SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005000020005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 17, 1955
• Content Type: NIE

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D iFIN N I'E 11-3-55
- OEJTIAL f -a
17 May 1955
# 032459
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-3-55
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE
SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizatio s participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Cenral IntelligenceS4gen-
cy and the intelligence organizg*ns of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
and the Atomic Energy Commssion.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
2U0
on 17 May 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic En-
ergy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant
to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.
1UURN TO : i;M ^~?
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COPY NO.
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CLASS. CHANJC,ED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: Iq v
Ali T H: HR 70-2
DATE: nLQ MP`2'8l REVIEWER: OOs1
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1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-
partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
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Operations Coordinating Board
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
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LI V I a I I IJ L - 1 G 1 U-11-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . 7
Problem of Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Relations Between the Soviet People and, the Regime . : . 8
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST
BLOC STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sino-Soviet Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Soviet-Satellite Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY . . . . . 11
Soviet Economic Policy . . . ... . . . ... . . . . 11
Soviet Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Developments in Soviet Industry . . . . . . . . . 14
Developments in Soviet Agriculture . . . . . . . . . 17
Soviet Consumption Levels . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Developments in Soviet Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . 20
IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS . . . . 22
? Magnitude of Scientific Assets - Policy and Priorities . . . 22
Scientific Education and Manpower . . . . . . . . . . 23
Scientific and Technical Developments of Military Signifi-
cance ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Guided Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Electronics and Communications . . . . . . . . . 25
Biological Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH . . . . . . 28
Size of Forces, Scale of Effort, Trends . ... . . . . . . 28
Soviet Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Eastern European Satellite Forces . . . . . . . . . 33
Communist Chinese Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CONFIDENTIAL
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WIN -. I U LL ,I I L
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR . . . . . . . 35
World Balance of Military Forces . . . . . . . . . . 35
Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities . . . . . . . . 35
Offensive Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION . . . . 39
The Factor of Communist Ideology . . . . . . . . 39
The Postwar Background .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
The Soviet View of Current Developments . . . . . . . 39
Probable Soviet Estimate of Future Developments . . . . 41
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION . . . . . . 42
Present Soviet Objectives . . . . . . . . . 42
Courses of Action - General . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Courses of Action in Particular Areas . . . . . . . 44
Tables of Military Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
CONFIDENTIAL
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%Ov. I. I . 1/ So. ? ^ .. .r
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET
COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weak-
nesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through 1960.
Political
CONCLUSIONS
1. The totalitarian character of the So-
viet political system is unlikely to be al-
tered in any important respect during the
period of this estimate. It appears that
a struggle for personal power, probably in
a context of differences over policy, has
been going on within the small ruling
group and is as yet unresolved. Although
this struggle may be sharpened during
the period of this estimate, we continue
to believe that it will be confined to the
small group at the apex of the power
structure, and will not result in open
violence involving the police or military
forces. (Paras. 22-26)
2. The relations between the USSR and
Communist China are probably now con-
ducted as between allied powers having
common interests and a common ideo-
logy, but also separate and potentially
conflicting national objectives. Despite
the possibility of some frictions between
the two countries, they will almost cer-
tainly maintain a relationship of close
alliance throughout the period of this
estimate. The continuing dependence of
Communist China on the USSR for sup-
port of its military and economic pro-
grams gives the USSR great influence
over Chinese policy, but this would prob-
ably not be decisive in matters which the
Chinese believed involved their own vital
interests.' (Para. 32)
Economic
3. Soviet economic policy during the
period of this estimate will almost cer-
tainly be directed primarily toward a con-
tinued rapid growth of basic economic
and military strengths and the mainte-
nance of high peacetime levels of military
1 The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
consider that this paragraph overstates the de-
gree of independence which Communist China
enjoys in matters of major policy. They believe,
therefore, that the last clause should be deleted,
and the following substituted:
"We believe therefore that the Soviet leaders
would almost certainly be able to apply sufficient
pressure, including the curtailment, and if nec-
essary the withdrawal, of economic and military
aid, in order to obtain Chinese conformity to
Soviet views."
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WW 1a1 JL/L.111 11Ut1-
TOP SECRET
production. Heavy industry will con-
tinue to be the primary focus of Soviet
economic activity. (Para. 41)
4. The rate of growth of the Soviet econ-
omy has been declining in recent years
and will continue to decline during the
period of this estimate. We estimate that
the annual increase in Soviet gross na-
tional product (GNP) by 1960 will prob-
ably be slightly less than five percent,
compared to a seven percent increase in
1954. Although absolute defense ex-
penditures apparently are to increase
markedly in 1955 over 1954, we believe
that they will probably increase hence-
forth at a slower rate and will be about
15 percent higher in 1960 than in 1955.
(Para. 43)
5. The expansion of agricultural produc-
tion and the procurement of foodstuffs
for the cities are problems which will con-
tinue to plague Soviet leaders during the
period of this estimate. Some of the more
recent agricultural measures like the
"new lands" program and the corn cul-
tivation campaign appear to be less realis-
tic than the measures announced earlier.
Although the results achieved will almost
certainly fall far short of plans for a near-
ly 100 percent increase, we estimate that,
with average weather conditions, there
will be approximately a' 30 percent in-
crease in agricultural production in 1960
over 1954. Per capita consumption will
probably rise, although at a rate far more
modest than that held out to the people
in the government's statements of 1953.
(Paras. 57-62)
6., We estimate that in 1960 Soviet GNP
will be roughly two-fifths that of the US,
as compared with about one-third in
1954; however, the US economy, will prob-
ably continue to draw ahead in absolute
terms, the dollar gap between the two
economies increasing from $228 billion to
about $269 billion. The USSR allocates.
an exceptionally large volume of re-
sources to investment and defense-in
the case of investment about four-fifths
and in defense about one-half the
amounts allocated to these sectors in the
US economy. (Para. 42)
7. The Soviet regime will, in the pursuit
of its objectives, continue to face difficult
choices in resource allocation. On the
one hand, increasingly heavy investment
outlays will be needed in order to main-
tain high rates of economic growth. On
the other hand, military requirements
constitute the chief competitor for the
resources on which investment must
draw. Consequently, if the Soviet regime
should choose to increase military ex-
penditures at a rate substantially higher
than we have estimated in paragraph 4
above, a reduction in the rate of growth
of the economy as a whole and in con-
sumption levels would result. (Paras. 43,.
56)
Military
8. We believe that, generally speaking,
the personnel strength of Soviet and
other Bloc forces will remain substantial-
ly unchanged during the period of this
estimate. However, the over-all effective-
ness of these forces will increase, mainly
because of the following factors:
a. Introduction into the Soviet Air
Force during the present year of super-
sonic interceptors, jet heavy bombers,
and four-engine turbo-prop aircraft,
probably heavy bombers; an increase in
the number of all-weather fighters and
jet medium bombers;
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(lVIMI IULIV 1_I/1L
b. A great increase in numbers of nu-
clear weapons, and in the range of yields
derived from these weapons;
c. A great increase in the number of
long-range submarines;
d. Generally improved and modernized
weapons available to Soviet ground forces,
together with changes in organization
and tactics designed to adapt these forces
to nuclear warfare.
If the USSR in fact develops the guided
missiles which we estimate to be within
its capabilities, these will provide a sig-
nificant increment to over-all Soviet mili-
tary effectiveness. (Paras. 103, 144)
9. At present the main Soviet offensive
strength lies in the capability to mount
large-scale ground attacks against West-
ern Europe, together with air attacks
against Western Europe and the UK and
an extensive submarine campaign to dis-
rupt the flow of reinforcements and sup-
plies from North America. During the
period of this estimate the additions to
Soviet air strength listed above will in-
crease very markedly the ability of the
USSR to launch air attacks against dis-
tant targets, including the continental
US. The growing submarine force will
also pose a greatly increased threat to
allied naval forces and shipping. (Paras.
133-134, 138)
10. During the period of this estimate the
Bloc air defense system will probably be
substantially strengthened by greater
operational experience and by the intro-
duction into operational units of new
fighter types (including all-weather),
new antiaircraft weapons, improved early
warning and GCI equipment, and guided
missiles. However, in view of the in-
creasing capabilities of offensive weapons
and improved techniques in counter-
measures, Soviet air defense capabilities
will probably remain inadequate to pre-
vent attacking forces from reaching criti-
cal target areas of the USSR. (Para.
137)
11. The chief limitations on Soviet armed
forces are likely to arise from the vast
size of the USSR, the great distances from
main interior sources of supply to several
main operational areas, the relatively in-
adequate road and rail network, and the
acute shortage of Bloc-registered ship-
ping. The Soviet rail system would be
vulnerable to air attack in general war,
and Soviet armed forces would eventually
suffer logistical difficulties, especially
in operations in the Far East., Other de-
ficiencies during the period of this esti-
mate will probably be in experience and
training for long-range air operations,
and in certain equipment for air defense,
together with lack of capability for long-
range amphibious and surface naval oper-
ations. The questionable political relia-
bility and relatively low combat effective-
ness of many of the Satellite forces will
continue to limit their usefulness to the
USSR, especially for offensive operations.
(Paras. 103-104, 124)
Probable Courses of Action
12. We believe that the principal imme-
diate objectives of Soviet external policy
during the period of this estimate will
be: (a) to promote the political and eco-
nomic instability of non-Communist
states, and to render them incapable of
decisive action by fostering and exploit-
ing neutralism and dissensions within
and among them; (b) to bring about the
withdrawal of US power from its present
advanced bases around the periphery of
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the Bloc; (c) to impede or offset the re-
armament of West Germany and its
association with the Western Powers; and
(d) to detach Japan from the sphere of
Western influence and encourage its
closer association with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. At the same time the USSR will
continue to pursue its fundamental aim
of expanding Communist influence and,
as opportunities develop, of extending the
area of Communist control. (Para. 158)
13. The Soviet leaders probably now be-
lieve (a) that general war would present
formidable hazards to the survival of
their system, and (b) that they can make
progress toward their objectives by polit-
ical action, and in some cases by localized
military action. Therefore, we believe
that during the period of this estimate
the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of
action, and to deter Communist China
from courses of action, which in its judg-
ment would clearly involve substantial
risk of general war. The Soviet leaders
are unlikely to believe that Soviet, Com-
munist Chinese, or European Satellite
forces can be used in open attacks across
recognized state frontiers during this
period without running such a risk.
However, the USSR or one of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc countries might engage
in indirect aggression or take action
which would create a situation in which
the US or its allies, rather than yield an
important position, would take counter-
action which could lead to general war.
We believe, moreover, that the Kremlin
would not be deterred by the risk of
general war from taking counteraction
against a Western action which it con-
sidered an imminent threat to-Soviet se-
curity. Thus, general war might occur
during the period of this estimate as the
climax of a series of actions and counter-
actions, initiated by either side, which
neither side originally intended to lead
to general war. (Para. 159)
14. We believe that the USSR will, despite
the growth of its nuclear capability dur-
ing the period of this estimate, continue
to try to avoid substantial risk of general
war, since the Soviet leaders will probably
still not be confident that they could
attack the US with nuclear weapons with-
out exposing the USSR to an even more
devastating counterblow. However, as
their nuclear capabilities grow, Soviet
leaders may come to estimate that the US,
because of fear for itself or for its allies,
or because of pressures exerted by its
allies, will be increasingly deterred from
initiating the devastation entailed in a
full-scale nuclear war. They may there-
fore come to believe that local wars will
be less likely than at present to expand
into general war, and thus that superior
Bloc military capabilities in certain local
areas can be exercised without substan-
tial risk of provoking general war. (Para.
161)
15. We believe that Soviet' diplomacy dur-
ing the period of this estimate will not be
directed toward a general settlement be-
tween the USSR and the West. It will al-
most certainly continue to combine moves
intended to ease international tensions
with other moves which increase. such
tensions, and with political warfare pres-
sures calculated to play upon the non-
Communist world's fear of war. At pres-
ent the USSR is engaged in very active
diplomacy on a number of important
issues-Austria, disarmament, Yugo-
slavia, Japan - and has made important
concessions, though no apparent impor-
tant sacrifices as yet. We believe that
Q P, M flT L,--- i I I I 'Al ~
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UUNHAMAL
the current Soviet diplomatic efforts are
directed primarily toward preventing
the rearmament of Germany in close
alliance with the West, and that the
ground is being prepared for new So-
viet proposals on this subject, perhaps
at Four Power meetings during this sum-
mer. We also believe that in connection
with the forthcoming peace treaty nego-
tiations with Japan the USSR is likely to
make some concessions in the hope of pro-
moting frictions in the relations of Japan
with the US and encouraging Japanese
neutralism. (Para. 162)
16. It is possible, however, that the Soviet
leaders also desire a substantial and pro-
longed reduction in international ten-
sions that would not only prevent German
rearmament but also further their other
objectives, including US withdrawal from
advanced bases and a reduction of the
incentive for the West to maintain its
present defense efforts. The Soviet lead-
ers may also feel that such a reduction
of international tensions is desirable be-
cause of the pressure of their own inter-
nal problems. (Para. 163)
17. The principal objective of Soviet poli-
cy in Europe is to obtain a solution of the
German problem favorable to Soviet in-
terests. Prevention or slowing down of
West German rearmament and blocking
the development of West Germany's ties
with the NATO powers have first priority.
To achieve these aims, Soviet policy will
almost certainly make great efforts to in-
fluence the situation in West Germany
itself. The Soviet leaders probably cal-
culate that by sedulous encouragement of
German hopes for unification they can,
for a limited time, increase neutralist
feeling in West Germany, complicate the
relations of the West German Govern-
ment with its NATO partners, and under-
mine unity of purpose within the NATO
alliance. The settlement of the Austrian
problem, together with the recent Soviet
proposals on disarmament and the cur-
rent advances to Yugoslavia, may indicate
a Soviet willingness, in the course of fur-
ther negotiations, to give up control of
East Germany in exchange for a guaran-
teed neutralization of a united Germany
and a Soviet share in international con-
trol over German armament. We believe
that the chances of such a development
are less than even.2 (Paras. 166-167, 170)
18. If such measures did not, in the So-
viet view, succeed in countering the de-
veloping threat of West German rearma-
ment, we believe that the USSR would
turn to more rigorous policies, including
a sharp build-up of Soviet and Satel-
lite military capabilities. It might also
adopt more threatening courses of ac-
tion against Berlin, or in the Far East,
or elsewhere, with the purpose of arous-
ing fear of nuclear war in the West and
causing Western peoples to demand that
their governments pursue a cautious poli-
cy. We believe that even at this stage
the USSR would still avoid courses of ac-
tion which in its judgment clearly en-
tailed the probability of general war.
(Para. 169)
19. We believe that the USSR is in sub-
stantial agreement with Chinese Commu-
nist objectives to destroy the Chinese Na-
tionalist Government and to gain control
2 The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the estimate contained in
the last sentence of this paragraph should read:
"We believe that the likelihood of such a de-
velopment is small, primarily because it seems
to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages,
from the Soviet point of view, would far out-
weigh its advantages."
('flPJ1 1fl~~IT1?l
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vvIII ivI_1I a if I`
of all territory held by it. The primary
Soviet interest in issues arising in the
area of the Formosa Strait is to exploit
them in such a way as to sow distrust of
the US among neutral nations and to
promote a maximum of discord between
the US and its allies. We believe that
Moscow might see certain advantages in
clashes between Chinese Communist and
US forces, provided it believed that the
clashes would be limited and localized.
However, we also believe that the USSR
will seek to restrain Peiping from adopt-
ing policies which in the Soviet view
would carry grave risks of major hostili-
ties between the US and Communist
China, since the Soviet leaders probably
believe ' that such hostilities would also
entail grave risk of Soviet involvement.
(Para. 173)
20. The Soviet leaders probably consider
that if major hostilities between Commu-
nist China and the US should occur, the
USSR would be presented with extremely
grave choices. They would probably give
the Chinese Communists support in
weapons and material, and the scale of
this aid would probably increase in pro-
portion to the threat to the Chinese Com-
munist regime. As hostilities expanded
and the threat to the Chinese Communist
regime increased, they would probably
engage Soviet forces in defensive opera-
tions, to the extent that they felt they
could plausibly deny such involvement.
Should the conflict progress so far that
destruction of the Chinese Communist re-
gime appeared probable, we believe that
the Soviet leaders would recognize that
open intervention on their part sufficient
to save the Chinese regime would involve
extremely grave risk of general war with
the US with its consequent threat to the
survival of the Soviet system. In decid-
ing upon a course of action, the Soviet
leaders would have to weigh the strengths
which they could bring to bear in the
struggle against those which would be
opposed to them, and the dangers to their
own regime of a possible global war with
the US against the strategic and psycho-
logical consequences to them of destruc-
tion of the Chinese Communist regime.
We believe, on balance, they would con-
clude that loss of the Chinese Communist
regime would be sufficiently damaging
and final to cause them to resort to open
intervention to save that regime.' (Para.
174)
21. Southeast Asia will almost certainly
appear to the USSR to be the most profit-
able field for the extension of Communist
influence, at least during the early period
of this estimate. The Soviet leaders will
probably continue, in concert with Com-
munist China, to support Communist
subversive activities, and possibly local-
ized military action if circumstances are
favorable. (Para. 175)
'Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, be-
lieve that the last sentence overstates the will-
ingness of the Soviet leaders to risk their own
regime and would substitute for the last sen-
tence:
"On balance, we believe that they would not
consider the elimination of the Chinese Com-
munist regime sufficiently damaging, or final,
to warrant the risk to their own regime which
open intervention would entail."
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vvi'il IUL-111 I Ir7L
DISCUSSION
1. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
22. The Soviet political system continues to
exhibit the essential features which it acquired
during the period of Stalin's ascendancy, even
though power appears now to be exercised by
a small group rather than by a single man.
Its totalitarian character, resting on the mo-
nopoly of political power held by the small
group composing the Communist Party Pre-
sidium, remains unaltered by developments
since Stalin's death. We think it extremely
unlikely that in the period through 1960, de-
spite possible shifts in leadership and policies,
the nature of the Soviet political system will
change in any important respect.
PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP
23. Since Stalin's death there has clearly been
an unstable situation at the top level of the
Soviet power structure. The elimination of
Beria and the demotion of Malenkov, together
with a number of similar actions against lesser
personalities, indicate that the division of
power and influence posed a serious problem
for Stalin's heirs. It seems unlikely that
this problem has yet been resolved, despite
Khrushchev's apparent rise to a position of
primacy. It is not yet clear whether his posi-
tion as Party First Secretary, the key position
Stalin used to gain absolute power, will enable
him to acquire a similar domination over his
colleagues in the Party Presidium. Prime
Minister Bulganin and other veteran members
of this body like Molotov, Kaganovich, and
Mikoyan, all of whom hold high governmental
positions, are probably not eager to submit to
the renewed domination of one man. Align-
ments among the top leaders, their relative
power and influence, or the following that
each may have within the Party and Govern-
ment apparatus are unknown. For the pres-
ent, major personnel and policy decisions are
probably still subject to negotiation among
them. There may be factional jockeying for
some time, although we incline to the view
that sooner or later the Soviet system will
revert to a personal dictatorship. This may
occur within the period of this estimate.
24. The personal power struggle has probably
been taking place in a context of differences
over policy. Strongest evidence of such dif-
ferences has appeared in connection with the
agricultural program, and in particular con-
cerning the most effective methods of increas-
ing agricultural production. On other issues
the evidence of divergent views is far less
clear, but the Soviet leaders may also have
disagreed among themselves concerning the
allocation of resources among the defense, in-
vestment, and consumption sectors of the
economy. Except on agricultural problems,
however, the Soviet leadership has not pub-
licly exhibited differences of view within its
tanks.
25. The struggle over power and policy may
be exacerbated during the period of this esti-
mate, unless one of the leading figures suc-
ceeds in acquiring a clear dominance in the
Party Presidium. As death or ill health thin
the ranks of the veteran members of the Pre-
sidium, who have probably up to now been
able to check the rise of any aspirant to the
full array of Stalin's power, the problem of co-
opting younger proteges may become acute.
Moreover, the issues of policy likely to develop
during the period of this estimate will present
hard choices, the resolution of which may
sharpen the struggle for personal power.
26. We continue to believe, however, that the
struggles over personal power and policy will
be confined to the small group at the apex
of the power structure and will not result in
open violence involving the police or military
forces. We do not believe that the police or
military establishments are likely within the
period of this estimate to participate as inde-
pendent factions in the contest over power
and policy. They are effectively controlled by
the Party, both openly and through penetra-
tion by agents, and their leaders are probably
(''.nNFIfFNTIAL_
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jUIVFIULIV I IPAL
too involved in conflicting personal loyalties
and factions outside the professional group to
permit independent political action. How-
ever, to the extent that issues affecting
spheres of activity of the army and police di-
vide the top Soviet leadership, the bureaucrat-
ic and professional point of view, particularly
of the army, may have a greater influence on
policy decisions.
27. Serious and prolonged instability within
the top leadership would probably impair the
efficiency of the Party and State administra-
tion. Insecurity and uncertainty might reach
serious proportions if a rapid series of re-
movals, accompanied by charges of disloyalty
and trials of those unseated, occurred within
the top leadership. In this case the regime
might have as much difficulty in carrying out
as in reaching its policy decisions. However,
the Soviet leaders are certainly aware of these
problems of effective administration in their
totalitarian state and will be concerned to
prevent their personal struggle for power from
degenerating into widespread purges which
might cause a deterioration in the administra-
tive apparatus. On balance, we think that
the regime will surmount dangers of this kind.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET
PEOPLE AND THE REGIME
28. The post-Stalin leadership has clearly
given increased attention to the attitudes of
the Soviet people toward the regime, and in
particular it has been concerned to improve
morale and to cultivate more positive atti-
tudes toward its goals. Despite the decline
in emphasis on the consumer goods program,
the regime has not explicitly repudiated the
promises made to Soviet citizens in 1953. It
will probably maintain the effort to raise living
standards to the extent that current defense
and investment programs permit. It prob-
ably still intends to limit arbitrary and ter-
roristic actions by the secret police as much as
it feels is compatible with safety.
