SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS THROUGH 1 JULY 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1954
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 11-7-54
17 August 1954
100.SECRET
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-7-54
(Supersedes SNIE 11-2-54)
031958
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS
ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS
INSTALLATIONS THROUGH 1 JULY 1957
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of. the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 17 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, 0-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC; and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
bOctiTA ENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
IS DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
A' ;.1" '? HR
70-2
DATE:4/Akid REVIEWER: _142124.
"COPY NO. 129
Tel SECRET ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,ONE
C7c7-9'9i
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
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within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
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SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND
KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS' THROUGH 1 JULY 1957
THE PROBLEM
To estimate gross Soviet capabilities for attacks on the US and key overseas in-
stallation& through .1 July 1957.
SCOPE
In planning the actual scale of attack on the US and key US installations over-
seas the Soviet rulers would recognize that such an attack would inevitably involve
general war. Accordingly, some portion of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and
delivery capabilities would almost certainly be allocated for use against US allies and
for reserve. This estimate does not consider the problem of such allocation, but con-
fines itself to the gross capabilities for attack on the US and key US installations over-
seas as indicated by the estimated state of Soviet weapons, equipment, and facilities
during the period of the estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
1. In attacking the US and key US over-
seas installations the major Soviet objec-
tives would be to: (a) destroy or cripple
as quickly as possible US capabilities for
nuclear retaliation; (b) deliver such an
Key US Overseas Installations: (a) United King-
dom ? strategic air bases and forces; (b) West-
ern Europe ? strategic air bases and forces; tac-
tical air bases and forces for NATO support;
bases and forces for support of naval operations;
army forces, depot and port complexes, major
-headquarters and key bridges and tunnels; (c)
Far East (including Okinawa) ? strategic air
bases and forces; tactical air support bases and
forces; naval and naval air forces and army and
navy installations; port complexes for support of
US and allied forces; (d) French North Africa-
Libya ? strategic air bases and forces; naval air
facilities; (e) Pacific (including Hawaii and
Philippines) ? strategic air bases and forces;
attack on urban, industrial, and psycho-
logical targets in the US as would prevent,
or at least hinder, the mobilization of US
war potential; (c) inflict such destruction
on US overseas installations as would be
LOC support bases; army bases; naval and naval
air bases and forces; (f) Middle East? strategic
air bases and forces; naval air facilities; (g)
North Atlantic (including Newfoundland, Green-
land, Labrador, Iceland) ? strategic air bases
and forces; naval and naval air facilities; LOC
support facilities; (h) Bermuda-Azores ? strate-
gic air bases; naval and naval air facilities; (i)
Alaska ? strategic air bases and forces; ports;
army base; naval air facility; (j) Panama Canal
and Caribbean? LOC link; naval and naval air
facilities; and (k) US Fleet Units ? elements of
Sixth, Seventh, Second and First Fleets consti-
tuting immediate threats to the USSR.
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necessary to hamper or prevent the US
from reinforcing or resupplying its forces.
2. The Soviet leaders would probably cal-
culate that in order to achieve success
such an attack would have to be accom-:
plished under conditions of maximum
surprise. Therefore the USSR would
probably launch its initial attacks from
such bases and under such conditions as
would offer the greatest security from de-
tection.
3. In order to achieve both maximum
surprise and maximum weight in an at-
tack on the US and its overseas installa-
tions, we believe that the USSR would
place chief reliance on nuclear air at-
tacks. Such attacks would probably re-
ceive the highest priority because of: (a)
the limited capabilities of naval, ground,
and airborne forces against the continen-
tal US; (b) the security difficulties in-
herent in the delivery of large numbers
of nuclear weapons by clandestine means;
(c) the insufficient development of other
methods of delivery of nuclear weapons
on a large scale; (d) the insufficient de-
velopment of other mass destruction
weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale
use; and (e) the availability of far north-
ern air bases, from which air operations
against the US are least susceptible to de-
tection.
4. The areas most suitable geographically
for launching long-range air operations
against the US are the Kola Peninsula
area; the Leningrad complex; the Chu-
kotski and Kamchatka areas in north-
eastern Siberia; and the Baltic-East Ger-
man area. The Chukotski, Kola, and
Kamchatka areas are particularly advan-
tageous as bases for surprise attacks since
great circle routes would initially avoid
overflight of nations friendly to the US.
2
5. Present Soviet capabilities for air at-
tacks on the continental US are limited
by dependence on the TU-4 bomber, by
the apparent lack of a developed inflight
refueling capability, and by the relatively
undeveloped character of the Kola, Chu-
kotski, and Kamchatka base areas. One-
way missions or such range extension
techniques as inflight refueling would be
required to enable Soviet bomber aircraft
to strike important targets in the conti-
nental US. We estimate that the capacity
of air bases in these areas would permit
launching a maximum of about 300 air-
craft in an initial attack against the US.
If all were committed to one-way unre-
fueled missions, approximately 250 might
reach US target areas not considering
combat losses. Such a force could de-
liver all or at least a substantial propor-
tion of the nuclear weapons estimated to
be available to the USSR in 1954, while
still permitting a portion of the striking
force to be used for electronic counter-
measures, escort, or diversionary tasks.'
2 The Director of Naval Intelligence and the As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the
Army, believe that available intelligence on
over-all Soviet capabilities for long-range air at-
tack is insufficient to warrant a finite estimate
of the number of aircraft which might be
launched from the Kola, Kamchatka and Chu-
kotski areas in 1954. They therefore believe
that paragraph 5 should read as follows:
"Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on tar-
gets in the continental United States are pres-
ently limited by dependence on the TU-4
bomber, by the apparent lack of a developed in-
flight refueling capability, and by the relatively
undeveloped character of the Chukotski and
Kola base areas. The Soviets have sufficient
TU-4's to attempt the delivery of all or a sub-
stantial part of their atomic stockpile (the num-
ber depending upon types of weapons stockpiled)
against the United States from bases in Soviet-
controlled territory, even though some of the air-
craft reaching target areas probably would not
be bomb carriers since a number would be used
for electronic countermeasures, escort, or diver-
sionary tasks.
Footnote continued on page 3
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6. If the USSR elected to utilize the addi-
tional bases in the Baltic-East German
and Leningrad areas and thus lessen its
chances of achieving surprise it could
launch a maximum of approximately 850
aircraft in 1954 in an initial attack on
the US. However, the great bulk of these
aircraft would have to fly one-way un-
ref u?d missions. Approximately 650
might reach target areas not considering
combat losses. We consider such an at-
tack highly unlikely.
7. Assuming an allocation of 300 TU-4's
against the continental US, the USSR
could in addition launch approximately
550 medium bombers against such other
targets as key US and allied installations
overseas. Not considering combat losses
approximately 450 might reach target
areas. However, the USSR will probably
rely more on the 2,100 jet light bombers
available in 1954 to attack key installa-
tions within operational radius of these
aircraft because of the greater capability
of the jet bomber to penetrate allied air
defenses.
8. By 1957 we estimate that the USSR
could, by a major effort, develop the ca-
pacity of the air bases in the Kola, Len-
ingrad, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas
Footnote continued from page 2
The implementation of this capability is de-
pendent upon:
(1) Their willingness to accept the loss on
one-way missions of a substantial portion of
their long-range air force.
(2) Their willingness to accept the expendi-
ture of all or a substantial portion of their nu-
clear? stockpile and to entrust its delivery to the
TU-4 aircraft.
(3) The development and employment of
range extension techniques.
(4) Use, of Leningrad base areas that would
considerably decrease the range of aircraft if
surprise is to be achieved by not overflying non-
Soviet territory."
3
to permit the launching of approximately
1,000 aircraft in an initial air operation
against the US. If all of these aircraft
were committed to one-way unrefueled
missions (or two-way unrefueled mis-
sions, where possible) , on the order of
750-800 aircraft mightyeach target areas
not considering combat losses. The ex-
ercise of this maximum capability would
involve the expenditure on one-way mis-
sions of most of Soviet Long-Range Avia-
tion.
9. We consider it more likely, however,
that the USSR would elect to commit
substantially fewer mission aircraft. It
might launch about 900 aircraft, which
could comprise 350 tankers and 550 mis-
sion aircraft. Of the 550 mission aircraft,
about two-thirds would possibly be
launched from the Kola-Leningrad area
and one-third from northeastern Siberia.
About 450 aircraft might arrive over tar-
get areas not considering combat losses.
However, exercise of this capability would
involve difficult operational and logistical
problems, particularly those pertaining to
the creation of a tanker fleet. Moreover,
the exercise of this capability would in-
volve the loss on one-way missions of
about one-third of Soviet long-range
bomber aircraft. A number of the mis-
sion aircraft would probably be used for
electronic countermeasures, escort, or di-
versionary tasks.
to. Assuming the scale of attack in para-
graph 9 above, the 'USSR would have 750
medium and heavy aircraft left for use
elsewhere. Of this number, approximate-
ly 85 percent would be immediately serv-
iceable for attack against key US and
Allied overseas installations, for reattack,
or for reserve. Not considering combat
losses, approximately 80 percent of these
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launched would probably arrive over tar-
get areas. We also estimate that in 1957
about 3,100 jet light bombers will be avail-
able for attacks on targets within the op-
erational capabilities of these aircraft.
11. Throughout the period of this esti-
mate the Soviet rulers probably would
employ other methods of attacking the
US or US installations overseas concur-
rently with or immediately following a
surprise nuclear air attack. They could
attack US overseas installations with
guided missiles up to ranges of 500 miles
and could employ airborne and amphib-
ious forces, ground forces, and chemical
warfare. Clandestine attack on the US
itself by sabotage, biological warfare, and
placement of nuclear, weapons, might
occur against specially selected targets.
12. The submarine force of the USSR
could, at least in the initial phases of an
attack, inflict serious damage on US over-
seas communications and carry out of-
fensive mining in the shipping ap-
proaches to harbors and ports of the US
and its Allies, in addition to its potential
for launching mass destruction weapons
against the US or key US overseas instal-
lations within range.
