PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES, THROUGH MID-1955

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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cONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE
EUROPEAN SATELLITES, THROUGH MID-1955
NI E-87
Published 28 May 1953
(Supersedes NIE-33)
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I
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 19 May 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
--T-eP--SEeRET---
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'..U17_k7WNIA.A.1.1
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
SATELLITES, THROUGH MID-19551
THE PROBLEM
To estimate: (a) the present and probable future extent of Soviet control over
the Satellites, and (b) probable developments within the Satellites.
ASSUMPTION
That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Control of the Satellites has in effect
advanced the frontiers of the USSR
roughly 500 miles westward in Central
Europe and has established for the USSR
a buffer zone now garrisoned by an esti-
mated 538,000 Soviet troops, organized
into 30 divisions, and 1,317,000 Satellite
troops. In addition, the area provides
ample advanced air bases, space for a for-
ward air defense system, and naval bases.
2. Soviet control over the Satellites is vir-
tually complete and is unlikely to dimin-
ish or to be successfully challenged from
within during the period of this estimate.
Even if a struggle for power should break
out within the Soviet ruling group, the
struggle would probably be carried on
within the higher echelons of the Soviet
Communist Party, and would not signifl-
1 As used in this paper, the term "Satellites"
means "European Satellites" and includes East
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hun-
gary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
CO
cantly affect Soviet control over the Satel-
lites. However, if the struggle within the
Party should spread to the Soviet Army
and the Soviet Security Forces and should
lead to open conflicts within or between
the forces, the stability of the Soviet re-
gime and Soviet control over the Satellites
would be shaken.
3. Although the majority of the Satellite
population is and will remain discon-
tented with the regimes, organized op-
position has been virtually eradicated.
The regimes will not be able to eliminate
passive resistance and sabotage, nor to
isolate their populations completely from
Western information, but these factors
will not seriously affect Soviet control
over the Satellites.
4. The Satellites now supply about two-
thirds of the Bloc's uranium ores and
concentrates; East Germany alone ac-
counts for about 40 percent of total Bloc
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supply. They also supply large quanti-
ties of raw materials and industrial goods,
notably petroleum products, industrial
chemicals, certain non-ferrous metals,
and engineering equipment. The pro-
ductive capabilities of the Satellites con-
stitute an important addition to Soviet
economic strength and war potential.
5. The Satellites have obtained from the
West and from the Far East materials and
equipment which contribute to the Bloc
war potential. About half of officially
reported East-West trade is conducted on
the Bloc side by the Satellites. The loca-
tion of the Satellites and the partition of
Germany and Austria facilitate clandes-
tine trade with the West.
6. By the end of 1951, the gross national
product of the Satellites as a whole had
returned approximately to the level of
1938. During the period of this estimate,
the average annual rate of growth of the
gross national product for the Satellites
as a whole will probably be about 5 per-
cent. Emphasis will continue to be
placed upon expanding the heavy indus-
tries. Satellite industrialization will
continue to be hampered by deficiencies
in skilled labor and competent manage-
ment, in raw materials, and in capital
equipment. The industrial capacity and
general economic strength of the Satel-
lites will remain low in comparison with
those of Western Europe.
7. The Satellite ground forces are now
estimated to number 1,317,000 men, or-
ganized into approximately 74 divisions.
The armies are supplemented by mili-
tarized security forces which total about
266,000 men. The Satellite ground forces
are improving in quality and have ex-
panded in strength steadily since 1947.
We estimate that they will be stabilized
at a strength of approximately 1,750,000
by the end of 1954.
8. The Satellite Air Forces are capable of
providing a limited defense by fighter in-
terception and ground attack. Modern-
ization by re-equipping the units with
jet fighters has progressed at a quickened
pace and probably will be completed with-
in the period of this estimate. A few jet
light bombers have been introduced into
the Polish Air Force and during the
period of this estimate some of the other
Satellite Air Forces may be similarly
equipped. Almost all operational type
aircraft and parts for their logistical sup-
port are furnished the Satellites by the
USSR.
9. The Satellite Naval Forces have only
minor capabilities. Small numbers of
Soviet ships, notably mine and escort
types, have been turned over to the Satel-
lite navies, apparently to be used as auxil-
iary forces to the Soviet Navy. By mid-
1955, the Satellite navies will probably be
capable of providing appreciable assist-
ance to the Soviet Navy in such fields as
minesweeping, minelaying, escort, and
coastal defense duties.
10. Because of deficiencies in equipment,
loyalty, and morale, the Satellite armed
forces as such do not now possess the ca-
pabilities which their size would appear to
indicate. However, they are already a
significant factor in the European mili-
tary situation. If they continue to ad-
vance along the lines projected by the
Kremlin, they will form a substantial ad-
dition to Soviet military strength in
Europe and will offset, at least in part, the
growth of Western strength in Europe.
r, rNITITTnr"
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CONFLutall
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DISCUSSION
ernments and Communist parties. In addi-
tion, the Kremlin uses the Cominform to help
establish a uniform political and propaganda
line. Although the Kremlin permits and en-
courages programs of cultural, economic, and
technical collaboration among the Satellites,
it appears determined to bind the Satellites
individually to the USSR rather than to unify
them. However, the USSR almost certainly
will not incorporate any of the Satellite states
directly into the USSR, at least within the
period of this estimate.