29. During the period of this estimate, the
attitude of the Soviet people toward the re-
gime will continue to be characterized more
by apathy than by dissidence. It is unlikely
that the promises made in 1953 to raise living
standards, or even the limited fulfillment
which followed, have aroused demands and ex-
pectations dangerous to the regime. The poli-
cies of the regime are likely to be successfully
calculated to allay active discontent and at
the same time to check excessive demands.
However, if there should be such a conspic-
uous failure of current agricultural programs
as to lead to a decline in food supplies, or if
the regime should be obliged to resort to
greater pressures on the peasantry to extract
the foodstuffs essential to feed the cities, a
serious deterioration in public attitudes to-
ward the regime might result. Such a devel-
opment during the period of this estimate
would be unlikely to threaten the security
of the regime.
30. The attitude of the Soviet people toward
the particular dangers of nuclear war is diffi-
cult to gauge. Only within the last year has
the regime begun to make some information
available, and this has been for a limited,
largely military, audience. For civil defense
purposes, an intensive public information pro-
gram would appear to be necessary. Even if
this is undertaken, popular fears are unlikely
to limit the freedom of action of the USSR
in a diplomatic crisis in anything like the
same degree as would be true for the Western
Powers. Nevertheless, the desire to avoid war
is strong and articulate in the Soviet people,
and the regime, despite its ability to distort
and obscure the meaning of events by propa-
ganda, must to some extent adapt its policies
to this attitude. It may be obliged to do so
in greater degree when the facts of nuclear
warfare become better known to the Soviet
people.4
'There will be a fuller discussion of the issues
raised in this paragraph in a forthcoming esti-
mate, NIE 100-5-55, "Implications of Growing
Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and
the Free World."
ONPUFJTIAI
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CON TIAL
INTEGRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTY (CPSU) AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT
15 MAY 1955
CENTRAL
CENTRAL
MINISTRIES,
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEES, AND
SECRETARIAT
PRESIDIUM
PRESIDIUM
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
KHRUSHCHEV ---
(First Secretary)
POSPELOV
MEMBERS
BULGANIN---- "~-
VOROSHILOV 1
KAGANOVICH--- `'-
--
--
-
-
CHAIRMAN
----BULGANIN
SUSLOV
MALENKOV---- '=-
-,
SHATALIN
MIKOYAN-----
-~-
-
-
----MIKOYAN----
-Trade
``~
~
MOLOT
-
MOLOTOV-----
-
-
-
-
-
OV
----
Foreign Affairs
t
PERVUKHIN---- --
-
-
-
-
----PERVUKHIN---
-Fuel and Chemical Industry
SABUROV
j
SABUROV
----- --
-
-
-
-
----
--- KHRUSHCHEV2
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
KIRICHENKO2,3
PONOMARENK02.4
SHVERNIK2
Medium Machine Building
(Nuclear development)
KOSYGIN Goods
KUCHERENKO State Construction Affairs-Committee
LOBANOV --------Agriculture
- ------MALENKOV Electrical Power Stations
MALYSHEV - - - - - - - Machine Building Industries
TEVOSYAN------- -Metallurgical Industry
KHRUNICHEV ----- - Aviation and/or Armament Industries
51 Other ministers
2 Other officials of ministerial rank
1 Also Chairman of Presidium of U S S R. Supreme Soviet
2 Also member of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet
3 Also First Secretary of Ukranian Central Committee
4 Also Ambassador to Poland
Listings ore alphabetical (Russian alphabet), consequently Khrushchev,
now highest ranking member of the Party Presidium, is listed lost.
----- Dual Membership
- Minister
----; Probable area of responsibility
CONFIDENTIAL
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Vv'di'IU
II. THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST BLOC STATES
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
31. Sino-Soviet relations within the last year
have been marked by a continuing enhance-
ment of Communist China's status within
the Communist Bloc. This was shown by the
visit of the Soviet delegation in September-
October 1954, by the agreements announced
in the 11 October communique restoring Port
Arthur and certain joint enterprises to Chi-
nese control, and by the more recent associa-
tion of Communist China with Communist
policy in Europe in opposition to West Ger-
man rearmament. The trend toward greater
Chinese independence from Soviet tutelage
probably was inevitable in view of the grow-
ing power of the Chinese regime and the in-
ternational prestige it derived from the Ko-
rean War and from Communist successes at
the Geneva Conference. Communist China
is coming to be accorded a formal status with-
in the Communist world more nearly equal
to that of the USSR.
32. The relations between the USSR and Com-
munist China are probably now conducted as
between allied powers having common inter-
ests and a common ideology, but also separate
and potentially conflicting national objectives.
Communist China continues to be dependent
on the USSR because only through Soviet aid
can it maintain or expand a modern military
establishment and because its industrializa-
tion program is also geared to Soviet support.
This dependence gives the USSR great influ-
ence over Chinese policy, but it would prob-
ably not be decisive in matters which the Chi-
nese believed involved their own vital inter-
ests. The USSR probably would not apply so
serious a sanction as withdrawal of economic
and military aid in order to obtain Chinese
conformity to Soviet views, since to do so
would seriously threaten the relationship.
33. The USSR and Communist China will al-
most certainly maintain a relationship of close
alliance throughout the period of this esti-
mate, despite the possibility of some frictions
between them. The USSR will continue to
sell or grant military and capital goods to
China but will almost certainly not meet Chi-
nese demands to the extent of overtaxing the
Soviet economy. Soviet policy may take a
more cautious view than the Chinese of the
risks appropriate to the pursuit of Communist
objectives in Asia. Some issues will probably
cause hard bargaining between the two part-
ners, but not to the extent of endangering the
alliance. The interests of both, as well as the
ideological gulf which separates both from the
non-Communist world, will continue to dic-
tate policies of hostility against the West.
The contribution which each makes to the
military security of the other may assume
even greater importance if the Western
alliance is able to add substantial military
power in Germany and Japan to its present
strength. These considerations, at least dur-
ing the period of this estimate, will almost
certainly outweigh any frictions in the Sino-
Soviet relationship.
SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS
34. The USSR's relations with its Eastern
European Satellites involve problems of con-
trol rather than of negotiation. Effective di-
'The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
consider that this paragraph overstates the de-
gree of independence which Communist China
enjoys in matters of major policy. They be-
lieve, therefore, that the following should be
substituted for the last two sentences:
"The continuing dependence of Communist
China on the USSR for support of its military
and economic programs gives the USSR great
influence over Chinese policy. Through ma-
nipulation of the various pressures which they
can exert, the Soviet leaders would probably be
able to forestall any development in Chinese
policy which they believed would involve a se-
rious conflict with Soviet vital interests. How-
ever, if such a conflict should arise, we believe
that the Soviet leaders would be prepared to
apply these pressures to whatever extent they
deemed necessary, even to the point of with-
drawal of military and economic aid, in order
to obtain Chinese conformity with Soviet
views."
_PMVIDWIN~
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VvtuI I- -
rection and surveillance of the small corps of
Party careerists in each of the Satellite re-
gimes, together with the presence or proximity
of Soviet military forces, have been enough to
insure Soviet control. This system does not
appear to have lost any of its effectiveness de-
spite the economic difficulties encountered in
most of the Satellites during the last two
years, and despite the uncertainties Satellite
leaders have apparently felt about who among
their Moscow preceptors might win the con-
test for power going on there.
35. There have been two developments of
purely external significance not affecting the
substance of Soviet control, but which are
nevertheless suggestive of the form which
that control is likely to take in future. One
of these has been the withdrawal of the.USSR
from the direct forms of exploitation exem-
plified by the joint stock companies which held
important economic assets in several of the
Satellites. To replace direct Soviet control
through bilateral arrangements it is intended
apparently to link all the Satellite economies
more closely with each other and with the
USSR by a greater degree of joint economic
planning in the new Five-Year Plan period
1956-1960. The other organizational develop-
ment of importance is the recently announced
collective defense and joint command struc-
ture which will replace the bilateral military
arrangements the USSR has had with each
.of the Satellites. In both the economic and
military fields therefore there is likely to be
during the period of this estimate a develop-
ment toward multilateral forms of organiza-
tion and planning. The result will probably
be closer integration and more efficient Soviet
direction and control of the Satellite area as
a whole.
36. Popular resistance of an organized and
active kind is unlikely to appear in any of
the Satellites during the period of this esti-
mate. Disaffection showing itself in nonco-
operation in economic fields and even passive
resistance might increase in some of the Satel-
lites if there should be further serious de-
terioration in living standards. The USSR
would intervene with force or by grants of
economic aid to check any development of
this kind which it believed threatened the
security of any Satellite regime. The USSR's
actions in the Satellite area will be based on
the assumption that effective Soviet control
there is an essential security requirement.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 rnmIcfl1MUkL
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY
37. The fundamental characteristics of So-
viet postwar economic policy have been em-
phasis upon a rapid rate of capital accumula-
tion, maintenance of high levels of military
expenditure, and the direction of the major
share of new capital to heavy industry. There
has recently been added a basic and probably
enduring concern for the expansion of Soviet
agricultural production, as a result of its con-
tinued failure to keep pace with the require-
ments of population growth and industrial
production. In 1953 marked attention was
given to consumer welfare and to agricultural
problems. However, during 1954 and the
early months of 1955 there was a reduction of
emphasis on the numerous promises to raise
standards of living which were made in offi-
cial pronouncements in 1953, but the em-
phasis on agriculture, which was the keystone
of the 1953 plan revisions, has continued with
increased intensity. There was also a re-
affirmation of the central role of heavy in-
dustry as the necessary foundation for the
entire Soviet economy, including the con-
sumption sector. Reductions in explicit mili-
tary outlays in 1953 and 1954 are roughly re-
stored to the 1952 level in the 1955 Soviet
budgets This increase of military outlays
is apparently to be achieved by a reduction in
the rate of growth of consumer goods activity
and capital investment.
38. The 1955 budget gives little information
on details of the current investment program,
but it does indicate that investment in heavy
industry will increase about four percent and
over-all investment expenditures will decrease
about one percent from the level planned for
1954. Announcements of some aspects of in-
The explicit military expenditures in the Soviet
budget do not include the outlays for atomic
energy and for most military research and de-
velopment. Expenditures on military plant and
tooling in any given year also appear elsewhere
in the budget, but these expenditures are be-
lieved to be charged against defense outlays in
subsequent years.
vestment in agriculture indicate increases of
as much as 10 percent over the record 1954
level. Nevertheless, total investment in the
sectors of the economy related to consump-
tion will be reduced from the levels planned
for 1954. These reductions will probably still
leave an investment program for these sectors
substantially above the 1953 outlay and in
most cases above the levels actually achieved
in 1954.
39. The traditional Soviet policy of concen-
trating economic decisions in the central
party and government apparatus in Moscow
was slightly modified during 1953, and has
been further modified during 1954 and early
1955. Although the central apparatus con-
tinues to make the basic decisions in economic
planning, a large share of the detailed work
necessary to implement plans has been trans-
ferred from Moscow to regional ministries and
local plant managers in the case of manu-
facturing, and to local (raion) committees in
agriculture. Manufacturing and agricultural
enterprises have been given the responsibility,
and have even been encouraged, to use local
materials and techniques, and to make their
own arrangements for the purchase of these
materials. There have been large-scale reduc-
tions in reporting requirements and in cleri-
cal and administrative personnel of both the
central and the local governmental apparatus.
Individuals released from these positions have
been largely transferred to production re-
sponsibilities, particularly in agriculture.
40. The foreign economic policies of the USSR,
although not significantly modified, have been
somewhat reoriented during 1953-1954. So-
viet foreign trade has always been directed to
the expansion of Soviet influence and to the
long-run objective of achieving economic self-
sufficiency. In the past, the Soviet economy
has not been in a position to accomplish much
toward the former objective. At present, how-
ever, the increased size and diversity of the
Soviet economy and the coordination of the
European Satellite economies gives the USSR
a supply of goods and trained personnel with
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which it may attempt to increase its economic
influence upon the free world. Increases in
Soviet offers of technical assistance, particu-
larly in Asia, and extension of the geograph-
ical distribution of foreign trade in 1954 indi-
cate Soviet intent to use its industrial econo-
my to extend its political influence as well as
to build up its own political, military, and
economic strength.
41. Assuming there is no war and in the So-
viet view no substantially increased danger of
war, Soviet economic policy in 1955-1960 will
be directed toward achieving a continued
rapid growth of basic economic and military
strength and at the same time, as far as is
compatible with this objective, a steady im-
provement in the well-being of the general
population. This latter improvement will al-
most certainly be at a rate far more modest
than that held out to the people in the govern-
ment's statements of 1953. Heavy industry
will continue to be the primary focus of Soviet
economic activity. Capital investment will
continue to absorb a slightly increasing share
of Soviet output. Defense expenditures 7 will
probably increase moderately as the cost of
development, production, and maintenance of
modern military equipment increases. A con-
certed effort will be made to increase agricul-
7In this and the following paragraphs, Soviet
"defense expenditures" have been estimated on
such a basis as to permit comparison with those
of the US; i.e., they include explicit budgetary
appropriations to the Ministry of Defense, plus
estimated outlays for research and development,
atomic energy, MVD paramilitary forces, mili-
tary education, and some military construction.
Figures for gross national product (GNP) pro-
vide the most concise and convenient means of
describing the size and composition of the econ-
omy of a nation, and (in a rough way) of com-
paring it with other national economies. How-
ever, considerable technical difficulties arise in
calculating the GNP of any country. In the
case of the USSR the limited nature of the
available data makes calculation and interpret-
ation especially difficult. For these reasons the
quantitative estimates given in the following par-
agraphs regarding GNP and its principal com-
ponents must be considered as approximations.
We believe nevertheless that they present a
reasonably accurate index of general trends in
the Soviet economy.
tural production. A slight increase over 1954
levels of production of housing and other dur-
able consumer goods is also likely in the period
1955-1960. Consequently, a somewhat more
balanced production effort in terms of the en-
tire Soviet economy can be expected. Such
an effort would result in growth of per capita
consumption of the Soviet people at a fairly
constant rate, although at a rate considerably
slower than that which will obtain for the
growth of the economy as a whole.
42. Soviet gross national product 8 (GNP) in-
creased by almost seven percent in 1954, as
compared with a gain in 1953 of about 3.5
percent; the latter rate was abnormally low
for the USSR because of a poor crop year and
the plan revisions then taking place. The
1954 level of Soviet output - about $129 bil-
lion - was approximately one-third that of
the US at $357 billion. A breakdown of Soviet
and US gross national product by end use
is presented in Figure 1.9 From this figure
it may be seen that, in dollar values, the USSR
allocates to consumption only about one-fifth
'In order to compare Soviet GNP with that of
the US, ruble estimates have been converted to
dollars by using appropriate ruble-dollar ratios
for the various sectors of the Soviet economy.
Only one set of GNP figures in dollars is present-
ed in this estimate. It should be noted, however,
that the deficiencies in the basic data on the
USSR, the fact that different methods of valuing
output can be used with equal validity, and the
latitude of judgment involved in converting
ruble figures into dollars permit alternative est-
imates of the size and composition of Soviet
GNP. For instance, an alternative calculation
of Soviet GNP gives the following results:
Consumption
54.1
41.7
Investment
36.5
28.2
Defense
23.8
18.4
Administration
15.2
11.7
Such differences as these do not materially affect
either the discussion of economic growth pre-
sented above or the general conclusions regard-
ing the size and structure of the Soviet economy,
but they would affect the analysis and inter-
pretation of some of its more detailed aspects.
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US and USSR
COMPARISON OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS, 1954
USSR
129 Billion 1954 Dollars
(By End Use)
US
357 Billion 1954 Dollars
13
NOTE: In interpreting the figures for Soviet !nd US defense expenditures,
it should be noted that the vQtU data presented do not necessarily reflect
the volume of armaments production (in terms of physical units, fire power,
tonnage, etc.) and do not show the amounts or proportions of gross investment
which are indirectly reiated to military production.
as much as the US, although its population
is 30 percent larger. Moreover, while the USSR
devotes larger proportions of GNP to defense
and to investment than does the US, the ac-
tual amounts thus allocated are considerably
less - in the case of defense about one-half,
and in investment about four-fifths of the
US figures. This manner of allocating re-
sources gives some indication of why the
USSR, with its smaller national product, has
nevertheless been able to build a large indus-
trial economy and military establishment
within a relatively short period of time.
43. The rate of growth of Soviet GNP has
been declining in recent years largely because
of the declining productivity of additional
units of capital investment in industry, but
also because of the stagnation in agriculture
and the heavy burden of military expenditure.
We believe that increasing investment in So-
viet agriculture, where the productivity of la-
bor is very low, a slowing down of investment
in consumer manufacturing industries, where
labor productivity is relatively high, and
a reduction in the rate of increase in the labor
force will tend to continue the recent declines
in the rate of growth. We estimate, therefore,
that the average annual increase in Soviet
GNP by 1960 will probably be slightly less
than five percent, compared to the seven per-
cent increase in 1954. Accordingly, we esti-
mate that Soviet GNP in 1960 will be about
$183 billion and US GNP about $452 billion.
To sustain this estimated rate of growth, in-
vestment must increase as a proportion of
total product while consumption, defense, and
administration decline. Although absolute
defense expenditures apparently are to in-
crease markedly in 1955 over 1954, restoring
them to about the 1952 level, we believe that
they will probably increase henceforth at a
slower rate, and will be about 15 percent high-
er in 1960 than in 1955. This figure com-
pares with an increase of about .50 percent in
investment and a GNP increase of about 35
percent. Soviet investment expenditure, con-
centrated as it is in the heavy and machine
industries, constitutes in itself a direct sup-
port for a future expansion of military effort.
44. The estimated rate of economic growth
in the USSR implies an increase in the ratio
of Soviet to US output. Soviet GNP in 1960
will probably be about 40 percent that of the
US. However, the US economy will probably
continue to draw ahead in absolute terms,
the dollar gap between the two economies in-
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creasing from $228 billion to about $269 bil-
lion. (See Figure 2). There will be a similar
relationship between the gross outputs of the
NATO countries taken as a whole and that
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The absolute gap
of $425 billion in 1954 will probably widen to
about $509 billion in 1960.
45. Our estimates of Western product for
1960 are based upon historical patterns of
economic growth in the West. Our estimates
for Sino-Soviet Bloc output in 1960 are based
on the assumption, which we believe reason-
able, that the Bloc will pursue a pattern of re-
source allocation comparable to that present-
ly existing and apparently planned for the
future. Both the Western countries and the
Sino-Soviet Bloc have the capability to alter
the pattern of resource use drastically, and
thereby to alter the final composition and
value of the product. The capability of the
West, and especially of the US, to do this is
greater than that of the Bloc because of the
higher Western product in proportion to pop-
ulation. However, large shifts in the pattern
of resource use cannot be as quickly or as
easily made in the West as in the USSR where
the economy is closely controlled and industry
is designed for maximum convertibility to war
purposes. If the Bloc and the West continue
to maintain full employment, considerable
changes in the composition of their respective
outputs would have little effect on their total
volume of output in so short a period. Should
either fail to maintain full employment, the
volume of output would be considerably re-
duced.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY
46. Soviet total industrial production approxi-
mately doubled during the period 1948-1954,
and increased about nine percent during 1954.
The current and apparent long-run objectives
and limitations of Soviet industrial produc-
tion indicate that the average annual real
rate of increase during 1955-1960 will be over
seven percent, and production in 1960 will be
about 55 percent greater than in 1954. The
substantial and continuing decline in the esti-
mated rate of growth of industrial output is
essentially attributable to (a) a reduction in
the rate of growth of the industrial labor
force; and (b) a reduction in the average yield
of annual additions to industrial investment.
The greatest production increases during the
1955-1960 period are expected to occur in
chemicals, electric power, electrical equip-
ment, and manufactured consumer goods.
SOVIET BLOC AND WEST
COMPARISON OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS
(Billions of /954 US Dollars)
BLOC WEST
1954
BLOC WEST
1960
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ment, and manufactured consumer goods.
The smallest production increases are ex-
pected in the more established industries with
relatively large current production, namely,
manufactured food products, forest products,
and defense industries.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,
SELECTED YEARS 1948-19601
Indexes:
1954=100
1948
1953 1954
1955
1960
Energy
52
91 100
111
172
Metals
45
90 100
108
146
Metalworking &
Machinery
41
88 100
114
169
Chemicals
45
88 100
111
172
Construction
Materials
39
88 100
111
172
Forest Products
66
91 100
103
124
Food Products
63
96 100
104
134
Manufactured
Consumer Goods
45
90 100
115
169
Defense Industry
36
102 100
113
122-1322
Total Industry
49
92 100
110
155
The 1955-1960 estimates are projected from re-
cent rates of growth, current investment pro-
grams, and such Soviet plans as have been an-
nounced for this period.
2 The lower figure -122 - is calculated on the
assumption that during the period of this esti-
mate there will be some reduction of present
levels of production of some military end-items.
The higher figure - 132 - assumes that present
production remains approximately constant, and
that new weapons and equipment programs are
added. It should be noted that the estimated
cost of the Soviet atomic energy program is not
included in the figures for defense industry.
47. Soviet heavy industrial production has
been increasing at an average annual rate of
over 10 percent during the current Fifth Five-
Year Plan. Official announcements indicate
that production plans for most nonferrous
metals, petroleum, and certain capital equip-
ment are not being met, but that the over-
all plan for heavy industry is generally being
met. Production of capital equipment for light
and processing industries has almost certain-
ly exceeded the original Fifth Five-Year Plan.
Heavy industry will almost certainly con-
tinue to dominate industrial production
plans for the 1955-1960 period, although more
attention will probably be devoted to housing
and nonindustrial construction than in the
last six years.
