MILITARY THOUGHT: "SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMY TANK TROOPS", BY MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION R. MALINOVSKIY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A030000120001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Thoughts on the Development of the
Soviet Army Tank Troops
by
Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Malinovskiy
The development of armored equipment attains
exceptionally important significance under Todern
conditions, and it is completely natural that lately,
in our classified military press, a discussion of this
question has started. The fact that our prominent
military leaders participated in the discussion of
the vital problems of developing our Armed Foroes,
including the tank troops, should be welcomed. We
should never forget that truth is born of controversy,
and even more so when we use such a tested weapon
as Marxist-Leninist dialectics. The discussion of
these questions attained such an active nature that
it cannot be disregarded. Therefore, we decided to
join in it and to share some of our thoughts concerning
this. It goes without saying that we have not assigned
ourselves the goal of giving the final, categorical
conclusions on all these questions.
The discussion concerns the problems of developing
armored equipment, the development and intent of tank
troops, their organizational structure, and methods
of their employment in warfare. The rost varied and
contrary opinions have been expressed. The opinions
of some comrades have split on several pro:blems
Some hotheads consideer that the development of tank
troops has been turned into a. serious poT.ob:em, and
one can even hear the voices of (7crtai eit-ealo-
novators who say that the tank h.s oollveeclf
and its development has reached a dead end. All
this is quite understandable we are living through
such a difficult period in the development of military
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art that it is not so easy to find the right path,
as it seems at first glance.
Lately, Soviet military art has been developing
rapidly in connection with the creation of new combat
weapons. We cannot lag behind this development. It
should be taken into consideration that people always
accept new ideas with difficulty, despite the fact
that people are the creators of these ideas. Also,
rash conclusions and categorical assertions having
little validity should not be tolerated because they
can lead us to large errors which are hard to correct
Therefore, it is essential to approach the problems
under discussion profoundly and comprehensively,
especially the conclusions that result from the dis-
cussion. Comrades should not be censured for their
statements and suggestions that seem foolish at
times
During further development and technical im-
provement of tanks, the great potentialities incor-
porated in them for conducting mobile combat operations
became evident. Therefore, in the period preceding
the Second World War much attention was given to the,
development of tank troops in the major countries of
the world. A great number of tanks possessing high
combat qualities appeared on the battlefields of
the Second World War. The massed employment of tanks,
supported by powerful air strikes and artillery fire,
permitted a successful resolution of the problem of
breaking through the defense and developing an
offensive to a great operational depth. As a result
of this, the Second World War, with the exception
of certain periods, basically had a mobile nature.
The main positive result of mass employment of
tanks in the past war consists of this.
Simultaneously with the development of tanks,
weapons for combating tanks, antitank weapons, were
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being developed. Over a prolonged period of time
there has been a persistent competition between the
tanks and the antitank weapons. During the years of
the Second World War, despite the mass employment of
fairly effective antitank weapons, the tanks stood
up to them and retained their overwhelming superiority
until the end of the war.
In order not to make a mistake in evaluating the
combat characteristics of our modern tank troops and
in determining the direction of their future development,
let us briefly examine the path followed by them in
the Second World War. This will also help us reveal
some lessons of history that should not be forgotten.
The tank troops of the Soviet Army played an
outstanding role in the defeat of fascist Germany's
armed forces. Possessing such remarkable qualities
as high mobility, great firepower, and good armored
protection, the tank troops became the main strike
force of our ground forces.
The skillful employment of great masses of
artillery and aircraft to neutralize the enemy
defense, followed by a massed tank attack in close
coordination with infantry, ensured the successful
breakthrough of the fascist German troop defense.
Tank troops played an especially great role in
developing the breakthrough and finally defeating
the opposing enemy groupings. These troops were
the leading force in conducting operations to a
great depth at high speeds. Tank armies and tank
and mechanized corps, led into the breakthrough and
led by brave and courageous commanding officers,
always decisively rushed into the enemy's operational
depth, encircled and broke up his main groupings,
routed the reserves, and captured important areas
and lines. Such employment of tank troops gave a
mobile nature to the operations of the Second World
War)permitted the swift achievement of the defeat
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of enemy operational groupings, and the penetration
of the operational formation of his troops to a great
depth in a short period of time. The tank troops
have the right to be proud of the results of their
operations in the Second World War.
In the past it was said about the cavalry:
"the glorious history of cavalry is the history of
its commanding officers". This aphorism refers to
the tank troops to an even greater degree: an in-
decisive commanding officer at the head of a tank
army, tank corps, or tank division is a most fright-
eningia most fatal thing. No matter how perfect
armored equipment is, an indecisive commanding officer
at the head of the tank troops cannot ensure their
successful combat employment. We should always firmly
remember this condition. The decisive factor that
ensured the successful employment of tank troops in
the Second World War, however, was the high level of
Soviet armored equipment. Socialist industry and
our designers armed the tank troops with splendid
tanks and assault weapons. It is generally known
that not a single foreign state, that actively partic-
ipated in the Second World War was able to achieve
the same high level in the development of armored
evipment as was achieved in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Army entered the war having three
types of tanks: light (BT and T-26 and a little later
the T-60 and T-70), medium (T-34), and the heavy (KV).
The medium and heavy tanks were considered to be the
basic ones: However, there were extremely few of
these tanks, andatthebeginning of the war. the. basic
part of our tank pool was composed of light tanks
that were obsolete by that time. This was already
evident from the experience of the Spanish Civil War
in 1936 to 1939. It is true that not all the highly
placed military leaders understood this. Many of them
considered that we did not need better tanks and that
war could be conducted with the existing tanks.
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Such leaders hindered tank development but a sober
calculation overruled them, and, as is knownlbefore
the war our tank troops began to be rearmed with new
types of tanks. However, we were unable to complete
this by the beginning of the fascist German attack
because time was lost.
Our medium T-34-76 tanks and heavy KV tanks which
were completely modern at that time and, with their
comparatively powerful armament and better armor
protection, proved to be more powerful in single
combat with German T-III and T-IV medium tanks.
They also suffered fewer losses from antitank weapons
than the German tanks.
