MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC 1961

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A002600060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
N? 3
MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
1961
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
This report is designed to present a brief survey of the significant
developments in merchant shipping of the Sino-Soviet Bloc during the
calendar year 1961. In addition to providing a brief analysis of the
growth and performance of the Bloc fleets, the report outlines the major
activities of Bloc merchant fleets insofar as they bear on Bloc capa-
bility to compete with non-Bloc merchant fleets.
The information in this report was derived principally from official
publications and announcements.
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Bloc Wide Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Growth of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. Performance of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Coordinated Shipping Services in Southeast Asia . . 4
D. Coordinated Shipping Service to West Africa . . . . 6
E. Sino-Satellite Merchant Shipping Activities . . . . 7
II. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Growth of the Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Performance of the Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Soviet Seaborne Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . 11
D. Increased Demands on Soviet Seaports . . . . . . 12
E. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962 . . . . . . 13
III. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Growth of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. General . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 15
2. Origins and Costs of Added Tonnage . . . . . . . 15
3. Characteristics of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Performance of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Utilization of Foreign Shipping . . . . . . . . . . 19
D. Other Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
a. Areas of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
b. Seaborne Foreign Trade and Port Traffic . . 22
E. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962 . . . . . . 23
1. Growth of the Fleets . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 23
2. Utilization of Polish Vessels . . . . . . . . . 23
3. Seaborne Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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Page
IV. Communist Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Performance of the Fleets . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C. Utilization of Foreign Shipping . . . . . . . . . . 27
D. Chinese Ships in International Trade . . . . . . . . 28
E. Growth of the Chinese Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
F. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962 . . . . . . 29
Appendix
Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tables
1. Performance of the Merchant Fleets of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc, 1957-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Origins and Costs of Additions to the Merchant Fleet of
the USSR, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Performance of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR, 1945,
1950, 1955-61, and Plans for 1962 and 1965 . . . . . . 10
4. Exports of Petroleum from Ports of the USSR, 1959-61 . .
5. Origins and Costs of Additions to the Merchant Fleets of
the European Satellites, 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Characteristics of the Merchant Fleets of the European
Satellites, 1960-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Performance of the Merchant Fleets of the European
Satellites, 1957-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Estimated Performance of the Merchant Fleets of the
Communist Far East, 1957-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9. Origins of Additions to the Merchant Fleet of Communist
China, 1957-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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Page
10. Merchant Fleets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by Type, Number,
and Tonnage, 1958-61 and 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. Estimated Seaborne Foreign Trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
1955 and 1958-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. Merchant Fleets of the European Satellites, by Type,
Number, and Tonnage, 1958-61 and 1965 . . . . . . . . .
Chart
USSR: Ton-Mile Performance of the Maritime Fleet, 1950,
1955-61, and Plans for 1962 and 1965 following page . . . . 10
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MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC*
1961
I. Bloc Wide Developments
A. Growth of the Fleets
The net additions to the vessel tonnage of the combined merchant
fleet of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1961 dropped considerably from the
peak attained in 1960.** The net tonnages added during 1956-61 were as
follows (in thousand deadweight tons -- DWT***):
Year
Total
USSR
Communist
China
European
Satellites
1961
686.2
380.9
55.6
249.7
1960
962.4
574.2
127.8
260.4
1959
632.4
280.1
128.0
224.3
1958
573.5
245.0
126.2
202.3
1957
398.5
209.1
61.4
128.0
1956
243.2
217.0
18.2
8.0
The largest decreases occurred in the additions to the Soviet
and Chineset fleets, the acquisitions by China being the lowest since
1956. The decline in additions to the Soviet fleet during 1961 was a
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 October 1962.
** The discussion of ships and fleets (as distinct from the per-
formances of the Bloc fleets) throughout this report refers only to
ships of 1,000 gross register tons (GRT) and above and does not include
ships in the Caspian Sea. Figures for the Soviet fleet include refriger-
ator ships in the fishing fleet. (Gross register tonnage is a measure of
the cubic capacity of the cargo space of a ship expressed in tons at the
rate of 1 gross register ton per 100 cubic feet.) Tonnages are given in
metric tons throughout this report.
*** Deadweight tonnage is a measure of the carrying capacity of a ship
in metric tons -- that is, the difference between the ship's displace-
ment light and its displacement loaded.
t Unless otherwise indicated, the terms Chinese and China as used in
this report refer to the Chinese Communists and Communist China.
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temporary phenomenon, reflecting a shift to the acquisition-of modern
cargo liners and supertankers. Acquisitions for the Soviet fleet in
1962 are expected almost to double the volume of acquisitions in 1961.
Additions to the Satellite fleets are expected to rise in 1962 and also
probably will surpass the 1960 peak.
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the growth of the
Chinese fleet in 1962 and 1963. The drastic decline in ship acquisitions
during 1961 probably was due principally to a decline in coastal traffic
and to shortcomings in domestic shipbuilding. Purchases from Western
shipowners also declined, even though the Chinese continued to charter
a large number of Western ships for the import trade, thereby failing
to take advantage of a possibility of saving foreign exchange both
currently and ultimately. The Chinese have been making a sizable out-
lay of foreign exchange to charter Western ships to carry grain and
sugar imports, and the volume of imports in 1962 is expected not only
to be greater than in 1961 but also to involve greater distances. In
the current state of the ship sales market, China could buy a Liberty-
type ship for what the country is and has been paying to time-charter
one comparable ship for less than a year: even under the most favor-
able consecutive-voyage charters, China expends the foreign exchange
equivalent of the cost of a Liberty ship in less than 8 months.
Furthermore, if the Chinese-owned ships have been as idle as evidence
indicates, there is no obvious explanation for the failure of China to
use its own shipping to reduce foreign exchange expenditures.
Although the proportion of tanker tonnage in the combined fleet
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc increased in 1961, the actual tonnage added,
257,400 DWT, was less than the 321,900 DWT added in 1960 (see Table l0**).
The largest increase was again in the Soviet fleet. Dry cargo tonnage
increased by 428,800 DWT, bringing the Bloc fleet, including tankers,
to a total of 1,252 ships and 7.2 million DWT at the end of 1961. This
figure represents only 4.5 percent of the world fleet of ships of 1,000
GRT and above.*-** In terms of size of fleets, the combined fleet of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc now ranks seventh largest among world fleets, with
the combined fleet of the Soviet Bloc ranking eighth and the Soviet
fleet alone ranking thirteenth.
* The secondhand market reached a peak in the fall of 1961 and spring
of 1962. Prices since then have been at the depressed level obtaining
before September 1961, and current sales by Western countries to the
Bloc are being made under relatively long-term credit arrangements.
-* Appendix, p. 33, below.
XXX Not including the US reserve fleet.
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Total investment by the Sino-Soviet Bloc in fleet expansion in
1961 probably amounted to about $204+ million. The major proportion of
this sum was spent in Bloc shipyards or transfers of ships among Bloc
members. Only about $58 million was paid to non-Bloc countries com-
pared with about $70 million in 1960.
B. Performance of the Fleets*
Although the tons carried by the combined fleet of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc declined slightly in 1961 because of the reduced activity
of the Chinese fleet, the ton-mile performance increased to more than
136 billion ton-miles** in 1961, as shown in Table 1.*** The over-all
increase in ton-mile performance is a result principally of the in-
creased average length of haul of the Soviet fleet. The average length
of haul of Chinese vessels, operating almost entirely on the Chinese
coast, was around 400 nautical miles, whereas the average length of
haul of Soviet vessels in 1961 increased by 16 percent to 1,089 nautical
miles, and the average length of haul of Satellite vessels decreased
by 13 percent to 2,960 nautical miles. With the European Satellite
fleets continuing to engage in the more distant trades, ton-miles per-
formed by Satellite ships amounted to 28 percent of the total Bloc per-
formance in spite of the fact that the Satellites accounted for only
11 percent of the tons carried by the combined Bloc fleet.
Again in 1961, non-Bloc ships carried about 70 percent of the
total seaborne foreign trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (see Table llt).
Actual tons moved by non-Bloc ships increased from about 59 million
tons in 1960 to about 73 million tons in 1961. The volume of Bloc sea-
borne trade is still increasing too fast for the Bloc to reduce its
utilization of non-Bloc shipping. Only three of the individual fleets --
the Polish, East German, and Bulgarian -- apparently managed to reduce
the amounts carried by Western ships. These fleets also are expected to
increase substantially in vessel tonnage in 1962.
During the year the Chinese put three ships into the Southeast
Asia trade, the first Chinese-flag ships to engage in international
tradett. Although they probably carried only about 150,000 tons of the
approximately 14.5 million tons of Chinese seaborne overseas trade, this
development is significant as the first move by China into non-Bloc
trading waters.
* The discussion of performance throughout this report includes per-
formances of vessels under 1,000 GRT.
* Mileages are given in nautical miles throughout this report.
