THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A002200080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
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NS' 1011
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Economic Intelligence Report
CIA/RR ER 61-51
December 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
CIA/RR ER 61-51
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trims-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
This report analyzes information on production and distribution of
precision instruments in the USSR, including the history of production
before 1959, current and projected production and requirements, major
facilities for research and production, characteristics and problems
of production, trends in technology, and patterns of distribution.
This report also attempts to define the categories of production
that are included in the Soviet instrument industry, a task made
difficult by the ambiguous and conflicting nature of Soviet statements
on the subject. The report further attempts to determine the categories
of instruments that are included in Soviet statistical reporting on the
value of output of instruments.
For the most part, this report treats the instruments industry as
a whole, analysis in depth of the various branches of the industry
being left for future research.
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CONTENTS
Summary
I. Introduction ? ,? ?. ?
Production FacilitieS and Output of Precision
Instruments
?
?
1
5
6
A. Before 1959 ? ?. ? . ? ? . , ? ?
6
B. Seven Year Plan ,(1999-65)
.
?
?
?
10
1. Organization and Administrative Structure
.
.
.
10
2. Production and Research Facilities
12
a. Major Plants
12
b. Research Facilities
15
3. Production and Goals
17
?
a. Levels of Production
17
b. Production Process
21
4. Trends in Technology ? ? ? ' ? 11
23
a. Scientific And Analytical Instruments
?
?
?
?
24
b. Process-Control Instruments
25
c. Other Categories of Instruments
27
III.
Patterns of Distribution . ? ? ?
27
A. General
27
B. Domestic
28
C. International
.?
?
28
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendixes
Plants Known or Suspected to Be Producing
Significant Quantities of Instruments in
the USSR in-1961
33
Major Plants Producing Instruments in the
USSR in 1961 43
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Appendix C. Methodology Used. in Estimating the Value of
Capital Investment in the Instrument Indus-
try of the USSR During the Seven Year Plan
(1959-65)
53
Appendix D. Methodology Used in Computing the Labor. Force
in the Instrument Industry of the USSR ? ? ?
57
Appendix E. Research Organizations of Considerable Impor-
tance to the Instrument Industry of the USSR
as of 1961
61
Appendix F. Estimated Value of Output of Instruments in
the US in 1958
63
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Tables
1. Soviet Exports of Instruments, 1955-60
30
2. Soviet Imports of Instruments, 1955-60
31
Chart
USSR: Production of Instruments, 1958-65 following page
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THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR*
&weary
The USSR has a large and expanding instrument-industry that has
grown rapidly in the last decade and is sdheduled for continued rapid
growth during the period of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65). In connec-
tion with the adbitious goals for medhanization and automation of in-
dustry, production of process control instruments is receiving particular
emphasis and is expected to increaSest a considerably faster rate than
is production of other types of instruments. Current production of in-
struments is insufficient in terms of both quantityand product mix to
meet the requirements of the Soviet economy. _AlthOligh the gap between
production and requirements 'will be narrowed in the course of the Seven
Year Plan, production of instruments in 1965 will still lag behind re-
quirements.
Although the Russians producedAmme types of instruments before the
Bolshevik Revolution, output of a camprehepsiverange of items did not
begin in the USSR until after World War II, aWnot-Ontil-the middle of
the decade of the 1950'41 did Soviet industry produce the more sophisti-
cated types of instruments 10 large quantities. ,,Production of instru-
ments during 1956-59 is eetimated to have increased at an average
annual rate of 25 to 30 percent. In 1960i4roduction increased only
18 percent to a total value of output of 1.1 billion rubles.** The 1961
plan calls for an output of 1.3 'billion rUblesi and output in 1965 Is
expected to reach 2.4 billionto2.5 billion ruble44 The industry
therefore is expected to exceed its original Seten Year Plan goals of
1.85 billion to 1.92 billion,rdbles as early as 1963 or 1964. Thus,
instead of an average annual rate of growth of 111.3 percent as ap-
parently programed under the original terns of the. Seven Year Plan,
it is estimated that the rate of growth will be about 18.7 percent per
year. During 1959-60 the rate of growth averagad'alightlymore than
22.5 percent per year. The estimated annual rate0f,growth of 18.7
percent for the Seven YearYlan is believedt0-.*Skthin the capa-
bility of the industry, WhiWis*xpeCted to have,d0041derable addi-
tional capacity available foi,production of instruments in the relain-
ing years of the plan. The marked attention given by So*iet officials
* The estimates and Conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 November 1961.
** Except for data OA foreign trade, ruble values in this report are
given in new rubles (based on the Soviet currency reform of 1961) and
may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 0.4 ruble to
US $1, Which is believed to reflect relative costs of similar instru-
ments in the US and the USSR.
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to mechanization and automation in 1959 and 1960 and to the industries
that provide equipment for this program suggest that a high priority
will be accorded the instrument industry in its efforts to achieve a
high level of production by 1965.
During the period of the Seven Year Plan the structure of the indus-
try will change appreciably. Production of process control instruments,
which constituted only 12 percent of the total production of instruments
in 1958, is expected to comprise 28 percent of the total production in
1965. The share of timepieces in the total production is :ached ed to
decrease from 23 percent in 1958 to 18 percent in 1965. These cnges
are reflected in the following tabulation:
Category
Percent of Total
Production
1958
1965
Electrical measuring instruments
13.0
14.8
Process control instruments
11.7
27.8
Calculators and computers
7.0
9.4
4
..Instruments for measuring mechanical
quantities
9.3
7.7
Timekeeping devices
23.0
18.3
Other instruments'
36.0
22.0
Total
100.0 100.0
In spite of rapid. growth, the Soviet instrument industry lags well
behind its US counterpart. Soviet production of instruments in 1958
probably was about tWo-fifths of that of the US. The US instrument
industry also has been growing rapidly, at an average annual rate of
11 percent since World War II, and. is expected to increase even faster
in the next 15 years* Even if the USSR achieves a production of 2.5
billion rubles of instruments in 1965, Soviet output of instrumentS in
that year probably will be no more than two-thirds that of the US.
Approximately 263 industrialplants in the USSR are principally
engaged in productift of instruments, and a number of research insti-
tutes also produce small quantities. Of these 263 plants, 71:plants
(the largest category) have been identified as producers of process
control instruments, and 28 produce optical instruments; 23, electrical
measuring instruments; 20, timekeeping devices; and 19, weighing de-
vices. The urban areas of Moscow0Leningrad, and Kiev have the heaviest
concentrations of plants, although instrument plants are located in all
Industrial regions of the USSR. In spite of the large number of plants
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now in existences-the inddetry is receivinisUbetentilal investment
allocations for thaveobstruction of :new Nta, and the expansion of a
large number of those now in existence. This investment IA estimated
to range between approxiestely 700 million And 1 billion rubles during
the Seven Year Plan, or 6.to 8 percent of the 11.8 billion rubles origi-
nally planned for investment in the machine building and metalworking
sector during 1959-65._
Employment in the instrument industry in 1959 is estimated to have
been 280,000 to 290,000,, which is about 5 percent of employment in the
machine building and metalworking sector in 1959.
The USSR is in a far better position now than?Whas been in the
past insofar as an adequate supply of a caMprehenalve range of modern
instruments is concernedsAut the requirementiVotinduetrial users are
growing so rapidly that the instrument:induatry.has not been able to
keep pace with the'dedend..,'krecent Soviet study indicates that pro-
duction of instruments and automation equipment*AW,1958 satisfied only
60 percent ofdomestic requirements. and that thwAloquirements for some
types of instruments mere-satisfiedonly to the 0000tof 20 to 40
percent. ,MOreover, it.iklmaXikely that the requirements,of the using
industries will be satisfied. as to either quent4tr:pr,quality of
Instruments by the end of 1965.
The technology of Soviet instruments has improved greatly in the
last decade. At present the general range of Soviet technology and its
degree of sophistication are still lagging behind the Ms although the
gap is closing in many areas, the most significant of Uhich is in the
field of automation equipment. The USSR is currently, believed to be
about on a par with the US in theory of automation but well behind the
US in application of automation. A vast network of research organiza-
tions has been brought into being to devise new equipMent, raise the
efficiency and quality of production, direct the implementation of
the automation program, and overcome the general lag in automation
application. As a result of the concentration of effort, the Soviet
lag in this area Should steadily decrease. Instrummatation in such
fields as guidance, upper atmosphere research, and telemetry is believed
to be of a high order of technology. Soviet optics are considered to
be very good. Instruments used in electron microscopy, ultra-high-energy
physics, and gas chromatography lag behind the US in quality of workman-
ship and in sophistication.
* The term automation equipment is defined in the USSR as including
sensors, amplifiers, electronic data-processing evipment, and servo-
mechanisms.
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The USSR has emphasized the development of radioactive isotopic
devices and may be using them to a much greater extent than is the
practice in the US.
Soviet analog computers, although not comparable withthe better
US models, are adequate for a wide variety of important applications.
In contrast, Soviet digital computers are markedly inferior to those
of the US.
Although all sectors of the Soviet economy will have a share of out-
put of the instrument industry, the greater part is channeled into domes-
tic industrial use or goes to the armed forces. Such key areas as the
chemical, petroleum-processing, and metallurgical industries receive
large quantities of this equipment. Currently the USSR supplements its
output of instruments through selective imports of small quantities of
? high-priority items, such as process control instruments, from the
Free World and the three major Satellite producers (East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). Soviet exports of instruments to either
the remainder of the Bloc or the Free World are small in quantity and
are about evenly divided between scientific and industrial types on
the one hand and consumer goods types -- timekeeping devices and photo-
graphic and cinematographic equipment -- on the other.
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I. Introduction
An instrument is any device used in observing, measuring, controlling,
recording, computing, or communicating. Instruments and instrument sys-
tems refine, extend, or supplement human faculties-and abilities to
sense, perceive, communicate, remember, calculate, or reason. The human
senses are refined or extended by such devices as surface-roughness and
contour gauges, micrometers, chemical analyzers, pH meters, microscopes,
telescopes, gyro stabilized. platforms, range finders, and many others.