16. Nationalization and direct operation by
the governments of the vital industrial and
commercial sectors of the Satellite economies
simplify Soviet control. Soviet authority over
these economies is exercised in addition
through trade and financial agreements to
implement specific production schedules, the
use of Soviet advisers in key positions
throughout the economy, joint companies
(notably in Rumania and Hungary) and the
Council of Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) , which functions as an effective in-
strument both of control and of "joint
planning."
17. The police and security forces of each of
the Satellites are large, carefully selected,
and well trained. In each Satellite they have
adopted the Soviet scheme of organization.
They are infiltrated and of ten directed by
experienced Soviet personnel.
18. Large Soviet military missions are super-
vising the reorganization of the Satellite
armed forces, which are adopting standard
Soviet methods, doctrine, organization, and
equipment. Soviet commanders, advisers,
and technicians are located in key command
and staff positions in the military forces and
in the defense ministries. The creation of a
politically reliable officer corps is well ad-
vanced. The Satellite forces will remain de-
pendent upon the USSR for most of their
aircraft, tanks, and heavy artillery.
19. Rigorous training and education pro-
grams, intensive Communist indoctrination
of selected segments of the population, and
SOVIET CONTROL
Degree of Control
11. Soviet control over the Satellites is virtu-
ally complete. It ensures the subservience
and reliability of the Satellite governments
and continued Soviet economic and military
benefit from the area.
12. The Kremlin has decapitated and pul-
verized the old political parties and opposi-
tion groups in the Satellites. Although a
vast majority of the Satellite population is
discontented with the regimes, and this re-
sentment may be intensified, it will remain
unorganized and practically impotent. Un-
derground resistance groups have survived
only as scattered remnants in a few areas,
and are now generally inactive.
13. The Communist hierarchies in the Satel-
lites have been purged of practically all indi-
viduals and groups distrusted by the Kremlin.
However, "cleansing" of Communist regimes
is a perpetual process. There will continue
to be purges within the Communist parties,
governments, armies, and police forces of the
Satellites to insure the reliability and effec-
tiveness of the Satellite regimes as instru-
ments of the Kremlin.
14. Soviet control over the Satellites is un-
likely to diminish or to be successfully chal-
lenged from within during the period of this
estimate. Even if a struggle for power should
break out within the Soviet ruling group, the
struggle would probably be carried on within
the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist
Party, and would not significantly affect
Soviet control over the Satellites. However,
if the struggle within the Party should spread
to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security
Forces and should lead to open conflicts
within or between these forces, the stability
of the Soviet regime and Soviet control over
the Satellites would be shaken.
Instruments and Techniques of
Soviet Control
15. The primary instruments of Soviet con-
trol over the Satellites are the Satellite gov-
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favored treatment of some groups will almost
certainly increase the number of supporters
of the Satellite regimes. Calculated use of
terror creates hopelessness, physical and
moral fear, and a sense of isolation.
Throughout the Satellites, severe security
measures have reduced personal contact of
the population with representatives of the
West to the vanishing point. Frontier con-
trols have drastically reduced the possibility
for escape, except for the present gap in
Berlin. However, the Kremlin will almost
certainly not be able within the period of this
estimate to isolate completely the population
of the Satellites from Western information.
20. The ultimate basis of Soviet control is
Soviet military domination of these countries.
We estimate that the Soviet forces stationed
within the Satellites and in the Soviet Zone
of Austria in April 1953 consisted of 538,000
from the Soviet Army (including military
missions) , 24,000 security troops, and ap-
proximately 2,400 Soviet-manned aircraft
(actual strength) .2
Troublesome Factors
21. A number of factors remain which will
constitute irritations for the Kremlin in
Eastern Europe, but which will not jeopardize
Soviet authority. Certain of these derive
from the history of this area: nationalism,
the traditional hatred of Russia (except in
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) , western cul-
tural traditions, religion, territorial conflicts
among the Satellites, and ethnic or religious
minorities within the Satellites. Others are
direct products of Soviet control: the imposi-
tion of the Soviet system and of Soviet cul-
ture, Soviet economic exploitation of the area,
and the decline of the standard of living in
most areas and for most classes. The Krem-
lin in the past has been so ruthless and effec-
tive in coping with the unrest resulting from
these factors and in discovering and obliterat-
ing hostile forces that none of these factors
is expected to develop into more than a nui-
For further detail concerning Soviet forces sta-
tioned within the Satellites, see Appendix A.
4
sance or an impediment to the Communist
program within the period of this estimate.
22. Collectivization of agriculture is a prob-
lem still facing the USSR and the Satellite
regimes. The extent and the tempo of col-
lectivization vary from Satellite to Satellite.