*** Table 1 follows on p. 4.
t Appendix, p. 34+, below.
tt With the exception of the route between China and North Vietnam,
started some years ago.
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Performance of the Merchant Fleets
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1957-61
Area
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
USSR
65.7
70.8
73.5
75.9
78.5
European Satellites b/
5.0
5.8
7.4
9.9
13.0
Communist Far East c
13.4
19.1
29.7
38.0
30.4
Total A/
84.1
95.7
110.5
123.8
121.9
Billion Ton Miles ,
USSR
50.0
57.4
62.5
71.0
85.5
European Satellite
13.7
17.1
24.9
33.6
38.5
s
Communist Far East c
7.1
8.3
11.5
15.2
12.0
Total
70.8
82.8
98.9
119.8
136.0
a. Including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. For details by country, see Table 7, p. 19, below.
c. For details by country, see Table 8, p. 26, below. Data have been
amended in this report to eliminate the performance by Free World ships
chartered by China to carry Chinese coastal cargo.
d. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
e. Metric ton - nautical miles.
C. Coordinated Shipping Services in Southeast Asia
In 1961 and early 1962 the plans of the Bloc to establish a
shipping. cartel suffered some setbacks and some advances, but no major
coordination moves were apparent in 1961 beyond the entry of China in-
to the trade -- which may or may not have been in conjunction with the
plans of the Eastern Bloc. The most significant developments occurred
in the first 6 months of 1962.
In February 1962, Indonesia and the USSR signed an agreement
to establish direct shipping service without third-party representation.
In March, Indonesia offered Chinese ships preferential treatment in ex-
change for regular service, presumably at lower than Conference rates.
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In March 1962 the Burma Agents Corporation in Rangoon, which
previously had been selected as future general agent for the cartel,
reportedly was directed by the government of Burma not to provide cargo
for Bloc ships. As a consequence, the Bloc decided to drop the Burma
Agents Corporation as cartel coordinator and to move the headquarters
for a general agency to Singapore. In May the Rumanian Economic Sec-
retary at Rangoon applied for a visa to Singapore, where he was to
organize a new headquarters for the cartel. The cartel was to be
organized not only for the purpose of coordinating shipping services
but also for cargo dumping, key dumping targets being Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, and Djakarta. Developments in June 1962, reflecting an ap-
parent change in the shipping policies of the Burmese government, re-
sulted in the Soviet Black Sea Steamship Lines officially appointing
Burma Agents Corporation as agents in Rangoon for both Soviet-owned
and Soviet-chartered ships. It now appears that the trip of the Ruma-
nian representative to Singapore was to appoint subagents rather than
general agents. The original Soviet plan to place 10 to 12 Soviet
ships into regular liner service from the Black Sea to the Far East
(including Japan) is reported to be still in effect, with only the
date moved forward from early 1962 to early 1963.
In spite of the delays in setting up the shipping cartel, there
continued to be frequent instances of Bloc shipping undercutting es-
tablished Conference tariffs. About May 1961, China sent the first
Chinese-flag ships into the territory, calling principally at Burma,
Indonesia, and Ceylon.* Evidence of rate cutting was obtained in Hong
Kong, where rates charged by Chinese ships were 30 to 40 percent below
Conference rates. No reports have yet been received of Chinese rate
cutting from other ports.
In Bangkok, where 16 Polish ships and 2 East German ships called
during the year, low rates were offered by the Polish ships inbound
from Europe and by the East German ships outbound to Europe. There
were several calls by Chinese-chartered ships for cargo between Thailand
and China, including Hong Kong, which undoubtedly offered low rates.
A Bangkok press item in February 1962 reported the decision of the Hong
Kong - Bangkok Conference to reduce rates, which were raised in October
1961, because most of the cargo moving between Bangkok and Hong Kong
was moving on non-Conference ships.
The two East German ships calling at Bangkok, both in October
1961, did so without official approval, and the Thailand Immigration
Department issued a letter in February 1962 repeating that East German
ships were not allowed to enter Thai ports. Permission was still
granted Polish ships on an. official "exception" basis.
* The terminus was recently expanded to Yemen but apparently not on a
regular basis.
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In July 1961, East German rate-cutting activities at Rangoon
eased because four ships on the Far East Line were shifted to the Cuban,
Canadian, and South American runs. Two of the remaining three Far East
Line ships which could have called at Rangoon called at Bangkok instead.
Nevertheless, the Burma-Homeward Conference (Burma-UK/Continent), even
in the absence of East German competition, had raised its rates by
November to only about 70 percent of the level in effect before the
East German slashing of rates.
D. Coordinated Shipping Service to West Africa
In the fall of 1961, East Germany officially joined Poland in
shipping service to West Africa, and the joint operation was named the
United West Africa Service (Uniafrika). Headquarters are still at
Szczecin in the offices of the Polish Steamship Company, and the East
German ships are served by the same network of representatives developed
by the Polish Steamship Company. The joint line is composed of three
ships of the VEB Deutsche Seereederei, four ships of the Polish Steam-
ship Company, and four Western ships time-chartered by the Polish Steam-
ship Company. Early in 1962, East Germany put two rebuilt banana boats
(purchased in 1960 from France) into the service to Guinea, and these
ships may eventually come under Uniafrika. According to published re-
ports, the Czechoslovaks also were to join Uniafrika on 1 July 1962,
but no Czechoslovak ships have been observed in this trade to date.
The agreement for Uniafrika is almost certainly a result of
long debate in circles of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA), and there is evidence that Poland resisted East German incur-
sions or demands on a Polish service that was proving to be of value
to Poland. In the agreement to make it a joint service, not only is
Czechoslovakia expected to join, but the Polish and East German press
report that African countries also can enter the joint service. In
July 1961, when the agreement was first signed, various East German
sources reported that the Ghanaian Black Star Line was to join. This
the government of Ghana denied, "protesting vigorously" to the East
German Trade Representative in Accra. The Ghanaian company is a Confer-
ence member, is being advised by officials of the Israeli ZIM Navigation
Company, and reportedly is doing well financially. Although there is
no doubt that Ghana is the only West African country owning a shipping
line which could be associated with the Uniafrika agreement, initially,
at least, it has rejected membership.
One of the initial reports announcing the Uniafrika agreement
revealed that the joint service would maintain its freight rates 10 to
15 percent below Conference rates in an attempt to break the Conferences.
All later reports make no mention of Conferences or rates. The rate-
cutting aspects of the earlier report do conform, however, to previous
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East German discussion on the subject of Conferences and capitalist
monopolies and may be a true picture of the East German and possibly
the CEMA attitude. The Polish line, however, may resist rate-cutting
tactics, as Poland generally has a history of joining or associating
with Conferences and otherwise cooperating with the international
shipping organizations. It is believed that the West African service
has been a profitable venture for the Polish Steamship Company (PZM).
When PZM first began this West Africa line in 1959, it carried
53,911 tons, including cargo carried by time-chartered ships. In 1960
these cargoes increased to 188,931 tons and to 309,000 tons in 1961.
A proportion of the traffic was non-Polish cargo, including cargo to
and from Western Europe, on which Poland earned foreign exchange.
Under the joint agreement, calls will continue to be made on the out-
bound trip at Portugal and inbound at France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
West Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. It is unlikely that the East German
ships, however, will make as many calls at non-Bloc European ports.
The African end of the route has been divided into two ranges, northern
and southern, covering 14 West African ports plus three optional ports.
The East German ships are to serve, for the time being, only five of
these ports: Conakry, Takoradi, Accra, Tema, and Lagos/Apapa.
E. Sino-Satellite Merchant Shipping Activities
In December 1961 China and Albania signed an agreement forming
a joint stock shipping company, the third such Sino-Satellite shipping
company.* Two Albanian ships are presently assigned to the Sino-Albanian
Shipping Company: the Durres (5,100 DWT, built in Poland in 1961) and
the Vlora (12,446 DWT, built in Italy in 1960), both acquired by Albania
in 1971-. It is certain that the Vlora was purchased at least with
Chinese aid funds ($3.1 million), and it may in fact be owned by China.
The company plans to acquire more ships, and Albania has made inquiries
in the Western secondhand ship market. Therefore, 1962-63 may see the
purchase of one or two more ships of 10,000 to 12,000 DWT for the Sino-
Albanian company.
II. USSR
A. Growth of the Fleet
During 1961 the Soviet maritime fleet acquired 435,000 DWT of
new vessels. Although this figure is almost 30 percent less than
* The other two are the Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Corporation (Chipol-
brok), created in 1951, and the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping Company
("international stock company"), created in 1959.
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the recordbreaking tonnage delivered in 1960, it is nevertheless greater
than any tonnage delivered to the fleet during any year before 1960.
Deliveries included 37 dry cargo vessels and 9 tankers for the Ministry
of the Maritime Fleet and 10 refrigerator ships for the Ministry of the
Fish Industry. The estimated value of these new vessels in current world
market prices is $128 million.