All this indicates that we took the correct
direction in the development of armored equipment on
the eve of the war. It ensured a qualitative super-
iority for us in armored equipment over fascist Germany
at the beginning of the war. In the initial period
of the war, however, because of a whole series of
great mistakes connected with Stalin's personality
cult and his military environment (voyennoye okruzheniye)
which permitted the treacherous attack of fascist
Germany, the Hitlerites were able to achieve consid-
erable superiority in the number of tanks, especially
on the main axes, and also in the methods of their
combat employment over the Soviet Army. This affect-
ed the operations of our troops very adversly and led
us to serious defeats in the initial period of the
war.'
It is essential to note that by the summer of
1943 the fascist army was armed with new "Panther"
and "Tiger" heavy tanks and also with "Ferdinand"
assault guns, which had better armored protection
and more powerful armament while our tanks funda-
mentally remained the same. On the eve of the
Kursk battle a certain qualitative superiority in
armored equipment temporarily passed into the hands of
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fascist Germany. It was under these disadvantageous
conditions that this outstanding tank battle occurred
which ended, however, with the greatest defeat of
fascist Germany. The backbone of Hitler's Germany
was broken in this battle.
The qualitative superiority of the German tanks
over our tanks did not last long. Already in 1944
mass quantities of T-34-85 tanks began to arrive
with an 85 mm gun that was good for that time. The
new IS heavy tank, armed with a 122 mm gun and havjng
powerful armored protection, arrived to replace the
KV tanks. The German "Panthers" and "Tigers" and
also "Ferdinanis" could no longer compete with our N.
new tanks. It is true that the T-VI-B heavy tank,
the "King Tiger," which had approximately the same
armored protection as QAW' IS tank, became part of
the German equipment. But the German tank was armed
with an 88 mm gun, and its weight reached 68 tons
as opposed to 46 tons for our IS tank. Besides,
there was only a limited number of T-IV-B heavy
tanks in the German Army. At the same time, a
large number of assault guns, including heavy ones,
became part of our army's equipment. All this '
ensured the reliable superiority of our armored
equipment over that of the Germans until the very
end of the Second World War. Our industry also
ensured the quantitative superiority in tanks over
fascist Germany and its allies.
The tank equipment of our allies in the last
war the British and American tanks -- were also
inferior to our tanks. The basic British tanks;
MK-III (Valentine) and MK-IV (Churchill), had weak
armament (a 57 mm gun) and low speed (26 to 32 km
per hour). The American (M4A2 and T-26-E3) tanks
were superior to the British tanks in armament
(75 mm and 90 mm guns) and had a greater speed;
however, they also were inferior to our tanks in
maneuverability, armament, dimensions, and were
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very heavy. The Soviet tanks had powerful diesel
engines installed in them, and at that time this was
something quite advanced in world tank building.
Consequently, during the years of the Second
World War, Soviet tank building firmly occupied
first place in the entire world. It provided our
army with remarkable combat vehicles -- tanks and
assault guns, which aided the successful conduct
of war against fascist Germany.
Parallel with the development of tankstilring
the Second World War antitank weapons were being
developed. As is known, we began the struggle
against fascist tanks with bottles of flammable -
mixture, with antitank grenades, bunches of regular
hand grenades, antitank rifles, etc, which, strictly
speaking, required single combat of a man against
tanks. We did not have any alternative. For that
reason, we used divisional 76 mm and 107 mm guns,
and also 37 mm and 85 mm antiaircraft guns together
with antitank artillery to combat enemy tanks. But
all these systems proved to be cumbersome and clumsy
and little suited for combating tanks. In 1942, we
had the mass production of 45 mm and 76 mm antitank
guns and antitank rifles set up, and this strengthened
our antitank defense. The 76 mm gun became the basic
weapon of antitank artillery. In 1943, 57 mm anti-
tank guns began to reach our army. In the same year
the artillery received, armor-piercing subcaliber
projectiles for the 76 mm regimental guns and 122 mm
divisional howitzers. In 1944, the delivery titi the
army of SU-85 assault mounts, armed with an 85 mm
gunland 100 mm antitank guns beganinmaSsquantity.
Field and antiaircraft artillery and aircraft with
special antitank bombs, the so-called PTAB (anti-
tank aerial bomb - protivotankovaya aviatsionnaya,
bomba) which were successfully employed to destroy
tanks, were brought in to combat tanks. A con-
siderable number of tanks were put out of action
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with antitank mines. However, the basic burden of
combating enemy tanks was borne by the antitank
artillery, especially 45 mm and 76 mm antitank guns,
which destroyed the greatest number of enemy tanks.
Moreover, the basic shell was the armor-piercing
subcaliber projectile. The shaped charge antitank
shell (kumulyativnyy snaryad) showed great effective-
ness; however, it was inferior to the armor-piercing
shell as far as accuracy and range of a grazing shot.
Of course, a large number of German tanks were destroy-
ed by our tanks. During the years of the Second World
War the tanks proved to be quite an effective weapon
to combat enemy tanks.
It is essential to note that our system of anti-
tank defense proved to be more successful in all
respects in comparison with the antitank defense
system of the fascist army. The bases of our anti-
tank defense were the tank-destroyer brigades and
regiments and also SAU regiments. Possessing great
maneuverability, these large units and fiats were
thrown into the axes of the enemy tank attack,
quickly assumed firing positions, and fired at
enemy tanks. Tank units and large units were also
thrown into the axes of the enemy tank attacks, and
they combated the tanks in coordination with tank-
destroyer units and SAU units. It is quite under-
standable that in this organizational form these
antitank 'units and large units, including both
battalions and separate companies of antitank rifles,
appeared to counteract the German tank divisions,
against which we quickly concentrated these weapons.
In the defense we skillfully created so-called
antitank areas that fully justified themselves. The
turning back of a great mass of enemy tanks was ,achieved
In this way in the Kursk battle, in the battles near
Budapest, and in other sectors.
The German fascist army also had a large number
of antitank weapons, including powerful guided mobile
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mines, which not only were not inferior in effective-
ness to our antitank weapons, but were even superior
to them. The 75 mm guns and the assault mounts,
armed with 88 mm guns with a high muzzle velocity
of the shell, were especially effective. However,
the basic mass of antitank weapons of the German
Army were in infantry divisions, and it did not
have such mobile and powerful large units and units
as our tank-destroyer brigades and regiments.
