SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A005000010010-6
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• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 125
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
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• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
SUBJECT: NIE 11-3-55: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET
COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH 1960
THE PROBLEM
To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military
strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet
courses of action through 1960.
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Soviet political system continues to exhibit the essential
features which it acquired during the period of Stalin's ascendancy,
even though power appears now to be exercised by a small group rather
than by a single man. Its totalitarian character, resting on the
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monopoly of political power held by the small group composing the
Cozmunist Party Presidium, remains unaltered by developments since
Stalin's death. We think it extremely unlikely that 1n the period
through 1960, despite possible shift,,! in leadership and policies,
the nature of the Soviet political system will change in any
important respect.
Problem of Leadership-
2. Since Stalin's death there has clearly been an unstable
situation at the top level of the Soviet power structure. The
elimination of Beria and the demotion of Valerkov, together with
a number of similar actions against lesser personalities, indicate
that the division of power and influence posed a serious problem
for Stalin's heirs.. It seems unlikely that this problem h s yet
been resolved, despite lthru.shchev's apparent rise to a position of
primacy. It is not yet clear whether his position as Party First
Secretary, the key position Stalin used to gain absolute power,
will enable him to acquire a similar domination over his colleagues
in the Party Presidium. Prime Minister Bulganin and other veteran
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members of this body like Molotov, Kaganovich, and Mikoyan, all
of whom hold high governmental positions, are probably not eager
to subs ]it to the renewed domination of one man. Alignments along
the top leaders, their relative power and influence, or the following
that each may have within the Party and Government apparatus are
unknown. For the present, z::sjor personnel and policy decisions
are probably still subject to negotiation among them. There :,a y
be factional jockeying for some time, although we incline to the
view that sooner or later the Soviet system will revert to a personal
dictatorship. This may occur within the period of this estimate.
3. The personal power struggle has probably been taking
place in a context of differences over policy. Strongest evidence
of such differences has appeared in connection with the agricultural
pro;-ram, and in particular concerning the most effective methods of
increasing agricultural production. On other issues the evidence
of divergent views is far lees clear, but the Soviet leaders may
also have disagreed among themselves concerning the allocation of
resources among the defense, investment, and consumption sectors of
the economy. Except on agricultural problems, however, the Soviet-
leadership has not publicly exhibited differences of view within its
ranks.
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4 The struggle over power and policy may be e.m,cerbated
during the period of this estirte, unless one of the leading figures
succeeds in acquiring a clear dominance in the Party Presidiuuu. As
death or ill health thin the ranks of the veteran members of the
Presidiuuru, who have probably up to no'r been able to check the rise
of any aspirant to the full array of Stalin `s power, the prcbieri of
co-opting younger proteges nay 'become acute. Moreover, the issues
of policy likely to develop during the period of this estivate, will
present hard choices, the resolution of which may sharpen the struggle
for personal power.
5. We continue to believe, however, that the struggles
over personal pourer and policy will be confined to the small group
at the apex of the pourer structure and will not result in open
violence involving the police or nilitary organs. We do not be-
lieve that the police or military establisluuents are lihely within
the period of this estimate to participate as independent factions
in the contest over power and policy. They are effectively con-
trolled by the Party, botlh: openly and through penetration by agents,
and their leaders are probably too involved in conflicting personal
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loyalties and factions outside the professional group to permit
independent political action. However, to the extent that issues
affecting spheres of activity of the aztmy and police divide the
top Soviet leadership, the bureaucratic and professional point
of view, particularly of the artiy, .:ay have a greater influence on
policy decisions.
6. Serious and prolonged instability Trithin the top leader-
-ship would probably impair the efficiency of the Party and State
administration. Insecurity and uncertainty might reach serious
proportions if a rapid series of removals, accompanied by charges
of disloyalty and trials of those unseated, occurred within the
top leadership. In this case the regirae might have as much
difficulty in carrying out as in reaching its policy decisions.
However, the Soviet leaders are certainly aware of these problems
of effective administration in their totalitarian state and will
be concerned to prevent their personal struggle for power from
degenerating into widespread purges whic3? might cause a deteriora-
tion in the administrative apparatus. On balance, we think that
the regime will surmount dangers of this hind.
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Relations Between the Soviet People and-the Regime
7.
The post-Stalin leadership has clearly given increased
attention to the attitudes of the 'Soviet people toward the regirse,
and in particular it has been concerned to improve morale
and to cultivate more positive ettitudes toward its goals. Despite
the decline in emphasis on the consumer goods program, the regime
has not explicitly repudiated the promises. nade to Soviet citizens
in 1973. It will probably maintain the effort to raise living
standards to the extent that current defense and investment programs
permit. It probably still intends to limit arbitrary and terroristic
actions by the secret police as much as it feels is compatible with
safety.
F. During zne perioct of this estimate, ti_e attit;,zce of
the Soviet people toward the regime will continue to be characterized
more by apathy than by dissidence. It is unlikely that the promises
made in 1953 to raise living standardB, or even the limited ful-
fillment which followed, have aroused demands and expectations
dangerous to the regime. The policies of the regime are likely
to be successfully calculated to allay active discontent and at
the same time to check excessive demands. However, if there should
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be such a conspicuous failure of current agricultural programs as
to lead to a decline in food supplies, or if the regime should be
obliged to resort to greater pressures on the peasantry to e:;tract
the foodstuffs essential to feed the cities, a serious deterioration
in public attitudes toward the regime might result. Such a develop-
Went during the period of this estimate would be unlikely to threaten
the security of the regime.
9. The attitude of the Soviet people toward the particular
dangers of nuclear war is difficult to gauges
Only within the last
year has the regime begun to make some information avcilable, and
this has been for a lir;ited, largely military, audience. For
civil defense purposes, an intensive public information program
would appear to be necessary. Even if this is done, popular fears
are unlikely to limit the freedom of action of the USSR in a
diplomatic crisis in anything like the same degree as would be
true for the Western Powers. Nevertheless., the desire to avoid
war is strong and articulate in the Soviet people, and the regime,
despite its ability to distort and obscure the meaning of events
by propaganda, must to some extent adapt its policies to this
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attitude.. It may be obliged to do so in greater degree when the
facts of nuclear warfare become better known to the Soviet people.
II . TIE USSR' S RELATIONS WITH OTI' R CONNUNIST BLOC STATES
Sino-Soviet Relations
10. Sino-Soviet relations within the last year have been
marked by a continuing enhancement of Communist China's status
within the Communist Bloc. This was flown by the visit of the
Soviet delegation in September-October 1954, by the
agreements announced in the 11 October communique restoring Port
Arthur and certain joint enterprises to Chinese control, and by
the more recent association of Coi unist China with Communist
policy in Europe in opposition to Wiest German rearmament. The
trend toward greater Chinese independence from Soviet tutelage
probably was inevitable in view of the growing power of the
Chinese regime and the international prestige it derived
1/ There will be a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this
paragraph in a forthcoming eitiinate, HIE 100-55, "The Probable
Effects of Increasing Nuclear Warfare Capabilities upon the
Policies of Selected Countries."
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from the Korean War and from Communist successes at the Geneva
Conference. Communist China is coming to be accorded a formal
status within the Communist world more nearly equal to that of
the USSR.
11. The relations between the USSR and Communist China are
probably now conducted as between allied powers having coiimon in-
terests and a common ideology, but also separate and potentially
conflicting national objectives. Communist China continues to
be dependent on the USSR because only through Soviet aid can it
maintain or expand a modern military establishment and because
its industrialization program is also geared to Soviet support.
This dependence gives the USSR great influence over Chinese
policy, but it would probably not be decisive in matters which
the Chinese believed involved their own vital interests. The
USSR probably would not apply so serious a sanction
as withdrawal of economic and military aid in order to obtain
Chinese conformity to Soviet views, since to do so would
seriously threaten the relationship.
2/ JIG reservation.
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12. The USSR and Communist China will almost certainly
maintain a relationship of close alliance throughout the period
of this estimate, despite the possibility of some frictions between
them. The USSR will continue to sell or grant military and capital
goods to China but will. almost certainly not meet Chinese derunds
to the extent of overtaxing the Soviet economy. Soviet policy may
take a more cautious v-iev than the Chinese of the risks appropriate
to the pursuit of Communist objectives, in Asia. Some issues will
probably cause hard bargaining between the two partners, but not
to the extent of endangering the alliance* The interests of both,
as well as the ideological gulf which separates both from the
non-Cor>munist world, will continue to dictate a joint policy of
hostility against the West. The contribution which each makes
to the military security of the other may assume even greater
importance if the Western alliance is able to add substantial
military pourer in Germany and Japan to its present strength.
These considerations, at least during the period of this estimate,
will almost certainly outweigh any frictions in the Sino-Soviet
relationship.
10
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W. W
Soviet-Satellite Relations
13. The USSR's relations with its Eastern European Satellites
involve Uroblems of control rather than of negotiation. Effective
direction and surveillance of the small corps of Party careerists
in each of the Satellite regir s, together with the presence or
proxinmity of Soviet military forces,- :have been enough to insure
Soviet control. This systen..does not appear to have lost any of
its effectiveness despite the economic difficulties encountered in
most of the Satellites during the last two years, and despite the
uncertainties Satellite leaders have apparently felt about who
among their Moscow preceptors might win the contest for power
going on there.
14. There have been two developments of purely external
significance not affecting the substance of Soviet control, but
which are nevertheless suggestive of the form which that control
is likely to take in future. One of these has been the withdrawal
of the USSR from the direct forms of exploitation exemplified by
the joint stock companies which held important economic assets
in-several of the Satellites. To,replace direct Soviet control
through bilateral arrangements it is intended apparently to link
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all the Satellite econoi:ies more closely with each other and with
the USSR by a greater degree of joint economic planning in the
new Five-Year Plan period 1956-1960. The other organizational
development of importance is the recently announced collective
defense and joint coramand structure which will replace the bilateral
military arrangements the USSR has had, with y::ch of the Satellites.
In both the economic and military fields therefore there is likely
to be during the period of this estimate a development toward
multilateral forms of organization and planning. The result
will probably be closer integration and more efficient Soviet
direction and control of the Satellite area as a whole.
15. Popular resistance of an organized and active kind
is umlikely to appear in any of the Satellites during the period
of this estimate. Disaffection showing itself in noncooperation
in economic fields and even passive resistance might increase
in some of the Satellites if there should be further serious
deterioration in living standards. The USSR would intervene with
force or by grants of economic aid to check any development of
this hind which it believed threatened the security of any
Satellite regime. The USSR's actions in the Satellite area will
be based on the assumption that effective Soviet control there is
an essential security requirement.
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III. DEVELOPMEIvtTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
SOVIET ECONO!1IC POLICY
16. The fundamental characteristics of Soviet postwar
economic policy have been emphasis upon a rapid rate of capital
accumulation, maintenance of high levels of military expenditure,
and the direction of the major share of now capital to heavy industry.