48. Soviet armaments production almost
doubled in value (though not in volume) be-
tween 1950 and 1954. US expenditures for
military end-items, although less than Soviet
expenditures during the period 1946-1950, in-
creased rapidly after 1951, reached a high in
1953, and have since slightly decreased. In
terms of what Soviet armaments would have
cost at US quantity-production prices, we esti-
mate that the aggregate dollar value of So-
viet military production in 1951 was roughly
50 percent more than the dollar value of US
armament deliveries, whereas in 1954 the
aggregate dollar value of Soviet military pro-
duction would have amounted to a little less
than half that of US armament deliveries.
The value of Soviet military end-item produc-
tion will probably increase by a moderate
amount annually through the period of this
estimate, assuming no significant change in
the level of international tensions. There will
be some shift in the relative outlay for various
types of weapons, in particular an increase in
expenditures for aircraft and naval vessels,
and perhaps for nuclear weapons and guided
missiles. We believe that it is within Soviet
capacity to increase present and estimated
future outlays by three to three and a half
times in the event of war or international de-
velopments which the Soviet leaders might
believe required such increases.
49. The output of consumer goods and services
in 1954 exceeded that of 1953 by about seven
percent, increasing at about the same rate as
GNP, but at a slower rate than gross indus-
trial production and at about two-thirds the
rate of heavy industry. Durable consumer
goods, housing and appliances led the ad-
vance, followed in order by clothing, trans-
port, and other services. Production of food
was limited by continuing agricultural diffi-
culties, and increased only about four per-
cent. Production of consumer goods is ex-
pected to continue to increase during the
1955-1960 period, although at a lower average
rate than in 1954.
50. The announced Soviet intention to re-
emphasize heavy industry will have the effect
of arresting the 1953-1954 rates of increase
in light industry, but will still permit some
improvement in the position of the Soviet
consumer. Increased emphasis on agriculture
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will ' probably provide an expanding output.
Agricultural products are the material base
for more than 80 percent of the Soviet con-
sumption pattern. Maintenance of capital
investment in both light industry and housing
at levels well above those of the 1953 plan
lends further support to the estimate that
the Soviet consumer will not be deprived of
the gains obtained in 1953-1954. The 1955
increases in military production, however, may
have the effect of slowing down increases in
the production of durable consumer goods.
51. Industrial Technology. The quality of
Soviet industrial technology as a whole is
difficult to assess. Where a particular pro-
gram has been indispensable to the mainte-
nance of the Soviet power position in the
world - for example, in connection with
atomic development, in weapons, and in basic
industry and construction - the USSR has
mobilized its technical resources with great
effectiveness. Because of the large number
of personnel, and the material and financial
outlays required for such technical develop-
ments, major efforts such as these have taken
a great share of the limited resources the
USSR can devote to improving its technology.
Soviet technology in lower priority enter-
prises ranges from the copying of Western de-
sign and technique in certain machine indus-
tries to admittedly archaic methods of pro-
duction in a vast majority of light industry
establishments. In many of the latter, efforts
are made to reduce production costs, but
these are largely local efforts made by plant
workers and managers who have relatively
little training and experience.
52. Regional Concentrations. The regional
distribution of industrial production shows
the impact of Soviet efforts to achieve greater
balance between the several economic regions
of the USSR, and to make these regions as far
as possible self-sufficient. However, produc-
tion continues to be relatively concentrated
in the long established industrial regions of
northwest, center, and south. (See Figure 3
on following page) . The rapid prewar devel-
opment of the Ural industrial complex based
upon West Siberian coal has continued in the
postwar period, and the Urals now produce
some 14 percent of Soviet industrial output,
compared to 16 and 27 percent respectively in
the Ukraine and the Central Industrial region
(including Moscow). Although industrial
production east of the Urals has grown rapid-
ly since World War II, the base from which
it grew was small and much of the production
is highly specialized and dependent upon
equipment and markets in other regions to
the west.
53. Stockpiling. There was some evidence
that during 1953-1954 Soviet reserve stocks
were drawn upon more freely than previously.
The scale of stockpiling operations during
these years indicates that the Soviet stockpile
will fail to meet the 100 percent expansion
planned for 1951-1955. However, Bulganin's
February 1955 speech gives evidence that the
USSR intends to apply renewed emphasis to
the stockpile program and to restrict the con-
ditions under which stockpiles may be used to
support current production programs. An in-
crease in the scale of the stockpiling program
may deprive Soviet industry and Soviet con-
sumers of a portion of the increased flow of
goods which would be expected from increased
production.
54. Transportation. The transport facilities
of the USSR continued to increase ton-miles
of freight at a rate well in advance of that
required by the Fifth Five-Year Plan. The
increase in rail freight turnover at the end
of 1954 was 42 percent over 1950, compared to
an increase of only 35-40 percent planned for
the period through 1955. These figures sug-
gest that Soviet planners may have underesti-
mated the transport requirements of their
rapidly expanding economy. A rate of in-
vestment higher than previously planned will
apparently be necessary to permit Soviet
transport to maintain growth necessary to
support the future expansion of the economy.
Highway and waterway freight carriage have
also increased rapidly in recent years but not
at a rate which will reduce the primary de-
pendence of the economy upon rail trans-
port, particularly in the areas served by the
Trans-Siberian Railway.
55. Labor Force. A large proportion of the
recent growth in Soviet industrial output has
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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1954
(Millions of /951 Rubles)
Circles ore based on I951 Rubles;
Scale 1
300
700,000
percentages are
eneralized
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g
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Railroad, selected
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Kilometers
SECRET
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been achieved by increasing the size of the
industrial labor force rather than by increas-
ing its efficiency. The 1951-1955 plan for in-
creases in the nonagricultural labor force
was fulfilled by 1953. Planned increases in
agricultural production - particularly in live-
stock and corn, both of which are labor in-
tensive items - and a significant reduction
of the annual rate of entry into the labor
force during 1955-1960 will deny industrial
production a labor force growth during this
period comparable to that obtained in the
preceding period. (See Table 2). In addition
to the labor requirements for agriculture,
rates of increase in the industrial labor force
will decline primarily because of the effects
of the low birth rate during World War II.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED LABOR FORCE OF THE USSR,
1938, 1947-1956, PROJECTED TO 1960
Yearly Averages in Millions of Workers
Total Excluding Total'
Non-
Military and
Labor
Agriculture Agriculture Forced Labor
Force
1938
53.3
25.7
79.0
90.3
1947
54.4
30.0
84.4
97.0
1948
53.8
31.0
84.8
98.0
1949
53.1
32.0
85.1
98.0
1950
52.6
34.6
87.2
99.0
1951
51.8
36.2
88.0
100.0
1952
51.0
37.8
88.8
101.5
1953
51.8
38.1
89.9
101.5
1954
52.7
40.3
-93.0
104.2
1955
54.1
41.6
95.7
106.5
1960
56.3
46.6
102.9
112.3
'Total labor force estimates are-subject to a con-
siderable margin of error because of lack of data
on the amount of forced labor.
56. A similar decline in the rate of entry to
the military manpower pool may be expected.
The decline in the annual entries into the in-
dustrial labor force in this period will require
continued emphasis on measures to increase
the productivity of labor. The trend since
1948 of declining annual rates of increase in
labor productivity was arrested in 1954.
Maintenance of high levels of capital invest-
ment and reasonably improved per capita
consumption levels - factors which are con-
sidered critical to Soviet labor productivity -
therefore become essential to the achievement
of the estimated rates of over-all industrial
and economic growth.
DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
57. Soviet agriculture completed its first full
crop year under the new agricultural program
in 1954. It became clear: (a) that the So-
viet leaders were seriously intent upon in-
creasing agricultural production; (b) that the
incentives contemplated in the 1953 program
had so far done little to improve rural produc-
tive effort; and (c) that there had been an in-
crease in the size of the agricultural labor
force and some improvement in the quality of
technical personnel. Owing in part to adverse
weather conditions, 1954 agricultural output
probably increased, but only about three per-
cent, and did not reach 1952 production levels.
(See Table 3). The 1954 increase was
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS IN THE USSR
1938 AND 1950-1955
1938 1950 1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
FOOD CROPS
Million Metric Tons
Grain
88.6 - 85.0 80.0
92.0
83.0
87.0
Potatoes
73.81 72.3 59.5
69.7
66.4
67.2
FIBER CROPS
Thousand Metric Tons
Cotton (Ginned)
730 1,140 1,220
1,260
1,300
1,410
Flax (Scutched Basis)
600 540 480
400
350
400
Wool (Grease Basis)
130 190 205
225
230
235
ANIMAL CROPS
Million head 1 Jan.
Cattle
59.2 57.2
58.8
56.0
57.7
57
6
Swine
31.6 24.1
26.7
28.5
29.6
.
31.8
Sheep & goats
73.1 99.0
107.5
109.9
112.0
114.7
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achieved largely as a result of favorable grow-
ing conditions in the "new lands," since a
severe drought struck the principal producing
regions in the Ukraine and Volga. On the
other hand, agricultural investment in 1954
increased almost 40 percent, in part by using
the increased income of collective farms and
also by large increases in state budget alloca-
tions. Crop acreage increased by six percent
as a result of overfulfillment of the "new
lands" program. A return to average weather
conditions throughout the USSR during 1955
would result in a sharp increase in agricul-
tural output.
58. Both 1954 and early 1955 saw additional
changes in the 1953 agricultural program, all
of which aimed at further expansion of out-
put. The "new lands" program, which is to
add to the cultivated acreage of the USSR an
amount of land equal to the total cultivated
acreage of Canada, moved forward ahead of
schedule and with favorable crop yields in
1954. The early 1955 announcements outline
what is apparently the essence of the Sixth
Five-Year Plan for agriculture, and despite
the failure of the current plan, they establish
a series of agricultural goals for 1956-1960
which are even more ambitious than those
set forth in the Fifth Five-Year Plan., (See
Table 4).
TABLE 4
OFFICIALLY PLANNED OUTPUT GOALS FOR
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
1960
Index: 1954=100
Meat
200
Milk
200
Eggs
200
Wool
180
Grain
1881
1 This is estimated from the officially announced
goal of "not less than" 164 million tons by 1960,
and the estimated output of 87 million tons in
1954.
Meat and dairy products, both very costly to
produce, constitute the major objectives of the
1960 plan. To achieve the vast growth in
animal production, the USSR has embarked
on a large-scale program to get an eight-fold
increase in corn acreage. The Kremlin has
also increased local control over agricultural
production and has undertaken a large pro-
gram to increase the stability and technical
competence of the agricultural labor force.
In April 1955 there was recruitment of some
30,000 managers, largely from Party ranks,
who would replace roughly one-third of the
existing collective farm managers.
59. While the measures announced in the fall
of 1953 reflected a more realistic appraisal
of material, natural, and human resource
requirements, this cannot be said of the de-
crees on virgin land and corn production
issued in 1954 and early 1955. A large part
of the program approaches the climatic limits
of economic production for the land and crops
involved. Moreover, the strains and stresses
engendered by these campaigns will probably
slow up the otherwise possible rate of growth
in the "old" regions. Thus the net results
will almost certainly fall far short of plans,
though there will probably be some increases
in production and in state control over agri-
cultural output.
60. The principal problems posed by the agri-
cultural program are: (a) the "new lands"
scheme will draw many skilled people from
established and more productive areas; (b)
the combined "new lands" and corn and live-
stock programs will require very large addi-
tional outlays for machinery, construction,
and fertilizer, as well as labor; and (c) cli-
matic conditions in the "new lands" areas are
such as to produce frequent crop failures.
Moreover, the apparent piecemeal manner in
which the program has been instituted raises
considerable doubt as to whether the above
problems have been adequately assessed.
61. All Soviet agriculture operates under sev-
eral inherent limitations. With few excep-
tions, the areas of adequate rainfall in the
USSR are areas of poor soil and short grow-
ing seasons. Nearly all of the good soils lie
in an area of uncertain or deficient rainfall.
There are no areas in the USSR comparable
to the US cotton belt or corn belt where soil,
rainfall, and temperature are favorably com-
bined over a large area to permit high pro-
duction response with conventional inputs.
Less than 10 percent of arable land in the
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USSR will yield more than modest increases
in output without the addition of extremely
large amounts of fertilizer and machinery.
Significant increases on most of the arable
land would require, in addition, even larger
investments in drainage or irrigation. Apart
from these natural limitations, the institu-
tional structure of Soviet agriculture, while
permitting effective political control over the
peasant population, fails to achieve operating
efficiency and continues to produce peasant
antipathy.
62. In view of these limitations we estimate
that, even with average weather conditions,
agricultural production in 1960, instead of in-
creasing by nearly 100 percent as planned,
will actually increase by only 30 percent. (See
Table 5).
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED SOVIET AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION: AN INDEX OF TEN
MAJOR COMMODITIES'
1938-1960
1938
94
1948
80
1952
103
1953
97
1954
100
1955
109
1960
130
'Bread grain, coarse and other grains, potatoes,
vegetables, meat, milk, cotton, wool, hemp, and
flax.
Further extension of capital investment and
labor might make possible additional growth
in agricultural output, but such additions
would result in a reduction in the average rate
of growth for the economy as a whole.
SOVIET CONSUMPTION LEVELS
63. Per capita Soviet consumption in 1954
rose somewhat more than five percent over
the 1953 level, a rate of increase slightly
higher than had been achieved in the first
year of the revised consumer goods program.
(See Table 6). Durable consumer goods other
than housing showed the most rapid increase,
about 20 percent on a per capita basis. Cloth-
ing and textile consumption increased about
10 percent and food consumption by only two
percent. Per capita consumption of certain
quality foods (whole milk) failed to increase
and some (meat) even declined. Improve-
ment in consumption in 1954, as in the period
since 1950, was not uniform for all income
groups; managers and skilled workers were
the principal beneficiaries. Middle and lower
income groups derived only negligible benefit
from increased supplies of expensive fabrics
and appliances. For most families in these
income brackets, failure of food production to
do much 'more than keep pace with popula-
tion increases in a period of greater dispos-
able income has meant longer queues, extra
visits to the free market, and no improvement
in real consumption.
USSR: ESTIMATED INDEXES OF PER CAPITA
CONSUMPTION
1948-1960
1948 1952
1953
1954
1955
1960
Food Products
Clothing
Manufactured
Consumer Goods
'Transport and
Communications
Housing
Urban
Rural
Other Services
76 97
50 82
36 73
61 87
95 98
95 97
94 98
89 95
98
91
83
95
99
98
99
97
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
103
112
117
105
102
102
101
102
116
153
160
132
109
113
105
117
Total Consumer Goods
and Services 69 90
95
100
106
129
64. Recent increases in real income through
increased family income and price reductions
have not been matched by commensurate in-
creases in the production of consumer goods.
Price reductions in 1954 yielded a negligible
increase in the workers' food basket and
failed, where preceding price cuts had suc-
ceeded, in reducing free market prices. The
increased state loan in 1955 and the failure
thus far in 1955 to provide the usual annual
reduction in consumer goods prices is evi-
dence of a desire to reduce inflationary pres-
sures.
65. We estimate that, given the probable rate
of increase, in Soviet agricultural production
for 1955-1960, aggregate Soviet consumption
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will probably increase by about 30 percent
during this period. However, food and hous-
ing, by far the major components for the
average Soviet consumer, will increase by less
than 20 percent. There were indications in
late 1954 and early 1955 that some influential
elements among Soviet planners were press-
ing for a higher rate of growth in consump-
tion than that called for in the 1953 plan.
Present agricultural plans indicate that the
present Soviet leadership hopes to increase
consumption at a more rapid rate than we
have here estimated. However, the high cost
of agricultural expansion and the competing
demands of other sectors of the Soviet econ-
omy will probably combine to restrict a more
rapid growth in Soviet consumption levels.
66. The disparity between rural and urban
scales.of living has grown more pronounced
The grossly inadequate rural transport and
market systems will continue to restrict the
ability of the Soviet government to eliminate
private agricultural production in rural areas.
They are also major blocks to the effective
exercise of the increased peasant purchasing
power which was intended to provide' the in-
centive to support the new agricultural pro-
gram.
DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
67. Soviet foreign trade in 1954 increased al-
most 20 percent over the preceding year. The
increase of $1.1 billion represents the largest
absolute volume increase since the period
prior to the Korean War, and the highest
trade level with the free world since before
1948. (See Tables 7 and 8). Total Soviet
Trading Area Value Percent
Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent
Satellites (incl.
Communist China) 3.6
80
4.1
80
4.9
86
5.6
82
Free World 0.9
20
1.0
20
0.8
14
1.2
18
since the beginning of the Five-Year Plans.
Exact quantification of this difference is ex-
ceedingly difficult because the greater part of
rural consumption is consumption in kind,
but the disparity probably exercises a sub-
stantial restraint upon peasant incentive and
interest in agricultural output. Despite the
fact that the peasants produce the major por-
tion of the Soviet food supply, they eat less
well than city people, even though their cal-
oric intake is about equal. The city dweller
consumes about 50 percent more milk, two
to three times as much meat, and appreciably
more fish, vegetable oil, butter, eggs, and
sugar. Housing quality is considerably better
in the city although the average space per
capita is greater in the country. An analysis
of retail trade suggests that city people con-
sume three to four times as much manufac-
tured consumer goods as do rural consumers.
foreign trade has increased at a rate more
than twice that of GNP; the increase is
attributable mainly to growing trade within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Trade with the free
world has been increasing since the end of
1950 with the exception of 1953, but remaixs
below prewar volume.
68. Soviet trade with the free world was still
primarily with Western Europe, although
TABLE 8
VOLUME INDEX OF SOVIET TRADE TURNOVER
(1948=100)
Total With the
With the
Year
Foreign Trade
Bloc
Free World
1949
126
191
75
1950
189
347
64
1951
218
399
74
1952
256
464
92
1953
298
577
77
1954
359
690
114
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there was a considerable increase in trade
with less highly developed areas of the world.
The usual export surplus with Western Eu-
rope declined slightly in 1954 and the USSR
ran a large deficit with underdeveloped areas.
It is estimated that the USSR ran a substan-
tial commodity deficit with the free world;
gold sales are estimated to have been $100-
150 million in 1954. Traditional Soviet ex-
ports to the West have been limited by in-
creases in internal Soviet consumption and
by the substantial trade program within the
Sino-Soviet Bloc; this program has recently
included large shipments of grain from the
USSR to the European Satellites, which, tak-
en as a whole, were formerly a net grain-ex-
porting area. Although there was some in-
crease in Soviet imports of consumer goods
from the free world in 1954, there was little
other change in the pattern of imports.
Grain exports to the free world declined
slightly, from the postwar low in 1953, while
exports of petroleum and other mineral and
forest products increased. In late 1954 and
early 1955 there were some indications that
the USSR might decrease its imports from the
West.
69. According to Soviet data foreign trade
turnover with other Bloc nations increased
(in value) about 14 percent in 1954, compared
to a 50 percent increase with the West. In-
asmuch as there was little change in the est-
imated volume or composition of Sino-Soviet
trade, most of the increase in Bloc trade prob-
ably took place between the USSR and the
European Satellites. The USSR apparently
serves as an intermediary for much of intra-
Bloc trade, and in part for this reason it is
difficult to ascertain the real volume of in-
crease in trade among the various members.
70. Soviet technical assistance programs
within the Bloc continued to constitute an
integral part of Soviet political and economic
control. There was a further increase in the
intensity of Soviet propaganda and in nego-
tiations to extend the area of technical as-
sistance to non-Bloc countries, particularly
to underdeveloped countries of Asia. For the
first time, there were actual movements of
technicians and equipment (into Afghani-
stan)., and a contract for the construction of
a steel mill in India was signed early in 1955.
More overtures like these will probably be
made as the Soviet economy grows, especially
if the USSR does not substantially increase
the scale of its military effort.
71. The 1955-1960 pattern of Soviet foreign
trade will be subject to so many conflicting
factors that any forecast must be conditioned
by possible changes in the international cli-
mate and in the respective capabilities of the
trading partners. The USSR is still suffi-
ciently behind Western technology to have
a continuing need for Western capital equip-
ment. Although Soviet food supply is ade-
quate for the immediate future, failure to
increase present agricultural production
would eventually lead to additional require-
ments for food products from outside the
Bloc. The USSR has the capability at pres-
ent to expand export of certain raw materials
and is rapidly approaching a position in
which it could export a substantial volume of
manufactured goods and capital equipment.
Thus the capability for an increase in trade
with the West exists..
72. Soviet programs and policies, however,
will probably preclude any rapid expansion
of trade with the West, and will probably
confine any increase in this trade to a level
approximating over-all Soviet economic
growth. The level of trade within the Bloc
will continue to increase, but at a somewhat
lower rate than in the recent past. The
amount of trade within the Bloc would be
greatly increased if the USSR encouraged a
greater degree of national specialization
among the Bloc states. We believe it more
likely that the USSR will maintain a Bloc-
wide division of labor not much changed from
the present structure and will continue to
restrict trade between its associates and the
free world.
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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
MAGNITUDE OF SCIENTIFIC ASSETS -
POLICY AND PRIORITIES
73. The USSR has consistently given strong
support to the development of science and
technology. As a consequence, Soviet scien-
tific and technical capabilities have increased
at a rapid pace, especially since World War
II. We believe that these capabilities will in-
crease throughout this period, and will con-
tinue to provide ample support for essential
economic and military programs. However,
there will continue to be limitations on Soviet
scientific resources which will make careful
allocation mandatory and circumscribe the
number of major programs that the USSR
can undertake concurrently, especially in
view of the increasing scientific demands
within the Bloc as a whole. Soviet military
and heavy industrial requirements will prob-
ably continue to be the primary factors in-
fluencing scientific planning and allocations
of technical resources, although increased at-
tention will probably be given to the applica-
tion of science to agriculture.