Other instruments, such as magnetometers and cosmic-ray counters, sense
or measure physical quantities for which there is no physiological sense
developed in human beings. Still other instruments (such as cameras,
correlators, simulators, and computers) perform functions of storing,
transmitting, or processing information signals in ways analogous to, or
going beyond, human abilities to record, remember, communicate, compare,
count, and apply logical operations systematically.
The following list includes some of the more important functions of
instruments or components of instrumentation systems in creating or han-
dling signals (or information or data): excitation, generation, modu-
lation, detection, comparison, amplification, differentiation, integration,
attenuation, conversion, switching, counting, coding, timing, programing,
correlating, linearizing, correcting, displaying, ?recording, reducing,
analyzing, computing, and controlling. Because all branches of experi-
mental science and technology depend on instrumentation, specialized
instruments (with a corresponding body of knowledge and practice) have
been developed separately in many fields. Thus chemical, aeronautical,
medical, and optical instrumentation among other types of instrumen-
tation indicate areas of specialization in various industries or pro-
fessions. Most types of instrumentation, however, have so-called "uni-
versal" usage -- that is, they can be used by a large number of diverse
consumers without major modifications.
Instruments are sometimes classified according to their field of
purpose or application, such as navigation instruments, surveying instru-
ments, or oceanographic instruments; according to their functions in
Instrument systems, such as detection, measurement, recording, computing,
controlling, signal modification, or display; Or according to the physi-
cal quantity or property that is to be measured or controlled by the
instrument, such as flow, temperature, pressure, force, displacement,
level, viscosity, acceleration, electrical quantities (voltage, current,
resistance, and capacitance), and optical qualities (transmission, gloss,
color, and brightness). Another method of designating or classifying
instruments, particularly those of vide applicability, is according to
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operating principles, examples being X-ray instruments (microscopes and
diffractometers); spectrometric instruments of various types for various
portions of the frequency spectrum or various particles (including infra-
red, ultraviolet, visible, microwave, X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, electron,
and alpha particles); and pneumatic, mechanical, electronic, electrical,
magnetic, hydraulic, nuclear, acoustic optical, and. instru-
ments. Each of the methods of classif;ing instruments is useful only in
specific instances. A single instrument or instrument system may utilize
many combinations of different principles. A given instrument often has
many applications. Any physical quantity may be measured by a number of
different principles. Each of the many operations performed in handling
the flow of information in instrumentation systems may be accomplished
by various techniques and devices. Thus no single method of classifying
instruments is possible, and the several methods are used where they.
apply.
In the USSR the instrument industry is referred to as priborostroyeniye
(instrument manufacturing) and the products of the industry as ptibory i
sredstva avtomatizatsii (instruments and automation equipment). This
industry is a branch of machine building, and its enterprises produce most
types of precision instruments (including some devices not usually regarded
as precision instruments, such as photographic and motion picture appara-
tus, watches and clocks, and calculating machines for office use). Soviet
accounting procedures for reporting physical production of instruments
narrow this list by omitting, apparently, value figures for production
of cameras and clocks and watches, output of which is reported separately
by units. Also, the Soviet instrument industry apparently does not
Include among its list ofproducts such categories as medical and dental
instruments, machinists' precision tools, or X-ray equipment (either
medical or industrial). 1/*
II. .Production Facilities and Output of Precision Instruments
A. Before 1959
Production of instruments dates back to the Tsarist period in
what is now the USSR, but significant production of such equipment did not
begin until early in ,the 1920's with the establishment of, plants for -
large-scale production 'of clocks and watches, weighing devices, and tem-
perature-measuring devices. 3/. Simple, devices for instrumentation and
testing, such as theodolites microscopes, metal-analyzing devices and
rudimentary electriCal and thermal control instruments began-to bolt pro-
duced in volume, during the First. Five Year Plan (192842). 1/ In campari-
kr
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son With similar prodUCtivof.Weatern Europe and the US, these instruments
were crude and inferioriankthe,USSR depended on imports for most of
the more complex precision instruments.
Before World War- II, production facilities were. contentrated
. , .
largely around Moscow, Leningrad,. and Kiev. These plants were relocated
to the east when the German Army overran the western USSR. When the
German Army was thrown back, many of the individual plants. were reestab-
lished in their former locations, leaving all or most of their produc-
tion machinery and a good portion of their labor- force at their relocated
facility, which thenceforth was to have a separate.identity. This arrange-
ment did not work a hardship, however, as Soviet instrument plants at
about the. same time received a-massive growth Stimulant in the form of -
dismantled German instrument plants and machinery and conscripted German
scientists and technicians. For example, shortly after the Soviet forces
took over Dresden it1945, they drew up elaborate floor plans of the
Zeiss Ikon Plant, then dismantled the plant and moved everything, includ-
ing light fixtures and key '-workman, to the USSR. This technique was
employed in Jena, Berlin, Rathenow, and other centers of the German
optical and precision instrument ind4stry. Ili %are than 90 percent of
the Carl Zeiss Plant in Jena, which before World War II was preeminent
in the field of optical equipment, was dismantled and sent to reestab-
lished plants in KrasnogOrsk, Kiev ? and Leningrad. In addition, the
Saxonian watch industry-in Olashue.tte was completely dismantled. 2/
With the possible exception of the machine tool industry, the USSR
placed greater emphasis on-thedystematic and thorough dismantling of
optical plants than it did on -any other branch of Germanindustry. Y
Apparently the Red Army also dismantled some of the optical plants of
other occupied countries, such as, for example, the Magyar Optikai
MUvek (Hungarian Optical Plant) in Budapest. 7/ -
These gains were retied-bed in the industrial.record of the first
two postwar 5-year plane. -- The USSR made considerable progress in produc-
tion of simple quality control instruments and optical instruments..
Great stress also was placed on achieving-large-volume-production of
process control instruments, pi but the complexity in designing and
producing such equipment apparently caused the programto fall behind
schedule in the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50)..
Production of watches and clocks however ? jumped from about
0.3 million units in 1945-t0--almbst 7.6 Million units in 1950 and 19.7
million units in 1955 (the -probable prewar high-water mark was4.5 million
units in 1935). Production of demerit also made a strong postwar recOvery
from virtually none in 1945 to 0-.3 million units in 1950 and. 1.0 Million
units in 1955 (the probable prewar high-water mark Was 0.4 million units
in 1940). 2/
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By 1951, Moscow and Leningrad were still the most important
centers of production of instruments, with 16 plants in the former and
14 in the latter city accounting for about 20 and 15 percent, respectively0
of the total production of instruments. 12/ By the end of the Fifth Five
Year Plan (1951-55)0 production of computers and process control instru-
ments moved into high gear.
All types of instruments continued to be produced at an expanding
rate. During the Fifth Five Year Plan, production tripled.* In 1955,
output of process control instruments was 2.8 times that of 1950; of
calculators and computers, 7.4 times; and of instruments for gas analysis,
3 times. 12/ Production of timekeeping devices and cameras more then
doubled, 2... as indicated below:
Thousand Units
, 1951 ,
1952
1953
1954
1955
Timekeeping devices
9,645
10,486
,
12,888
16,397
19,705
Cameras
357.2
459.1
499.1
767.9
1,022.5
In spite of its impressive rate of growth in production of instru-
ments, the USSR found itself hampered by several nagging problems. As
the country moved into the abortive Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60), instru-
ments were being produced in large numbers by more than a dozen different
ministriesl**
Each ministry often anactured instruments solely for its own use. 1?/
Also, output of instruments fell far short of satisfying the needs of-the
national economy. 11/ Not enough instruments were being produced, and,
in comparison with the West, the level of technology was lower. Produc-
tion often included obsolete items, 1g/ and shortages of raw materials
and components were frequent problems. 12/ As if these problems them-
selves were not enough, the Sixth Five Year Plan called for production
of instruments worth 700 million rubles in 1960.4R-* Di
production of instruments in 1955 was
2.7 times that of 1950 rather than 3 times. 11/
** For example, most of the optical instruments were produced by the
Ministry of Defense Industries; electrical measuring instruments were
produced principally by both the Ministry of Electric Plower Stations
and the Ministry of Electrical Engineering Industry; and process control
instruments were produced by more than half a dozen ministries. 1It/
*** The goals under the Sixth Five Year Plan varied for different cate-
gories of instruments, as follows: process [footnote continued on p. 9)
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Early in 1956 the Council of Ministers of the USSR divided the
Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building into two separate ministries,
one of which was the Ministry of Instrument Building and Automation.
The new ministry inherited those instrument plants under the jurisdic-
tion of its predecessor and was to coordinate production of measuring
instruments and automation equipment and speed up production. g2/ The
new ministry apparently was simply another of the many ministries produc-
ing instruments, and there is no indication that it solved or alleviated
any of the nagging problems. 22/ This ministry and all other instrument-
producing ministries were swept away in the general administrative reorgan-
ization of industry in the summer of 1957. Over-all planning functions
for the instrument industry were shifted to GoOplan and perhaps other
state committees as well. Instrument plants fell under the jurisdiction
of the various sovnarkhozes (Councils of the National Economy).
During the first 3 years of the Sixth Five Year Plan, output of
instruments continued to rise sharply at an 8.4e-rage annual rate of 25
to 30 percent. The value of instruments produced in 1958 (excluding
watches, clocks, and cameras) is estimated to have been slightly less
than 740 million rubles. Growth of _production of consumer goods (watches,
clocks, and cameras) was sluggish, as indicated by the following official
figures 2.5./:
Timekeeping' devices
Cameras ,
Million Units
1956
. 1957
1958
22.6
23.5
24.8
1.2
1.3
1.5
At a time when most branches of the machine building sector were failing
to achieve the levels of production called for by annual plan goals during
the Sixth Five Year Plan, the instrument industry in 1958 had already
exceeded the 1960 goals established by the Sixth Five Year Plan, thanks
to the construction of new plants, the expansion of existing ones and
the conversion of certain plants to production of instruments. In spite
of the rapid growth of the industry, production of instruments in 1958
was still insufficient in terms of both quantity and product mix.
control instruments 4 times that of 1955; electrical measuring instru-
ments, 3.6 times; calculators and Computers, 4.;.5 times; and optical-
mechanical instruments',-ItiMeS. ELY
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B. Seven Year Plan (1999,65)
1. Organization and. Administrative Structure
The sovnarkhoz system of administration was in full opera-
tion by the beginning of the Seven Year Flan. The large number of
monolithic, Moscaw-centered ministries had been replaced by the sotra
narkhozes as supervisors of individual plants, although Ultimate authority
ani policymaking powers had beah:retained by functional state committees
under the Council of Ministers, USSR. The day-to-day responsibility for
distribution of raw materials, the appointment of principal Officials
of the plants, and other forms of direct control, however, were now
.vested in functional administrations subordinate to sovnarkhozes.
