INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS - - SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 22, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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Executive ecret y
USIB-D-24.7/ 3
22 October 1965
Limited Distribution
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT : Infiltration and Logistics- -South Vietnam
REFERENCE : USIB-M-397, 5 August 1965, Item 6
1. The attached study on the subject, prepared as a response to
the referenced United States Intelligence Board (USIB) action by an ad
hoc interagency working group, is circulated herewith for consideration
by the USIB. The ad hoc group was chaired by Df the
Board of National Estimates and included representatives of CIA,
State (INR), DIA and NSA, with the assistance of Army, Navy and Air
Force representatives.
2. The attached study is being placed on the agenda of the USIB
meeting scheduled for 28 October.
Attachment
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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AvaiZabZe
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USIB-D-21l.7 3
22 October 1965
INFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS -- SOUTH VIETNAM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY
FORCES AND THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Internal Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Internal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
External Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Critical Items of Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH
VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . . . 19
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points . . . . 28
Infiltration of Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . 34
Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forms of Sea Transportation Used . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . .
34
37
39
4o
V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . 42
Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
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Page
Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory . . . . . . . . . . 48
Cambodian Government Collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas . . . . . . . . . 54
ANNEXES
ANNEX A. TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED FROM THE VIET
CONG, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
ANNEX B. COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, DECEMBER 1964-
JUNE 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
ANNEX C. METHODS OF PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES . . . b3
ANNEX D. ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNAL VIET CONG LOGISTICS
NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5
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22 October 1965
The object of this study is to assess the nature and amount of the
support being provided to the Communist military forces and the popula-
tion under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in
which supplies and personnel are provided both from inside and from out-
side South Vietnam by land and by water.
CONCLUSIONS
(to follow)
SF ET
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Conclusions to
USIB-D-24.7/3
26 October 1965
Limited Distribution
A. The most important source of manpower and supplies for the
Viet Cong is South Vietnam itself. The Viet Cong have developed an
effective logistic system which procures from internal sources almost all
the supplies used by the Viet Cong. Important military materiel unavail-
able locally is obtained from external sources.
B. Within South Vietnam the Viet Cong transportation system and
network of supply bases are indispensable to the operations of their
forces at anything approaching the present level of military activity. The
volume of supplies moving internally and the total stockpile in the supply
bases cannot be determined from present evidence.
C. The Viet Cong are increasingly dependent on outside sources for
arms and ammunition, certain technical equipment, medical supplies,
cadre personnel, and trained technicians. These move into South
Vietnam via three principal routes, as follows:
1. The Laotian corridor, which is continuously being improved,
is the principal route for the movement of personnel and supplies from
SECRET
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'Nowe
Conclusions to
USIB-D-24.7/ 3
26 October 1965
Limited Distribution
North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Supplies moved over this route are
destined primarily for the northern and central highland areas.
2. The sea route from North Vietnam is probably being used
less at this time, although' it played an important part in stocking the
supply bases in the southern and coastal parts of the country. The use
of alternative routes for maintaining stocks of military materiel in these
areas has not been detected.
3. Relatively convenient land and water routes from Cambodia
provide direct access to the southern part of South Vietnam for the
movement of supplies largely commercially procurable in Cambodia.
Although there is cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian
government and military levels, central government policy, while
generally favorable to the Viet Cong, stops short of military support.
D. Although it is impossible to compute the total amount of supplies
available for infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, it appears
that the daily average thus far during 1965 has been at least 5 tons and
may have been more than 8 tons. These amounts, primarily delivered
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OI I LI MEW
Conclusions to
USIB-D-24e 7/3
26 October 1965
Limited Distribution
by truck in the past dry season, may have been supplemented by additional
'supplies moved by porters and other means of transport- The additional
amounts cannot be quantified. We have also been unable to determine
comparable figures for the sea route from North Vietnam and the land
and water routes from Cambodia. However, what evidence there is leads
to the conclusion that the tonnages moving over these latter routes are
significantly less than the tonnage moving through Laos.
SECRET
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1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environ-
ment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clan-
destine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the
Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See the map at
Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles 1/ of navigable
canals, rivers, and streams, and more than half of the area is flooded
each summer and autumn. The principal streams are 800 to 1,100 feet wide
in their upper courses and 2,500 feet to over 1 mile wide in their lower
courses. The land adjacent to the streams consists of large areas of
marsh and paddy land. Mangrove swamps also line the lower reaches of
some rivers.