13. The USSR would probably employ
ground, airborne, and amphibious forces
in attacks that occur simultaneously with
or immediately after the initial attacks.
Soviet ground forces, particularly in
Western Europe, possess a high capability
for attacking Allied forces and installa-
tions located in forward areas. The addi-
tional employment of airborne or amphib-
ious forces would enable the Soviet
Ground Forces to attack more distant
forces and installations.
DISCUSSION
I. AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
14. Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet atomic en-
ergy program, directed primarily toward the
production of nuclear weapons, will continue
to receive special emphasis through 1957.
Extensive reserves of uranium exist within
the USSR and current rates of exploitation of
domestic and Satellite uranium deposits will
probably continue to be more than sufficient
to support estimated fissionable material pro-
duction. It is believed that the other basic
materials required for nuclear energy pur-
poses up to mid-1957 are available in sufficient
quantity as not to cause curtailment of other
important Soviet efforts if nuclear program
needs are to be met.
15. In the light of technological capabilities
as of the end of 1953, Soviet military require-
ments will govern the allocation of available
fissionable material to various types of weap-
ons, consideration being given to the total
energy yields attainable from the weapons
stockpile. By the end of 1953 the USSR had
tested small, medium, and large-yield weapons
and had employed thermonuclear boosting
principles to produce energy yields in the
range of the equivalent of a few thousand to
at least one million tons of TNT. During the
immediate future, the types of weapons stock-
piled will probably have the general character-
istics and the explosive powers of weapons al-
ready tested. On this basis, one of the ways
in which the USSR might allocate its stock-
pile of fissionable material is as follows :3
_ In view of the range of error applicable to the
estimate of Soviet fissionable material produc-
tion, the actual figures for mid-1954 may be as
much as one-third lower or higher than the fig-
ures given above. Uncertainty increases as esti-
mates are projected into the future and the
actual figure for mid-1957 may be as low as one-
half or as high as twice the figures given in the
table.
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Mid-
1954
Mid-
1957
Large-yield weapons (1,000 KT each)
18
80
Medium-yield weapons (60 KT each)
85
235
Small-yield weapons (5 KT each)
250
700
16. The USSR will probably cdntinue work
on weapons with equivalent yields well in
excess of one million tons of TNT as well as
on small-yield and small-dimension weapons.
Further developments along these lines could
be tested in 1954. Such developments would
permit more flexibility in the use of nuclear
weapons. We estimate that by 1957 the USSR
will have weapons with the following ranges
of yields:
Large-yield weapons ? 1,000 to 10,000 KT or more
Medium-yield weapons ?20 to 100 KT
Small-yield weapons ? 0.5 to 5 KT
17. Radiological Warfare. It is most unlikely,
for technological reasons, that the USSR will
be able to stockpile militarily significant
quantities of radiological warfare weapons
during the period of this estimate. Although
not strictly within the category of radiological
warfare, the significance of radio-active fall-
out following large nuclear explosions becomes
greater as the yield of nuclear weapons in-
creases. This factor should be considered in
connection with Soviet capabilities to produce
explosions in the megaton range.
18. Biological Warfare. The USSR is in pos-
session of all the necessary basic knowledge
for the production of Most BW agents and ef-
fective dissemination devices. If the Soviets
chose to do so, they would be able to construct
and operate plants for BW agent production
and devices for dissemination could be avail-
able in adequate numbers. However, " there
is no evidence that the USSR is engaged in
BW agent production or possesses production
facilities designed specifically for BW agents.
There is also no evidence of Soviet stockpiles
of BW agents or munitions. Since it is not
feasible to stockpile large quantities of most
I ?
BW agents in prolonged storage, most opera-
tional requirements would have to be supplied
directly from production facilities.
5
19. Chemical Warfare. We assume that the
stockpile of standard agents and munitions
accumulated during World War II 'has been
maintained and will be available for use dur-
ing the period of this estimate. Intelligence
indicates that the Soviets could have been
producing at least one of the nerve gases since
1949, and we estimate that the USSR will be
capable of employing nerve gases during the
period of this estimate.
II. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND
MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
BY AIRCRAFT
Long-Range Aviation
20. The TU-4. Soviet Long-Range Aviation
constitutes the long-range striking force of
the USSR. It consists of 3 Air Armies, 1 in
the Far East and 2 in the western USSR, plus
1 corps of undetermined subordination in the
western USSR. The TU-4 medium bomber,
which was copied from the American B-29,
is the only bomber available to the Soviets in
large numbers and capable of carrying nu-
clear weapons to distant targets. As of 1
July 1954, a total of about 1,100 TU-4's was
estimated to be available in operational units.
(Table of Equipment Strength of Soviet air
regiments known to be equipped with or in
process of being equipped with TU-4 aircraft
totals 1,340 but the TU-4 regiments are cur-
rently estimated to be at only about 85 per-
cent of T/E strength.) As of 1 July 1954 ap-
proximately 210 TU-4's (eight regiments with
a T/E strength of 260) were located in the
Soviet Far East. It is believed that deliveries
of TU-4's to operational units have virtually
ceased and that with the gradual phasing out
of these aircraft as new jet models become
available only 700 will remain in operational
units by mid-1957.
21. Jet Medium Bomber. In the past four
months there have been conclusive indications
that a jet medium bomber equipment program
has been initiated in Soviet Long-Range Avia-
tion. During the 1954 Soviet May Day fly-by
and the rehearsals preceding it, 9-11 twin
jet medium bombers, designated by allied in-
telligence as the Type 39, participated. Sub-
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sequent intelligence has associated this type
with a known Soviet Long-Range Aviation
unit. We estimate that as of 1 July 1954 at
least two regiments of Soviet Long-Range
Aviation with a T/E strength of 60 aircraft
were in process of equipment with Type 39
jet medium bombers. Total actual strength
of these units is estimated at approximately
20 aircraft. Series production of the Type 39
is estimated to have begun in mid-1953, and
total production as of 1 July 1954 is estimated
at about 40 aircraft. By mid-1957 it is esti-
mated that Soviet Long-Range Aviation will
contain an actual strength of 650 jet medium
bombers.
22. Jet Heavy Bomber. The Type 37, which
was initially observed on 30 July 1953 and
later observed in flight on seven different
occasions in connection with the 1954 May
Day celebration, is a swept wing, four-engine,
jet heavy bomber with an estimated gross
weight of 365,000 pounds. The aircraft, con-
SUMMARY- OF ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL
STRENGTH OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE
AVIATION
Type Mid-1954 Mid-1957
TU-4 piston medium bomber
1,100
700
Type 39 jet medium bomber
20
650
Type 37 jet heavy bomber
50
Total
1,120
1,400
6
sidered presently to be in the prototype stage,
is expected to appear in operational units by
the end of 1956 building up to an actual
strength of about 50 aircraft by mid-1957.
23. Type 31 Class Heavy Bomber. There has
been some evidence of the existence of a large
bomber designated the Type 31. On the basis
of present evidence, it is highly doubtful that
any substantial re-equipment of Long-Range
Aviation units with Type 31 class aircraft has
occurred to date, though possibly 15 or 20 may
have been introduced. The Long-Range Avia-
tion re-equipment program to replace the
TU-4 is more likely to be accomplished by in-
troduction of the jet bomber aircraft which
have now appeared, and the Type 31 class
probably will not be introduced in numbers.
The estimated radius/range of this aircraft is
2,500/4,800 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound
bomb load or 2,800/5,500 nautical miles carry-
ing a 3,000 pound bomb load.
Aircraft Characteristics of Soviet Long-
Range Aircraft
24. The TU-4. Radii/ranges of Soviet Long-
Range bombers are shown in the following
tables. Table I indicates capabilities calcu-
lated in accordance with US military mission
profiles. Table II indicates maximum per-
formance under combat conditions.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED 1954-1957 CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
(Calculated in accordance with US Military Mission profiles)
Conditions
Combat Radius/
Range (nm)
Heavy Bomber
Medium Bomber (1957)
TU-4 TU-4 (Modified) Type 39 Type 37*
a. 10,000 lb.
load
1,700/3,100
2,000/3,600
1,400/2,700
2,350/4,350
one refuel.
b. 3,000 lb.
load
2,400/4,300
1,950/3,500
2,800/5,000
2,300/4,100
2,000/3,800
1,600/3,200
3,300/6,100
2,450/4,800
one refuel.
2,750/4,900
3,200/5,700
2,250/4,500
3,400/6,700
Speed/Altitude
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
540/19,000
(In/ft)
a. Maxi. speed
b. Com. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
490/36,000
490/41,000
Combat Ceiling
36,500
37,500
38,500
45,000
(ft)
* The performance figures shown for the Type 37 were calculated on the basis
of a gross take-off weight of 345,000 pounds and a fuel load of 180,000 pounds.
Since recalculation indicates a maximum gross take-off weight of 365,000
pounds with a fuel load of 200,000 pounds, the performance figures shown are
subject to upward revision.
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TABLE II
ESTIMATED 1954-1957 MAXIMUM PERFORMANCE UNDER COMBAT
CONDITIONS OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT
Conditions
Combat Radius/
Range (nm)
Heavy Bomber
Medium Bomber (1957)
TU-4 TU-4 (Modified) Type 39 Type 37*
a. 10,000 lb.
load
1,800/3,300
2,150/4,000
1,550/3,000
3,000/5,850
one refuel.
b. 3,000 lb.
load
2,500/4,500
2,050/3,700
3,000/5,600
2,450/4,600
2,150/4,200
1,800/3,550
4,200/8,000
3,100/6,050
one refuel.
2,850/5,100
3,450/6,450
2,500/4,900
4,250/8,100
Speed/Altitude
350/30,000
360/30,000
535/15,000
535/19,000
(kn/ft)
a. Maxi. speed
b. Corn. speed
350/30,000
360/30,000
475/38,500
485/43,000
Combat Ceiling
(ft)
36,500 37,500 38,500 44,500
* The performance for the Type 37 was calculated on the basis of a 365,000
pound take-off weight with 200,000 pounds of fuel.