There has recently been added a basic and probably enduring concern
for the expansion of Soviet agricultural production, as a result of
its continued failure to keep pace with the requirements of population
growth and industrial production. In 1953 marked attention was given
to consumer welfare and to agricultural problems. H_wevcr,.during 1954 and
the early months of 1955 there was a ~ reduction of emphasis on the
numerous promises to raise standards of living which were made in
official pronouncements in 1953, but the emphasis on agriculture,
which was the keystone of the 1953 plan revisions, has continued
with increased intensity. There was also a reaffirmation of the
central role of heavy industry as the aecesnary foundation.. for
the entire Soviet economy, including the consumption sector.
Reductions in explicit military outlays in 1953 and 1954 are roughly
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restored to the 1952 -level in the 1955 Soviet budLet.3/ This increase of
dilitary outlays is apparently to be achieved by a reduction in the rate of
growth of consumer goods activity and capital investment.
17. The 1955 budget gives little information on details of
the current investment progrnn, but it does indicate that investment
in heavy industry will increase about four percent and over-all
investment expenditures will. decrease about one percent fror..i the
level plans.ed for 1954. Announcements of some aspects of invest-
vent in agriculture indicate increases of as much as 10 percent over
the record 1954 level. Nevertheless, total investment in the sectors
of the economy related to consumption will be reduced from the levels
planned for 1954. These reductions will probably still leave an in-
vestment program for these sectors substantially above the 1953 out-
lay and in most cases above the levels -.ctually achieved in 1954.
13. The traditional Soviet policy of concentrating economic
decisions in the central party and government apparatus in Moscow
was slightly modified during 1953, and has been further modified
during 1954 and early 1955. Although the central apparatus con-
tinues to rake the basic decisions in economic planning, a large
3/
The explicit military expenditures in the Soviet bu,gricultural
products are the material base for more than 80 percent of the Soviet
consumption-pattern. Maintenance of capital investment in both
light industry and housing at levels well above those of the 1953
plan lends further support to the estimate that the Soviet consumer will
not be deprived of the gains obtained in 1953-1954. The 1955 increases
in military production, however, :may have the effect of slowing down
increases in the production of durable consumer goods.
30. industrial Technology. The quality of Soviet industrial
technology as a whole is difficult to assess. Where a particular
program has been indispensable to the maintenance of the Soviet
power position in the world -- for example, in connection. with atomic
development, in weapons, and in basic industry and construction -- the
USSR has mobilized its technical resources with great effectiveness.
Because of the large number of personnel, and the material and financial
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outlays required for such technical developments., major efforts
such as these have taken a great shore of the limited resources
the USSR con devote to improving its technology. Soviet technology
in lower priority enterprises ranges from the copying of Western
design and technique in certain m chine industries to
adr ittedly archaic methods of production in a vast majority of light in-
dustry establishments. In nary of the latter, efforts are ode to reduce
production costs, but these are largely local efforts r erode by plant workers
and pagers who have relatively little training and experience.
31. regional Cmncentratio;:ns. The regional distribution of industria
production shows the impact of Soviet efforts to achieve Greater balance
between the several economic regions of the USSR, and to make these regions
as far as possible self-sufficient. However, production continues to be
relatively concentrated in the long established industrial regions of north-
west, center, and south. (See Figure 3) The rapid prewar development of
the Ural industrial complex based upon West Siberian coal has continued
in the postwar period, and the Urals now produce some 14 percent of Soviet
industrial output, compared to 16 and 27 percent respectively in the
Ukraine and the Central Industrial region (including Moscow). Although
industrial production east of the Urals has grown rapidly since World War
II, the base from which it grew was small and much of the production is
highly specialized and dependent upon equipment and markets in other
regions to the west.
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32, Stockpiling. There was some evidence that during 1953-1951+
Soviet reserve stocks were drawn upon more freely than previously. The
scale of stockpiling operations during these years indicates that the
Soviet stockpile will fail to meet the 100 percent expansion plcnaed
for 1951-1.55. However, Bulganin's February 1955 speech gives evidence
that the USSR intends to apply renewed emphasis to the stockpile program
and to restrict the conditions under which stockpiles may be used to sup-
port current production programs. Ari increase in the scale of the stock-
piling program may deprive Soviet industry and Soviet consumers of a
portion of the increased flow of goods which would be expected from in-
creased production.
33, Transportation. The transport facilities of the USSR con-
tinued to increase ton-miles of freight at a rate well in advance of
The
that required by the Fifth Five Year Plan. / increase.. in rail freight
turnover at the end of 1954 was 42 percent over 1950, compared to ax.
increase of only 35-40 percent planned for the period through 1955.
These figures suggest that Soviet planners may have underestimated the
transport requirements of their rapidly expanding economy. A rate of
investment higher than previously planned will apparently be necessary
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to perndt Soviet transport to maintain growth necessary to support
the future expansion of the economy. Highway and waterway freight car-
riage have also increased rapidly in recent years but not at a rate
which will reduce the primary dependence of the economy upon rail trans-
port.
34. Labor Force. A large proportion of the recent gro-vrth in
Soviet industrial output has been. achieved by increasing the size of
the industrial labor force rather than by increasing its efficiencya
agricultural
The 1951-1955 plan for increases in the non-/ labor
force was fulfilled by 1953. Planned increases in agricultural pro-
duction -- particularly in livestock and corn, both of which are labor
intensive items -- and sigiificant reduction of the annual rate of
entry into the labor force during 1955-1960 will deny industrial pro-
duction a labor force growth during this period comparable to that ob-
tained in the preceding period. (See Table 2) In addition to the labor
requirements for agriculture, rates of increase in the industrial labor
force will decline primarily because of the effects of the low birth
rate during World War II.
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Table 2
F timated Libor Force of the tU3 'R. 1938 117-1956, Projected to 1960
Ye. rly :.ver.-,ges in Millions of Workers
Total Excluding Total
"ilitair and Labor
!y riculture ?3on-A riculture Forced Labor Force
1938 53.5 25.7 79.0 90.3
1947 54.4 30.0 04.4 97.0
1948 53.8 31.6 84.8 98.0
1949 53.1 32.0 86.0 98.0
1950 52.6 3/-.6 87,2 99.0
1951 . 51.8 36.2 88.0 100.0
1952 51.0 37.8 88.8 101.5
1953 51.8 38.1 89.9 101.5
1954 52.7 40.3 93.0 104.2
1955 54.1 41.6 95.7 106.5
1960 56.3 46.6 102.9 112.3
Total labor force estimates are subject to a considerable margin
of error because of lack of data on the amount of forced labor.
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- e s
35. A similar decline in the rate of`' entry to the military
manpower pool may be expected. The decline in the annual entries into
the industrial labor force in this period will require continued empha-
sis on measures to increase the productivity of labor. The trend since
1948 of declining annual rates of increase in labor productivity was
arrested in 1954. Maintenance of high levels of capital investment and
reasonably improved per capita coisuraptor levels --- factors which are
considered critical to Soviet labor productivity -- therefore become.
escer.tial to the achievement ol'the estimated rates of over-all industrial
and economic growth.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE
36, Soviet agriculture completed its first full crop year under
the new agricultural program in 1951. It became clear: (a) that the
Soviet leaders were seriously intent upon increasing agricultural pro-
duction; (b) that the incentives contemplated in the 1953 program had
so far done little to improve rural productive effort; and (c) that there
had been an increase in the size of the agricultural labor force and
some iiaProvement in the quality of technical personnel. Owing in part
to adverse weather conditions, 1954 agricultural output increased only abut
three percent, and did not reach 1952 production levels. (See Table 3)
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Table '3
Production of z-"a'or Crops in the USSR
1938 and 1950-3.955
Focd Crops
~~ .ll ion
1 e tric .cons
1938 1950 1951 1952 1l9 1954 1955
.6 $5.0 80.0 92.0 83.0 87.0 ---
31/ -
73.a- 72.3 59.5 69.7 66.4 67.2 ---
Fiber Crops Thousand
Metric Tons
Cotton (Ginned) 730 1,140 1,220 1,260 1,300 1,410
Flax (Ccutched 'asis) 600 540 480 1:00 350 400
Fool (Grease )asis) 130 190 205 225 230 235
Animal Crops Fill ion h-cad.
1 Jan.
Catt.3_e 59.2 - -- 57.2 58.8 56.0 57.7 57.6
'urine 31.6 ----2.4.1 26.7 28.5 29.6 31.8
Sheep & goats 73.1 ---- 99.0 107.5 109.9 112.0 114.7
/ 1933-1937 average.
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The 1954 increase was achieved largely as a result of favorable growing
conditions in the "new lands," since a severe drought struck the principal
producing regions in the Ukraine and Volga. On the other hand, agricultural
in 1951+
investimut/ increased almost 40 percent, in pert- by using the increased
income of collective farms and also by large increases in state budget
allocations. Crop acreage increased by six percent as a result of over-
fulf illr..ent of the "new lands" proLrai.:. A return to avera_3a weather con-
throughout the USSR
ditions/ during 1955 would result in a sharp increase in agricultural output.
37. Both 1954 and early 1955 saw additional changes in the 1953
agricultural program, all of which aimed at further expansion of output.
The now lands program, which is to add to the cultivated acreage of the
USSR an amount of land equal to the total cultivated acreage of Canada,
moved forward ahead of schedule and with favorable crop yields in 1951+.
The" early 1955 announcements outline what is apparently the essence of the
Sixth Five-Year Plan for agriculture, and despite the failure of the cur-
rent plan, they establish a series of agricultural goals for 1956-1960 which
are even more ambitious than those set forth in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.
(See T ble 4)
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Officially Planned Output Goy s for Soviet gricul.ture
1960
index: 195 -=100
Meat
Milk
Eggs
Wool
Groin
18o
188*
* This is estimated fror.i the officially announced of not less
them" 164 million tons by 1960,. and the estimated output of 87
million tons in 1954.
Meat and dairy products, both very costly to produce, constitute the
major objectives of the 1960 plan. To achieve the vast growth in animal
production, the USSR has embarked on a large-scale program to get an
eight-fold increase in corn acreage. The Kremlin has also increased
local control over agricultural -production and has undertaken a large
pro6:r.,1r to increase the stability and technical competence of the agri-
cultural labor force. In .',pril 1955 there was rceruittaent of
some 30,000 managers, 1:r;ely from Party ranks, who would replace
roughly one-third of the existing collective farm managers.
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38. While the measures announced in the fall of 1953 reflected
a more realistic appraisal of r:.terial, n:.::turaa1, and hu .n resources
requirei:nonts, this cannot be said of the decrees on virgin land and
corn production issued in 1974 and early 1955. 1_r e . port of the
program approaches the climatic limits of ec)nemaic production for the
land and crops involved. Moreover, the strains ..;.rid stresses engendered
by these campaigns will probably slow up the otherwise possible rate of
growth in the "old" regions. Thus the net results will almost certainly
far
fall/ short of plans, though there will probably be .>cme iucre--.ses
in production and in state control over agricultural output.
39. The principal problems posed by the agricultural program are:
(a) the "new lands" scheme will draw many skilled people from established
and more productive areas; (b) the combined "new lands" and corn and live-
stock programs will require very large additional outlays for machinery';
construction, and fertilizer, as well as labor; and (c) climatic con- -
ditions in the new lands areas are such as to produce frequent crop failures.
Moreover, the apparent piecemeal manner in which the program has been insti-
tuted raises considerable doubt as to whether the above problems have been
adequately assessed.
