THE PROGRAM FOR WATER CONSERVANCY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-61

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A002400040001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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N? 106
THE PROGRAM FOR WATER CONSERVANCY
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1949-61
May 1962
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR
IN PART WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE PROGRAM FOR WATER CONSERVANCY
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1949-61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Extent of the Cultivated Area . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Limitations on Increasing Agricultural Production
C. Attempts to Overcome Limitations . . . . . . . . . .
II. Irrigation Program, 1949-61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Administration and Organization of Irrigation Pro-
grams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Inadequacies of Planning and Training . . . . . . . .
C. Types of Irrigation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .
7
9
12
1. Before 1949 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Communist Approaches.Since 1949 . . . . . . . 13
D. Progress of the Irrigation Program . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Consolidation and Recovery, 1949-52 . . . . . . . 15
2. First Five Year Plan, 1953-57 . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. "Leap Forward" of 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Policies and Programs Since 1958 . . . . . . . . 17
III. Input Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Irrigation Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
C. Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
IV. Analysis of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. Claims and Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Probable Effectiveness of the Program . . . . . . . . 26
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix B.. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Tables
1. Communist China: Large Reservoirs Claimed to Have Been.
Completed, 1949-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Communist China: Number of New Irrigation Projects
Claimed, by Type, 1949-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3. Communist China: Number of Wells Claimed for Irrigation,
1949-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4. Communist China: Claimed Production of Engines for
Drainage and Pumping, 1956-59 and 1960 Plan . . . . . . 36
5. Communist China: Earthwork, Work Efficiency, and Man-
Days Claimed to Have Been Spent in Water Conservancy,
1949-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6. Communist China: Irrigated Area in 1932 and Claims,
by Region and Province, 1957 and 1958 .. . . . . . . . . 38
Communist China: Claimed Increase in the Irrigated Area
Annually and the Total Irrigated Area, 1949-59 . . . . . 40
8. Communist China: Claims of the Extent of the Improved
Irrigated Area, 1949-60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Illustrations
Figure 1. Mainland China: Precipitation (Map) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2. Mainland China: Soils (Map) following page . . . 6
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Page
Figure 3. Mainland China: Major Construction for Water
Conservancy, 1949-58 (Map) following page . . . .
14
Figure 4. Communist China: Construction of a Reservoir
(Photograph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
20
Figure 5. Communist China: Po-shah Reservoir on the Upper
Reaches of the Huai System (Photograph) . . . . .
20
Figure 6. Communist China: Reservoir for Irrigation in
Wei-hsing Commune (Photograph) . . . . . . . . . .
22
Figure 7. Communist China: Workers at the Construction Site
of the Mi-yun Reservoir (Photograph) . . . . . . .
22
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THE PROGRAM FOR WATER CONSERVANCY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1949-61
Summary and Conclusions
Comi,iunist China must sustain approximately one-fourth of the world's
people on about one-fifteenth of the earth's land surface. Only 11 per-
cent of the land area of mainland China is cultivated, and productivity
of much of the cultivated area is limited by unsuitable topography, soil,
and climate. The most suitable topography for agriculture and some of
the most productive soils in the country are located in the North China
Plain, but the productivity of the area is limited by low rainfall. The
productivity of South China, which has a long growing season and abun-
dant, although seasonal, rainfall, is limited by mountainous terrain
and leached, acid soils. The intense population pressure on the culti-
vated land has resulted in low productivity of farm labor and has pushed
cultivation into all but the most marginal and inaccessible areas.
Since 1949 the Communist regime has embarked on a series of ambi-
tious programs for industrialization. Almost all of these programs
have depended directly or indirectly on agriculture for financing in
spite of the fact that China through 1949 habitually was a net importer
of food. Even with net imports of food, most of the population had been
accustomed to surviving at low dietary levels. If the agriculture of
Communist China were to support industrialization successfully, agricul-
ture had to be elevated quickly to the point of producing substantial
surpluses above the minimum needs of the population.
The Communist regime implemented a number of programs in its attempts
to circumvent the limitations imposed on agriculture by topography,
climate, and soils. Of these programs the expansion and improvement of
the irrigated area and the use of larger quantities of chemical ferti-
lizers appear to have had the greatest potential. Of the two programs,
irrigation seemed to be the most compatible with conditions existing in
Communist China. Irrigation, which would utilize a maximum of the abun-
dant labor of China and a minimum of its scarce capital, promised quick
returns. Rural labor, normally idle or underemployed during the winter
months, could be used constructively in water conservancy during the
seasonally slack period, but there were limitations to the potential of
labor-intensive efforts for irrigation. The magnitude of the area adapt-
able to irrigation by simple projects was limited both by natural condi-
tions and by the shortage of trained technicians, and apparently the
regime was either unwilling or unable to supply the required quantities
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of capital and materials, especially iron, steel, and cement. These
materials were needed especially for the complicated, large-scale
projects. The initial irrigation program late in 19+9 assigned pri-
ority to flood control and secondary importance to the rehabilitation
of irrigation projects damaged or destroyed by war. In 1952 it was
claimed that practically all the dikes along the major rivers had been
completed, and it is believed that by that time the irrigated area
approached or slightly exceeded that under irrigation before the out-
break of the Sino-Japanese War in 1932.
