PAKISTAN: GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO WIN LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700720002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 23, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/05: CIA-RDP90T00114R000700720002-1
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 November 1987
Pakistan: Government Likely to
Win Local Bodies Elections
Summary
Municipal and local elections scheduled in Pakistan for 30 November will be
the first test of Prime Minister Junejo and his Pakistan Muslim League's
(PML) popularity. The elections officially are nonpartisan, but they will
directly pit PML against its strongest opponent, the Pakistan People's Party
(PPP). Junejo has sought to throw the PPP off balance by establishing a very
short election period that he hopes will limit the PPP's ability to organize. The
Prime Minister also calculates that restrictions on party support for candidates
will work against the PPP.
The Prime Minister's gamble will succeed, we judge. The PPP probably
holds the upper hand in Sind Province and could do well in the North West
Frontier Province, but the election will be decided by results in Punjab Province
where most Pakistanis live. The PPP has been badly undercut in Punjab by
defections, internal fighting, and poor organization. If the PPP does win the
elections, its victory would be a serious but not fatal embarrassment for Junejo.
This memorandum was prepared by Pakistan/Bangladesh
Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Information as of 19 November was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division
NESA 1.087-20113
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In Pakistan's
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Movement for the
local bodies elections,
wish to run. The
held every four years, voters elect
Restoration of Democracy--an umbrella
officials to district (subprovincial),
group of opposition parties--has taken
township (subdistrict), and municipal
no official position on the elections.
governments. These local government
Several of its minor parties, whose
bodies have significant influence
prospects we judge would be poor in
because they disburse federal and
any event, have denounced the elections
provincial development funds. They
as rigged in favor
of the Muslim
have little authority to raise revenues,
however, rendering them subject to the
influence of the federal and provincial
legislatures as well as to the civil service
bureaucracy. Because Pakistani law
permits individuals to concurrently
hold a local office and a provincial or
national assembly seat, the local bodies
elections will also serve as an indirect
referendum on many provincial and
national leaders. The government is
not required to held provincial and
nation' elections before
1990.
All observers agree that the elections
will attract large numbers of
candidates. One independent provincial
assembly member offered a convincing
rationale to US diplomats in Karachi;
local office is a lucrative position, and
t be another election soon.
The election shapes up to be a test of
strength between the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) and the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Both
are making a major nationql
commitment.
Parties as diverse as the pro-Soviet
Awami National Party?not officially
participating but encourag,ing party
members to run, according to its Sind
Chief--and the conservative religious
Jamaat-i-Islamt. will also as;ist
candidates. They must act.
circumspectly as candidates who arc
identifiably supported by a poliiic:O
part' can be disqualified. Not all
parties are pacticipatilig. Ohulam
Mustapha Jatoi, leader of the modelate
National People's Party, has annonneed
his party will not back candidates bui
will not stand in the way or those who
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League.
The Mechanics: Stacking the Deck for
the PML
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LIS diplomatic reporting suggests
that the ground rules for the elections
have been shaped to favor incumbents,
most of whom are members ()I' the
PML. Prime Minister Juncjo has
sought to throw the PPP off balance by
establishing a short election period that
he hopes will limit the PPP's ability to
organize. Although he repeatedly 25X1
vowed to hold elections in 19g7, the
actual 30 November balloting date was
announced only at the end of October
in most provinces and in early
s ? in Sind, the PPP stronghold.
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The Provincial Chief Ministers, who
head the PML in each province, have 25X1
been empowered to set the rules; those
announced for Sind Province arc
typical. Consistent with previous local
elections, the candidates will run on a
nonpartisan basis; the use of political
party names, flags, symbols, or political
platforms is forbidden. Party rallies 25X1
have been prohibited. Candid a les
cannot be excluded from the elections
because of membership, including
holding office, in a political party.
Despite these restrictions, the
candidate
nom inatio n forms require penarctl;
membership, if any. 25X1
U nder the regulations proclaimed by
Cii let' Minister Arbab Jehangir for Inc
Not th West Frontier Province (NW FP),
Candidales sponsOrCd by any political
party %yid be disqualified. We believe
similar restrictions apply in the other
province. One opposition politician
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recently told US diplomats in Karachi
that he thinks Benazir Bhutto's public
announcement that the PPP will back
candidates is a tactical error because it
will facilitate rejection iiLcan4idatcs
identified with the PPP.
We agree with US diplomatic
reporting that these restrictions will
favor incumbents. Opposition parties,
such as the PPP and the Awami
National Party--the Muslim League's
strongest foe in the NWFP--cannot
directly deploy their organizational
strength to help their candidates, most
of whom are challengers. Office
holders, in contrast, can exploit the
strength of their positions, and
patronage historically is a very
powerful tool in Pakistani politics. The
US Consulate in Peshawar notes that
federal and provincial ministers can
pay "official" visits to electoral districts
and use the occasion to informally
endorse the candidacies of their political
allies.