40. All Soviet agriculture operates under several inherent limitations.
With few exceptions, the areas of adequate rainfall in the USSR are areas of
poor soil and short growing seasons. Nearly all of the good soils lie in an
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area of uncertain or deficient rainfall. There are no areas in the USSR
comparable to the US cotton belt or corn belt where soil, rainfall, and
temperature are favorably combined over a large area to permit high pro-
duction response with conventional inputs. Less than 10 percent of arable
land in the USSR will yield more than modest increases in output without
the addition of extremely large, amounts of fertilizer and machinery. Sig-
nificant increases on most of the arable land would require, in addition,
even larger investments in drainage or irrigation. .part from these natural
limitations, the institutional structure of Soviet agriculture, while permitti:
effective political control over the peasant population, fails to achieve
operating efficiency and continues to produce peasant antipathy.
41. In view of these limitations we estimate that, even with average
weather conditions, agricultural production in 1960, instead of increasing
by nearly 100 percent as planned, will actually increase by only 30 percent.
(See Table 5)
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Table
Estimated Soviet AFricultura1 Production: An Index of
Ten Major Cormcditics*
1938-1960
1938
94
1948
80
1952
103
1953
97
1954
100
1955
109
1960
130
Brea, groin, coarse onC other groins, pot-..t:.:ec, vegetables, meat,
milk, cotton, wool, he>:ip, and flax.
'Further extension of capital investment and labor might make possible addi-
tional growth in agricultural output, but such additions would result in a
reduction in the average rate of growth for the economy as a whole.
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SOVIET CONSI TION LEVELS
42. Per capita Soviet consumption in 1954 rose somewhat more than 5
percent over the 1953 level, a rate of increase slightly higher than had
been achieved in the first year of the revised consumer goods program. (see
Table 6) Durable consumer goods other than housing showed the most rapid
increase, about 20 percent on a per capita basis. Clothing and textile
consumption increased about 10 percent and food consumption by only 2 per-
cent. Per capita consumption of certain quality foods (tih:1(_, milk) fz.iled
try incrc:=cc ::nd s.-rie i:ie at even Cieclined. Imprcve::.ent in concuinpti'-..,n in
1954, as in the period since 1950, was not uniforr:a for all income groups,
managers and skilled workers were: the principal beneficiaries. Middle
and lower income groups derived only negligible benefit from increased sup-
plies of expensive fabrics and appliances. For most families in these in-
come brackets, failure of food production to do much more than keep pace
with population increases in a period of greater disposable income has
meant longer queues, extra visits to the free market, and no improvement
in real consumption.
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Tale 6
USSR: Indexes of Per Capita ConsuMtion
1948-1960
1954 = 100
1952
1960
Food Products
76 97
98
100
103
116
Clothing
50 82
91
100
112
153
Manufactured
Consumer Goods
13
83
100
117
160
Transport and
Communications
61 87'
95
100
105
132
Housing
95 98
99
100
102
109
Urban
95 97
98
100
102
113
Rural
194 98
99
100
101
105
Other Services
89 95
97
100
102
117
Total Consumer Gccds
and Services
69 .90
95
100
106
129
43. Recent increases in real income through increased fe_nily income and
price reductions have not been matched by commensurate increases in the pro-
duction of consumer goods. Price reductions in 1954 yielded a negligible
increase in the workers' food basket and failed, where preceding price
cuts had succeeded, in reducing free market prices. The increased state
loan in 1955 and the failure thus far in 1955 to provide the usual annual
reduction in consumer goods prices is evidence of a desire to reduce infla-
tionary pressures.
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44 We estimate that, given the probable x'ato of increase in Soviet
agricultural production for 1955-1960, aggregate Soviet consumption will
probably increase by about 30 percent during this period. However, food and
housing, by far the najor components for the average Soviet consumer, will
increase by less than 20 percent. There were indications in late 1954 and
early 1955 that some influential elements among Soviet planners were pressing
for a higher rate of growth in consumption than that called for in the 1953
plan. Present agricultural plans indicate that the present Soviet leader-
ship hopes to increase consumption at a more rapid rate than we have here
estir:ated. However, the high cost of agricultural expansion and the competing
demands of other sectors of the Soviet econor7~ will probably combine to re-
strict a more rapid growth in Soviet consumption levels.
14.5. The disparity between rural and urban scales of living has grown
?:aore pronounced since the beginning of the Five-Yeas Plans. Exact quanti-
fication of this difference is exceedingly difficult because the greater
part of rural consumption is consumption in kind, but the disparity probably
exercises a substanVial restraint upon peasant incentive and interest in
agricultural output. Despite the fact that the peasants produce the major
portion of the Soviet food supply, they eat less well than city people, even
though their caloric intake is about equal. The city dweller consumes about
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50 percent more milk, two to three times as much meat, and appreciably
more fish, vegetable oil, butter, eggs, and sugar. Housing quality is
,considerably better in the city although the average space per capita is
greater in the country. An analysis of retail trade suggests that city
people consume three to four times as much manufactured consumer goods as
do rural consumers. The grossly inadequate rural transport and market
systems will continue to restrict the ability of the Soviet government to
eliminate private agricultural production. in rural areas. They are also
major blocks to the effective exercise of the increased peasant purchasing
power which was intended to provide the incentive to support the new agri-
cultural program.
IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
46. Soviet foreign trade in 1954 increased almost 20 percent over the
preceding year. The increase of tl1.1 billion represents the largest abso-
lute volume increase since the period prior to the Korean War, and the
highest trade level with the free world since before 1948. (See Tables 7
and 8) Total Soviet foreign trade has increased at a rate more than twice
the increase is
that of GNP*/ attributable mainly to growing. trade within the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Trade with the free world has been increasing since the end of 1950
with the exception of 1953, but remains below prewar volume,
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Table 7
Estimated Foreifi Trade Turnover in the TJSSR
_ 1951 1552 _
1953
191
Trading 1 roa
Satellites (incl.
Value Percent Value Percent
Value Percent
Value Percent
Com!nunist China)
3.6
CO.
4.1
801
4.9
86
5.6
32
Free 7 rorld
0.9
20
1.0
20
0.8
14
1.2
18
Total Trade
4.5
100
.i
100
5.7
100
6.8
100
Table 8
Volume index of Soviet Trade Turnover
Year
~~~~
''ith the J-1oc
? 9L~ 8=100) -
?ith the Free ''orld
Total
1949
101
75
126
1950
347
64
189
1051
399
7L,.
218
1952
464,
92
256
1953
577
77
298
1554
690
114
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47. Soviet trade with tiie free world was still prii.iarily with Western
Europe although there w s a. considerable increase in trade with less highly
devel.":ped areas of the world. The usual export surplus with Wester. Europe
declined slightly in 1954 and the USSR ran a large deficit with under-
developed areas. It is estimated that the USSR ran a substantial commodity
deficit with the free world; gold sales are estimated to have been $100-150
i illions in 1954. The substantial trade program within: the Sine:-Soviet
Bloc, together with increases in internal Soviet consumptions which has
recently it cluded large shipments of grain from the USSR to the European
Satellites, have limited traditional Soviet exports to the West. Although
there was some increase in Soviet imports of consumer goads from the free
world in 195 4,, there was little other change in the patter,.- of ii-.,,ports.
Grain emports to the free world declined slightly from the postwar low in
1953, while exports of petroleur:l and ether mineral and forest products
increased. In late 195+ and early 1955 there was some indications that
the USSR i:ii ;ht decrease its imports froi._ the West.
48. According to Soviet data foreign trade turnover with other Bloc
nations increased (in value) about 14 percent in 1954, compared to a 50
percein -t increase with the West. Inasmuch as there was little change in the
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estimated volume or composition of vino-Soviet trade, most of the increase
in Bloc trade probably took place bet-1-Teen the W SR and the European
-Satellites. The U$SR. apparently serves as an intermediary for much of
intr.-loc trade, and in part for this reason it is difficult to ascer-
tain the real volume of increase in trade among the various r1er hers .
49. Soviet technical asc-istanc6 programs within the Bloc continued
to constitute an integral part of -Soviet political and economic control.
'T'here. was a further increase in the intensity of ~'?oviet propaganda and
negotiations to extend the area of technical assistance to non-Bloc
countries, particularly to underdeveloped. countries of k! sia. For the
first tine, there were actual movements of tec'hnicans and equipment
(into ,:1fgh. nistan} =ancd. contract for the construction of a steel mill
in India was signed early in 1955. More overtures like these will he
probes ly made
the soviet economy grows, especially if the U"SP does
not substantially increase the scale of its military effort.
50. The 1955-1960 pattern of Soviet foreign trade will be subject
to so many conflicting factors that any forecast must be conditioned
by possible changes in the international climate and in the respective
capabiliti_os of the trading partners. The U"SP is still sufficiently
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behind ?estern technology to have a continuing need for 'Western capital
equiprlont. Although Soviet food supply is adequate for the immediate
future, failure to increase present agricultural production would
eventually lead to additional requirements for food products from out-
side the Bloc. The USSR has the capability at present to expand export
of certain raw materials and is rapidly approaching a position in which
it could export a suhstartial volume of manufactured goods and capital
equipment. Thus the cnnabili;ty for an increase in trade siwith the T lest
e_-ists.
51. " oviet programs and policies, however, will probably preclude
any rapid expansion of trade with the West, and will probably confine
any incren.se in this trade to a level approximating over-all Soviet
economic growth. The level of trade within the flloc will continue to
increase, but at e. somewhat lower rate than in the recent past. The
amount of trade within the Bloc would be greatly increased if the U'SR
encouraged a greater do ree of national specialization among the Bloc
sty .tes. Je h;,li eve it more likely that the USSR will nai.ntain a :aoc-
wide division of labor not much changed from the present structure and
will continue to restrict trade between its associates and the free
world.
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IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS
MAGNITUDE OF SCIENTIFIC ASSETS -- POLICY AND PRIORITIES
;2. The USSR has consistently given strong support tothe development
of science and technology. As a consequence, Soviet scientific and technical
capabilities have increased at a rapid pace, especially since World War II.
We believe that these capabilities will increase throughout this period., and
will continue to provide ample support for essential economic and military
programs. However, there will continue to be limitations on Soviet
scientific resources which will make careful allocation mandatory and cir-
cumscribe the number of major programs that the USSR can undertake con-
currently, especially in view of the increasing scientific demands within
the Bloc as a whole. Soviet military and heavy industrial requirements
will probably continue to be the primary factors influencing scientific
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planning and allocations of technical resources, although increased at-
tention will probably be given to the application of science to agri-
culture.
53. At present the scientific assets of the USSR (the number and
quality of trained personnels facilities, and equipment) are smaller
than those of the US, and the assets of the Sine-Soviet Bloc are far
smaller than those of the West. Soviet financial support for science,
while increasing, remains considerably below that of the US, possibly
about one-half. However, with respect to scientists of the very top
rank, whose numbers are few in any country, the USSR probably has in
many f4lds men who are as able as their counterparts in Western countries.
During the period of this estimate the will provide the great bulk of
Bloc scientific assets, and its proportionate share will continue to grow.
However, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Poland and
Hungary, will continue to contribute a substantial increment. On the
other hand, Communist China, because of an extreme shortage of scientific
and technical manpower and facilities, is unlikely to contribute to
Soviet Bloc technical resources during the period of this estimate.-
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54, The USSR has large number of organizations, laboratories.,
institutes, etc., engaged in research in all fields of science. In
general, organizational control and laboratory facilities are sufficient
for effective utilization of scientific talent. Important Soviet laboratories
conducting high priority research projects are adequately equipped. However,
complex research instruments and equipment are somewhat less readily
available in the USSR than in the United States or the UK. Consequently,
some specialized lower priority research projects are probably delayed
longer than similar projects would be'in Western nations. Although the
USSR continues to import some scientific instruments from Western nations,
it is now manufacturing or can obtain within the Bloc practically all
types of scientific instruments for laboratory research and also in-
dustrial instruments for plant operations and control. Research and
development in electronics will dominate the science of instrumentation
within the U.,,-)SR during the period of this estimate, with emphasis on
better recording and controlling instruments.
55 There is no evidence that Soviet ideology has seriously
hampered the development of the physical sciences, especially in appli-
cations directly affect_,.ng industrial and military capabilities. In
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certain fields of the biological sciences, however, officially sponsored
ideological doctrines have probably exerted a retarding influence on re-
search, although the present weakness in. these fields is probably due
more to the heavy official emphasis laid on other fields of research
than to ideological restraints. There are indications that even in the
biological field ideological restraints are likely to be of less conse-
quence in the future than they have been in the past.
SCI,`NT IF IC EDUCATION AND MANP0i', E
56. Prior to World War II the general quality of Soviet higher
education and research in most scientific and technical fields was
markedly below that of the US. In the postwar period, however, it has
been generally good, and has approached US standards. Only in some areas
of biology, particularly in the agricultural sciences, does it appear
that the present quality of Soviet education and research may be decidedly
below that of the US. However by 1960, in view of the probable greater
emphasis upon agricultural development, this deficiency is likely to be
considerably reduced.
57. About 1,560,000 Soviet citizens have scientific or technical
degrees from colleges and universities, of whom about 785,000 are postwar
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graduates. The number of university or technical institute graduates
employed in the scientific-.technical field in the USSR (1$24-0.,000)
7
compares closely with that in the US, It is estimated that 175,000
scientists are engaged in advanced research or teaching at higher
level institutions in the USSR, compared with about 265,000 so engaged
in the US. Because of the greater stress on the biological azd health
sciences, however, the USSR has only an.esti.mated 85,000 in the physical
sciences,no compared with about 210,000,in the US. Soviet scientists
in research and development in all fields of science (excluding those
primarily engaged in teaching) number about 100,000, about one-half of
the number similarly occupied in the US. During the period of this estimate
the Soviet scientific manpower pool will probably increase considerably
more rapidly than that of the US.
58. The USSR is not as well supplied with technicians, mechanics,
and maintenance men as are the Western countries, where broader sections
of the population have acquired mechanical skills over a considerably
longer period, Standards of maintenance for all kinds of mechanized
Numerical estimates of Soviet scientific personnel are believed to
be correct to within plus or minus 10 pr rcent, For a detailed com-
parison of USSR and US scientific personnel, see ~rcithico n
fn:1lJWln( p:n o.
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equipment are in general lower than in Western countries and rates of
deterioration higher. In addition, the number of skilled mechanics and
technicians which would be available to the armed forces in war is far
smaller than in the West. However, Soviet engineers have sought to com-
pensate for these deficiencies by building machines and equipment which
are simple in design and easy to maintain and repair.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNIC 1I, DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
59. The capability of Soviet sci(,ntists and technicians in those
basic scientific fields (e.g., physical sciences, mathematics) which are
related to the development and production of weapons and military equip-
ment is sufficient to insure the development of modern arms for Soviet
forces. In response to new requirements and conditions crea.tcd by the applic
tion of advance technology to war and war preparations, the UU_'R appears
to be placing great emphasis upon development of new scientific fields and
techniques to maximize the return from Soviet resources, both human and non-
human (e.g., human engineering, mental conditioning, casualty therapy, comput
research, automation).
60. The USSR probably has the scientific and technological capa-
bility necessary to develop most weapons and military equipment equivalent
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to, and in a few cases possibly better than, those of other nations.
However, in a number of weapons categories, especially those involving new
and complex equipment., the USSR lags behind the West. Moreover, the
USSR probably does not have sufficient. scientific resources to program
vigorous weapons and equipment research simultaneously in all fields, and
this deficiency, while possibly decreasing, will probably continue through
1960. Nevertheless., Soviet espionage potential, coupled with the free
nations' inherent inability to guard their secrets, probably compensates in
some degree for deficiencies'in the Soviet scientific effort.
Nuclear Weapons
(Paragraphs to be inserted)
For a fuller treatment of this subject see NIE - (JPLEIC estimate).
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Guided Missiles 2/
61. We believe that the strategic requirements of the USSR
would dictate a major effort in the field of guided missiles, and
the evidence which we have concerning the large number of personalities
and activities believed to be involved in the current Soviet missile
program leads us to the conclusion that it is a largo one. On the
basis of our extensive knowledge of Soviet exploitation of the
wartime German missile experience and our estimate of Soviet capa-
bilities in related fields, we believe that the USSR has the basic
scientific and technical capabilities to support a comprehensive
missile research and. development program. The USSR also has an
adequate economic base for a sizeable production program. It is
probable that the USSR now has some guided missiles incperational
status, and that a growing Soviet guided missile threat will develop
within the next several years. However, we have no firm current
intelligence on what particular types of missiles the USSR is presently
developing, or may now have in operational use.
For a discussion of Soviet guided missiles, including estimates of
the dates at which various types of missiles might appear in Soviet
operational use, see NIE 11-6-5L: "Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Programs in the Guided Missile Field.." published 5 October l5S1..
No evidence has appeared, since the publication of that estimate,
which justifies a change in its conclusions.
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Electronics and Communications
62. The USSR has made substantial progress toward catching up with
the West in electronics by expanding its manufacturing facilities and
adapting Western equipment. The magnitude, diversity, and past successes
of the Soviet research and development program in electronics indicate the
probable development of new and improved devices. Air defense capabilities
will probably be improved as a consequence of significant advances in de-
tection, warning, interception, a d data-handling equipment, which are
expected during the period of this estimate. Those aspects of communication
theory which have a direct bearing on communication techniques, radar,
computers, automatic guidance devices, and telemetering are under continuing
study by Soviet scientists. Such research will result in practical applica-
tions and may within the period of this estimate lead to a communication
network exceedingly difficult to intercept or jam. During the period of
this estimate the USSR will improve its electronics capabilities in the
folios=i ng categories.
63. Early Warning Radar (EWJ) - The USSR has a large variety of EW
radars in use. These include World War II sets, native sets based on
Western designs, and sets of purely native design. Most of these will con-
tinue in use through 1956 and will afford fairly reliable coverage against
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maximum ranges from
medium bombers at/125 mils (up to 60,000 feet altitude) to 180 miles (up
to 45,000 feet altitude) Against fighters these maximum ranges are
fr :_i 85 iailes (up t 45,000 foot :.ltitude) to 135 :ii1oo (upt30,000 foot 1t:.
t- -44 . Continued use of luw-frequency radars (in the 72 nc/s reUiou) through 1(
is indicated. By 1958 the USSR will probably have developed one or more
EW radars capable of detecting an object the size of a medium bomber at 60,000
feet up to a distance of about .200 nautical miles. The -problem of low altitudk
coverage will still exist but probably will be greatly lesssned by the use
of moving target indicators and gap-filler radars. By 1960 the performance
of the early warning radar estimated to be introduced in 1958 will probably
be increased somewhat.
61,? Ground Control Intercept Radar (GCI) - We estimate that by
1958 the USSR will have GCI radars of several types, including the V-beam
sets presently in use, which should be capable of coverage on medium
bombers at maximum reliably: ranges of 150-200 nautical miles and on
fighters at maximum reliable ranges of 55-85 nautical miles, depending
on altitude, location, and other factors. More recent than the excellent
V-beam sets are the ,aired combinations of long-range azimuth indicating
sets (GAGE) and height indicating sets (PATTY CPK'), which collectively
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can provide GCI data. We believe that by 1960 GCI coverage will be increased
to the order of 200 nautical miles; this will necessitate the use of trans-
ponder beacons in interceptor aircraft. Maximum reliable altitude coverage
up to 60,000 feet, though at less than maximum ranges, will be achieved by
1959.
65. Airborne Intercept Radar - There is confiz'med evidence that
the USSR now has airborne intercept radar, 4:n at Jp4pt limited operational
use in widely separated geographic areas. The equipment is probably
comparable to existing Western types. It can probably be placed on current
types of Soviet fighter aircraft. Within the period of this estimate
the Soviet air defense system will probably have improved AI radar in
general operational use.
66. Fire Control Radar - The nTHIFF radar, the Soviet version of
th.; S.R-58L, will almost certainly continue to be used in auantity. Mean-
while, development work on radar sets with greater accuracies, range
definitions, and reduced vulnerability to jaiming will proceed during the
period of this estimate and might appear at any time. The X-band probably
will be used for newly developed fire control radars.
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67. Blind Bombing and Navigational Radar - The USSR currently has
in operational use an X-band (three centimeter) set developed in the post-
war period and capable of further improvement. By the end of 1957? the
best Soviet blind bombing aid navigational radar should be capable of
operating at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and. should have a range of about
125 nautical miles frr nAvigation. Bombing and naviga-
tion equipment will permit accuracies equivalent to those of present
US equipment. The use of frequencies higher than X-band is unlikely by
mod-1956, but operational use of-the higher frequency equipment may be
achieved by mid-1960.
68. Electromagnetic Warfare - The USSR presently has the capability
of seriously disrupting Wester n.long-range communications and navigational
systems. Soviet achiever~tnts in related electronic fields indicate that
the USSR is also able, by an intensive effort, to develop electronic jamming
equipment which could be effective up through 12,000 megacycles m d possibly
through 46,000 megacycles. It is estimated that by 1960 the USSR can have
jamming equipment in operational use in frequency ranges up through 30,000
megacycles.
69. Microwave Radio - Microwave communication equipment is in
wide use in East Germany, and. fixed networks exist in the Soviet Union.
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Based on the reported procurement of microwave relay equipment from both
East Germany and Hungary, the present inventory of the Soviet Bloc is
estimated at approximately 3,000 sets. By 1960, mobile ricrowave sets
of eight channels will probably be standard military issue to divisions and
higher echelons. VHF equipment for ground-air., ship-ship, and ship-shore
communication, already in u5, will find more widespread use with increased
numbers of channels and improved reliability. Techniques such as "flash"
transmissions will be used to transmit important messages with a minimum
susceptibility to countermeasures and maximum of message security.
