-
mised, for instance-would circumvent the system. So Simmons, in
his fourth iteration, proposed that a third party do on-site encryp-
tion using the public-key technique. With at least three parties con-
tributing to the message-scrambling, the system was immune to
impeachment by unilateral actions.
"Each time you solve one problem and peel off that layer of diffi-
culty," says Simmons, "you find a more subtle one inside." But for
now at least, he thinks the problem is finally solved If the Soviets do
not agree on his first-generation system, there are many alternatives.
-John A. Adam
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 TAT - - -,L' - L ? -- -- LL - A - T--- - --- A T_ ?' e T
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Illy MICHAEL R. GORDON
ar?eil Y ltrt Nn YYn Tw
WASHINGTON. Jan. 27 - On Dec. 6,
two days before Mikhail S. Gorbachev
and President Reagan were to sign a
new missile accord in Washington,
American and Soviet negotiators were
still arguing in Geneva about a key
treaty detatt
As the evening wore on. Maynard W.
Glitman, the chief American negotia-
tor, angrily accused his Soviet counter-
anandd jeopardizing agreement over stalling the
issue - the American insistence that
inspectors should be able to look inside
Soviet structures big enough to hide
rocket stages, but too small to hide the
SS-20 missiles that were to be elimi-
nated under the terms of the treaty.
"I've had it," said Mr. Glitman, sug-
gesting that the issue be taken up the
next day. "I'm leaving."
Just a Misunderstanding
But finally, Mr. Obukhov gave in. The
entire dispute, he said, had simply been
a misunderstanding.
Shortly after midnight, the senior
negotiators initialed the final treaty
text, which gave the Americans the in-
spection rights they wanted, and
brought six years of negotiations to an
end.
In the Senate hearings on the new
missile accord this week, the way the
treaty was negotiated - and whether
the United States agreed to flawed
provisions to meet the summit dead-
line - have emerged as key issues. On
Thursday, Paul H. Nitze, the senior
arms-control adviser to Secretary of
State George P. Shultz, will testify be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Interviews with American officals
familiar with the secret negotiating
record reveal that the American post-
Late in the game,
Washington's
position was still
in flux.
and Eduard A. Shevardnadze, the
Soviet Foreign Minister, only two
weeks before the summit meeting.
But once the general outlines of the
verification plan were defined, the Rus-
sians appear to have made most of the
r concessions on Important details of
how the plan would be carried out.
The question of how to make sure the
Soviet side observes the treaty has
been a central concern for both the Ad-
ministration and its critics since the
negotiations started. One important
issue was what kinds of installations on
either side could be inspected at short
notice. Another was how the United
States would make sure no prohibited
missiles were being produced in Soviet
installations.
The Administration initially wanted
a broad right to carry out short-notice
inspections virtually anywhere in the
Soviet Union where banned missiles
tton an key verification issues was in-
deed in flux until suprisingly late in the
negotiations. In addition, American of-
ficials say, the Russians tried to back
away from some concessions they
made at a meeting between Mr. Shultz
could be kept - a position promoted by
civilian Pentagon officials and known
as "anytime, anywhere."
Then American intelligence experts,
military officials, and Government
weapons developers began arguing
that letting Soviet inspectors check
sites "anytime, anywhere" in the
United States was not desirable at all.
Last summer, once the Russians
agreed to the principle of eliminating,
rather than limiting, medium- and
shorter-range missiles based on land,
the Administration made less strict de-
mands on verification. The Adminis.
tration explanation for the reduced de-
mands was that a ban on such missiles
would be easier to verify than limits.
The 'Froot Loops Plan'
But last fall, the American delega-
tion was alerted in a cryptic cable that
the Administration was reviving the
idea of "anytime, anywhere " Inspec-
tions.
In mid-November, less than a month
before the summit meeting, the chief
American arms negotiator, Max M.
Kampelman, and a National Security
Council aide, Col. Robert E. Linhard of
the Air Force, arrived in Geneva, and
Colonel Linhard made a proposal
known as the "Froot Loops plan" to the
Soviet negotiators.
Under this plan, if the Russians
asked to inspect an innocent American
installation - Colonel Linhard used the
example of a factory that made Froot
Loops breakfast cereal - the United
States would consult with the private
concern and allow the inspection to
proceed.
But if the Russians asked to inspect a
highly sensitive installation, the United
States would have the right to turn
down the request. As Colonel Linhard
reportedly explained it, each country
would maintain a list - kept secret
from the other side - of installations,
like sensitive intelligence sites, that
would not be open to inspection.