The Germans created a fairly solid antitank
defense on the offensive sectors of our troops but
on different organizational principles'. Their anti-
tank defense was less adaptable for fast maneuvering
and concentration of efforts on certain axes, and
when they were subjected to our artillery and aircraft
strikes they were put out of action faster. To restore
the overwhelmed antitank defense the Germans had to
bring in new forces and weapons, but often these did
not exist. All this greatly simplifted our break-
through of the enemy defense. Of course, in this
matter an important role was also played by such
factors as the general artillery fire superiority
of our army, initiative in operations, and higher
military art.
Still, from this indisputable historical fact
the important conclusion suggests itself: the success
of combat operations is ensured not only by the
availability of the necessary weapons.oI armed combat,
but also by their skillful empnYi'at.
It is necessary to note that by the end of the
war the Germans had succeeded in creating a menacing
weapon against tanks -- the Panzerfaust, based on
the employment of shaped charge antitank shells.
It was a mass'rocket-firing weapon which was inex-
pensive to manufacture. Its range of operation
was fairly small, and the infantry was armed with it.
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Any tank armor was burned through by the shaped charge
shell of the Panzerfaust. True, it must be said
that this weapon made its appearance not because of
the easy life the Germans led, but it also appeared)
in its way, as a weapon for single combat of man
against a tank?that with which we started, the
Germans ended with -- but it was already unable to
exert any noticeable influence on the outcome of
the war because by that time the fate of fascist
Germany was already decided; however, it indicated
the appearance of a new effective close combat anti-
tank weapon.
The successful employment of tank troops in
the past war, the same as of other arms of troops,
to a considerable degree depended on their organi-
zational structure. In this question we were able
to achieve a definite success. During the years of
the Second World War the organization of the Soviet
tank troops corresponded quite closely to the nature
of war and the methods of employing tank troops in
it, in comparison to the organization of the tank
troops of other states. However, we did not arrive
at it at once.
At the beginning of the war, in connection with
the lack of tanks, we had to reject mechanized and
tank corps. By the fall of 1941, the Soviet Army
had separate tank brigades, regiments, and battalions
which were used to reinforce rifle and cavalry large
units. As the saying goes, it was necessary "to
cut one's coat according to the cloth."
Already in the initial period of the Second
World War, the progress of armed combat indicated
the need to have more powerful tank large units to
combat enemy tank groupings and to exploit one's
success. In 1942, the mass production of tanks was
set right, and this made it possible to begin forming
tank and mechanized corps and then tank armies. In
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1943, we established the organization of the tank
troops which remained without any substantial changes
until the end of the war.
The special features of this organization were
limited to the following. The composition of the
Soviet Army had a fairly large number of separate
tank brigades, tank and tank assault (tankosam-
okhodnyy) regiments. They were all used mainly to
reinforce the rifle divisions as tanks for direct
infantry support. In the defense, they ensured
the necessary stability of the combat formations,
and on the offensive they played a decisive role
in the successful breakthrough of the enemy defense.
All the separate tank brigades and regiments were
under the orders of the command of the fronts and
the Supreme High Command, but in some armies, and even
in corps, they had their own organic tank assault
regiment. This provided us the opportunity to con-
centrate the tank troops on the main axes when carry-
ing out offensive operations.
To develop the offensive and to conduct mobile
operations in the operational depth, our army had
tank and mechanized corps as well as tank armies.
They were not assigned to task of breaking through
the enemy defense; they were intended for entry
into the breakthrough carried out by the rifle
divisions together with the NPP (direct infantry
support - neposredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty)
tanks, with artillery and aircraft support. This
ensured the retention of tanks in these large units
and formations to perform the main task of the op-
eration - the rout of the enemy grouping in mobile
operations in cooperation with and with the support
of aircraft. But in practice, tank and mechanized
corps and tank armies did not stop before the creation
of a finished breakthrough and, as a rule, were brought
in to complete the breakthrough of the defense with
its subsequent development.
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The tank corps had three tank and one motorized
rifle brigades in their composition. The mechanized
corps included three mechanized and one tank brigades.
Initially the tank army included tank and mechanized
corps, rifle and sometimes cavalry divisions. But
such a tank army did not exist for a long time. Soon
only the tank and mechanized corps were left in its
composition - a total of two or three corps, or just
the opposite, tank and mechanized large units were
withdrawn from their composition, and it was replenished
with rifle divisions and was transformed into a con-
ventional army.
The German Army had tank and motorized divisions
that approximately corresponded to our tank and
mechanized corps, although as for the number of tanks,
they were inferior to the latter. There were also
tank armies in the composition of the German troops,
but until the end of the war tank and infantry
divisions were included in their composition, i.e.,
they had a combined composition. Separate tank
or assault battalions were added to reinforce the
infantry divisions. In the British and American
armies, there were armored or tank divisions; they
did not have tank armies. Thus, during the period
of the Second World War, the Soviet Army had the
best organization of the tank troops, and in the
Second World War this permitted us to achieve im-
portant superiority over the German fascist army
also in the methods of employing tank troops in
operations.
For the German Army it is characteristic that
its tank divisions and armies operated in the first
echelon from the beginning and until the end of an
operation, and they i-eceived independent offensive
zones, broke through the defense on an equal footing
with the infantry divisions and the field armies,
and developed the breakthrough themselves. In this,
fundamentally they counted on tanks and aircraft;
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they did not have powerful artillery for the break-
through, especially at the beginning of the war.
This method of tank troop operations was successful
at the beginning of the war when a firm defense and
a solid front did not exist and our troops did not
have experience and weapons to combat a great mass
of tanks. However, in the further progress of the
war, the situation changed fundamentally. The break-
through of the prepared defense became the most
difficult stage of the offensive operation. During
a breakthrough the tank troops, if they were drawn
in for this, suffered their greatest losses in tanks.