The designation of these administrations varies from one sov-
narkhoz to another, depending on the volume and character of the indus-
trial production of the sovnarkhoz. Ordinarily, if there is a significant
volume of production of instruments, there is an Administration of Electri-
cal Engineering Industry and Instrument Making, as in the Belorussian
Sovnarkhoz, or an Administration of Radio Engineering and Instrument
Making, as in the Mbscow city Sovnarkhoz or simply an Administration of
Instrument Making, as in the Lithuanian :I.nd L'vovskiy Sovnarkhozes.
If production of instruments is of minor importance, responsibility or
Instrument plants may be lodged in an Administration of Machine Building,
as in the Estonian and'Kirgiz Sovnarkhozes. 27/
The sovnarkhoz directs and monitors production activity.
It also is believed to have an important voice in appointing or removing
major officials at instrument plants, in establishing what a plant should.
produce, and in instituting corrective action for any plant failing to
meet its plan goals or being remiss in controlling the quality of its
production.
Gosplan? USSR, through its Division of Electrical Engineering
and Instrument Milking Industry, together with its counterpart at the republic
level,* gives final approval to the plan for production of instruments
after consideration of the recommendations of stmarkhozes and other
Interested governmental organs. In some instancesi.Gosplan, USSR, or its
counterpart in One of the larger republics will even designate the plant
that is to produce or cease to produce a specific item. In addition,
the gosplan of a major republic apparently assigns to individual plants
* As in the sovnarkhozes, the designations are believed to _differ slightly
in the various republics, depending on the importance of the industry.
In the smaller republics, the areas of Which coincide with the areas of
individual sovnarkhozes, there may not be a separate Gosplan division
for instruments. 22/
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the specific development responsibilities for a new instrument. Gosplan,
USSR, also establishes wholesale and. retail prices ,for instruments. 22/
',A.-1 ?
The new system of administration has provided the instru-
ment industry with a greater degree of both Centralization and. decentral-
ization. The assumption by Gosplan, USSR, at certain control functions
previously dispersed among the many ministries, responsible for production
of instruments has provided the opportunity for treating the country's
instrument industry as an integrated unit. This increased centraliza-
tion makes possible the eliMination of unnecessary duplication in both
research and development and production. The' benefits of centralization,
however, presuppose effective coordination among various centralized
bodies, some of them new which have responsibilities in the field of
instrumentation. In addition to Gosplan, USSR, ? these bodies include
the State Committee on Automation and Machine Balding; the State
Committee on Standards, Measures, ;and Measuring Instruments; and. the
recently formed Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work.
Statements in the Soviet press indicate that the degree of coordination
necessary for these orgeskimations to furnish unified policy guidance
and over-all control has not yet been achieved.
The increased. degree of decentralization has been provided
by sovnarkhoz administration of local plants, which has made possible
better coordination of production of instruments at the regional level.
This system also seems ,to have enabled the older, emall,er, and more
backward plants to, improve their ,production capacity by relieving them
of the responsibility far manufacturing extraneotis,vroducts and enabling
them to specialize -in :the 'output c)f fever items. Sovnarkhoz operational
control at the local level,, however,, is not complete. There is evidence
that the Division of the Electrical Engineering and Instrument Industry
of Gosplan, USSR, and the Division of Elect.rical'Engineering and Elec-
tronics of the State Commattee for Automation and achine Building not
only exercise over-all policy guidance end control but also can interfere
in operations at the plantIeveli
Certain problems that were supposed to have been solved by
the reorganization of industry -- such as continued production of
obsolete instruments -insufficient ,cooperation, between plants, and poor
allocation of materiils. -- have not been eliminated under the new
administrative system, although they have been .alleviated.
Long-ra1ge,p0licy guidance for the instrument industry comes
from the Communist cParty itoelZ. A recent example; is the Plena* Session
of the Central Committee of the -iitommaist Party-.of the USSR, held on
24-29 June 1959. At this Mieting, certain specific tasks were -pinpointed
for the industry: Theac.taska,included. a requirtemment for Improving the -
present product 11,st,,of instraments:and. instructions for the principal
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administrative organizations to Cooperate in drawing together within
a 6-month period a liet,of proposals for review by the Council of
Ministers, USSR, to *prove the organization, coordination, and control
of the most important research, experimental, and planning operations
of instrument development, Other Actions included an order to
emphasize the standardization of Certain categories of instruments and
a reiteration that the development of specialization and cooperation of
industrial installations of the industry are important programs of the
Seven Year Plan. 33 The Party devoted another plenary setsion to this
subject in July l6O. ?
2. Production and Research Facilities
a. Major Plants
It is estimated that there are 263 plants in the USSR
that are principally engaged in production of instruments.* The number
of plants under the industry ts growing each year as new ones are built
or converted to production of instruments. Since the beginning of the.
Seven Year Plan, between 30 and 40 new plants have been identified.**
It is quite likely that perhaps an equal nuMber may be added to the list
during the remainder of the: plan period, although few of these will reach
significant levels of production by11965.
In addition to the new plants being added to the industry,
there is an impressive expansion program for many of the existing plants.
For example, the Leninakan Instrument Plant during 1960 was to have
increased its facilities by the construction of new shops worth 1.8
million rubles, .lit/ and the Baku Machinery and Instrument Plant imeni
Kalinin began a reconstruction program in the middle of 1959 which, when
completed, reportedly will enable the plant to increase its output 20
times by the end of the Seven Year Plan. 22/ Similarly the Leningrad
Vibrator Plant, one of the oldest and largest manufacturers of electrical
Instruments, is adding an additional one-third to its present 400,000
square feet of floorspace. 2?/
The question of how much it is costing the USSR to build
30 to 40 new plants and to expand a large number of existing plants is
Intriguing. No official figures have been released, and the few references
to capital investment in the industry have been disappointingly brief and
vague. On the basis of available data, however, it is believed that during
* For a list of plants known or suspected to be producing significant
quantities of instruments in'the USSR, See Appendix A. For a list of
major plants producing instruments in the USSR, see Appendix B.
** Not all of these plants have actually. gone into production. Con-
struction has just begun on some, and still others have not yet talogressed
beyond the planning stage.
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the Seven Year Plan period the USSR may invest between approximately
700 million and 1 billion rubles for new and expended plant facilities,*
which is 6 to 8 percent of the 11.8 billion rales originally planned
for investment in the machine building and metalworking sector during
the Seven Year Plan.
Not all output of ,the industry comes from the regular
producing plants. Some of the research institutes which do design and
development work (generally of a theoretical nature), also often produce
prototypes or have a limited output of highly technical or complex instru-
ments. For example, the Institute of Optics (GOI) imeni S.I. Vhvilov in
Leningrad, which is primarily a research facility, is believed to manu-
facture limited quantities of the Linnik microscope, profile interfer-
ometers, portable polarizing microscopes, fluorescent microscopes, high-
temperature microscopes, and diffraction gratings. 27/ The Central
Laboratory of Automatics of the Ministry of Construction, RSFSR, in
1960 produced its first consignment of high-speed automatic photoelectric
pyrometers. 2/ Still other institutes have "experimental works" where
large-volume production is carried out, as at the Experimental Works of
the Ural Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry, which is producing
? electrical instruments and exporting them to Communist China, Burma,
India, Rumania, Poland, and other countries. ,12/ Or, again, there is
the Experimental Production Division of the Institute of Physics,
Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian SSR, which recently began the series
production of bolometers, high-precision instruments designed to detect
very slight temperature changes. lig/
?
The western part of the USSR contains most of the
plants of the instrument industry, although instrument plants are
located in all of the industrialized regions of the country. The
largest localized concentration of plants is around Moscow (34 plants),
Leningrad (31 plants), Kiev (17 plants), Khartkov (7 plants), and Minsk
(7 plants). These five urban areas contain more than one-third of the 263
plants of the industry.
The size of the labor force at the plants of the industry
varies widely.** Of a group of 30 plants for Which recent employment
figures are available, the range is from 200 employees in the Tashkent
Gidrometpribor Plant to 12,0001 at the Leningrad State Optical Machinery
Plant imeni OGPU. On the basis of derivative data, it is estimated
that there were 28 ,000 to 290,000 employees in the instrument industry
in 1959, or about 5 percent of the 6.2 million employees that are estimated
* For an analysis of factors used in reaching this conclusion, see
Appendix C.
** For the methodology used in computing the labor force of the instru-
ment industry of the USSR, seeAppendix D.
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to have been in the machine building and metalworking sector of industry
In 1959. The number of women employed by the industry is high, possibly
constituting more than half of the labor force. Illustrative of the large
number of women employed are the Moscow Timepiece Plant where 84
percent of the 7,500 workers are women 142/; the Leningrad Vibrator
Plant, where 64 percent of the 3,500 employees are women W; and the
Leningrad Electrical Machinery Plant, where 80 percent of the 1i500
employees are women many of wham are girls just out of high school. !fit/
The ratio of women employed in comparable industries in the US is
believed to be far below these levels.
Apparently the Soviet instrument industry is not
dependent on any one plant for the entire output of any one category
of instruments. In 1958, however, two plants, the Moscow and the
Penza Analytical and Calculating Machine (SAM) Plants, are believed to
have produced, by value, approximately 83 percent of production of
electronic computers in the USSR. This concentration of production of
computers is expected to lessen in the Seven Year Plan as new plants
go into production. Five computer plants are presently in various
states of construction, and 22 plants are to be producing computers
by the end of 1965. it2/
Of the 263 plants believed to be serving the instrument
Industry, those plants principally engaged in output of process control
instruments comprise the largest single category, with optical instrument
facilities the next largest. The following is a rough estimate of plants
engaged in the output of various categories of instruments:
Category
Number of Plants
Process control instruments* 71
Unknown and other instruments (including, among other
categories, testing machinery, industrial jewels,
and certain scientific instruments)* 61
Optical instruments (including ;botographic, cinemat-
ographic, and film-processing equipment) 28
Electrical measuring instruments* 23
Timekeeping devices 20
Weighing devices 19.