Biological Warfare
Firm evidence on Soviet activity in the biological warfare
field is exceedingly scanty, and is likely to remain so because of the
relative ease with which such a program can be concealed. The US:R has,
however, the technical knowledge, trained personnel, and facilities neces-
sary for a program of research and development in biological warfare,
and such a program is prebablyy in progress. The USSR is capable ,
of producing Bird agents ...i disseminating devices suitaule for small-scale
clandestine attacks against certain crops, against livestock, and against
personnel in buildings or concentrated in relatively small areas. Soviet
capabilities for large-scale attacks are more difficult to estimate.
Antilivestock BW against the US need not be large-scale to be effective,
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Anticrop Bit against the US would probably not substantially affect US
crop production unless carried out on a very large scale and under favor-
able seasonal and environmental conditions. The USSR is probably capable
of large-scale production of antipersonnel BW weapons.
71. Soviet capabilities for defense agcainst BYJ are inferior to those
of the US because of Soviet. deficienc c in public health, sanitation, live-
stock management, and plant protection.. Gradual progress will probably be
made to correct these deficiencies during-the period of the estimate. Be-
cause widespread shipment of livestock is not practiced in the USSR, Soviet
vulnerability to small-scale antilivestock attacks is probably less than
that of the United States.
Chemical Weapons
72. During World War II, the Soviet Union is known to have produced
most of the standard chemical warfare agents as well as the necessary
auxiliary equipment. The USSR has the facilities and scientific knowledge
necessary to produce at least one of the nerve gases and could employ
these agents during the period of this estimate. Published Soviet research
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in fields closely allied to chemical wa-fare -- organophosphorus chemistry,
aerosol formation, cholinesterase, alkaloids, and adsorption -- indicates a
scientific capability for the development of new or improved chemical agents,
dissemination equipment, and protective devices. We assvkic that the stock-
pile of standard agents end munitions accumulated during World War II has
been maintained and that the facilities for CIV agents production are being
maintained on a standby basis or operated to produce other chemicals or
materiel, The USSR is able to engage. in chemical carfare on a large scale.
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SIZE OF FORCES,, SCALE OF EFFORT, TRENDS
73. The USSR is both the foundation and arsenal of Communist Bloc
military strength, and thus the primary source of Bloc military capa-
bilities. The-main contribution of the other Bloc states is manpower,
althouh industries in the Eastern European Satellites supply some military
equipment. Sino-Soviet Bloc forces-in-being now total about 8,000,000 men
(of which about 4,000,000 are Soviet) not including security forces. The
forces of the East European states, for all practical purposes, are under
direct control of the Kremlin. The Communist Chinese forces, while heavily
dependent upon Soviet aid, are outside direct Soviet control.
74. In the postwar period the USSR has produced armaments at a
relatively high rate, which has made possible an extensive re-equipment
program. Since-1950, Soviet production of armaments has been at an
average rate of roughly 25 percent of capacity. The levelling off of
as indicated in the budgets
military expenditures/ 1953-1954/apparently resulted in a reduction
in output of some weapons, many of which were already st k-
piled in quantity. The announced increase in the military budget for 1955,
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however, suggests that the cutback in production was temporary-and may
have reflected transition to the production of newer models, especially
aircraft.
75. iassuming no significant changes in the international situation,
we have estimated above (section III, Table 1) that Soviet military
espenditure after 1955 will probably show a relatively small annual
increase -- of the order of three or four percent per year on the
average. In view of the continuing rise in the unit cost of most major
weapons, and the probable introduction of increased quantities of new
weapons, this rate of increase will not permit simultaneous production
of all major weapons at the high levels reached during the period
1950-1952 when defense expenditures rose sharply, about 15 percent
annually. Mcreover, the already sizeable stockpiles of some major
weapons, and the introduction of new weapons, including guided missiles,
probably make it unnecessary to produce certain major conventional
weapons at the previous high rates.
76. During the period of this estimate the personnel strength of
Bloc forces-in-being will probably remain substantially unchanged.
However, the over-all effectiveness of these forces will almost certainly
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increase, primarily due to the improved weapons available to Soviet
forces, and to changes in organization, doctrine, and tactics designed
to adapt these forces to nuclear warfare. The major weapons changes will
be the increases in the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, in aircraft,
especially jet bombers and all-weather fighters, and in long-range sub-
marines. There will also be progressive modernization of weapons and
equipment, particularly those incorporating electronic guidance and con-
trol. The principal limitations of Bloc armed forces during the period
of this estimate will be: deficiencies in experience, training, and
equipment for long-range air operations and air defense, and for long-
range amphibious and surface naval operations.
77? Logistical problems will continue to place a considerable
limitation upon the Si.o-Soviet Bloc's capability to wage intensive
warfare over an extended period. These problems are due to the vast
size of the USSR, the great distances from main interior sources of
supply to several main operational areas, and the relatively inadequate
road and rail network and merchant fleet. 10/ In order to offset these
disadvantages the USSR has maintained large forces and military stock-
piles in forward areas. Stockpiles of POL, ammunition, and other types
of supplies consumed at a relatively constant rate, are probably
10; For a breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Bloc merchant fleet, see Appendix
Table
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sufficient to maintain a force of 300 line divisions together with air
and naval forces in Europe and Asia for an extended period (i.e., up to
six months depending upon the scale of conflict). During the period of
this estimate the Soviet logistical situation will probably improve as
a result of continued stockpiling and the development of a more flexible
and mobile transport system. However, logistical problems will probably
continue to be a considerable limitation upon capabilities for extended
offensive operations, especially in the Far East. If the USSR were sub-
jected to intensive nuclear attack, its capability to support extensive
military operations , especially outside S.:;viet bur ter, , would be m rkedly
curtailed both in finitude and duration.
Ground Forces -
78. The Soviet Army has been reorganized and modernized since the
end of World War II, and now totals about 2,500,000 men. There are suf-
ficient trained reserves and stockpile equipment to expand the army to
11~ For detailed estimates of strengths and disposition of these forces,
see Appendix
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about 300 line divisions plus supporting troops with a total strength
of 7,500,000 by M X30. The estimated maximum mobilization potential
is about 12,500,000 men. In the absence of general war, we believe that
the Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately their present size
and disposition through 1960. The concentration of Soviet ground forces
in East Germany, the Western USSR, the Caucasus, and the Far East pro-
vides for the defense and security of the most important and vulnerable
areas of the USSR, while facilitating" administrative support.
79. The Soviet Army is well-twined, discipline is good, and morale
is almost certainly high. The 30 Soviet divisions located in East Germany
and the European Satellites are known to be well equipped. This force is
well-trained and combat ready, although its readiness is somewhat lowered
in the late fall of each year when new recruits have replaced trained men.
Intelligence concerning the remaining divisions, particularly those in the
interior of the USSR, is considerably less extensive. However, it is prob-
able that the latter are maintained at a stage of war readiness sufficient
to permit their early deployment to a combat theater.
80. During the last year the Soviet Army has placed considerable
emphasis upon training exercises to improve ground force defense against
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nuclearattack. There is also evidence that army offensive and de-
fensive tactics envisage the use of tactical atomic weapons by Soviet
forces. Emphasis is placed on mobility and maneuvers bi?.ity, greater
initiative, dispersion, deeper objectives, reconnaissance, and in-
dividual protective measures. Soviet offensive doctrine emphasizes
allocation of a substantial number of nuclear weapons for use against
enemy defensive positions, air facilities, reserves, atomic capabilities,
and encircled enemy units. The assault following a nuclear attack would
employ tanks and armc,red infantry in order to develop maximum speed of
exploitation. Doctrine for the defense emphasizes deep revetted trenches
and other protective construction, dispersion in width and depth, and
larger and more mobile reserves.
81. The Soviet Army is currently embarked on an extensive program
of improvement of its ground weapons systems which will greatly increase
its mobility, flexibility, and firepower. Armored cars and armored per-
sonnel carriers have been introduced. It is estimated that in East
Germany alone there are now about 2,000 armored personnel carriers, each capab
of traneporting 15 men. General is:,ue u f new weap ;nr_, ha included a medium tan':
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(T-5l) mounting; a 100-mm gun, mortars of 1604x , and of 200 to 240-mm calibers,
a tr,:.:.-mounted rocket launcher, and d new !:.ily of antiaircraft guns,
and possibly a new heavy tank (JS-4). During this period the Soviet Army
will probably have new and improved heavy artillery of large enough caliber
to utilize nuclear projectiles, an infantry antitank guided missile, and
infrared night driving and firing aids., By mid-1960 it is estimated that
a new medium tank and a heavy tank, substantially superior to the current
T-54 and JS-3 (or JS-4), will be in operation.
W. Duringthe period of this estimate, the combat readiness of
the Soviet Army will almost certainly continue to increase. The addition
of improved equipment and weapons, more flexibility in logistical opera-
tions, a considerable increase in mobility and changes designed to meet
the effectiveness of
requirements for nuclear warfare will improve/the Soviet Army for
a nuclear war and also increase its capabilities to engage in highly
mobile, conventional type actions.
g3, Security Forces. Soviet internal security forces are controlled
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and number about 400,000. These troops
are select group, well-trained and equipped, and provide a significant in-
crement to Soviet military strength in being. However, their primary
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responsibility for maintaining internal control would probably prevent
their becoming available for operations outside the USSR. About 150,000
are in the border troops, disposed along all accessible land and sea
frontiers. The remaining 250,000 include troops responsible for sup-
pressing any organized resistance in the country, for giarding shipments
of prisoners, strategic cargoes, and labor carps, and for maintaining
the security of high-level government and military cat ions.
'_ir Forces'
During the postwar period the USSR has continually improved
84.
its air force both in size and quality. Although in World 11,:x II the
USSR gave primary emphasis to the ground support role of air forces, in
the postwar period increasing attention has been given to the development
of the interceptor and strategic bombing arms. We estimate that the
current over-all authorized (TOLE) air strength is about(21,000)including
about 10,700 jet fighters, 3,-00 jet light bombers, 1,200 piston medium
and 20 jet heavy bombers.
bombers, 200 jet medium bombers Over-all actual strength is probably
For strengths of the Soviet Air Forces in aircraft, personnel, and
by major combat components and geographic distribution, see Appendix
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about 85 percent of authorized strength. We believe that replacement of
TU-11 aircraft by jet bomber types and growing numbers of all-weather
jet fighters will almost certainly be the most important developments in
the Soviet air forces during the period of this estimate. We estimate
that by 1960 the over-all authorized strength (TO&E) will have increased
about
tq'122,,000 aircraft, which will include about 11,200 jet fighters (about
40 percent all-weather), 3,)400 jet light bombers, 900 jot medium bombers,
and 500 jet heavy bombers.
The Soviet aircraft industry has accounted for about 95 percent
85.
of total Bloc aircraft production in the postwar period. Estimated Bloc
production of fighter and bomber aircraft during the period 1946-195)4 has
been roughly equal to that of the NATO countries in numbers of aircraft,
although substantially below that of NATO in terms of total airframe
~
weight.J
' During the latter part of this period (1952-1954) Soviet Bloc
production of fighters and bombers, both in numbers and weight, was con-
siderably below that of NATO. During 195)? the Soviet aircraft industry
was operating at about 25 percent of capacity, and produced about 8,500
to 9,000 aircraft, including about 5,300 fighters and bombers. We believe
J For detail, see Appendix
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that during the period it operate at about
25-30 percent of capacity, with annual production at about 9,000 1.0,000
aircraft, including about 5,000 to 6,000 fighters and bombers. Aero-
engine industries will probably continue to operate at about 35 percent
of capacity, with a total output of about 30,000 to 35,000 engines.
view of the requirements of the operating forces, these rates of pro-
duction are insufficient to permit any significant stockpiling of the
latest aircraft types, aircraft engines, and electronic devices. Con-
version of the aircraft industry to full capacity production would prob-
ably require 18-24 months..