All of the vessels delivered were of new construction, and all
were equipped with modern diesel, steam turbine, or gas turbine pro-
pulsion machinery, making them competitive with the latest vessels in
the fleets of the Free World. Deliveries included lead vessels of a
number of important classes scheduled for series production. Some im-
portant characteristics of the vessels in these classes are shown below:
Name
Country
of
of
Speed
Lead Vessel
Type of Vessel
Build
DWT
(Knots)
Omsk
Dry cargo*
Japan
12,000
19
Poltava
Dry cargo*
USSR
12,500
17
Krasnograd
Dry cargo-
Finland
12,200
17
Am ema
Icebreaker-cargoes
USSR
7,100
16
Bauska
Tanker
Poland
19,000
16
The small proportion of tankers among the new classes of vessels
introduced and the drop of more than 100,000 DWT in tanker deliveries
during 1961 represent only a temporary lull in the expansion of the Soviet
tanker fleet pending the acquisition of supertankers of.the latest design.
The number, tonnage, and estimated costs of the ships added to
the Soviet fleet in 1961 are shown in Table 2.***
Deliveries from each of the three major sources were signifi-
cantly lower than in 1960. Deliveries from Soviet shipyards decreased
the most, from 219,130 to 144,660 DWT.
After allowing for deletions from the fleet resulting from sink-
ings, retirements, and other causes, the net effect of the above deliveries
was an increase in the size of the Soviet maritime fleet from 829 vessels
* Vessels of these classes have oversized hatch openings and super-
structure aft to facilitate the carrying of aircraft, heavy industrial
equipment, and other awkward cargo.
** These vessels are an improved version of the Dutch-built Lena class,
designed for cargo-carrying operations under extreme arctic conditions.
*** Table 2 follows on p. 9.
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Origins and Costs of Additions
to the Merchant Fleet J of the USSR
1961
Area
Units
Deadweight Tons
Estimated Value b/
(Million US $)
USSR
15
144,660
45.4
European Satellites
30
149,265
49.8
Free World
11
140,910
33.0
56
434,835
128.2
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. In terms of current Free World market prices.
totaling 4.5 million DWT at the end of 1960 to 871 vessels totaling
4.9 million DWT at the end of 1961 (see Table 10*). The combined
effect of the deliveries and deletions in 1961 was a reduction in the
average age of the vessels in the fleet from 14 to 13 years and favor-
able increases in the average size and average speed of these vessels.
B. Performance of the Fleet
During 1961 the cargo turnover of the Soviet maritime fleet
exceeded 85 billion ton-miles (see Table 3**). This figure represents
an annual increase of close to 15 billion ton-miles, almost twice the
highest increase previously achieved. More important, it is 10 billion
ton-miles greater than the cargo turnover anticipated for 1961 in the
control figures of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65), a further indication
that the Seven Year Plan will be overfulfilled by a wide margin.***
* Appendix, p. 33, below.
Table 3 follows on p. 10.
*** The control figures are the planned performance figures for the in-
dividual years of the plan period envisaged at the time of the publi-
cation of the Seven Year Plan. There is no reason to expect these fig-
ures to correspond to the annual plan figures normally published near
the beginning of each year, inasmuch as the latter reflect changes in
expectations for fulfillment which may have occurred subsequent to the
publication of the control figures. In the case of ton-mile performance
by the Soviet maritime fleet, the control figures for the first 3 years
of the Seven Year Plan have been exceeded by successively higher per-
centages: 1.8 in 1959, 5.7 in 1960, and 13.7 in 1961.
-9-
S -E -C -R -E-T
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Table 3
Performance of the Maritime Fleet of the USSR a
1945, 1950, 1955-61, and Plans for 1962 and 19 5
Million Metric Tons
Billion Ton Miles
1945
20.2
18.5
1950
33.7
21.4
1955
53.7
37.2
1956
57.7
44.5
1957
65.7
50.0
1958
70.8
57.4
1959
73.5
62.5
1960
75.9
71.0
1961
78.5
85.5
1962 Plan
86.8
109.4
1965 Plan
138.1
172.2
a. Including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. Metric ton - nautical miles.
c. Estimated.
The growth in the cargo turnover of the Soviet maritime fleet
since 1955 can be accounted for entirely by the increased activity of
the fleet in carrying foreign navigation cargoes, most of them on
Soviet account. As the chart* reveals, the cargo turnover performed
in the carrying of Soviet cabotage (coastal and intercoastal) cargoes
has actually diminished slightly since 1955, while that performed in
carrying foreign trade and interport cargoes has increased by almost
300 percent.**
Following p. 10.
Soviet tonnage and ton-mile performance figures for the maritime
fleet are normally divided between those performed in "cabotage navi-
gation," which reflect the activities of Soviet vessels carrying
coastal and intercoastal domestic cargoes, and "foreignnavigation,"
which reflect the activities of Soviet vessels carrying Soviet foreign
trade and cargoes between foreign ports (interport cargoes). The ac-
tivities of vessels carrying intercoastal cargoes and cargoes between
foreign ports make up a small part of the whole.
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USSR
TON-MILE PERFORMANCE OF THE MARITIME FLEET
1950, 1955-61, and Plans for 1962 and 1965 *
0
0
\a~`
Q
BILL
ION T
ON-MIL
ES
/
/
TO
TAL
00.~
00000,
FOREI
GN
0Z
-
N
AVIGA
TION
000,
Q\a~
CABOTAGE
*Revised plan data ind
icate a new
goal for 19
65 of 172.2 billion ton-miles. There
are no comparable dat
a available fo
r the planne
d ton-mile turnover in cabotage and
foreign navigation.
1950
36550 12-62
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
GROUP I
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In 1961, as in 1960, there was considerable disparity between
the growth rate for cargo turnover measured in ton-miles and that for
performance measured in tons of cargo carried. The volume of cargo
carried by the Soviet maritime fleet increased by only 3.4 percent in
1961, whereas cargo turnover in ton-miles increased by 20.4 percent.
This change indicates that the Soviet maritime fleet is engaging in-
creasingly in longer distance trade. Thus the average length of haul
has risen steadily, from 761 miles in 1957 to 1,089 miles in 1961.
C. Soviet Seaborne Foreign Trade
Soviet seaborne foreign trade increased from 45 million tons
in 1960 to almost 59 million tons in 1961.* More than 60 percent of
this increase resulted from the growth of exports of petroleum from
Soviet Black Sea and Baltic ports (see Table 4) and of imports of
sugar from Cuba.
Table 4
Exports of Petroleum from Ports of the USSR
1959-61
Sea Basin of Origin
1959
1960
1961
Black Sea
14.6
19.0
25.3
Baltic Sea
Negl.
1.5
2.1
Far Eastern
Negl.
0.2
0.1
Total
14.6
20.7
27.5
Exports of petroleum from Soviet ports increased by almost 7
million tons in 1961. Petroleum movements to Cuba, Italy, Japan, and
Egypt accounted for 5 million tons of the increased exports. Deliveries
were made for the first time to Burma and Yemen.
During 1961 the potential for exports from the Baltic was in-
creased by the opening of Ventspils as the second Baltic petroleum port**
and the delivery of additional tankers to the new and growing tanker
fleet of the Latvian Steamship Company.
* This figure includes cargo carried in Soviet and foreign vessels
(see Table 11, Appendix, p. 34, below).
X The first Soviet port on the Baltic to be used for the export of
petroleum was Klaypeda. Shipments of petroleum from this port began at
the end of 1959.
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The seaborne trade of the USSR with Cuba increased significantly
during 1961. Soviet exports of petroleum to Cuba rose from 2.2 million
to 3.8 million tons, while exports of dry cargo rose from 0.4 million
to 0.5 million tons. Soviet imports of Cuban sugar increased from 1.5
million to 3.3 million tons.
In 1961, for the third successive year, the share of Soviet sea-
borne trade carried in Soviet vessels dropped. As Table 11 reveals,*
although the actual volume carried in Soviet vessels increased from
18 million to 21 million tons, the percentage share carried by them
dropped from 41 to 36 percent. Major factors in the disproportionately
greater increase in the volume carried by foreign vessels were the
sharp increases in the volume of exports of petroleum carried in
foreign tankers, from 13.6 million to 18.6 million tons, and of im-
ports of sugar in foreign dry cargo ships.
D. Increased Demands on Soviet Seaports
The rapid growth of Soviet seaborne trade has led to a corre-
spondingly rapid growth in the volume of cargo handled by Soviet sea-
ports. From the point of view of cargo handled, these ports appear to
be meeting the demands placed on them, and in 1961 the volume of cargo
handled by Soviet ports exceeded the plan. Nevertheless, port congestion
has become a serious problem, resulting in expensive losses of time from
prolonged demurrage by Soviet and foreign vessels and by railroad rolling
stock. The seriousness of this problem led to the calling of a high-
level meeting in Moscow on 30 January 1962 and was one of the factors
behind Khrushchev's recent decision to create a special committee sub-
ordinate to the Council of Ministers to coordinate activities in the
field of transportation. The meeting, attended by officials of the
ministries responsible for rail and sea transport and foreign trade,
emphasized the need for closer coordination among the ministries and
organizations involved.