74. At present the scientific assets of the
USSR (the number and quality of trained
personnel, facilities, and equipment) are
smaller than those of the US, and the assets
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are far smaller than
those of the West. Soviet financial support
for science, while increasing, remains con-
siderably below that of the US, possibly about
one-half. However, with respect to scientists
of the very top rank, whose numbers are few
in any country, the USSR probably has in
many fields men who are as able as their
counterparts in Western countries. During
the period of this estimate the USSR will
provide the great bulk of Bloc scientific assets,
and its proportionate share will continue to
grow. However, East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and Hun-
gary, will continue to contribute a substantial
increment. On the other hand, Communist
China, because of an extreme shortage of
scientific and technical manpower and facili-
ties, is unlikely to contribute to Soviet Bloc
technical resources during the period of this
estimate.
75. The USSR has a large number of organ-
izations, laboratories, institutes, etc., engaged
in research in all fields of science. In gen-
eral, organizational control and laboratory
facilities are sufficient for effective utilization
of scientific talent. Important Soviet labo-
ratories conducting high priority research
projects are adequately equipped. However,
complex research instruments and equipment
are somewhat less readily available in the
USSR than in the United States or the UK.
Consequently, some specialized lower priority
research projects are probably delayed longer
than similar projects would be in Western
nations. Although the USSR continues to
import some scientific instruments from
Western nations, it is now manufacturing or
can obtain within the Bloc practically all
types of scientific instruments for laboratory
research, and also limited numbers and types
of industrial instruments for plant operations
and control. Research and development in
electronics will dominate the science of in-
strumentation' within the USSR during the
period of this estimate, with emphasis on bet-
ter recording and controlling instruments.
76. There is no evidence that Soviet ideology
has seriously hampered the development of
the physical sciences, especially in applica-
tions directly affecting industrial and mili-
tary capabilities. In certain fields of the
biological sciences, however, officially spon-
sored ideological doctrines have probably ex-
erted a retarding influence on research, al-
though the present weakness in these fields
is probably due more to the heavy official
emphasis laid on other fields of research than
to ideological restraints. There are indica-
tions that even in the biological field ideologi-
cal restraints are likely to be of less conse-
quence in the future than they have been in
the past.
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SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION AND
MANPOWER
77. Prior to World War II the general quality
of Soviet higher education and research in
most scientific and technical fields was mark-
edly below that of the US. In the postwar
period, however, it has been generally good,
and has approached US standards. Only in
some areas of biology, particularly in the ag-
ricultural sciences, does it appear that the
present quality of Soviet education and re-
search may be decidedly below that of the US.
However, by 1960, in view of the probable
greater emphasis upon agricultural develop-
ment, this deficiency is likely to be consider-
ably reduced.
78. About 1,560,000 Soviet citizens have scien-
tific or technical degrees from colleges and
universities, of whom about 785,000 are post-
war graduates. The number of university or
technical institute graduates employed in the
scientific-technical field in the USSR (1,240,-
000) compares closely with that in the US.10
It is estimated that 175,000 scientists are en-
gaged in advanced research or teaching at
higher level institutions in the USSR, com-
pared with about 265,000 so engaged in the
US. Because of the greater stress on the bio-
logical and health sciences, however, the
USSR has only an estimated 85,000 in the
physical sciences, as compared with about
210,000 in the US. Soviet scientists in research
and development in all fields of science (ex-
cluding those primarily engaged in teaching)
number about 100,000, about one-half of the
number similarly occupied in the US. Dur-
ing the period of this estimate the Soviet
scientific manpower pool, will probably in-
crease considerably more rapidly than that of
the US.
79. The USSR is not as well supplied with
technicians, mechanics, and maintenance
men as are the Western countries, where
broader sections of the population have ac-
quired mechanical skills over a considerably
"Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific person-
nel are believed to be correct to within plus or
minus 10 percent. For a detailed comparison
of USSR and US scientific personnel, see graph-
ics on following page.
longer period. Standards of maintenance for
all kinds of mechanized equipment are in gen-
eral lower than in Western countries and
rates of deterioration higher., In addition,
the number of skilled mechanics and techni-
cians which would be available to the armed
forces in war is far smaller than in the West.
However, Soviet engineers have sought to
compensate for these deficiencies by building
machines and equipment which are simple in
design and easy to maintain and repair.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE
80. The capability of Soviet scientists and
technicians in those basic scientific fields (e.
g., physical sciences, mathematics) which are
related to the development and production of
weapons and military equipment is sufficient
to insure the development of modern arms for
Soviet forces. In response to new require-
ments and conditions created by 'the appli-
cation of advanced technology to war and war
preparations, the USSR appears to be placing
great emphasis upon development of new
scientific fields and techniques to maximize
the return from Soviet resources, both human
and non-human (e.g., human engineering,
mental conditioning, casualty therapy, com-
puter research, automation).
81. The USSR probably has the scientific and
technological capability necessary to develop
most weapons and military equipment equiv-
alent to, and in a few cases possibly better
than, those of other nations. However, in a
number of weapons categories, especially
those involving new and complex equipment,
the USSR lags behind the West. Moreover,
the USSR probably does not have sufficient
scientific resources to program vigorous weap-
ons and equipment research simultaneously
in all fields, and this deficiency, while possi-
bly decreasing, will probably continue through
1960. Nevertheless, Soviet espionage poten-
tial, coupled with the free nations' inherent
inability to guard their secrets, compensates
in some degree for deficiencies in the Soviet
scientific effort.
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CONFIDENTIAL
COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFIC GROUPS*
(In Thousands)
Health Sciences
330
Agricultural
Sciences
225
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
685
GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Health Sciences
450
Agricultural
Sciences -165
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
560
Health Sciences
400
Agricultural
Sciences
285
Physical
.Sciences and
Engineering
890
"SCIENTIFIC WORKERS"
(Professional scientists in research institutions or
teaching in higher educational institutions)
Health Sciences
25
Agricultural
Sciences-30
Health Sciences
55
Agricultural
Sciences-35
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
85
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
210
Health Sciences
450
Agricultural
Sciences
335
Health Sciences
510
Physical
Sciences and
engineering
1030
Agricultural
Sciences-215
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
685
SOVIET KANDIDATS AND
AMERICAN Ph.D.'s
IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Mid-1955
Health Sciences
20
Agricultural
Sciences
15
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
35
*Numericol estimo$es of Soviet scientific personnel ore be-
lieved to be correct to within plus or minus 10 percent.
CONFIDENTIAL
Health Sciences
485
Agricultural
Sciences-195
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
Health Sciences
9
Agricultural
Sciences
12
Physical
Sciences and
Engineering
34
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Nuclear Weapons"
82. The Soviet atomic energy, program, di-
rected primarily toward the production of nu-
clear weapons, will continue to receive special
emphasis through 1958. The USSR had
tested by the end of 1953, small and medium
yield weapons and has employed thermonu-
clear boosting principles to produce an ener-
gy yield up to 1,000 kilotons of TNT. The
1954 test series showed stockpile types in the
medium yield range and extensive develop-
ment in the small yield ranges, but there was
no further development in the large yield
range. During the immediate future, the
types of weapons stockpiled will probably
have the general characteristics and explosive
powers of weapons already tested although
the quantity of the large yield type that could
be produced would probably be limited.
Within the limits of technological capabilities
as of the end of 1954, Soviet military require-
ments will govern the allocation of available
fissionable material to various types of weap-
ons, with consideration probably being given
more to operational requirements than to the
largest total energy yield attainable.
83. In order to provide an example of Soviet
stockpile capabilities, we have assumed that:
(1) one-third of estimated uranium-235 is
utilized in large-yield weapons (500 to 1,000
KT); (2) two-thirds is utilized in medium-
yield (70 KT) composite weapons; and (3)
the remaining plutonium is divided equally
between medium-yield (40 KT) and small-
yield (5 KT) weapons. For purposes of com-
parison this allocation of fissionable material
is carried through mid-1958. If the Soviet
stockpile were allocated in this manner it
would be as follows':
Mid- Mid-
1955
1958
Large-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT)
15
50
Medium-yield weapons (40-70 KT)
320
950
Small-yield weapons (5 KT)
155
250
84. However, due to continued Soviet nuclear
progress, other allocations of fissionable ma-
"See Nie 11-2-55, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro-
gram," Restricted Data, dated 25 April 1955 for
details of Soviet nuclear energy program.
terial might become more likely toward mid-
1958. The USSR will probably continue work
on larger-yield weapons as well as on'smaller-
yield and small-dimension weapons. We es-
timate that by mid-1956 the USSR could have
weapons with ranges of yields from 0.5 KT to
10,000 KT or more. Such developments would
permit more flexibility in the use of nuclear
weapons. Assuming such progress on the
part of the Soviets, and an increased alloca-
tion of fissionable material to large-yield
weapons, one of the ways in which their 1958
weapons stockpile could be divided would be
as follows:
Large-yield weapons (500 to 10,000 KT)
230
Medium-yield weapons (5 to 500 KT)
440
Small-yield weapons (0.5 to 5 KT)
570
85. Soviet fissionable material production
capabilities for the period beyond mid-1958
are subject to even greater uncertainty than
noted in footnote 12, because of the lack
of information on long-range plans and the
unpredictability of new developments in this
field. However, long-range extrapolations
can be carried out on the basis of assumptions
of the growth pattern the Soviet nuclear pro-
gram could follow during the period in ques-
tion. Alternate assumptions, which indicate
a range of growth capabilities, are:
(a) No expansion of Soviet fissionable ma-
terials production facilities after 1958 (As-
sumption A) ; or,
(b) Continued expansion of Soviet fission-
able materials production facilities after 1958
at the same rate as estimates for the period
1949 to mid-1958 (Assumption B) ; or,
(c) Expansion of the Soviet program after
1958 at a rate which will increase its require-
ments for uranium to approximately 7,000 to
10,000 tons per year by 1964 (Assumption C).
86. In view of the broad spectrum of weapon
types which will probably be available to the
In view of the range of error applicable to the
estimate of Soviet fissionable material produc-
tion, the actual figures for the end of 1955 may
be as much as one-third lower or higher than
the figures given above. Uncertainty increases
as estimates are projected into the future and
the actual figure for mid-1958 may be as low as
one-half or as high as twice the figures given
in the table.
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USSR, it becomes increasingly difficult to
make specific estimates of the detailed make-
up of the Soviet stockpile as it is projected
into the future. The following example of a
possible Soviet weapon stockpile will indicate
the general magnitude of the Soviet capability
under each of the three assumptions given
above, utilizing the same percentage alloca-
tion of fissionable material to large-, medium-,
and small-yield weapons as in paragraph 84
above.
EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE SOVIET NUCLEAR
WEAPONS STOCKPILES - 1959-1960
Assumption A
Mid
1959
Mid
1960
Large-Yield Weapons
(500-10,000 KT or more)
(5-500 KT)
Small-Yield Weapons
(0.5-5 KT)
Assumption B
Large-Yield Weapons
290
360
(500-10,000 KT or more)
Intermediate-Yield Weapons
560
700
(5-500 KT)
Small-Yield Weapons
720
900
(0.5-5 KT)
Assumption C
Large-Yield Weapons
320
450
(500-10,000 KT or more)
Intermediate-Yield Weapons
630
880
(5-500 KT)
Small-Yield Weapons
810
1130
(0.5-5 KT)
87. There is no direct information on the na-
ture of the Soviet control organization and
facilities for storage, handling, and distribu-
tion of nuclear weapons. However, we believe
that Soviet nuclear weapons will be handled
by a special organization within the Ministry
of Defense and will be stored at both a few
large reserve-stockpile storage sites and a
large number of smaller sites. These small
sites will probably be located at or near air-
fields, guided missile sites, and other delivery
vehicle installations in advanced areas.
88. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlike-
ly, for technological reasons, that the USSR
will be able to stockpile militarily significant
quantities of radiological warfare weapons
during the period of this estimate. However,
the significance of radio-active fall-out follow-
ing large nuclear explosions should be con-
sidered in connection with Soviet capabilities
to produce explosions in the megaton range.
Guided Missiles 13
89. We believe that the strategic requirements
of the USSR would dictate a major effort in
the field of guided missiles, and the evidence
which we have concerning the large number
of personalities and activities believed to be
involved in the current Soviet missile pro-
gram leads us to the conclusion that it is a
large one. On the basis of our extensive
knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the war-
time German missile experience and our esti-
mate of Soviet capabilities in related fields,
we believe that the USSR has the basic scien-
tific and technical capabilities to support a
comprehensive missile research and develop-
ment program. The USSR also has an ade-
quate economic base for a sizeable production
program. It is probal le that the USSR now
has some guided missiles in operational status,
and that a growing Soviet guided missile
capability will develop within the next several
years. However, we have no firm current in-
telligence on what particular types of missiles
the USSR is presently developing, or may now
have in operational use.
Electronics and Communications
90. The USSR has made substantial progress
toward catching up with the West in elec-
tronics by expanding its manufacturing facili-
ties and adapting Western equipment. The
magnitude, diversity, and past successes of
the Soviet research and development program
in electronics indicate the probable develop-
ment of new and improved devices. Air de-
fense capabilities will probably be improved as
a consequence of significant advances in de-
tection, warning, interception, and data-
handling equipment, which are expected dur-
'$ For a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, in-
cluding estimates of the dates at which various
types of missiles might appear in Soviet oper-
ational use, see NIE 11-6-54: "Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile
Field," published 5 October 1954. No evidence
has appeared, since the publications of that
estimate, which justifies a change in its con-
clusions.
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ing the period of this estimate. Those aspects
of communication theory which have a direct
bearing on communication techniques, radar,
computers, automatic guidance devices, and
telemetering are under continuing study by
Soviet scientists. Such research will result
in practical applications and may within the
period of this estimate lead to a communica-
tion network exceedingly difficult to intercept
or jam. During the period of this estimate
the USSR will improve its electronics capabili-
ties in the following categories.
91. Early Warning Radar (EW) - The USSR
has a large variety of EW radars in use. These
include World War II sets, native sets based
on Western designs, and sets of purely native
design. Most of these will continue in use
through 1956 and will afford fairly reliable
coverage against medium bombers at maxi-
mum ranges from 125 miles (up to 60,000 feet
altitude) to 180 miles (up to 45,000 feet alti-
tude). Against fighters these maximum
ranges are from 85 miles (up to 45,000 feet
altitude) to 135 miles (up to 30,000 feet alti-
tude). Continued use of low-frequency radars
(in the 72 me/s region) through 1959 is indi-
cated. By 1958 the USSR will probably have
developed one or more EW radars capable of
detecting an object the size of a medium
bomber at 60,000 feet up to a distance of about
200 nautical miles. The problem of low alti-
tude coverage will still exist but probably will
be greatly lessened by the use of moving tar-
get indicators and gap-filler radars. By 1960
the performance of the early warning radar
estimated to be introduced in 1958 will prob-
ably be increased somewhat.
92. Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI)-
We estimate that by 1958 the USSR will have
GCI radars of several types, including the
V-beam sets presently in use, which should be
capable of coverage on medium bombers at
maximum reliable ranges of 150-200 nautical
miles and on fighters at maximum reliable
ranges of 55-85 nautical miles, depending on
altitude, location, and other factors. More
recent than the excellent V-beam sets are
the paired combinations of long-range azi-
muth indicating sets (GAGE) and height in-
dicating sets (PATTY CAKE), which collec-
tively can provide GCI data. We believe that
by 1960 GCI coverage will be increased to the
order of 200 nautical miles; this will necessi-
tate the use of transponder beacons in inter-
ceptor aircraft. Maximum reliable altitude
coverage up to 60,000 feet, though at less than
maximum ranges, will be achieved by 1959.
93. Airborne Intercept Radar (AI) - There is
confirmed evidence that the USSR now has
airborne intercept radar in at least limited
operational use in widely separated geographic
areas. The equipment is probably compar-
able to existing Western types. It can prob-
ably be installed on current types of Soviet
fighter aircraft. Within the period of this
estimate the Soviet air defense system will
probably have improved AI radar in general
operational use.
94. Fire Control Radar - The WHIFF radar,
the Soviet version of the SCR-584, will almost
certainly continue to be used in quantity.
Meanwhile, development work on radar sets
with greater accuracies, range definitions, and
reduced vulnerability to jamming will proceed
during the period of this estimate, and new
sets might appear at any time. The X-band
probably will be used for newly developed fire
control radars.
95. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar -
The USSR currently has in operational use
an X-band (three centimeter) set developed
in the postwar period and capable of further
improvement. By the end of 1957, the best
Soviet blind bombing and navigational radar
should be capable of operating at altitudes up
to 50,000 feet and have a range of about 125
nautical miles for navigation. Bombing and
navigation equipment will permit accuracies
equivalent to those of present US equipment.
The use of frequencies higher than X-band is
unlikely by mid-1956, but operational use of
the higher frequency equipment may be
achieved by mid-1960.
96. Electromagnetic Warfare - The USSR
presently has the capability of seriously dis-
rupting Western long-range communications
and navigational systems. Soviet achieve-
ments in related electronic fields indicate that
the USSR is also able, by an intensive effort,
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TOP SECRET
to develop electronic jamming equipment
which could be effective up through 12,000
megacycles and possibly through 46,000 mega-
cycles. It is estimated that by 1960 the USSR
can have jamming equipment in operational
use in frequency ranges up through 30,000
megacycles.
97. Microwave Radio - Microwave communi-
cation equipment is in wide use in East Ger-
many, and fixed networks exist in the Soviet
Union. Based on the reported procurement
of microwave relay equipment from both East
Germany and Hungary, the present inventory
of the Soviet Bloc is estimated at approxi-
mately 3,000 sets. By 1960, mobile micro-
wave sets of eight channels will probably be
standard military issue to divisions and high-
er echelons. VHF equipment for ground-air,
ship-ship, and ship-shore communication, al-
ready in use, will find more widespread use
with increased numbers of channels and im-
proved reliability. Techniques such as "flash"
transmissions will be used to transmit im-
portant messages with a minimum suscepti-
bility to countermeasures and maximum of
message security.
Biological Warfare
98. Firm evidence on Soviet activity in the
biological warfare field is exceedingly scanty,
and is likely to remain so because of the rel-
ative ease with which such a program can be
concealed. The USSR has, however, the tech-
nical knowledge, trained personnel, and facili-
ties necessary for a program of research and
development in biological warfare, and such
a program is probably in progress. The USSR
is capable of producing BW agents and dis-
seminating devices suitable for small-scale
clandestine attacks against certain crops,
against livestock, and against personnel in
buildings or. concentrated in relatively small
areas. Soviet capabilities for large-scale
attacks are more difficult to estimate. Anti-
livestock BW against the US need not be
large-scale to be effective. Anticrop BW
against the US would probably not substan-
tially affect US crop production unless car-
ried out on a very large scale and under favor-
able seasonal and environmental conditions.
The USSR is probably capable of large-scale
production of antipersonnel BW weapons.
'99. Soviet capabilities for defense against BW
are inferior to those of the US because of So-
viet deficiencies in public health, sanitation,
livestock management, and plant protection.
Gradual progress will probably be made to cor-
rect these deficiencies during the period of
the estimate. Because widespread shipment
of livestock is not practiced in the USSR, So-
viet vulnerability to small-scale antilivestock
attacks is probably less than that of the
United States.
Chemical Weapons
100. During World War II, the Soviet Union
is known to have produced most of the stand-
ard chemical warfare agents as well as the
necessary auxiliary equipment. The . USSR
has the facilities and scientific knowledge nec-
essary to produce at least one of the nerve
gases and could employ these agents during
the period of this estimate. Published Soviet
research in fields closely allied to chemical
warfare - organophosphorus chemistry, aero-
sol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and
adsorption - indicates a scientific capability
for the development of new or improved chem-
ical agents, dissemination equipment, and
protective devices. We assume that the stock-
pile of standard agents and munitions accum-
ulated during World War II has been main-
tained and that the facilities for CW agents
production are being maintained on a stand-
by basis or operated to produce other chemi-
cals or materiel. The USSR is able to engage
in chemical warfare on a large scale.
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V. SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH
SIZE OF FORCES, SCALE OF
EFFORT, TRENDS
101. The USSR is both the foundation and
arsenal of Communist Bloc military strength,
and thus the primary source of Bloc military
capabilities. The main contribution of the
other Bloc states is manpower, although in-
dustries in the Eastern European Satellites
supply some military equipment. Sino-Soviet
Bloc forces-in-being now total more than
8,000,000 men (of which about 4,000,000 are
Soviet and 2,400,000 Chinese) not including
security forces. The forces of the East Euro-
pean states, for all practical purposes, are un-
der direct control of the Kremlin. The Com-
munist Chinese forces, while heavily depend-
ent upon Soviet aid, are outside direct Soviet
control.
102. In the postwar period the USSR has pro-
duced armaments at a relatively high rate,
which has made possible an extensive re-
equipment program. Since 1950, Soviet pro-
duction of armaments has been at an average
rate of roughly 25 percent of capacity. The
levelling off of military expenditures as in-
dicated in the 1953-1954 budgets apparently
resulted in a reduction in output of some
weapons, many of which were already stock-
piled in quantity. The announced increase
in the military budget for 1955, however, sug-
gests that the cutback in production was tem-
porary and may have reflected transition to
the production of newer models, especially
aircraft. Assuming no significant changes in
the international situation, we have estimated
above that Soviet defense expenditure after
1955 will probably show a relatively small an-
nual increase - of the order of three percent
per year on the average.
103. During the period of this estimate the
personnel strength of Bloc forces-in-being will
probably remain substantially unchanged.
However, the over-all effectiveness of these
forces will almost certainly increase, primari-
ly due to the improved weapons available to
Soviet forces, and to changes in organization,
doctrine, and tactics designed to adapt these
forces to nuclear warfare. The major weap-
ons changes will be the increases in the num-
bers and types of nuclear weapons, in air-
craft, especially bombers and all-weather
fighters, and in long-range submarines.
There will also be progressive modernization
of weapons and equipment, particularly those
incorporating electronic guidance and control.
Limitations on Bloc armed forces during the
period of this estimate will derive from: de-
ficiencies in experience and training for long-
range air operations, and in certain equip-
ment for air defense, together with lack of
capability for long-range amphibious and sur-
face naval operations.