We believe that collectivization will be in-
creased gradually throughout the Satellites
during the period of this estimate. In the
unlikely event that the new Soviet rulers
should adopt a policy of rapid collectivization
of agriculture, peasant resistance would in-
crease and agricultural production in the
Satellites would decline for some time. How-
ever, even rapid collectivization of agriculture
would probably not seriously shake Soviet
control.
SATELLITE CONTRIBUTION TO
BLOC STRENGTH: ECONOMIC
Long-Term Program
23. During the first years after the conclu-
sion of hostilities, the USSR ruthlessly ex-
tracted from Eastern Europe the immediately
obtainable economic benefits. The means
used included outright requisition of mate-
rials and equipment and the imposition of
bilateral trade pacts on terms advantageous
to the USSR. While this policy of exploita-
tion was being pursued by the USSR, the
Satellite states were themselves endeavoring
to recover from the wartime damage inflicted
upon their economies.
24. The economic programs both of the USSR
with respect to the Satellites and of the Satel-
lite regimes themselves began to change late
in 1948. New programs provided for the care-
fully planned industrialization of the Satel-
lite countries and their integration into the
Soviet economic system. Main emphasis was
placed upon expansion of productive capacity,
especially of the mining, metallurgical, and
engineering industries.
3 These estimates of Satellite economic develop-
ments are based upon extrapolation of past
Satellite trends and upon a critical appraisal of
published Satellite economic data. It is impos-
sible to estimate whether the political develop-
ments following the death of Stalin will change
or disrupt these trends and plans.
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25. This long-range program was designed in
such a way that the industrial base and mili-
tary readiness of the Satellite countries
should advance simultaneously. After the
outbreak of the Korean war, the emphasis of
this program was shifted in the direction of
a more rapid development of heavy engineer-
ing and armaments-serving industries. While
the Satellites are thus in a progressively ad-
vancing state of preparedness, there is no
indication that the program envisages the
outbreak of hostilities at any particular time,
or that the long-term plan for economic de-
velopment is being further modified to achieve
greater immediate war-readiness.
26. Behind the facade of the Council of Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance, in which all Satel-
lites theoretically operate as equals, and
through its other instruments of control, the
Kremlin directs the allocation of raw mate-
rials, capital equipment, and foreign exchange
among the Satellites, and arranges specializa-
tion and division of labor. The USSR pro-
vides some of the raw materials and capital
goods necessary for the industrialization of
the Satellites, but the industries developed
are those which can contribute most to the
military potential of the Bloc. The Satellites
have thus been forced into a pattern of pro-
duction and trade subservient to the interests
of the USSR.
Principal Economic Contributions
27. Throughout the period of this estimate,
the Satellites (except Albania) will continue
to contribute substantially to the economic
strength of the Bloc, particularly with respect
to the following: 4
a. Uranium ores. We estimate that the
Satellites in 1952 supplied about two-thirds
of the Soviet Bloc's uranium ores and concen-
trates, with Eastern Germany accounting for
about 40 percent of total Bloc supply, Czech-
oslovakia about 15 percent, and Bulgaria,
Poland, and Hungary about 8 percent.
'Appendix B compares Satellite, Soviet, and total
Bloc production in 1952 and 1955 of various
selected raw materials and manufactured equip-
ment.
5
b. Heavy industrial products. Some Satel-
lite products requiring highly skilled labor
(steam locomotives, railway passenger and
freight cars, automobiles, merchant ships,
and machine tools) constitute an important
contribution to the strength of the Bloc.
Satellite output of these items will probably
continue throughout the period of this esti-
mate to account for a substantial proportion
of Bloc production, varying among specific
items from 20 to 40 percent.
c. Petroleum. In 1952 the Satellites pro-
duced approximately 20 percent of the Bloc's
production of crude petroleum, over two-
thirds of which came from Rumania. About
80 percent of the Bloc's output of synthetic
liquid fuels is derived from the Satellites,
principally East Germany (synthetic products
account for about 4 percent of Bloc synthetic
and natural petroleum production). Of the
total Satellite output of petroleum products,
from both natural and synthetic production,
about 40 percent is exported to the USSR.
During the period of this estimate the propor-
tion of Bloc production of crude petroleum
and synthetic liquid fuels furnished by the
Satellites will decline somewhat in view of the
probable greater rate of increase of production
in the USSR.
d. Chemicals. The chemical industries in
the Satellite area make an important direct
contribution to the Bloc's war potential. The
chemicals of which Satellite production in
1952 is significant in relation to Bloc output
as a whole include synthetic ammonia,
chlorine, calcium carbide, caustic soda, sul-
phuric acid, benzol, and toluol. East Ger-
many and Poland are the most important
Satellite producers of chemicals.
e. Other products. Satellite production of
steel in 1952 amounted to about one-fifth of
total Bloc production. The Satellites are im-
portant contributors of lead (35 percent of
the Bloc's production) ; zinc (49 percent) ;
and bauxite (66 percent). The Satellites also
produce about three-fourths of the Bloc's out-
put of rayon and one-third of the Bloc's out-
put of cement.
