RESPONSE TO NSDD 266: OBJECTIVITY AND INTEGRITY OF ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01032R000100080021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 23, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Wu6igroo, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03027-87
23 July 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Response to NSDD 266: Objectivity and Integrity
of Estimates
1. Action Requested: that you sign the attached letter to the National
Security Adviser, which together with its attachment is your response to a
requirement levied on the DCI by Section III, NSDD 266, dated 31 March 1987
(p. 8, attached NSDD).
"The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide such
additional review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct
of national foreign intelligence estimates as may be required to
accomplish fully this objective. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall review established procedures for the
production of national foreign intelligence estimates and, not
later than July 31, 1987, shall inform the NSC, through the
National Security Advisor, of any modifications or additions
thereto he may deem appropriate for this purpose."
Further, request that you sign the attached letters to the NFIB Principals,
forwarding copies of your response to the NSDD, and thanking the Principals
for their participation in the process.
2. Background. Recommendation 5 of the Tower Commission Report
(p. V-6, attached) noted that:
"It is critical that the line between intelligence and
advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelligence is to
retain its integrity and perform its proper function."
a. That recommendation was the basis for the tasking in NSDD 266.
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b. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council reviewed the issues
of integrity and objectivity with the National Intelligence Officers.
c. Acting Director Gates asked the NFIB Principals for their views
on 28 April.
d. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council drew upon NIO and
Community comments for the draft paper discussed at the 1 June NFIB.
e. You will recall that there was general agreement on the draft
paper, along with numerous suggestions for clarity and additional
emphasis.
f. Those first round comments were incorporated in another draft
dispatched 30 June for NFIB Principal review. The second round comments
were all positive, with only State, Air Force, and Treasury offering any
further suggestions. All these were incorporated in the attached text
with these exceptions:
Declined Air Force suggestion to distribute SRP comments to
Community because of privacy considerations between you and
your advisors. In fact, SRP comments often are discussed at
coordination meetings without direct attribution.
-- Declined Treasury suggestion to delete reference to excluding
policymaker from the coordination process and substitute a
statement that policymaker input is accepted. We believe that
the exclusion statement (3rd tick, p. 1) should be the general
rule; any unusual circumstances demanding policymaker
involvement in coordination should be the exception in the
interest of objectivity and integrity.
-- Declined State's suggestion to delete para 15, p. 10. It
states a requirement for the Intelligence Community to make
judgments even when there is meager evidence. We did rewrite
the paragraph to highlight our obligation to identify
uncertainty, skimpy evidence, and identify "insight" as a
basis for qualified judgments.
g. All other NFIB Principals concurred in this version as written,
and State and DIA expressed particular pleasure with the new delineation
of the role of the DCI in the process.
3. Related Action
While this reply to NSDD 266 was being prepared and coordinated,
the review and revision of guidelines for interagency production discussed
at NFIB and mentioned in the proposed reply has been ongoing, drawing on
Intelligence Community inputs. It should be ready for your review and
Community coordination shortly.
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4. Recommendation:
a. That you sign the covering letter to the National Security
Adviser, to which is attached the report on the integrity and
objectivity of the estimative process.
b. That you sign the proposed letters to the NFIB Principals, to
which are attached copies of the letter to the National Security Adviser
and the associated report.
Very respectfully,
Attachments:
As stated
CONCUR: 4.a. 4.b.
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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NIC #03027-87
23 July 1987
SUBJECT: Response to NSDD 266: Objectivity and Integrity
of Estimates
DCI/VC/NIC:H.F.Hutchinson:bha(23 July 87) HSTS
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC (FH)
1 - O/C/NIC
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Vlbshington. D. C. 20505
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Frank,
This report is in response to the President's instruction in NSDD 266 to
review the established procedures for producing national foreign intelli-
gence estimates. These procedures were reviewed to determine if we were
achieving our goal of maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the
process and the products.
We believe the national intelligence estimates process does achieve
objectivity in the many interagency products issued by the Intelligence
Community. We find that there is integrity and independence on the part of
the people and the process. Nonetheless, we have taken steps to reinforce
the safeguards already built into the system. These include
discussions with the National Intelligence Officers concerning
their responsibilities to assist me in maintaining the integrity of
the process
discussion with NFIB Principals and their representatives on the
issues of objectivity, integrity, and quality of the estimates
an ongoing revision of the Intelligence Community's guidelines for
interagency production to bring currency and more clarity to the
guidelines for process
some changes in the DCI role to assure myself that the independence
of the intelligence process is maintained at several key points and
to foster full discussion of national estimates by the members of
the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
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The attached report lays out in greater detail the results of the review
directed by the President. The review included solicitation of the views of
each National Foreign Intelligence Board member on the issues of integrity
and objectivity in the production of our national foreign intelligence
estimates. The NFIB members provided thoughtful responses, including
consideration of the relationships between their intelligence organizations
and the policy community. These responses were included in the review
conducted by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the
National Intelligence Officers who manage the interagency production on my
behalf. The review also included a special session of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board where the members discussed their views and
recommendations for strengthening the independence of the intelligence
process in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the product.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
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THE INTEGRITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS
We believe the current practices of the Intelligence Community do
preserve the integrity, objectivity and independence of the process for the
production of national foreign intelligence estimates. The integrity,
quality, and objectivity of the personnel involved in estimative work is at
least as important as the process itself. Some further changes in the DCI's
role have been made to reinforce further the independence of the process.