104. Logistical problems will continue to place
a considerable limitation upon the Sino-So-
viet Bloc's capability to wage intensive war-
fare over an extended period. These prob-
lems are due to the vast size of the USSR,
the great distances from main interior sources
of supply to several main operational areas,
and the relatively inadequate road and rail
network and the acute shortage of Bloc-regis-
tered shipping.14 In order to offset these dis-
advantages the USSR has maintained large
forces and military stockpiles in forward
areas. Stockpiles of POL, ammunition, and
other types of supplies consumed at a rela-
tively constant rate, are probably sufficient to
maintain a force of 300 line divisions together
with air and naval forces in Europe and Asia
for an extended period (i.e., up to six months
depending upon the scale of conflict). Dur-
ing the period of this estimate the Soviet
logistical situation will probably improve as
a result of continued stockpiling and the de-
velopment of a more flexible and mobile trans-
port system. However, logistical problems
will probably continue to be a considerable
limitation upon capabilities for extended
offensive operations, especially in the Far
East. If the USSR were subjected to inten-
14 For a breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Bloc mer-
chant fleet, see Appendix, Tablell.
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sive nuclear attack, its capability to support
extensive military operations, especially out-
side Soviet borders, would be markedly cur-
tailed both in magnitude and duration.
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
Ground Forces 15
105. The Soviet Army has been reorganized
and modernized since the end of World War
II, and now totals about 2,500,000 men. There
are sufficient trained reserves and stockpiles
of equipment to expand the army to about 300
line divisions plus supporting troops with a
total strength of 7,500,000 by M+30. The
estimated maximum mobilization potential
is about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of
general war, we believe that the Soviet ground
forces will remain at approximately their
present size and disposition through 1960.
The concentration of Soviet ground forces in
East Germany,' the Western USSR, the Cau-
casus, and the Far East provides for the de-
fense and security of the most important and
vulnerable areas of the USSR, while facilita-
ting administrative support.
ty and maneuverability, greater initiative,
dispersion, deeper objectives, reconnaissance,
and individual protective measures. Soviet
offensive doctrine emphasizes allocation of a
substantial number of nuclear weapons for
use against enemy defensive positions, air
facilities, reserves, atomic capabilities, and en-
circled enemy units. The assault following
a nuclear attack would employ tanks and
armored infantry in order to develop maxi-
mum speed of exploitation. Doctrine for the
defense emphasizes deep revetted trenches
and other protective construction, dispersion
in. width and depth, and larger and more
mobile reserves. '
108. The Soviet Army is currently embarked
on an extensive program of improvement of
its ground weapons systems which will great-
ly increase its mobility, flexibility, and fire-
power.'6 Armored cars and armored person-
nel carriers have been introduced. It is esti-
mated that in East Germany alone there are
now about 2,000 armored personnel carriers,
each capable of transporting 15 men. Gen-
eral issue of new weapons has included a
medium tank (T-54) mounting a 100-mm
gun, mortars of 160-mm, and of 200 to 240
mm calibers, a track-mounted rocket launch-
er, and a new family of antiaircraft guns, and
possibly a new heavy tank (JS-4). During
this period the Soviet Army will probably
have new and improved heavy artillery of
large enough caliber to utilize nuclear projec-
tiles, an infantry antitank guided missile, and
infrared night driving and firing aids. By
mid-1960 it is estimated that a new medium
tank and a heavy tank, substantially superior
to the current T-54 and JS-3, (or JS-4), will
be in operation.
109. During the period of this estimate, the
combat readiness of the Soviet Army will al-
most certainly continue to increase. The
addition of improved equipment and weapons,
more flexibility in logistical operations, a con-
siderable increase in mobility and changes
designed to meet requirements for nuclear
warfare will improve the effectiveness of the
106. The Soviet Army is well-trained, disci-
pline is good, and morale is almost certainly
high. The 30 Soviet divisions located in East
Germany and the European Satellites are
known to be well equipped. This force is
well trained and combat ready, although its
readiness is somewhat lowered in the late fall
of each year when new recruits have replaced
trained men. Intelligence concerning the re-
maining divisions, particularly those in the
interior of the USSR, is considerably less ex-
tensive. However, it is probable that the
latter are maintained at a stage of war read-
iness sufficient to permit their early deploy-
ment to a combat theater.
107. During the last year the Soviet Army
has placed considerable emphasis upon train-
ing exercises to improve ground force defense
against nuclear attack. There is also evidence
that army offensive and defensive tactics en-
visage the use of tactical atomic weapons by
Soviet forces. Emphasis is placed on mobili-
16 For detailed estimates of strength and disposi-
tion of these forces, see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
'e For a comparison of Soviet and US production
of major ground force weapons for 1953-1954,
see Appendix, Table 8.
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Soviet Army for a nuclear war and also in-
crease its capabilities to engage in highly
mobile, conventional type actions.
110. Security Forces. Soviet internal security
forces are controlled by the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs and number about 400,000. These
troops are a select group, well trained and
equipped, and provide a significant increment
to Soviet military strength-in-being. How-
ever, their primary responsibility for main-
taining internal control would probably pre-
vent their becoming available for operations
outside the USSR. About 150,000 are in the
border troops, disposed along all accessible
land and sea frontiers. The remaining 250,-
000 include troops responsible for suppressing
any organized resistance in the country, for
guarding shipments of prisoners, strategic
cargoes, and labor camps, and for maintain-
ing the security of high-level government and
military communications.
Air Forces "
111. During the postwar period the USSR has
continually improved its air force both in size
and quality. Although in World War II the
USSR gave primary emphasis to the ground
support role of air forces, in the postwar peri-
od increasing attention has been given to the
development of the interceptor and strategic
bombing arms. We estimate that the cur-
rent over-all authorized (TO&E) air strength
is about 20,300, including about 10,400 jet
fighters, 3,200 jet light bombers, 1,160 piston
medium bombers, 200 jet medium bombers,
and 20 jet and 20 turbo-prop heavy bombers.
Over-all actual strength is probably about 85
percent of authorized strength. We believe
that replacement of TU-4 aircraft by jet
bomber types and growing numbers of all-
weather jet fighters will almost certainly be
the most important developments in the So-
viet air forces during the period of this esti-
mate. We estimate that by 1960 the over-all
authorized strength (TO&E) will have in-
creased to about 21,400 aircraft, which will
For strengths of the Soviet Air Forces in aircraft,
personnel, and by major combat components and
geographic distribution, see Appendix, Tables 1,
3, 4, and 5.
include about 10,900 jet fighters (about 40
percent all-weather), 3,100 jet light bombers,
700 jet medium bombers, and 400 jet and 300
turbo-prop heavy bombers.
112. The Soviet aircraft industry has account-
ed for about 95. percent of total Bloc aircraft
production in the postwar period. Estimated
Bloc production of fighter and bomber air-
craft during the period 1946-1954 has been
roughly equal to that of the NATO countries
in numbers of aircraft, although substantially
below that of NATO in terms of total airframe
weight.18 During the latter part of this period
(1952-1954) Soviet Bloc production of fighters
and bombers, both in numbers and weight,
was considerably below that of NATO. Dur-
ing 1954 the Soviet aircraft industry was
operating at about 25 percent of capacity, and
produced about 8,500 to 9,000 aircraft, includ-
ing about 5,300 fighters and bombers. We
believe that during the period of this estimate
it will operate at about 25-30 percent of capa-
city, with annual production at about 9,000-
10,000 aircraft, including about 5,000 to 6,000
fighters and bombers. Aero-engine industries
will probably continue to operate at about 35
percent of capacity, with a total output of
about 30,000 to 35,000 engines. In view of
the requirements of the operating forces,
these rates of production are insufficient to
permit any significant stockpiling of the
latest aircraft types, aircraft engines, and
electronic devices. Conversion of the air-
craft industry to full capacity production
would probably require 18-24 months.
113. Airfield development in the USSR and
the European Satellites during the postwar
period has generally kept pace with demands
created by the introduction of new aircraft
into operational units. The principal excep-
tion is in Northeastern Siberia opposite Alas-
ka and along the Northern Arctic coast. In
these areas air operations would at present be
limited by relatively undeveloped base facili-
ties and by lggistical difficulties even though
airfield construction and development has
been in progress there for some time. Under
its airfield development program the USSR
has created an interlocking network of air-
'For detailed comparisons, see Appendix, Table 9.
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fields along perimeter areas in Europe and
internal approach lines within the USSR.
We believe that during the period of this esti-
mate the Soviet airfield construction program
will be continued, and will receive special em-
phasis in the Far East and possibly in Soviet
Arctic areas.
114. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military
aviation is, on the whole, below that of the
US. The chief limiting factors have been
lower average aircrew proficiency, lower
standards of maintenance and training, and
lack of certain aircraft types. During this
period the introduction into operational units
of new jet types, including a supersonic in-
terceptor, an all-weather fighter, and medium
and heavy bombers, plus a four-engine turbo-
prop aircraft, together with the training ap-
propriate to these types, will lead to a signifi-
cant increase of combat effectiveness. How-
ever, assuming that the US maintains its
present standards, over-all Soviet air combat
effectiveness will almost certainly remain be-
low that of the US during this period, especial-
ly in night and all-weather operations and in
long-range operations.
115. The MIG-15 (Falcon) and MIG-17
(Fresco) are now standard equipment of So-
viet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense as of
other components of the Soviet Air Force.
The MIG-17, which began to replace the
MIG-15 in 1953 and now constitutes nearly
half of fighter aircraft, is estimated to have
a maximum speed of 635 knots at sea level,
and a combat ceiling of 58,000 feet. We be-
lieve the USSR will have a supersonic inter-
ceptor in operational use early in the period.
Aircraft with AI radar have been introduced
into operational units, and by 1960 all-weather
fighters will probably make up about 40 per-
cent of the whole fighter force.
116. The TU-4 (BULL) medium bomber is
now obsolescent, but remains for the present
probably entered series production. We esti-
mate that these new jet types will rapidly re-
place the TU-4 medium bomber and that the
authorized bomber strength of Soviet long-
range aviation throughout the period will be
as follows : 19
Aircraft
Mid
Mid
Mid Mid
Mid Mid
Type
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
TU-4
1,160
840
400
100
0
0
Type 39
200
400
650
700
700
700
Type 37
20
80
200
350
400
400
Turbo-prop
20
80
150
250
300
300
There is no firm intelligence on the planned
balance between the types and categories of
long-range aircraft or on their future au-
thorized organizational aircraft strengths;
the above figures represent our estimate of
the most probable way in which Soviet Long-
Range Aviation would be proportioned during
the period and is predicated on the assumption
(a) that no change will occur in the total au-
thorized number of aircraft in long-range
units; (b) that the Bear turbo-prop heavy
bomber is currently in series production; and
(c) that the USSR is devoting a major air-
craft production effort to the development of
a massive intercontinental air attack capabili-
ty.
Naval Forces"
117. During recent years the Soviet Navy has
been greatly strengthened by an intense and
rapid building program; this program has
not included aircraft carriers, battleships, or
heavy cruisers, but has concentrated on light
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The So-
viet submarine fleet is now the largest in the
world and is still growing; about half its
strength consists of long-range craft of which
a significant and increasing proportion are
modern types. Most of the major surface
vessels and all of the modern submarines will
probably be kept active, but the present rate
the principal aircraft of the Soviet long-range "For estimates of the performance characteristics
aviation. However, series production of a of Soviet long-range aircraft, see Appendix,
twin-jet medium bomber, the Type 39 (BAD1 Table 6.
GER) is now under way, and a four-engine 20 For strength and disposition of Sino-Soviet naval
jet heavy bomber, the Type 37 (BISON), and? forces, see Appendix, Table 7. For strength of
the Soviet Naval Air Force by aircraft type, see
a turbo-prop heavy bomber (BEAR) have Appendix, Table 5.
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of new construction is such that the Soviets
might elect to create a substantial reserve fleet
of submarines. It is believed that all such
reserve or inactive units could be activated by
M+180.
118. Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearly
20 percent of the total strength of Soviet mil-
itary aviation, has converted completely to
jet aircraft in the fighter and light bomber
categories. The number of jet reconnais-
sance aircraft in service has also increased,
but attack and transport aircraft continue
to be piston engine types. During the period
of this estimate, Soviet Naval Aviation is ex-
pected to remain approximately constant in
strength, while continuing its program of
modernization of equipment. Improved all-
weather jet fighters will probably be intro-
duced, and possibly jet medium bombers for
attack, reconnaissance, and airsubmarine op-
erations.
119. We estimate that in mid-1955 the main
strength of the Soviet Navy will consist of 31
cruisers, 142 destroyers, and 374 submarines,
including 13 light cruisers, 85 fleet destroyers,
and about 150 long range submarines of post-
war design. Naval construction in the USSR
is presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT
which represents about one-third Soviet ca-
pacity and one-fifth total Bloc capacity.
Battleships and carriers could be built in all
fleet areas except the Far East. Presently
one "capital ship" of unknown type is believed
to be under construction in the Baltic area
and possibly one in the Black Sea area, and
these vessels may become operational during
the period of this estimate. It appears, how-
ever, that the USSR will continue to place
primary emphasis upon the construction of
long-range submarines, while continuing the
construction of cruiser and destroyer types."
120. The Soviet Navy is now concentrating on
the construction of two long-range submarine
types developed since World War II. These
are equipped with snorkel. The "W" type
has an operating radius under combat condi-
tions of about 4,700 nautical miles; the "Z"
21 For estimated Soviet production of major vessels,
1955-1960, see Appendix, Table 10.
type, 6,700 nautical miles. By early 1955,
107 (including 20 "Z" type) of these had
joined the fleet; the present building rate is
estimated as 75 (including 15-20 "Z" type)
per year. The Soviets have the technical
capability for modifying either of these types
for launching guided missiles. The USSR is
known to have continued development of the
Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine
propulsion, and an experimental submarine
powered by such an engine could be opera-
tional now. It is also possible that, during
the period of this estimate, nuclear propul-
sion for Soviet submarines will have been
developed. However, there is no evidence
that the USSR is constructing submarines
equipped with either of these types of pro-
pulsion.
121. Soviet naval capabilities can be expected
to improve throughout the period due to the
building program, technological development,
and intensive training. While the operation-
al efficiency of the Soviet Navy is still below
that of the navies of the major Western Pow-
ers, it will continue to improve during this
period. Little is known of the operating effi-
ciency of the submarine force. It is probably
still inferior to that of US and German forces
of World War II, but performance standards
will probably rise steadily during this period.
Personnel of the submarine force are the pick
of the Soviet Navy, and their morale is high.
122. The principal weakness of the Soviet
Navy derives from the wide separation of the
sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its in-
ability to control the sea routes between these
areas. The USSR is thus deprived of the
strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by
naval powers, and is compelled to maintain
four separate fleets together with their sup-
porting facilities. The inland waterway sys-
tem connecting the White and Baltic now
permits the interchange of vessels up to the
size of small destroyers and including all
current submarine types. During this per-
iod, possibly by 1957, improvements in the
system will extend this interchange capabil-
ity to include the Black Sea. However, parts
of the waterway system are open only on an
average of five months a year because of
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weather conditions. Increased use of the
Northern Sea Route, which is open for a six
to eight week period in the summer, may also
improve the situation. The lack of adequate
supply lines to the Northern and Far Eastern
areas is an additional handicap. Limitations
on sustained offensive operations derive from
the land-locked position of the fleets in the
Baltic and Black Seas (containing roughly 60
percent of Soviet naval strength), the exits
from which are controlled by the NATO Pow-
ers, and from the lack of advanced bases.
The long-range capabilities of the Soviet Navy
are further reduced by lack of aircraft car-
riers, long-range reconnaissance aircraft,
auxiliary vessels suitable for underway lo-
gistic support, forward bases, and by the lack
of experience in long-range operations.
123. There is no force in the Soviet Navy com-
parable to the amphibious forces of the US
Navy, although the naval infantry compo-
nents have received some training in amphib-
ious warfare. While capable of mounting
short range lifts in considerable force in the
Baltic and Black Seas and in the Sea of Ja-
pan, the Soviet Navy. does not possess suffi-
cient amphibious craft to launch and sustain
long-haul amphibious operations.
EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITE
MILITARY FORCES22
124. Soviet control of the Satellites has in ef-
fect moved the Soviet military frontier into
Central Europe, and the USSR has given a
high priority to the development of this area
for military operations. The Satellite ground
and air forces now constitute a substantial
element in the balance of military power in
Europe. However, their over-all effectiveness
is only fair, and the political reliability of
some national units is questionable. During
the period of this estimate the over-all capa-
bilities and usefulness to the USSR of the
Satellite forces will probably increase. How-
ever, many of the current deficiencies will
continue to limit the military usefulness of
For detailed strength figures by country, see Ap-
pendix, Tables 1, 2, 3, and 7. See also NIE 12-54,
"Probable Developments in the European Sat-
ellites through Mid-1956," dated 24 August 1954.
these forces to the Soviets, especially for of-
fensive operations.
Ground Forces
125. The Satellite ground forces' present
strength is about 1,085,000 men, organized
into 81 line divisions. In general, the Satel-
lite ground forces (not including those of
East Germany) have probably reached the
desired peacetime strength level. By 1957,
primarily through an increase of East Ger-
man forces, Satellite ground personnel will
probably increase to about 1,200,000, a figure
that, probably will not change significantly
through 1960. The Satellite armies, which
are presently equipped largely with Soviet
World War II material of good quality, will
continue to be largely dependent upon the
USSR for major items of equipment, particu-
larly tanks, self-propelled guns, and medium
to heavy artillery.
Air Forces
126. The Satellite air forces now have an esti-
mated TO&E strength of 3,850 aircraft (ap-
proximately 2,700 actual), and during this
period their TO&E will probably increase to
about 4,800 aircraft. During this period em-
phasis will probably be placed on the
strengthening of the Satellite fighter and
light bomber establishments, and the further
integration of the Satellite air forces into the
Soviet air defense system. The Satellites will
continue to be greatly dependent upon the
USSR for logistic support, and virtually all
aircraft will be Soviet types. Satellite pro-
duction, almost exclusively Polish and Czech-
oslovak, while growing, will probably not ex-
ceed 15 percent of the Bloc total.
Naval Forces
127. Owing to their small size,'their meager
equipment, and the unreliability of personnel,
the Satellite navies provide only a minor con-
tribution to Soviet naval strength. However,
ports and bases in some of the Satellites pro-
vide the USSR with a considerable extension
of naval logistic and operational facilities.
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COMMUNIST CHINESE
MILITARY FORCES23
128. The military forces of Communist China
constitute the most formidable Asiatic fight-
ing force. The Kremlin exercises no direct
control over these forces. However, the na-
ture of Sino-Soviet relations, especially the
dependence of Communist China upon the
USSR military support in weapons and sup-
plies, provides the Kremlin with considerable
leverage for influencing Chinese military de-
velopments and policy. As a consequence
the military frontiers of the USSR, in a prac-
tical sense, have been extended deep into the
Asian land mass, a factor which greatly in-
creases the Soviet power base and potential.
Ground Forces
129. The Chinese Communist Army is well
adapted by tradition, training, and the char-
acteristics of its individual soldiers to the
type of warfare likely to be encountered in
the extremes of weather and terrain of the
Asian region. These forces now number
about 2,300,000 men organized into 37 armies
and 125 line divisions plus supporting troops.
Any expansion during this period would be
dependent upon the acquisition of weapons
and equipment from sources outside China.
The Chinese Communist forces have been
primarily infantry, equipped with a hetero-
geneous assortment of foreign-made weapons.
A recent extensive reorganization and re-
equipment program has reduced the number
of divisions, increased the number of combat
and service units, and is standardizing equip-
ment to that of Soviet and Chinese manu-
facture. Communist China now produces its
own requirements of clothing, food, small-
arms, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and
certain types of ammunition, and progress is
being made toward self-sufficiency in sub-
machine guns, light machine guns, and mor-
tars. It will continue to be dependent upon
the Soviet Union for heavy equipment, motor
29 For strengths and dispositions, see Appendix,
Tables 1, 2, 3, and 7. For strengths of additional
Bloc forces in Asia, see figures for North Korean
and Viet Minh forces given in Tables 1 and 2.
vehicles, artillery above 70-mm, and POL.
The combat readiness of the Chinese Com-
munist ground forces will continue to increase
during this period, primarily due to the re-
equipment program, to standardization of
equipment, and to improved combat and serv-
ice support.
Air Forces
130. The Communist Chinese Air Force now
has a TO&E strength of about 2,400 aircraft
(about 1,700 actual). It is equipped primar-
ily for defensive operations, but the acquisi-
tion of some piston medium and jet light
bombers has given it a limited capability for
offensive operations. The combat effective-
ness of the CCAF is only fair, but it will prob-
ably improve somewhat throughout the peri-
od of this estimate, mainly through increased
proficiency of flying personnel, improved
quality of aircraft, and more numerous and
improved air facilities. However, since Com-
munist China will probably not produce com-
bat aircraft during the period of this esti-
mate, over-all effectiveness will be largely de-
termined by Soviet willingness to continue
to supply additional aircraft, especially jet
fighters, jet light bombers, and medium
bombers, together with the necessary parts
and equipment.
Naval Forces
131. Communist major vessel strength prob-
ably now consists of two destroyers and 5-7
submarines (2-4 long-range and three coastal
types). These were obtained from the USSR,
most of them probably during the last year.
There are also at least 55 torpedo boats, 56
landing craft (LST, LSM, LSIL),24 17 frigates,
and several hundred small patrol craft. The
Soviet Far Eastern naval forces are providing
training, advisors, and logistic support to the
Chinese Communist naval forces. The USSR
will probably add modestly to the Chinese
Communist naval strength during the period
of this estimate.
24 In addition there are 25 landing craft of these
types operating in the Chinese` Communist mer-
chant marine.