28. The scientific and technical assets of
Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to
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a lesser extent of Poland and Hungary, con-
stitute a substantial addition to those of the
USSR. The contributions of Satellite scien-
tists and technicians, especially in electronics,
optics, instrument development, and pharma-
ceuticals, are of great value to the Soviet
economy.
29. The Satellites have obtained from the
West and from the Far East materials and
equipment which contribute to the Bloc war
potential. About half of officially reported
East-West trade is conducted on the Bloc side
by the Satellites. Their established trade
connections with the West and their ability
to supply coal, grains, and some other goods
greatly needed in Western Europe, have
encouraged the continuance of this trade,
even though Western controls over the export
of strategic commodities have reduced it by
20 percent since 1951. The location of the
Satellites and the partition of Germany and
Austria facilitate clandestine trade with the
West.
Limitations on the Development of the
Satellite Economies
30. Certain deficiencies in the Satellite coun-
tries constitute important limiting factors in
the development of the Satellite economies
and in Soviet plans for the Satellites:
a. The planned expansion of industry re-
quires a larger supply of skilled labor and
management than will be available. Al-
though the non-agricultural labor force will
increase because of growth of population, re-
cruitment of women, and reduction of the
agricultural labor force by increased mecha-
nization, the skilled labor market will remain
tight.
b. Some materials and equipment needed
for industrialization of the Satellites are in
short supply not only in the Satellites but also
in the USSR itself. In particular, the Satel-
lites will lack adequate supplies of high-grade
iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, chromium,
molybdenum, tungsten, rubber, sulphur, and
tin.
c. The capacity of the machine-building
industries will probably remain inadequate to
meet the high demand for turbines, genera-
tors, petroleum exploration and drilling
equipment, complex automatic machine tools,
precision instruments, and machinery for
manufacturing anti-friction bearings required
for the projected program of industrializa-
tion.
d. The morale of the workers and of the
population in general will remain low.
e. Peasant resistance to compulsory deliv-
eries and to collectivization will limit agricul-
tural output and marketable supplies.
Probable Economic Developments
31. By the end of 1951, the gross national
product of the Satellites as a whole had re-
turned approximately to the level of 1938.
During the period of this estimate, the aver-
age annual rate of growth for the Satellites
as a whole will probably be about 5 percent.
Industrial production has grown and will con-
tinue to grow more rapidly than the other
sectors of the economy.5
Estimated Indices of Satellite Production
in Industry and Agriculture
1938
1950
1952
Mid-1955
Industry
69
100
137
169
Consumer Goods
122
100
111
114
Producer Goods
60
100
144
184
Agriculture
116
100
91
99
32. Throughout the Satellites as a whole, con-
tinued emphasis will be placed upon expand-
ing the heavy industries, which will provide
the base for further expansion of industrial
capacity and for increasing production of mili-
tary end-items. The pattern of allocation of
the growing national product in the Satellites
reveals increasingly large allocations to invest-
ment, with consumption kept low. In Poland
The current emphasis upon industrial produc-
tion in the Satellites is clear. For example, the
value of agricultural production in Poland
(postwar boundaries) in 1938 was about 50 per-
cent greater than the value of industrial pro-
duction, but by 1951 the value of industrial pro-
duction was 10 percent greater than that of
agricultural. In Czechoslovakia, the value of
industrial production in 1938 was 25 percent
greater than that of agricultural; by 1951, it was
nearly double.
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and Czechoslovakia, for example, gross capital
investment by mid-1955 will probably be about
one-third above the level of 1950, with per-
sonal consumption of goods and services re-
maining about the same as in 1950. Such an
allocation of resources would permit a sub-
stantial increase in the defense expenditures
of these countries.
Comparison of the Satellites and
Western Europe
33. During the period of this estimate the an-
nual rate of economic growth of the Satellites
will probably remain somewhat higher than
that of the Western European NATO coun-
tries. However, the total gross national prod-
ucts of these countries, plus West Germany
and Austria, is nearly four times as great as
that of the Satellites; their total population is
two and a half times as great.
SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
BLOC STRENGTH: MILITARY
Advanced Bases for the USSR
34. Control of the Satellites has in effect ad-
vanced the frontiers of the USSR roughly 500
miles westward in Central Europe and has es-
tablished for the USSR a buffer zone now gar-
risoned by an estimated 538,000 Soviet troops,
organized into 30 divisions, and 1,317,000
Satellite troops. In addition, the area pro-
vides ample advanced air bases, space for a
forward air defense system, and naval bases.
35. The bulk of Soviet forces in the Satellite
area is concentrated in East Germany and
represents the core of Bloc military strength
in Europe. Soviet air units based in the Satel-
lites and in the Soviet Zone of Austria have
an estimated TO & E strength of about 2,900
aircraft (actual strength is approximately
2,400) , of which about 1,400 are jet fighters,
and 330 jet light bombers. Although the
over-all figure will probably remain approxi-
mately unchanged during the period of this
estimate, the proportion of jet types will in-
crease. (See Appendix A.)