U.S. Negotiators' Qualms
The American negotiating team in
Geneva was dubious about this plan,
which conflicted with what they hod al-
ready told the Russians. What would
happen if the Russians put too many in-
stallations on their secret list, some of
them wondered. Others worried that
some American installations were too the Americans that Moscow had no in-
secret to be put on a list that might tention of providing a photo of the SS-20
somehow be made public. missile because the Americans would
Yuli M. Vorontsov, then the top never see an SS-20 missile outside of
Soviet arms negotiator, abruptly dis- the canister. The Americans rejected !
missed Colonel Llnhard's suggestion. this position. On American insistence,
The Administration decided that the the Soviets sent a telephoto of the mis-
proposal would never succeed, and, Bile on the morning the treaty was
The negotiators finally agreed on
short-notice inspections only at sites on
an agreed list of installations for medi-
um-range and shorter-range missiles.
Critics see this more limited approach
as a serious flaw in the treaty, while
the Administration asserts that the
total package of verification measures
provides sufficient protection against
possible Soviet cheating that would
have military significance.
Closing the Gaps
By all accounts, the critical meeting
that closed the gap between the two
sides on key verification issues was the
one in Geneva between Mr. Shultz and
Mr. Shevardnadze, just before Thanks-
giving.
During several days of intense talks,
aides to the two officials worked out the
basic arrangements for short-notice in-
spections, and drafted treaty provi-
sions to make it.easier for American
spy satellites to determine that no pro-
hibited SS-20 missiles could be hidden
at SS-25 missile bases.
The two sides also worked out the
l basic procedures for monitoring the
Russian missile assembly plant at Vot-
kinsk, west of the Urals, by stationing
inspectors outside of the gates, a moni-
toring plan originally devised by Amer-
ican experts.
That monitoring was necessary be-
cause the Russians had earlier in-
formed the United States that the first
stage of their long-range SS-25 missile
was very similar to that of their medi-
um-range SS-20 missile, which was Lo-
be banned by the treaty, and that both
were assembled in Votkinsk. In return,
the Americans agreed to allow the sta-
tioning of Soviet inspectors outside of
an American missile assembly plant in
Magna, Utah.
In announcing these breakthroughs,
Mr. Shultz told reporters in Geneva:
"We have now completed agreement
on all of the outstanding I.N.F. issues."
But, as it turned out, a lot of hard bar-
gaining Jay ahead.
For one thing, the some critical de-
tails of how the monitoring was to be
carried out had not been worked out.
For another, the Russians began trying
to renegotiate some already agreed
upon compromises.
Soviet negotiators began arguing
that agreement on carrying out short-
notice inspections at factories that
made launchers for ground-launched
cruise missiles meant that the Soviet
factory at Volgograd that made
launchers for ballistic missiles covered
by the treaty should be exempt. The'
Americans. rejected this argument and
prevailed.
At the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting,
the Soviet side had appeared to accept
the principle that the United States
could keep inspectors outside any new
Russian installation that assembled
SS-25 missiles if one was ever built. But
now, Soviet negotiators were saying
that the Americans could conduct
monitoring only outside of the Votkinsk
plant. The Americans objected and
prevailed here, too, but they had some
last-minute wrangling over the ar-I
rangements.
Initially, the Russians said American
inspectors would be able to look inside
only every 30th missile canister that
came out of the plant. The Americans]
wanted to be able to conduct more Ire-
quent inspections at random. It was
thus agreed that inspectors could look
inside the canisters eight times a year.
Soviet negoqtiators said that each side;
should be allowed to have 10 inspectors
at each installation. The Americans
wanted 40. It was agreed that each side
could have 30 inspectors.
The 'Stages Problem'
Even after the treaty terms were
agreed on, there were last-minute
hitches. Maj. Gen. Vladimir Medvedev,
one of the Soviet negotiators, informed
signed, Dec. 8, and later sent a glossy
original.
By Sunday night, Dec. 6, the two sides
were down to the "stages problem"
that so exasperated Mr. Glitman. The
Russians were insisting that they be
able to look inside structures that could
hide individual rocket stages, since the
American Pershing 2 missile is trans-
ported in stages and assembled on its
launcher.
But the Russians said that American
inspectors should not have the same
right. They argued that because their
SS-20 missiles were transported in can-
nisters, American inspectors should be
allowed to look only inside structures
that could hide entire missiles.
The Americans demanded reciproci-
ty, seeking to close any possible loop-
hole in the treaty. After saying the
Soviet delegation lacked the authority
from Moscow to make such a conces-
sion, Mr. Obukhov relented.
The next morning, the Americans de-
layed their departure from Geneva
until early afternoon to review the final
treaty language.
Soviet negotiators had been in-
structed to complete the treaty in time
for Mr. Gorbachev's arrival in Wash-
ington that afternoon, and Mr. Obukhov
and General Medvedev hitched a ride
with the Americans, who were bringing
copies of the treaty with them on a
camouflaged Air Force C-141 plane.