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VI. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR
WORLD BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES
132. During the postwar period a rough bal-
ance of military power has existed between
the Communist Bloc and the Western coali-
tion. During most of this period the USSR's
main military assets have been a marked
superiority in organized military manpower
and in conventional weapons, and the ability,
because of the strategic advantage of its
"heartland" position, to concentrate these
forces against such strategically vital areas
as Western Europe and the Middle East. At
the same time the principal offsetting
strengths of the West have been its greater
economic potential and its nuclear. capabili-
ties. The effectiveness of the latter has been
greatly contributed to by the development of
bases around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc numeri-
cal superiority in forces-in-being and conven-
tional ground and air armaments has been
narrowed markedly; in fact Western strength
in modern aircraft is now greater than that
of the Soviet Bloc. On the other hand, al-
though the West has greatly increased its nu-
clear weapons production and delivery capa-
bilities, the growing Soviet capabilities in
these respects are progressively reducing the
significance of the superiority.
133. During the period of this estimate the
West will probably continue to maintain its
lead in the development and introduction of
new weapons. The West will also retain its
sizable lead in trained air and naval person-
nel, and to the extent that West German and
possibly Japanese rearmament take place, the
Soviet superiority in ground forces-in-being
may be reduced. On the other hand improv-
ing air strengths will give the USSR a greatly
increased capability to conduct long-range air
operations against the West, probably includ-
ing two-way refueled missions to the US. Its
modern long-range submarine fleet will pose
an increasing threat to Allied naval forces and
to shipping carrying supplies and reinforce-
ments to Allied forces. Trained reserves, plus
stockpiled equipment, permit a rapid mobili-
zation of additional units to augment their
already strong ground forces. These develop-
ments, along with other increasing Soviet
strengths such as a significant increase in nu-
clear weapons would reduce the significance
of the Western nuclear and logistics superior-
ity, and possibly reduce the military value of
the superior western economic potential.
134. The development of nuclear weapons
and of the ability to deliver such weapons on
target will probably be the most decisive
single factor that could alter the relative mil-
itary power of the Communist Bloc and the
US-NATO coalition. At present, the USSR's
principal capability for delivering nuclear
weapons lies in attack by aircraft; the im-
proved new bombers becoming operational
during the period will greatly increase this
capability. In addition, although specific
evidence is lacking on the types of guided
missiles under priority development in the
USSR, Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack
by means of guided missiles will probably be-
come significant, especially in the period 1958-
1960. Nevertheless, provided there are no
significant alterations in present political
alignments or US-NATO military programs,
the USSR almost certainly will not achieve by
1960 any such gains in relative military pow-
er as would permit it to launch general war
with assurance of success. While trends in
weapons developments will increasingly give
an advantage to a power capable of launch-
ing a massive surprise attack, the USSR will
almost certainly not be able, during the. peri-
od of this estimate, to launch such an attack
with assurance of escaping an even more dev-
astating retaliatory attack.
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES25
135. The air forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are
capable of attacking the US and Allied bases,
Z, NIE 11-5-55, "Bloc Air Defense Capabilities,
1955-1960," scheduled for publication in July,
will provide a detailed treatment of this subject.
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especially those on the periphery of the Bloc,
or the carrier task forces from which Western
air operations could be launched against the
Bloc. In a strictly defensive sense, the air
defense system of the USSR provides for the
potential employment of virtually all Soviet
and Satellite fighters - about 14,000 aircraft,
including 3,700 fighters in the Soviet Aviation
of Air Defense - (PVO). In addition, the
Chinese and North Korean Communists have
about 900 jet fighters which to some de-
gree contribute to the defense of the Soviet
Far East. The assignment of an air defense
role to the fighter forces does not cancel their
other missions and responsibilities, but re-
sults in a "multiple mission" for most fighter
forces.
136. The capabilities estimated below are sub-
stantially limited to the areas of dense air de-
fense concentration (European USSR, East-
ern Europe, and the Maritime-South Man-
churia area of the Far East). Air defense
capabilities in other areas would probably be
considerably less than indicated below and
virtually nonexistent in the North Siberian
area, the greater part of China, Indochina,
and Albania.
a. Against daylight bomber formations be-
tween 10,000 and 30,000 feet in clear weather
the Soviet Bloc air defense system is believed
capable of inflicting severe losses against pis-
ton bombers and moderate losses against
high-speed jet bombers. Above 30,000 feet
altitude this capability would begin to dimin-
ish, and above 40,000 feet would fall off
markedly, due to problems of target detection
and tracking, loss of AAA effectiveness, and
reduced GCI capabilities. Under certain cir-
cumstances, such as persistent visible con-
trails, these capabilities would, of course, be
markedly increased. Primary limitations
would then be the numbers and individual
capabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft
available.
b. Against multiple-pronged penetrations
utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary tac-
tics, and electronic countermeasures, the So-
viet Bloc air defense system is subject to seri-
ous breakdowns which would tend to degrade
its effectiveness progressively.
c. Against air attacks conducted under
poor visibility conditions the Soviet Bloc air
defense system is capable of offering only lim-
ited resistance, owing to inadequacy of equip-
ment and training for all-weather operations.
137. During the period of this estimate the
Bloc air defense system will probably be sub-
stantially strengthened by greater operation-
al experience and by the introduction into
operational units of new fighter types, new
antiaircraft weapons, improved early warning
and GCI equipment, and guided missiles.
However, in view of the increasing capabili-
ties of offensive weapons and improved tech-
niques in counter measures, Soviet air de-
fense capabilities will probably remain inade-
quate to prevent attacking forces from reach-
ing critical target areas of the USSR.
OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES26
138. The main Soviet offensive strength at
present lies in the ability to mount attacks
against Western Europe and the UK. Air
attacks of great weight involving nuclear
weapons could be launched with little or no
warning. Submarines could be employed in
an extensive effort to disrupt reinforcements
and supplies from North America. With its
ground forces the USSR could launch a sur-
prise attack against Western Europe using
25 to 30 Soviet ground divisions now in East-
ern Europe. By prior concentration of great-
er forces west of the Oder-Neisse Line, involv-
ing almost certain loss of surprise, the USSR
could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. A build-
up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accom-
plished by D + 90. Satellite units could be
used to reinforce the above attacks, but it is
unlikely that European Satellite armies
would be used independently, except as se-
curity forces or to protect Soviet lines of com-
munication, or in isolated cases against tra-
ditional enemies (e.g., Bulgaria vs. Yugoslav-
ia).
139. Air support of land campaigns in West-
ern Europe could come from the approxi-
mately 2,200 aircraft presently stationed in
No estimate of the success of the offensive op-
erations described in this section can be made
without considering the effects of the actions of
opposing forces.
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East Germany and the Satellites, with rein-
forcements available from the nearly
5,000
aircraft stationed in the Western
USSR.
However, a large proportion of these aircraft
are fighter interceptor types in units which
currently have an air defense responsibility
as well as a tactical support role. This re-
sponsibility would to some degree limit com-
mitment of fighter aircraft to participate in
land campaigns. The probable increase in
satellite air defense capabilities during this
period may reduce this limitation.
140. Utilizing only those aircraft belonging
to the Aviation of Airborne Troops, the USSR
could lift about 9,000 well-equipped and well-
trained troops with one drop on D-Day or
about 14,000 with two drops. These troops
could be assembled in ten days, and could be
delivered to Rhine River crossing sites and
nearby military installations by aircraft using
bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. For a
five-day operation the Aviation of Airborne
Troops could lift approximately 23,000-25,000
troops depending on whether one or two drops
were executed on D-Day. This lift capacity
could be increased by an average of 1,800
troops for every 100 transports borrowed from
the 3,500 transports of the military air forces
and civil air fleet. However, at least during
the early period of the estimate nearly all of
these forces would have to be carried in the
low performance transport Li-2 (approximate-
ly C-47 characteristics), and this would place
a significant limitation upon the effectiveness
of such an operation. Soviet airlift capabili-
ties will probably increase through 1960, but
the lack of a large force of modern transport
aircraft will probably continue to be a limita-
tion.
141. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for
long-continued full-scale war are considerably
limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
railway, the only route by which supplies in
large amounts could be brought from other
parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has
about 30 divisions in the Far East, together
with more than 5,000 aircraft and a sizable
naval force. There are stockpiles of supplies
sufficient for a considerable period of combat.
These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with
Chinese Communist forces, renew hostilities
in Korea. They could probably launch an
invasion of Japan with an initial assault
strength of one airborne and two or three
waterborne divisions, with about six divisions
supporting. These attacks could be launched
concurrently with campaigns in the Middle
East and in Western Europe.
142. The USSR is now capable of undertak-
ing concurrent air bombardment operations
against strengths located in the US, the UK,
continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan,
and the island chain of Asia. This capability
will improve considerably during the period
of this estimate with the introduction of new
jet medium and heavy bombers. Present So-
viet capabilities for air attack on the conti-
nental US are limited by the relatively small
numbers of operational heavy bombers and
by the relatively undeveloped base facilities
in forward areas. They are also probably
limited by the lack of a developed inflight
refueling capability. The forward base capac-
ity and the performance characteristics of
aircraft estimated to be available to the So-
viets will continue to impose limits upon the
number of strike aircraft which can be
launched at one time in a intercontinental
attack upon the United States. However, the
increase in numbers of heavy bombers, and
continued Long-Range Aviation training pro-
grams, together with the probable develop-
ment of an inflight refueling capability and
extensive improvement of the forward staging
areas would result in a substantial increase in
Soviet capabilities for attack on the United
States, during the period of this estimate.27
143. At the present time, it would be techni-
cally feasible for the USSR to attack targets
within the US with missiles launched from
long-range aircraft and from submarines.
The USSR could at present have V-1 type mis-
siles with nuclear warheads for launching
from submarines, and by late 1955 could have
'7 For a full discussion see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and
Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through
1 July 1958," dated 17 May 1955.
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for this purpose a subsonic guided missile with
a maximum range of 500 nautical miles., We
believe that it will not be within Soviet capa-
bility within the period of this estimate to
attack continental United States with guided
missiles launched from Soviet Bloc territory.
144. If the USSR in fact develops the guided
missiles which we have estimated to be within
its capabilities, the following possibilities for
attack would exist during the period of this
estimate :
a. At present, from advanced bases in East-
ern Europe, targets could be reached in West-
ern Europe as far west as London, Paris, and
Rome, and in the southern half of the Scan-
dinavian peninsula. In the Far East, if
launched from Soviet or North Korean terri-
tory,. these weapons could reach targets in
western Japan and Alaska; if launched from
Chinese territory, they could reach targets in
the Ryukyu Islands and Formosa.
b. In 1957,28 Soviet guided missiles could
reach all of the UK, France, Italy,. Scandina-
via, and Turkey. In the Far East, if launched
from Soviet or North Korean territory, these
weapons could reach all of the Japanese is-
lands, and if launched from China they could
reach all of Luzon.
These have been estimated to be the earliest
probable dates of the availability of the missiles
described; it is possible that the date might be
still earlier. See NIE 11-6-54 "Soviet Capabili-
ties and Probable Programs in the Guided Mis-
sile Field," dated 5 October 1954.
.c. In 1958-1960,28 . Soviet missiles could
reach US North African bases in Tunisia, in
addition to the targets listed above.
145. During the period of this estimate Soviet
offensive naval capabilities will still be limited
to undersea warfare, surface operations in-
volving vessels no larger than cruisers, and
air operations utilizing shore-based naval air-
craft. The Soviet submarine force will great-
ly increase its capability to undertake offen-
sive patrols and mining operations along
most of the world's strategically situated sea
lanes, and possibly to launch guided missile
attacks against targets on both the Atlantic
and Pacific seaboards of the US. Major So-
viet surface units and supporting shore-based
naval aircraft will probably continue to in-
crease their capability to undertake offensive
operations in Bloc coastal areas; especially in
the Baltic and Black Seas, and to protect the
seaward flank of ground campaigns. The So-
viet Navy will almost have no long-range am-
phibious capability within the period of this
estimate, but it will remain capable of mount-
ing short-range amphibious lifts in consider-
able force.
146. We estimate that the USSR now has a
stock of over 500,000 mines and has the capa-
bility to employ mine warfare to interfere
seriously with allied sea communications. In
the European area, this effort could include all
the ports and approaches of the UK and
Western Europe. In the Far East, most of
the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around
the perimeter of the Bloc could be similarly
attacked.
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TOP SECRET 39
VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
THE FACTOR OF
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
147. The policy of any state is conditioned by
the particular view which its leaders have of
the world situation and of the dangers and
opportunities which it presents to them. The
Soviet leaders' view of the world situation is
affected by their Communist ideology and by
their isolation from the general currents of
world opinion. It is of particular importance
in estimating Soviet courses of action, there-
fore, to take into account the fact that events
outside the Communist Orbit or developments
in relations between the USSR and the West
may frequently have for the Soviet leaders
a meaning quite different from that which
they have for non-Communist statesmen.
148. The ideological heritage of the 1917 rev-
olution remains a principal determinant of
the Soviet view of developments in the world
situation. The Soviet leaders still view world
developments in terms of an irreconcilable
conflict between the "camps" of Communism
and Capitalism which will continue until
Communism has triumphed throughout the
world. In large part, this view both deter-
mines their. long-term objectives and colors
their interpretations of Western actions and
developments. We believe that the validity
of the guiding principles of Communist ideol-
ogy has in Soviet eyes been confirmed in the
main by the course of events in the war and
postwar periods.
THE POSTWAR BACKGROUND
149. Soviet leaders recognized towards the
end of World War II that a situation favor-
able to Communist expansion existed in a
large part of the non-Communist world.
Hence they pursued their advantage as fast
and as far as they could in expanding the
Communist sphere and extending Soviet influ-
ence. After some time their progress slowed
down, especially in Europe, and ran against
increasing opposition as the non-Communist
world gradually re-established stability. The
Soviet leaders are probably aware that it was
the advance of Soviet power in Central Europe
and in Asia that called forth an increasingly
stubborn Western counteraction and consoli-
dated Western opposition. Beginning in 1947,
and at an accelerated rate after 1950, the
Western nations built up their power and
cohesion to the point where further Commu-
nist expansion in Europe, and even in some
parts of Asia, could no longer be accomplished
without risk of general war. At the same
time, an accommodation with the West, even
if the USSR had wished it, came to depend
upon concessions so costly to the USSR's
power position that the Soviet leaders clearly
regarded them as unacceptable.
150. Faced with a world situation increasing-
ly inhospitable to their aims, the Soviet lead-
ers have sought to find a middle way between
the alternatives of war or accommodation at
unacceptable cost. They have proceeded on
the assumption that both Western fear of war
and hope for peace could be manipulated to
advance Soviet objectives. Consequently, a
policy of alternating menace and conciliation
was adopted to encourage the view in the West
that Soviet expansionist aims would be moder-
ated if the Western Powers refrained from
measures in their own defense which the
USSR portrayed as provocative. This policy
required no abandonment of expansionist
aims nor any cessation of Communist aggres-
sion, at least where such aggression could be
carried out without grave risk of general war.
In the period after Stalin's death, however,
Soviet policy began to place relatively more
emphasis on the element of conciliation, pos-
sibly in some degree because of the pressure
of Soviet internal problems, but apparently
mainly in the belief that for an interim period
at least such tactics were more likely to weak-
en Western opposition.
THE SOVIET VIEW OF
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
151. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
the US remains firm in its intention to oppose
Communist expansion, and that it means to
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persist in its effort to bring all important
strategic areas peripheral to the Bloc into
closer linkage with the US defense system.
They probably also estimate that the US is
unlikely deliberately to initiate general war
during the next few years. The Soviet leaders
probably believe that, due to their increasing
nuclear capability, a situation is approaching
in which a general war involving use by both
sides of nuclear weapons would bring about
such extensive destruction as to threaten the
survival of both Western civilization and the
Soviet system. They probably estimate that
a situation of mutual deterrence could develop,
in which each side would be strongly inhibited
from initiating general war or taking actions
which it regarded as materially increasing the
risk of general war. However, they probably
estimate that the US would not be deterred,
by fear of the consequences of general war,
from using its full military capabilities if it
believed that its security was imminently
threatened. The Soviet leaders almost cer-
tainly believe that overt armed aggression by
Bloc forces against any state formally allied
with the US would result in the employment
of US military power as necessary to counter
such aggression. They probably also estimate
that such aggression against a state not for-
mally allied to the US would involve risk of US
military reaction, but that the degree of this
risk, and the dimensions of the US reaction,
would depend upon the importance to the US
of the country attacked, the circumstances
of the attack, and the political situation with-
in the US and non-Communist world general-
ly.
152. The Soviet leaders probably recognize
that the success of the US effort to prevent
further Communist expansion depends heavi-
ly upon the ability of the US to establish and
maintain cohesion in the non-Communist
world. Some developments of the last year,
such as the failure of the Western Powers to
present a united front at the Geneva Confer-
ence, their subsequent inability to associate
more Asian states with the defense of South-
east Asia, and the unwillingness of most West-
ern and Asian states to support US policy to-
ward Communist China, may indicate to the
Soviet leaders a decline in US ability to main-
tain such cohesion. They probably believe
that the influence of India will continue to
grow, and that it may become the leader of a
group of states capable of an independent role
in world affairs. They may also believe that
Germany and Japan will become increasingly
capable of taking an independent position. On
the other hand, they probably now recognize
that certain aggressive actions by the Sino-
Soviet Bloc tend to increase the willingness of
the non-Communists to follow US leadership.
At the same time they probably estimate that
there are areas and problems in which such
actions would have the opposite effect. While
they may not expect during the next few years
to accomplish the defection of any states for-
mally allied with the US, they probably believe
that their own policies can encourage frictions
within the Western alliance, undermine the
willingness of US allies to support the US in
policies of firmness, and weaken US influence
among uncommitted states.
153. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
trends in the development- of Western mili-
tary strength do not present them with any
immediate threat, either of war or of a weak-
ening of their position in negotiations. While
Western nuclear capabilities will continue to
improve, this development will not alter es-
sentially the situation which the USSR has
faced throughout the postwar period. More-
over, the West's advantage in this respect is
being reduced as the USSR develops its own
nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably recognize that the present rough balance
of military power could be altered in favor of
the West by the appearance of major military
power in West Germany and Japan, but they
probably now believe that German or Japa-
nese rearmament is not likely to take place on
a significant scale during the next two or
three years at least. The Soviet leaders will
have noted that the declining trend in West-
ern military expenditures has continued de-
spite the recent increase in their own mili-
tary budget. Therefore, they are probably
quite confident that Western military power,
although remaining formidable, is not now
being developed at a rate which will permit
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the application of substantially increased mili-
tary pressure on the USSR.
154. The Soviet leaders have always reckoned
heavily on a deterioration of "capitalist" econ-
omies to undermine non-Communist strength
and to produce "imperialist contradictions"
which would range the Western Powers
against each other. Despite the continuing
vigor of the economies of Western Europe
and the failure of the long-awaited US de-
pression to materialize the Soviet leaders are
unlikely to have been shaken in their view
that long-term trends point to eventual eco-
nomic crisis in capitalist countries. They are
aware, moreover, that the economies of some
states of critical importance to the Western
alliance, such as Germany and Japan, would
probably prove vulnerable in the event of even
a moderately serious decline in levels of trade.
The latter they probably regard as a possibili-
ty even in the short term, and one which, if it
did develop, might produce a political situa-
tion which they could exploit.
PROBABLE SOVIET ESTIMATE OF
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
155. On balance, the, Soviet leaders probably
estimate that there is at present no critical
threat to their security, and that there may be
renewed opportunities for Communist expan-
sion by means short of- general war. They
probably estimate that Western power and
unity are vulnerable to Soviet political action,
and may become increasingly so. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders probably believe that they
can rely primarily upon political means, and
in some cases military action by local forces,
to carry on their struggle against the non-
Communist world.
156. However, the Soviet leaders almost cer-
tainly recognize that developments may occur
during the period of this estimate which
would require a revision of this judgment.
Some of the problems which presently con-
cern Soviet policy-makers could develop in
such a way as to present a direct threat to So-
viet security interests. Others might take a
course which, while not involving Soviet se-
curity interests directly, could heighten in-
ternational tensions, engage the prestige of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and cause the. USSR to
revise its estimate of Western intentions.
Possible developments which might lead the
Soviet leaders to make such a revision would
include the following: (a) a rate or scale of
West German rearmament greater than that
presently foreseen, or aggressive NATO poli-
cies in Europe as a result of influence exer-
cised within NATO by a rearmed West Ger-
many; (b) actions by Communist China which
led to hostilities or imminent danger of hos-
tilities between Communist China and the
US; (c) rearmament of Japan on a major
scale, including the acquisition of offensive
weapons by Japanese forces; and (d) commit-
ment of SEATO forces in Indochina to pre-
vent the Communists from gaining control of
the country by military action.
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VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION 29
PRESENT SOVIET OBJECTIVES
157. We believe that the developments within
the sphere of Soviet power and the Soviet esti-
mate of the world situation which have been
discussed in the foregoing sections have led
the Soviet leaders to assess their own situa-
tion somewhat as follows: the balance of mil-
itary power in the world and the increasing
destructiveness of nuclear weapons are such
that general. war would involve very heavy
risks to the Communist sphere, extending
possibly to the destruction of the Soviet re-
gime. On the other hand, non-Communist
strength is not so great nor the intentions of
the non-Communist powers so menacing as to
make withdrawals from the present advanced
positions in Europe and Asia seem necessary.
Moreover, in view of the growing military
capabilities of the Bloc and the frictions with-
in the non-Communist world, the Commu-
nists probably estimate that they can make
progress toward their objectives through po-
litical action, or in some. cases by localized
military action. The Soviet Bloc faces serious
internal problems which include the correc-
tion of certain weaknesses in the Bloc econo-
my, particularly in agricultural production,
and the necessity to build up economic power
in the Bloc as a step toward balancing the
vastly greater economic potential of the West.
These problems do not imply a weakness
which requires neglect of opportunities for
expansion under circumstances of limited
risk.