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25. Int'light Refueling. We have no intelli-
gence that the USSR is actually employing
inflight refueling. However, inflight refuel-
ing techniques do not impose serious technical
problems and the USSR has had access to the
wartime techniques and equipment employed
by the US in this field. The USSR is known
to have evinced interest in Western demon-
strations of refueling techniques, and refuel-
ing methods have been discussed, in Soviet
technical literature. It is therefore necessary
to consider the effect of inflight refueling in
extending the range of Soviet bomber aircraft.
A fleet of tanker aircraft, appreciable train-
ing in their operational use, and the modifi-
cation of mission aircraft fuel systems, would
be necessary before two-way missions against
the US could be conducted on a large scale.
The establishment of tanker units would re-
quire the conversion of TU-4's or production
of new tanker aircraft. Since TU-4 strength
in operational units is estimated to decrease
from the present figure of 1,100 to about 700
by mid-1957, sufficient TU-4's could be avail-
able for conversion to tanker aircraft during
the period of this estimate. With one refuel-
ing the combat radius/range of USSR's long-
range aircraft could be increased as shown in
the table.
Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the US
26. Five areas within Soviet dominated terri-
tory are most suitable geographically for
launching long-range air operations against
the United States: the Kola Peninsula area;
the Leningrad complex; the Chukotski and
Kamchatka areas in northeastern Siberia;
and the Baltic-East German area. The
Chukotski, Kola, and Kamchatka areas are
particularly advantageous as bases for sur-
prise attacks since great circle routes would
avoid initial overflight of nations friendly to
the US. The extension of bomber ranges by
mid-1957 will not be great enough to allow
the enemy to dispense with these areas if im-
portant targets in the whole of the United
States are to be reached on other than one-
way missions. It is therefore reasonable to
suppose that at least until the end of the
period of this estimate any large-scale attacks
would involve use of these areas.
9
27. Chukotski Area. This area is not known
to contain any bases suitable for TU-4 take-
offs at maximum gross weights of 140,000
pounds over a 50-foot obstacle, but does have
at least four bases which have undergone post-
World War II runway development which
would probably make them suitable for oper-
ations under conditions of either reduced
take-off or acceptance of lower safety margins.
Among these are: Tanyurer (65-51N, 174-
13E) , Markovo (64-41N, 170-25E), Providen-
iya/Urelik (64-20N, 173-14W), and Velkal
(65-31N, 179-16W). Available intelligence
does not permit conclusive determination of
the current status of these facilities. It does
indicate that a new hard-surfaced runway was
built at Tanyurer after World War II, esti-
mated, at approximately 5,200 feet in length.
Available intelligence also indicates that de-
velopment work occurred at Markovo, where
a 4,300-foot runway extensible to a maximum
of 5,000 feet existed in 1945. Due to this
limitation on extensibility of this runway,
however, piston medium bomber operations
from it would be severely restricted. The
runway at Provideniya/Urelik was developed
to its present length of approximately 5,000
feet between the spring of 1952 and 1953.
Airfield development work has also been car-
ried on at Velkal and at some other locations
in the Chukotski area in the postwar period.
Such work could be carried out in the area
without detection. It is estimated that the
construction capability of elements presently
in the Chukotski area could provide one addi-
tional improved installation (5,000 to 8,000-
foot runway) each year between now and 1957.
Construction of permanent-surfaced runways
suitable for long-range bomber operations
may have been retarded in this area due to
the perma-frost problem, but the USSR prob-
ably has learned to solve this difficulty
through frozen soil studies conducted since
World War II. The Soviets have had a long-
standing interest in ice and snow-impacted
runways.
28. Long-range air operations from the Chu-
kotski area would encounter many difficulties
because of basic logistic limitations and ad-
verse climatic conditions. However, the
USSR has a fund of Arctic flying experience
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which could be exploited for operations from
this area. Logistically, the area is served
principally by sea-lift limited to the ice-free
months of the year. The status of base logis-
tical support facilities in this area is un-
known. The supply problem inherent in the
support of air operations in the Chukotski
area would be difficult; however, the stock-
piling of the supplies necessary to sustain
limited air operations could be accomplished
prior to initiating such operations. Cold,
wind, snow, and fog in the area would make
air operations difficult and hazardous at cer-
tain times of the year. The lack of modern
navigational aids would also hamper opera-
tions, but there are indications that the USSR
is steadily improving its air operational poten-
tial in this area through the installation of
modern radio navigational facilities. It is be-
lieved that no long-range bomber units are
presently stationed in this area, although
TU-4 flights have been made to the area.
29. Kola Peninsula Area. The Kola Penin-
sula has six known bases which would be suit-
able for operations of the standard and/or
modified versions of the TU-4 at maximum
gross weights (140,000 pounds and 135,750
pounds respectively), provided the Soviets ac-
cepted a reduced safety margin. These are
Murmansk/Vayenga, 69 02N-33 25E, with a
7,600-foot graded earth surfaced runway;
Alakurtti, 66 58N-30 21E, 6,000-foot concrete
surfaced runway; Nautsi, 69 04N-29 10E,
5,500-foot graded earth surfaced runway;
Ponoy, 67 06N-41 07E, 5,300-foot graded earth
surfaced runway; Pechenga, 69 24N-31 00E,
5,000-foot concrete surfaced runway; and
Nivskiy, 67 26N-32 50E, where recent develop-
ment is believed to have provided at least a
6,000-foot hard surfaced runway. There is a
lack of recent intelligence on the current
status of runway surfaces at the above fields
other than Nivskiy, although there have been
some indications of runway development at
several of these installations.
30. In addition to these six airfields there are
other fields in the area which could be devel-
oped, and which may already have been de-
veloped to accommodate medium/heavy
bomber operations. Such development could
10
now be in progress or could have been car-
ried out without detection. We estimate that
construction elements in the area would be
capable of completing at least one improved
installation each year between now and 1957.
Permanent surfaced runways can be con-
structed without difficulty throughout the
Kola area as it is relatively free of perma-
frost. Prevailing climatic conditions, while a
restrictive factor on air operations, are rela-
tively more favorable in this area than in
other portions of the Soviet Far North. Sup-
ply routes by rail and sea are open to the
Kola Peninsula on a year-around basis. The
status of base logistical support facilities
which would be required to conduct long-
range nuclear attacks from airfields in this
area is unknown. At least four of the six
fields named above are now used by other
Soviet air components. These units would
have to be relocated to permit maximum use
of the fields by long-range bomber aircraft.
However, the airfield system in the Kola area
would permit such relocation if required.
31. Leningrad Area. This area, in which
long-range bomber units are probably now
based, contains at least one known airfield,
Leningrad/Pushkin (59-42N, 30-21E) , with a
7,000-foot concrete runway. In addition, at
least four airfields in the area, Tartu (58-
24N, 26-46E) , Pakov (57-47N, 28-24E), Pal-
diski/Vasalemma (59-16N, 24-12E) , and Len-
ingrad (59-48N, 30-18E) have runways in ex-
cess of 6,000 feet. Seven additional airfields
in the area have runways in excess of 5,000
feet. Operations from this area by strike air-
craft would offer advantages of launching an
operation from a temperate climate with good
logistic support. However, if overflight of
Scandinavia were to be avoided, a dogleg
course over the Kola Peninsula would be
necessary on an attempted attack against the
United States.
32. Kamchatka Area. At present, airfields
in the Kamchatka area are not considered to
be suitable for TU-4 take-offs at maximum
gross weight of 140,000 pounds over a 50-foot
obstacle. However, there are four airfields in
the area which would permit ground runs of
5,000 feet and could be used by modified ver-
sions of the TU-4, providing lower safety
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margins were accepted. These are Petropav-
lovsk (53-10N, 158-26E) , Kataoka (50-44N,
156-52E) , Matsuwa (48-03N, 153-15E) , and
Magadan (59-39N, 150-52E).
33. Baltic-East German Area. This area,
which includes the Soviet zone of Germany
and Poland, now has at least 60 airfields suit-
able for long-range bomber operations. These
bases are favorably situated with respect to
communications and weather and are ade-
quately served by existing transportation
facilities. A major disadvantage is that great
circle routes to the United States from these
bases pass over portions of Western Europe or
Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike
would probably be detected early enough to
provide warning. In addition, security of
preparations would be lower in this area than
in other forward base areas.
34. The capabilities of Soviet bombers oper-
ating from these base areas against the US
and key US overseas installations are shown
'in the charts annexed to this estimate.
35. Navigation and Bombing Accuracy. So-
viet long-range aviation has available through
open sources virtually complete target and
navigation data on North America and its
approach routes. It is even probable that in
the event of a surprise attack, certain Western
electronic navigational aids would be availa-
ble during at least part of the flight. Sim-
ilarly, meteorological reports, including pro-
file data at all altitudes, are regularly broad-
cast in the United States and Canada in sim-
ple cipher. We estimate that Soviet blind-
bombing and navigational radar equipment is
capable of equal or better performance than
the US World War II equipment which the
USSR acquired. It is also possible that
clandestinely placed navigational beacons
may be used for aircraft homing. The cur-
rent Soviet training program points to con-
tinuing improvement in air crew proficiency.
In view of these factors and Soviet ability to
select a time of attack with respect to favor-
able route and target weather conditions, it
is almost certain that Soviet air crews would
be able to navigate with sufficient accuracy
to reach the major population and industrial
centers of the United States and in bombing
11
to achieve CEP accuracies of 1,000-4,000 feet
for visual bombing from 30,000 feet, and
4,000-7,000 feet for radar bombing from the
same altitude. However, the effectiveness of
attack delivered by radar alone might be ma-
terially reduced by defensive electronic coun-
termeasures.
36. Availability and Abort Rate. Mainte-
nance of Soviet aircraft, although below US
standards, has improved since World War II.