One member of the American team
took an extra precaution to. make cer-
tain the treaty arrived in Washington
for the Tuesday signing. He sent a copy
by Federal Express.
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A-
Helms and Shultz Are in High-Stakes Duel
Over Verifiability of Pact, Missile Numbers
ItY PCItR SAMUEL
Aby a ere rlita.. C-w/--eeee
WAS i N. lan, 36 - While Re
publican and Disriocretic sonatas
joined form today sedmng to discredit
him Sea Jesse Hear, R-N.C. has
saga seamy of Sete Geese
Shunts in a high-stakes battle over the
rim5cati w of the D'tF Duty.
At mdays tenaawry before the
Saute Purge Relations Committee.
the top US arms cintrd g corset
Gana, Max Kampdma and MaYnhad
Grimm aid the arty adhere the
goal of eliminating Soviet madiuru,
thmge misib a a military threat to
Western Europa and a political tart to
the stability of the NATO alliance
They told the o auuwnse that daavo-
bon of the mists a the areal
ern because that meant that
>,arttads could no longer be de iverad
m that mgna
Destroying the warheads thensdves
might be dangerous. Kampetbtmt and
Grimm aid, became roan U.S. ma-
A 3
PACT... CONTINUED
ing them baying then underground or
exploding them after an serial latridh-
Ing.
'lla fasianable arterial by itself is.
not dangerVA" Kanpelnoo_ aid. 'ylhe
danger, involved is when it a raked to
that which shoos it direcs it outs it
to aplode A big atom of the
warhead does go damoyed, doe get
though. has aved his wrath
for Shur. who has give ratification of
the Duey high priority in the find yin
of the Raga admineramai Hebua
and his sail are deeply onmmitad in
der view that the easy a deaCnend
to the amity of the United Shares and
la anie, and my, privately. the anty
s being aid with lit,
They my that the adminsaamon is
pleading the American people on two
central muss attuned up in the tetras
-Manitmability' and -Orly M'- ' SS
3DC
Monitaabihty riders to the ability of
United Sate intelligma sold veifi-
caom itspectos to adequately tract
gad identify Soviet missiles std dead
vioieno s The 'Only iO ' sea reform
in the credibility of the Satrino' dsdzr-
a = char it ha any t160 S&20
sssilss. which will be dstroysd refer
der arm of the iNF tray. .
The phb& has been ahawn only the
sip d the ioebrg of this dsp to the
swarm ssya and an Monday he
illustrated his pow drag the public
him i by having an aide want ataa
the soon and deliver in Shills a top
sash repot which Helm said was of
.paramount m?arams to our national
rarity"
In apes release he aid em lie that
it the daaified material was legitimate
he would question -whether thee
should be hasher Soar action at this
due m din propped arty'
Helms mad he pommel confirmation
from Shun that the donanoa was
gerhume and that he and the president
sines is mnata Slacks tfectinsd to
open the document, drag the Pis
of rasa is the use Hasa than
shggaed else der asp maw foidr
?aid named aimed to a oar
be had weisa him.
Sbuitt pidmd up 'Well [ is... it
ntprsetas sold a being a at of
quotations from highly classified tu-
aiaM dot we a the hands of the
imeiigence -.
Hdmr Yta -
Shultz And how you name to have
that. I have an ids You have better
a? than I do to whatever they (due
stdligaha papiel are doing ..
The Seam, of Sao then aid *AL
from what he had beam able to ass-
tam the probi?s raised in the rave
repots 'm be dab with ahishic-
torily but is should be disc a ed
with the aodligeno people in dad
assn
Hebrer responded that he was moots.
aged Shultz had read his letter. He then
put into the Senate retvtd that he had
received a hand-delivered letter from
CIA Outer Winirm Webster which
mduded the stateitmt We have 1e
viewed the highly sasidve daatifiad
information cited in the amt- ut to
yaw Ytor.
This afomrdm a, in hi. coo-
teed a a rent draft d Vtiawr Two
of TAW A6sond Ganiges Faunae
4111.88. The information is
ahbmehtvdy as n tea. ahhatgh the
final wending in the puhlWhd cram
w41. in sea ass, be slightly cider.
am.