158. We believe that the Soviet leaders will
concentrate on the following principal objec-
tives during the period of this estimate:
a. To increase the economic and military
strength of the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
This section deals with Soviet external courses
of action. Soviet intentions with respect to
various internal developments are treated in
preceding sections of the paper. In the sum-
mary of Soviet objectives contained in the first
two paragraphs of this section, however, ob-
jectives internal to the USSR and to the Sino-
Soviet Bloc are included.
b. To promote the political and economic
instability of non-Communist states, and to
render them incapable of decisive action by
fostering and exploiting dissensions within
and among them;
c. To effect a degree of disarmament, in-
cluding the outlawing of nuclear weapons,
under conditions favorable to the Commu-
nists;
d. To bring about the withdrawal of US
power from its present advanced bases around
the periphery of the Bloc;
e. To impede or offset the rearmament of
West Germany and its association with the
Western Powers;
f. To detach Japan from the sphere of
Western influence and encourage its closer
association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc;
g. To expand Communist influence and, as
opportunities develop, to extend the area of
Communist control.
Military
159. In foregoing sections of this paper it was
estimated that the Soviet leaders probably
now believe (a) that general war would pre-
sent formidable hazards to the survival of
their system, and (b) that they can advance
toward their objectives by actions short of
general war. Therefore, we believe that dur-
ing the period of this estimate the Kremlin
will try to avoid courses of action, and to de-
ter Communist China from courses of action,
which in its judgment would clearly involve
substantial risk of general war. The Soviet
leaders are unlikely to believe that Soviet,
Communist Chinese or European Satellite
forces can be used in open attacks across rec-
ognized state frontiers during this period
without running such a risk. However, the
USSR or one of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries
might engage in indirect aggression or take
action which would create a situation in
which the US or its allies, rather than yield
an important position, would take ' counter-
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action which could lead to general war. We
believe, moreover, that the Kremlin would not
be deterred by the risk of general war from
taking counteraction against a Western
action which it considered an imminent
threat to Soviet security. Thus, general war
might occur during the period of this esti-
mate as the climax of a series of actions and
counteractions, initiated by either side, which
neither side originally intended to lead to
general war.
160. It is possible that at some time during
the period of this estimate the USSR might
come to believe that world developments had
taken a turn that would ultimately lead to a
serious impairment of Soviet security. Such
a belief might develop, for example, as a result
of developments in Germany or in connection
with an armed conflict between the US and
Communist China. In such a situation the
USSR might feel impelled to undertake local
military action in order to forestall an in-
evitable deterioration of its security position,
even though such action would entail height-
ened risk of general war. We believe, how-
ever, that even under these circumstances the
USSR would seek to keep any resulting con-
flict localized and to avoid general war.
161. By the end of the period of this estimate
the USSR will have a greatly increased ca-
pability to inflict destruction with nuclear
weapons, particularly on the US itself. Nev-
ertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still
not be confident that they could attack the
US with nuclear weapons without exposing
the USSR to an even more devastating coun-
terblow. We believe, therefore, that the
USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial
risks of general war despite the increase of
its nuclear capabilities. However, as these
capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to
estimate that the US, because of fear for itself
or for its allies, or because of pressure by its
allies, will be increasingly deterred from ini-
tiating the devastation entailed in a full-scale
nuclear war. They may therefore come to
believe that local wars will be less likely than
at present to expand into general war, and
thus that superior Soviet Bloc military capa-
bilities in certain local areas can be exercised
without substantial risk of provoking general
war. In diplomatic negotiations the Soviet
leaders will almost certainly try to take ad-
vantage of the increased urgency with which
Western governments,, pressed by their bet-
ter-informed public opinion, will strive to es-
cape nuclear war through peaceful solutions.
We believe it unlikely, however, that in a sit-
uation of sharp and general international
crisis the USSR would seek to break Western
determination by direct and open threats of
nuclear attack. The Soviet leaders would
probably fear that such tactics would bring
about a situation in which war would become
unavoidable, and they might even fear that
they would provoke a preventive attack by the
US.
Diplomacy and Propaganda
162. We believe that Soviet diplomacy during
the period of this estimate will not be directed
toward a general settlement between the
USSR and the West. It will almost certainly
continue to combine moves intended to ease
international tensions with other moves
which increase such tensions, and with politi-
cal warfare pressures calculated to play upon
the non-Communist world's fear of war. At
present the USSR is engaged in very active
diplomacy on a number of important issues
- Austria, disarmament, Yugoslavia, Japan
- and has made important concessions,
though no apparent important sacrifices as
yet. We believe that the current Soviet dip-
lomatic efforts are directed primarily toward
preventing the rearmament of Germany in
close alliance with the West, and that the
ground is being prepared for new Soviet pro-
posals on this subject, perhaps at Four Power
meetings during this summer. We also be-
lieve that in connection with the forthcoming
peace treaty negotiations with Japan the
USSR is likely to make some concessions in
the hope of promoting frictions in the rela-
tions of Japan with the US and encouraging
Japanese neutralism.
163. It is possible, however, that the Soviet
leaders also desire a substantial and prolonged
reduction in international tensions that would
not only prevent German rearmament but
also further their other objectives, including
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TOP SECRET 44
US withdrawal from advanced bases and a
reduction of the incentive for the West to
maintain its present defense efforts. The So-
viet leaders may also feel that such a reduc-
tion of international tensions is desirable be-
cause of the pressure of their own internal
problems.
164. We believe that the USSR will place con-
tinuing emphasis in its diplomacy and propa-
ganda upon proposals for the control or aboli-
tion of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders
will probably try by such maneuvers to hold
out to the non-Communist world the prospect
of release from the threat of nuclear warfare,
and, by seeking to place upon the US the
blame for failure to achieve workable control
arrangements, to stimulate doubts about the
reasonableness and moderation of US policies
in this field. We believe it highly unlikely that
the USSR during the period of this estimate
will agree to any plan which would involve
inspection within the USSR under provisions
acceptable to the Western Powers. Soviet pro-
posals regarding the control of nuclear weap-
ons will probably be designed primarily to
erect political, psychological, and moral bar-
riers to US freedom of action in the use of
nuclear weapons.
Trade and Technical Assistance
165. Basic Soviet economic philosophy, and
the shortages of commodities which the non-
Communist world is willing to accept from
the Bloc will continue to act as deterrents to
any major change in the present Soviet trade
pattern. Nevertheless, the Communists prob-
ably estimate that political dividends can be
earned from even small increases in their cur-
rent volumes of trade with individual non-
Communist states. The countries most vul-
nerable to this form of -political warfare, in the
Soviet view, would probably be in underdevel-
oped areas. Moreover, the Soviet leaders
might be willing to accept certain economic
losses for political gains in areas of prime
strategic significance, such as Germany or
Japan. In any case, they will almost certain-
ly seek to increase trade with these countries
during the course of this estimate. The So-
viet leaders will probably also try to expand
Soviet economic influence in selected areas
through technical assistance or the sponsor-
ship of development programs. In some cases
these programs could take the form of techni-
cal training missions or the sponsorship of
training programs for foreign technicians
within the USSR and could consequently be
carried out at small cost.
COURSES OF ACTION IN
PARTICULAR AREAS
Europe
166. The principal objective of Soviet policy
in Europe during the period of this estimate
will be to obtain a solution of the German
problem favorable to Soviet interests. Pre-
vention or slowing down of West German re-
armament and blocking the development of
West Germany's ties with the NATO powers
have first priority. The Soviet leaders prob-
ably recognize that the three principal West-
ern Powers are committed to West German re-
armament at present, and probably estimate
that any direct Soviet attempt to foster differ-
ences among them with the aim of halting
the implementation of the Paris Agreements
would fail. They recognize that Franco-Ger-
man differences and, in particular, French
apprehension concerning German rearma-
ment, will remain and may even sharpen dur-
ing the next few years, but they know that
France alone does not have the power to stop
West German rearmament once it has begun.
The West Germans themselves, however, do
have this power, and the Soviet leaders prob-
ably believe that the continuing desire for
unity will make West Germany susceptible to
influences within the power of Soviet policy to
apply.
167. Consequently, the USSR will almost cer-
tainly make great efforts to influence the sit-
uation in West Germany itself. It will al-
most certainly increase propaganda and po-
litical warfare measures designed to encour-
age the existing anti-rearmament sentiment
in West Germany. Beyond this, the USSR
will probably seek to increase points of con-
tact on trade and other matters between it-
self and the West German government. These
contacts could be used to prepare for the re-
sumption of diplomatic relations and could
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uuiJriut11 I Il"%L
be represented by propaganda as leading to
the possibility of direct political negotiations
on, German reunification. The Soviet leaders
probably calculate that a sedulous encourage-
ment of German hopes for unification will,
over the course of time, increase neutralist
feeling in West Germany, greatly complicate
the relations of the West German government
with its NATO partners, and undermine unity
of purpose within the NATO alliance. More-
over, they may calculate that with the passing
of Adenauer from the scene, the internal po-
litical balance in Germany will change, and
that consequently a political climate will de-
velop which would be more favorable to
attempts to detach West Germany from its
ties to the NATO powers.
168. While increasing its efforts to undermine
West German support for rearmament, the
USSR will not relax its efforts to weaken West-
ern unity by playing upon fears and hopes
elsewhere in Western Europe. Soviet propa-
ganda and diplomacy will be designed to pro-
mote French confidence in the USSR's peace-
ful intentions and in the reasonableness of
Soviet proposals, to stimulate French fears
of future German aggression, and to sow re-
sentment of US policy. It Italy, as in France,
the USSR possesses a powerful weapon in the
large native Communist party, and Italy will
probably continue to be an important target
in the Soviet campaign to alienate Western
Europe from the US and undermine NATO.
169. If such measures did not, in the Soviet
view, succeed in countering the developing
threat of West German rearmament, it is
possible that the Soviet leaders would accom-
modate themselves to the situation of in-
creased Western strength, and would pursue
a cautious and nonprovocative policy. We be-
lieve it more likely, however, that they would
take 'rigorous measures in an attempt to off-
set the accretion to the strength of the West.
These measures would include a sharp build-
up of Soviet and Satellite military capabilities,
and might also include more threatening
courses of action against Berlin, or in the
Far East, or elsewhere, with the purpose of
arousing fear of nuclear war in the West and
causing Western peoples to demand that their
governments follow a cautious policy. We be-
lieve that, even at this stage, the USSR would
still avoid courses of action which in its judg-
ment clearly entailed the probability of gen-
eral war.
170. It is also possible that the Soviet leaders
might offer to withdraw from East Germany
in exchange for a guaranteed neutralization
and armament control of a unified Germany.
Such a policy could offer the advantages of
halting German rearmament, reducing the
strength of US forces in Europe, and, together
with an Austrian settlement, creating in
effect a neutralized zone in Central Europe.
We believe that the chances of such a develop-
ment are less than even.30 It might be adopt-
ed, however, if the Soviet leaders believed that
it offered the only means, short of general
war, to prevent the development of a critical
threat to the security of the USSR.
171. The USSR will probably increase its
efforts during the course of this estimate to
detach neutral states from the sphere of West-
ern influence. In Europe, the states most
likely to be subjected to Soviet pressure or
inducements are Finland and Yugoslavia. In
Finland the USSR will probably continue to
use pressures to increase Finland's economic
dependence upon the USSR. It might even,
in the event that developments in Germany
made such a course appear desirable, invoke
the terms of the Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assist-
ance Treaty of 6 April 1948.31 The USSR will
persist in its aim to wean Yugoslavia away
from its present ties with the West and might
make additional concessions to accomplish
The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department
of State, believes that the estimate contained
in this sentence should read as follows:
"We believe that the likelihood of such a de-
velopment is small, primarily because it seems
to us that its uncertainties and disadvantages,
from the Soviet point of view, would far out-
weigh its advantages."
"The terms of the treaty require Finland to join
the USSR in resisting aggression by Germany or
any power allied with Germany, and to "con-
sult" with the USSR in the event of "threat" of
such aggression.
CONFIDENTIAL
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uunriuLiiIV L.
this. Any internal crisis in Yugoslavia, such
as might follow the death of Tito for example,
would probably see an intensification of these
efforts.
Asia 32
172. In Northeast Asia the principal objective
of Soviet policy during the course of this esti-
mate almost certainly will be to detach Japan
from the sphere of US influence. The Soviet
leaders probably believe that the political in-
stability of Japan will render it increasingly
vulnerable to Communist pressures, including
that which the Japanese Communist Party
exerts through its influence in other political
organizations. Most importantly, in the So-
viet view, Japan's critical need for markets
and for raw materials will make Communist
trade solicitations increasingly more attrac-
tive, and create frictions beween Japan and
the West. The USSR almost certainly in-
tends, in concert with Communist China, to
employ these weapons of political warfare
vigorously during the course of this estimate,
and probably believes that with the normaliza-
tion of relations with Japan which would fol-
low the signing of a peace treaty, its oppor-
tunities to detach Japan from US influence
would be greatly enhanced.
173. We believe that the USSR is in substan-
tial agreement with Chinese Communist ob-
jectives to destroy the Chinese Nationalist
Government and to gain control of all terri-
tory held by it, but is concerned to restrain
Peiping from adopting policies which would
clearly involve substantial risk of general
war. The Soviet leaders probably believe they
can derive advantage from issues in the For-
mosa Strait by combining public advocacy of
Peiping's claims with a conciliatory posture
calculated to impress the world with the sin-
cerity of Soviet efforts to reach a peaceful
settlement. The primary Soviet motivation
in this is to, exploit the issue in such a way
"See NIE 10-7-54, "Communist Courses of Action
in Asia Through 1957," 23 November 1954, which
deals with Chinese Communist as well as Soviet
intentions in Asia. A separate NIE on Chinese
Communist capabilities and courses of action
will appear later in 1955.
as to sow distrust of the US among neutral
nations and to promote a maximum of dis-
cord between the US and its allies. Moscow
almost certainly does not consider that its
vital national interests are involved in issues
arising in the Formosa Strait. We believe
that Moscow might see certain advantages in
clashes between Chinese Communist and US
forces, provided it believed that the clashes
would be limited and localized. However, we
also believe that the USSR will seek to pre-
vent a situation from arising in the Formosa
Strait which in its view would carry grave
risks of major hostilities between the US and
Communist China, since the Soviet leaders
probably believe that such hostilities would
also entail grave risk of Soviet involvement.
174. The Soviet leaders probably consider that
if major hostilities between Communist China
and the US should occur the USSR would be
presented with extremely grave choices. They
would probably give the Chinese Communists
support in weapons and material, and the
scale of this aid would probably increase in
proportion to the threat to the Chinese Com-
munist regime. As hostilities expanded and
the threat to the Chinese Communist regime
increased, they would probably engage Soviet
forces in defensive operations, to the extent
that they felt they could plausibly deny such
involvement. Should the conflict progress so
far that destruction of the Chinese Commu-
nist regime appeared probable, we believe that
the Soviet leaders would recognize that open
intervention on their part sufficient to save
the Chinese regime would involve extremely
grave risk of general war with the US with
its consequent threat to the survival of the
Soviet system. In deciding upon a course of
action, the Soviet leaders would have to weigh
the strengths which they could bring to bear
in the struggle against those which would
be opposed to them, and the dangers to their
own regime of a possible global war with the
US against the strategic and psychological
consequences to them of destruction of the
Chinese Communist regime. We believe, on
balance, they would conclude that loss of the
Chinese Communist regime would be suffi-
( flNFIDFITIAL
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VVIVI IULId I IM L
ciently damaging and final to cause them to
resort to open intervention to save that re-
gime.33
175. Southeast Asia will almost certainly ap-
pear to the USSR to be the most profitable
field for the extension of Communist influence,
at least during the early period of this esti-
mate. The Soviet leaders will probably con-
tinue, in concert with Communist China, to
support Communist subversive activities, and
possibly localized military action if circum-
stances are favorable. However, if the ac-
tivities of local Communist groups stimulate
anti-Communist attitudes within Asian states
or tend to unite these states in joint resistance
with Western powers, the Kremlin may choose
to exercise its influence to hold local Com-
munist movements in check. The USSR will
consider the interests and possible gains of
local Communist movements as subordinate
to the broader purpose of Soviet strategy in
the world conflict.
176. The Soviet leaders almost certainly be-
lieve that the US will make substantial efforts
to prevent South Vietnam from falling under
Communist control. In attempting to frus-
trate such efforts, Soviet policy will be guided
by the concern to avoid actions which would
consolidate the Western allies on the Indo-
china issue and bring them wider support in
Asia. The Soviet leaders probably believe that
the US will accede to the initiation of nego-
tiations in preparation for the elections in
1956, but will cause conditions and issues to
be introduced with a view to obstructing the
negotiations and preventing or delaying the
elections. If the US succeeds in postponing
the elections, or if it adopts measures which
seriously reduce Communist capabilities for
further expansion in Indochina through legal
'The Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Dep-
uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff,
believe that the last sentence overstates the
willingness of the Soviet leaders to risk their
own regime and would substitute for the last
sentence:
"On balance, we believe that they would not
consider the elimination of the Chinese Com-
munist regime sufficiently damaging, or final,
to warrant the risk to their own regime which
open intervention would entail."
means, the USSR would still regard Commu-
nist opportunities for expansion through sub-
version as good. It would probably support
military action by local guerrillas and infil-
trated Viet Minh military elements, but would
probably seek to restrain the Viet Minh from
openly crossing the demarcation line with
large organized forces, at least as long as
military intervention by the Manila Pact
powers seemed likely to result.
177. The principal concern of Soviet policy
in South Asia will be to encourage and exploit
the neutralism already present in the area.
The Soviet leaders probably hope thereby to
promote differences within the British Com-
monwealth over ways of dealing with Commu-
nism in Asia. They would expect such differ-
ences to affect Anglo-American relations ad-
versely, and to render difficult the efforts of
the Western powers to enlist the support of
Asian peoples in effective oposition to further
Communist advances in Asia. India in par-
ticular is likely to receive increasing attention
and consideration in the USSR's conduct of
the world struggle.
Middle East
178. The USSR has devoted increased atten-
tion to the countries of this area during the
last year. It has settled long-standing border
and financial issues with Iran, and has
achieved a growing influence over the econ-
omy of Afghanistan, mainly through expand-
ed trade and economic development pro-
grams. The USSR has attempted through
propaganda and diplomacy to prevent the
extension of Middle East 'defense plans, and
in particular has warned Iran of the undesir-
able consequences that would stem from for-
mal Iranian adherence to any non-Soviet mili-
tary bloc. If Iran moves openly to take such
a step, the USSR would almost certainly adopt
a more truculent attitude, and would probably
threaten to invoke its 1921 treaty agreements
with Iran, which provide for Soviet occupa-
tion of northern Iran under certain circum-
stances. We believe, however, that the USSR
would not openly intervene in Iran with mili-
tary force unless it had decided for reasons
of policy unrelated to Iran to accept substan-
(:nNFlDENTIAL
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UUI1FiUL11 iII%L
tial risk of general war. The USSR will prob-
ably step up its activities throughout the
Middle East in proportion to the success of
present Western efforts to build toward a sit-
uation of strength through regional alliance
and external military support. The USSR
will probably in any case press its present
effort to gain a controlling position in Afghan-
istan.
Latin America
179. The USSR will continue its efforts
through local Communist parties and front
groups, appealing particularly to labor, stu-
dents, and intellectuals, to promote anti-US
sentiment, to embarrass US business interests,
and to obstruct economic and military coop-
eration of Latin American governments with
the US. The type of political action the Com-
munists pursued in Guatemala, where a small
Communist element was able to obtain a de-
cisive influence over policy by operating
through front groups, will be the most likely
pattern of Communist tactics in Latin Ameri-
ca. Communist strength is insufficient to at-
tempt open seizures of power or to run the
risk of intervention by other American states.
At present, Soviet aims are probably limited to
promoting policies calculated to disrupt the
Organization of American States and to dam-
age US prestige. The Bloc will probably try
to increase its trade with Latin America. In
addition to providing a source of needed raw
materials, such trade might be calculated to
contribute to the softening of inter-American
solidarity and to the creation of a more re-
ceptive atmosphere for Bloc propaganda.
CONFIDENTIAL
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APPENDIX
Tables of. Military Strength
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ESTIMATED T/O STRENGTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
MID-1955 AND MID-1960
Country
Mid-1955
Mid-1960
Totals
(Not including
-
Security)
Army
Air Force
Navy
Security
Army
Air Force
Navy
Security
Mid-'55
Mid-'80
USSR (Total)
2,500,000
800,0001
695,000-
400,000
2,500,000
840,0001
750,0001
400,000
3,995,000
4,190,000
EE Satellites (Total)
1,085,000
92,700'
34,800
306,000
1,210,000/'
115,000'
48,500
326,000
1,212,500
1,373,500
Albania
30,000
200
800
10,000
30,600
........
1,000
10,000
31,000
........
Bulgaria
170,000
18,500
5,500
45,000.
70,000
........
7,500
45,000
194,000
........
Czechoslovakia
170,000
18,000
40,000 ,000
170,000
........
......
40,000
188,000
.......
East Germany
100,000
7,000
30,000
225,000
........
15,000
50,000
116,000
........
Hungary
150,000
12,000
38,000,
150,000
........
......
38,000
162,000
........
Poland
250,000
25,000-
65,000
250,000
........
15,000
65,000
286,500
........
Rumania
215,000
12,000
78,000
215,000
10,000
78,000
235,000
Communist Asia (Total)
2,894,000
94,500
.
15,000
2,947,000
117,000
53,000
1,015,500
3,031,500
3,117,000
Communist China
2,300,000
78,500
00,000
2,300,000
95,000
37,000
1,000,000
2,410,500
2,432,000
North Korea
317,000
16,000
15,500
357,000
22,000
15,000
15,500
344,000
394,000
Viet Minh
277,000
290,000
1,000
277,000
291,000
BLOC TOTALS
6,479,000
987,200
,
,21,000
6,657,000
1,072,000
851,500
1,741,500
8,239,000
8,680,500
'Including 95,000 naval aviation personnel. Included in the 800,000 are 466,000 in operational air units and 334,000 in nonoperational categories.