By the end of 1957 the Soviets should be
capable of achieving in the forward staging
areas a serviceability rate of 85 percent for
an initial, deliberately prepared surprise at-
tack against North America. The sustained
serviceability rate for bombers is estimated at
about 40 percent for normal operations. Cold
weather operations might cause some reduc-
tion in the foregoing figures. In addition,
some of the aircraft taking off would abort
and fail to reach target areas for reasons other
than our air defense activity. The allowance
for aborts and for all causes other than com-
bat attrition is estimated at about 20 percent
for nonrefueled and 25 percent for refueled
missions.
37. Replacement Rate. No appreciable re-
serves of TU-4's are believed to exist at the
present time. If a tanker fleet is created, or
TU-4's are converted for other special pur-
poses, appreciable numbers of TU-4's, phased
out of operational bomber units during the
period of this estimate, would probably not
be available as a reserve. There will be no
appreciable reserves of any new types of air-
craft introduced during the period of this
estimate.
38. Weather. The USSR has for many years
devoted considerable emphasis to both short-
period and long-period meteorological fore-
casting and has achieved a high degree of
success in this field. We believe that the
USSR has the forecasting capability to sup-
port long-range air operations. This capa-
bility plus extensive experience in meteor-
ological research in the extreme northern lat-
itudes, weather reporting facilities in Siberia,
and constant access to current North Ameri-
can weather reports and forecasts should en-
able the USSR to predict both route and target
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weather with reasonable accuracy. We esti-
mate that Soviet capabilities in upper air
research and in the more complex phases of
meteorological instrumentation are somewhat
less than those of the US; however, the Soviets
have the technical capability to overcome
these deficiencies within a few years.
39. Electronic Countermeasures. The USSR
has had access to a wide variety of World War
II US defensive radar and to some US jam-
ming equipment. It is apparently well aware
of the tactical advantage to be gained by
jamming defensive radar and other communi-
cations. We believe that the USSR is now
technically capable of producing limited
quantities of ground based and airborne
jamming equipment to cover frequencies
through 10,000 megacycles, and, by use of
ground-based equipment, can seriously dis-
rupt long-range radio communications be-
tween the continental US and its overseas
facilities. We further believe that the USSR
will increase the effectiveness of its jamming
equipment as well as the proficiency and num-
ber of its trained personnel throughout the
period of this estimate. Airborne counter-
measures are likely to be available for use
against defensive radars and ground/air
fighter control communications in use at the
present time for the defense of North America.
The effectiveness of the future Soviet counter-
measures will depend on their degree of suc-
cess in analysis of signal radiations and in
other means of obtaining technical data on
the defense radar that will then be in use.
The USSR has probably produced sufficient
electronic countermeasures devices to equip
some aircraft, but we do not know how effec-
tive those devices would be against US de-
fensive radar. Use of jamming equipment
probably would require the employment of
extra aircraft equipped specially for this
purpose.
Aircraft Available for Attacks Against Key
US Overseas Installations
40. The long-range aircraft discussed above
cOuld also be used for attacks on installations
overseas. In addition, the IL-28 and Type 35
12
jet light bombers are estimated to be capable
of carrying out attacks on many of these in-
stallations. The IL-28 is the standard light
bomber of the Air Force of the Soviet Army.
It is powered by two centrifugal flow gas tur-
bines each delivering approximately 6,000-
pounds thrust. With a normal bomb load of
4,400 pounds and two 220-gallon external wing
tanks the high altitude combat radius is esti-
mated to be 690 nautical miles. As a low level
attack bomber its radius is estimated to be
595 nautical miles.
41. The Type 35 is believed to be currently
operational in Soviet Naval Aviation in addi-
tion to the IL-28. This aircraft is believed to
incorporate special features to permit it to
carry out naval missions such as torpedo? at-
tacks and mine-laying as well as high level
bombing. The Type 35 is believed to be
powered by two VK-1 centrifugal flow gas
turbines rated at approximately 6,000-pounds
thrust. Its combat radius carrying a 4,400-
pound bomb load is estimated at 765 nautical
miles.
ESTIMATED JET LIGHT BOMBER STRENGTH
IN OPERATIONAL UNITS
Mid-1954 Mid-1957
Air Force of Soviet Army
1,550
2,300
Naval Aviation
550
850
2,100
3,150
42. By 1957 the USSR may also have an opera-
tional jet light bomber with improved per-
formance characteristics. This aircraft could
be a twin-turbojet swept-wing bomber with a
radius of 800 nautical miles and a range of
1,500 nautical miles carrying a 4,400-pound
bomb load. Moreover, the performance of the
IL-28 and Type 35 aircraft may improve dur-
ing the period of this estimate because of the
installation of higher-thrust engines.
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ESTIMATED 1954-1957 PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET
JET LIGHT BOMBERS
Combat Radius/Range/
Type Load (nm/nm/lbs)
Max Spd/Alt
(kn/ft)
Combat Ceiling
(ft)
IL-28
590/1,165/4,400
570/1,100/6,600
690/1,365/4,400
765/1,510/4,400
800/1,500/4,400
440/30,000
PI
IP IP
455/30,000
500/35,000
37,000
IP
39,500
48,000
a. Internal fuel
b. Internal fuel
c. External fuel
Type 35
Imp. Jet Light Bomber
(1957)
Base Areas for Direct Attack on Key US
Installations Overseas
43. Soviet Base Areas. In the Soviet Union,
the European Satellites, Communist China,
and North Korea, there are approximately 175
airfields with hard-surfaced runways of 6,000
feet or over which are estimated to be suitable
for operations by jet light bombers, medium
bombers, and heavy bombers. Of this num-
ber approximately one-third are located in the
European Satellites and one-fourth in Com-
munist China and North Korea. The remain-
der are located chiefly in the western and
southern USSR and in maritime provinces of
the Soviet Far East. In addition, there are
approximately 150 airfields in .the Soviet Bloc
which are estimated to be potentially capable
of accommodating jet light bomber and medi-
um and heavy bomber operations. We believe
that the large number of suitable airfields
available could adequately support Soviet
bomber attacks against most key US overseas
installations.
44. Soviet Capabilities for Attack on Key US
Overseas Installations. From bases in East
Germany, Soviet jet light bombers on two-way
missions could reach the entire North Sea
area, the UK and its northern and western
approaches (including the Faroes) , France
and its western approaches, and northeastern
Spain. From bases in Hungary these air-
craft could reach the Mediterranean area up
to an arc drawn south of Sardinia and Sicily.
From bases in the southern USSR, they could
reach an area north of an arc ? Crete-Israel-
Kuwait. Jet light bombers based in the
Vladivostok and Dairen areas could reach all
of Japan. To reach Okinawa and Luzon on
two-way missions, they would have to stage
from bases in Communist China.
45. From bases in the USSR, Soviet stripped-
down TU-4's on two-way missions could reach
key US installations in the UK, Western Eu-
rope, Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, French
North Africa, Libya, the Middle East, Japan,
Okinawa, Alaska, Guam, and the northern
Philippines. To reach key installations be-
yond these areas, TU-4's would have to resort
to inflight refueling or one-way missions. Jet
medium bombers from bases in the USSR
could reach all the above areas except south-
ern Greenland (marginal against Thule) , the
Azores, Guam, and the Philippines. In 1957
jet heavy bombers on two-way missions could
reach key US installations in the UK, Western
Europe, Far East including Okinawa, French
North Africa-Libya, the Philippine and Mari-
ana Islands, Middle East, Greenland, Iceland,
and the northeastern coast of Labrador, the
Azores, and Alaska. The TU-4 and jet heavy
bombers could reach the Panama Canal on
one-way missions only if inflight refueling
were employed.
46. Targeting and Bombing Accuracy. The
factors discussed in Paragraph 35 for long-
range operations apply equally to Soviet air
attacks against key US installations overseas.
In addition, it has been established that radar
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bombing by IL-28 jef light bombers has been
carried out using equipment with character-
istics similar to the US AN/APS-15 type radar.
IL-28 units in Eastern Germany are known
to have practiced bombing at night and during
instrument weather conditions and such
practice is probably included in other jet light
bomber units. In the absence of definite in-
formation on Soviet radar and visual bombing
proficiency, it is assumed that accuracies for
trained units approach the limitations of the
equipment. It is estimated, therefore, that jet
light bomber crews could achieve CEP accu-
racies of 1,000-4,000 feet for visual bombing
from 30,000 feet, and 4,000-7,000 feet for radar
bombing from the same altitude.
47. Availability, Abort Rate, Replacement
Factors. The factors discussed in Paragraph
36 for long-range bombers attacking the US
apply generally to bomber aircraft attacking
key US installations overseas. A serviceabili-
ty rate of 90 percent by mid-1957 for initial
attacks from other than the forward northern
bases, is considered possible because of the
better facilities and logistic support in these
areas. The sustained serviceability rate for
jet light bombers is estimated to be about 50
percent. No reserves of jet light bombers are
believed to exist at present, nor do we estimate
an appreciable reserve of this type of aircraft
will exist during the period of this estimate.
48. Electronic Countermeasures. The Soviet
ECM capabilities discussed in Paragraph 39
apply also to bomber attacks against key US
overseas installations. However, Soviet re-
quirements for ECM would probably be less
because of the less elaborate defenses around
most of these installations and the shorter
times required to penetrate defenses before
targets are reached. Space and weight limita-
tions would probably preclude Soviet jet light
bombers from carrying ECM equipment (ex-
cept for Chaff) in addition to bomb loads.
However, the USSR has the technical capabili-
ty to produce and configure a jet light bomber
with both passive listening and active jam-
ming electronic equipment. No evidence is
available of Soviet intentions in this regard.