The guidelines for the process of interagency production are under NFIB and
DCI review and will be republished.
The integrity of Estimates is safeguarded principally through:
-- Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the
process.
-- The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a
context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
-- The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination
process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in
the development and coordination of estimates from concept through
final drafting.
The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in
recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the
unpredictability of some events.
Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the
Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
The right of any community member to explicity dissent from any or
all parts of estimates.
Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent
views on selected issues.
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-- Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation
of new ones as the cycle continues.
-- The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to
publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of
policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs
to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's
consensus views.
The independence of the estimative process from policymaker preference,
however, is not an absolute end in itself but rather involves a number of
trade-offs:
NI0's must maintain close contact with the policy community to
ensure they are aware of US policy goals and the details of its
implementation. Analysis conducted without knowledge of the US
role on the international scene will inevitably be skewed.
There inevitably exist areas in which policy and intelligence
cannot and should not be surgically separated--each has something
to offer the other in insight; nearly all participants in both the
policy and intelligence communities are engaged in some facet of
the other's work at some time.
Senior review within the Intelligence Community should bring
advantages of wisdom, experience and perspective to the
analysis--but is also possibly open to the charge of "politicizing"
analysis written at the working level.
Consensus cannot be allowed to eliminate sharpness of judgment.
Evidence can serve to buttress Community judgment, but the relative
absence of evidence cannot be allowed to stifle creative insight
where evidence may not be immediately available.
Recent changes in the DCI's role in the process should serve to
reinforce further the objectivity of his key role:
-- The DCI will no longer approve draft estimates prior to
coordination by NFIB representatives, but will review them to
ensure that they conform to goals set in the Terms of Reference.
-- The DCI will no longer approve post-coordination drafts, but will
bring his own comments and any suggestions for change to the NFIB
table.
-- The DCI will seek the judgment and advice of NFIB members before
deciding on the disposition of draft estimates.
Further, the DCI has directed the revision of the 1981 guidelines for
interagency production in order to provide currency and clarity to this
process.
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1. As the President has stated, it is an important goal of the United
States intelligence effort that the integrity and objectivity of the
intelligence process be maintained, demanding critical differentiation
between foreign intelligence and policy advocacy. This is a particularly
important and sensitive goal as applied to the production of national
estimates. It requires critical and constant attention especially by the
Intelligence Community but also by the Policy Community. This must be
considered side by side with another important goal, emphasized by the SSCI
in a draft report last year, that the utility and relevance of the
intelligence product be sustained, demanding cognizance of policy concerns
in the production of foreign intelligence. This dual objective of assuring
policy relevance while assuring against policy prescription makes two basic
demands.
-- First, while input to the estimative process is to be sought from
the Policy Community, it should be as to the questions asked, and
not as to the answers provided. And the Policy Community should
not be the only source of these questions.
-- Second, while the output of the estimative process should outline
the general implications of the Intelligence Community's judgments
for US interests, it should not cross the line to the advocacy of
particular policy proposals. That must be deferred to the
consumers in the Policy Community.
It should be recognized that the search for perfection in the estimative
process inevitably involves a process of tradeoffs between faithful
observance of the full bureaucratic process and the intellectual vigor of
the final product. As more people and more opinions become involved, many
of the sharp edges of insight can be lost; process can be observed but the
product can be pallid, and the message to the policymaker can be
unenlightening. The Intelligence Community must strive to strike a balance
between often conflicting goals of timeliness and deliberation, between
crispness of judgment and full consideration of alternative views, between
safe consensus and boldness of insight, between policy relevance and policy
neutrality.
2. The estimators must interact with policymakers, but maintain their
independence from them. They must provide not only what the policymaker
wants to know, but also what he needs to know. While the estimators need to
focus on a policymaker's topic, they need to place it in proper context,
which may well provide an estimate not anticipated by the policymaker. An
estimate must examine the conventional wisdom on an issue, but also
challenge it. Estimators must examine all the evidence on an issue, but,
when evidence is lacking, they must not shrink from offering the insights
the Community may nonetheless be able to offer. Complicating the process is
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the impact of US activity on the event to be analyzed while the outcome of
an estimate may influence future choices of action. The estimators must
assess both risks and opportunities for the US, and here they will march up
to the fine line short of policy prescription. They owe it to their readers
to engage in prediction, including which outcomes are most likely. But they
owe it also to their readers to make their uncertainties clear and to
provide alternative scenarios.
3. We have reviewed the national estimates process in terms of three
basic elements--personnel, process, and products. This facilitates
highlighting areas where vulnerabilities exist and safeguards help,
especially noting where senior officers directly affect the process.
Personnel
4. The most critical element in ensuring the integrity and objectivity
of the estimative process is people. Without individual integrity and
objectivity at all levels, particularly at the top, no process will work;
with it, nearly any process will be successful.
The National Intelligence Officer system is designed to select
experienced, skilled officers who will manage the estimates process
on behalf of the DCI. These NIOs are assigned to the Office of the
DCI where they can be relatively free of pressures from the policy
arms of government. The NIOs, selected from different parent
agencies and backgrounds, also bring a variety of Intelligence
Community perspectives to the estimates.
Additionally, Assistant NIOs, drafters, and Agency repre-
sentatives--themselves representing different parent agencies and
backgrounds--bring additional range of perspective to the analytic
process. If the NFIB agencies fail to provide their best talent,
the process will not provide the best product.
