CRITICISM OF STALIN IN THE CHINESE MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00997R000100240002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 6, 1981
• Content Type: CABLE

10/22/
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STATE
ACTION: NONE INFO: EAP/CH-411 EAP/CPSC, LAP/SPA, NESAt
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PLANFAC?E ( ). FILE. RF, CPA/II, AFm4s Ci-3. CR/FE, CRES/AROt D/F815?20
DCD?3. EA-60 EPS/EG-2. IAD/CAS0.39 LAD/IC, ICS/HTO, NICAG/CHt NIO/AF,
NIO/CH, NIG/PE, 0ER?31, OSR/RFCs OR/SE' SE, SSD/SSB, STD/CSTBs (42/0)
81 7425968 SCA PAGE 001 AC 7425968
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PR RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
RR AUENC
DE RUEHC 06115 3101043
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 0608542 NOV 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO,PUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0000
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0000
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0000
PUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
BY
---C-13M?F-1-1)?,E?N-7 1-4?L?S TA TE 9b115
FROM FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
E.O. 12065: GDS 11/3/87 (HARTER! 0.6s)
TAGS: PINT. CH. US. SU
SUBJECT: (C) CRITICISM OF STALIN IN THE CHINESE MEDIA
REFS A) BEIJING 11917s B) FLS HA 260744.
C) BEIJING 11176s D) BEIJING 11753
Is C ? ENTIRE TEXT.
? 2. FOLLOWING IS ANALYSIS PREPARED Y F8I5 IN RESPONSE TO
REFTEL As
3. CHEN WEIDA'S REMARKS ON STALIN IN REF FBIS SEEM TO
ACCORD WITH THE PREVAILING LINE UN STALIN'S MERITS 4ND
FAULTS REGARD/NG THE CLASS STRUGGLE ISSUE SINCE THE THIRD
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PLENUM THREE YEARS AGO. ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE.
THEREFORE. WE DO NOT SENSE ANYTHING NEW AFOOT.
4. OVER THE YEARS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV.s "SECRET SPEECH.' AT
THE 1956 20TH CPSU CONGRESS. CHINESE ASSESSMENTS OF
STALIN'S MERITS AND FAULTS CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO BROAD.
CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS. .EOCH OF THESE VIEWPOINTS
NATURALLY HAS BEEN INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH CONTENDING
ASSESSMENTS WITHIN THE CCP LEADERSH1p OF THE ROLE OF
CLASS STRUGGLE WITHIN CHINA'S SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND WITH
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE SINU?SOVIET POLEMIC. THE
FIRST OF THESE TWO VIEWPOINTS EMERGED IN RESPONSE TO
KHRUSHCHEVeS SECRET SPEECH ITSELF AND TO DE?
STALINIZATION TRENDS wITHIN THE BLOC AT LARGE. IT *AS
CONTAINEO MOST AUTHORITATIVELY IN THE TWO LANDMARK
PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL -DEPARTMENT ARTICLES "ON THE
--HISTORTCAL?EXPERIENCE-MF-THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE
PROLETARIAT" (5 APRIL 1956) AND "MORE ON THE :HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" (29
DECEMBER 1956). BUT ALSO OBLIQUELY IN MAO'S OWN REMARKS
OF 27 APRIL 1956. NO CALLED "ON THE TEN GREAT RELATION
SHIPS." THE ESSENCE OF THIS JUDGMENT WAS THAT STALIN
EXAGGERATED THE SHARPNESS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE 1930'S AND THUS ',BROADENED THE SCOPE
OF SUPPRESSION OF COUNTERREVOLUTION.' AND WRONGLY
PERSECUTED NUMEROUS PARTY LEADERS AND CADRES IN THE
GREAT PURGES,
5. THIS VIEWPOINT. OF COURSE. COINCIDED BOTH WITH THE
PREVAILING TREND OF DE?STALINIZATION WITHIN THE COM-
MUNIST BLOC AT THE TIME AND ALSO WITH THE CCP'S MAN
AUTHORITATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE ROLE uF CLASS STRUGGLE
WAS DIMINISHING IN CHINA. LIU SHAOQI'S REPORT TO THE
EIGHTH CCP CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER 1956 HAD DECLARED THAT
"THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL AIN IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM IN OUR COUNTRY HAS NOW BEEN
DECIDED.' WITH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE SOCIALIST
TRANSFORMATION. THAT VICTORY. LIU STATED, MEANS THAT
"THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTIONARY STORM AND STRESS IS PAST.'