III. PROBABLE MAXIMUM SCALE OF
SOVIET AIR ATTACK IN 1954
14
Attack Against Continental US with
Maximum Effort to Achieve Surprise
49. Soviet capabilities for air attacks on the
continental US are presently limited by de-
pendence on the TU-4 bomber, by the ap-
parent lack of a developed inflight refueling
capability, and by the relatively undeveloped
character of the Kola, Chukotski, and Kam-
chatka base areas. These three base areas are
the closest to the US and are so situated as
to offer the best possibilities for launching at-
tacks without allied detection. We believe,
therefore, that if the USSR attempted a sur-
prise attack against the US, aircraft would
probably be launched from bases in the Kola,
Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas. In 1954
the estimated capacity of air bases in these
areas would permit launching approximately
300 aircraft in an initial attack against the
US. If all these aircraft were committed to
one-way unrefueled missions, approximately
250 might reach target areas, not considering
combat losses. A portion of these aircraft
would probably be used for electronic counter-
measures, escort, or diversionary tasks. If
the USSR were to use inflight refueling to ex-
tend the radius/range of some of the mission
aircraft, the size of the striking force from
forward bases would be reduced by the num-
ber of tanker aircraft launched from these
bases.4
4 The Director of Naval Intelligence and the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the
Army, believe that available intelligence on over-
all Soviet capabilities for long-range air attack
is insufficient to warrant a finite estimate of the
number of aircraft which might be launched
from the Kola, Kamchatka and Chukotski areas
in 1954. They therefore believe that paragraph
49 should read as follows:
"Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on tar-
gets in the continental United States are present-
ly limited by dependence on the TU-4 bomber,
by the apparent lack of a developed inflight re-
fueling capability, and by the relatively unde-
veloped character of the Chukotski and Kola
base areas. The Soviets have sufficient TU-4's to
attempt the delivery of all or a substantial part
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50. Bases in the Leningrad area could also
be used to launch additional long-range bomb-
ers on one-way missions in a surprise attack
against the US in 1954 provided aircraft de-
toured north of Scandinavia. However, use
of these bases by the USSR is unlikely since
the capacity of the more advanced base areas
is estimated to be adequate to launch a force
capable of delivering a substantial proportion,
and perhaps all, of the estimated Soviet stock-
pile of nuclear weapons.
Full-Scale Attack Against Continental US
51. If the USSR elected to utilize the addition-
al bases in the Baltic-East German and Len-
ingrad areas, thus lessening chances of sur-
prise, it could, using its entire medium bomber
force, launch a maximum of approximately
850 aircraft in the initial attack on the US.
However, practically all of these aircraft would
have to fly one-way missions. Approximately
650 might reach target areas, not considering
combat losses. We consider such an attack
highly unlikely, since it would involve the loss
of practically the entire Soviet long-range air
force and since the considerably smaller num-
ber of aircraft described in paragraph 49
would probably be great enough to deliver all,
or at least a substantial proportion, of the
Footnote continued from Page 14
of their atomic stockpile (the number depending
upon types of weapons stockpiled) against the
United States from bases in Soviet-controlled
territory, even though some of the aircraft reach-
ing target areas probably would not be bomb
carriers since a number would be used for elec-
tronic countermeasures, escort, or diversionary
tasks.
The implementation of this capability is de-
pendent upon:
(1) Their willingness to accept the loss on
one-way missions of a substantial portion of
their long-range air force.
(2) Their willingness to accept the expendi-
ture of all or a substantial portion of their nu-
clear stockpile and to entrust its delivery to the
TU-4 aircraft.
(3) The development and employment of
range extension techniques.
(4) Use of Leningrad base areas that would
considerably decrease the range of aircraft if
surprise is to be achieved by not overflying non-
Soviet territory."
15
nuclear weapons available to the USSR in
1954, if the USSR should wish to do so.
Attacks Against Overseas Installations
52. Assuming a surprise attack against the
continental US as outlined in paragraph 49
above, the remaining force of approximately
750 medium bombers in Soviet Long-Range
Aviation would be available for re-attack pur-
poses, for attacks ?against targets in other
areas, and for reserve. If the USSR made no
provision for re-attack or for reserve it could
launch all remaining serviceable medium
bombers ? approximately 550 ? against key
US and allied installations overseas. Not con-
sidering combat losses approximately 450 of
these mission aircraft might reach target
areas. In addition the USSR could employ
jet light bombers to attack those key installa-
tions within the operational radius of these
aircraft. In fact, the USSR would probably
rely more on jet light bombers than on piston
medium bombers to attack such installations
because of the greater capability of the jet
bomber to penetrate allied air defenses. Al-
though Soviet jet light bombers would also
be engaged in close ground support, interdic-
tion, air superiority, and mining and torpedo
missions in support of other Soviet campaigns,
the USSR could probably allocate a sufficient
number of the 2,100 jet light bombers available
in 1954 to attempt to neutralize or destroy
with HE or nuclear weapons selected allied
forces and installations within range.
IV. PROBABLE SCALE OF SOVIET AIR
ATTACK IN MID-1957
53. If the USSR attempted a surprise attack
against the US in 1957, all aircraft could be
launched from bases in the Kola, Leningrad,
Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas in order to
reduce the possibility of detection. We esti-
mate that by 1957 the USSR could, by a major
effort, develop the capacity of the air bases
in these areas to permit the launching of ap-
proximately 1,000 aircraft in an initial air
operation against the US. If all of these air-
craft were committed to one-way unrefueled
missions (or two-way unrefueled missions,
where possible) , the magnitude of the attack
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might be on the order of 750-800 aircraft
reaching target areas not .considering combat
losses. This would probably be the maximum
Soviet long-range bomber capability against
the US and its exercise would involve the ex-
penditure of one-way missions of most of So-
viet Long-Range Aviation. A number of these
aircraft would probably be used for electronic
countermeasures, diversionary, and escort
missions.
54. We consider it more likely, however, that
the USSR would elect to commit substantially
fewer mission aircraft. It might launch about
900 aircraft, which could comprise 350 tankers
and 5505 mission aircraft. Of the 550 mission
aircraft, about two-thirds would possibly be
launched for the Kola-Leningrad area and
one-third from northeastern Siberia. About
450 aircraft might arrive over target areas not
considering combat losses. However, exercise
of this capability would involve difficult oper-
ational and logistical problems, particularly
those pertaining to the creation of a tanker
fleet. Moreover, the exercise of this capabili-
ty would involve the loss on one-way missions
of about one-third of Soviet long-range bomber
aircraft. A number of the mission aircraft
would probably be used for electronic counter-
measures, escort, or diversionary tasks.
Attack Against Key US Overseas
Installations
55. Assuming the USSR -launched a maxi-
mum bomber attack against the US employ-
ing 1,000 aircraft (mostly on one-way missions
without refueling) , less than 30 percent of
5 Of these 550 mission aircraft about 80 percent
would be used in one-way missions. It is esti-
mated that a total of about 160 bombers, in-
cluding 70 TU-4's and 90 Type 39's could be
launched from Chukotski and Kamchatka base
areas; of this number approximately 115 would
be one-way missions. From the Leningrad and
Kola areas about 390 of the 550 mission aircraft
could be launched. Of this number perhaps 270
would be TU-4's, 80 Type 39's, and 40 Type 37's.
Of the mission aircraft launched from the Kola
and Leningrad areas about 330 would be one-way
missions. This distribution shows one of several
possibilities. It represents what might be re-
garded as the optimum striking force to insure
target coverage in various US areas.
16
Soviet long-range bombers would remain and
these would probably not be immediately serv-
iceable. If, as we consider more likely, the
USSR launched 550 mission aircraft against
the US, it would have 750 long-range aircraft
available for re-attack, for attack in other
areas, and for reserve. Assuming no provi-
sion for re-attack or reserve, the USSR could
launch all serviceable bombers ? about 550 ?
against key US and allied installations over-
seas. Not considering combat losses, approxi-
mately 80 percent would probably arrive over
target areas. Since, the probable number of
long-range aircraft estimated to be involved
in initial air attacks against the US in 1957
would still leave a major portion of Soviet
Long-Range Aviation available for other uses,
it is considered unlikely that the estimated
force striking the US would be decreased to
make available additional long-range aircraft
to attack key US installations overseas. Such
diversion of long-range aircraft is also un-
likely in view of the great number of jet light
bombers which could be employed against key
installations within their radius.
56. We estimate that in 1957 the USSR will
have about 3,100 jet light bombers which could
also be available for attacks against key US
and allied installations within the operational
capabilities of these aircraft. We believe that
the USSR could allocate a sufficient number
of these jet light bombers to attempt to neu-
tralize or destroy with HE or nuclear weapons
selected allied forces and installations within
range.
57. Soviet air attacks against key US and
allied overseas installations could achieve
varying degrees of surprise depending on the
location of such installations with respect to
base areas from which the USSR could launch
attacks. Soviet aircraft attempting to at-
tack key installations in Western France,
Spain, the UK, North Africa, and the Azores
would initially have to overfly the Western
zones of Germany or Austria or other friendly
allied areas and it is probable that defenses
would be alerted some time before aircraft
reached target areas. Therefore, surprise
would probably not be a primary considera-
tion in determining the scale of attack against
installations in these areas, since allied de-
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fenses would probably be alerted by a small as
well as a large number of attacking aircraft.
On the other hand key installations in Ice-
land, Greenland, Labrador, and Newfound-
land could be reached from Soviet base areas
without overflying areas friendly to the allies.
Attacks against key US installations in the
Middle East could probably be launched unde-
tected from the southern USSR but might be
detected approaching or over Turkey, Iraq, or
Iran. From bases in the Soviet Far East the
USSR could make direct attacks across the
open Pacific against Midway, Wake, and
Guam. To attack Okinawa and the Philip-
pines by a direct course from bases in the
Vladivostok area, Soviet aircraft would have
to overfly early warning radar areas in Japan
and South Korea.
V. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND
MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
BY OTHER MEANS
Guided Missiles'
58. General. A native Soviet guided missile
research and development program is known
to exist. The extent of Soviet exploitation of
the German wartime guided missile program
was comparable to their exploitation of such
other programs as electronics and aircraft.