However, the Germans did not change their tactics
of employing tank troops. As before, the break-
through of the defense was carried out by the tank
divisions. That is the way it was during the entire
1942 campaign, then near Kursk and in the area of
Lake Balaton near Budapest. It is natural that when
breaking through a strong defense that is well sat-
urated with antitank weapons tank divisions lost the
basic mass of tanks and successescould notbe achieved.
Thus, during the war the Germans were unable to over-
come their established pattern in the employment of
tank troops.
Our tactics for the employment of tank troops
differed from those of the Germans to a significant
degree. First of all, the great massing of tanks
on sectors of the breakthrough should be noted.
Up to 80 to 90 percent of all tanks available in
a front were usually concentrated on the axis of
the main strike, and the density of the tanks
reached 85 units per kilometer of the front, in-
cluding up to 30 tanks and SAU for direct support
of infantry. The enemy defense was overwhelmed by
artillery and aircraft and was then broken through
by the operations of rifle divisions, reinforced by
separate tank brigades and tank and assault gun
regiments. Mobile troops - tank armies or tank and
mechanized corps were led into the created break-
through, and they completed the breakthrough and
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immediately rushed into the operational depth. The
mobile troops were usually assigned the tasks of
enveloping the basic enemy groupings and encircling
and destroying them. In the last stage of the war
mobile troops were often employed for a swift advance
to a great depth with the goal of splitting the front,
of dividing enemy groupings, of destroying them by
units, and of capturing important operational lines
and areas as swiftly as possible. As a rule, the
mobile troops daringly detached themselves at a
considerable distance from the remaining forces of
the front and conducted decisive mobile operations
in the enemy rear. The depth of the mobile troop
advance sometimes reached up to 600 km (the Belo-
russian and the Vistula - Oder operations). The
speeds of the tank troop advance fluctuated between
30 and 40 km, but in certain periods they reached
60 km per calendar day. In the operation to rout
the Kwantung Army, the 6th Guards Tank Army, despite
the difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain,
advanced at a rate of about 80 km per calendar day.
In those periods when the army did not meet organ-
ized enemy resistance, the speed of the advance
reached 120 km per calendar day.
Thus, during the Second World War the Soviet
Army achieved a very real superiority over the Ger-
man-fascist army in the art of employing tank troops.
As for the American and British army tactics of em-
ploying tank troops - they were not at a high level
and were not distinguished by great mobility and
swift operations.
The great experience acquired by the Soviet
Army in the years of the Second World War, in
problems of combat employment of tank troops, their
technical equipping, and organizational structure,
were taken into consideration by us both in the
development and improvement of tank troops in the
postwar period. However, we could not limit our-
selves only to the experience of history in this
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OL%-.1XL I
important matter, and we were keen in searching
for new paths in the development of tank troops.
11
The future development of Soviet military art
must proceed not only and not so much along the path
of interpreting lessons of past wars, even though
they must be taken into consideration, as along the
path of consistent and persistent investigation of
fundamentally new methods for conducting combat
operations which permit the fullest use of the com-
bat capabilities created by the development of
weapons of armed combat.
The development of armored equipmentIthe organi-
zational structure, and the methods of combat employ-
ment of tank troops were decisively influenced in
the postwar period by such factors as thegeneral
scientific and technical progress in the country,
the appearance of powerful nuclear/missile weapons,
and the change in the nature and in the methods
of conducting war. The swift development of antitank
weapons also played an important role and continues
to do so.
In comparison with the Second World War, a
future war will be conducted with qualitatively
new weapons of armed combat. The broad employment
of nuclear/missile weapons and modern combat equip-
ment has sharply increased combat capabilities, the
strike force, and troop mobility. This led to the
review of opinions on the nature of a future war,
on the technical equipping and organization of the
Armed Forces, and also the basic tenets for conduct-
ing combat operations and armed combat on the whole,
which were established on the experience of the past
war.
In a future war the objectives of armed combat
will be not only the armed forces deployed in the
theaters of military operations, but mainly the
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IMP Lk...Kt I
deep rear area of the warring sides - the industrial
base, supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs, the
system of state control, communications, and also
strategic weapons of armed combat deployed beyond
the limits of the theater of military operations.
Nuclear strikes against important enemy ob-
jectives af-the-fiont and in the rear and swift
operations of forces and weapons on the ground, in
the air, and on the sea, with the purpose of employ-
ing the results of these strikes for the final enemy
defeat is the basis of combat operations of the
armed forces. The combat operations of the ground A
troops will attain greatswiftness, dynamic quality,,;?
and mobility. In short periods of time they must /
be able to carry out a purposeful offensive over
the entire depth of the theater of military operations.
The decisive role in achieving the high speeds of
the offensive will belong to the tank troops, who
must possess high combat qualities. It is precisely
on the battier-of these requirements that we must pro-
ceed when determining the paths of future tank troop
development.
The improvement of Soviet tanks and their arma-
ment in the postwar years mainly proceeded along
the line of increasing firepower and effectiveness,
mobility, of improving armor protection, of equipping
them with a system of antiatomic protection, of '
providing them with the ability to cross water
barriers on the bottom, of increasing their cruising
range, and of increasing their service life. As a
result of the large amount of work that was performed,
new models of Soviet tanks have been built, that are
superior to the latest models of tanks of the armies
of the largest capitalist countries - the USA,
Britain, France, and West Germany - according to
several of their tactical-technical and combat
quality features , and they have become part of
our armament.
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btL,Kt I
During this period the heavy tanks IS-4 (1947),
T-10 (1953) and T-10M (1957); medium tanks T-54 (1946),
T-54A (1954), T-54B (1956), T-55 (1958), and
T-62 (1961); and the light amphibious tank PT-76B
(1957) became part of our armament. Work continues on
several experimental models.
There is a 122 mm gun installed on the heavy
tank which has a shaped charge antitank shell that
can penetrate, in practice, any armor of a modern
tank (up to 500 mm thick). The medium tank has a
100,mia- gun installed for which a shaped charge anti-
tank shell has been adopted.that possesses great
armor-piercing capability (up to 400 mm). The light
tank is armed with a 76 mm gun that has a fairly
powerful shaped charge -iititank shell. By installing
an armament stabilizer (stabilizator vooruzheniya)
on all tanks, their firing effectiveness when on the
move sharply increased. For example, the firing
effectiveness of a T=5.4B tank at speeds of 18 to 22
kph reached 60 percent. The 115 mm smooth bore gun
"Molot," installed on the T762 medium tank, with a
1615 m/sec muzzle velocity of the armor-piercing
subcaliber shell, has very high armor penetration.