After 1952 the regime began to carry out larger and more complex
projects for control of the larger rivers. At that stage of development
the policy was still to divert flood water into rivers that would drain
into the sea. The government also introduced the "lower stage" agri-
cultural cooperative in 1952 and gave greater autonomy to lower admin-
istrative levels in the construction of facilities for water conservancy.
This effort resulted in the first "upsurge" in water conservancy in 1952.
A shift in the basic policy of the regime in 1955, along with a
nationwide drive for the formation of "higher stage" agricultural coop-
eratives, led to the second "upsurge" in 1956. A shortage of skilled.
labor and a lack of technical capabilities together with long construc-
tion periods, waste, higher requirements for capital, and disappointing
results associated with large government-initiated projects apparently
induced the regime to shift its emphasis to the small-scale project con-
structed by the peasants themselves. This procedure, in effect, gave
rise to two simultaneous programs for water conservancy within the coun-
try. The large projects remained directly under the central government,
whereas authority over the construction of the smaller projects was
shifted to the province, the hsien (county), or the cooperative. In
order to circumvent the limitations imposed by the inadequate technical
force, an attempt was made to standardize projects for the country as a
whole.. The drive in 1956 was characterized by great emphasis on sinking
wells.
Following a year of "consolidation" and "advancement" in 1957, the
third and most ambitious of all the "upsurges" was touched off during
the "leap forward" of 1958, accompanied first by additional "tidying
up" of the "higher stage" cooperatives and later by the shift to com-
munes. Additional emphasis was placed on the small projects. Millions
of small reservoirs and ponds were constructed to store excess water
rather than to facilitate its removal, and the peasants were given
almost complete autonomy for the design and construction (and financing)
of these projects. The state also shifted more responsibility for the
large projects to the lower administrative levels.
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The commune organization had been extended throughout all of Commu-
nist China by late in 1958, and thereafter the regime assigned still
more responsibility for the large irrigation projects to the communes.
Before 1958 the masses had donated materials, funds, and "volunteer"
labor to the large-scale projects. Now the communes were "permitted"
to build large projects, many of which were said to have been divorced
completely from state aid.
Fewer but larger projects were said to have been constructed in 1959,
and emphasis was on the "improvement" of areas under irrigation rather
than on the development of new areas of irrigation. This trend con-
tinued throughout 1960 and into the early part of 1961. No increases
in the irrigated area have been claimed since 1959.
The regime claims that from 51 million to 57 million hectares* were
brought under irrigation between 1949 and 1959, 32 million hectares of
which were said to have been added during 1958. Ample evidence and some
official admissions indicate that actual achievements have fallen far
short of these official claims. Several provinces have scaled down
rather sharply their original claims for irrigation accomplished in 1958,
but the national total claimed has remained unchanged. The cultivated
area and the multiple-cropping area have declined since 1956, and there
has been no widespread substitution of high-yielding or high-value crops
such as rice and cotton for low-yielding ones such as wheat and "miscel-
laneous" grains. These conditions seem incompatible with a great in-
crease in irrigation, for if irrigation projects were as numerous and
efficient as claimed, the droughts of 1959, 1960, and 1961 should not
have been so devastating. Some sources announced that the irrigated
area was based on the designed capacity of the projects, whereas other
sources admitted that many projects were not completed, that these
projects were not performing up to potential, and that ditches would
have to be dug and the land leveled before many projects would be bene-
ficial.
The shortcomings of the Chinese Communist campaigns for irrigation
have been so serious that the benefits of the programs probably will
be very limited in relation to the tremendous expenditure of labor.
It is apparent that the resources have been unwisely used in many
cases, for these campaigns seem to have contributed little to the solu-
tion of the agricultural problems during 1959-61.
The advisability of the indiscriminate construction of millions of
small reservoirs and ponds is doubtful, as these pools have lowered
the potential of many large and medium-size projects and have resulted
in instances of water logging, soil alkalization, and/or salinization.
* One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
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Because the construction of so many small reservoirs has changed the
water equilibrium, many streams and rivers have ceased to flow, and
the dependability of others has been affected.
Apparently, little potential remains for expanding irrigation by
the small or medium-size projects. The easiest and cheapest areas to
irrigate undoubtedly were the first to be brought under irrigation.