Excluding 95,000 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (98,000 in 1960) and 125,000 MVD naval frontier guards who become part of the Navy during wartime.
These are included separately under the security forces.
Includes naval air arm.
'Excluding 1,070 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (1,250 in 1960).
1 Excluding 4,000 naval aviation personnel in 1955 (7,000 in 1960).
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CONFIDENTIAL
Trained
Ground Mobilization Capacity
Line Divisions
Ground Reserves
Mid-1955
By Type Mid-1955
Total2
Mid-
Mid-
M+30
M+360
COUNTRY
Rifle
Mech
Tank
Cav
1955 1960
1955
1960
Personnel
Divisions
Personnel
Divisions
USSR (Total)
105
45
20
5
175 175
6,250,000
8,000,000
8,750,000
300
12,500,000
500 `
Occupied Europe'
5
16
9
..
30 30
........
.......
.........
...
.........
..
NW USSR
13
..
1
..
14 14
........
..........
.........
...
.........
...
W USSR
30
15
6
2
53 53
........
.........
.........
...
.........
...
W Central USSR
16
2
2
..
20 20
........
.........
.........
...
.........
Caucasus
10
2
..
2
14 14
........
.........
.........
...
.........
E Central USSR
10
3
..
1
14 14
........
.........
.........
...
.........
...
Far East
21
7
2
..
30 30
........
.........
.........
...
.........
...
Satellites (Total)
61
13
6
1
81 93
2,650,000
4,475,000
2,905,000
118
4,800,000
188
Albania
3
..
3 3
45,000
75,000
80,000
4
100,000
6
Bulgaria
12
2
1
15 15
475,000
700,000
500,000
20
700,000
28
Czech
8
4
2
..
14 14
515,000
800,000
500,000
20
1,000,000
40
E. Germany
4
3
..
7 14
50,000
350,000
175,000
9
250,000
12
Hungary
9
1
1
11 13
375,000
600,000
450,000
18
650,000
25
Poland
12
5
..
17 18
660,000
1,100,000
650,000
25
1,100,000
42
Rumania
13
1
14 16
530,000
850,000
550,000
22
900,000
35
Com. Asia (Total)
147
3
4
154 164
e
2,867,000'
157'
3,082,000
170
China'
118
..
3
4
125 125
........
.........
2,300,000
125
2,500,000
135
Korea
27
..
27 27
........
.........
.........
...
.........
...
Northeast
13
..
1
2
16 16
North
12
..
1
2
14 14
........
.........
.........
...
.........
...
Northwest
7
..
..
7 7
.......
.........
.........
...
.........
...
E. China
29
1
30 30
........
Central/South
20
..
..
..
20 20
........
Southwest
10
..
10 10
........
.........
.........
...
........
...
Unlocated
..
..
..
..
1 1
........
.........
.........
...
North Korea
19
..
..
19 24
.....
332,000
19
________
19
Viet Minh
10
10 15
........
.......:.
235,000
13
.
16
BLOC TOTALS
313
58
29
10
410 432
8,900,000
12,475,000
14,522,000
575
858
It is estimated that Soviet line divisions are generally at about 70 percent of their average wartime T/O strength of about 12,000 men.
' Airborne and Mountain Divisions are included in the Rifle Division total; at least 20 Artillery and 25 AAA Divisions, however, are additional to the line
divisions shown.
In East Germany: 415,000 men; 22 divisions.
It is estimated that Chinese Communist divisions have a wartime T/O strength of about 8,000-10,000 men.
Of these 500 divisions 300 could probably be equipped from stockpiles. The remaining 200 divisions would be equipped from current production and
would probably be used primarily to provide replacement units or individual replacements.
Communist Asian forces have no system of organized reserves. The Communist Chinese have an estimated 6,000,000-20,000,000 men in the militia, but
as presently constituted these forces cannot be classed as trained reserves since they receive little military training and have almost no equipment. With
the institution of a formal military system, expected to be adopted by mid-1956, it is probable that Chinese personnel who complete a term of military
service will form the trained reserve available for mobilization.
'Communist Asian forces are considered virtually fully mobilized. Mobilization of additional units would require substantially increased amounts of
equipment from the USSR.
CONFlU) 'IAI
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF BLOC GROUND FORCES AND-TRAINED RESERVES, MID-1955,
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CONFL1EN3TIA.L
ESTIMATED AUTHORIZED (TO&E) STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS
? MID-1955 - MID-19601
Mid-1955
Mid-1956
Mid-1957
Mid-1958
Mid-1959
Mid-1960
CCAF/
CCAF/
CCAF/
USSR
EE SAT NKAF
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
USSR
USSR
USSR
EE SAT
NKAF
Fighter: Jet (Day)
10,100
2,200 1,550
9,500
8,100
2,500
1,850
6,900
6,300
6,100
2,000
1,700
Jet (All-Weather)
300
.... ....
1,000
2,500
....
....
3,800
4,500
4,800-
500
200
Attack: Jet'
300
600
950
220
40
1,300
.1,600
1,900
500
160
Piston
1,600
880 360
1,300
1,050
740
400
700
400
100
500
280
Light Bomber: Jet
3,250
120 400
3,250
3,25.0
420
640
3,150
3,100
3,100
700
740
Piston
.....
300 280
.....
....
290
80
.....
.....
.....
....
....
Medium Bomber:' Jet
200
....
400
650
....
....
700
700
700
Piston
1,160
.... 30
840
400
....
90
100
....
....
....
100
Heavy Bomber:' Jet
20
.... ....
80
200
....
350
400
400
Turbo-prop
20
.... ....
80
150
....
....
250
300
300
....
Transport:' Medium
.....
.... ....
50
100
....
....
200
400
500
Light
1,900
160 130
1,850
1,800
220
190
1,700
1,500
1,400
270
200
Helicopters:,
300
....
500
600
....
....
600
600
600
....
....
Reconnaissance: Jet Fighters
100
20 30
200
400
170
80
400
400
400
200
80
Jet Light
Bombers
850
.... ....
850
850
....
....
850
850
850
....
Prop
200
170 10
200
200
130
10
200
250
250
100
10
Tankers'
TOTALS
20,300
3,850 2,790
20,700
21,200
4,690
3,380
21,200
21,300
21,400
4,770
3,470
BLOC TOTAL (TO&E)
26,940
29,270
29,640
JETS (TO&E)
19,540
22,730
25,330
TOTAL (ACTUAL) 1
20,500
JETS (ACTUAL)
15,000
Estimated actual strength of Soviet air units has usually been less than estimated TO&E strength; however, based on present re-equipment trends, it is
estimated that the actual strength of the over-all establishment will be close to the total authorized (TO&E) strength by mid-1956, although many of the
units would be equipped with a combination of old and new types of aircraft.
It is estimated that jet attack aircraft will be one-third light bombers and two-thirds fighter types.
' There is no firm intelligence on the planned balance between the types and categories of long-range aircraft or on their future authorized organiza-
tional aircraft strengths; the above figures represent our estimate of the most probable way in which Soviet Long-Range Aviation would be proportioned
during the period and is predicated on the assumptions (1) that no change will occur in the total authorized number of aircraft in long-range units,
(2) that the BEAR turbo-prop heavy bomber is currently in series productions, and (3) that the USSR is devoting a major aircraft production effort to
the development of a massive intercontinental air attack capability.
'It is estimated that in addition to transports there are 250 gliders in organized glider regiments.
' These do not include liaison type helicopters.
' Tankers are not shown in specific numbers since they have not been identified in operational units nor have inflight refueling techniques been de-
tected. However, employment of tanker aircraft is considered to be within Soviet capabilities and production capacity is estimated to be capable of sup-
porting production of tanker aircraft in required numbers.
PW90"IM! WIT
~nni r~ nrAITI M
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 ('nMMCIIWKI I,b
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ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIR STRENGTH BY AIRCRAFT .TYPE
MID-1955
North-
West
East
Aircraft Type
Eastern
Europe (1)
western
USSR (2)
Western
USSR(3)
Central
USSR (4)
Caucasus
USSR (5)
Central
USSR (6)
Far East (7) Total
Fighter: Day
1,260
1,370
2,270
1,220
1,310
550
2,120
10,100
A/W
40
30
30
130
40
30
300
1,300
1,400
2,300
1,350
1,350
550
2,150
10,400
Attack: Jet
100
....
100
....
....
...
100
300
Piston
440
250
250
80
80
500
1,600
540
250
350
....
80
80
600
1,900
Medium Bomber: Jet
170
30
200
Piston
200
650
90
220
1,160
200
820
120
220
1,360
Transport: Medium
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
.....
Light
130
150
500
420
70
70
560
1,900
130
150
500
420
70
70
560
1,900
Reconnaissance:
Jet Fighter
100
....
....
....
100
Jet Light Bomber
100
90
280
30
30
30
290
850
Prop
.....
60
60
....
....
...
80
200
200
150
340
30
30
30
370
1,150
Areas referred to in Geographic Distribution of Soviet Air Strength by Aircraft Type are:
(1) Includes E. Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania.
(2) Includes Arkhangelsk M.D., Leningrad M.D., and White Sea M.D.
(3) Includes Baltic M.D., Belorussian M.D., Carpathian M.D., Kiev M.D., Odessa M.D., and Tauric M.D.
(4) Includes Gorki M.D., Moscow M.D., South Ural M.D., Volga M.D., Voronezh M.D., and Ural M.D.
(5) Includes North Caucasus M.D. and Transcaucasus M.D.
(6) Includes East Siberian M.D., Turkestan M.D., and West Siberian M.D.
(7) Includes Far East M.D., Maritime M.D., Transbaikal M.D., and Port Arthur/Dairen Area.
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S TABLE 5 CONF'OENTI
A
ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS
MID-1955, MID-1960
r. -
0 0
>~+ w O
O O
0 00
04Z
y y O am
O 6D cd
0 r~4..~ 0 cd O
w W o ~4-:4 Z< Ei
Fighter: Day
Attack: Jet
Piston
4 to
W o
4,480 3,630 .... 1,990 .... 10,100 3,420 1,660 .... 1,320 .... 6,100
70 170 60 300 1,680 2,340 780 .... 4,800
Total 4,550 3,800 2,050 10,400 4,800 4,000 2,100 .... 10,900
300 .... .... .... .... 300 1,800 .... .... 100 .... 1,900
1,500 .... 100 ..,. 1,600 100 .... .... .... 100
Total 1,800 .... .... 100 .... 1,900 1,0-0 .... 100 .... 2,000
2,370 30 .... 850 .... 3,250 2,220 30 .... 850 .... 3,100
Medium Bomber: Jet .... 200 .... .... 200 .... 700 .... .... 700
Piston .... .... 1,160 .... 1,180
Total ... .... 1,360 1,380 .... 7000 .... 700
Heavy Bomber: Jet .... 20 .... .... 20 .... .... 400 ... .... 400
Turbo-prop .... 20 20 .... 300 .... .... 300
Total .... 40 .... 40 .... 700 .... .... 700
Transport: Medium
Light
.... .... .... .... .... 50 .... 100 50 300 500
850 120 190 190 550 1,900 800 120 90 140 250 1,400
Total 850 120 190 190 550 1,900 850 120 190 190 550 1,900
Reconnaissance: Jet Fighters 100 .... .... .... .... 100 400
Jet Light Bombers 600 .... .... 250 .... 850 600
Prop .... .... .... 200 .... 200
Total 700 .... .... 450 .... 1,150 1,000
250
250
500
400
850
250
TOTALS 10,300 3,950 1,590 - 3,660 800 20,300 10,870 4,150 T59-0 3,840 9550 21,400
rt)KMC71F)CKITIA i
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.t1V I IHL
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US military mission profiles)
Conditions
BULL
(TU-4)
MODIFIED
BULL
(TU-4) t
BADGER
(Type 39)
IMPROVED
BADGER
19571
TURBO
PROP 5
BISON
(Type 37)
19576
Combat Radius/
Range (NM)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1,700/3,100
2,000/3,600
1,500/2,900
1,900/3,700
3,700/7,000
2,750/5,300
one refuel'
2,400/4,300
2,800/5,000
2,100/4,000
2,660/5,180
5,200/9,800
3,800/7,300
b. 3,000 lb. load
1,950/3,500
2,300/4,100
1,700/3,300
2,100/4,200
..........
2,850/5,500
one refuel
2,750/4,900
3,200/5,700
2,400/4,600
2,940/5,880
3,900/7,500
Speed/Altitude
(kn/ft)
a. Max. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
470/35,000
535/19,000
b. Target speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/41,000
470/43,000
445/40,000
475/44,500
Combat Ceiling 2
(ft)
36,500
37,500
43,500
43,500
40,000
48,000
ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
UNDER A MODIFIED MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance with a maximum US military mission profiles except
that fuel reserves are reduced to permit 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft
operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range.)
Conditions
BULL
(TU-4)
MODIFIED
BULL
(TU-4)1
BADGER
(Type 39)
IMPROVED TUR- BISON
BADGER BO (Type 37)
19574 PROP 6 19570
Combat/Radius
Range (NM)
a. 10,000 lb. load
1,800/3,300
2,150/4,000
1,600/3,100
2,050/4,000
3,100/6,100
one refuel 8
2,500/4,500
3,000/5,600
2,200/4,300
2,870/5,600
4,300/8,100
b. 3,000 lb. load
2,050/3,700
2,450/4,600
1,850/3,700
2,300/4,500
3,200/6,400
one refuel
2,850/5,100
3,450/6,450
2,250/5,000
3,220/6,300
4,300/8,200
Speed/Altitude
(kn/ft)
a. Max. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
550/12,500
535/19,000
b. Target speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/42,000
470/43,500
475/45,500
Combat Ceiling'
(ft)
36,500
37,500
43,500
43,500
48,000
ESTIMATED BISON AND BADGER MAXIMUM TARGET ALTITUDES
(Calculated on the basis of 100 ft/min. rate of climb, one-way missions, one hour
of fuel remaining, bombload aboard, and with maximum power.)
Bombload (lbs.)
BISON
(Altitude Ft.)
BADGER
(Altitude Ft.)
IMPROVED BADGER
(Altitude Ft.)
20,000
55,100
10,000
56,300
49,500
51,500
3,000
57,200
51,000
53,000
1 The TU-4 could be modified in a manner similar to the US B-29B conversion to increase its range.
However, we have no indications that this has been or will be done.
2 The altitude at which rate of climb of 500 ft/min. can be maintained at the end of the given combat
radius of the aircraft.
8 Refueling radius/range estimates based upon the use of compatible tankers.
The improved Badger performance is based upon installation of higher thrust engines.
6 The figures in this column are tentative and incomplete Air Force estimates. Coordination with other
agencies has been deferred, pending further analysis of available data.
? Based upon estimated installation of 20,000 lb. thrust engines. Previous estimates indicated these en-
gines would not be available until 1957. The USAF now believes they are available at the present time.
Analysis leading to a re-estimate is now in progress.
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL FORCES, MID-1955, MID-1960
MODERN VESSELS'
BLOC
TOTAL
Satellites
COUNTRY
Comm.
& Comm.
U.S.S.R.
Satellites
U.S.
S.R.
U.S.S.R.
Satellites
U.S.S.R.
Ch
ina
U.S.S.R.
China
SHIPS
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55
'60
'55 '60
'55
'60
MAJOR SURFACE VESSELS
Capital Ships
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0 0
0
2
Heavy Cruisers
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
6
3
0 0
6
3
Light Cruisers
10
10
0
0
4
4
6
6
0
0
0
0
1
0
20
202
1 0
21
202
Destroyers
46
46
1
0
26
22
23
18
1
1
32
23
2
2
127
109
4. 3
131
112
Escort Destroyers
16
33
0
4
4
4
16
31
0
0
20
35
0
0
56
103
0 4
56
107
TOTAL (Major)
74
90
1
4
34
30
47
57
1
1
54
60
3
2
209
237
5 7
214
244
MINOR SURFACE VESSELS
(TOTAL)8
1,018
1,018
66
140
211
211
215
215
94
94
412
412
166
166
1,856
1,856
326 400
2,182
2,256
SUBMARINES
Long Range
43
83
0
0
60
169
31
71
0
0
15
120
0
0
149
443
0 0
149
443
(new construction)
Long Range
17
6
0
0
11
0
3
0
0
0
12
1
0
0
43
7
0 0
43
7
Medium Range
10
5
0
0
0
0
5
0
2
0
7
0
0
0
22
5
2 0
24
5
Short Range
33
29
4
4
3
0
14
3
0
0
30
20
2
2
80
52
6 6
86
58
TOTAL .(Submarines)
103
123
4
4
74
169
53
74
2
0
64
141
2
2
294
507
8 6
302
513
Battleships/Monitors
2
2
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
4 4
Heavy Cruisers
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
1 4
Light Cruisers
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
1
3 4
Destroyers
0
10
0
1
3
7
2
7
4
4
2
11
0
0
7
35
4
5
11 40
TOTAL (Overage Major
Vessels)
3
15
0
1
3
7
7
13
4
4
2
11
0
1
15
46
4
6
19 52
Long Range
7
13
0
0
11
16
4
3
0
0
6
14
2
0
28
46
2
0
30 46
Medium Range
4
6
3
1
0
0
3
5
1
2
14
13
0
0
21
24
4
3
25 27
Short Range
11
4
0
0
2
3
10
16
0
0
8
14
0
0
31
37
0
0
31 37
TOTAL (Overage
Submarines)
22
23
3
1
13
19
17
24
1
2
28
41
2
0
30
107
6
3
86 110
'Modern vessels include surface ships 20 years of age and less (from date of completion), and submarines 14 years of age and less. Overage vessels
include surface ships more than 20 years of age, and submarines 15-20 years of age. Submarines are excluded entirely from the estimated future
Order of Battle at 20 years, while surface vessels are not excluded because of age. These are included until it becomes apparent that they are no longer
fulfilling type assignments, at which time they are assigned to the Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG) category.
2 Present indications are that the current cruiser program may be substantially completed with mid-1955 deliveries. No new hulls have yet been laid
down, in the Leningrad area at least, for the 1956-1957 program, and information on construction outside the Leningrad area is usually delayed for a
considerable period. We estimate that additional cruiser-type vessels will be constructed in the Soviet Union during the period, but until some evi-
dence to confirm this is received, no additional cruisers will be added to the over-all strength figures after 1955.
S Construction rates of minor combatant vessels= are uncertain and probably will be limited to only slightly more vessels than will be needed to fulfill
CONFIDENTIAL
T
nnrurirrKITIAI
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UUI'TIutINii/\L
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MAJOR ARMY WEAPONS 1953-1954
(USSR and US)
ITEM
USSR TOTAL
US TOTAL
1953
1954
1953
1954
Heavy Tanks
700
700
1,400
195
104
299
(over 50 tons)
Medium Tanks
3,700
3,700
7,400
7,816
2,956
10,772
(35-50 tons)
Light Tanks
...
.....
1,123
667
1,780
SP Guns
1,600
1,600
3,200
Artillery Pieces
11,300
11,300
22,600
3,042
2,987
6,029
(75 mm & above)
ESTIMATED POSTWAR PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT
(Soviet Bloc and NATO)'
ITEM
SOVIET BLOC
NATO
1946-51
1952-54
Postwar Total
1946-51
1952-54
Postwar Total
Fighters and Bombers
28,800
19,050
47,850
18,000
21,935
39,935
(Units)
Production of Other
28,190
11,450
39,640
100,000
29,787
129,787
Aircraft (units)`
Total Aircraft
311
210
521
329
484
813
Production
(million lbs)
' BLOC and NATO production combined account for about 95 percent of world production. The major
contributions to NATO have been roughly: US, 65-70 percent; UK, 20-25 percent; other, about 10-15
percent. However, the Eastern European share has gradually increased and in 1954 Eastern European
production, primarily Czech and Polish, accounted for about 15 percent of the Bloc total. The USSR
has accounted for virtually all of the Bloc aircraft production.
Trainers are included in this category.
r'(NFln1NTIAI
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V'JJ I IVLIY I IIiL
ESTIMATED TOTAL USSR NAVAL PRODUCTION, 1955-1960
Cruisers 1
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-2
0-3
Destroyers
2
2-4
2-6
2-8
2-8
2-8
Escort Destroyers
12
10 -
9
9
9
9
Present indications are that the current cruiser program may be substantially completed, with mid-
1955 deliveries. No new hulls have yet been laid down, in the Leningrad area at least, for the 1956-57
program, and information on construction outside the Leningrad area is usually delayed for a con-
siderable period. We estimate that additional cruiser-type vessels will be constructed in the Soviet
Union during the period, but until some evidence to confirm this is received, no additional cruisers
will be added to the over-all strength figures (Table 7) after 1955.
z This estimate is based upon the assumption that the construction of destroyers/escort destroyers in the
future will once again be expanded to the approximate level of activity which was reached during the
years 1950-1953.
8 It is unrealistic to estimate the future building rate of minor surface vessels, but it will be adequate to
replace existing units as they become obsolete or are transferred to the Satellites or Chinese Commu-
nists. Building activity in the smaller yards is constant and indicates a gradual future build-up of
minor surface vessels in the Soviet Navy.
CON i TIAL
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coi
vri AL
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETS
MID-1955, MID-1960
(Vessels 1000 GRT. and upward
In thousands of gross tons)
Non- Non-
Tankers' Tankers Total Tankers 1 Tankers Total
No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT No. GRT
635 2,083 57 266 692 2,349 947 3,037 130 656 1,077 3,693
BLOC TOTALS 831 2,704 69 292 900 2,996 1,271 4,142 157 725 1,428
4,867
1Includes passenger ships, freighters, and miscellaneous types such as crab canneries, fish factories, trawlers, and hydrographic ships.
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TOP SECRET
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