Poor coordination is not the only reason for port congestion.
Soviet port officials complain that capital investment in pier frontage,
warehouse space, and bunkering facilities in ports has not kept up with
investment in new ships. Shipments of general cargo, which require a
considerable amount of manual labor in handling, are increasing faster
than shipments of bulk cargo. As a result, many ports are experiencing
shortages of stevedores.
Some of the measures that the USSR is contemplating to relieve
port congestion include stepped-up capital investment in ports, the
specialization of ports in the handling of specific types and classes
* Appendix, p. 34, below.
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of cargo, and the diversion of manpower to key ports. Steps already
taken include the raising of norms for longshore work and the es-
tablishment of new machinery for coordination between organizations in
the fields of trade and transportation. During 1961, in an effort to
utilize port facilities normally out of operation for part of the
winter because of ice, the USSR began to use its newest and most power-
ful conventional icebreakers to extend the navigation seasons in a
number of ports including Nagayevo, Riga, and Leningrad.
E. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962
It appears likely that deliveries to the Soviet fleet during
1962 will be close to 740,000 DWT, considerably more than the previous
high of about 603,000 DWT achieved in 1960. Deliveries of dry cargo
vessels will include a heavy proportion of modern cargo liners of from
10,000 to 15,000 DWT with speeds in excess of 17 knots, among them new
models from Polish and Danish shipyards. Seven of the 15 tankers
planned for delivery in 1962 will be in the range of 19,000 to 35,000
DWT. The tankers in this size range will include the first four units
under a contract with Japan for 35,000-DWT tankers of the Lisichansk
class, a 32,000-DWT Sevoyno-class tanker from Yugoslavia,* 7a 28,970-DWT
Pekin-class tanker from the USSR, and a 19,000-DWT Bauska-class tanker
from Poland.
Combined deliveries of tankers and dry cargo vessels for the
remaining years of the Seven Year Plan will average close to 1 million
DWT per year. The USSR expects to exceed the goal of the Seven Year
Plan for expansion of the fleet as a whole by 1 million tons. This
fact is deceiving, however. It appears likely that the tonnage of the
tanker fleet at the end of 1965 will exceed the original plan control
figure by as much as 103 percent, while the tonnage of the dry cargo
fleet will be as much as 8 percent below plan. The chief reason for
the stepping up of tanker acquisitions appears to have been a rise in
* Under the original terms of a trade agreement between Yugoslavia and
the USSR signed in the spring of 1961, Yugoslavia was to deliver 16
tankers of 25,400 DWT to the USSR during 1961-65. The USSR and Yugo-
slavia have subsequently announced the signing of a contract under which
Yugoslavia is obliged to deliver nine tankers of 20,800 DWT during 1964
and 1965. In view of the large number of vessels currently on order in
Yugoslav shipyards for Free World and Satellite owners, it appears
likely that the deliveries specified under the contract are intended to
replace rather than supplement those specified under the trade agreement.
Even assuming a reduction in planned deliveries from Yugoslavia, deliver-
ies of tankers of 19,000 DWT and above planned for 1962-65 total
28 vessels with a combined tonnage of close to 1 million DWT.
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output and in exports of petroleum that was not anticipated at the
time the plan was drawn up. The prospective failure to fulfill the
plan for the acquisition of dry cargo vessels reflects reduced expec-
tations for increases in the volume of dry cargo moved rather than
difficulties in building or buying such vessels.
The record-breaking increase in the tonnage of the fleet planned
for 1962 should be reflected in the performance of the fleet. Cargo
turnover in ton-miles is planned to increase by 28 percent. There is
no reason to believe, however, that this high rate of growth will con-
tinue into the remaining 3 years of the plan period. Recently it has
been revealed that the USSR expects cargo turnover in 1965 to be three
times rather than two times the level of 1958 as originally planned.
To achieve the new goal, the average annual increase in turnover during
1963-65 will have to average only 16 percent.
Prospects for fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan goal for the
volume of cargo carried looked doubtful through the end of 1961.*
During the first 3 years of the plan period the average annual increase
in this series has remained below 4 percent. The planned increase for
1962 of 10.6 percent and the revised 1965 goal for cargo turnover in-
dicate, however, that this series will rise at an increased rate during
1963-65. As previously pointed out, the contrast in the outlook for
fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan performance goals in ton-miles and
tons carried stems from an increase in the average length of haul that
was not foreseen in 1958 when the plan was formulated. If during
1963-65 the average length of haul remains at the level planned for
1962, 1,260 miles, the original goal for 1965 for increase in cargo
volume should be overfulfilled.
Significant increases are anticipated for 1962 in the volumes
of timber, ore, sugar, coal, machinery, and petroleum carried by the
Soviet fleet in all classes of navigation. The volume of petroleum
exported from the Baltic will increase by almost 100 percent to 4 million
tons in 1962. To attain this performance, the USSR is planning the
transfer of a number of 11,500-DWT tankers of the Kazbek class from the
Black Sea to the jurisdiction of the Latvian Steamship Company in the
Baltic. It is planned to increase the size of the tanker fleet subordi-
nate to the Latvian Steamship Company to between 40 and 50 units by the
end of 1965. This increase will be accomplished partly by the transfers
from the Black Sea and partly by deliveries of new vessels, including
tankers of 19,000 DWT from Poland and 20,800 DWT from Yugoslavia.
The volume of timber exported to Japan, Cuba, Communist China,
and other countries from the Soviet Far East is planned to double in
1962 for a total of 1.4 million tons.
* See Table 3, p. 10, above.
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III. European Satellites
A. Growth of the Fleets
1. General
In 1961, although the additions to the combined European
Satellite fleets were less than in 1960, the rate of growth was the
highest in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As a result, the combined fleets of
the European Satellites accounted for 22 percent of the Bloc carrying
capacity in 1961 compared with only 20 percent in 1960 (see Table 10*).
Both East Germany and Poland added fewer oceangoing ships
in 1961 than in 1960, although East Germany carried on extensive ne-
gotiations for secondhand ships. Ship deliveries have been up in the
first half of 1962 for both Poland and East Germany, and the growth of
their fleets probably will accelerate in 1962. Rumania in 1961 made
considerable progress toward attaining the planned goal for 1965,** and
Bulgaria also was active in ship purchases in 1961, exceeding the
tonnage plan for the year. Albania in 1961 acquired its first large
ship (12,400 DWT), which was purchased for the new Sino-Albanian
Shipping Company.
2. Origins and Costs of Added Tonnage
In 1961, as in 1960, the pattern of acquisitions by the
European Satellites showed an increase in the purchase of secondhand
ships from the West, although the buying patterns of the individual
Satellite countries changed considerably. Poland bought about the
same amount of secondhand tonnage as the year before. Bulgaria and
Albania were the only other countries to buy secondhand ships, Bulgaria
having purchased exclusively secondhand and in an amount exceeding the
purchases of Poland and Albania combined. East Germany, which acquired
more than half of its additional tonnage in 1960 through the purchase
of secondhand ships, bought none in 1961. The cost of Satellite ship
purchases in 1961 (not including ships under 1,000 GRT) is estimated
to have been about $65.4 million (see Table 5***), an amount that is
almost identical with the estimated costs in 1960 of $65.0 million.
Purchases from non-Bloc shipyards, which accounted for al-
most 18 percent of all vessel tonnage acquired, were only slightly
Appendix, p. 33, below.
Three of the ships reported to have been added by Rumania in 1960
in the account by this Office of merchant shipping in the Sino-Soviet
Bloc for 1960 actually were delivered to the fleet in 1961.
*** Table 5 follows on p. 16.
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Origins and Costs of Additions to the Merchant Fleets
of the European Satellites
1961
Newly Built Ships
Country
Total
Secondhand From Bloc
Ships Shipyards
From Non-Bloc
Shipyards
Thousand Deadweight Tons
Poland
127.1
43.0
44.7
39.5
East Germany
50.1
0
50.1
0
Czechoslovakia
0
0
0
0
Bulgaria
71.4
71.4
0
0
Rumania
29.5
0
16.7
12.8
Hungary
1.3
0
1.3
0
Albania
17.5
12.4
5.1
0
Total
2W. 0
126.8
117.9
52.3
Million US $
Poland
28.0
1.4
16.0
10.6
East Germany
16.3
0
16.3
0
Czechoslovakia
0
0
0
0
Bulgaria
4.5
4.5
0
0
Rumania
11.3
0
7.5
3.8
Hungary
0.7
0
0.7
0
Albania
4.6
3.1
1.5
0
Total
65.4
0
42.0
14.4
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
c. Estimated costs of ships built in Bloc and Yugoslav shipyards
represent the values at prices prevailing at those Western shipyards
whose costs are believed to be most comparable with those at Bloc
and Yugoslav shipyards.
d. All from Yugoslav shipyards.