Floss in his keener in Wehaa
turgid dot the ate arterial 'di-
dam a major vtdaom by the Soviet
Union of din peopmed treaty an Inter-
mediate Ntdsr Faroe'
teo?t
Of6csb have been unusually
a mmneritag an the contented the
secret materials, big the indications am
that they bear in put an two matters
already reported in the Cit. Tnbhw to
the aria publdsd November 1$ 16,
17 and 18
That refs to
? the intelligence conmumcys gnat
difficulty in detecting mobile Soviet
missiles and its nod for considerably
ah7aad ramrta in cedr to be Ibte
at detect and identify hest with conf-
dma
? initiations from us intomfehce
dat do INF-board SS-21) missile is
being --* sbe and me
slightly lt with is
INF-dlowed
-mama" the 9125
Two (setae SS-2D bass in the
wane steins Union Veklmyays
Saida ad Yrya have been oathanf
convertsd to sea bas. U usffi-
gehce has repoad The 5525 ansms
aid garages, which we 10 fat longer
than those for the SSA, over the years
1984 to 1987 displaced the shorter
testes and gvaaa identified as
those in hold 5 . . Analysis a
Washington muhdd the bases wee
being nursed hat the SS-Ms to
ihamitimaisI SS-25L U.S inteligehr
mepotad that 36 SS20s that wane
though at be "eau.' disappeared from
else hate
Amdhar sapesatm Is that do
at, 98 mown was simply mowd
as do bW cimm r and garage
idenifsd with 9b25@ and wee give
10 fact of . rum' a part of Soviet
plan in to that ability to hide their
aaardste range fans
In his opening saanem lofty.
Serra Republican L- Robert Dole
aid in supported ratification, of the
treaty but aid US intelligence would
rued hoe resources to do the job.
The asnigii chefs I madad
cared me that. with adegtar is,
smmla, rd I rideacoe that. they cam
do the ver+6atiom jo' Dole .id We
may well need to bad top or own
capability in are dlattivs veif-
canna'
A 4
---r-- ~- ...%.- .- ~
pard a Sorrier atpwtioa They air
dad do risk of rasbstim mint rk-
With other memmes hug agaaat
kit. Nelms peed his dace "that
usahasry to attw public uaets the
lanty dam not demur even one
nuclear wrhetd"
'A missile is a carrying case and the
pounced a the thing that goo 'boon'
and kill you,' Iletna declared. 'A
inhale doesn't kin you unless it fans an
your had and crass it opna'
Kartpdnm said the taty doe
permit renoval of faoonabie material
and guidance a0 before US and
Soviet missiles are demoyd by crush-
This s an appaien allusion to
intelligence as momma that the United
State would only have about a ZD
pewit probability of detecting an
ilkRany deployed SSZO. and that a
pri nipol surveillance system needed to
catch for mobile monks - the
IedigalaGaae infrared imaging atel-
Ise - ha bun grounded by the space
ahutde dhssater and the lacii of any US
bmvy4dt Ismrh op.bitity.
geA Mobile kfsols Task Foe hunt RaTaremm W'aRling Group WG)riepot d ted
Dec. 11, 1986 arid addressed to the
theater of central intelligence saint
-Our, teem capability to meet ad-
equately the denude placed an our
iaarm to adduct effativety the
mobile missile ptobleu is linits&.. A
our capability to loan, Identify and
tract mobile missiles a evolutionary
and will rpmme sign dmit enhance-
over pramt capabihina .. It is
deer that development of strategies to
captive our apebibties will tepteae
many tome apes than are cis city
available'
The 'O*4W scar bars heavily
an the eadibitiry of the adminsaaoo,
because in is dale to on the tray
ratified, I is edosing the Sovies'
ddeatim the they have only 660 SS
Ma to dosoy. Ye, thin read s repine
with artier ssoenena by the adnina?
emote enphas?ug that the SS-2D
I was built and deploy to
reload and firs.
The Penaagm's Sorrier Mliay, fbar-
publication has always aid this. and is
picanli repremmatims of S&70 units
at actin have madly shown refire
mine The number of refire miaala per
ready-to-fire missiles atop their
tiansparto recur launcher triacim has,
been ati std bet an one and but.
Eva with the low atcute of one
refine missile per deployed numale, there
would with the admasaation's count
of Nl deployed msiala, be 882 mina
am In addition to tum in the field.
every insane syaen ha is stodepak d
mssilm held for as firing and replao-
mas of theta that on damaged from
?a rips of depbI
This has lad der Defense Intelligence
Agaiy in enema the SSZD count to
be road 14 with other --
based an Soviet phi for four ndae of
7.250.
A memaaeduto from Helms to his
colleagues dated Jan. 25 discusses this
sae at length an page 22 and Z3. It
aye that the DIA has -assumed that
the SS-2D form was dow to aid even
over 1.OOD.' It Was on to any some
atrDigeace analysis have estimated the
numbers se high an 2250 and adds
"This amber is a derived manter not
a deuced somber, but it is based tarn
some very raimonable assumptions and
sa-igm afrmation..
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/17: CIA-RDP90M00551 R000700350042-0