There are balances that each of these players must strike. The
NIOs manage the production of estimates for the DCI and serve as
guardians of the Community process. Drafters need to be able to
utilize their agency background and at the same time rise above it
and take on the community mantle. Representatives need to
represent their agencies ably and responsibly, while being capable
of setting aside parochialism in the interest of producing the best
possible Community product.
And finally there are the intelligence principals, who need to be
involved throughout the process, initially through their
representatives and ultimately at the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, to bring to bear their broader perspective and to help
protect the intelligence process against undue policy pressures. A
key to the success of this endeavor is the NIOs keeping the
representatives informed, so that they in turn can keep their
principals informed and involved. .
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The Process
5. The Request for the Estimate. Any executive office can request an
estimate, but most are generated by State, DoD, or NSC. The DCI also calls
for estimates, as do other senior intelligence officers, although the
greatest number of nominations come from the NIOs. The NIOs usually suggest
that an Estimate be written because they have learned--from their contact
with the policymakers and their knowledge of the intelligence--that such an
estimate will be timely and relevant to a policy decision; sometimes one
that has not yet captured the policymakers' attention.
-- The NIO is routinely in contact with other members of the
Intelligence and Policy Community in his area of expertise. He
needs to be well aware of current US policy to anticipate both the
intelligence needs that the policy might spark as well as the
foreign policy repercussions of prospective US action. Those
contacts are a constant and common source of ideas for new
estimates--a boon for policy relevance and legitimate support to
the policy process, but carrying with it the danger of skewing
production to topics formulated only to support, and not to
illuminate, policy.
-- To guard against this, the NIOs, and other intelligence officials
generate estimates where policy attention is needed, to tell the
policymaker what the Intelligence Community feels the policymaker
needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. And second,
each request for an estimate is reviewed by the NIO with the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and must be approved
by the DCI. Disapproval is infrequent--never because of
uncongeniality to the Policy Community--and only because of limited
resources, conflicting priorities, or appropriateness--especially
if a topic appears to be of a limited interest or too narrow or
parochial in its focus for a national level estimate. The NFIB
members' periodic review of the interagency production plan assures
that they are well informed and can advise the DCI. The NIOs also
maintain a continuing dialogue within the Intelligence Community
and with the DCI to ensure that the production plan remains up to
date and relevant.
6. Preparation and Coordination of TORS. In conjunction with the
proposal for an estimate, the NIO presents a Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference (TOR), drawing on suggestions from the Intelligence Community and
the relevant policy people to define the scope and major themes of the
estimate.
Usually the office requesting the estimate will set forth the main
questions which it hopes to see answered. The NIO views any
intelligence questions posed as legitimate and will respond to
them. The NIO and his Intelligence Community colleagues will not
necessarily limit the scope of a proposed estimate strictly to the
questions and issues posed by the requester, however. Answering
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only those questions posed by the requester, without considering
the broader context could give a misleading impression regarding
policy implications.
The NIO maintains contact with the requester to insure that he
understands the specific interests and purposes of the questions
posed in an estimate, and to insure that the requester's
intelligence needs are met. Although this is a practice long
followed, it is worth noting that the SSCI in a September 1986
draft study also urged that NIOs remain in close contact with
policymakers during the estimative process to ensure that relevant
issues are addressed.
A critical part of the TOR is the Key Questions. This section sets
forth the few central questions which the NIO believes to represent
the heart of the intelligence problem.
The TOR also should clearly highlight the specific policy-related
questions posed by the requester. Responses to these should also
be highlighted in the estimate itself to catch policymaker
attention.
The TOR also includes a retrospective look at previous estimates on
the same subject. This process helps remind the Community of past
discussions on the topic and provides opportunity for minority or
alternative views to be tested against subsequent events.
The draft TOR also is seen by the Senior Review Panel (SRP) for its
independent comment to the DCI and the NIO. The SRP is made up of
retired senior diplomats, military officers, and scholars and
reports directly to the DCI. Other independent DCI or NIO
consultants or panels may also be asked to comment.
The NIO then will make changes in the Concept Paper/Terms of
Reference as he believes are necessary. The TOR is then sent to
the DCI with a cover memo indicating how informal Community inputs
and SRP comments were or were not accommodated.
The DCI views the proper formulation of the TOR as a key element in
developing a good estimate. Further, he uses the TOR as the first
step in his personal supervision of the process to ensure
objectivity and integrity of the product.
The Intelligence Community representatives then meet with the NIO
to review the TOR, suggest changes for content, clarity, and
comprehensiveness, and coordinate for their agencies. The revised
TOR is sent to the DCI and Community principals as the formal,
coordinated TOR for the Estimate.
This process of TOR review almost invariably adds to the scope of
the paper. Rarely, if ever, are questions or issues dropped in the
course of such review, except when deemed outside the purview of
intelligence.
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7. The Drafting Process. The NIO will select a drafter for the
estimate, from within the Intelligence Community. The drafter thereafter is
responsible to the NIO for the estimate. The drafter seeks ideas and
contributions from the Intelligence Community and outside experts as he
develops the estimate.
The drafting process, however, is sometimes influenced by the
drafter's parent organization biases. The drafter--whatever his
parent organization--will usually submit his draft for review at
least to his own immediate superior and possibly higher reviewing
officials before the draft goes to the NIO. This is not always the
case, and usually is prompted by a desire to improve the writing
through peer review.