Calculators and computers
Aircraft instruments
Geodetic and geophysical instruments
Hydrographic and meteorological instruments
Watt-hour meters
22
9
7
6
* Because of the problem of classifying some types or instruments,- it
is possible that several plants should ,be listed under another category,
of instruments.
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b. Researdh Facilities
An impressive research effort Supports the production
program for instruments. Research and design organizations exist at
many governmental levels in the USSR and for all the scientific disciplines
of interest to the inatiotry. There has been a general proliferation in
both type and number of such organizations in recent years and an increase
in their importance. This rank growth apparently has not been accompanied
by stringent control or delineation of programs in spite of the fact
that in theory, at least, there is a high degree of centralization. The
field is a jungle of confusing administrative subordination and over-
lapping functions and responsibilities. IV
In the spring of 1961 a shakeup evidently took place in
the administration of all scientific research, including that pertaining
to instruments. A new agency, the State Committee for Coordination of
Scientific Research Work, 'Sae-created with broad administrative powers.
Specific functions of this new committee are somewhat vague but seem
to be primarily concerned with a reduction in the span of time between
product development and production, a general tightening up of coordina-
tion and direction of collection and dissemination of scientific informa-
tion, and (probably the most significant of all) *major voice in the
preparation of annual plans for financing Soviet scientific research
and capital investment in research facilities. IV
Mast of the major plants have their own research and
development personnel and facilities) which generally are supposed to
limit their efforts to engineering modifications and improvements and to
expansion of product applicatiOn. Some of the plants occasionally engage
in more or less basic design-vork on their own) but such research is
supposed to require the,agreeSent of superior scientific bodies'. 2.4g/
The latter are made up of research institutes (III's and VRII's)- and
design bureaus (KB's and :Mrs). 142/
It is these organizations that-do:the major design and
development work. At their head is a group of administrative bodies that
collectively exercise either direct or indirect supervision over all
design and development work pertaining to instruments and also are vested
occasionally with' broad peverSever the entire machine building and
metalworking sector.:, These administrative bodied include the following:
(1) State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Reneardh Work of the
Council of Ministers, USSR; (2) Committee on Standards, Measures, and
Measuring Instruments (Which is attached to the Council of Ministers,
USSR, and to some extent 1.5 centerible to the US:letional Bureau Of
Standards, although more peverhil); (3) MdinAdMinistration of Scientific
Research Institutes and Planning Organization* (under Goeplan, USSR);
(4) State Committee onAntomatiOn and Machine Building of the Council of
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Ministers, USSR; and (5) Academy of Sciences, USSR. 22/ Among these
scientific organizations the State Committee on Automation and Machine
Building plays an important role in the formulation and supervision of
plans for the introduction of automation and production processes into
all the branches of national industry and the development of new (and
the improvement of existing) instruments and automation equipment.' 21/
Each of the research institutes and design bureaus
solves the basic research and development problems associated with its
own specialized field of application.* Major institutes have branches
located in some of the principal cities, and each of these branches
serves a sovnarkhoz in the same area of specialization as its parent
organization. An example is Kirovakan NIIAvtomatika in the Armenian
SSR, which is subordinate to the State Committee on Automation and
Machine Building ,of the Council of Ministers, USSR. 22/ The responsi-
bility of the institute and its branches is to work in the realm of
theory, and when the capability of a device to function has been
satisfactorily demonstrated, the project is passed on to a design .
bureau. The latter bureau works on precisely defined individual projects
for the creation of specific types of items and performs all development
work to the point of readiness for production. At this point a designated
plant is given the necessary technical documentation relating to the
developed item and, on approval of the sovnarkhoz, will produce the
new item. 22/
Although theoretically none of the research facilities
is to engage in production of equipment, it is evident that they often
engage in custom production or amall series production, particularly at
so-called experimental plants.- 22.4/ In addition, the degree of teamwork
and support rendered by. the Various research facilities appears to be
uneven. An example is evident in a recent complaint by the Mytistchi
Electric Meter Plant. In attempting to gather data on the effects of
mechanical wear in bearings of electric meters, it asked for help from
the Leningrad branch of VNIIEP, the All-Union Scientific Research
Institute of Electrical Measuring Instruments.** In response, VNIIEP
apparently sent a survey team which gathered some. statistics. Neither-
VNIIEP nor its purvey team furnished the plant with any data or recommen-
dations. A survey team from VNITIPribor, the All-Union Scientific Research
Technological Institute of Instrument Making,*** was in the plant at the
same time, and, instead of pooling resources and cooperating, the two teams
went through the plant duplicating each other's questions. 52/
* For a list of the tesearch organizations of special importance to the
precision mechanism and automation equipment industry, see Appendix E.
** Vsesoyuznyy NauchnorIssledovateltskiy Institut Elektroizmeritel'nykh
Priborov.
*** Vsesoyuznyy Nauchno-Issledovaterskiy Tekhnologicheskiy Institut
Priborostroyeniya.
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The ptoblem of duplication of effort has been of real
concern to the government. Late in 1957 it was reported that more than
4o organizations were engaged in the development or application of ultra-
sonic instruments an&that 18 worked on computers, and in 1960 more than 20
organizations were involved in the designing of flow meters and level
meters. 2Y In addition, it appears that tight control of research,
through various high-level institutes sugh as -clearinghouses, is not
always effective. Visitors to the Institute of Automatics and Tele-
mechanics of Gosplan, Ukrainian SSR, in mid-1960 concluded from discussions
with officials of the institUte that there was a strong trend toward
decentralization of research and development. Thus each republic and
even each plant would work out its own methods of automation. 21/ Unless
some new form of stringent control is exercised, it appears that this
trend could effectively vitiate the coordination of research and develop-
ment.
A close tie among industrial plants, scientific organi-
zations, and administrative organs is obtained through the trade journals,
which are published by the scientific bodies and Which furnish policy
guidance and specific details on theory or recent developments in instru-
mentation for the benefit of research and design facilities and manufac-
turing establishments.. Among the most important are Mekhanizatsiya i
avtomatizatsiya proissvodstva (Mechanization and Automation of Production)
and Priborostroyen4e,t1nstrument Manufacture), published jointly by the
State Committee on AutoMation and Machine Building of the Council of
Ministers, USSR, and the Central Administration of the Scientific and
Technical Society,ofthe InttruMent Industry, and-Izmeriternaya tekhnika
(Measurement Techniques), Avtomatika i telemekhanika cAutomation and
Remote Control), and Pribory i tekhnika eksperimenta (Instruments and
Equipment for Experiments), all published under the auspices of the
Academy of Sciences, USSR.
In spite of the multiplication of scientific organi-
zations in recent ye-art, it is likely that there will be even more in
the future. At the beginning of 1960 it was announced that the number
and scope of projects :Connected with instrument design and development
work were beyond the capabilities of existing NII's and KB's and that
new Nil's and KB's would be created (some of Which will be attached to
the larger manufacturing establishments) and existing ones expanded. 2/
Process control instrumentation was singled out for increased develop-
mental emphasis in the future. 5.2/
3. PrOduction-AndA0als
a. Levels 'Of Production
-Production of instruments during the first 2 years of -
the Seven Year Men increased 27.5 percent in 1959 and 17.9 percent in
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1960 compared with an average annual rate of growth of 14.3 percent
required to meet the Seven Year Plan goal for 1965.
It is probable that the Soviet instrument industry has
set its sights considerably higher than the Seven Year Plan goal for
1965 of 1.8 billion to 1.9 billion rubles. Shortly after the publica-
tion in November 1958 of Ehrushehev'a theses for the Seven Year Plan, a
leading official in the instrument industry asserted that these goals
were insufficient, and he submitted some rough calculations to prove
that an output of 2.4 billion to 2.5 billion rubles would be required
in 1965 to meet the requirements of the economy for instruments. gy A
goal of this magnitude vould require an average annual rate of growth
of 18.7 percent for 1959-65. The increases in production that were
achieved during 1959-60, coupled with the planned increase of 21 per-
cent for 1961, suggest that the USSR will reach a level of production
of 2.4 billion to 2.5 billion rubles in 1965. TO accomplish this goal
would require absolute annual increments to production during 1961-65
of 258 million to 278 million rubles, which are considerably greater
than the increments of 203 million and 169 million rubles achieved, re-
spectively, in 1959 and 1960. The priority attention devoted to the
instrument industry in recent years, however, and. the program for mech-
anization and automation of Soviet industry, the growing number of new
instrument plants, and the widespread program for expansion of existing
instrument plants all indicate an effort that makes feasible the achieve-
ment of the level of 2.4 billion to 2.5 billion rubles.
The planned, actual, and estimated value of production
of instruments* for selected years., 1958-65, is as follows glb
Million Rubles
1961
Original
Probable Level
of Production
1958
1959
1966
Plan
1965 Plan
in 1965
739
942
1,111
1,344
1,850 to 1,920
2,1100 to 2,500
* These statistics include production of opticalo-mechanical instru-
ments and apparatus, electrical and electronic measuring instruments,
calculators and computers, instruments for the control and regulation
of thermal-energy processes, instruments for measuring mechanical
magnitudes, instruments for navigation and piloting, and instruments
of time but do not include cameras, [footnote continued on p. 19]
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For a graphic presentatiOn-Of production of instruMents during this
period, see the Ohart.,
Information on production by individual category of
equipment is extremely meager. Classification of instruments tends
to be arbitrary and occasionally misleading, as even the leading
Soviet professional journal in the field of instrument manufacture
admits, as follows:
When exaMining [the planned change in
production of instruments in 1965 compared
with 1958] it is necessary to keep in mind
that we have treated in a somewhat arbitrary
manner the distribution of instrument pro-
duction by groups. It is clear, for example,
that some electrical measuring instruments
(laboratory and. ,others) are incorrectly
referred to as automation equipment, while
many instruments included in the group
entitlek"other instruments," such as time
relays, etc.., must necessarily be considered
automation equipment. Instruments used in
determination of mechanical quantities, When
installed in automatic production lines of
machine building enterprises, undoubtedly
Should also be considered as automation
equipment, Opticomedhanical instruments
and radio measuring and dosimetric instru-
ments, etc., are considered special-purpose
instruments. 2/
watches and clocks, X-ray equipment, or medical instruments.