Consequently, extension of irrigation has become increasingly more
difficult and costly, and future substantial increases in the irrigated
area will have to come from large, capital-intensive, multipurpose
projects. According to the Chinese Communists, such projects require
3 to 5 years to build and 2 to 3 years.more before they become bene-
ficial. Although a few projects are in vaxious stages of construction,
it will be many years before many large projects can be constructed
and put into operation, and the problems of silting and alkalinity in
North China, the region most urgently requiring this type of project,
will limit their effectiveness.
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I. Background
For centuries the people of China have survived only by intensive
use of the small part of the mainland that is suitable for agriculture.
Since obtaining control of the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Communist
regime has embarked on a series of ambitious programs for industrial-
ization that have depended heavily on agriculture. The state has de-
manded from agriculture a level of production that not only would feed
a rapidly growing population but also would provide large quantities
of industrial raw materials as well as substantial surpluses to be
exported in exchange for imports of industrial capital. These demands
have stimulated the introduction of many new and at times questionable
programs and policies to increase agricultural production. Because
the opportunities for expanding the cultivated area are very limited,
these programs have emphasized increasing the yield per unit of the
land.
A. Extent of the Cultivated Area
Communist China encompasses about 9.5 million square kilometers,
one-fifteenth of the land surface of the earth, but its population con-
stitutes about one-fourth of the world total. /* The limitations
placed on Chinese agriculture by topography and climate are clearly
revealed by the fact that in spite of intense population pressure over
the centuries, the cultivated area still comprises only about 11 per-
cent of the total land area. By comparison, the cultivated area of the
US exceeds that of China by about 75 percent and on a per capita basis
by more than five times. In China, however, the intensive use of land
through multiple cropping permits the sown area to exceed the basic
cultivated area by almost 50 percent and to exceed somewhat the sown
area in the US. According to Chinese Communist claims, which in this
instance appear to be realistic, the cultivated area reached a maximum
of almost 112 million hectares in 1957 and declined to about 108 mil-
lion hectares in 1958 ,/ and to 107 million hectares in 1959.
B. Limitations on Increasing Agricultural Production
The population pressure on agricultural land in Communist China
has forced very poor land into production, and the low productivity of
agricultural labor has made the formation of agricultural capital dif-
ficult. Consequently, increases in agricultural production have de-
pended largely on more labor inputs. In October 1959 an editorial in
the People's Daily (Jen-min jih-pao) revealed that of the cultivated
area of China, about 31 percent is classified as "fertile," 40 percent
For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.
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as "ordinary," and 29 percent as "low yielding." V In addition, nearly
one-half of the farmland is in hilly or mountainous regions that are not
suitable for significant improvement by means of conventional irrigation
programs. 5
The productivity of the cultivated area is greatly affected by
climate, as precipitation varies widely from region to region, from
year to year, and from season to season. About 25 percent of the land,
largely in the north and east, receives less than 12 inches of rainfall
annually and either is entirely unfit for agriculture or is usable only
under special conditions of dry farming or irrigation. / In general,
the regions south of the Yangtze River receive abundant rainfall (see
the map, Figure 1*). South China has 75 percent of the national water
resources but only 38 percent of the cultivated acreage. Y/ Of the
total rainfall in the summer months, North and Northeast China receive
almost 60 percent, and Central and South China more than 40 percent.
China has a wide variety of types of soil, as would be expected
in a large country with such diverse climatic conditions (see the map,
Figure 2*). In general, soils south of the Yangtze River are acid as
a result of intense leaching brought about by the combination of high
rainfall and warm temperatures, whereas comparatively cool temperatures
and low rainfall north of this river have given rise to alkaline or
saline soils. / The adverse effects of nature on the soil have been
intensified further by centuries of concentrated cultivation that has
resulted in an almost universal deficiency of nitrogen 10 and organic
matter. 11 The shortage of organic matter is due primarily to the
habitual use by the Chinese peasants of plant stalks and leaves for
livestock feed and fuel. The content of organic matter in manure and
night soil fertilizer has been too low to make up this loss. The soils
also are often deficient in phosphorous and potassium, but these de-
ficiencies are not so widespread or so severe as that of nitrogen.
C. Attempts to Overcome Limitations
The Chinese Communist regime has implemented a number of pro-
grams in its attempts to circumvent the limitations of topography,
climate, and soils. The "deep plowing" and "close planting" programs
of the "leap forward" had little scientific basis. The campaign to
accumulate "native fertilizer" was of dubious value, especially be-
cause of increased labor requirements. The two most promising methods
of increasing agricultural production per unit of area in Communist
China are the development of irrigation and the increased use of chem-
ical fertilizer. Of the two the Chinese leaders apparently believed
* Following p. 6.
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72 84 96 108 120 132
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