However, we are unable to assess the priority
of the Soviet guided missile program vis=a-vis
other weapons programs, or to assess the pri-
orities accorded the various guided missile
categories within this program. Indications
are that the Soviet exploitation of German
guided missile developments resulted in the
USSR acquiring by 1948 a thorough familiar-
ity with the German program and that by
1950 the USSR was capable of continuing
independent guided missile development, ex-
cept possibly in the field of advanced guid-
ance and control systems. The types and
characteristics of the missiles which might
be produced by the USSR would depend upon
the Soviet assessment of military require-
O Detailed studies of this 'subject are currently in
progress and will provide the basis of NIE 11-6-
54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Field of Guided Missiles," scheduled for
production in the third quarter of 1954.
17
ments and upon the allocation of priority
among the many possible types which 'might
be developed. To avoid spreading its talent
thinly, the USSR may be concentrating on a
small number of missile projects. Neverthe-
less, it is well within Soviet capabilities to
develop numerous types of missiles within the
period of this estimate.
59. Present Capabilities. We believe that the
USSR could now have an improved version
of the German V-1 pulse-jet winged missile
with ranges up to 200 nautical miles, a war-
head of 2,000-3,000 pounds and a CEP of 2
to 3 nautical miles. The USSR also could
now have an improved version of the German
V-2 with ranges up to 350 nautical miles, a
warhead of 2,000 pounds, and a CEP of 2 to
3 nautical miles. Such missiles could be
launched from advanced bases in Communist
territory against key US installations in West
Germany. However, we have no firm evi-
dence that the USSR has these weapons avail-
able in operational quantities. In addition,
the USSR is now technically capable of at-
tacking targets within the US with rocket-
propelled glide bombs launched from long-
range aircraft and V-1 type missiles from
submarines; however, we have no evidence
that the USSR has developed these capabili-
ties either as to production of the missiles or
as to conversion of submarines to missile
launchers.
60. Capabilities through 1957. Intelligence
confirms that at least as early as 1948 the
USSR began a research and development pro-
gram for guided missiles. The dates at which
various missiles are estimated to become avail-
able in future are based on the assumption
of a concerted and continuous effort started
in 1948. These dates of estimated availa-
bility are the earliest probable dates at which
each missile type could be brought by the
USSR into limited operational use.7
7 "Limited operational use" is defined for the pur-
poses of this estimate as a stage of development
where small quantities of guided missile systems
have been produced and are in the hands of
trained personnel of at least one operational
unit.
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61. In 1955 the USSR could have in limited
operational use an improved V-2 type missile
with a range of 500 nautical miles, a warhead
of 3,000 pounds, and a CEP of 2 to 3 nautical
miles. Subsonic, turbojet powered pilotless
aircraft missiles with a maximum range of
500 nautical miles and a warhead of 3,000
pounds could also become available in 1955.
Launched from advanced Bloc bases in East-
ern Europe, such weapons could be used to
attack targets in Western Europe as far west
as London, Paris, and Rome. In the Far East,
if launched from Soviet or North Korean ter-
ritory, these weapons could be used to attack
targets in Western Japan; if launched from
Chinese territory, they could be used to at-
tack targets in the Ryukyu Islands. The
pilotless-aircraft missiles could also be
launched from submarines against the US or
key US overseas installations within range.
62. We believe that in 1957, the USSR could
have in limited operational use single stage
guided missiles capable of ranges up to 900
nautical miles carrying a 3,000-pound war-
head and achieving a CEP of 3 to 4 nautical
miles.8 Launched from Bloc bases, such mis-
siles could reach all of the UK, France, Italy,
Scandinavia, and Turkey. In the Far East, if
launched from Soviet or North Korean ter-
ritory, these weapons could reach all of the
Japanese islands, and if launched from China,
they could reach all of Luzon.
Clandestine Delivery
63. Nuclear Weapons. We have no evidence
as to any Soviet plans or preparations for
clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons
against the US. However, during the period
The Director a Intelligence, USAF, believes this
missile could be in limited operational use in
1955, and that a ballistic missile with a range of
about 1300 n.m. could be in limited operational
use in 1957. This belief is based on intelligence
of early Soviet exploitation in Germany, on So-
viet interest in guided missiles up through 1952
and the demonstrated ability to follow a con-
certed development program as witnessed by
rapid developments in aircraft, armament, and
electronics in the past 8 years. It is also possi-
ble that accuracies better than those quoted will
be within Soviet capability.
18
of this estimate the USSR will be capable of
producing nuclear weapons which could be
smuggled into the US either as complete
assemblies or as component parts or subas-
semblies. These could range from small-
yield weapons (equivalent of 5,000 tons of
TNT or less) weighing a few hundred pounds
to larger-yield weapons (possibly up to the
equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of TNT) weighing
less than ten thousand pounds. Their size
could range from that of a package small
enough to fit into the luggage compartment
of an automobile to that of a packing case
large enough to contain an automobile. All
of these weapons could be designed to break
? down into a number of relatively simple and
readily transportable components. Those de-
signed to give a relatively low yield would not
require much labor or technical training
assemble. Somewhat more labor and train-
ing would be required to assemble weapons
designed to give high yields, and, once as-
sembled, they would be more difficult to trans-
port. It is conceivable that only the fission-
able material, in small pieces, need be smug-
gled into the US, since other components
could be fabricated or procured in this boun-
try. This scheme, however, would require
careful advance planning and coordination by
supervisory personnel with engineering skill
and familiarity with the US sources of needed
components, and would take a longer time to
carry out. It would probably result in a re-
duced yield for a given amount of fissionable
material. It would also incur a substantially
greater security risk than the clandestine in-
troduction of all components.
64. Considering the known limitations of the
means of physical detection, the USSR could
probably introduce into the US and detonate
in place a considerable number of nuclear
weapons by clandestine means. A variety of
methods of clandestine delivery suggest them-
selves. Assembled weapons could be dropped
by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated in
the hold of a merchant ship, or sown as under-
water mines. Either components or assembled
weapons could be brought in under diplomatic
immunity, smuggled across land or sea fron-
tiers, introduced through normal import chan-
nels, or brought in as bonded merchandise
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awaiting transshipment. The selection of the
method of introduction and of transport and
and assembly within the US would depend
on the Soviet objective and the risk of detec-
tion which the USSR was willing to accept.
Satellite agents and merchant ships could be
utilized for such attacks as could Communists
in other countries. There are at least 5,000
Communists in Mexico and 10,000 in Canada
together with thousands of other persons be-
longing to Communist led labor unions and
front organizations that could be instrumental
in clandestine attacks against the US. In
addition, Mexico is considered a traffic center
for Communists in North and South America
giving Communists from other countries ac-
cess to the US borders. Although these Com-
munist elements of other countries could be
used, it is doubtful if the Soviets would incur
the risk of using them in surprise clandestine
attack against the US prior to overt military
attack.
65. In introducing nuclear weapons clandes-
tinely into the US, however, the USSR would
have to take into account not only the esti-
mated chances of detection, but also the con-
sequences of such detection in forfeiting the
element of surprise in any intended overt
attack and provoking US counteraction. As
the number of weapons clandestinely intro-
duced was increased, the risk of compromise
Would increase. This increased risk would be
less a function of US capabilities for physical
detection then of the scope and complexity of
the clandestine operations, particularly inso-
far as larger numbers of Soviet agents became
involved. Considering the consequences of a
breach of security, the USSR would probably
be unwilling to risk the use of even selected
and trained agents in such numbers as would
be involved in the clandestine delivery of large
numbers of nuclear weapons. We conclude,
therefore, that, although clandestine attack
with nuclear weapons might occur against
specially selected targets as a supplement to
overt delivery by air, such attack, with large
numbers of weapons, would probably be pre-
cluded by security considerations.
66. Biological Weapons. Most biological war-
fare, (BW) agents are peculiarly adaptable to
19
clandestine utilization, since the introduction
of small amounts of BW agents would be dif-
ficult to detect. Small-scale employment of
biological, warfare agents against livestock
could be highly effective. BW attacks against
key personnel concentrated in selected build-
ings could be effective. There is little likeli-
hood that effective anticrop BW operations
can be carried out clandestinely.
67. Chemical Weapons. CW agents are not
easily adaptable to clandestine use. They are
easily identifiable by their immediate effects
and it probably would not be feasible to build
up sufficient supplies or to procure the means
clandestinely? in the required areas for their
dissemination against large population cen-
ters. The most practicable use would be
against personnel in key installations, but
even this would be difficult.
VI. ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Attacks by Ground Forces and Tactical
Air Forces
68. Many key US installations overseas, such
as those in Western Europe, the Middle and
Far East, are subject to attack by Soviet
ground and tactical air forces. Such at-
tacks, however, would almost certainly be an
integral part of the over-all Soviet campaign
in these areas, and it would be impossible to
separate the specific scale of attack on key US
installations from the over-all scale of Soviet
campaigns.?
69. The peacetime establishment of the So-
viet Army probably will continue at 175 divi-
sions and supporting troops, which can be
expected to be combat-ready on D-day. By
M+30, this force can be expanded to about
300 line divisions. These forces would be
capable of overrunning large areas of Western
Europe, the Middle East, and Far East. How-
ever, to attain a high capability for destruc-
tion of most key US installations in these
areas the Soviet Army probably would have
to be reinforced in peripheral areas or to em-
ploy airborne or amphibious forces in connec-
? See NIE 11-4-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
able Courses of Action through Mid-1959," for
Soviet ground and tactical air capabilities.
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tion with a ground attack. It is estimated
that for air support of these attacks in 1954
the USSR has an actual strength of approxi-
mately 9,500 combat aircraft in the Air Force
of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation. Of
this total, approximately 7,500 are jet aircraft.
For 1957 actual combat aircraft in operational
units is estimated at approximately 12,500 of
which about 11,500 will be jets.