Satellite Ground Forces
36. The present strength of the Satellite
ground forces is estimated at 1,317,000 men
organized into approximately 74 line divisions,
of which 7 are armored and 10 mechanized.
These forces are supplemented by internal se-
curity forces which total about 266,000 men.
The Satellite armies are improving in quality
and have expanded in strength steadily since
1947. We estimate that they will be stabilized
at a strength of approximately 1,750,000, or-
ganized into about 100 line divisions, by the
end of 1954. (See Appendix C.)
37. The reorganization of the Satellite ground
forces to conform to the Soviet pattern is
nearing completion in all countries except
East Germany and Albania. Although the
equipment program is well advanced, there
will be major shortages in heavy armor and
artillery at least until 1955. The Satellites
are now manufacturing for their own use
Soviet-designed non-combat vehicles, light
artillery, small arms, ammunition, and parts,
but they will remain dependent upon the
USSR for most of their heavier equipment.
38. The Bulgarian Army is believed to be the
most loyal and the best trained of the Satel-
lite armies, but it is not yet completely or-
ganized and equipped along Soviet lines. The
equipment which has been issued to its 14 divi-
sions is almost entirely Soviet, but there are
still deficiencies in heavy armor and artillery.
Stockpiles of materiel, which include quanti-
ties of German weapons, are available. Mo-
rale is good. Limited quantities of more re-
cent Soviet weapons such as the JS-3 tank,
100 mm SP gun, and 100 mm field anti-tank
gun will probably soon be made available to
Bulgaria.
39. Other Satellite forces will approach, and
some may attain, the capabilities of the Bul-
garian Army by mid-1955. The Hungarian
and Polish ground forces have progressively
improved in proficiency and in equipment re-
ceived in the Soviet arms standardization pro-
gram. However, they will probably still be
short of heavy equipment in 1955. The
armed forces of Czechoslovakia and Rumania
are less advanced in training and equipment
than other Satellite armies. East German
forces, numbering 100,000 are officially desig-
nated as the Garrisoned People's Police
(Kasernierte Volkspolizei ? KVP) but are de-
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-,11LJ
veloping into an army. They will need regi-
mental and higher level training and they are
still below the level of the other Satellite
armies in equipment. Their morale is low
and their reliability is questionable. The
small Albanian Army will continue to have a
negligible combat potential.
40. In the event of a general war the Kremlin
probably could not rely on the Satellite armies
except for employment in secondary roles.
However, the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and ? to
a lesser degree ? the Rumanian armies could
be expected to fight effectively against Yugo-
slavia, Greece, and Turkey, if fully supported
logistically. Throughout the period of this
estimate, the armed forces of East Germany
and Czechoslovakia will remain least trust-
worthy, from the point of view of the Kremlin.
41. The ground forces of the various Satellite
powers do not form a single coordinated or-
ganization. There is no reliable evidence of
the existence of joint staffs or commands
among the ground forces. No combined high-
level maneuvers of Satellite or Soviet-Satellite
forces have been conducted. However, a trend
toward coordination is indicated by Soviet
efforts to standardize on Soviet-type equip-
ment and weapons in all the Satellite armed
forces. In the event of total mobilization by
the Bloc, all higher staff planning would al-
most certainly be done by the Soviets.
42. Satellite ground force reserves are esti-
mated at approximately 5,000,000. This pool
now includes more than 1,000,000 fully trained
men and nearly 4,000,000 partially trained.
The total will probably not change significant-
ly in the next few years, but the percentage of
fully trained men will increase steadily.
There is little equipment available for re-
serves, except in Bulgaria and except for the
equipment and stockpiles of Soviet forces now
stationed in Eastern Europe.
Satellite Air Forces and Airfields
43. The mission of the Satellite Air Forces is
primarily defensive. These air forces in April
1953 had an estimated TO & E strength of
2,900 aircraft (approximately 2,000 actual) ,
and we estimate that in 1955 they will prob-
8
ably have a TO & E strength of 3,900, of which
1,900 will probably be jet fighters. As of 1
April 1953 the European Satellite air forces
are estimated at an over-all personnel
strength of approximately 79,000. (See Ap-
pendix E.) The Kremlin is continuing to de-
velop these forces. The main increases are
occurring in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland. Piston fighters are being replaced by
jet fighters (there were about 700 jet fighters
in April 1953 compared to about 125 in Janu-
ary 1952), and other equipment is being mod-
ernized. The jet re-equipment program en-
tered a new phase with the introduction of
IL-28 jet light bombers into the Polish Air
Forces. During the period of this estimate
this phase of the program will probably be ex-
tended to some of the other Satellite Air
Forces. Almost all operational type aircraft,
and parts for their logistical support, are fur-
nished the Satellites by the USSR. The re-
equipment program will probably be accel-
erated if the Korean war should end.
Intensive Soviet training of carefully selected
Satellite pilots is assuring Soviet control, doc-
trines, techniques, and tactics.