PPP Strategy
The PPP sees the local elections as
its best chance to regain the
momentum lost after the August 1986
street confrontations with the
government. According to the US
Embassy, the PPP had decided by this
spring that it had no alternative but to
reverse its position that participating in
the elections would recognize the
legitimacy of the government. It
decided to contest the elections, even 25X1
though party leaders fear many PPP
candidates could defect to the Muslim
League after taking office. (Many PPP-
backed candidates who won in 1979
later quit the party, succumbing to
government pressure or financial
inducements.) The party held a series
of internal elections this summer aimed
at revitalizing its local leadership. US
diplomats report that the elections
generally advanced this goal but also
exacerbated fighting between moderates
and radicals in the party, particularly
in Punjab. 25X1
According to the US Consulate in
Karachi, the PPP has begun to
distribute lists of candidates to its
workers that it intends to support but
will not release them to the press. The 25X1
lists are divided into three categories; in 25)0
descending order of importance, they
arc "friends of the people," "friends of
democracy," and "good citizens." US
diplomats in Lahore add that Benazir,
contrary to the advice of PPP radicals,
is courting the support of locally
influential leaders in Punjab, including
landlords, religious figures, and biradiri
(clan) leaders. Her father pursued a
similar tactic in the 1977 provincial
and national assembly elections.
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Outlook: A Muslim League Victory
We believe the PML will win the
elections. We define such a victory as
incumbents or candidates identified
with the PML winning a majority of
scats in Punjab, which comprises over
half or Pakistan's population and is its
political center of gravity. Victories
outside Punja b would en ha lice the
PM L's success but arc not essential to
a credible showing. We expect a PML
majority or plurality in the NWFP and
a respectable showing in Baluchistan,
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where party labels historically have not
been important. The PML recently
benefited by an October decision of
leaders of the Jamali tribe of
Baluchistan to join the Muslim League.
We do not expect the PML to do well
in Sind. Rural Sind will almost
certainly be carried by PPP-backed
candidates, while Karachi is likely to be
split among ethnic and religious
parties. US diplomats report that the
PML in Sind is relying heavily on the
local clout of provincial and national
assembly members which is unlikely to
be sufficient to win in Sind.
The PPP faces an uphill battle if it is
to overcome the PML's advantage.
Particularly in Punjab, the party has
been weakened by defections of many
of its local leaders since it fell from
power in 1977, US diplomats report.
The most recent setback was the PPP's
humiliating defeat in a September
National Assembly byelection in
Punjab. US diplomats say that the
PPP-backed candidate had poor ties to
the district and that his candidacy was
badly organized and funded. The
byelection defeat appears to have
accelerated defections from the PPP
and other parties to the PML. For
example, the former president of the
PPP in Karachi and his followers bolted
rate?nartly for the PML in October.
Two facets of the elections will work
to the PPP's disadvantage:
--The elections will be fought on
local issues and cast largely in
terms of popularity contests
between local cornmunity leaders,
thus blunting the coattail effect
of Benazir's strong personal
appeal.
--Local bodies will depend upon the
provincial and federal
governments--firmly controlled
by the PML--for most of their
budgets, increasing incentives to
vote for candidates known to
enjoy PML support. Those PPP
candidates who do win will be
subject to such funding
pressures and ti c ii ted to
join the PML. 25X1
In rural Sind, where the PPP retains
a strong organization, few supporters
have defected to the PML, and
alienation against the federal
government will likely work to the
PPP's advantage there. In the NWFP,
although we believe the PPP has gained
strength since 1977, US diplomats
speculate that it lags behind the PML 25X1
in organization. Neither party has
been strong in Baluchistan. 25X1
The best hope for the PPP is that the 25X1
government may be overconfident.
The PML suffers from organizational
problems,
We speculate that, if the PPP is
defeated, Benazir will seek to minimize
the damage by emphasizing the 25X1
nonpartisan nature of the elections and 25X1
by charging the PML with an unfair
advantage. Even if the PML prevails
WC do not 25X1
believe that Benazir will attempt to
reverse the results through violent
demonstrations. She would probably
conclude that violence would undercut
her longer term strategy of positioning
the PPP as a moderate nationalist
party that is a legitimate contender in
the next national elections. 25X1
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the Muslim Lelva_.te Should Lose
A PML defeat would be a severe
blow to the prestige of Prime Minister
Junejo, particularly if many PM L
members of the provincial and national
I.
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assemblies are defeated. Junejo might
face a parliamentary vote of no
confidence, but we believe he would
survive it because no strong challenger
to his authority has emerged within the
PML.
Bhutto and other opposition leaders
would proclaim the elections a national
referendum and renew their demands
that Junejo resign and hold new
parliamentary elections. Junejo, we
presume, would counter by stressing
the nonpartisan nature of the elections
and would attempt to seize the moral
high ground by asserting that they
demonstrated the democratic nature of
his government. We believe
would resist all calls to resign.
Bcnazir would be faced with the
difficult choice of taking to the streets
to force his resignation or biding her
time until 1990. We believe that she
would elect to do the latter, fearing that
Zia and the Army would rally to
Junejo's support and that the public
would be unwilling to risk Arm
to force a shift in government.
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SUBJECT: Pakistan:
NESA M#87-20113
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
Government Likely to Win Local Bodies Election-
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1 - Robert Peck (State)
1 - Robert Flaten (State)
1 - Jeffrey Lundstead (State)
1 - Ann McDonald (AID)
1 - Sherin Tahir-Khali (NSC)
1 - Rena Epstein (State)
INTERNAL:
1 - DCl/DDCl/Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
1 - analyst
DDI/NESA/SO/P/
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23Nov87) 25X1
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