Besides these there are shaped charge antitank
shells for this gun with even higher armor penetrat-
ing ability.
The tanks have new devices installed for driving
and for controlling fire, including night sights
(nochnoy pritsel). On the medium tanks the supply
of ammunition is increased (from 34 to 43 rounds),
the horsepower of the engines has been increased
to 580, and the cruiting range to 500 km.
All these and other improvements greatly in-
creased the combat characteristics of tanks. Our
medium tanks possess especially good combat
qualities. They firmly hold the title of the best
tanks in the world.
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MOM L I% L I
The combat qualities of our tanks may be seen
when comparing them with the tanks of our probable
enemies. For comparison it is adequate to take
the basic types of tanks which may include: in the
USSR, the medium T-55 tank and the new T-62 tank;
in the USA, the M48A2 medium tank and the latest
new tank M-60; and in Britain, the MK-IX-X tank.
The experimental models of medium tanks that have
been built in France and West Germany are not
finished and have not become part of their arma-
ment yet.
From the given data it can be seen that the
T-55 tank with its 100 mm gun is superior to the
American M48A2 tank according to several indicators:
it weighs less, has better armor protection, more
or less equal firepower, and a greater cruising
range. However, it is inferior to the American M-60
tank and the Britis4 "Centurion" tank in firepower.
This is explained by the fact that a 105 mm gun is
mounted on their tanks for which there is a sub-
caliber shell with a muzzle velocity of 1475 m/sec.
We do not have such a shell for our 100 mm gun yet.
It is necessary to speed up the creation of a sub-
caliber shell for rifled guns on all types of tanks.
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MrLlcII
Year produced
Combat weight, tons
Armor protection in
mmi
hull-front
side
turret.- front
Armament (caliber
In mm)
Muzzle velocity of
armor-piercing shell
m/sec
USSR
USA
T-55 with
D-10T2,8
gun 4
T-62
M48A2
Armor penetration in
mm at 2000 m with an
angle of fire of 00
to 600k.
armor-piercing shell
subcaliber shell
s hap e d charge
antitank shell
Unit of fire
Maximum speed, kph
Horsepower of engine
Cruising range, km
1958
36
100
80
200
100
895
1961 i1956
36.5 46
100
80
200
110
51-76
178
115 90
?
1615 I 930
1245
(subcaliber)
122-55
Being 270-
develop...100
ed
390-150 440-
200
43 40
50 48
580 580
400 500
130-451
200-60'
Britain
M-6
,MK
"Centurion"
-IX-X 0
1960
1959
46.27
51
Abbdt
76
150
51-76
51
178
152
105
105
1475
1475
(subcaliber)
!OMB
220- 220-85
85
411111110 ?????
60
45
850
310
57
48
750
400
70
34
650
190
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WRIF J..1[C I
As for the T-62 tank, it is superior to the
American M-60 tank according to the basic features,
especially in the range of grazing shot and armor
penetration. It should be kept in mind, however,
that the smoothbore gun has several important short-
comings; in particular,the metal body (sektor) of
the subcaliber shell that shatters right after the
firing createpthe danger of striking our own troops
operating in front of the tank. For a certain period
this gun may ensure the qualitative superiority of
our tanks over the tanks of our probable enemy.
But we do not have the right to -be. content; we
must decisively move ahead to a significantly greater
distance in the quality of tanks from our probable
enemies.
If we compare the T-10M heavy tank with the
American M103 (1956) tank, then our tank has slightly
better armor protection and a greater speed and
cruising range. The British heavy tank "Conqueror"
(1954) has more powerful armament, for the 120 mm
gun mounted on it has a subcaliber armor-piercing
shell with a muzzle velocity of 1550 m/sec.
We made an effort to achieve a qualitative
superiority of our heavy tank over the American and
British heavy tanks by installing a 130 mm gun on
it. Experimental models were prepared. But because
oflhis the tank became too heavy. It became necessary
to give up further work on these models. Our T-62
medium tank may successfully wage combat against the
heavy tanks of the USA and Britain. Also, the TlOM
tank possesses combat qualities that are not bed.
Our PT-76B light tank is inferior to the Ameri-
can M41A3 (1956) light tank in armor protection and
firepower. But it is almost 10 tons lighter and is
amphibious, which is very important for conducting
reconnaissance, and has a greater cruising range.
As for the other models of light tanks, the experience
of the Second World War showed that it was inadvisable
to use them, and we stopped building them.
soMmailik
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Heavy Tank Comparison,Table
USSR
T -10M
USA Britain
M103* "Conqueror"**
Year produced
Combat weight
Armor protection (in mm):
Front - turret
Front - hull
Side - hull
Armament of tank (caliber
in mm)
Muzzle velocity of armor
shell (in m/sec)
of gun
piercing
Machine gun (number), caliber (mm
Armor penetration, in mm at
2000 m (armor piercing shell):
at a 00 angle of impact
1958
50
250
120
80
122
950
)2x14.5
200
at a 600 angle of impact 65
Unit of fire:
rounds for gun (No.)
cartridges for machine gun
Maximum speed (kph)
Cruising range (km)
30
744
50
250
1956
54.4
127-13
127
51
120
1000
lx12.
2x7.6
200
70
34
7825
34
130-160
1954
About 66
200
200
90
120
About 1000
(Subcaliber
1500-1550)
lx7.62
250-100
(subcaliber)
35
7500
34
150
* Until 1954 a total of 300 of these tanks were produced in
the USA; tanks of this type are not produced any more.
Modernization of the ones produced is being done.
** Until 1959)a total of 250 of these tanks were produced.
A new 45-ton tank, the "Chieftahr, with a 120mm gun and
a710 hp multiple fuel engine is being tested, but the
armor of the hull does not exceed 76 mm.
41111011111M
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IMP J L1/4. L I
On themhole, it may be considered that our tanks
possess better combat qualities than the modern tanks
of our probable enemy. However, the difference in the
combat qualities of the tanks is rather small. Can this
situation satisfy us? No, naturally it cannot.