These figures probably include some, but not all, of the instru-
ments destined for military use, but there is little evidence on
this point. The figures-, with the exception of the probable level
of 1965, are either those reported by the USSR or those derived
from Soviet published figures. The figures are believed to repre-
sent the quantity of instruments produced multiplied by 1955 prices
and adjusted to new rubles.
* Following p. 20.
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The change in composition in the Soviet instrument
industry between the beginning and end of the Seven Year Plan has
been estimated by the official Soviet journal Priborostroyeniye
(in percentages*), as follows i3./:
Percent of Total
Production
Category
1958
1965
Electrical measuring instruments
13.0
14.8
Process control instruments
11.7
27.8
Calculators and computers
7.0
9.4
Instruments for measuring mechani-
cal quantities
9.3
7.7
Timekeeping devices
23.0
18.3
Other instruments (probably includ-
ing optical instruments and
special-purpose scientific instru-
ments)
36.0
22.0
Total
100.0
100.0
The most important aspect of the character of output
of instruments during the Seven Year Plan is the increase in volume of
process control instruments. The share of these instruments is to in-
crease from 12 percent of the total production of instruments in 1958
to 28 percent of the total production of instruments in 1965. This
trend is accompanied by a decrease in the relative shares of timekeep-
ing devices and "other" instruments. 2.4/
A physical unit indicator of production of instru-
ments is possible in only two categories of consumer goods, timekeeping
devices and cameras. Output, which is believed to be running behind
Schedule, is as follows ?j/:
* These percentages represent output of the entire instrument indus-
try, including clocks, watches, and cameras, which are not included
in Soviet statistics on the value of output of instruments. The
value of output of the individual categories listed above, therefore,
cannot be determined.
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Millions of Rubles
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
USSR: Production of Instruments, 1958-65*
t
//
2
/)
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
?V
//
//
//
//
,7
7/
V/
9
7 i
/
/ V
1961
Plan
/,
/3
/ -
///
V
7-
/
/V
VV
1958
1959
1960 1961
1962
*Exclusive of Cameras, Timekeeping Devices, and Watt-hour Meters
35564 12-61
1963
1964
Estimated
1965 Output
1965
Original
1965 Plan
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Million Units
1958
1959
1960
1965 Plan
Timekeeping devices
24.8
26.2
26.0
35.5
Cameras
1.5
196
1.8
3.48
The RSFSR is the largest producer of instruments among
the republics, producing 15 percent of the total Soviet output in 1960.
Instrument plants are located in most of the other republics, includ-
ing the Ukrainian SSR, Which is the second most *Portant producer.
Although the USSR is demonstrating a remarkable growth
in output of instruments it Appears unlike1vthatthe country will
equal US output of instruments for at least another decade. Since
World War II, for example, US output has increaSed at an average annual
rate of growth of 11 percent and. is expected: to increase faster than
11 percent in the next 15 In 1958, US output probably was over
twice that of the USSR. ??/ 1:ven at the probable upper limit of 2.5
billion rubles, the Soviet output of instruments in 1965 Will be no
more than two-thirds,e?:_that7-Of the US in that year if US output con-
tinues to grow as itAMO-sinceMorld War
The USSR, like Up, its engdgWin large-volume pro-
duction of instruments for its armed forces So little is known, how-
ever, concerning the relative volume of production of this equipMent
in the USSR that it is impossible to estimateitS-Magnitude.
b. Production Process
In spite of the extreme diversity in products and the
wide range in volume of output among the various categories of equip-
ment, the instrument industry for the most part pursues the same pro-
grams as the other sectors of machine building. Currently, the most
important of these programs include (1) an emPhasill on a high degree
of mechanization in thepeodudtiOn process 5n& (2) increased standard-
ization and interdhangeabilitybf components.
In emphasizing a_high degree of mechanization in the
production process, the objective of the industry is to achieve
in-
creased production at reduced ldbOor costs. In some cases, such as
conveyor assembly line technives0** the USSR apParently has overworked
* For a computation:ofHoutput of instruMentiCin,tte US, see Appendix F.
** Including testing an?alibration work in :addition to assembly oper-
ations.
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the concept. In those instrument plants visited by Western observers
it has been noted that Conveyor eiseMbly line techniques are used to
a much greater e*tent than in the US. Such techniques often are em-
ployed in the case of production runs as small as several dozen units
and are considered by the USSR to be preferable to individual assembly
methods for runs as short as 2 days' duration or as law as 100 units a
month. Qualified Western observers have noted the irrationality of
using conveyor line techniques in small-unit runsl.particularly in the
case of complex instruments where as many as 5,000 different parts are
involved and where small dimensions and high precision are significant
factors in the production process.
? A second important program is aimed at increasing
standardization and interchangeability of components. Some standardi-
zation'of parts, components, and products has been going on for many.
years in the instrument industry, but the program apparently is being
rapidly accelerated during the period of the Seven Year Plan. TsNIIKA,
the Central Scientific. Research Institute for Complex Automation*
(which is subordinate to the State Committee on Automation and Machine
Building), and no less than eight other research institutes and design
bureaus are primarily concerned with the application of standardization
in the instrument field. Work is in progress on the development of
norms for both instruments and their components, including materials
and methods of manufacture. One Soviet journal recently reported
even that en high-precision i ruments of diverse types can be built
through the use of .14.0 to 60 percent of the standardized parts. 19/ In
addition to the savings accrued through the use of standard interchange-
able parts, the. industry hopes to reap an additional benefit by reduc-
ing the number of parallel models. Soviet engineers believe, for
example, that the number of tachometer designs can be reduced from
32 to 7, yet these 7 will have a broader range of high-precision
measurement than the original. 32.. Other benefits expected from the
standardization program are savings in materials, labor, and money.
In spite of the increased emphasis on standardization
in the Seven Year Plan and the particular attention devoted to the
subject at the 1959 Plenum of the Central.Committee of the Communist
Party of the USSR, it appears that progress during 199940 has been
slow. Also notable is the fact that TsNIIKA has been pilloried by
the press for ineffectual leadership and failure to fulfill its
assigned work projects. 71/
One of the more serious problems of production facing
the Soviet instrument industry is that of excessive lead time in the
development of an item Of equipment. Four or more years frequently
* Tsentral'nyy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Kampleksuoy
Avtomatizatsii.
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elapse betyeen the date on-ithich the development of an item begins
and the date on Which it Icesinto-industriel production, compared
with from 1 to 2 years in the US. A new Soviet inetrument occasion-
ally becomes obsolete in some of its aspects by the timeit is readied
for large-scale production. 3E/ In the area of instrumentation for
complex weapons systems, hoWever, excessive leid time does not appear
to be a problem.
An even soreserious problem facing the industry is
the continued production otobsolete or poor-quality equipment. The
Kazan' Teplokontrol' klant,'the Krasnodar ZIP Plant, and the Tomsk
Manometer Plant, far example- (producers of process control instru-
ments), have been excoriated in the press for several years for
failing to observe production standards and for producing obsolete
or poor-quality itemsaa/ Supposedly, there is a safeguard against
such a condition -- e plant has a quality contra organization,
the OW, which is supposed to insure good quality-of output. In
addition, the State Committee-on Measures and Measuring Instruments,
which is attached to the Council of Ministers USSR, is required to
make a spot check of output of a plant for adherence to production
standards. Although this committee has the power to forbid produc-
tion of obsolete equipment,'apPerntly it can and :does permit produc-
tion of acknowledged obsolete items. 72.;/
4. Trends in Technology
In addition to attempting to triple its production of
instruments during the Seven Year Plan, the USSR is making an extra-
ordinary effort to raise tbe level of equipment technology. The
supreme authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the USSR in June 1959 and again in ally 1960 emphasized the
importance of this effort. Amaze of scientific organizations
is implementing this poliey deVeloping equipleht characterized
by simplicity of design and advanced technical attributes. The
utilization of common parts and components is being stressed to
effect savings in labor, Materials, space, and time. An attempt
also is being made to divelop all types of instrumentation needed
by the entire spectrum of the Soviet economy.
The USSR iwalread.v II long. way elotag the, road to these
goals. 3?/ In its space program the country hex clearly demonstrated
a high order of technology in such fields of instruientation as guid-
ance, research on the upper atepsphere, and telemetry. ri Research
institutes have custom-produCedt4cientific apparatus of superior
technical attributes in Such-fields as high-speed photography, high-
temperature measurement, anitbs phygics of hi o pressure. V/ There
are other areas, however, where the USSR is clearlt lagging in tech-
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nology behind the US and other leading Western industrial countries,
as in process control instrumentation The industry is well aware
of its weaknesses in this regard because the popular press and scien-
tific journals give this subject A great deal of attention. 72/
The Soviet instrument industry, like all branches of the
machine building and metalworking sector, has long been an unabashed
imitator of the best in equipment technology developed abroad.
Occasionally, an item of equipment produced in the USSR is such a
close reproduction of an existing foreign-produced item as to be
practically indistinguishable from it.
In some cases a replica has modifications of the original which indi-
cate a considerable degree of sophistication, as in the IKS-14 double-
beam spectrophotometer, which is an improved version of the Perkin
Elmer Model 21 produced in the US. gl/
Technical and scientific publications from all over the
world are systematically exploited for the latest developments in
practice and theory of design and application, which are then utilized
in new and improved types of equipment. The designers of instruments,
however, are by no means incapable of producing new departures in
instrumentation.
-
both the equipment of domestic design and the improved facsimiles
of foreign instruments reflect a high degree of Soviet technical
competence in all or nearly all fields of instrumentation. Eq/
Instrumentation appears to vary widely in level of
technology from one category of equipment to another as well as
within each category. The disparity in levels of technology among
the various types of equipment precludes the possibility of making
over-all generalizations that will hold true for all the major cate-
gories. The present "state of the art" for several of the more
important categories of instruments is as follows:
a. Scientific and Analytical Instruments
Apparently a full range of spectroscopic equipment
is produced in the USSR. The quality of such equipment is believed
to be good, although not on a par with the best of comparable products
of the West. The USSR ie-eapable of producing optical-gratings in
the quality andin the quantities that it requires. ?1.5/ In equip-
ment used for electron microscopy, in ultra-high-energy physics,
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and in gas chromatography, there apparently is &substantial timelag
behind the US, particularly in such areas 'as quality ,of workmanship,
lack of refinements, ank.,sophistication. 'Equipment produced in
the USSR for UM in interferometry and metrology apparently differs
from similar equipment produced. in Western Europe and the UB, princi-
pally because the Soviet equipment is much more optical in character,
whereas equipment produced in the West would be electronic.