86. Airfield development in the USSR and the European Satellites
during the postwar period has generally kept race with demands created
by the introduction of new aircraft into operational units. The
principal exception is in Northeastern Siberia opposite Alaska and
along the Northern Arctic coast. In these areas air operations would
at present be limited by inadequately developed bases and by 'Logistical
difficulties even though airfield construction and development has
been in progress there for. some time. Under its airfield development
program the ?SSR has created an interlocking network of airfields along
perimeter areas in Europe and internal approach lines within the USSR.
We believe that during the period of this estimate the Soviet airfield
construction program will be continued, and will receive --special
emphasis in the Far East and possibly in Soviet Arctic areas.
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87. Combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is, on the
whole, below that of the US. The chief limiting factors have been lower
average aircrew proficiency, lower standards of maintenance and training,
and lack of certain aircraft types. During this period the introduction
into operational units of new jet types, including a supersonic
interceptor, an all-weather fighter, and medium and heavy bombers,
plus a four-engine turbo-prop aircraft together with the training
appropriate to these types, will lead to a significant increase
of combat effectiveness. However, assuming that the US maintains
its present standards over-all Soviet air combat effectiveness will
almost certainly remain below that, of the US and UK during this period,
especially in night and all-weather operations and in long-range
operations.
88. The MIG-15 (Falcon) and MLG-17 (Fresco) are now standard
equipment of Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense as of other com-
ponents of the Soviet Air Force. The MIG-17, which began to replace
the MIG-15 in 1953 and now constitutes nearly half of fighter aircraft,
is estimated to have a maximum speed of 635 knots at sea level, and
a combat ceiling of 58,000 feet. We believe the USSR will have a
supersonic interceptor in operational use early in the period.
Limited numbers of aircraft Frith AI radar have been introduced into
operational units, and by 1960 all-weather fighters will probably
make up about 40 percent of the whole fighter force.
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89. The TU-4 (BULL) medium bomber is now obsolescent., but
remains for the present the principal aircraft of the Soviet long-
range aviation. However, series production of a twin-jet medium
bomber, the Type 39 (BADGER) is now under way: and a four-engine
jet heavy bomber, the Type 37 (BISON), has probably entered
series production. We estimate that these new jet types will rapidly
replace the TU-4 medium bomber and that the authorized bomber strength
of Soviet long-range aviation throughout the period will be as follows:
Type 1955 1956 1957 1958
TU-4 1,180 920 550 250
Type 39 200 400 650 800
Type 37 20 80 200 350
1959 1960
0 0
goo 9o0
500 500
This table does not take into c.ooideration the possibility that the
nine (and possibly 12) four-engine Turbo-prop aircraft sighted at
the time this estimate was being completed, may represent a new
bomber type.
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14J
Naval Forces
During recent years the Soviet Navy has been greatly strengthened
go.
by an intense and rapid building program; this program has not included
aircraft carriers, battleships, or heavy cruisers, but has concentrated
on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine fleet
is now the largest in the world and is still growing; about half its
strength consists of long-range craft of which a significant and increasing
proportion are modern types. Most of the major surface veosels and all of
the modern submarines will probably be kept active, but the present rate
of new construction will permit the creation of a substantial reserve fleet
of submarines. It is believed that all such reserve or inactive units
could be activated by M 4 180.
lV For strength in ships and personnel as well as dispositioins, see
Appendix , Table ? For strength of the Soviet Naval Air
Force by aircraft type, scc Appendix
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91. Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearly 20 percent of the
total strength of Soviet military aviation, has converted completely
to jet aircraft in the fighter and light bomber categories. The number
of jet reconnaissance aircraft in service has also increased, but attack
and transport aircraft continue to be piston engine types. During the
period of this estimate, Soviet Naval Aviation is expected to remain
approximately constant in strength, while continuing its program of
modernization of equipment. Improved all-weather jet fighters will
probably be introduced, and possibly jet medium barbers for attack, re-
connaissance, and airsubmarin_e operations.
92. W,-: Usti.: :to tl..t in 1:;i".'..-1955 t1..i: r oin, otrenLt .._f the Soviet
Navy will c ncict . f 31 cruiccro, 142 deatr :,ycrs, -nJ 356 su'oiiorines, includ-
in`; 13 li,;'.t cruicers, 85 fleet dost.;ycrs, oncl about 150 1 n r,-nC,.e
submarines of postwar design. Naval construction in the USSR is
presently estimated at about 175,000 NSDT which represents about one-
third Soviet capacity, and one-fifth total Bloc capacity. Battleships
and carriers could be build in all fleet areas except the F:r East.
Presently one "capital ship" of unknown type is believed to be under
construction in the B itic area and possibly one in the Black Sea area,
and these vessels may become operational during the period of this
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estiixte. It appears, however, that the USSR will continue to place
primary emphasis upon the construction Of long-range submarines, while
continuing the construction of cruiser and destroyer types. 5/
93
The Soviet Navy is now concentrating on the construction of
two long-range submarine types developed since World War II. These
are equipped with snorkel. The W" tyi e b n,:, r rc.tin ; r-.c'iuc and er
miles
c :f ab:.ut -,700 n.:uticr.l 3ec; t'_i 6,700 ,,c:utical/
By early 1955, 107 (including 20 "Z" type) of these had jointed the
fleet; the present building rate is estimc;:ted as 75 (including 15-20 "Z"
type) per year. The USSR is known to have continued development of the
W-:lther closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion, and an experimental
submarine powered by such wit engine could be operational now. It is also
possible that, during the period of this estiniate, nuclear propulsion for
Soviet submarines will have been developed. However, there is no evidence
that the USSR is construction submarines equipped with either of these
types of propulsion.
Soviet naval capabilities can be expected to improve throughout
94.
the period due to the building program, technological develop
15/ or Detail see Appendix
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intensive training. While the operational efficiency of the Soviet
JUvy is still below that of the navies of the major Western Powers,
it will continue to improve during this period. Little is known of
the operating efficiency of the submarine force. It is probably still
inferior to that of US and German forces of World War II, but performance
standards will probably rise steadily during this period. Personnel of
the submarine force are the pick of the Soviet Navy, and their morale
is high.
The principal weakness of the Soviet Navy derives from the wide
separation of the sea frontiers of the USSR, and from its inability to
control the sea routes between these areas. The USSR is thus deprived
of the strategic mobility traditionally enjoyed by naval powers, and is
compelled to maintain four separate fleets together with their supporting
facilities. The inland waterway system connecting the White and Baltic
now permits the interchange of vessels up to the size of small destroyers
and including all current submarine types. During this period, possibly
by 1957, improvements in the Black Sea canal system will extend this
capability to include the Black Sea. However, parts of the waterway system
are open only an average of five months a year, because of weather conditions.
Increased use of the Northern Sea Route, which is open for a six to eight
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week period in the summer, may also improve the situation. The lack
of adequate supply lines to the Norther and Far Eastern areas is an
additional handicap. Limitations on sustained offensive operations
derive from the land-locked position of the fleets in the Baltic and, Black Sea
(containing roughly 60 percent of Soviet naval strength), the exists of
which are controlled by the NATO Powers, and from the lack of advanced
bases. The long-range capabilities of-the. Soviet Navy are further re-
duced by lack of aircraft carriers, long-range reconnaissance aircraft,
auxiliary vessels suitable for underway logistic support, forward bases,
-and by the lack of experience in long -ra.n,;e operations.
96. There is no force in the Soviet Navy comparable to the amphi-
bious forces of the US Navy, although the naval infantry components have
received some training in .raphibiTus warfare. While capable cf mounting short
r: nnL,e l.ifta in c nsider-'_ l~ f --rc~ in the B::.ltic ...nd Bl::ck S~ _s and in the Sea
f J-_,'.!_-.n, the S _ vii t N.:vy 1-1 ;_)es not possess sufficient amphibious craft to
launch and sustain long-haul amphibious operations.
16/
EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITE FORCES`
97 Soviet control of the Satellites has in effect moved the
Soviet military frontier into Central Europe, and the USSR has given a-
1-6/ For detailed strength figures by country, see Appendix -,
Tables See also NIE 12-51, "Probable Developments in the
European Satellites through Mid-1956," dated 24 August 1954.
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high priority to the development of this area for military operations.
The Satellite ground and air forces now constitute a substantial element
in the balance of military power in Europe. However, their over-all
effectiveness is only fair, and political reliability of some national
units is questionable. During the period of this estimate the over-all
capabilities and usefulness to the USSR of the Satellite forces will
probably increase. However, many of the current deficiencies will con-
tinue to limit the military uoegulneos cf-the:e forces to the Soviets,
especially for offensive operations.
98 Ground Forces. The Satellite ground forces' present strength
is about 1,085,000 men, organized into 81 line divisions. In general,
those of
the Satellite ground forces (not including/East Germany) have probably
reached the desired peacetime strength level. By 1957, primarily
through an increase of East German Forces, Satellite ground personnel
will probably increase to figure that probably will
not change significantly through 1960. The Satellite armies, which are
presently equipped largely with Soviet World War II material of good
quality, will continue to be largely dependent upon the USSR for major
items of equipment, particularly tanks, self-propelled guns, and medium
to heavy artillery.
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99? Air Forces. The Satellite air forces now have an estimated
TO&E strength of 3,850 aircraft (aproximately 2,500 actual), and during
this period their TO&E will probably increase to about 5,000 aircraft.
During this period emphasis will probably be placed on the strengthening
of the Satellite fighter and light bomber establishments, and the further
integration of the Satellite air forces into the Soviet air defense
system. The Satellites will continue to be greatly dependent upon the
USSR for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft will be Soviet
types.. Satellite production, almost exclusively Polish and Czechoslovak,
while growing, will probably not exceed 15 percent of the Bloc total.
100. Naval Forces. Owing to their small size, their meager equip-
ment, and the unreliability of personnel, the Satellite navies provide
only a minor contribution to Soviet naval strength. However, ports and
bases in some of the Satellites provide the USSR with a considerable
extension of naval logistic and operational facilities.
COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY FORCES 17/
101. The military forces of Communist China constitute the most
formidable Asiatic fighting force. The Kremlin exercises no direct
17/ For strengths and dispositions, see Appendix Table
For strengths of additional Bloc forces in Asia, see figures for?
North Korean and Viet Minh forces given in the same tables.
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control over these forces. However, the nature of Sino-Soviet relations,
especially the dependence of Communist China upon the USSR military sup-
port in weapons and supplies, provides the Kremlin with considerable
leverage for influencing Chinese military developments and policy. As
a consequence the military frontiers of the USSR, in a practical sense,
have been extended deep into the Asian land mass, a factor which greatly
increases the Soviet power base and potential.