AND THAT "THE AIM OF OUR STRUGGLE IS CHANGED INTO ONE OF
SAFEGUARDING THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCES OF
.34
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PRODUCTION OF SOCIETY, SO THAT A CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN
THE METHODS OF STRUGGLE WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW AND A
COMPLETE LEGAL SYSTEM BECOMES AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY."
6. THE OTHER VIEWPOINT ON STALIN EMERGED GRADUALLY OVER
THE NEXT DECADE AS MAC CAME EVENTUALLY TO QUESTION THE
EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS LINE ON CLASS STRUGGLE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOCIALIST MODERNI-
ZATION AND THE PARTY'S ROLE IN iTo MAO BELIEVED IN-
CREASINGLY THAT, FAR FROM RECEDING AS CHINESE SOCIALISM
ADVANCES, CLASS STRUGGLE ACTUALLY INTENSIFIES AS 01$-
ENFRANCHISED REACTIONARY ELEMENTS FROM THE ABOLISHED
EXPLOITING CLASSES MAKE LAST-DITCH EFFORTS TO REGAIN
POWER AND AS THE CONTINUING CORROSION OF RES/DUAL
REACTIONARY IDEOLOGIES COMPROMISES THE REVOLUTIONARY
INTEGRITY OF THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP* PROGRESS IN
INTEGRITY OF THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP* PROGRESS IN
SOCIALIST SOCIETY. MAO CONCLUDED, REQUIRES THE EVER-
-SHARPER DRAWING OF CLASS LINES IN SOCIETY AND MAY
ULTIMATELY REQUIRE THE OVERTHROW OF ONCEI?REVOLUTIONARY
PARTY LEADERS NOW CORRUPTED BY THE SUGAR-COATED BULLETS
OF REACTIONARY IDEAS* AND IT NECESSITATES THE ABANDON-
MENT OF FORMAL PARTY AND STATE INSTITUTIONS, LAWS AND
PROCEDURES WHICH MAY RESTRAIN THE PROGRESSIVE AIMS OF
THE MASSES AND THEIR ACTIVIST LEADERS.
To THAT THESIS OF MAO'S, WHICH WAS CALLED THE THEORY OF
"CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE
PROLETARIAT" AND CONSIDERED A PIONEERING CONTRIBUTION TO
MARXISM-LENINISM, WAS THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION BOTH
FOR HIS INAUGURATION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND FOR
THE DIFFERENCES WHICH HE LED THE WAY IN ELABORATING
Iwo' BETWEEN THE CCP AND THE CRSW* IT ALSO LED TO 4
REVISED ASSESSMENT OF STALIN'S MISTAKES* ALTHOUGH MAO
ZEDONG WAS ALREADY WELL ON THE WAY TO ELABORATING HIS
VIEWS ON CLASS STRUGGLE IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY BY THE
EARLY 1960'S (HIS FAMOUS REMARK "NEVER FORGET THE CLASS
STRUGGLE" WAS MADE AT THE 1962 10TH PLENUM), AND
ALTHOUGH HE HAD CALLED CLASS STRUGGLE THE ESSENCE OF THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CCP AND CPSU (BOTH IN INTER-
PRETATION OF BLOC DOMESTIC POLICIES IN PLACES LIKE
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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR ITSELF, AND IN FOREIGN POLICY
THEORY REGARDING THE CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE),
THE NEW ASSESSMENT OF STALIN DID NOT EMERGE UNTIL THE
HEIGHT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. THE 1963 PEOPLE'S
DAILY-RED FLAG EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT ESSAY *ON THE
QUESTION OF STALIN" (ONE OF THE FAMOUS "NINE COMMEN-
TARIES" COAUTHORED BY MAO. CHEN BODA. AND KANG SHENG)
THUS RETAINED THE ORIGINAL 1956 JUDGMENT OF -STALIN THAT
HE HAD *ENLARGED THE SCOPE OF SUPPRESSION OF COUNTER-
REVOLUTIONARIES" IN THE GREAT PURGES AS ONE OF HIS MAJOR
ERRORS.