Soviet optics are regarded as being very, good. tipi
b. Process Control Instruments
In the area of process control instrumentation the
USSR is believed to be well behind the US and other Western industrial
countries in technology. The USSR is deficient in instruments for
the measurement of high vacuums and for the measurement of corrosive
media or viscous fuels of a combustible and aggressive nature; in
long-submersion thermocouples for measuring the temperature of molten
steel; in continuous fluid-stream analyzers; and in automatic devices
for controlling concentrations of multicomponent solutions of salts,
acids, and alkalis. ??/ In the practical application of automatic
control to industrial processes the USSR clearly lege behind the US,
In theory of automatic control, however, the Soviet effort is con-
sidered to be excellent and at least equal to comparable effort in
the US and the UK. ?g/ The USSR also is believed to be strong in the
theory of self-optimizing and data-sampling systems, in application
of computer-actuated pneumatic controls, and in pneumatic computer
components. 2/
In electronic computer development the current Soviet
position reflects the emphasis accorded to analog types since the
end of World War II. A, vide range of types of analog computers for
routine use in schools, scientific laboratories and industry and
In military applications :has been produced. Although the majority
of Soviet analog computers do not meet the levelsor performance
of the better analog computers produced in the US, they are clearly
adequate for a wide variety of important applications. In contrast,
Soviet production of digital computers until recently has exhibited
a much slower rate of growth, and production technology in the digital
computer field has been markedly inferior to US practice. Beginning
about 1956, however, the economic effort devoted to production of
digital electronic computers was intensified, and at the present
time production of digital computers is Showing signs of vigorous
growth. g2/
Although the current level of technology of process
control instrumentation does not seemAmpresaive at first glance, there
are factors at work that probably will raise this level considerably.
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It should be borne in mind that the success of the program for inte-
grated mechanization and automation of industry is of utmost importance
to the Soviet government. Because automatic control is the heart of
precision guidance systems, continuous advancement in automatic Control
theory and in complex automatic control systems is. necessary in order
to keep the rocket and apace programs of the USSR moving ahead. Auto-
mation also is considered to be the best means of increasing industrial
production and of lowering manufacturing costs. The USSR correlates
the success and progress of its social system, at least in part, with the
country's economic status (including its position in world markets), and,
therefore, the cost of automation is regarded as a cost to the government
rather than a cost,applicable to industry. The importance that the govern-
ment attaches to the development of automatic control can be seen in the
caliber of the personnel assigned to work in this field. About 7 percent
of the 167 Soviet academicians are working directly on automatic control.
Many of the best mathematicians in the USSR also are Working on control
theory in close collaboration with engineers. This support has taken the
form of several new institutes to implement the translation of theory in-
to practical application, and the institutes are expected to double or
triple in size in the next few years. The result of this tremendous con-
centration of effort should be a considerable strengthening of the research
and development base in the field of automatic control and, eventually,
production of a more comprehensive range of better quality instruments
than are currently produced. 22/
One other category of Soviet process control instrumen-
tation, radioactive isotopic devices, is of considerable significance
from the point of view of its level of technology. The USSR became
actively interested in this field during the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1946-50) and since then has been according it preferential treatment
because it is considered to be of great importance in achieving auto-
mation in industry. 21/ Currently the USSR may be using radioactive
Isotopic devices to a much greater extent than is the practice in the
US.* In 1959 the USSR produced 800,000 curies of cobalt 60 (the isotopic
element used in industrial gauges utilizing radioactive isotopes), and
1.5 million curies were to be produced in 1960, or about twice the amount
being produced in the US.** At least eight plants in the. USSR are engaged
in production of radioactive itiotopic instruments. 22/
* In the US, current interest is largely centered on instruments of
the beta ray type because they can be so constructed as to protect
workers from exposure to radiation. The USSR apparently is utilizing the
instruments of both the beta ray and the gamma ray types.
** Industries in the US, however, also use other radioactive materials
such as strontium-90, cesium-l37, krypton-85, and ruthenium-106.
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I.
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c. Other Categories of Instruments
In the eatepory of general inatrumentation, there is
apparently little superior tedhnology: Equipment' of domestic Soviet
design is sturdily built but often is large and bulky and is slightly
inferior in quality to comparable Items manufactured in the US and
other leading industrial countries of the West. ' Also, there is no
apparent desire to strive for miniaturization, as in the US. 22/
Consumer goods such as watches and clocks and cameras are produced
in a limited number of tytes and sizes and generally, from the point
of view of technology, are satisfactory but peat exceptional. 212
Components, especially electronic components, also are slightly
inferior to those produced in the US. Tubes, ftor exanple, have a
shorter service life, and other components are' more susceptible
to malfunctioning. Poor quality and inadequate quantities of com-
ponents have severely handicapped Soviet production of computers. 22/
III. Patterns of Distribution
A. General
Although thelUSSR has a healthy and growing,instrument indus-
try, output of several categories of instrumento is seriously inade-
quate. A recent Soviet'stddi indicates that production of instru-
ments and autamation equipment in 1958 satisfied only 60 percent of
domestic requirements and. that the requirements for some types of
instruments were satisfied only to the extent of 20 to 40 percent. 2W
To compensate for the inadequacy of output in certain categories of
instruments, the USSR has stepped up its own production program
during the Seven Year Plan' and also imports a selective list of
equipment to fill specific' high-priority needs. East Germany and
Czechoslovakia have been and. 'probably will continue to be important
Bloc sources of instruments, and.West Germany and Switzerland are
major Free World suppliers. last Germany, however) is encountering
serious problemi in its deVelOpment and production program and is
expected to be unable to meet an important segment of its export
commitments to the USSR.-V/ Soviet purchases of instruments from
the West are hampered. by rade controls and by reluctance on the
part of some firms to do business with Communist countries. The
USSR in the past has managedito import a large volume of instru-
ments in spite of these handicaps and is expected to continue to
make vigorous efforts to get those high-priority instruments which
are needed by its econaly but are not available within the Bloc.
On the other hand, exports are not significant and are not expected
to become so in the remaining years of the Seven Year Plan.
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B. Domestic
The constantly growing requirements for more and better instru-
ments have led to several problems of a cyclic nature involving the in-
dustry and the domestic consumer. There is the problem of achieving
standardization of a new instrument yet at the same time making certain
that all of the principal industries using this instrument will find it
acceptable. Often it is necessary to convince an industry that this
instrument should be used. rather than another specialized type that the
industry wants to see developed or produced. The timelag between de-
velopment and production frequently drags out over several years, and
an instrument that may have been modern while under development is
occasionally obsolete When produced, resulting in consumer dissatisfac-
tion and a new cycle of development. 2?/
Minor problems also confront the users of instruments. Few
catalog; are available, for example, making it difficult to prepare
purchase orders. Also, repair shops apparently are not available in
sufficient numbers. As a result, users discard equipment prematurely
(thus placing an additional load on the already overburdened industry)
or are forced to set up their own repair shops. Finally, a plant using
a foreign-made item of equipment has a difficult time obtaining replace-
ment parts, because the plants of the instrument industry refuse to pro-
duce spare parts for equipment that they do not make. 22/
C. International
The USSR is engaged in a small but growing volume of foreign
trade in instruments. Between 1955 and 1960, Soviet exports of instru-
ments increased from 11.0 million to 40.0 million rubles.* (In addi-
tion, an unknown quantity of instruments was exported as parts of com-
plete industrial plants.) Imports of instruments during the same
period grew at a slightly slower rate, from 12.8 million to 43.3 million
rubles. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is the principal trading partner of the
USSR in instruments, absorbing about 95 percent of the total Soviet
exports of instruments and furnishing about 75 percent of the total (
Soviet imports of instruments (see Tables 1 and 2**). The major impor-
ters of Soviet instruments are }bland, Czechoslovakia, and Communist
China, and the principal suppliers are East Germany (which in recent
years has furnished between one-half and two-thirds, by value, of all
Soviet imports of instruments), Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
* All trade figures used in this report have been drawn from offi-
cial Soviet trade statistics, 1291/ are given in new foreign trade
rubles, and may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange
of 0.90 ruble to US $1.
** Tables 1 and 2 follow on pp. 30 and 31, respectively, below.
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The current trends in Soviet foreign trade in instruments
are expected to continue throughout the remainder of the Seven
Year Flan. Recent agreements between the USSR and Hungary and
Czechoslovakia have committed those two Satellites to export a very
large Amount of instruments to the USSR throughout the period. 121/
Trade with the UK, West Germany, and other Western countries in
instruments is expected to remain active, especially in instruments
not produced in the USSR such as those for measuring high vacuums,
viscous fuels, and corrosive media; balanced instruments for
measuring pressure and pressure differences; and continuous fluid
ptream analyzers. 122/ .1be USSR also has announced that it will
import six times as many instruments in 1965 as in 1960. 122/
There is a good possibility in the next few years that the
USSR will resort to dumping tactics to market same of its time-
keeping devices in the West. Output is extremely large at present
and is scheduled to increase substantially by 1965. This outlook
has been of concern to Some Western producers. 12!!/ The USSR has
announced its intention to export a much larger quantity of measur-
ing and control instruments in 1965 than at present. It is believed,
however, that the critical requirements of the domestic economy will
cause this announcement to be soon forgotten. 125./
Virtually all foreign trade in instruments has to be con-
ducted through one of the state monopolies established for this
purpose. Until recently, several monopolies had responsibility
for different types of equipment in this category. It now appears
that V/0 Mashpriborintorg, the All-Union Association for Foreign
Trade in Instruments,* is the successor to several or all of the
organizations that coordinated the trade in instruments in the
past. 12?/
* Vsesoyuznoye Obnyedineniye Mashinostroyeniye Pribori Inostrannaya
Torgovlya.