2. The coastal. lowland extending northward from the delta plain
varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places, spurs of the high-
lands encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress
to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many
sheltered landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep
rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong
Valley lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the
Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the 14th
Parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with inter-
vening deep, narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however,
1 Mileages are given in statute miles and tonnages in short tons through-
out this report.
S&GAET
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is a complex of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains,
some with peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the
plateaus make surface transportation difficult.
3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles,
all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the
east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts
on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia
extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460
miles of which is in the delta area, and is crossed by numerous rivers and
streams that can be used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the
boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-mountain-
ous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads
cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains
north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong can also use trails to cross the
border in numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia is an area
of tension because of frequent clashes between the forces of both coun-
tries. The boundary with Laos continues &ener6ily northward for about 300
miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boun-
dary is generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones appar-
ently used most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the
border is hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between
North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope
of the Annam Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain
to the South China Sea. The Demilitarized Zone extends 5 kilometers
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(about 3 miles) on each side of the demarcation line. An inoperable
railroad and a road cross this line, but normal traffic on these routes
has been stopped by military outposts on both sides of the border.
4. Within South Vietnam the terrain for the most part enables the
Viet Cong to move supplies about quite freely using primitive transport.
Most of the population of South Vietnam lives in villages, principally
in the Mekong Delta. The few large towns are mainly in the delta and
along the coast. Settlements in the delta are built along the banks of
rivers and canals. Numerous small inland water craft provide the major
share of transport in this area both for the local populace and for the
Viet Cong. In the highlands, villages are located in scattered clearings
on high ground. A sparse network of mostly one-lane to two-lane bitum-
inous-treated roads links the large settlements and towns. The majority
of the settlements, however, are connected by tracks or, at best, by
one-lane earth roads or roads that have crushed-stone surfaces. Many
villages are linked only by trails. In such terrain the Viet Cong can
use porters, bicycles, carts, and occasionally modern vehicles. Poor
modern transportation, plus the fact that the Viet Cong can mingle with
the local traffic, makes government interception of Viet Cong traffic
very difficult.
SE CRE T
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II. SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND
THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Internal Organization
5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam -- the southern
branch of the Communist Party in North Vietnam -- is responsible for the
complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of pro-
viding most of the essential, nonmilitary goods for the Viet Cong organi-
zation. Operating through a vertical series of Party committees which
exist on almost all geographical levels from village to the Central
Office, South Vietnam (COSVN) the Party has attempted to develop internal
sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A wide array of front,
Party, and military elements -- under the overall direction of the
Party -- implement the principal tasks of production, acquisition, and
transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the
Party, the Rear Services of the Viet Cong military organization, and the
various units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSV) are the principal instrumentalities in these tasks. The Finance
and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of
the Viet Cong and the source of almost all supplies provided internally
and some of those provided externally. At the province level and above,
each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a policy level Party cadre
and includes the chief of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong main force
units. It is the responsibility of the various finance and economic
units to supervise the economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire
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the money and goods required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic
programs designed to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the
economy of South Vietnam.
6. As a principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics net-
work, the Finance and Economic Section irks closely ith'.the -Rear
Services of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV
organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services provides the
Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military
units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assist-
ance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the
NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies on these
organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the
Party, and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian
population by supplying the necessary goods.
Internal Sources
7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient in regard to
almost all nonmilitary supplies. Nonmilitary supplies available to the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam are indigenous or imported through legal or
illegal trade channels. The Viet Cong have developed a complex system
of economic operations devoted to acquiring financial and material re-
sources in South Vietnam for their military effort. Taxation, self-
initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear
to be the principal means of obtaining financial and material support
for the Viet Cong.
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8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most impor-
tant source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. The US
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) has estimated that the Viet
Cong collect 50 to 100 million piasters per province annually, or about
US $30 million to $60 million per year in all of South Vietnam. There
is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collections in cash and
in kind, but it is known that the Viet Cong impose agricultural, planta-
tion, transportation, and business taxes on a wide scale throughout the
country. Although tax payments are probably the major source of local
currency, bond drives, monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also
represent significant sources of local currency.
There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage
of local currency, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that
the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of
2 This range is intended to be a rough approximation of internally
acquired Viet Cong resources. In comparison, central government revenues
in 196+ totaled about $175 million, mainly from indirect taxes and cus-
toms duties collected in the Saigon metropolitan area. South Vietnamese
piasters were converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 73.5
piasters to US $1.