8. THE NEW VIEW WAS FIRST EXPOUNDED AUTHORITATIVELY IN
1967.. ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CULTURAL REVOLU-
TION'S START, IN AN 18 MAY PEOPLE'S DAILY-REP FLAG
EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT ARTICLE. THAT ARTICLE STATED:
"STALIN WAS A GREAT MARXIST-LENINIST BUT *HERE HE
FAME- 6'1,4E IN NOT -RECOGNIZING ON THE LEVEL OF THEORY
THAT CLASSES AND CLASS STRUGGLE EXIST IN SOCIETY
THROUGHOUT THE HISTORICAL PERIOD OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF
THE PROLETARIAT AND THAT THE QUESTION OF WHO *ILL *IN IN
THE REVOLUTION HAS YET TO BE FINALLY SETTLED; IN OTHER
WORDS. IF ALL THIS IS NOT HANDLED PROPERLY THERE IS
A POSSIBILITY OF A COMEBACK BY THE BOURGEOISIE. THE
YEAR BEFORE HE DIED. STALIN BECAME AWARE OF THIS POINT
AND STATED THAT CONTRADICTIONS DO EXIST IN SOCIALIST
SOCIETY AND IF NOT PROPERLY HANDLED MIGHT TURN INTO
ANTAGONISTIC ONES. COMRADE MAO ZEDONG HAS GIVEN FULL
ATTENTION TO THE WHOLE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF THE
SOVIET UNION. HE HAS CORRECTLY SOLVED THIS SERIES OF
PROBLEMS IN A NUMBER OF WRITINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS
AND THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATION THAT MARXISM
HAS DEVELOPED TO AN ENTIRELY NEW STAGE." WHERE
ACCORDING TO THE 1956 ASSESSMENT STALIN HAD IN-
CORRECTLY MAGNIFIED CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE USSR.
ACCORDING TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION INTERPRETION,.
STALIN HAD INCORRECTLY UNDERESTIMATED IT,
9. MANY OF THE POLITICAL BATTLES IN THE CHINESE
LEADERSHIP SINCE MAO'S DEATH. OF COURSE, HAVE BEEN OVER
THE VALIDITY OF MAO'S "CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION"
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THESIS* AND THE REFORM GROUP LED BY DENG XIAOPING HAS
LED THE WAY IN ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHRow THE THEORY AND
RESTORE THE 1956 EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS LINE ON THE ROLE
OF CLASS STRUGGLE-IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY AS THE BASIS FOR
HIS uN1TED FRONT APPROACH TO MODERNIZATION. THE MAOIST
VIEW WAS ENSHRINED BY HUA GUOFENG IN A MAJOR ARTICLE ON
MAY DAY 1977 AS MAO'S GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO MARXIST,.
LENINIST THEORY AND AGAIN IN THE 1977 PARTY -CONSTITUTION
AS PART OF THE CCP'S GENERAL TASK. WHICH STATED THAT
POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS LIKE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION "WILL
BE .CARRIED OUT MANY TIMES IN THE FUTURE." DENG SUCCESS,.
FULLY ..LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR OVERTHROWING MAO'S THESIS,
HOWEVER, AT THE THIRD PLENUM IN LATE 1978. THE PLENUM
COMMUNIQUE SAID IN LANGUAGE REMINISCENT OF LIU'S 1956
CONGRESS REPORT THAT "THE LARGE-SCALE STRUGGLES :OF A
MASS CHARACTER HAVE IN THE MAIN COME 70 AN END" AS CHINA
SHIFTS THE FOCUS OF ITS WORK TO SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION_ .
WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF SOCIALIST LAW. :DENG.-ACHIEVED
COMPLETE VICTORY ON THIS SCORE DNLY wITH THE RECENT
SIXTH PLENUM, WHERE THE PARTY'S HISTORY RESOLUTION
EXPLICITLY STATED THAT MAO'S "CONTINUING THE REVOLU-
TION" THESIS WAS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE
SITUATION IN CHINA AND THAT THE EIGHTH CCP CONGRESS HAP
PROVIDED A CORRECT ASSESSMENT.
10. THE REVERSION IN THE PARTY'S LINE SACK TO THE
EIGHTH CONGRESS VIEW ON CLASS STRUGGLE HAS NATURALLY
NECESSITATED A CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN VIEWPOINT ON
STALIN, AND PRESS MATERIAL SINCE THE THIRD PLENUM HAS
BEGUN TO DO THAT. BECAUSE THE ISSUE oF CLASS STRUGGLE
CONTINUED TO BE CONTENTIOUS AFTER THE 1978 THIRD -PLENUM
CLASS STRUGGLE WAS SECONDARY* BUT HO* SECONDARY
REMAINED UNCLEAR IN VIEW OF PHENOMENA LIKE THE BEIJING
WALL DISSIDENT MOVEMENT IN 1979 ?? SUCH ASSESSMENTS OF
STALIN WERE VERY TENTATIVE. IN FACT. ONE ARTICLE*
APPEARING IN THE 22 AUGUST 1979 GOANGmING DAILY,
ASSERTED THAT BOTH THE 1956 ASSESSMENT AND THE MAOIST
ASSESSMENT OF LATER YEARS WERE "CORRECT." CHEN wEIDA'S
DECISIVENESS ON THE ISSUE ?., "COMRADE MAO ZEDONG
CRITICIZED STALIN FOR MAGNIFYING THE CLASS STRUGGLE"
SEEMS TO US TO REFLECT THE RESOLUTION OF THESE UN..
3L-1
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CERTAINTIES BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE SIXTH PLENUm'S
HISTORICAL RESOLUTION ON MAC AND HIS IDEAS OF HIS LATER
YEARS.
11. BECAUSE MAO'S "CONTINUING THE REVOLUTION" THESIS
WAS FORMULATED IN THE CONTEXT OF BOTH HIS DIFFERENCES
WITH THE CCP LEADERSHIP IN THE EARLY 1060's AND wATH THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP OF THE SAME TIME, DENG XIAUPING HAS
FACED THE PROBLEM OF REJUSTIFYING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
MAO'S ,CRITIQUE OF THE SOVIET UNION UNDER KHRWSHCHEv
WHILE OVERTHROWING THE LEGITIMACY OF MAO'S CRITIQUE OF
THE CCP LEADERSHIP. ESSENTIALLY DENG HAS BEEN ATTEMPT-
ING TO REHABILITATE "CHINA'S KHRUSCHEV" AT HOME WITHOUT
REHABILITATING THE SOVIET KHRUSHCHEV IN SINO"SOVIET
RELATIONS. ACCORDINGLY. "REVISIONISM" DROPPED OUT OF
USAGE AS APPLIED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN LATE 1978, AS
DENG WAS WINNING CENTRAL COMMITTEE ENDORSEMENT FOR THE
1956 EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS LINE ON CLASS STRUGGLE AT THE
THIRD PLENUM, AND AUTHORITATIVE CHINESE STATEMENTS HAVE
GRADUALLY REDEFINED "REVISIONISM" ACCORDING TO CURRENT
ANTAGONISMS TOWARD MOSCOW. YE JIANYiNO/S 1979 NATIONAL
DAY SPEECH THUS DEFINED REVISIONISM As THE PRACTICE OF
"SOCIAL?FASCISm AT HOME AND HEGEMONIsm ABROAD." THE
SIXTH PLENUm'S HISTORY RESOLUTION UPHELD THE CORRECTNESS
OF MAO'S "JUST STRUGGLE" AGAINST KHRusHCHEV AND THE .