Some comrades consider that the improvements in
tanks that were effected in the postwar period are ade-
quate, that they ensured the creation of a completely
modern combat vehicle, and that there was no special need
to seek other, more radical ways to develop armored equip-
ment. After all, our probable enemies also have not
thought up anything special in tank construction.
It seems to us, however, that the question is some-
what different. Above we determined the combat effective-
ness of our modern tanks by comparing them with the tanks
of our probable enemy. But it is impossible to determine
fully the combat effectiveness of tanks in this way. For
this, it is necessary to take into consideration other
factors as well, first of all the development of antitank
defense weapons and also the nature and methods for waging
armed combat in ground theaters.
The postwar period has been characterized by the
rapid development of antitank wea.pons, based on the use
of sllaped chAEges (kumufSrativnyy zaryad). In the first
years after the war, recoilless weapons appeared together
with the Panzerfaust type of antitank grenades.
This weapon Was not inferior to tube antitank artillery
in armor penetration and even surpassed it. By the end
of the 1950s at home and abroad there appeared guided
antitank missiles with a tank-destroying range of up to
2 km and more. The shaped charge of the antitank missile
is capable of piercing the steel armor of any tank.
Moreover, the effectiveness of fire against tanks has
sharply increased because the missile is controlled by
radio, by wires and by a homing hmd (golovka). The
antitank missiles are small in size and in weight and are
mobile, and therefore it is difficult to combat them, but
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11111 OLL.ML I
it is completely possible to do so.
During the discussion some comrades concentrated
all their attention on the search for shortcomings
of the antitank guided missiles. Naturally, a titank
mitjage.?._like any new weapons, have shortcoming .
They are only beginning to be introduced into the
armament of the armies, fire with them may be con-
ducted within the limits of visibility, and technically
they are not sufficiently reliable. For example, so
far they have only been tested under firing range
conditions, where nothing influences the operator and
he is not subjected to any danger. In combat it can
be different. The operator only needs to lose his
presence of mind or even to flinch and then the mistile
in flight will "flinch"also; it will not hit the tank.
This is very important. Moreover, the speed of the
missile flight is too low, the dead space (mertvaya
voronka) (up to 500 m from the launching mount) is
too great, and there is the need to see the tank to
be destroyed, something which is not always possible.
Visibility is greatly influenced by the relief of the
terrain,"on paperitwasflat, and they forgot about
the ravines and that one had to walk through them,"
and it is possible that the missile will meet various
types of obstructions before reaching the target
causing the missile to explode, etc. All this
lowers the combat qualities of the antitank missiles
But the indicated shortcomings will be eliminated,
and it would be a serious mistake to underestimate
this new type of antitank weapon.
We must consider the fact that modern antitank
weapons are light, mobile, and very effective in
armor penetration. On the battlefield they will be
dispersed,and unavoidably part of them will survive,
or new units will be moved out to replace the ones
destroyed, even on axes where nuclear weapons are
used. Therefore,.the underestimation of new anti-
tank weapons is very dangerous, and it may lead to
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the fact that in a future war our tank troops may
meet such surprises which may decisively reduce their
combat capabilities.
It is necessary to recognize frankly that our
development of armored equipment in the postwar period
proceeded without due consideration for the develop-
ment of antitank weapons. This is a serious lesson,
and we must not ignore it. As a result of this,
the antitank missiles and other new antitank weapons
with shaped charges took the lead over armor. The
old method for tank development has been exhausted,
and we must find a new one, a drastic path for its
future development. N.S. Khrushchev personally
assigned us such a task, and we must accomplish it
as soon and as well as possible.
III
What direction should the further tank develop-
ment take?
At the present time this question is being actively
discussed, but opinions on it have differed greatly.
Some comrades consider that despite the development
of antitank weapons the modern tank is a vehiole
completely capable of combat, one that does not
require fundamental reconstruction, at least for the
near future. Others, on the contrary, say that the
modern tank, especially the heavy one, has outlived
itself, any mass tank attack may be disrupted, and
that the production of a tank is not justified
economically. Therefore, it is proposed to return
to the light amphibious tank or to create a new
armored vehicle with a wheeled running gear of the
armored-personnel-carrier-type. The foreign press
has carried statements that the tank is a weapon
of the past war and that for a future war a vehicle
with powerful armored protection is not required.
It seems to us that it is impossible to agree
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I
with either opinion. Both now and, obviously) in
the future we cannot reject the tank. It has several
remarkable combat qualities that permit the success-
ful performance of combat tasks under conditions of
nuclear/missile warfare. Among all the other combat
vehicles the tank withstands a nuclear burst best,
mainly the shockwave and penetrating radiation.
This is a very important quality under modern conditions
Moreover, the tank has great mobility and fire and
strike force. At the present time the missiles of
operational-tactical designation have become the main
fire weapon of the ground troops. Tube artillery has
ceased to be the "god of war." If the tank is removed
from the armament, then the fire and strike force of
ground troops will be sharply reduced. One cannot
conceive this matter in such a way that all the tasks
of fire destruction of the enemy in a future war will
be performed only by missile troops of operational-
tactical designation using nuclear weapons; many
tasks will still have to be performed by conventional
fire weapons. Tanks are the best weapons for this,
When necessary they can be concentrated on definite
sectors due to their high mobility, and this ensures
the necessary fire density. Therefore, a tank-type
combat vehicle must remain in the armament of our
army.
At the same time, the modern tank has become
vulnerable to new antitank weapons; is poorly pro-
tected from shaped charges; and has insufficient
antiatomic protection. Therefore, we cannot remain
at the level achieved under any circumstances.
Recent research showed that there are potential-
ities to increase considerably the shaped charge
protection of tanks. This problem is resolved by in-
stalling special shielding (ekranirovaniye) devices,
the employment of combined (kombinirovanaya) armor,
and the use of appropriate forms of armor protection,
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WI SU,Kt I
This may greatly increase the viability of tanks on
the battlefield. Moreover, it will not require an in-
crease of Armor protection and consequently an increase
in the tank's weight.