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administering additional areas that may come under their control.
9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of
Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed
progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25
separate rates in the Mekong delta region alone. If these rates had been
applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the
delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 100,000
tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta or
even on a national basis. J Because equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are
applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated
that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide requirements
for food in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricul-
tural tax collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been
applied as systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta
area. However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agri-
cultural tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice,
salt, manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area
the Viet Cong often purchase or confiscate rice and salt.
10. Plantation taxes -- either in money or in kind -- also account
3 During January through August, rice deliveries to Saigon from the
delta totaled about 650,000 tons in 1963, 41+0,000 tons in 1964, and
31+0,000 tons in 1965. It is possible that Viet Cong tax collections
account for most of this so-called shortfall of deliveries to Saigon.
There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong are smuggling
rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate
funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed
of through Cambodia is not known.
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for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. Rubber plantations
close to War Zones C and D (see map at Annex) provide an important means
of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas; these plantations possess
large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long
been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure. According to a recent
captured document, the annual plantation tax is approximately 1,000
piasters ($13.70) per hectare (2.47 acres) or a total of about $1 million
for the potentially exploitable area of 75,000 hectares if subject to
Viet Cong taxation. Wage taxes on plantation workers and Viet Cong de-
mands for labor service for transportation are also known to exist on a
internal transportation of the country, both
personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is
impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from this source.
Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and commercial acti-
vities whenever possible. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas
outside of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters,
charcoal kilns, and sawmills are generally easy prey for the Viet Cong.
Import and export taxes are levied against trade between areas controlled
by the Viet Cong and areas controlled by the central government in order
to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the
Viet Cong. Thus the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing sup-
plies into areas controlled by the Viet Cong is not taxed at all, but
the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.
11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources avail-
able to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial.
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operations such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit
cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to
support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under
Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts to produce their own
foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made by the Viet Cong
in the central highlands. Units to produce clothing have been estab-
lished as subordinate elements of the Rear Services of the Viet Cong
military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm
implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such
as mines, and grenades. Where materials are not ordinarily available
through other means, they are often seized outright, although it is some-
times difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced
tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant sup-
plies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, food-
stuffs, and military equipment.
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14. Military supplies that are moved via North Vietnam usually are
transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam.
Until early 1965 the International Control Commission (ICC) observers
were permitted to read the manifests but were not permitted to inspect
the contents of the freight cars that moved into North Vietnam from China
through Dong Dang. After the bombing of North Vietnam began and the
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were pulled back to Hanoi in early 1965,
reported that two military trains per day obviously loaded with many
kinds of war materiel moved into North Vietnam. Although this materiel
undoubtedly was destined for the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam
(PAVN), supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken from PAVN stor-
age areas. Reports are also available indicating that military supplies
have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships to various
points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible that
munitions are moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments
have been identified. Information on the cargo carried by the 425
foreign merchant ships that called at Haiphong during 1964 is not com-
plete. However, about 175 of the ships were owned by Bloc countries,
and a considerable number of the Free World ships calling there were
chartered to Bloc countries. Foreign seamen have reported that some
merchant ships have unloaded cargo into junks and other small craft
before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo could have been des-
tined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much of which seems to
originate in the Haiphong area.
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Critical Items of SupLly
16. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong depend on the countryside
and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation
policy permits payments in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food
items. Where food is not p3ntiful, particularly in the mountainous
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areas, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in farming.
According to recently captured documents, prior to June 1963 the Viet
Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by
COSVN to provide their own subsistence for a period of 4 months per
year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by COSVN.
From June 1963 to June 1961+, all units were required to furnish 100
percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1961+, combat units have
provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent.
Some reports have indicated that PAVN battalions operating in the
northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies
from external sources.
17. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile
products, such as hammocks and mosquito nets, are not extensive.
Because of the mild climate, clothing is not a major problem. A num-
ber of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uniforms,
underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks, are
produced in North Vietnam. For the most paxt, these items have been
issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two
uniforms, a knapsack, a hammock, and a mosquito net when entering the
country. Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear
Services of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet
Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from
Cambodian sources.
18. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the
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present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers
are located within South Vietnam and probably have been located tem-
porarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of
these medical facilities have been identified, some of which are re-
ported to be well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated
equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs.