44. An extensive program of airfield improve-
ment and construction is being carried out in
all of the Satellites. There are at least 353
air facilities available to the Soviet forces in
the Satellite countries. There are 44 airfields
capable of supporting heavy and medium
bomber operations on a sustained basis and 30
others on a limited basis, plus 8 potential
bomber fields. All of these airfields are ca-
pable of supporting sustained jet fighter and
light bomber operations. In addition, there
are 59 airfields capable of basing lighter com-
bat planes. Most fields are being extended to
6,000-foot runways, and many others even to
8,000 feet or longer. The most extensive air-
field construction program has taken place in
Eastern Germany with Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland sharing in priority work
schedules. The developing network of mod-
ern airfields, some of which are equipped with
night lighting and radio navigational aids, re-
flects an integrated and well-coordinated air-
field development program. Upon comple-
tion, the network will add to both the offensive
and defensive capabilities of the Bloc.
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45. The Soviet forces stationed in the Satel-
lites are supplied with modern antiaircraft
equipment, but intensive development for the
Satellites of early warning radar networks,
radar-controlled antiaircraft equipment, and
civil defense began only in the spring of 1951.
Satellite antiaircraft units have been supplied
with AA equipment which by modern Western
standards is deficient because it lacks effec-
tive radar warning as well as control adapta-
tions. There are indications that improved
equipment, such as gun-laying radar, and
techniques have been developed by the Soviets,
but there is no evidence at this time that
Satellite forces have benefited from these
developments.
Satellite Naval Forces
46. Owing to their small size, their meager
equipment, and the unreliability of the per-
sonnel, Satellite navies have only minor capa-
bilities. The USSR is placing Soviet naval
officers in the command structures, eliminat-
ing personnel whose loyalty is suspect, and
conducting intensive political indoctrination
courses. Satellite naval tactics, techniques,
and training are entirely patterned on Soviet
concepts. Small numbers of Soviet ships,
notably of mine and escort types, have been
turned over to the Satellite navies, apparently
to be used as auxiliary forces to the Soviet
Navy. (See Appendix D.) By mid-1955, the
Satellite navies will probably be capable of
providing appreciable assistance to the Soviet
Navy in such fields as minesweeping, mine-
laying, escort, and coastal defense duties.
Satellite shipbuilding facilities are largely de-
voted to the construction and repair of mer-
chant vessels.
CONPIDENTIAZ
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J.1./E..411 1.1.111J
10
APPENDIX A
SOVIET FORCES STATIONED IN THE SATELLITES' April 1953
COUNTRY
ARMY
SECURITY
TROOPS
SOVIET-MANNED AIRCRAFT 3
Number
of
Troops
Line
Divi-
sions
Fighters
Light
Bombers
Attack
Trans-
port
-
Recon.
TOTAL
Jet I Pis
Jet I Pis
Jet I Pis
E. Germany
400,000
22
15,000
740
250
20
250
90
30
30
1,410
Poland
41,000
2
2,000
220
200
10
30
460
Czech
1,000
Hungary
30,000
2
1,500
110
80
130
320
Soviet Zone of
Austria
33,000
2
2,500
220
40
10
30
300
Albania
500
Rumania
30,000
2
2,000
110
80
120
60
30
4002
Bulgaria
2,500
1,000
TOTAL
538,000
30
24,000
1,400
330
270
570
170
30
120
2,890
' Includes units of the Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation.
' Some of these aircraft may be based in Soviet territory near the Rumanian border.
Approximate figures based on TO & E strength.
COlVFIDENTIAV
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APPENDIX B
ESTIMATED SATELLITE PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
1952-1955
COMMODITY
PRODUCTION - 1,000 MT
SATELLITE PRODUCTION
SATELLITES
USSR
% OF
USSR
% OF
BLOC
1952
1955
1952
1955
1952
1955
1952
1955
Ferrous Metals
Iron ore 3,848
4,623
55,000
75,000
7.0
6.2
6.1
5.3
Pig iron 4,985
6,660
25,100
34,000
19.9
19.6
15.6
15.5
Raw steel 8,387.5
10,255
34,300
43,900
24.5
23.4
19.1
18.4
Metallurgical coke 10,128
11,268
33,000
42,600
30.7
26.5
22.4
19.9
Rolled steel 5,985
7,397
25,100
32,000
23.8
23.1
18.6
18.1
Manganese ore 327.6
346.8
4,200
5,500
7.8
6.3
7.2
5.9
Chromite (MT) 100,700
146,000
650,000
685,000
15.5
21.3
13.4
17.6
Nonferrous Metals
Primary Copper 15.8
53
287
460
5.5
11.5
5.1
10.1
Secondary Copper 27
27
39
53
69.2
50.9
38.6
31.8
Refined Lead 70.7
101
117
210
60.4
37.4
35.9
26.3
Refined Zinc 132
217
130
250
101.5
86.8
49.4
45.8
Antimony 2.5
3.5
3.0
3.75
83.3
93.3
13.9
19.7
Bauxite 1,220
1,625
625
790
195.2
205.7
66.1
67.3
Primary Aluminum 27
135.5
220
546
12.2
24.8
10.9
19.9
Secondary Aluminum 9
14
72.5
120
12.4
11.7
11.0
10.4
Fluorspar 38
45
160
205
23.8
22.0
18.7
17.6
Magnesium (MT) 1,200
13,000
3.3
19.1
Coal
Anthracite & Bituminous 110,025
129,450
220,500
260,000
49.9
49.8
29.5
29.6
Lignite 242,904
312,075
82,500
100,000
294.4
312.1
74.6
75.7
Petroleum
Crude Petroleum 11,576
11,775
44,000
52,000
26.3
22.6
20.7
18.3
Liquid Fuels (from syn- 1,610
thetics & shale oils)
2,215
300
850
536.7
260.6
80.9
68.8
Natural & Synthetic 11,720
12,460
41,580
49,590
28.2
25.1
21.9
19.8
Petroleum Products
Natural Gas (Million M3) 4,340
3,705
5,500
8,800
78.9
42.1
44.1
29.6
Chemicals
Ammonia (Synthetic) 382
N.A.