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Table 1
Soviet Exports of Instruments
1955-60
Category
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Value IV
(Thousand
Rubles)
Percent to
the Bloc
Value 1.)/
(Thousand
Rubles)
Percent to
the Bloc
Value .h./
(Thousand
i_j_sis_Rbl
Percent to
the Bloc
Value lot
(Thousand
it.Lj_.esub
Percent to
the Bloc
Value ?../
(Thousand
t_2,...0.1._Rtol
Percent to
the Bloc
Value ki
(Thousand Percent to
Rubles) the Bloc
Seismic stations
933.8
95.8
1,329.1
100.0
477.5
78.6
760.4
92.8
980
61.7
,
1,026
63.5
Movie cameras and apparatus
690.8
97.4
983.6
88.3
1,163.1
70.1
945.9
74.2
1,194
71.8
1,103
71.2
Calculating machines and
spare parts
290.5
100.0
924.1
99.6
758.3
71.4
593.5
84.3
1,823
66.3
1,356
54.62/
Precision instruments
6,023.0
99.4
7,699.1
99.0
11,454.7
90.7
15,592.3
98.2
15,355
98.5
16,602
94.7
Timekeeping devices
2,189.4
99.7
5,582.4
98.9
6,908.6
97.9
10,996.2
99.3
15,469
97.4
18,966
96.7
Cameras (still)
903.5/
94.1
1,655.4J
96.0
2,143.9
93.6
2,371.8
95.5
908
85.8
936
76.1
Accessories for cameras
2/
2/
8.8
94.9
79.5
94.9
63
76.2
60
68.3
Total.
11,030.9
98.6
18,173.7
98.2
22 914.9
91.2
31 339.6
97.3
35.79e
94.1
40,049
92.2
Instruments exported as a part of equipment and materials for complete plants are not included in these figures.
In new foreign trade rubles, which may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 0.90 ruble to US $1.
This figure is misleading because official Soviet trade statistics show no exports of this commodity to the Free World.
Including accessories for cameras.
Data for this category are included with data for cameras.
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Table 2
Soviet Imports of Instruments
1955-60
- Category
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Value 2/ Value 2/
(Thousand Percent from (Thousand Percent from
Rubles) the Bloc the 41oc
Value 2/
(Thousand
Rubles)
Value 2/
Percent from (Thousand Percent from
the Bloc 2guel_ the Bloc
Value 2/
(Thousand
Rubles)
Percent from
the Bloc
Value 2/
(Thousand
Rubles)
Percent from
Movie comer.* andepparatus
525.4
_mal)_
0 3856 0
879.7
0 1,718.9 0
.2,239
o -
3,042
_ft.S...loc,.-
40.7
Calculating machines and
spare parts
2,228.8
98.1
2,993.9
99.6
3,199.1
99.4
8,375.2
81.6
7,227
92.9
8,198
91.8
Precision instruments
9,994.1
82.8
10,750.9
79.6
18,098.4
73.8
20,231.3
77.5
26,856
77.4
32,060
73.9
Total
12.784.3
82.1
14130 4
--4--1-
81.7
22
--L177g2 ?
74.6
.120.
74.2
36,302
75.8
43,300 IV
74.9
- a. In new foreign trade rubles, which may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 0.90 ruble to US *1.
/b. This total does not include still cameras and photographic equipment worth 526,000 rubles that were imported from Czechoslovakia.
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APPENDEC A
PLANTS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE PRODUCING
SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF INSTRUMENTS IN THE USSR
IN 1961
Probable Current Official Designation
Variants and Former Names
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Alma-Ata Scales Plant
Angarsk Electrical Machinery Plant
Angarsk Precision Instrument Plant
Armavir Armalit Scales Plant
Armavir Testing Machine Plant
Arzni Precision Industrial Jewels
Plant
Baku Elektro-Avtomat Works
Baku Geophysical Instrument Plant
Baku Geophysical Instru-
ment and Equipment Plant
9.
Baku Instrument Making Plant
10.
Baku Machinery and Instrument
Baku Machinery Plant imeni
Making Plant imeni Kalinin
Kalinin
U.
Barnaul Geophysical Apparatus
Plant
12.
Bobruysk Scales Plant
13.
Cheboksary Electrical Instrument
Cheboksary Electrical
Plant
Measuring Instrument
Plant
14.
Cheboksary Electrical Performing
Mechanisms Plant
15.
Chelyabinsk Electrical Repair
Plant
16.
Chelyabinsk Teplopribor Plant
Chelyabinsk Teploelek-
tropribor Plant
17.
Chelyabinsk Timepiece Plant
18.
Cherkessk Plant
19.
Chistopol' Timepiece Plant
20.
Chumlyak Plant
21.
Dnepropetrovsk Mine Automa-
Dnepropetrovsk Selenium
tion Plant
Rectifier Plant
22.
Engel's Aviation Instrument
Plant
23.
Frunze Physical Instrument
Plant
24.
Gomel' Instrument Making Plant
Gomel' Measuring Instru-
ment Plant
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Probable Current Official Designation Variants and Former Names
???
25.
Gori Instrument Making Plant
Gori Precision Instrument
Plant
26.
Grodno Electrical Measuring
*
Instrument Plant
27.
Groznyy Electrical Machinery
Plant
28.
Irkutsk Plant of the former Minis-
try of Electrical Engineering
industryiUSSR
29.
Ivanovo Ivmashpribor Plant
30.
Ivanovo Measuring Instrument Plant
31.
Ivanovo Ptrforming Mechanisms Plant
32.
Ivanovo Testing Machine Plant
33.
Izyum Optical Plant imeni
50X1
Dzerihinskiy
34.
Kalinin Engineering and Instrument
Building Plant
35.
Kalinin Radio and Electrical
Machinery Plant
36.
Khluga Pyrometric Instrument Plant
Khluga Instrument Making
Plant Kalugapribor
37.
Kaunas Automation Equipment Plant
. Kaunas Automatic Instru-
ment Plant
38.
Kazan' Aircraft Instrument Plant
50X1
39.
Kazan' Optical Plant, Derbyshki
Derbyshki Optical Plant
50X1
40.
Kazan' Pneumatic Computer Plant
41.
Kazan' Teplokontrol' Plant
42.
Kazanbulak Electrical Instrument
Kazanbulak Electrical
Plant
Equipment Plant
43.
Khar'kov Control and Measuring
Instrument. Plant (KIP)
44.
Khar'kov Ehimavtomat Plant
45.
Khar'kov Nonstandard Equipment
Plant
Khar'kov Assembly Parts,
Nonstandard Equipment, nd
Instrument Plant (trade
name: FED)
46.
Khar'kov Plant imeni Dzerzhinskiy
47.
Khar'kov Scales Plant
48.
Khar'kov Teploavtomat Plant
49.
Khar'kov Transsvyazo Plant
50.
Khimki YUnyy Tekhnik Plant
51.
Kiev Arsenal Optical Machinery
Kiev Machinery Plant
Plant imeni V.I.. Lenin
Kiev Arsenal Plant
50X1
S-E-C-R-E-T
50X1
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Probable Current Official Designation
Variants and Former Names
?
52.
Kiev Aviation Instrument Plant
53.
Kiev Control and Measuring Instru-
ment Plant
Kiev Platt KIP
54.
Kiev Electrical Instrument Plant
Kiev Elektropribor Plant
55.
Kiev Electrical Machinery Plant
56.
Kiev Electrical Measuring Equip-
ment Plant
Kiev Plant' of the Armset'
Trust
57.
Kiev Gazpribor Plant
58.
Kiev Geophysical Instrument Making
Plant
59.
Kiev Instrument Plant
60.
Kiev Kinap Plant
61.
Kiev Kinodetal' Plant
62.
Kiev Nefteizmeritel' Plant
63.
Kiev Oktyabr' Plant
64.
Kiev Radiopribor Plant
65.
Kiev Relay and Automatics Plant
66.
Kiev Automatic Apportioning
Kiev Scales Plant iteni
Machine Plant linen! Dzerzhin-
skiy
Dzerzhinskiy
67.
Kiev Tochelektrdpribor Plant
68.
Kirov Fizpribor Plant
50X1
69.
Kirovabad Instrument Making Plant
Kirovabad Machinery Plant
70.
Kirovakan Avtomatika Plant
KiravakanAvtomatika Instru-
ment Making Plant
71.
Kishinev Elektrotochpribor
Plant
72.
Kishinev Electrical Measuring
Instrument and Oscillograph
Kishinev Electrical Meas-
uring Instrument Plant
Plant
73.
Klintsy Machinery Plant
74.
Kokchetav Machinery Plant
75.
Konstantinovka Vtorchermet Plant
76.
Krasnodar Electrical Measuring
Instrument Plant
Krasnodar Measuring Instru-
ment Plant
Krasnodar ZIP Plant
Krasnodar ZIP Electrical
Engineering Plant
77.
Krasnodar Krasnolit Plant
78.
Krasnogorsk Optical Machinery
Krasnogorsk Machinery Plant
Plant
Krasnogorsk Mechanical
Plant
Krasnogorsk Plant
50X1
79.
Kursk Computing Machine Plant
80.
Kusa Precision Industrial
Jewels Plant
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Probable Current Official Designation Variants and Former Names
81. Kuybyshev Kinap Plant
82. Kuzbass Elektivapparat Plant
83. Leninakan Electric Meter Plant
84. Leninakan,Instrument Making Plant
85. Leningrad Aircraft Parts Plant
86. Leningrad Analytical Instrument
Plant
87. Leningrad Electric Timepiece Plant
88. Leningrad Electrical Machinery
Plant (LEMZ)
89. Leningrad Elektrodelo Plant
90. Leningrad Elektropribor Plant
91. Leningrad Elektropul't Plant
92. Leningrad Etalon Experimental Plant
93. Leningrad Experimental Computer
Plant
94. Leningrad Experimental Semiconduc-
tor and Ultrasonic Instrument
Plant
95. Leningrad Geofizika Plant
96. Leningrad Geologorazvedka Plant
97. Leningrad Gidrometpribor Plant
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
Leningrad Goametr Scales Plant
Leningrad Kinap Plant
Leningrad Krasnyy Izobretatel'
Plant
Leningrad Lengazapparat Plant
Leningrad Lengazapparat Plant
ngrad Lenneftekip Plant
Leningrad Lenprfbor Plant
Leningrad Lenteplopribor Plant
Leningrad Optical Machinery Plant
Leningrad Optical Machinery Plant
of the Main Administration of
Local Industry
108. Leningrad Progress Plant
109. Leningrad Reduktor Plant
110. Leningrad Scales Repair Plant
Leningrad Precision and
Optical Instrument Plant
imeni Pirometr,
Petrodvorets Electrical
Machinery Plant
Leningrad Computing and
Analyzing Machine Plant
Leningrad Hydrometeorolo-
gical Instrument Plant '
Leningrad Cinema Apparatus
Plant
Leningrad Experimental
Optical Machinery Plant
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
?