This review by the drafter's parent organization usually does
contribute in terms of clarity, style and accuracy, but it also can
affect the position taken by the drafter. In the real world,
however, any drafter will be in part influenced by his own
bureaucratic culture whether he undergoes his own in-house review
or not.
The NIO will review the draft closely and critically. He has
license to make any changes he feels are necessary in the interest
of clarity, style, length, comprehensiveness, focus, sharpness and
accuracy of judgment. Initial drafts often require extensive work
to insure that they are terse and estimative in character. The
NI0's changes in the draft reflect a balance of his own best
substantive judgment and an awareness that he will have to
coordinate the text with the Intelligence Community and that he has
an obligation to reflect their significant views in the main or
alternative text.
The draft estimate will then go to the SRP for independent review
and comment. The NIO will accommodate as much of the SRP
suggestions as he believes is appropriate. In most cases, SRP
suggestions for change and improvement are incorporated. The
revised draft is then sent to the DDCI and the DCI with a cover
memo indicating how the SRP comments were accommodated. In a "fast
track," this may occur after initial DCI review and simultaneous
with informing the DCI and NFIB principals of the results of
Community draft coordination.
DCI review at this point is intended primarily to ensure that the
draft meets the goals set forth in the TOR and to ensure sharpness
of judgment. The DCI may offer comment on substance as well but
prefers to reserve his comments until after he has heard from the
NFIB principals. Simultaneous with DCI review (this does not imply
his approval yet), the paper is sent to NFIB representatives for
review and staffing.
The NIO and the NFIB representatives take care throughout to ensure
that the policy community should not have impact on the conclusions
of the draft estimate. Policymakers do not attend the coordination
process.
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8. Draft Coordination. The role of the NIO at the coordination meeting
is a crucial one. He is responsible to the DCI to produce the best possible
estimate he can along the lines agreed upon in the TOR, and is responsible
to the Intelligence Community to assure that alternative views are
adequately expressed.
-- The estimate must reflect the best Community judgments but must not
be allowed to deteriorate into the "lowest common denominator"
consensus. It must reflect important alternative views while
avoiding the pitfalls of becoming a Christmas tree of endless
possibilities that destroy clarity of the judgment.
-- The NIO cannot simply be an "honest broker" among contending
parties; his role involves a greater degree of leadership--more
akin to that of judge and manager who must ultimately arbitrate
conflicts of view and serve as catalyst to ensure judgments are
considered and far-reaching. The NIO must avoid foreclosure of
debate or rejection of certain viewpoints by having recourse to
statements such as "the DCI has special interest in this issue," or
"the Secretary of wants," which can serve to
intimidate some representatives. The NIO should encourage
expression from all representatives of the Community, avoiding
dominance of the process by any one element or person.
-- Organizations and their representatives presenting dissenting
viewpoints have a special obligation to present a coherent and
significant alternative view that enriches the document--rather
than simply noting dissent or blurring the judgment.
9. Final DCI Review. The DCI receives an information copy of the
post-coordination draft as it is forwarded to all NFIB principals for review.
-- DCI comments or criticisms of the paper usually will be withheld
until after full discussion at NFIB with the principals. This is a
change from previous practice, in which DCI-proposed changes
usually were inserted prior to NFIB. This change is meant to
encourage a more free-flowing and active discussion of alternative
views at NFIB.
10. Final Review in the Intelligence Community. Following distribution
to NFIB principals, most agencies will submit the estimate to further
in-house review. Certain problems can arise in the course of this process.
-- Some Intelligence Community working level representatives may not
fully represent their agency and their principal at coordination
meetings--because of unresolved differences within the agency,
inability to get the view of the agency's principal, or lack of
empowerment. As a result, a commitment by a working level
representative at the pre-NFIB coordination meetings may not be
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supported by the NFIB principal, sometimes over lesser issues.
Getting the NFIB principals into discussions at the table is a
positive development in most cases, but sometimes the discussion is
over issues that could have been more efficiently handled by
effective representatives working with the NIO at pre-NFIB meetings.
Intelligence organizations attached to departments with
policymaking responsibility face other complications. Their
working level intelligence representatives sometimes commit their
NFIB principal to an intelligence judgment in the estimate that is
seen as unwelcome by the policy side of the department. This
places a special responsibility on the heads of INR, DIA, and the
Service intelligence organizations to insulate the intelligence
process from undue policy influence.
-- For whatever reason, we find that even after completion of working
level coordination and pre-NFIB distribution, representatives
sometime report back to the NIO that new changes are being sought
by their Agencies. This part of the process is vulnerable to
charges of politicization. These issues can be resolved,
however--pre-NFIB brokering for routine adjustments, and deferral
to NFIB hearing for those of greater significance.
11. NFIB. The National Foreign Intelligence Board represents the final
forum for adjudication of estimates. The DCI and the principals are free to
propose changes in the work of the Community representatives. It falls to
the DCI to stimulate discussion, to elicit explanations of disagreements, to
accept footnotes or alternative language, or to remand the estimate for
further work. The dissent procedure at NFIB is one of the important
mechanisms available to ensure that each intelligence agency has an
opportunity to express its views if they have not already been adequately
reflected earlier. Finally, it is the DCI who approves the document.
12. After NFIB. The NIO and the drafter accommodate changes directed
by the DCI as a result of NFIB deliberations. Usually, these changes will
be coordinated only by the NFIB representatives but any agency can request
further NFIB principal review depending on the nature of the changes.