590
733
64.7
N.A.
39.3
N.A.
Nitric Acid (100%) 314.5
625
1,172
1,211
26.8
51.6
21.2
34.0
Sulphuric Acid 1,002
N.A.
3,627
4,450
27.6
N.A.
21.6
N.A.
Toluol 11.4
N.A.
56
88
20.4
N.A.
16.9
N.A.
Chlorine 268
314
261
350
102.7
89.7
50.7
47.3
Calcium Carbide 957.7
N.A.
300
410
319.2
N.A.
76.1
N.A.
Caustic Soda 386
N.A.
333
496
115.9
N.A.
53.7
N.A.
Crude Benzol 107.1
N.A.
305
483
35.1
N.A.
26.0
N.A.
Refined Benzol 137.4
N.A.
223
360
61.6
N.A.
37.6
N.A.
Refined Phenol 4.9
N.A.
10.6
16.8
46.2
N.A.
31.6
N.A.
Synthetic Rubber 65.3
88
187
260
34.9
33.8
25.9
25.3
Reclaimed Rubber 15.5
N.A.
55
72
281.8
N.A.
27.0
N.A.
Rubber Tires (1,000 units)
2.84
4.98
10.0
13.2
28.4
37.7
22.1
27.4
'Including Communist China.
TD-P- SECRET
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4-Por OIBORET- 12
COMMODITY
PRODUCTION - 1,000 MT
SATELLITE PRODUCTION
SATELLITES
USSR
% OF
USSR
% OF
BLOC
1952
1955
1952
1955
1952
1955
1952
1955
Agricultural Products
Bread Grains (Million MT) 19.92
20.6
61.29
62.35
32.5
33.0
19.2
19.5
Other Grains (Million MT) 14.22
18.66
29.91
26.15
47.5
71.4
10.8
14.0
Potatoes
40,026.6
53,304
78,880
90,000
50.7
59.2
27.0
30.8
Sugar
1,926.4
3,018
2,267
2,600
85.0
116.1
42.2
50.1
Meat
2,240
2,158
3,485
3,630
64.3
59.4
23.6
21.2
Animal Fats
716
693
851
910
84.1
76.2
29.7
28.3
Vegetable Oils
234.7
335
885
1,011
26.5
33.1
8.4
11.0
Wool (Grease base)
50.41
58.47
150.9
165.0
33.4
35.4
21.4
22.7
Rayon
142.8
166.8
41.2
52.0
346.6
320.8
77.6
76.2
Heavy Industrial Products
Antifriction Bearings
17.1
27.7
115
140
14.9
19.8
12.9
16.5
(000 units)
Tractors (000 units)
12.3
29.0
121
126
10.2
23.0
9.2
18.7
Trucks (000 units)
19.3
49.0
410
423
4.7
11.6
4.5
10.4
Passenger Cars (units)
41.9
N.A.
35
50
119.7
54.0
N.A.
Steam Locomotives
(units)
1,142
1,322
2,250
2,390
50.8
55.3
33.7
35.6
Electric Locomotives 61
(units)
60
280
450
21.8
13.3
17.9
11.7
Freight Cars (2 axleU.) 52,500
62,400
137,500
147,000
38.2
42.4
27.6
29.8
Railway Passenger Cars 1,855
(units)
2,090
2,800
2,960
66.3
70.6
39.8
41.4
Merchant Ships (1000 GRT) 8.6
N.A.
380
410
28.6
22.2
N.A.
Machine Tools (units) 58,250
N.A.
80,340
N.A.
72.5
42.0
N.A.
Military End-Items
Artillery (units) 500
600
13,000
13,000
3.8
4.6
N.A.
N.A.
Construction Materials
Flat Glass (Million M2) 29.0
40.2
90
111
32.2
36.2
24.4
26.6
Gypsum 488
754
1,900
2,400
25.7
31.4
20.4
23.5
Unglazed Bricks (Millions) 5,310
7,056
15,990
22,080
33.2
32.0
24.9
24.2
Artificial Abrasives 28.4
43
70
80
40.6
53.7
N.A.