- 16 -
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higher than in 1960 and were still well below the 1959 level of 32 per-
cent. All ships delivered from non-Bloc shipyards in 1961 were from
Yugoslavia. Although Poland took delivery in early 1962 of a ship of
8,400 DWT from French yards and has two ships totaling 24,800 DWT on
order in a Danish yard, Yugoslavia will still be a large supplier in
1962. There have been negotiations by various Satellite countries con-
cerning ships for order or presently being built in Japanese, Norwegian,
West German, Spanish, and other Western yards, but no firm orders have
been placed.
Seven tankers were added to the European Satellite fleets
in 1961: two from Soviet yards, one from a Yugoslav yard, and four
(purchased secondhand) from the West.
3. Characteristics of the Fleets
As shown in Table 6, only the Rumanian fleet declined in
1961 in terms of average size, and the average size of the combined
Characteristics of the Merchant Fleets of the European Satellites
1960-61
Average Size b/
(Deadweight Tons)
Average Age
(Years)
Average Speed
(Knots)
Country
1960
1961
1960
1961
1960
1961
-
Poland
7,060
7,250
13.4
12.7
13.4
13.5
East Germany
8,310
8,320
9.7
9.0
14.2
14.2
Czechoslovakia
10,300
10,450
9.3
8.1
14.7
14.7
Bulgaria
4,940
6,620
13.5
13.7
11.7
11.8
Rumania
4,900
4,580
36.3
20.5
12.1
12.3
Hungary
1,210
1,220
8.0
7.9
10.2
10.1
Albania
2,800
4,780
2.0
2.5
11.5
12.5
All European
Satellites
6,850
7,020
13.1
12.0
13.2
13.3
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. Rounded to the nearest 10 DWT.
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fleets increased by 2 percent to 7,020 DWT. This figure is to be com-
pared with a world average of 10,170 DWT for ships of 1,000 gross tons
and above. All fleets except those of Bulgaria and Albania declined
in average age. The average age for the combined fleets at the end of
1961 was 12 years, which compares favorably with the world average of
between 14 and 15 years. The average speed, 13.3 knots for the combined
fleets, is on a level with the estimated average speed of the world
fleet. Improvement in average speeds of the individual fleets is almost
imperceptible and will not be significant until additions to the Euro-
pean Satellite fleets include a considerably greater proportion of
newly built ships of 8,000 DWT and above.
B. Performance of the Fleets
Performance in ton-miles of the Satellite fleets in 1961, in-
cluding ships of less than 1,000 GRT, was again considerably greater
than that of the Soviet or Chinese Communist fleets in relation to the
quantity of tons carried, a result of the continued longer average hauls
by European Satellite ships (see Table 7*). In 1961, as in 1960, the
Soviet fleet engaged to a slightly greater extent in longer ocean hauls,
but the average length of haul was still less than one-third of that of
the European Satellite fleets. As shown in the tabulation below, the
performance of the European Satellite fleets continued to show a larger
rate of growth than the capacity of the combined fleets, an indication
of improving operating efficiency:
Percent of Increase**
1958
1959
1960
Capacity in deadweight tons
31.5
26.6
24.4
1959
1960
1961
Performance
Tons carried
27.5
34.0
31.9
Ton-miles
45.9
34.9
14.5
Table 7 follows on p. 19.
Comparison of the performance increase with the capacity increase
of the year before is more valid than comparison for the same years
because ships are added at varying times during any year. An even
better method would be to use the increase in the average capacity of
the fleet during the year, but at present available information does
not permit the use of this method.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Table 7
Performance of the Merchant Fleets of the European Satellites /
1957-61
Estimated
Country
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
Poland
3,397
3,879
41646
6,200
8,600 c/
East Germany
370
593
981
1,375
1,592 c/
Czechoslovakia
125
142
307
494
511 /
Bulgaria
718
762
898
1,064
1,370 c/
Rumania
224
217
215
195
343 c/
Hungary
50
53
76
91
110
Albania
133
123
232
440
48o J
Total
5,017
5,769
7,355
9,859
13,006
Million Ton Miles J
Poland j/
10,611
12,052
15,900
21,700
25,000
East Germany
449
2,017
4,909
5,649
6,126 c/
Czechoslovakia
1,266
1,277
2,225
4,035
4,100
Bulgaria
840
1,133
1,134
1,370
1,700 c/
Rumania
493
514
529
575
1,167 2/
Hungary
70
69
101
124
150
Albania
18
16
114
155
231 21
Total
13,747
17,078
24,912
33,608
38,474
a. Including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. Including Chipolbrok vessels.
c. Published data.
d. Published data are conflicting, and these estimates may be low.
e. Metric ton - nautical miles.
C. Utilization of Foreign Shipping
The European Satellite countries used foreign ships in*1961
(including other Bloc ships) to carry an amount estimated at 30 million
tons, or about 77 percent of their seaborne foreign trade compared
with 81 percent in 1960. It is estimated that Bloc ships carried about
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5 million tons of this trade,- leaving about 25 million tons to be
carried by Western ships. This was a slight decrease from about
26 million tons in 1960.
Preliminary data on total European Satellite seaborne trade
and those amounts carried by the individual fleets indicate that in
1961, for the first year since 1957, the use of foreign vessels did
not increase. This situation is a result of two main factors: the
total seaborne trade of the Satellites apparently increased only
4 percent above 1960, whereas carriage of their own trade by Satel-
lite ships increased 31 percent, and Satellite carrying capacity is
approaching the level of increase necessary to keep pace with growing
seaborne trade. CEMA goals, however, call for at least 50 percent of
seaborne trade to be carried in CEMA vessels, including the trade of
the USSR. If the rate of increase in the volume of trade in 1962 picks
up to its previous levels of 10 to 20 percent, increases in Satellite
carrying capacity must accelerate faster than indicated by present
fleet plans for 1965 (see Table 12**). Otherwise, Western ships will
continue to carry 65 to 70 percent of European Satellite seaborne
foreign trade.
D. Other Developments
1. Poland
Poland inaugurated one new line -- that to Cuba -- in 1961,
augmented several others, and dropped Albania as a port of call on the
Levant Line. By November 1961, there were five Polish ships in the
Cuban trade (compared with six in the US trade), permitting two sail-
ings a month for Cuba. The South America line was brought up to 11
Polish ships plus 2 time-chartered ships, and a twelfth Polish ship was
added early in 1962. The Poland-India Line was assigned six Polish
ships and one time-chartered ship as a result of a new shipping
agreement signed in 1961 with India. Under the old agreement, dating
back to 1956, the India line was served by two Polish ships at best.
The Red Sea - Persian Gulf Line, inaugurated in 1960, has utilized
from three to five ships. Plans may be to expand this line, as the
ships are reported to be running full. The Levant and Black Sea Lines
were served by 13 scheduled dry cargo ships (not including tramps) and
* Including about 1.5 million tons carried by Polish ships and esti-
mated amounts of 3.0 million to 3.3 million tons carried by Soviet ships,
the latter mainly between the European Satellites and the USSR.
** Appendix, p. 37, below. One Polish maritime economist, taking in-
to account the constantly increasing trade, recently claimed the need
for a minimum CEMA fleet capacity in 1970 of 24+ million DWT (almost
four times the capacity of the Soviet and Satellite fleets in 1961) to
handle a volume of trade 1.6 to 2.0 times the present volume.
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5 tankers compared with 5 scheduled dry cargo ships and 2 tankers in
1957. The number of ships assigned to the Far Eastern Lines remained
about the same. The volume of cargo carried by this line may have de-
clined slightly during 1961, but the net foreign exchange earned on the
Far Eastern Lines increased, indicating more foreign interport and
general cargo carried than in 1960.
2. Albania
The rift between Albania and the USSR brought several
changes in the pattern of shipping services to and from Albania.
Notable are the formation of the Sino-Albanian Shipping Company* and
the drop in trade with the USSR, resulting in far fewer Soviet ships
calling at Albania. Although Satellite ships also stopped calling or
decreased the number of calls at Albania, the volume of trade between
Albania and the Satellites did not decrease drastically as did Soviet-
Albanian trade. The result was that non-Bloc ships carried increased
amounts of Albanian cargo to the Satellite countries, thereby causing
the Satellites to expend greater amounts of convertible foreign ex-
change. In spite of the drop in traffic moving between the USSR and
Albania (from about 700,000 tons in 1960 to about 400,000 tons in 1961),
increased trade with Communist China and with non-Bloc countries was
enough to account for a 200,000-ton increase in total Albanian seaborne
foreign trade.
The most aggressive step taken by any European Satellite
in the Albanian rift was the refusal by Poland to turn over to Albania
in November a 5,100-DWT cargo ship built in Polish yards which was
added to the Polish fleet instead. Whether or not this action was
taken on Soviet orders, the Albanian government used it as the excuse
to retaliate by holding a Soviet ship in an Albanian port for almost
a month by various delaying tactics.