SOVIET "BIG NATION CHAUVINISM" gm" A CHARACTERIZATION
THAT ACCORDS BOTH WITH CHINESE STATEMENTS ON THE NATURE
OF THE CCPs^CPSU DIFFERENCES EARLY IN THE SPLIT AND WITH
CURRENT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOSCOW AS "HEGEMONIST" AND
"SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST." ACCORDINGLY. WE SEE NO GROUNDS
FOR SUSPECTING THAT THESE CHANGED ViEwS ON STALIN ARE
EARLY SIGNALS IN ANY KIND OF PRC OVERTURE TO THE USSR.
NOR ARE THEY EVEN INTENDED BY SOME IN CHINA TO IMPLY A
GROWING CONVERGENCE OF ,CHINESE AND SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL
VIEWPOINTS HINTING AT A COMMON ASSESSMENT OF STALIN*
PREVAILING COMMENTARY IN GENERAL IN TmlS REGARD WOULD
SEEM TO SUGGEST QUITE THE OPPOSITE, DESPITE THE
OBJECTIVE SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES
SOCIALISM AND ITS TASKS THESE DAYS.
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12. OTHER ASPECTS OF RECENT, EXPLICIT CHINESE CRITICISM
OF STALIN SEEM QUITE CONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL PRC
VIEWS. THE 1956 PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLES., FOR EXAMPLE.
ALSO CRITICIZED STALIN FOR HIS TACTICS IN DEALING WITH
FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. PARTICULARLY THE -CCP IN THE
19200S THROUGH 1940'Ss AND FOR HIS RUSSIAN CHAUVISM.
THESE THEMES WERE REITERATED ON OCCASION EVEN THROUGH
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION YEARS. AND REPEATED AS RECENTLY
AS LAST MONTH IN RED FLAG (NO. 17, PAGE 24).
13. HAVING SAID ALL THIS. wE WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE
CONCUR STRONGLY IN THE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE
POLITICAL IMPORT OF LID KEMING'S ViEwS CONTAINED IN REF
EMBASSY CABLES. WE HAVE SEEN ARTICLES IN ECONOMIC
JOURNALS LIKE SHIJIE JINGJI AND IN SOME OF THE PROVIN-
CIAL ACADEMIC JOURNALS SINCE MID?1979 DISCUSSING THE
MERITS AND FAULTS OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN STALIN'S
1952 "ESSAY" EMERGING FROM THE 19TH CPSU CONGRESS EN-
TITLED "ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR."
THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE SEEMED THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR
THE CONTROVERSY BEGUN AROUND THAT TINE OVER THE "AIMS OF
SOCIALIST PRODUCTION" ?? A DEBATE RELATED TO THE RE-
ORIENTATION OF CHINESE INDUSTRY TOWARD CONSUMER PRODUC-
TION AND AwAY.FROM ONE-SIDED STRESS ON ACCUMULATION,
OTHER ARTICLES HAVE SEEMED TO IMPLY A REINTERPRETATION
OF SOVIET HISTORY'S FIRST FE* DECADES. STRESSING IN
PARTICULAR (FOR OBVIOUS REASONS IN VIEW OF CHINA'S
CURRENT READJUSTMENT EFFORT) THE "NE* ECONOMIC PLAN"
PERIOD. THESE REINTERPRETATIONS HAVE SEEMED TO POINT IN
THE DIRECTION OF LID KEMING'S REFORM.mINDED ANALYSIS OF
SOVIET ECONOMIC HISTORY, AS THE EMBASSY HAS SAID, BUT
CERTAINLY FALL SHORT OF HIS VIEWS SO FAR. wE HAVE HAD
ON THE BOOKS HERE FOR SOME TIME PLANS TO DU A LONG
ANALYSIS REPORT ON CHINESE TREATMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
. FROM THIS REFORMIST PERSPECTIVE "1" INCLUDING THE DISCUS-
SION ABOVE ON CLASS STRUGGLE AND ON ECONOMIC STRATEGY.
THE REPORT WILL SPELL OUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRC 1VIEWS
OF THE USSR FOR CHINA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS, SINO?SOVIET
RELATIONS. AND CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD FRATERNAL
COMMUNIST PARTIES IN GENERAL. WITH ANY LUCK. IT *ILL
EMERGE WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. REGARDS TO ALL.
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HAIG
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