13. Feedback. There is a feedback process that enables the DCI to
determine customer satisfaction. The DCI meets frequently with his senior
readers; the President and the Cabinet-level consumers. The NIOs meet with
sub-cabinet consumers on a daily or weekly basis. The interaction of senior
intelligence officers with intelligence consumers in the interagency
meetings occurs on a daily basis. All of these contacts afford the DCI the
opportunity to gauge consumer satisfaction with the product.
14. Competitive Analysis. While the community has no formal mechanism
to force competitive analysis, it does in fact exist. In addition to the
expression of alternative views in the estimates themselves, each agency in
the Intelligence Community is free to--and usually does--provide.its own
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in-house and contract studies and estimates which usually gain broad
dissemination. These (sometimes) alternative views are brought to bear in
coordination of National Intelligence Estimates or even after publication.
These individual Agency studies keep competitive analysis available to
policymakers.
15. The Problem of Evidence. Uncertainty needs to be clearly
identified in the text whenever judgments are made that are based more on
informed insight than abundant evidence. Appendices can buttress arguments
for positions taken in the text but meager evidence also cannot be allowed
automatically to bar a judgment. A judgment on an issue can sometimes be
sustained by insight into and experience with an area even when intelligence
is skimpy or ambiguous. This is especially true in areas involving
clandestine or covert activity by another party. In short, the drafter and
the Community likewise must not be so mesmerized by absence of indicators,
or by a misplaced faith in the most likely outcomes that it leads to
automatic rejection of judgments based on intuitive feel for behavior of the
players. Thus, on the evidentiary problem the Community is called to walk a
fine line between establishing a legal brief and accepting a position based
on circumstantial evidence and intuition in the absence of any certain
knowledge.
16. The Dilemma of Senior Level Review. The review of draft estimates
by the DCI and NFIB principals and their suggestions for changes can evoke
charges of politicization of the intelligence process. These individuals,
and their subordinate senior managers in particular, are closer to the
policy process than are the intelligence analysts who draft the estimates
and they bring a different outlook to the intelligence process. Differing
senses of international realities can be identified mistakenly as a
politically partisan view. The benefit of senior level review of estimates
is that it often brings to bear a broader view of the international order
and the character of international conflict. These views inevitably
influence the assessment of the likelihood of certain events. It is
important for all parties involved to distinguish between a legitimate
critique of a narrow, ill-formed or naive conception of politics or the
international order, and the advocacy of preferred political views on how
deal with the nature of the international conflict. In short, the higher
the level of generalization about how certain situations will evolve, the
more one's own unspoken philosophical sense of how the world works is
involved. Searching critiques of Community estimative views by senior
officials need not represent "politicization" of the process. But, the
senior reviewer must be careful that his critique is not in fact politically
driven or broadly perceived by the Community as such.
Products
17. Out of this process come four types of formal estimative products.
-- National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence
Estimates, or NIEs and SNIEs, go through all steps of the process
just outlined. As they bear the NFIB imprimatur and DCI signature,
they have the greatest weight. As a general rule NIEs deal with
broader subjects than SNIEs, deal with anticipated events, look
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further ahead, and more time is given to their preparation. The
SNIE usually treats with unanticipated events, more narrow
questions, and over a shorter period. SNIEs further differ from
NIEs in that they go through some of the steps in parallel rather
than in series, to expedite production of high priority and
time-sensitive requirements, but they still involve the key
players, the NFIB is still the final forum for adjudication, and
the DCI is still the final approval authority.
Interagency Intelligence Memoranda and Interagency Intelligence
Assessments, or IIMs and IIAs, differ from NIEs and SNIEs in that
they are less estimative in nature and do not necessarily go
through NFIB or bear the DCI's signature. But all agencies (in the
case of IIAs at least all those with a substantive interest) still
have the opportunity to coordinate, and agency representatives
still have the opportunity to bring their principal's point of view
to bear in the coordination process. Like the SNIEs, the IIAs go
through some of their steps in parallel. Where the issues emerge
as important enough, or the controversy surrounding them becomes
great enough, IIMs in particular can be and sometimes are elevated
to NFIB for consideration.
It should be noted that there are other intelligence products which
the NIOs work with the Community to produce, which are not formal
estimates and do not go through the formal coordination process.
Key among these are warning products, generated by discussions at
specially convened meetings between NIOs and Intelligence Community
representatives and then produced by the NIOs on a particular
issue, or combined by the NIO for Warning from all the NIOs for a
global review. The former are done on an as needed basis; the
latter are done monthly for the DCI and further distribution.
These warning products reflect Community views, often make note of
alternative views, but are not formally coordinated Community
products.
Further, the NIO, as senior staff advisor to the DCI in his
assigned area, fulfills a number of roles in which he does not have
any responsibility to represent the Community. In these roles,
such as producing talking points for DCI meetings or memos done as
think pieces for the DCI or wider distribution to stimulate
discussion, the NIO brings his own best judgment to bear. In these
cases, it is imperative that he make explicit the fact that his
views are his own, and he is not speaking on behalf of the
Intelligence Community, even though his views will have been formed
in the context of his interaction with that community.