3. East Germany
a. Areas of Service
In 1961, East Germany added two new services, one to
West Africa** and one to Cuba. By January 1962, six East German dry
cargo freighters of the 10,000-DWT class, representing 20 percent of
the vessel tonnage of the East German oceangoing fleet, were in the
Cuban trade, four having been drawn from the Far East service and one
from the Murmansk-Baltic area. The sixth made her maiden voyage to
Cuba in June 1961. In the summer months of 1962, some of these ships
See I, E, p. 7, above.
See I, D, p. 6, above.
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were transferred to other areas of operation as sugar shipments to
East Germany fell off, and only three freighters totaling 30,920 DWT
remained in the trade.
b. Seaborne Foreign Trade and Port Traffic
Although'East German ports handled a larger share of
East German seaborne foreign trade in 1961 (more than 70 percent compared
with about 60 percent in 1960), the ambitious plans for 1961, for both
total sea trade and East German port traffic, were by no means met.
Plans published in 1959 called for 7.7 million tons to be handled in East
German ports and 1.7 million tons to be handled by foreign ports. The
port of Rostock alone, including the development of the new Petersdorf
overseas harbor in Rostock, was to handle 2.8 million tons in 1961.
The contrast between plans and performance is as follows:
Plan
Performance
Port
1961
1961
1960
All ports*
9_4
7.2
7.1
East German ports
7.7
5.2
1+.3**
Of which:
Rostock
2.8
2.6
1.4
Polish ports
0.6
1.1
Hamburg
(1-7
1.4
1.6
Statements in the East German press during 1961 varied from glowing
reports on the accomplishments in the Rostock-Petersdorf development
to admissions of delays in various specific construction aspects of
the project. Although construction of the new port of Petersdorf is
undoubtedly progressing, it having handled 418,000 tons in 1960
(beginning in may 1960) and 1.8 million tons in 1961, it seems unlikely
that Petersdorf will handle the planned 4.3 million tons in 1962.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Not including a little more than 100,000 tons believed to be
coastal and transit trade.
Including both old and new sections of Rostock port.
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Unless the preliminary reports received of traffic
through Hamburg are incorrect, the decrease of only about 12 percent
(200,000 tons through Hamburg) compared with a decrease of 45 percent
(500,000 tons) in traffic through Polish ports is an interesting de-
velopment. East Germany has consistently publicized the need for re-
ducing traffic through Hamburg in order to avoid payment in West German
marks and until 1961 traffic through Polish ports expanded rapidly,
partly at the expense of Hamburg traffic. The division of traffic in
1961 suggests two circumstances: the possibility of occasional con-
gestion in Polish ports and, principally, the continuing necessity to
utilize the liner connections available in Hamburg, which vastly out-
number those available in the Bloc Baltic ports.
E. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962
1. Growth of the Fleets
In the first half of 1962 the European Satellites acquired
24 ships, totaling 220,000 DWT, compared with 297,000 DWT for the
entire year of 1961. Judging by ships launched but not yet delivered,
as well as by negotiations on the secondhand market and announced or
reported plans, net additions should reach at least 350,000 DWT in 1962,
the largest increase in postwar years and at least 35 percent above the
former peak year of 1960.
Although the Polish and East German fleets probably will
show the largest additions for the full year, Rumanian ship purchases
in the first half of 1962 were only 8,000 DWT below Polish and East
German acquisitions. Two of the ships purchased by Rumania are
19,000-DWT tankers, the first tankers in the Rumanian fleet. In
previous discussions of its fleet plans, Rumania has mentioned tankers
but emphasized dry cargo ships in spite of the fact that petroleum ship-
ments account for more than 75 percent of the total estimated seaborne
foreign trade of the country. It is too early to assess whether these
two purchases point to a larger emphasis on tankers than indicated in
the 1965 fleet estimates in Table 12.*
2. Utilization of Polish Vessels
During 1962, Poland is planning a change in the emphasis
on types of services for the first time in at least 5 years. A con-
siderably faster growth in vessel tonnage in unscheduled (tramp)
service is expected in 1962, whereas in preceding years increasing
amounts of tonnage were placed in liner services. Plans to increase
the share carried by Polish ships of bulk cargo handled in Polish ports
may reflect the intention of providing greater service to Czechoslovak
import cargo (mainly bulk cargo) as well as Polish bulk cargo.
Appendix, p. 37, below.
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Polish service to the West African and South American areas
(probably including Cuba) is expected to show the most rapid growth in
the liner services. The growth in liner services to East Asia and North
America and in the Baltic will be slowed down, although apparently some
tonnage will be added.
3. Seaborne Foreign Trade
The leveling off in volume of European Satellite seaborne
foreign trade in 1961 from the expansion observed in 1959 and 1960
probably will continue in 1962, with trade increasing by no more than
2 million tons. The trade of Poland, comprising almost 4+5 percent of
the Satellite seaborne foreign trade, may increase by only a small
volume if at all. The share carried by non-Bloc ships, as well as the
volume, is expected to decrease.
The most drastic change in the trading pattern in the Bloc
will be in Albanian trade. Whereas trade with Communist China in 1959
amounted to less than 10 percent of total trade and increased to 28 per-
cent in 1960, Albania expects China to account for almost 60 percent of
its trade in 1962. This being so, the two ships of the Sino-Albanian
Shipping Company undoubtedly will continue to be employed exclusively
in the Albania-China route rather than being deployed to serve other
areas also as was claimed in official announcements concerning the
formation of this company.
IV. Communist Far East
A. General
A number of interesting developments occurred in merchant ship-
ping in the Communist Far East during 1961. Most important was an in-
crease of almost 30 percent in the amount of China's seaborne foreign
trade, nearly all of which was carried by foreign ships chartered by
China. The increased tonnage consisted mainly of bulk food items which
the Chinese imported from Western countries to relieve the mainland
food shortages.
There also was a significant drop in performance by both
Chinese ships and chartered ships operating on the China coast. The
decline in coastal traffic together with the fact of only small ad-
ditions to the size of the Chinese coastal fleet reflected the worsen-
ing economic situation in China during 1961. The long-anticipated
venture of Chinese-flag ships in international trade began during 1961
with the use of two Chinese-built ships and one Western-built ship.
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North Korean ports, which had been closed to foreign trade
since the Korean War, became fairly busy with Bloc and non-Bloc ships
in the harbors. North Korea also began acquiring an oceangoing fleet
during 1961 with the launching of a 3,000-DWT cargo ship and the
transfer to the North Korean flag of a former Bulgarian ship of 3,032
DWT. North Vietnam acquired a number of small-size ships and tugs and
is engaged in negotiations to purchase cargo ships of considerable size.
The combined performance of the fleet of North Korea and North Vietnam,
however, was only 1 percent of that of the Chinese fleet (see Table 8*).
B. Performance of the Fleets
Although there is considerable uncertainty regarding Chinese
shipping in 1961, total performance of Chinese ships in that year is
estimated to have been about 27 million tons carried, about the same
as in 1959 and 23 percent less than in 1960. An additional amount of
1.2 million tons was carried in 1961 on foreign-chartered ships in
Chinese coastal trade compared with 5.1 million tons carried by foreign
ships in 1960. The level of coastal shipping activity during 1961 de-
clined from a high point in March and continued at a low level even
during the fall months, when transport volume is normally the largest.
The decline is attributed to a number of problems but principally to
the lack of cargo to be transported.
The lack of cargo for Chinese ships was described by the master
of one foreign-chartered ship as being serious. Although specific re-
ports of a lack of cargo are scarce, the conclusion that there was not
nearly as much cargo to be transported as in previous years can be
drawn from the absence of the usual reports of large backlogs and short-
ages of transport capacity. Other problems such as scarcity of fuel,
stevedores, and materials for repairs were present, but it is unlikely
that they could have accounted for much of the decline. Harbor con-
gestion and long delays in port were reported only at major foreign
trade ports. Although harbor facilities at the major ports have been
improved considerably and expanded during recent years, the large in-
crease in imports of bulk commodities, such as grain and sugar, taxed
facilities at specific ports. To cope with the congestion, the Chinese
installed special equipment such as suction-type grain unloading
machines, diverted some foreign-trade ships to minor ports, carried out
stevedoring on a 24-hour basis, and in general tried to improve ef-
ficiency.
The shortage of food in China created a number of problems in
water transport in 1961. In addition to the fact that malnutrition
lowered worker efficiency aboard ships and in the ports, ships were
known to have slowed their speed in order to fish en route. Stevedores
* Table 8 follows on p. 26.