One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Viet-
nam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates, most drugs can
be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities.
Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical sup-
plies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically
directed toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and supply con-
voys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist
and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.
19. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building
up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of peni-
cillin and blood plasma -- both of which are widely used in treating
battle casualties -- have risen sharply in 1965. Although Communist
countries have been the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals,
Japan has provided virtually all the blood plasma imported by North
Vietnam. The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from
North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known. In addition to equipping
the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese
reportedly have used infiltrators to carry small packets of medical
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supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine
derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of trans-
porting pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to deli-
ver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal vessels
and over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam these
supplies presumably would be stored in central areas near base hospitals.
20. Viet Cong requirements for POL products probably are quite
small. They have some organic vehicles and self-propelled craft, how-
ever, and also power generators and other power-driven equipment for
which they need fuel. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks,
outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local
gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisition
from internal sources.
21. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are
unknown. Simple construction in base areas probably can be accomplished
by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the
Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement.,
their access to other internal and external sources of construction mate-
rials is not known.
22. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has
been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind
by retreating government forces in South Vietnam; supplies infiltrated
by land and sea; captured supplies; and locally produced supplies. The
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I I
available quantities are unknown, but it is evident that substantial
quantities of Soviet and Eastern European weapons and Chinese Communist
copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use
by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has
enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardiza-
tion within main force units. Older weapons are being passed on to
guerrilla units. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be
on the reloading of ammunition and the fabrication of mines, grenades,
and other explosive devises, rather than on the production of rifles and
more complicated weapons. Some repair work is also carried on. The
majority of the Viet Cong production facilities are located from Viet
Cong Military Region VI south to Ca Mau. Annex A contains a list, by
country of origin, of the types of Communist-supplied and locally-
produced weapons and ammunition captured by central government and US
forces from the Viet Cong.
23. Most of the telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong
consists of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from the South
Vietnamese. The importance of this source of supply has been noted in
Viet Cong communications plans and in the North Vietnamese program of
training Viet Cong operators in the use of US equipment. The types of
radio equipment captured range from handheld, low-power transceivers to
relatively large, vehicle-mounted, transmitters having power ratings of
from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has been augmented to a
small extent by comparable equipment of Soviet, Chinese Communist, and
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Japanese manufacture, and by locally manufactured equipment. Spare parts
and batteries are obtained by capture, infiltration, and purchase.
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III. LAND INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved
24+. There is a scarcity of information on the overland movement
of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam
to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It is apparent, however,
that a major corridor from North Vietnam through Laos serves as a
principal means of transporting supplies. Within this corridor,,
there are at least two distinct land routes. Both of these routes end
in the same series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward
supply points. From these points in Laos, supplies are moved across
the South Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts,
and pack animals.
25. The route from Mu Gia Pass via routes 12/23/9/92 is the
higher capacity route. This road network is in part useable only
in the dry season for through motor transport, but it can be used
during the remainder of the year by a combination of methods. Its
maximum use is from about mid-December through May or June to supply
the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong
in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages
along routes lA and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos and then south
on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9.
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V&Wf Ivor
Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at
the junction of routes 9 and 92 and then move down route 92 toward
the South Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a very important
portion of this supply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck
traffic is restricted from about June through November each year
because of flooding and ground softening caused by the southwest
monsoons. The Communists have nearly finished constructing route 911
as an alternate to parts of routes 23 and 9. When completed this road
will reduce the distance from Mu Gia Pass to Sepone (Tchepone) by
about one-third.
26. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, some supplies for
the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During
January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed
moving south on route 23. Although some of these trucks probably
carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, the
remainder of the supplies may have been stockpiled or portered
over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam.
Again in 196+ large convoys moved during the dry season only.
Observation by road-watch teams was so incomplete in both years
that it is impossible to estimate with confidence the volume of
supplies moved into the area, or to establish the amount of materiel
which may have been stockpiled or moved on into South Vietnam. As
a result of considerably improved reporting by the road-watch teams
during the 1965 dry season, however, it is possible to estimate that
the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks
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VI. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES
Organization Control
68. Internal distribution of infiltrated supplies and transportation
of locally procured goods are basic elements of the Viet Cong logistics
network. About 14,000 personnel, exclusive of enforced labor, are used
on a full-time basis. Viet Cong emphasis on the importance of local
self-sufficiency testifies to efforts to reduce the internal logistics
task. On the other hand, the existence of known internal logistics
operations confirms that the requirements for internal distribution and
transportation are substantial.