Naval Attack
70. Soviet submarine forces could, at least in
the initial phases of an attack, inflict serious
damage on US overseas communications and
carry out offensive mining in the approaches
to harbors and ports of the US and its allies,
in addition to its potential for launching mass
destruction weapons against the US or key
US overseas installations within range. Dur-
ing the period of this estimate the Soviet sub-
marine force will probably be enlarged and
strengthened by the addition of about 46 long-
range submarines per year, by a limited mod-
ernization of older classes (including installa-
tion of snorkel) , and by the possible adapta-
tion of submarines to missile launching. It
is estimated that during 1954 the Soviet Navy
will have a total of 221 long and medium-
range submarines, of which 65 will be snorkel-
equipped boats of the long-range type devel-
oped since World War II. In a maximum
effort, as many as 135 of the long and medium-
range submarines located in the Baltic?
Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet areas ? 92
and 43 respectively ? could be made available
for attacks against the continental US and
key installations overseas. By 1957, the avail-
ability of long- and medium-range subma-
rines in the two Soviet fleet areas would
increase to about 165 and 65 respectively.
Assuming that egress from the Black Sea
would be denied Soviet submarines at least
in the initial stages of a war, the Black Sea
submarine force is not considered an imme-
diate threat to US installations.
71. The capabilities of surface naval forces
for attack on the US are low. The Soviet
surface fleet is geographically divided, lacks
advance bases and does not possess a ship-
borne air arm. Sporadic raider operations
are possible, but the surface fleet, in general,
20
lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuitable for
transoceanic naval attack on any significant
scale.
Amphibious Attack
72. Because of the lack of long-range am-
phibious type vessels and aircraft carriers,
large-scale Soviet amphibious attacks will be
limited to areas where air cover can be pro-
vided from Communist-controlled territory.
However, amphibious raids by submarine-
borne forces for the purpose of attempting the
destruction or neutralization of key US over-
seas installations are possible within a radius
of 2,000 miles from Soviet submarine bases.
Amphibious assault against the continental
US (except Alaska) is beyond Soviet capa-
bilities. In assaults against Alaska, logistic
problems, weather, and ,the requirement for
air cover would probably limit the scale and
duration of such attacks to raids in force to
destroy or neutralize US installations in the
Aleutian Islands or along the Bering Sea
coast. Amphibious attacks against key US
overseas installations, except in the Far East,
would probably be limited to amphibious raids
by submarine-borne forces. Amphibious at-
tacks in considerable force could be made
against US installations in Japan, Okinawa,
and Formosa.
Airborne Attack
73. The USSR has approximately 100,000
trained paratroopers, organized into 6 to 8
airborne divisions, plus about 100,000 trained
airborne reserves. The capability of these
forces to seize and destroy key US installa-
tions overseas is limited by the availability
of transport aircraft. The USSR can utilize
about 2,000 two-engine transports which
could lift about 32,000 paratroopers in a
maximum initial assault and about 77,000
troops during a five-day assault operation in
Western Europe. The operational radius of
such assaults would be from 500 to 650 nauti-
cal miles. This capability will probably in-
crease through 1957 with the addition of new
medium transports. The most likely objec-
tives of airborne assaults would be the neu-
tralization of key US installations, the seizure
of bases, and the securing of important corn-
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munications features in Western Europe,
Japan, and Alaska. Because of air transport
limitations, the USSR will not be capable of
launching major airborne operations against
the continental US during the period of this
estimate. However, small, highly-trained
assault groups probably could be delivered to
some targets in the US.
VII. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SABOTAGE
OTHER THAN BY CLANDESTINE
PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
74. The USSR is capable of widespread sabo-
tage in the US through the use of existing sub-
versive elements and the placement of foreign
agents. However, such sabotage efforts prob-
ably would not be initiated on a large scale
prior to an all-out attack on the US since
such efforts would nullify the advantage of
surprise. Large-scale sabotage" of US trans-
portation, industrial, and communications fa-
cilities, and military installations could be
expected with and immediately following sur-
prise attack by the USSR. Communist party
members and adherents are capable of organi-
zing saboteur units or teams of varying sizes
equipped with small arms and other suitable
material which could strike at especially se-
lected and widely separated targets simultane-
ously and without warning. Whether such
attacks would be timed with a surprise mili-
tary attack or carried out after such an at-
tack would be dependent upon the Soviet ap-
praisal of the relative advantages of such
action.
75. Soviet capabilities for widespread sabotage
attacks against key overseas bases are greater
than against the continental US, because of
the much larger percentage of Communist
elements, widespread political discontent, and
lack of adequate security measures in certain
foreign nations. Those areas in which such
capabilities are now greatest are France, Italy,
Japan, and the Philippines. However, in
numerous other countries the Communists
almost certainly have capabilities for acts of
sabotage. The populations of these areas are
experienced in such operations and sabotage
21
efforts timed with large-scale military attacks
could materially reduce the capability of US
military forces overseas.
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
OF ATTACK
Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives
76. In determining the scale and type of ini-
tial attacks on the US and key US overseas
installations to be adopted in event of general
war, the Soviet leaders would be influenced by
the following factors:
a. The power of the US is the main support
of Free World opposition to the Communist
Bloc and the main obstacle to Communist
world domination. The USSR would probably
calculate that if US war-making strength
could be sufficiently reduced in the initial
stages of a war, organized anti-Communist
resistance throughout the world would prob-
ably collapse.
b. The chief immediate threat to the USSR
in event of general war is a US strategic air
offensive. The Soviet rulers have demon-
strated their sensitivity to the danger of US
air attack with nuclear weapons by the high
priority which they have given to the develop-
ment of defenses against such an attack. De-
spite the substantial progress already achieved
in building up their defenses, it is unlikely
that they would regard their defensive capa-
bilities as adequate to prevent substantial
numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching
strategic targets in the USSR.
c. The major proportion of facilities, equip-
ment, and forces which together constitute US
nuclear capabilities are located in the conti-
nental US. Soviet destruction of all key US
installations and forces overseas which possess
a capability for employing nuclear weapons
would greatly handicap but would not prevent
the delivery of nuclear weapons on targets
throughout the USSR.
d. At the same time, however, certain key
US installations overseas are essential to a
maximum 'strategic air offensive against the
USSR. The Soviet leaders would probably
calculate that destruction or neutralization of
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these installations, as well as those in the US,
would be essential to neutralize the US strate-
gic air capability.
e. Soviet leaders also must realize that other
US forces and installations, as well as those
of US allies particularly in Eurasia, present
formidable obstacles to Soviet success in oper-
ations that will occur simultaneously with or
immediately after the initial attacks.
77. In view of the above factors it is likely
that the USSR in attacking the US and key
overseas installations would have the follow-
ing major objectives: (a) to destroy swiftly or
cripple US capabilities for nuclear retaliation;
(b) to deliver such an attack on urban, indus-
trial, and psychological targets in the US as
would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobili-
zation of the US war potential and its pro-
jection overseas; and (c) to inflict such de-
struction on US overseas installations as to
hamper or prevent US reinforcement and lo-
gistical support of overseas forces. To achieve
these objectives we consider it almost certain
that a portion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile
would be employed against certain key US in-
stallations outside the continental US. We
believe that these Soviet objectives would re-
main the same throughout the period of this
estimate although Soviet capabilities for
achieving them will obviously increase
through 1957.
78. Desirability of Surprise. In order to be
successful, an attack on US nuclear capa-
bilities would have to be accomplished with
almost complete surprise. It is therefore
probable that the USSR would launch initial
attacks against the US and key overseas in-
stallations in size and from base areas which
would offer the greatest security from detec-
tion, with attacks by other forces against other
areas after the element of surprise had lost its
significance.
79. A maximum Soviet attack on the conti-
nental US, and key overseas installations, in-
volving utilization of all or most of the capa-
bilities discussed in this estimate, would re-
quire preparations that would almost certain-
ly result in the loss of surprise. Therefore,
if the USSR attempts to achieve maximum
22
surprise it will probably be forced to accept
the following major limitations: (a) no large-
scale mobilization of additional units; (b) no
large-scale redeployment of Soviet air, naval,
or ground forces to reinforce peripheral dis-
positions; and (c) no unusual movement of
Soviet air, naval, or ground forces in such
areas as would likely to indicate the immi-
nence of attack.
Probable Methods of Attack Against the
US
80. Nuclear Attacks by Aircraft. In view of
the desirability of achieving both maximum
surprise and maximum weight in any attack
on the US, we believe that the USSR would
place chief reliance on nuclear air attacks.
Among the forces and weapons available, the
USSR's greatest capability lies in overt mili-
tary attack with nuclear weapons delivered
by long-range aircraft. It is probable that
such attack would receive the highest priority
because of : (a) the limited capabilities of con-
ventional naval forces, ground forces, and air-
borne forces against the US; (b) the security
difficulties inherent in the delivery of large
numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine
means; (c) the insufficient development of
other methods of delivery of nuclear weapons
on a large scale; (d) the insufficient develop-
ment of other mass destruction weapons, or
handicaps to their large-scale use; and (e) the
availability of far northern air bases, from
which air operations against the US are least
susceptible to detection.
81. Other Methods of Attack. The Soviet
rulers might, however, employ other methods
of attacking the US concurrently with or im-
mediately following a surprise nuclear air
attack. Soviet capabilities for airborne at-
tack and chemical and biological warfare,
against the continental US, appear to be com-
paratively slight. Clandestine attack in the
form of sabotage, biological warfare, or use of
nuclear weapons might occur against spe-
cially selected targets. Guided missiles could
be launched from submarines against US
ports and coastal installations.
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Probable Methods of Attacks Against Key
US Overseas Installations
82. The USSR would have a much wider
range of capabilities for effective attack on
many key US installations overseas than on
the US itself because of the shorter ranges,
greater possibilities for clandestine action,
and other factors involved. However, we be-
lieve that if the USSR planned a surprise
attack on the US itself, it would time its
attacks on US installations overseas so as not
to compromise the achievement of surprise
against the US. Thus initial attacks on
these installations would probably take place
simultaneously with or shortly after the at-
tack on the US, and prior detectable prepara-
tions would be avoided to the Maximum
extent. These considerations would marked-
ly affect the scale and timing of the attacks
discussed below.