Increasing the tank's anIAAAtmas,_21.192_will
have important significance. It is achieved by in-
stalling special "linings" (podboy) that reduce the
flow of neutrons, and also an automatic system for
hermetically sealing the tank by removing radioactive
dust from the air, by creating pressurization, etc..
This ensures the protection of the tank's crew from
destruction by a medium yield (30"kt) nuclear burst
at a distance of 400 to 600 m from ground zero.
Recently, increased combat character sties of
the 100 mm join_have been achieved. The muzzle
velocity of an armor-piercing shell of this gun
has been brought up to 1015 m/sec, the same armor
penetration as achieved by the British 105 mm gun.
The firing range of the new 100 mm gun with a high-
explosive shell reaches 15 kilometers.
The presence of a large.number of tanks with
guns having powerful charges and a considerable
range of fire in tank and motorized rifle large units
permits their use for fire from concealed positions
with the goal of performing various tasks and first
of all of destroying the missile...motmt, atomic
weapons, and Other enemy objectives both in open
and in concealed positions.
The acceptance into armament and the assimila-
tion of the T-62 medium tank with the new smooth bore
gun will und6aTed1y increase the combat capabilities
of the tank troops. This tank may successfully
combat any enemy tank, using subcaliber and high-
explosive antitank shells. Therefore, it is
advisable to have a definite number of tanks with
a smooth bore gun.
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At the present time our designers are developing
a new model of a medium tank weighing 34 tons which
will have a 115 mm smooth bore gun with full mechani-
zation of loading, and this will permit reducing the
crew by one man. Subsequently, the tank will also
have a rifled gun installed on it with mechanized
loading. This tank will have a complete antiatomic,
antichemical, aid antibacteriological protection and
also will have armor that ensures protection from
high-explosive antitank weapons of destruction.
The tank runninggpar will ensure an average speed
over terrain (not over roads) of about 45 kph and
a maximum speed over roads of about 75 kph.
A noticeable increase in the combat capabilities
of tank troops may be achieved by accepting into our
armament a medium tank with guided missile arma-
ment (range of fire 3 to 4 km), on the creation
of which work is proceeding at the present time.
This tank should destroy any enemy tank when on the
move with one or two rounds.
After the new medium tanks with guided missile
equipment are accepted into our armament and are
assimilated it will be possible to raise the question
of replacing the T-10M heavy tank because the new
medium tanks will have higher combat characteristics.
However, it is necessary for us to take into con-
sideration that our probable enemies, especially
Britain, continue work on building heavy tanks with
increased qualities in comparison with the existing
ones.
We should concern ourselves with the problem
of building a combat vehicle - a tank destroyer
with guided missile armament of the assault-gun
type.
At the present time work is being done to build
a half-tracked (or wheeled) combat Vehicle with
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missile and small arms armament for the infantry.
Such a combat-armored vehicle must have antiatomic
protection and high mobility on the terrain, equal
to the mobility of a tank.
This "combat vehicle" let us call it that,
must have very strong armor protection, have high
road qualities, and it must have a low silhouette
(prizemistyy) so that it would be easy to camouflage
it and would be less vulnerable to antitank guided
missiles (PTURS). As for its capacity, it must carry
a squad of riflemen (Approximately 10 to 12 persons,
including the driver and commanding officer. It
must be capable of waging combat, i.e., of destroying
the enemy with its own weapons, and when necessary
the riflemen can leave it and in coordination with
it, as well as with their own combat weapon, perform
the tasks of an infantry battle. It must replace
the armored personnel carrier and provide our tanks
with an infantry assault group which it is now
completely impossible to transport on the body of
the tank.
Together with all this, we must speed up work
directed toward the sensible reduction of a tank's
weight, the increasing of its mobility, especially
the increase of its speed and cruising range, the
reduction of the crew while ensuring mutual re-
placement - the entire crew must know how to drive
the tank, etc.6
Special attention must be devoted to work on
the use of plastics in tank building. Initial results
received in this problem testify that plastics
(plexiglass) (stekloplastika) may find broad use in
building modern reliable tank-type armored vehicles.
The realization of all these primary measures
will-undoubtedly increase the combat capabilities
of our tanks', will make them more reliable against
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IOW btC,Kt I
modern antitank weapons and nuclear bursts; and
this will permit the employment of our tank troops
with greater success in a future war.
We have expressed some thoughts on the building
of new tanks and combat vehicles in the near future.
But this by no means reduces the significance of
the tanks which we have in our armament, They are
quite suitable for combat use and can perform combat
tasks successfully. We are firmly convinced that
certain statements which appeared in the press and
which express doubt about the usefulness of the tank
for modern warfare are wrong, The tank continues
to be a powerful weapon of modern combat and, by
developing, will remain so in the future. However,
it is necessary to take into consideration new
conditions for employing tanks on the battlefield,
in particular the possession of very effective
antitank weapons by the enemy. For this it is
necessary to take measures in all cases for the
decisive neutralization and destruction of these
weapons of the enemy, in order to decrease as much
as possible the effectiveness of their operation
against tanks on the battlefield.
Above we spoke of the immediate task of im-
proving tank equipment. But this is not enough.
We must also look into the more distant future.
No weapon can be developed successfully if at
the proper time a prospective forward movement is
not determined. In relation to tanks, this
problem has become especially urgent at the present
time.
It is quite apparent that despite the presence
and development of nuclear/missile weapons mass
ground troops will participate in future wars for
a long time yet. To wage successful armed combat
the ground troops will have to have combat vehicles
which, as far as possible, must be able to resist
nuclear bursts and protect personnel from light
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radiation and penetrating radiation and also from
destruction by conventional weapons i.e., these
vehicles must be reliably armored. Moreover, we
must have at least two types of combat vehicles:
the first type is a vehicle with light armament
to conduct an infantry battle ("combat vehitle"-
((boyevaya mashina)); the second type should have
heavier armament so that it could wage combat
against any combat vehicles on the battlefield and
achieve success.
The second type of vehicles of the future will
apparently appear as a continuation of modern tank
development. It is mainly intended for the swift
exploitation of the results of using nuclear/missile
weapons. for the final defeat of enemy ground troop
groupings, and for the seizure of important areas
and objectives. For this the tank of the future
must be capable of waging successful combat against
tanks and lighter enemy "combat vehicles" and of
destroying his personnel and the fire weapons of
the ground troops, including nuclear and antitank
weapons.