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Estimated Performance of the Merchant Fleets
of the Communist Far East a/
1957-61
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
Country
Million Metric Tons
Communist China
12.19
16.95
26.7
34.8
26.8
North Korea
1.1
2.0
2.8
3.0
3.4
North Vietnam
0.06
0.15
0.19
0.21
0.24
Total /
13.4
19.1
29.7
38.0
30.4
Million Ton Miles
Communist China 7,100 8,300 11,400 15,100 11,900
North Korea 20.3 37.2 56.1 73.4 89.4
North Vietnam 10.6 18.1 30.5 40.0 46.4
Total / 7,100 8,300 11,500 15,200 12,000
a. Including vessels under 1,000 GRT. These figures do not include
the performance of chartered Free World ships in Communist China's
coastal trade. Figures for North Korea include inland water traffic
which, however, is only a small portion of the total. Because the
official performance figures for Communist China for 1960 and 1961 are
not available, these estimates are subject to much wider margins of
error than the other figures appearing in this table.
b. Data are rounded to the nearest 100,000 tons and 100 million metric
ton - nautical miles. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may
not agree with the sums of the rounded components.
c. Metric ton - nautical miles.
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were included in the drive to return former agricultural workers to
their home areas to aid food production, leaving the ports without
sufficient labor. Moreover, the wholesale movement of large groups of
farm workers created problems for all forms of transportation. Along
the coast a few cargo ships were diverted entirely to carrying passengers
or were forced to open holds to passengers and reduce their cargo loads.
The number of passengers carried was at an all-time high during the
summer and fall, but still the number of passengers awaiting transpor-
tation created serious problems.
Operating problems, which became more acute in 1961 than in the
previous year, included shortages of repairs for ships and harbor machin-
ery and problems of poor maintenance of navigational routes. Funds for
capital repairs and improvements at various harbors were cut back or
delayed. Fuel problems at least continued during 1961 and possibly
became more serious. Besides local shortages of fuel, both coal and
domestically produced petroleum products were noted to be of such poor
quality that at times Chinese ships could not operate while using them.
C. Utilization of Foreign Shipping
Although China carried nominal amounts of foreign trade cargoes
on its own ships in 1961, it still had to utilize increased amounts of
foreign shipping to move its expanding foreign trade. The country's
seaborne foreign trade amounted to between 14 million and 15 million
tons in 1961, an increase of at least 3 million tons above the level of
1960. All of this trade was carried on foreign ships except the small
amount carried by the three Chinese vessels in international trade.
Because of the decline in the amount of Chinese coastal traffic carried
on foreign vessels from 5.1 million tons in 1960 to 1.2 million tons in
1961, however, the total Chinese traffic carried by foreign ships de-
creased slightly.
China had an increased need for international shipping in 1961
to carry imports of grain, sugar, and fertilizer. It is estimated that
between 14 million and 15 million tons of cargo moved in and out of
China by sea in 1961, of which about 9.5 million tons were imports and
about 5 million tons were exports. In 1960, imports amounted to 4.6
million tons, and exports were 6.6 million tons. In 1961 a total of
about 740 voyages by chartered ships was required to carry the principal
bulk imports compared with less than 400 voyages by chartered ships for
all inbound cargo in 1960. In 1961, China chartered 192 ships on time
charter and 505 other ships for one or -- in a few instances -- two
voyages each. Ships chartered by China amounted to a daily average of
2.1 million DWT. By comparison, the 175,000 DWT of ships that are sur-
plus in coastal traffic is small, but the saving in foreign exchange
would be substantial if these ships could be transferred into inter-
national operations.
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Foreign ships probably would have been used in the China coastal
trade even less than they were in 1961 if Chinese Communist ships could
have passed by Formosa. Cargo carried by foreign ships in 1961 is
believed to have consisted almost exclusively of iron ore moving from
Hainan Island to North Coast ports. The Chinese Communist fleet had
the capacity to transport the iron ore, but these ships could have been
intercepted by the Chinese Nationalists.
D. Chinese Ships in International Trade
During the first half of 1961 the Chinese Communists finally
initiated an international shipping service and assigned three ships to
run between the south coast of China and the Bay of Bengal, with stops
at least at Djakarta, Rangoon, and Colombo. One ship is an old British-
built passenger-cargo ship of about 8,800 DWT recently acquired by the
Chinese. During 1961 it made four trips to Indonesia, probably return-
ing with Chinese repatriates from Indonesia. The other two ships,
built by the Chinese within the last 4 years, are of 5,000 to 6,000 DWT.
These two ships probably carried about 150,000 tons of cargo in 1961,
consisting principally of rice for Indonesia, general cargo and sugar
for Rangoon, cement for Colombo, and rubber from Djakarta and Colombo.
Although the quantity of goods carried was comparatively small, the
rates quoted in Hong Kong for the Chinese line were 30 to 40 percent
below Conference rates. Because of this development, the entry of China
into international shipping, in addition to giving the country prestige
and more opportunity for economic penetration in South and Southeast
Asia, portends a possible disruption in Far Eastern freight markets as
China expands its merchant fleet.
E. Growth of the Chinese Fleet
At the end of 1961 the Chinese merchant fleet included 156
ships* totaling about 736,000 DWT (see Table 10**). Of the nine ships
added to the fleet in 1961, two ships were used tankers, accounting for
nearly 50 percent of the total deadweight tonnage added; one was a large
passenger-cargo ship; and the remainder were dry cargo ships. The ad-
dition of the tankers doubled the tonnage of the tanker fleet, and al-
though the newly added tankers are generally considered to be large for
efficient operation along the China coast, they have not been observed
in international trade.
Acquisitions in 1961 resulted in an increase in the fleet capa-
city of only 8 percent compared with an increase of 23 percent in 1960.
The continued decline in the rate of acquisitions from the high level
* Including only ships of 1,000 GRT or above.
** Appendix, p. 33, below.
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of 1958-59 was the result chiefly of difficulties experienced in do-
mestic shipbuilding. With the existing fleet operating at a lower
level in 1961 than in the previous 2 years, there may have been less
urgency to increase the size of the fleet. The few foreign acqui-
sitions during 1961 were added early in the year, perhaps as the re-
sult of contracts completed during 1960.
Construction was completed on a number of domestically pro-
duced ships, including the Leap Forward and the East Wind, but these
ships were not observed in operation during 1961. The reason for the
delay presumably is difficulties with machinery aboard ship and lack
of navigation components. It was expected that the Chinese would wait
for the Leap Forward to begin international shipping operations. The
decline in availability of cargoes undoubtedly made it possible to re-
lease some cargo vessels for use in international trade without waiting
for the Leap Forward.
Additions to the fleet during 1961 cost China an amount esti-
mated at $10.2 million. About $7.6 million of this total represented
the cost of building three ships totaling 12,500 DWT in domestic yards.
A fourth Chinese ship was transferred to the coastal fleet from a river
fleet, and its value is not included in the above total. The remaining
$2.6 million constituted the estimated cost to China of five ships
totaling 42,000 DWT purchased or transferred from foreign countries.
Three of the foreign ships were from Norway, one was from Poland, and
one was from Czechoslovakia.
Although acquisitions in 1961 continued from both Bloc and non-
Bloc sources (see Table 9*) the number of ships and percentage of the
total tonnage acquired from non-Bloc countries declined from the high
level of the past few years. In 1961, about 37 percent of the total
tonnage acquired came from non-Bloc sources compared with an average
of about 60 percent during 1958-60. On the other hand, acquisitions
from Bloc countries accounted for 39 percent of the total tonnage in
1961 compared with less than 10 percent in 1960.
F. Preliminary Estimate of Progress in 1962
Economic activity in Communist China during 1961 may have
slumped to its lowest level, but it is rather unlikely that there will
be much recovery during 1962. Food imports are expected to reach a
high level again in 1962, with continued reliance on chartered Western
ships for transportation. Growth of the fleet may be even less than
in 1961. One cargo ship of 10,000 DWT, recently built in Poland, has
traveled to China under the Chinese flag. It is possible that this
ship and other fairly large ships will be added to the international
shipping fleet during the year and that Chinese-flag ships will extend
their routes.
* Table 9 follows on p. 30.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
Origins of Additions to the Merchant Fleet
of Communist China
1957-61
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
Origin
Number
of
Vessels
Percent
of Total
Tonnage
Number
of
Vessels
Percent
of Total
Tonnage
Number
of
Vessels
Percent
of Total
Tonnage
Number
of
Vessels
Percent
of Total
Tonnage
Number
of
Vessels
Percent
of Total
Tonnage
Domestic yards
0
0
6
18.6
10
35.8
7
18.3
4
24.5
Bloc countries
15
95.1
6
20.2
2
14.8
1
7.0
2
38.9
Non-Bloc countries
1
4.9
10
61.2
7
49.4
12
74.7
3
36.6
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
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STATISTICAL TABLES
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Merchant Fleets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by Type, Number, and Tonnage
1958-61 and 1965
1958
1959
1960
1961
Estimated 1965
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Type of Ship and Area
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Total tankers
118
892.1
132
1,024.5
151
1,346.4
167
1,603.8
N.A.
N.A.