102. Ground Forces. The Chinese Coranist Array is well adapted by
tradition, training, and the -characteristics of its individual soldiers
to the type of warfare likely to be encountered in the extremes of weather
and terrain of the Asian region. These forces now number about 2,300,000
men organized into 37 armies and 123 line divisions plus supporting troops.=
Any expansion during this period would be dependent upon the acquisition of
weapons and equipment from sources outside China. The Chinese Communist
forces have been primarily infantry, equipped with a heterogeneous assort-
ment of foreign-made weapons. A recent extensive reorganization and re-
equipment program has reduced the number of divisions, increased the number
of combat and service units, and is standardizing equipment to that of
Soviet and Chinese manufacture. Communist China now produces its own re-
clothing,
quirerrients of/food, small-arms, roc.ket launchers, recoilless rifles and
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certain types of ammunition, and progress is being made toward, self-
sufficiency in submachine guns... 'light machine guns,, and mortars. It
will continue to be dependent upon the Soviet Union for heavy equipment,
motor vehicles, artillery above 70-rgn, and POL. The combat readiness
of the Chinese Communist ground forces will continue to increase during
this period, primarily due to the re-equipment program to standardization
of equipment, and to improved c:ribat and service support.
Air Forces. The Con tinist Chinese Air Force now has about 2,300
103. --
aircraft. It is equipped primarily for defensive operations, but the
piston
acquisition of some/medium and jet light bombers has given it a limited
capability for offensive operations. The combat effectiveness of the CC::F
is only fair, but it will probably improve somewhat throughout the period
of this estimate, mainly through increased proficiency of flying personnel,
improved quality of aircraft, and more numerous and improved air facilities.
However, since Communist China will probably not produce combat aircraft
during the period of this estimate, over-all effectiveness will be largely
determined by Soviet willingness to continue to supply additional air-
craft, especially jet fighters, jet light bombers, and medium bombers,
together with the necessary parts and equipment.
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Naval Forces. Co=m ist major vessel strength probably now
1o4.
consists of two destroyers and -5.7 submarines (2-4 long-range and three
coastal types). The destroyers and most of the submarines were ob-
tained from the USSR probably during the last year. There are also
at least i8/
least 55 torpedo boats, (56 l._i}r'iii:,.; cr:.ft (LST, LSM, LSIL)
and several hundred-small patrol craft. The Soviet Far Eastern naval
forces are providing training, advisors, and logistic support to the Chinese
Conniunist naval forces. The USSR will probably add modestly to Chinese
Communist naval strength during the period of this estimate.
- In addition there are 25 landing craft of these types operating in
the Chinese Communist merchant marine.
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VI. VJLITARY CAPABILITIES OF TIC, USSR
WORLD BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES
105. During the postzrar period a rough balance of military
power has existed between the Connunist Bloc and the Western
coalition. During most of this period the USSR's main military
assets have.been a marked superiority in organized military man-
power and in conventional weapons, and the ability, because of
the strategic advantage of its "heartland" position, to concentrate
these forces against such strategically vital areas as Western Europe
and the Middle East. At the same time the principal offsetting
strengths of the West have been its greater economic potential and
its nuclear capabilities. The effectiveness of the latter 'has been
greatly contributed to by the development of bases around the
periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Since 1951 the margin of Bloc
numerical superiority in forces-in-being and conventional ground
and air arm a cents has been narrowed markedly; in fact Western
strength in modern aircraft is now greater than that of the Soviet
Bloc. On the other hand, although the West has greatly increased
its nuclear weapons production and delivery capabilities, the growing
Soviet capabilities in these respects are progressively reducing the
significance of the superiority.
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106. During the period of this estimte the West will probably con-
tinue to E.-Lintain its lead in the development and introduction of new
wean;o;.:_s. The West will alsr., retain its sizable lead in trained air and
naval -jperson-~nel, and to the extent that West Cerr. an and possibly Japanese'
rearti.._.en_t take place, the Soviet superiority in ground farces-in-being
nay be reduced. On the other hand improving air strengths will give the
USSR i greatly increased ca ability to conduct long-ra; e air operations
against the West, probably including; two-way refueled missions to the US.
Their modern long-range submarine fleet will pose an increasing threat to
Allied r:avai forces and to shipping carrying supplies and reinforcements to
Allied f ::roes . Trained reserves, plus stockpiled equipment permit a rabid
miobilizati:.on. of additional units t ; augment their already strong ground
forces. These develop:ients, along with :ether i3 creasing Soviet strengths
such as o significant increase in nuclear weapons would reduce the
significance of the Western nuclear and logistics superiority, and possibly
reduce the fiilitary value c.:f the suyperior western economic p."tential.
107. The development ::~,f nuclear wea.pcns and of the ability to
deliver such weapons on target will probably tie the most decisive
single factor that could alter the relative uilitary power of the
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Communist Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. At present, the USSR's
principal capability for delivering nuclear weapons lies in attack
by aircraft; the improved new bombers becoming operational during the
period will greatly increase this capability. In addition, although
specific evidence is lacking on the types of guided missiles under
priority development in the USSR, Soviet capabilities for nuclear
attack by means of guided missiles will probably become significant,
especially in the,period 1958-1960. Nevertheless, provided there
are no significant alterations in present political alignments or
US-NATO military programs, the USSR almost certainly will not achieve
by 1960 any such gains in relative military power as would permit it
to launch general war with assurance of success. While trends in
weapons developments will increasingly give an advantage to a power
capable of launching a massive surprise attack, the USSR will almost
certainly not be able, during the period of this estimate, to launch
such an attack with assurance of escaping an even more devastating
retaliatory attack.
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 19/
108. The air forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are capable of
US and Allied
attacking the/bases, especially those on the periphery of the Bloc,
task forces
or the carrier /from which western air operations could be launched
against the Bloc. In a strictly defensive sense, the air defense
system of the USSR provides for the potential employment of virtually
all Soviet and Satellite fighters- about 14,000 aircraft, including
3,700 fighters in the Soviet Aviation of Air Defense --(PVO). In
addition, the Chinese Communists have about" ?'jet fighters
which are to some degree integrated with defenses in the Soviet
Far East. The assignment of an air defense role to the fighter
forces does not cancel their other missions and responsibilities,
but results in a "multiple mission" for most fighter forces.
109. The capabilities estimated below are substantially
limited to the areas of dense air defense concentration (European
USSR, Eastern Europe) and the Maritime-South Manchuria area of the
Far East). Air defense capabilities in other areas would probably
19/ NIE 11-5-55; "Bloc Air Defense Capabilities, 1955-1960!" scheduled
for publication in July, will provide a detailed treatment of
this subject.
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be considerably less than indicated below and virtually nonexistent
in the North Siberian area, the greater part of China, Indochina,
and Albania.
a. Against daylight bomber formations between 10,000
and 30,000 feet in clear weather the Soviet Bloc air
defense system is believed capable of inflicting
severe losses against' piston bombers and moderate
losses against high-speed jet bombers, Above 30,000
feet altitude this capability would begin to diminish,
and above 40,000 feet would fall off rarkedly, due
loss of MJ, effectiveness
to problems of target detection and tracking,/and
reduced GCI capabilities. Under certain circumstances,
such as persistent visible contrails, these capabilities
would, of course, be markedly increased. Primary
limitations would then be the numbers and individual
capabilities of fighter interceptor aircraft available,
b. Against multiple-pronged penetrations utilizing
altitude stacking, diversionary tactics, and
electronics countermeasures, the Soviet Bloc air
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defense system is subject to. serious breakdcwr!s
which would tend to degrade its effectiveness
progressively.
c. Against air attacks conducted under poor visibility
conditions the Soviet Bloc air defense systen is
capable of offering only limited resistance, owing
to inadequacy of equiprent and training for all-
weather operations.
3.10. During the period of this estii_nate the Bloc air defense
systex, will probably be substantially strengthened by greater operational
experience and by the introduction into operational units :_'f new fighter
types, new antiaircraft weap~r-5 improved early warning an - GCI equipment,
and surface-to-air guided ,-::issiles. However, in view of the increasing
capabilities of offensive weapons and improved techniques in counter
measures, Soviet air defense capabilities will probably remain inadequate
to prevent attacking forces reaching; critical target areas of the
USSR i:.: effective numbers.
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OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES 20
111. The core of Soviet offensive strength at present is an ability
to mount attacks against Western Europe and the UK. Air attacks of great
weight involving nuclear weapons could be launched with little or. no
warning. Submarines could be employed in an extensive effort to disrupt
reinforcements and supplies from North America. With its ground forces
the USSR could launch a surprise attack against Western Europe using 25 to
30 Soviet ground divisions now in Eastern Europe. By prior concentration
of greater forces west of the Oder-Neisse line, involving almost certain
loss of surprise, the USSR could attack with 50 to 60 divisions. A
build-up to 75 to 140 divisions could be accomplished by D-plus 90.
Satellite units could be used to reinforce the above attacks', but it is
unlikely that European Satellite armies would be used independently,
except as security forces or to protect Soviet lines of communication,
or in isolated cases against traditional enemies (e.g., Bulgaria vs,
Yugoslavia).
20 No estimate of the success of the offensive operations described
in this action can be made without considering the effects of the
actions of opposing forces.
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112. Air support for ground operations against Western Europe
could come from the approximately 2,200 Soviet aircraft presently
stationed in East Germany and the Satellites, with reinforcements
available from the nearly 5,000 aircraft stationed in the Western
USSR. However, a large proportion of these aircraft are fighter-
interceptor types which also have an air defense responsibility,
and in many areas, including East Germany and Poland, the only
Soviet fighters available for air defense are those assigned
primarily to a tactical support role. This dual mission would,
probably limit to some degree air strength conmiitted to a West
European campaign, although the probable increase in Satellite
air defense capabilities during this period may reduce this
limitation somewhat.
113. In a maximum si ngl.e-lift operation the USSR also has
the capability of utilizing 32,000 well-equipped and trained air-
borne troops in an assault against the Western Zones of Germany.
These troops could be assembled in 10 days, and could be delivered
to Rhine River crossing sites and nearby military installations by
aircraft utilizing bases in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Successive
lifts would be on a decreasing scale because of combat and operational
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five-day maximum effort, we believe that the DSSR could deliver
approximately 55,000 troops. This lift capacity could be increased by
about 2,000 troops for every 100 transports borrowed from the 3,500
transports of the military air forces and civil air fleet. However, at
least during the early period of the estii:ate, nearly all of these forces
would have to be carried in the low performance transport Li-2 (approxi-
mately C-47 characteristics), and this would place an significant
limitation upon the effectiveness of such an operation. Soviet airlift
capabilities will . probably. increase through 1960, but the lack of a large
force of modern transport aircraft will probably continue to be a
limitation.
114. In the Far East, Soviet capabilities for long-continued full-
scale war are considerably limited by the capacity of the Trans-Siberian
railway, the only route by which supplies in large amounts could be brought
from other parts of the USSR. However, the USSR has about 30 divisions in
the Far East, together with more than 5,000 aircraft and ^ sizable naval
force. There are stockpiles of supplies sufficient for a considerable
period of combat. These Soviet forces could, in conjunction with Chinese
Communist forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They could probably launch
an invasion of Japan with an initial assault strength of one airborne and
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two or three waterborne divisions, with about six divisions supporting:
These attacks could be launched concurrently with campaigns in the
Middle East and in Western Europe.