69. Viet Cong logistics operations are organized at all levels from
COSVN to the village Party chapter. At every major echelon of the Party,
the Viet Cong have a route protection or communications-liaison section
whose mission is to establish, maintain, and supervise safe corridor
routes for the flow of men, materiel, and messages. For security reasons,
the Viet Cong appear to maintain separate routes for these transport tasks
with the organizational subordination of any given task determined by the
nature and importance of the task. The route protection and communications-
liaison section of the Party exercises a crucial role in approving and
safeguarding all types of logistics support operations. An estimated
2,000 or more Party cadre are probably directly associated with the com-
munications-liaison function as guides, security personnel, station atten-
dants, and supervisory personnel. In general, these sections supervise
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the work of the two basic transport organizations -- the Rear Services
transport units and the Finance and Economic transport units.
70. Special and organic transport elements directed by the Rear
Services are found at all military echelons from COSVN to local (regular)
forces. The military elements of COSVN and the Viet Cong military
regions control special military transport units which appear to be
primarily concerned with the receipt and redistribution of infiltrated
supplies. About 5,800 personnel are associated with these special mili-
tary transport units subject to region or Central Office level control,
according to MACV. In addition, every military echelon of the main and
local forces has an organic transport element under its Rear Services
to provide logistic support for its military and non-military require-
ments. An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 personnel are associated with these
organic transport units.
71. The second basic element involved in internal distribution and
transport consists of the transport units of the Finance and Economic
Section of the Party. These transport units appear to be generally
responsible for transferring goods acquired locally to depots estab-
lished within their area. In most cases, it is believed that the
organized transport element of the Finance and Economic element is rela-
tively small and is primarily responsible for recruiting local civilian
personnel to accomplish movement of supplies. In some cases, however,
where the movement of civilian-type goods is substantial, nonmilitary
transport units have been permanently established under the Finance and
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VANO s
Economic Section. About 2,000 personnel are probably permanently associ-
ated with transport elements of the Finance and Economic Section.
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas
72. Personnel, infiltrators, and supplies acquired from both internal
and external sources are moved over a fairly well-established network of
protected routes within the Viet Cong-controlled areas of South Vietnam.
The network includes an interconnected system of depots and way stations
all the way from Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces in the north to the
Ca Mau peninsula in the south. There are two roughly parallel north-south
corridors, one of which closely follows the western border of the country
and is used mainly for personnel. The other corridor is located nearly
midway between the coast and the western border and extends from the
highland region above the Do Xa base area to War Zone D northeast of
Saigon. It is probably used for both personnel and materiel. These two
corridors have several lateral routes leading east and west to and from
infiltration points along the coast and the Laos and Cambodian borders.
Both internal main corridors connect with COSVN base areas in Tay Ninh
Province north of Saigon. Here COSVN apparently maintains the principal
agency for coordinating operations over the entire system. This has
been identified as the Postal Transportation and Communication Branch.
The Tay Ninh base in turn forms the principal connection with at least
three other corridors including the remainder of the network which forms
a loop within the Mekong delta region, See the map at Annex for location
of the Viet Cong war zones, storage areas, and main redistribution cor-
ridors, and Annex D for organizational chart.
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73. Study of the routes, when plotted in detail on a map, shows
that this logistic network relies heavily on overland movement and that
the principal motorable roads are generally not used. Principal water-
ways are used, however, in the delta region and several land routes
follow streams (probably for guidance at night). It is also noted that
a major portion of the network is located at or near provincial boun-
daries where South Vietnamese surveillance may be least effective.
Comparison of this network with a map of the current status of pacifica-
tion shows that a considerable part of the transport system runs through
unsecured territory which may be controlled by the South Vietnamese in
the daytime but is used by the Viet Cong at night when most of their
supply movements take place.
74. Supply depots which would normally have a nominal capacity of
from 5 to 10 tons of supplies each are sometimes connected with the way
stations and are controlled by the appropriate logistic organization.
Although classes of supplies in these depots are usually mixed, some
contain only weapons and ammunition, and some handle food exclusively.