83. Western Europe and the Middle East.
Attacks on the majority of key US installa-
tions in these areas (except the UK and
Spain) probably could most profitably be car-
ried out primarily by ground and tactical air
forces. The Soviets have the capability to
launch attacks on these areas from Soviet-
controlled territory without increasing their
forces, but might elect to carry out at least
partial mobilization to insure the decisive
success of the operations.
84. Other Overseas Installations. Except for
Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa, US installa-
tions in other areas would be subject pri-
marily to air attacks with nuclear and con-
ventional weapons. Sufficient Soviet jet
light bombers are now available in peripheral
areas occupied by or under the influence of
the USSR to permit large-scale attacks on
installations in the UK, Turkey, and the Mid-
dle East. Attacks in considerable force could
be launched by amphibious and airborne
forces against Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa.
Overseas installations within 2,000 miles of
Soviet submarine bases could be subjected to
amphibious raids by submarine forces and
virtually all overseas installations are subject
to nuclear attacks by long-range aircraft. In
addition the Soviets possess the capability of
making attacks on selected overseas installa-
tions by special small airborne teams and
could mount large-scale airborne attacks on
installations within a radius of 500 to 650
nautical miles of Soviet bases.
85. Likelihood of Change in Primary Methods
of Attack through Mid-1957. Soviet capabili-
ties for all methods of attack will increase
considerably by mid-1957 as a result of im-
proved aircraft, an enlarged stockpile of nu-
clear weapons, increased naval strength (in-
cluding possible utilization of submarine
launched guided missiles), and ground forces
probably supported by weapons employing
nuclear warheads. ,However, the choice of
primary method of attack will be unlikely to
change materially because the improvement
of Soviet capabilities in any particular field
will probably not be sufficient to guarantee
success against the US or key US installations
overseas. If anything, Soviet capabilities for
large-scale nuclear air attack on the US will
increase more during this period than Soviet
capabilities for use of any other weapons sys-
tem against the US. In addition, however,
by 1957 the USSR could have substantially
increased capabilities for use of guided mis-
siles, particularly against US coastal areas
and key installations overseas.
TOP SECRET
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
I U-9.1 J I HIIINAKU PUILJ IVILM111t1J
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
`C-1-- 950 TWO-A, 3,000 lb. STA DAD
2000 TWO-WAY-710,000 t 1DtFIED
\/(
lb. STANDARD 2750
lb. MODIFIED 2800
,000 lb. STANDARD
irriltf,1300 lb. MODIFIED
lb. STANDARD 4900 ),(
ROO b. MODIFIED 5000? \
Under maximum performs cc conditions, these radii/
ranges could be increase as shown in Table II, Page 8
13446 CIA, 8-54
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4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
TYPE 39 AND TYPE 37
From the Chukotski Area
SECRET
'Leningrad
---With re e
. Ranges are in nad4lal miles.
Weights indicattei onib loads.
oov v k 4
eflovik
Anchorage
jo.
00 TWO-WAY 0,000 P
TYPE
00
TWO- Y 3,0013 lb. UPE
00 lb.TYPE 3
,nder
TWO-WA 000 lb.TYPE 39 2 50\
3 0 TWO-WAY, 10,00 TYPE 37
A50 TWO-WAY, 3,000 I ? TYPE 31/'?b". ?Boh
27004NE1/
.Mteneopo
.D?rrsp
TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. r`".PE 37Mitwookee.
Sioux Fatia?
TWO-WAY, 3,000 b,TYP 7---330)(K)
F ancisco 32.0 Oft190,
.KteK.SA
.14nonwitle
ONE- 10,000 lb.TYPE 39 3800'Ks
los Angelo. ,X(emattis
San Siege 'Albuquerque \\?' ?Adlotite
.Phatteht
locksonvItlen
Vilodelphio
hIngtun
,00CIPI x`nrit'E 39
Charleston
Bennodo
E 37
10100D7 b.
Under maximum performance nditions, these radii/
ranges could be increased as own in Table II, Page
8 The radii/ranges for the ype 37 are computed on
the basis of a 345,000 pox takeoff weight. These
radii/ranges are being reco puted on the basis of the
latest gross takeoff weigh of 365,000 pounds.
SECRET
00 TYPE 37
-WAY, 3,000 lb.
AY,'
37
6 00'
13447 CIA, 8-54
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
TU-4, STANDARD AND MODIFIED
From the Kola Area
SECRET
- -- With r
Ranges are in na
. Weights indicate
2809 275O;Z...' STANDARD
'IV TWO-WAY, 3,000 lb.
3,000 lb. STANDARD 350
10 000 IMDIFIED 3600
, .
eYork
lodelphio
,10;000 lb. STANDARD
E-WAY, 3,000 lb. MODIFIED 4100
Lo AngnIe
4900 ONE-Maatdb. TANDARD
5000 ONEMAY740:000 FIED
Odeon,
Under maximum performan conditions, these radii/
ranges could be increased 5h0wn in Table II, Page8
13448 CIA, 8-54
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
I YPE 39 AND I YPE 3/
From the Kola Area
SECRET
Mp. 4
t ref el
---With ref
. Ranges are in nauti al miles.
, Weights inchcat- 5.mb loads.
Potropor
000 TYPE 39
0-WAY, 10,000 lb.
2250 TYPE 39
0-WAY, 3,000 lb.
11W0-WAY 1,001
TWO-WA , 3,000 Ib. TYPE 245
ci
ONE-WAY, 1 ;0061--lb TYPE 39 270
A'S
"TWO-WAY, 10,000 lb. /
TYPE 37 t2
Y, 3,000 lb E 37
AMinnoopol
Mlh000koo
o QE-WAY, 10,00
av.,Ore ,York
?lodelPhlo
inaeon
,foond
Y, 3,00. "lb. TYPE 39
Loa Anatol,
San Diego AfinoLuor
ON WAY, 11 Ili lb. Ire"37 4350
harleoon
.00)555 jufloenijla
*IT
?
39
A Bermuda
NE-WAY, 3,000 lb. PE 37 4800-"--
Under maximum performance raitions, these radii/
ranges could be increased as own in Table II, Page
8 The radii/ranges for the ype 37 are computed on
the basis of a 345,000 pou d takeoff weight. These
radii/ranges are being reco puted on the basis of the
latest gross takeoff weigh of 365,000 pounds.
SECRET
6100 ONE- PY,-10,000 lb. 'fY
6700 ONE-WAY, 3,000 lb. -YPE 37
13449 CIA, 8-54
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
IU-', J I HIV IMRE/ ANL) MUIJIMEIJ
From the Baltic-East German Area SECRET
Map 5
out re
? ? ? With r
lApInprad
-VLF'
Ranges are in acel miles.
s.? Weights indicat- .omb loads.
N.?
Petropa
,l.
?Wfc, 10, lkj.STANDARD 1
-5 ;OPP JI2. ST IARbI&50
,000 I oDiFi, 2000-
,z-1
. MO Er2ao
milt:nage
400 STANDARD
/ TWO?WAY, 10,000 lb.
AFANDARD
TWI 01-WAY ,Z000 lb.
plODIFI ED
Y, 10,000 lb.
ONE-WAY,
lb. STANDARD'3400
0 lb DIFIED
A DARD.3500
ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. M DIFIED 3600
.8vne .8 smarck
.11olve .M n5,sI
?"thc. DNE?
'Albuquerque
ladelphio
Moon
.Cincinnotl R ond
6Y)
10,01/1 lb. STANDARD
1:otteston
.5t .55
4300 014601
uMemphi
Bermuda
.Clars Jocksomalre
.LI":17.6b0 ONE-WAY, 3,000 lb. STANDIARfil
5000 ONE-WAY, 10,000 lb. MODIFIED
Under maximum performan e conditions, these radii/
ranges could be increased s shown in Table II, Page 8
5700ON
WAY, 3,000 lb. MODIFIED
SECRET
13450 CIA, 8-54
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
Trt 31 AVIV I trc al
From the Baltic-East German Area SECRET
111111101Mileeee,
6
t ref
---With re
. Ranges are in riau
Weights indicat
REFUEL
AREA
2000 TYPE 39
'--"SAnchoroge
WAY, 3,000
0,0004. TYPE
AY, 10,000 lb.
4, 2250 39
/ TWO-WAY, 3,000
Azd:
?
0
ONE-WAY, 3,000
b TYPE 39 3200
Voncowr.s
?Pooto d
1Q000 lb.
aTWOWAY, 3,000 s. PE
37
E 37
xlSetse -
Sloe Fehs?
.Cheyonew
"Denver
sfkaklfaythY, 10,000 lb. TYPE 37 43 0
\ Son Diego *Albuquerque
`Phoenix
.opolil
coke*iiiodelphio
,40,000 lb. TYPE 39
ington
.Cincinmul
cItY.rklYPE 39
Orleans
Itt
Bermuda
Under maximum performance nditions, these radii/
ranges could be increased as s own in Table II, Page
8 The radii/ranges for the pe 37 are computed on
the basis of a 35.5,000 pox takeoff weight. These
radii/ranges are being reco puted on the basis of the
latest gross takeoff weigh of 365,000 pounds.
SECRET
. /
1C 6100 ONE-WAY, 10,001 lb. TYPE 37
br/ 6700 ONE-WAY, 3,000 Is. TYPE 37
13451 CIA, 8-54
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
CAPABILITIES AGAINST KEY US....7.0VERSEAS.- INSTALLATIONS
leo
/I
Map 7
"
anghai
sovr,'p.
ropavlo
FRENCH
WEST
AFRICA
BERING
COMBAT RADII
690?IL-28 with External Fuel
1800?TYPE 39 with 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
1950?TU-4 with 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
2720?TYPE 37 with 3,000 lb. Bomb Load
The if...notional boundaries shown on she map do not
oven:wily correspond in ell eases to eh* boundaries rec.
ognisod by she U. S. Governrn...
13445 CIA, 8-54
14EXIC
All ranges are in nautical miles.
* US Airbase Complex
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0
spilt SECRET
)SEC RET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/16: CIA-RDP79R01012A003800010001-0