115. The USSR is now capable of undertaking concurrent strategic
air operations against the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle
East, Japan, and the islands off the coast of Asia; This capability
will improve considerably during the period of this estimate with the
introduction of new jet medium and heavy bombers. Operations against the
US will, however, continue to be attended with great difficulties.21
116. At the present time, it would be technically feasible for the
USSR to attack targets within the US with missiles launched from long-
range aircraft and from submarines. The USSR could at present have V-1
type rissiles with nuclear warheads for launching from submarines, and
by late 1955 could have for this purpose a subsonic guided missile with
a maximum range of 500 nautical miles. We believe that it will not be
within Soviet capability within the period of this estimate to attack
continental United States with guided missiles launched from Soviet
Bloc territory.
2I/
For a full discussion see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities
for Attack on the US and ey Overseas Installations," scheduled for
early publication.
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117. If the USSR in fact develops the guided missiles which
we have estimated to be within its capabilities, the following
possibilities for attack would exist during the period of this
estimate:
a. At present, from advanced tosses in Eastern Europe,
targets could be reached in Western Europe as far
west as London, Paris, and Rome, and in the southern
half of the Scandinavian peninsula. In the Far
East, if launched from Soviet or North Korean territory,
these weapons could reach targets in western Japan
and Alaska; if launched from Chinese territory, they
could reach targets in the Ryukyu Islands.
22/
b. In 1957, Soviet guided missiles could reach all of
the UK, France, Italy,'Scandinavia, and Turkey. In
the Far East, if launched from Soviet or North
Korean territory, these weapons could reach all of
the Japanese islands, and if launched from China they
could reach all of Luzon.
22/
c. In 1958-1960, Soviet missiles could reach US North
African bases in Tunisia, in addition to the targets
22/ These have been estimated to be the earliest probable dates of the
availability of the missiles described; it is possible that the
date might be still earlier. See NIE 11-6-54 `Pule Warning of
Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-1958`; for a fuller discussion
of this point.
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118. During the period of this estimate Soviet offensive naval
capabilities will still be limited to undersea warfare, surface
operations involving vessels no larger than cruisers, and air
operations utilizing shore-based naval aircraft. The Soviet sub-
marine force will greatly increase its capability to undertake offen-
sive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategi-
cally situated sea lanes, and possibly to launch guided missiles attacks
against targets on both the ?tlantic and Pacific seaboards of the US.
Major Soviet surface units and supporting shore-based naval aircraft
will probably continue to increase their capability to undertake offensive
operations in Bloc coastal areas, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas,
and to protect the seawar flank of ground campaigns. The Soviet Navy
will almost certainly have no long-range amphibious capability within
the period of this estimate, but it will remain capable of mounting
short-range amphibious lifts in considerable force.
119. We estimate that the USSR now has a stock of over 500,000
mines and has the capability to employ mine warfare to interfere seriously
with allied sea communications. In the European area, this effort could
include all the ports and approaches of the UK and Western Europe. In
the Far East, most of the vital allied port areas and sea lanes around
the perimeter of the Bloc could be similarly attacked.
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VII. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
THE FACTOR OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
120. The policy of any state is conditioned by the particular view'
which its leaders have of the world situation and of the dangers and op-
portunities which it presents to them. The Soviet leaderst view of the
world situation is affected by their Cormunist ideology and by their iso-
lation from the general currents of world opinion. It is of particular
importance in estimating Soviet courses of action, therefore, to take into
account the fact that events outside the Communist Orbit or developments
in relations between the USSR and the West may frequently have for the
Soviet leaders a meaning quite different from that which they have for
non-Corr=ist statesmen.
121. The ideological heritage of the 1917 revolution remains a
principal determinant of the Soviet view of developments in the world sit-
uation. The Soviet leaders shill view world developments in terms of an
irreconcilable conflict between the "camps" of Communism and capitalism
which will continue until Cormiunism has triumphed throughout the world. In
large part, this view both determines their long-term objectives and colors
their interpretations of Western actions and developments. We believe that
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the validity of the guiding principles of Corzunist ideology has in Soviet
eyes been confirmed in the main by the course of events in the war and
postwar periods.
122. Soviet leaders recognized towards the end of World War II
that a situation favorable to Comunist expansion existed in a large
part of the non-Cor_nunist world. Hence they pursued their advantage as
fast and as far as they could in expanding the Corzunist sphere and ex-
tending Soviet influence. After some time their progress slowed down,
especially in Europe, and ran against increasing opposition as the non-
Communist world gradually re-established stability. The Soviet leaders
are probably aware that it was the advance of Soviet power in Central
Europe and in Asia that called forth an increasingly stubborn Western
counteraction and consolidated Western opposition. Beginning in 1947,
and at an accelerated rate after 1950, the Western nations build up their
power and cohesion to the point where further Communist expansion in
Europe, and even in some parts of Asia, could no longer be accomplished
without risk of general war. At the same time, and accommodation with
the West, even if the USSR had wished it, came to depend upon concessions
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so costly to the USSRts power position that the Soviet leaders clearly
regarded them as unacceptable.
123. Faced with a world situation increasingly inhospitable to
their aims, the Soviet leaders have sought to find a middle way between
the alternatives of war or aecormaodation at unacceptable cost.. They have
proceeded on the assumption that both Western fear of war and hope for
peace could be manipulated to advance Soviet objectives. Consequently,
a policy of alternating menace and conciliation was.adopted to encourage
the view in the West that Soviet expansionist aims would be moderated
if the Western Powers refrained from measures in their own defense which
the USSR portrayed as provocative. This policy required no abandonment
of expansionist aims nor any cessation of Corraunist aggression, at least
where such aggression could be carried out without grave risk of general
war. In the period after Stalints death, however, Soviet policy began
to place relatively more emphasis on the element of conciliation, pos-
sibly in some degree because of the pressure of Soviet internal problems,
but apparently mainly in the belief that for an interim period at least
such tactics were more likely to weaken :Western opposition.
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THE SOVIET VIEW OP CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
124. The Soviet leaders probably believe that the US remains
firm in its intention to oppose Communist expansion, and that it means
to persist in its effort to bring all important strategic areas peripheral
to the Bloc into closer linka with the US defense system. They probably
also estimate that the US is unlikely deliberately to initiate general war
during the next few years. The Soviet leaders probably believe that, due
to their increasing nuclear capability, a situation is approaching in
which a general war involving use by both sides of nuclear weapons would
bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of
both Western civilization and the Soviet system. They probably estimate
that a situation of mutual deterrence could develop in which each side
would be strongly inhibited from initiating general war or taking
actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general
war. However, they probably estimate that the US would not be deterred,
by fear of the consequences of general war, from using its full military
capabilities if it believed that its security was imminently threatened:
The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that overt armed aggression
by Bloc forces against any state formally allied with the US would result
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in the employment of US military power as necessary to counter such
aggression. They probably also estimate that such aggression against
a state not formally allied to the US would involve risk of US military
reaction, but that the degree of this risk, and the dimensions of the US
reaction, would depend upon the importance to the US of the country at-
tacked, the circumstances of the attack, and the political situation
within the US and non-Communist world generally.
125. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the success of
the US effort to prevent further Communist expansion depends heavily
upon the ability of the US to establish and maintain cohesion in the
non-Co1.lmunist world. Some developments of to last year, such as the
failure of the Western Powers to present a united front at the Geneva
Conference, their subsequent inability to associate more Asian states
with the defense of Southeast ',sia, and the unwillingness of most
Western and Asian states to support US policy toward Communist China,
may indicate to the Soviet leaders a decline in US ability to maintain
such cohesion. They probably believe. that the influence of India will
continue to grow, and that it clay become the leader of a group of states
capable of an independent role in world affairs. They may also believe
that Germ any and Japan will become increasingly capable of taking an
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independent position. On the other hand, they probably now recognize
that certain aggressive actions by the Sino-Soviet Bloc tend to in-
crease the willingness of the non-Communists,to follow US leadership.
At the same time they probably estimate that there are areas and problems
in which such actions would have the opposite effect. While they may not
expect during the next few years to accomplish the defection of any states
formerly allied with the US, they probably believe that their own policies
can encourage frictions within the Western alliance, undermine the willing-
ness of US allies to-support the US in policies of firmness and weaken US
influence among uncommitted states.
126.- The Soviet leaders probably believe that trends in the develop-
ment of Western military strength do not present them with any immediate
threat, either of war or of o weakening of their position in negotiations.
While US nuclear capabilities continue to improve, and the Soviet defense
problem nay be further complicated as the British also develop their
nuclear capabilities, these developments do not alter essentially the
situation which the USSR has faced throughout the postwar period. More-
over, the West's advantage it this respect is being reduced as the USSR
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develops its own nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders probably reco-
gnize that the present rough balance of military power could be altered
in favor of the West by the appearance of major military power in West
Germany and Japan, but they probably now believe that German or Japanese
rearmament is not likely to take place on a significant scale during the
next two or three years at least. The Soviet leaders will have noted
that the declining trend in Western military expenditures has continued
despite the recent increase in their own military budget. Therefore, they
are probably quite confident that Western military power, although re-
maining formidable, is not now being developed at a rate which will, permit
the application of substantially increased military pressure on the USSR.
127. The Soviet leaders have always reckoned heavily on a deterio-
ration of "capitalist" economies to undermine non-Communist strength and
to produce "imperialist contraditions" which would range the Western
Powers against each other. Despite the continuing vigor of the economies
of Western Europe and the failure of the long-awaited US depression to
materialize the Soviet leaders are unlikely to have been shaken in their
view that long-term trends point to eventual economic crisis in capitalist
countries. They are aware, moreover, that the economies of some states
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of critical importance to the Western alliance, such as Germany and
Japan, would probably prove vulnerable in the event of even a moderately
serious decline in levels of trade. The latter they probably regard as
a possibility even in the short term, and one which, if it did develop,
might produce a political situation which they could exploit.
PROBIiBLE SOVIET ESTUGTE OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
128. On balance, the Soviet leaders probably estimate that there
is at present no critical threat to their security, and that there may be re-
newed opportunities for Communist expansion by means short of general war.
They probably estimate that Western power and unity are vulnerable to
Soviet political action, and may become increasingly so. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders probably believe that they-can rely primarily upon
political means, and in some cases military action by local forces, to
carry on their struggle against the non-Communist world.
129. However, the Soviet leaders almost certainly recognize that
developments may occur during the period of this estimate which would
require a revision of this judgment. Some of the problems which presently
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/04: CIA-RDP79RO1012AO05000010010-6
concern Soviet policy-makers could develop in such a way as to present
an iiiiiediate threat to Soviet security interests. Others might take a
course which, while not.involving Soviet security interests directly,
could heighten international tensions, engage the prestige of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc, and cause the USSR to revise its estimate of Western in-
tentions. Possible developments which would lead the Soviet leaders to
make such a revision would include the following: (a) a rate or scale
of West German rearmament greater than that presently foreseen, or
aggressive N