18. In summary, the estimative process has some vulnerabilities in
terms of meeting everyone's sense of objectivity and integrity, but it also
contains many safeguards. These safeguards, consistently applied by all the
players in the process, from drafters and agency representatives through
NIOs and the NFIB principals, will provide the objectivity and integrity we
seek. To summarize these safeguards, they are:
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o Careful selection and orientation for each of the key people in the
process.
o The broadening of the scope of key policy questions to provide a
context beyond that suggested by policymakers.
o The exclusion of policymakers from the analytic and coordination
process, ensuring Intelligence Community independence.
o The participation by all elements of the Intelligence Community in
the development and coordination of estimates from concept through
final drafting.
o The development of most likely and alternative outcomes in
recognition of uncertainty on some evidence and the
unpredictability of some events.
o Explicit recognition in estimates of differing views within the
Intelligence Community on particular judgments.
o The right of any community member to explicitly dissent from any or
all parts of estimates.
o Numerous levels of review within each Agency throughout the process.
o The use of outside specialists and consultants for independent
views on selected issues.
o Evaluation of completed estimates and feedback to the preparation
of new ones as the cycle continues.
o The ability of member agencies of the Intelligence Community to
publish their own estimates and bring them to the attention of
policymakers whenever they feel that a new line of analysis needs
to be taken which may be at odds with the Intelligence Community's
consensus views.
o The DCI reviews the estimate at key points in its development to
ensure that the integrity and objectivity of the process is
maintained.
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ET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Vlahiv on, Q 020505
Mr. Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Dear Dick,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment:
As stated
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The Director of Central Intelligence
b shington.D.C20506
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mort,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment:
As stated
XET
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 I
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JCy1CC 1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Lenny,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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 i
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,TE-eRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
V sI*i on.D.C20505
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army
Director, National Security Agency
Fort Meade, MD 20755
Dear Bill,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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 i
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ET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Vlashingon,D.C20505
Mr. James H. Geer
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535
Dear Jim,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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 i
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Vl shir on. D. C 20505
Mr. Robert J. Walsh
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Bob,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment:
As stated
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP89TO1032R000100080021-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP89T01032R000100080021-9
SEA
The Director of Central Intelligence
% shUVon.D.C20505
Mr. Arthur Long
Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security)
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20220
Dear Art,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant'to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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 i
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-ISE ETA
The Director of Central Intelligence
Y14shingon, D. C. 20505
The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.
Secretary of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330
Dear Pete,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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 I
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SECgH-
The Director of Central Intelligence
wuhingon. D. 020505
Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
Dear Bill,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
7W
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 i
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SE
The DifEdor of Central intelligence
Nbshirtpn. D C 20505
Lieutenant General Sidney T. Weinstein, U.S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310
Dear Tom,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment:
As stated
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Major General Schuyler Bissell, U.S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330
Dear Sky,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment:
As stated
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Brigadier General Frank J. Breth, U.S. Marine Corps
Director of Intelligence
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20480
Dear Frank,
I enclose a copy of the report on the integrity and objectivity of the
national estimative process that has been submitted to the NSC pursuant to
the President's instruction in NSDD 266. That report benefited greatly from
our dialogue on the subject and your thoughtful inputs to the drafts, which
were greatly appreciated. The resulting product truly reflects, I feel, a
Community perspective thanks to your efforts and those of the other NFIB
Principals.
The associated revision of production guidelines is continuing, drawing
on our dialogue and inputs received from across the Community. A draft
should be available for review shortly. Together, these efforts should
strengthen an already sound estimative process. The cooperation that has
gone into this review exemplifies the close Community relationship that we
all desire and support. Again, thank you for your constructive
contributions; I look forward to our continued and close interaction in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
William H. Webster
Attachment:
As stated
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 266
March 31, 1987
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
SYSTEM II
90249
The President's Special Review Board submitted its Report on
February 26, 1987. I addressed the Nation on March 4 and
announced first, that I endorse the Board's recommendations; and
second, that I intend to go beyond the Board's recommendations to
put the National Security Council (NSC) process in even better
order. This Directive spells out the specific steps I have
approved to implement the letter and spirit of the Board's
recommendations.
Many steps were taken even prior to the issuance of the Board's
Report. The NSC staff was rebuilt and made subject to proper
management discipline. A directive was issued on my instruction
to prohibit the NSC staff itself from undertaking covert
operations. A comprehensive legal and policy review of such
operations, ordered by me, was already far advanced. Proper
procedures for consultation with the Congress were reaffirmed and
are being observed.
In light of the Board's Report, additional measures are
required. This Directive sets forth the specific timetable
according to which I expect all such measures to be completed.
It is of utmost importance that the NSC -- including all members
of, and advisors to, the NSC, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, the NSC staff, and all other
participants in the NSC process -- act decisively to accomplish
my objectives fully.
I shall inform Congress of the nature and progress of these
Executive branch efforts prior to the end of March; I also shall
call upon Congress to heed the balance of the Board's
recommendations, namely:
-- that no substantive change be made in the provisions of the
National Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of
the NSC system;
-- that the position of Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs not be made subject to Senate
confirmation; and
-- that Congress replace the existing Intelligence Committees
of the Senate and House of Representatives with a new joint
committee with a restricted staff to oversee the intelligence
community.
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These recommendations of the Board, which are addressed to
Congress, I also strongly endorse.
1. Model for the National Security Council System
The structure and procedures of the National Security Council
shall incorporate all aspects of the model of the NSC system
described in the Report of the President's Special Review Board
as the Board's principal recommendation. This directive
implements that recommendation in each of the following respects:
-- organizing for national security, including provision of
appropriate guidelines to participants in the NSC process;
the role and functions of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs;
the nature and responsibilities of the NSC staff; and
the NSC and interagency process.