A typical depot may be described as consisting of a small cluster o
huts or shelters surrounded by a security fence and occasionally an auto-
matic weapons emplacement, all well concealed under foliage. A minimum
of traffic is allowed at the depot, deliveries by transport units being
made at some distance from the depot with final haul and storage made
by the depot cadre. According to Viet Cong documents, supplies are moved
in stages and handled through as many depots as necessary to insure their
security and to build up a reserve for support of an engagement by Viet
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Cong forces. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands
were considerably smaller than at present, food depots were limited to
a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of South Vietnamese government
action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased,
the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic constraint on the rapid
initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions.
75. Because the communications-liaison routes often run across
open country or over back roads and the Viet Cong do not possess any
sizeable inventory of motor trucks, much of the shipment of supplies is
handled by teams of porters provided by the local village and district
Viet Cong organizations. Other forms of transport have also been
utilized in significant amounts in the lowlands and in the delta region,
including trains of oxcarts, river and coastal water craft, "hired"
three-wheeler Lambretta-type motorcycle carriers, and occasionally com-
mandeered cargo trucks. Movements by the transport units are secured
by route protection forces usually assigned from local guerrilla units.
These security troops may conduct raids near the routes as a diversion
to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.
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v
TYPES OF COMMUNIST-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAPTURED FROM THE VIET CONG
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)
7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSh) VC modified
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)
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Iftw, 'ROW
60-mm Mortar, Model 31
82-mm Mortar
90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51
Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge,
7.62-mm
7.62-mm
7.62-mm
7.62-mm
7.62-mm
7.92-mm
12.7-mm
Cartridge,
Cartridge,
Cartridge,
Cartridge,
Cartridge,
Cartridge
Cartridge
40-mm Grenade, PG-2
60-mm Shell, mortar
82-mm Shell, mortar
75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun
Model 50
Model 53
Model 56
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Carbine, Model M44
7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSh 41
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46
23-mm Cannon
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1..- w
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32
3. Czechoslovakia
a. Weapons:
7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B4+6
b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited):
7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle
7.92-mm Cartridge, Mauser
4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel
a. Weapons and Explosive Devices:
Skyhorse (VC-Type Bazooka)
Grenade launcher
AA Machinegun (modified from US-50-caliber MG)
AT Parachute hand grenade
Bicycle mine
Mine delay firing device
Shaped charge (2 types)
Shaped mine, short cone type
Hollow cone mine, non-electric
AP mine, cylindrical type
AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)
AT mine, cast iron fragmentation
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AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)
AT mine, iron case, cylindrical
AT mine, wooden, box type
Mine, turtle shaped, cement
Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal
Mine, betel box shaped, cement
Mine, round volume type, sheet metal
Mine, round mound type, cement
Mine, 81-mm mortar container
Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-10
Incendiary grenade, sodium
Chemical firing device
AP mine, match box size
Antenna detonating device
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METHODS OF PACKAGING AND
TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES
1. Supplies are packaged in boxes, crates, bags, or other means
normally used for market transactions or in sizes, shapes, and weights
that can be handled by one porter. Listed below are some of the methods
used:
a. Rice in 220-pound fiber bags or sacks.
b. Rice in 22-pound to 33-pound tubular cloth sacks carried
over the shoulder or across the back.
c. Salt in bags or sacks.
d. Ammunition in squared, wooden boxes or cases, about 50
pounds each.
e. Shoulder weapons wrapped in oil soaked rags or waterproof
paper.
f. Fuel in standard barrels or in cans of about 5 gallons each.
g. Fish in cans or dried and salted in sacks.
h. Meat, usually dried, in sacks.
i. Clothing in sacks.
j. Medicines in bottles or syrettes, in sizes that can be
concealed on a person.
k. Chemicals: saltpeter in 220-pound units; sulphur in 110-
pound to 220-pound units; acid in less than one-quart bottles;
mercury in containers weighing about 22 pounds.
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2. Transportation methods vary but are generally as follows:
a. By vehicles -- car or truck.
b. By human porters with 40-pound to 60-pound loads in back
packs or shoulder poles, traveling in teams of 10 to 100 men.
c. Single or dual bicycles with up to 500-pound loads,
traveling in teams of up to 30 men.
d. Horses and mules (seldom reported) with loads of 150 to
300 pounds.
e. Elephants with loads of 800 pounds.
f. Bull carts with 1,500 pounds.
g. Sampans with up to 1,500 pounds.
h. Motor carts (3-wheel) with 500 pounds.
i. Junks and oceangoing ships.
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-Imw -low
TOP SECRET
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012!08110 : CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180011-3