It should be taken into consideration that in
a future war the enemy may employ a large mass of
tanks. They must be opposed by our tanks with such
armament which would ensure the reliable destruction
of enemy tanks. But in actuality, the combat cap-
abilities of tube artillery are almost all exhausted.
In the near future it will apparently be replaced
by modern guided and homing missiles with powerful
new charges.
However, antitank missiles may not be the only
armament of the tank of the future. Antitank missiles
are close combat weapons, which are intended mainly
for combat against tanks. The tank of the future
apparently must have weapons with the aid of which
it would be possible to wage combat against enemy
tactical nuclear weapons and neutralize the
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conventional fire weapons of the ground troops,
first of all, naturally, antitank weapons over a
fairly large area.
Tank troop operations will be supported by
missile troops of operational-tactical designation.
But in several instances this support may not be
effective enough, especially when conducting mobile
operations in the operational depth. At the present
time the missile troops of operational-tactical
designation are considerably inferior to the tank
troops in mobility. We must decisively increase
their mobility. If the battle formations of tank
troops contain protected mobile combat vehicles
of the tank type but which are capable of delivering
nuclear strikes against the enemy, then the combat
capabilities of the tank troops will grow immeasur-
ably. We must work on building such a missile
combat vehicle, and it should be built.
There are many other problems of a purely
technical nature that require resontion. modern
tank armament is becoming obsolete, and we must
search for a new type of armor - lighter, economically
more advantageous, and at the same time very stable
and strong; we must improve the running gear of the
tank so that it can ensure movement over the terrain
at high speeds and great distances; we need a more
powerful and more economical engine, etc. Right
now we must work on the resolution of these problems.
IV
A discussion is also proceeding on the problems
of the role of tank troops in a future war and es-
pecially on the organization of these troops. The
most varied opinions have also been expressed on
these problems. It is impossible to agree with some
of these opinions because this would not move us
forward but would push us back and would inflict
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damage on the combat effectiveness of our ground
troops.
First of all, let us discuss the role of tank
troops in a future war. There is no doubt that
an important role in a future war will belong to
the tank troops. This arm of troops may use the
results of massed nuclear/missile strikes for
their swift movement into the depth and the defeat
of the opposing enemy groupings more quickly and
more effectively than the motorized rifle or other
troops which are organized on Unified principles.
Together with this it would be incorrect to count
on the fact that only the tank troops in their
present existing organization would perform all the
tasks on the battlefield, as some comrades main-
tain. Tank troops cannot operate successfully in
a modern operation without missile troops of various
designations and without close coordination with air-
craft and motorized rifle troops in the main theaters
of war. The successful conduct of combat operations
in a future war will depend on joint, clearly co-
ordinated operations of all arms of troops, first
of all of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, and
airborne troops. The tank troops played an out-
standing role in the defeat of the German fascist
troops in the past war, and we must not forget
this. Now they must be prepared for operations
under the complex conditions of nuclear/missile
warfare and for the display of exceptional re-
liability and endurance.
On the problems of tank troop organization
opinions are divided. Some comrades favor the
liquidation of the tank army and the transition to
a single army organization. There is also an
opinion about a transition to a single division
organization, the transition to the so-called unified
division. These are very serious problems and can-
not be simply and easily resolved. The further
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structure of the ground troops and the methods for
their combat employment in the future will greatly
depend on their correct resolution. Therefore, let
us examine them in greater detail and more deeply.
Soon after the Second World War, and taking into
consideration its experience, three basic types of
divisions were created in the composition of the
ground troops: rifle, mechanized, and tank; and
the tank army was reorganized into a mechanized
army. The rifle division, which included the tank
assault regiment (tankosamokhodnyy polk), was in-
tended for breaking through a prepared defense, and
the mechanized division was intended for completing
and developing the breakthrough. The mechanized
army, the composition of which included tank and
mechanized divisions, was intended for commitment
into the breakthrough and for conducting mobile
combat operations in the operational depth. This
organization of the ground troops conformed to the
methods for conducting armed combat in the ground
theaters which were employed in the last war, and
It was based on the experience of this war.
This we should not forget even now)because
everything new arises from the experience of the
past.
The development of the weapons of armed combat
introduced changes in the methods of conducting
military operations, and this in turn, naturally,
required the introduction of corrections in the
organization of troops. Nuclear weapons, which
were received into the armament at the beginning
of the 1950s brought about the most serious and
fundamental changes in the methods of conducting
military operations. Their further development and
the appearance of missiles as a means of delivering
nuclear weapons to the target and the mass employment
of this weapon completely changed the method of
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breaking through the prepared enemy defense.
Military operations acquired a swift and more mobile
and dynamic nature, and broad possibilities for the
employment of tank troops in the first echelon from
the very beginning of the operation were discovered.
By this time the complete motorization of the ground
forces was achieved.
In connection with this, the decision was made
to have one motorized rifle division, instead of
rifle and mechanized divisions, and for it to have
motorized rifle and tank units in its composition.
The motorized rifle division is capable of success-
fully performing the tasks of breaking through the
enemy defense, developing the breakthrough, and
conducting mobile operations in the depth. Also,
for operations on the main axes it was necessary
to have a division with a more-powerful strike force
and at the same time a lighter one, a tank division,
which could develop the offensive at high speeds to
a greater depth and which would possess the best
capabilities for waging combat against enemy tank
troops.
The motorized rifle division was the basic
large unit of the combined-arms army, which possesses
almost the same combat characteristics, if not
greater ones, as the mechanized army. Thus, naturally,
the need for a mechanized army ceased. However, it
immediately became necessary to have a large unit
which would possess swifter, powerful breakthrough
force and greater mobility than the combined-arms
army. The tank army proved to be the best organi-
zation of this type. Its composition normally
includes three tank and one heavy tank divisions,
but its organization is not a set form, and its
composition may bechanged depending on the situation.
The tank army is intended for performing the most
important tasks in operations, which must be performed
reliably in the fastest possible way.
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