A. Organizing for National Security
The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for
consideration of national security policy issues requiring
presidential decision. The function of the NSC shall be as set
forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Broadly
speaking, the NSC shall advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to the national security so as to enable Executive departments
and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security.
Participation in the NSC shall be as provided by law and this
Directive. Statutory members of the NSC are the President, the
Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense. Other heads of Executive departments and agencies and
senior officials within the Executive Office of the President
shall participate in the NSC as provided in this Directive.
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are statutory advisors to the NSC. The
Director of Central Intelligence' shall advise the NSC with
respect to coordinating intelligence activities of Executive
departments and agencies in the interest of national security are
as otherwise provided by law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff shall be principal military advisor to the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.
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The Directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and United States Information Agency are special statutory
advisors to the NSC. The Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament. Agency shall be principal advisor to the President,
the Secretary of State, and the NSC on arms control and
disarmament matters. The Director of the United States
Information Agency shall be principal advisor to the President,
the Secretary of State, and the NSC on international
informational, educational, and cultural matters.
The Secretary of State shall be the President's principal foreign
policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be responsible for
the formulation of foreign policy, subject to review within the
NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, and for
the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of
State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by
law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination,
and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to
foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive
departments and agencies of the United States overseas. Such
activities shall not include those of United States military
forces operating in the field under the command of a United
States area military commander, and such other military
activities as I elect, as Commander in Chief, to conduct
exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that
are internal to the execution and administration of the approved
programs of a single department or agency and that are not of
such nature as to affect significantly the overall United States
overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be
activities covered within the meaning of this Directive.
The Secretary of Defense shall be the President's principal
defense policy advisor. As such, the Secretary shall be
responsible for the formulation of general defense policy,
subject to review within the NSC process and the President's
guidance as appropriate, for policy related to all matters of
direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for
the execution of approved policy. I assign to the Secretary of
Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by
law and this Directive, for the overall direction, coordination,
and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to
defense policy formulation.
The Director of Central Intelligence shall be the President's
principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, the Director
shall be responsible for the formulation of intelligence
activities, policy and proposals, subject to review within the
NSC process and the President's guidance as appropriate, as set
forth in law and relevant Executive orders. I assign to the
Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to
the extent permitted by law, Executive order, and this Directive,
for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the
interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.
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Although taking part in the NSC system by virtue of official
positions as heads of Executive departments or agencies or as
senior officials within the Executive Office of the President,
all NSC participants shall sit as advisors to the President in
connection with the President's exercise of authority under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. In their capacity as
department and agency heads, NSC participants shall ensure the
effective and expeditious execution and implementation of overall
national security policies established by the President.
Execution and implementation of such policies shall not be the
responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs or of the NSC staff except as the President
specifically directs.
B. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
("National Security Advisor") shall have primary_responsibility
for day-to-day management of the National Security Council
process, and shall serve as principal advisor on the President's
staff with respect to all national security affairs. The
National Security Advisor shall have access and report directly
to the President, and shall keep the President and the Chief of
Staff to the President fully and currently informed on all
matters of substance.
As manager of the NSC process, the National Security Advisor
shall ensure the following: that matters submitted for
consideration by the NSC cover the full range of issues on which
review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a
full range of options is considered; that the prospects and risks
of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and other
information is available to NSC participants; that legal matters
are addressed; and that difficulties in implementation are
confronted. The National Security Advisor shall monitor policy
implementation to ensure that policies are executed in conformity
with the intent of presidential decisions. He shall initiate
periodic reassessments of policies and operations, in light of
changed circumstances or United States interests. The National
Security Advisor shall keep NSC participants currently informed
of presidential decisions. He shall ensure that NSC consulta-
tions and presidential decisions are adequately recorded, and
that appropriate and timely preparations are made with respect to
meetings convened under NSC auspices.
As the President's principal staff advisor on national security
affairs, the National Security Advisor shall present his own
views and advice and, at the same time, faithfully represent the
views of other NSC participants.
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C. The National Security Council Staff
The functions and responsibilities of the Executive Secretary of
the National Security Council shall be as provided by the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The Executive
Secretary heads the NSC staff and, in accordance with applicable
laws and regulations, appoints and fixes the compensation of
personnel required to perform such duties as may be prescribed by
the President, the NSC, or the National Security Advisor. The
Executive Secretary shall establish procedures within the NSC
Executive Secretariat for maximum effective support of the NSC
and the National Security Advisor in performance of
responsibilities assigned by the President. With the guidance
and under the instruction of the National Security Advisor, the
Executive Secretary shall develop and implement appropriate
policies with respect to the overall size of the NSC staff, the
background and experience of its members, the duration of their
service, and the organization of staff offices. The objectives
shall be twofold: first, an NSC staff that is small, highly
competent, broadly experienced in the making of national security
policy, and properly balanced from among Executive departments
and agencies and persons drawn from within and outside
governments and second, an NSC staff organization that imposes
clear, vertical lines of control and accountability.
The Executive Secretary, through the National Security Advisor,
shall recommend for my consideration specific measures designed
to enhance the continuity of the functioning of the NSC,
including measures to ensure adequate institutional recordkeeping
from administration to administration. Specific recommendations
for these purposes shall be made not later than June 30, 1987.