N.A.
Cement (Hydraulic) 8,020
12,838
14,500
23,000
55.3
55.8
33.0
35.8
Electric Power
56,370
79,271
117,000
170,000
48.1
46.6
N.A.
N.A.
(Million KWH)
Electric Equipment 2
Electron Tubes
(millions of 1950 rubles)
246
747
718
1,170
34.2
63.8
N.A.
N.A.
Turbines (000 KW)
1,485
2,125
3,600
5,125
41.2
41.4
28.9
28.3
Transformers
3,960
5,637
6,029
8,583
65.6
65.6
N.A.
N.A.
(000 kilovolt-ampers)
Wire and Cable
51,300
87,202
70,060
101,089
73.2
86.2
N.A.
N.A.
(MT of copper)
Motors (000 KW)
8,612
11,746
15,608
22,005
55.1
53.3
N.A.
N.A.
Generators (000 KW)
1,688
2,404
4,241
6,038
39.8
39.8
N.A.
N.A.
' Including Communist China.
2 Range of error: -?20%.
11(1111111Trirvverm-r A -p1
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APPENDIX C
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SATELLITE GROUND FORCES 1953-1955
April
1953
Summer
1955
Country
Total
Army
Total
Security
Troops
Percent of
Total Popu-
lation
(Army &
Security)
DIVISIONS
Trained &
Partially
Trained
Reserves
Total
Army
Total
Security
Troops
Percent
Increase
(Army &
Security)
DIVISIONS
E.
.0
7.13
E. Germany 100,000
25,000
0.68
1
3
3'
11,000
250,000
25,000
120
4
8
12
Poland 330,000
65,000
1.6
1
4
12
17
1,535,000
350,000
65,000
5
3
4
15
22
Czechoslovakia 185,000
35,000
1.7
2
4
8
14
1,195,000
275,000
40,000
43
3
4
8
15
Albania 40,000
10,000
3.9
3
3
80,000
40,000
10,000
S3
3
Hungary 185,000
35,000
2.3
1
1
8
10
450,000
250,000
37,500
31
1
2
12
15
Rumania 267,000
56,000
2.0
1
12
13
1,275,000
350,000
56,000
26
1
2
12
15
Bulgaria 210,000
40,000
3.4
2
12
14
500,000
225,000
45,000
4
2
2
12
16
TOTAL
1,317,000
266,000
2.23
7
10
57
74
5,046,000
1,740,000
278,500
32.7
10
18
70
98
(Mean Average)
(Mean Average)
addition, E. Germany has 19 Cadre units of regimental size.
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APPENDIX D
ESTIMATED SATELLITE NAVAL FORCES
April 1953
14
Country
CI)
>a
0
1...
02
4
Submarines
Patrol
0
0
Amphibious
LCU
>a
S.
Cd
..
.,.
x
o
*4
Personnel
E. Germany
10
582
31
6,000
Poland
1
3
164
15
12
12
8,800
Albania
14
3
14
800
Rumania
4
3
201
4 a
28
7,500
Bulgaria
1
31
20
3
4,900
All under construction.
52 of which are under construction.
2 of which are under construction.
' 4 under construction.
' These include two old submarines held by the USSR and claimed by Rumania. We believe these have
been returned to the Rumanians in the last few months.
-CIONIPTDENTIATI,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP79R01012A002800030001-9
APPENDIX E
ESTIMATED SATELLITE AIR FORCES
April 1953
?
COUNTRY
FIGHTERS
BOMBERS
TRANS-
PORT
TO&E Actual
RECON-
NAIS-
SANCE
TO&E Actual
TOTAL
TO&E Actual
PERSONNEL
Jet
TO&E Actual
Piston
TO&E Actual
Attack
TO&E Actual
Jet
TO&E Actual
Piston
TO&E Actual
E. Germanyl
6,500
Poland'
480
270
100
40
150
140
40
20
100
90
20
20
40
30
930'
6102
20,300
Czech.
180
120
50
40
130
140
30
30
60
50
450
380
14,000
Hungary
110
100
50
50
80
90
80
40
30
20
350
300
12,000
Albania
10
10
10
10
200
Rumania
150
80
100
70
80
40
80
30
30
20
30
20
470
260
12,000
Bulgaria'
260
130
100
60
130
130
130
70'
30
30
40
20
690
440
14,000
Total
1,180
700
410
270
570
540
40
20
390
230
140
120
170
120
2,900
2,000
79,000
'The newly formed East German Air Force is now considered to have an estimated TO&E strength of 150 Piston Engines fighters and an
estimated actual strength of 75 trainer-type aircraft. Conversion to operational type aircraft may be directly to jets rather than piston
fighters.
"Includes Polish Naval Air Arm consisting of 50 TO&E (10 actual) Piston fighter, 20 TO&E (10 actual) attack planes, and 20 TO&E (10
actual) light bomber (Piston).
Does not include approximately 60 single engine trainer types carried in so-called "night light bomber" units.
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CONFIDENTIAIL
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