USSR
102
793.1
113
884.1
128
1,163.0
136
1,315.5
228
2,900
European Satellites
6
75.3
9
116.7
12
156.1
18
233.3
29
410
Communist China
10
23.7
10
23.7
11
27.3
13
55.0
N.A.
N.A.
Total dry cargo
845
3,996.3
.~7
4,496.3
1,019
5,136.8
1,085
5,565.6
N.A.
N.A.
USSR
619
2,826.1
651
3,015.2
701
3,310.5
735
3,538.9
1,075
5,700
European Satellites
127
769.0
148
951.9
182
1,172.9
207
1,345.4
390
2,425
Communist China
99
401.2
118
529.2
136
653.4
143
681.3
N.A.
N.A.
Total Bloc merchant fleet
963
4,888.4
1,049
5,520.8
1,170
6,483.2
1,252
17, 69.4
N.A.
N.A.
USSR
721
3,619.2
764
3,899.3
829
4,473.5
871
4,854.4
1,303
8,600
European Satellites
133
844.3
157
1,068.6
194
1,329.0
225
1,578.7
419
2,835
Communist China J
109
424.9
128
552.9
147
680.7
156
736.3
N.A.
N.A.
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b.. In most cases, estimates are based on announced plans.
c. Sufficient information is now available regarding the size in deadweight tons of individual ships in the Chinese fleet to present
corrected figures. In previous reports it was necessary to convert the gross register tons of the fleet to deadweight tons, and a
factor of 1.48 DWT for 1 GRT was used. The latest information indicates that a factor of 1.3 is more accurate for the Chinese fleet.
This revision accounts for the difference between the figure of 761,000 DWT given in previous reports as the size of the fleet at the
end of 1960 and the figure of 680,700 DWT given in this report.
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Estimated Seaborne Foreign Trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1955 and 1958-61
Area and Country
1955 1958
1959
1960
Estimated
1961
European Satellites
Poland
13,028
13,676
14,125
16,868
16,965
Polish ships
2,291
2,729
3,377
4,321
5,808
Foreign ships
10,737
10,947
10,748
12,547
11,157
East Germany
4,o84
4,790
5,717
7,100
7,200
East German ships
115
492
800
1,200
1,400
Foreign ships
3,969
4,298
4,917
5,900
5,800
3,430
3,960
4,340
5,335
6,200
Czechoslovak ships
110
105
250
400
420
Foreign ships
3,320
3,855
4,090
4,935
5,780
Bulgaria
584
874
1,790
1,800
2,000
Bulgarian ships
300
290
400
550
800
Foreign ships
284
584
1,390
1,250
1,200
4,700
5,000
5,300
5,500
5,700
Rumanian ships
150
165
165
145
290
Foreign ships
4,550
4,835
5,135
5,355
5,410
Hungary
1,000
850
900
1,000
1,200
Hungarian ships
25
50
75
9o
100
Foreign ships
975
800
825
910
1,100
475
850
1,100
1,500
1,700
Albanian ships
40
100
175
350
400
Foreign ships
435
750
925
1,150
1,300
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Estimated Seaborne Foreign Trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1955 and 1958-61
(Continued)
Estimated
Area and Country
1955
1958
1959
1960
1961
Total European Satellites
27,301
30,000
33,272
39,103
40,965
Minus duplication of trade
between Satellites J
550
600
700
1,000
1,350
26,751
29,400
32,572
38,103
39,615
Domestic ships
3,031
3,931
5,242
7,056
9,218
Foreign ships
23,720
25,469
27,330
31,047
30,397
15,200
26,600
34,800
44,700
58,500
Soviet ships
9,900
16,200
16,300
18,300
21,000
Foreign ships
5,300
10,400
18,500
26,400
37,500
41,951
56,000
67,372
82,803
98,115
Minus duplication of trade
between the USSR and
Satellites a/
3,700
5,000
5,800
6,800
6,400
38,251
51,000
61,572
76,003
91,715
Domestic ships
12,931
20,131
21,542
25,356
30,218
Foreign ships
25,320
30,869
40,030
50,647
61,497
Communist China b
N.A.
10,500
10,900
11,200
14,500
Chinese ships
N.A.
0
0
0
150
Foreign ships
N.A.
10,500
10,900
11,200
14,350
N.A.
61,500
72,472
87,203
106,215
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/30 :
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Estimated Seaborne Foreign Trade of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1955 and 1958-61
(Continued)
Estimated
Area and Country
1955
1958
1959
1960
1961
Minus duplication between
China and Soviet Bloc J
N.A.
2,700
2,900
2,900
2,500
Balance
N.A.
58,800
69,572
84,303
103,715
Domestic ships
N.A.
20,131
21,542
25,356
30,368
Foreign ships
N.A.
38,669
48,030
58,947
73,347
a. These figures are estimates based generally on piecemeal informa-
tion. The weakest facet is trade between Rumania, Bulgaria, and the
USSR moving on the Black Sea, for which there are virtually no data ex-
cept general background. Consequently, these estimates may be high or
low by as much as 25 percent.
b. Estimates do not include traffic between China and North Vietnam,
which in 1961 amounted to about 1 million tons. Performance by Chinese
ships in this trade is treated in Chinese statistics as coastal traffic.
c. Estimates are a result of either published information on seaborne
trade moving between China and other individual Bloc countries or com-
pilations of known shipments. The estimates may be high or low by as
much as 15 percent in 1961, probably less for earlier years.
d. These amounts of cargo shown as shipped on "foreign" ships include
cargo carried by Bloc ships for other Bloc members but do not include
the carriage of cargo between the Bloc shipowner and another Bloc coun-
try -- for example, cargo between East Germany and the USSR carried by
East German or Soviet ships. The latter type of Bloc ship performance
has already been accounted for under each country's trade and by elimi-
nation of duplicate trade. Of the approximately 73 million tons of
cargo carried by "foreign" ships in 1961, it is estimated that Bloc
ships carried about 3.0 million tons, Polish ships accounting for about
2.0 million to 2.2 million tons. Non-Bloc ships therefore carried
about 70 million tons of the total Sino-Soviet seaborne trade of 104
million tons, or 67 percent, compared with about 56 million tons in
1960, which also was 67 percent.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/30: CIA-RDP79RO1141AO02600060001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 12
Merchant Fleets of the European Satellites, by Type, Number, and Tonnage
1958-61 and 1965
1958
1959
1960
1961
Estimated 1965
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Country and Type of Ship
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Poland
21
584.8
101
698.6
119
840.4
129
935.4
220 22/
1,500 b/
Tanker
4
52.3
5
71.7
5
71.7
5
79.4
9
150
Dry cargo J
87
532.5
96
626.9
114
768.7
124
856.0
211
1,350
East Germany
15
120.7
21
173.7
29
241.1
35
291.3
73
535
Tanker
2
23.0
2
23.0
4
49.7
6
72.7
7
85
Dry cargo
13
97.7
19
150.7
25
191.4
29
218.6
66
450
Czechoslovakia
5
48.3
8
91.0
11
113.3
10
104.5
20
250
Tanker
0
0
1
20.2
1
20.2
1
20.2
2
40
Dry cargo
5
48.3
7
70.8
10
93.1
9
84.3
18
210
Bulgaria
9
48.8
11
53-8
15
74.1
21
139.1
42 /
240 12/
Tanker
0
0
1
1.8
2
14.5
6
61.0
8
80
6
Dry cargo
9
48.8
10
52.0
13
59.6
15
78.1
34
1
0
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/30: CIA-RDP79RO1141AO02600060001-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Merchant Fleets of the European Satellites, by Type, Number, and Tonnage a
1958-61 and 1965
(Continued)
1958
1959
1960
1961
Estimated 1965
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Thousand
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Deadweight
Country and Type of Ship
Number
Tons
Numb r
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Number
Tons
Rumania
7
34.7
7
34-7
8
39.2
15
68.7
30
190
Tanker
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
55
Dry cargo e/
7
34.7
7
34.7
8
39.2
15
68.7
27
135
Hungary
6
7_0
6
7.2
8
9-7
2
11.0
22
80
Tanker
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Dry cargo
6
7.0
6
7.2
8
9.7
9
11.0
22
80
Albania
0
0
3
9.6
4
11.2
6
28.7
12
40
Tanker
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Dry cargo
0
0
3
9.6
4
11.2
6
28.7
12
40
Total Satellites
131
844.3
1,068.6
124
1,329.0
225
1,578.7
L1
2
2,835
Tanker
6
75.3
9
116.7
12
156.1
18
233.3
_
29
410
Dry cargo
127
769.0
148
951.9
182
1,172.9
207
1,345.4
390
2,425
a. Not including vessels under 1,000 GRT.
b. Estimated on the basis of published plan data minus ships under 1,000 GRT.
c. Including two 10,000-DWT ships transferred to the fishing fleet as supply ships.
d. This estimate may be low.
e. Including one fish factory ship.
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S-E-C-R-EST
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SECRET
SECRET
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