The NSC staff, through the Executive Secretary, shall assist the
National Security Advisor in each aspect of his roles both as
manager of the NSC process and as my principal staff advisor on
national security affairs.
The NSC staff shall include a Legal Advisor whose particular
responsibility it will be to provide legal counsel to the
National Security Advisor, the Executive Secretary, and the NSC
staff with respect to the full range of their activities, and to
assist the National Security Advisor in ensuring that legal
considerations are fully addressed in the NSC process and in
interagency deliberations. The NSC Legal Advisor shall be
accorded access to all information and deliberations as may be
required for these purposes, and shall advise the National
Security Advisor and Executive Secretary as appropriate on all
matters within his responsibility. He shall work cooperatively
with the Counsel to the President, the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, and with senior counsel to all other NSC
members, advisors, and participants.
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D. The National Security Council and Interagency Process
1. National Security Council Meetings
The National. Security Council shall meet regularly to consider
matters directed by the President or recommended by the National
Security Advisor or by the other NSC members. The National
Security Advisor shall attend all NSC meetings and shall be
responsible for the agenda and conduct of such meetings under my
direction. The statutory members of the NSC, and the Director of
Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
statutory advisors to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings. In
addition, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the Chief of Staff to the President at my invitation shall
attend NSC meetings. The special statutory advisors to the NSC,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the
heads of other Executive departments and agencies shall be
invited to attend such NSC meetings as relate to matters vested
under their authority.
The National Security Advisor shall provide NSC participants
advance notice of all NSC meetings and agenda therefor. To the
extent practicable, the National Security Advisor shall circulate
decision documents in advance of such meetings. The Executive
Secretary of the NSC and the NSC staff shall assist the National
Security Advisor in connection with appropriate preparations for,
and follow-up to, NSC meetings, as directed by the President.
Such assistance shall include preparation of meeting minutes and
the development and dissemination of decision documents and, as
appropriate, study directives. All decision documents shall be
submitted for the President's review and action by the National
Security Advisor. The National Security Advisor shall transmit
decision documents to the President through the Chief of Staff to
the President. National Security Decision Directives,
intelligence findings, and similar decision documents shall be
coordinated, in advance of their submission to the President, by
the NSC Legal Advisor with the Counsel to the President.
2. The Interagency Process
To assist the NSC at large and its individual members and
advisors in fulfilling their responsibilities, I previously
directed or authorized the establishment of senior interagency
groups and regional and functional interagency groups. The
purpose of such groups was to establish policy objectives,
develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations,
consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy
or overall national security policy, and undertake such other
activities as may be assigned by the NSC.
The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review the
structure of senior-interagency groups and regional and
functional interagency groups established pursuant to, or under
authority of, presidential directives or applicable memoranda,
and shall recommend all such changes thereto as may be necessary
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or desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the
Special Review Board's recommended model for the NSC system, as
well as all.of the Board's other recommendations. These include
establishment of an interagency process in which the National
Security Advisor chairs the senior level committees of the NSC.
The National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by
the NSC, a draft National Security Decision Directive for this
purpose not later than April 30, 1987.
II. Covert Actions and Use of Non-Government Personnel
I have directed the National Security Council's Planning and
Coordination Group (PCG) to review all covert action programs.
This review is designed to ensure that such programs are
commenced and pursued in accordance with law and are consistent
with United States policy. The PCG shall complete this review on
an expedited basis. It shall report its findings to the NSC on
or before April 30, 1987. The NSC promptly shall review all such
programs and seek my concurrence in their continuation as
appropriate. The NSC, through the National Security Advisor,
shall review current procedures for covert action policy approval
and coordination and shall recommend such changes as may be
necessary or desirable to ensure, among other things, the
following:
-- that proposed covert actions will be coordinated with NSC
participants, including the Attorney General, and their
respective recommendations communicated to the President;
-- that all requirements of law concerning covert activities,
including those requirements relating to presidential
authorization and congressional notification, will be addressed
in a timely manner and complied with fully;
-- consistent with the foregoing, that covert activities will
be subject to tightly restricted consideration, and measures to
protect the security of all information concerning such
activities will be enhanced;
-- that the NSC staff itself will not undertake the conduct of
covert activities; and
-- that the use of private individuals and organizations as
intermediaries to conduct covert activities will be appropriately
limited and subject in every case to close observation and
supervision by appropriate Executive departments and agencies.
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This review shall take fully into account such changes as I have
authorized by this Directive to the structure of the NSC. The
National Security Advisor shall present, for consideration by the
NSC, a revised National Security Decision Directive on procedures
for covert action policy approval and coordination not later than
April 30, 1987.
G III. Intelligence Process
Maintaining the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence
process is an important goal of the United States intelligence
effort. It demands, as the President's Special Review Board has
stated, careful differentiation between the respective roles of
foreign intelligence, on the one hand, and
the other. The Director of Central Intelligenceyshall cprovide
such additional review of, guidance for, and direction to, the
conduct of national foreign intelligence estimates as may
be required to accomplish fully this objective. The Director of
Central Intelligence shall review established procedures for the
production of national foreign intelligence estimates and, not
later than July 31, 1987, shall inform the NSC, through the
National Security Advisor, of any modifications or additions
thereto he may deem appropriate for this purpose.
IV. Reporting
The National Security Advisor shall keep me fully informed of
progress on all aspects of the implementation of the
recommendations of the President's Special Review Board.
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