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002200080001-7
S-E-C-R-E-T
Probable Current Official Designation
Variants and Former Names
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
Leningrad Sevzapteplokontrol' Plant
Leningrad State Optical Machinery
Plant imeni OGFU (GOMZ)
Leningrad State Computer Plant
Leningrad Svoboda Plant
Leningrad GOMZ
Plant
Leningrad Electrical
Uring:InstrumentPlant
Leningrad Electrical
ment Plant ,
Leningrad Elektropribor
Machinery
Mess-50X1
Instru-
50X1
Leningrad Vibrator Plant
Plant
116.
Lokhvitsa Instrument Making Plant
117.
Lytkorino Optical Plant
Lyubertsy Plant
50X1
118.
L'vov Aircraft Instrument Plant
119.
L'vov Instrument Plant
L'voVfibor Plant 50X1
120.
LIVOV Kontakt Plant
LIvov Kontakt Electii01.1
Machinery Plant
121.
L'vov Teplokontrol' Plant
L'vov Thermal Control
Instrument Plant
122.
Lyubertsy Mosneftekip Plant
Lydbertdy Control and Meas-
uring Ingtitment Plant
123.
Minsk Instrument Repair Plant
124.
Minsk Kinap Plant
125.
Minsk Kinodetal' Plant
126.
Minsk Mathematical4achine Plant
127.
Minsk Optical Machinery Plant
imeni S.I. Vavilov
128.
Minsk Timepiece flavt
129.
Minsk Udarnik Scalea-Flant
130.
Mbscow Computer and Analytical
Machine Plant
131.
Mbscow Control and Measuring
Mbstow Mbekip:Uperimental
Instrument Plant of the
former Ministry of Light and
Control and Measuring
Instrument Plant -
Food Industry, ussR
132.
Moscow Control and Measuring
Mbitcow ExperiMental Control.,
Instrument Plant or the former
and Measuring Instrument
Ministry of the Petroleuu
Plant.
Industry, USSR
133.
Moscow Electrical Machinery
Plant (MEZ) of the former
Ministry of Machine and
Instrument Building
- 37
5-E-C7R-E-T
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002200080001-7
Probable Current Official Designation
Variants, and Former Names
134. Moscow Electrical Machinery Plant
(Sokolnicheskiy Rayon) of the
former Ministry of the Electrical
Engineering Industry
135. Moscow Elektroapparat Plant
136, Moscow Elektroshchetchik Plant
137. Moscow Energodetal' Plant
138.
Moscow Energopribor Plant
139.
Moscow Experimental Testing Machine
and Scales Plant
140.
Moscow Experimental Factory for
Timepiece Production
141.
Moscow Fizprlbor Plant
142.
Moscow Geofizika Plant
143.
Moscow Geopribortsvatmet Experi-
mental Plant
144.
Moscow Hydrometeorological Instru-
ment Plant
Moscow Gidrometeopribor
Plant
Moscow Gidrametpribor
Plant
145.
Moscow Instrument Plant
50X1
146.
Moscow KEMZ Cinema Electrical
Machinery Plant
147.
Moscow Komega Plant
148.
Moscow Kontrol'pribor Plant (KIP)
Moscow Experimental Control
and Measuring Instrument
Plant
149.
Moscow Manometer Plant
Moscow Experimental Instru-
ment Plant
150.
Moscow Medical and Sanitation
Equipment Plant
151.
Moscow Moskinap Plant
Moscow Kinap Experimental
Cinema Apparatus Plant
152.
Moscow Neftepribor Plant
153.
Moscow Phonograph Plant
154.
Moscow Photographic Accessories
Plant
155.
Moscow Platinopribor Plant
156.
Moscow State Measuring Instru-
ment Plant (GZIP)
157.
Moscow Tekhnolog Experimental
Moscow Tekhnolog Machinery
Plant
Plant
Moscow Tekhholog Plant
158.
Moscow Tekstil'mashpribor Con-
trol and Measuring Instrument
Plant
- 38 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
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-R-E-T
Probable Current4Offieiall/esignation
Varianti and. Former Names
159.
Moscow Timepiece Plant
imeni
50X1
Kirov
160.
Moscow Timepiece Plant
50X1
161.
Moscow Timepiece Plant
162.
Moscow Thermal Measuring
ment Plant
Instru-
NO80cow Plant Tizpribor
163.
Moscow Tochizmeritel' Plant
164.
Mytishchi Electric Neter Plant
Mytishchi Elektroschetchik
Plant
165.
Mytishchi InstruMent Making Plant
166.
Naltchik Tsvetmetpribor Plant
167.
Nazran' Instrument Making Works
168.
Nikolayev Instrument Plant
169.
Nor Kbayn Precision Gems Plant
170.
Novosibirsk Aviation Instrument
Plant
171.
Novosibirsk Plant I:meal Lenin
Novosibirsk Optical Instru-
ment Plant
50X1
?
172.
Odessa Kinap Plant imeni
Odessa Cinema Equipment
Dzerzhinskiy
Plant imeni Dzerzhinskiy
173.
Odessa Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant
-Odessa Krasnyy Oktyabr'
?
Th7si?6L. Plant'
174.
Odessa Scales Plant imeni
0detti Heavy Scales Building
Starostin
PlantiMeni:Starostin
175.
Omsk Omelektrotochpribor Plant
'OmakX100trical Measuring
Instrument Plant
176.
Ordzhonikidze Gatspparat Plant
177.
Ordzhonikidze Precision Indus-
trial Jewels Plant
178.
Ordzhonikidze Signal and Elec-
tric Clock Plant
179.
Orekhovo-Zuyevo Priborodetal'
Orekhovo-Zuyevo Scales Plant
Plant
180.
Orel Instrument Making Plant
181.
Orel Timepiece Plant
182.
Penza Aviation Instrument Plant
183.
Penza Computer Analytical
,end
Machine Plant
184.
Penza Timepiece Plant
PessaAtate Timepiece Plant
185.
Petrodvorets Electrical Machin-
ery Plant
186.
Petrodvorets Timepiece Plant
187.
Petropavlovsk Pneumatic Perform-
ing Mechanises Plant
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S-E-C-R-E?T
Probable Current Official Designation Variants and Former Names
188. Pokrovka Automation Equipment Plant
189. Pskov Instrument Plant
190. FUShkino Electrical Machinery Plant
191. Pushkino ElektrOkonstruktsiya
Electrical Machinery Plant
192. Rakvere Ultrasonic EquipMent Plant
193. Riga Avtoelektropribor Plant
194. Riga Etalon Plant
195. Riga Gidrometpribor Plant
196. Riga Scales Plant
197. Rostov Cinema Apparatus Plant
198. Rostov Electric Instrument
Plant
199. Rostov-na-Donu Timepiece Plant
200. Rostov Yumetalluravtomatika Plant
201. Ryazan' Analytical and Calculating
Machine Plant
202. Ryazan' Aviation Instrument Plant
203. Ryazan' Thermal Instrument Plant
204. Rybinsk Aviation Instrument Plant
205. SafonovoGidrometeopribor Plant
206. Safonovo Teplokontrol'pribor
Plant
207. Samarkand Kinap Plant
208. Saransk Instrument Plant
209. Saratov Motion Picture Machinery
Plant
210. Saratov Scales Plant
211, Serdobsk Timepiece Plant
212. Sevan Performing Mechanisms Plant
213. Simferopol' Krymmetroves Plant
214. Smolensk Automation Equipment
Plant
215. Smolensk Instrument Plant
216. Stalino Electrical Machinery
Plant
217. Stalino Experimental Works for
Controlling and. Measuring
Instruments
218. Stalin() Pawer Engineering Plant
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Rakvere Oscillograph Plant
Riga Etalon Experimental
Plant
Riga HydrometeorologiCal
Instrument Plant
Rostov Cinema Machinery
Plant
Samarkand Cinema Apparatus
Plant
Cinema Mechanical Plant
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Probable Current Official Designation
Variants and Former Names
219.
220.
221
Stanislav Machine Building Plant
Stanislav Weighing Instrument and
Engineering Plant
Stavropol' Electrical AUtomation
Equipment Plant
Stepnyak Instrument Plant
Sukhumi Instrument and Automation
Equipment Plant
Suksun Optical Machinery Plant
222
223.
224.
225.
Sumy Electronic Microscope and
Slimy Instrument Making
Electroautomatics Plant
Plant
226.
Sverdlovsk B,ydrometeorological
Sverdlovsk Gidrometpribor
Instrument4flant
lant
227.
Tallinn Control and Measuring
Tallinn Experimental Con-
Instrument Plant (lap)
trol and Measuring Instru-
ment Kant
228.
Tallinn Measuring Instrument
Plant
229.
Tallinn Punane BET Plant
230.
Tartu Instrument Making Plant
Tartu Thermal Automatic
ApparatUs Plant
Tartu AGE Plant
231.
Tashkent Automation Equipment
Plant
232.
Tashkent Gidroneteopribor Plant
233.
Tashkent Machinery and Repair
Plant
234.
Tbilisi Agat Plant
235.
Tbilisi Gidrometpribor Plant
Mina HydrometeorOlogical
Instrument Plant
236.
Tbilisi Precision Instrument
Plant
237.
Tbilisi Tbilpribor Plant
238.
Ternopol' Electric Fixtures
Plant
239.
Tiraspol' Electric Instrument
Plant
240.
Tomsk Manometer Plant
241.
Ufa Aircraft Instrument Plant
242.
Uglich Industrial Jewels Plant
243.
Uglich Timepiece Plant
244.
Uman' Megommetr Electrical
Measuring Instrument Plant
41-
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Probable Current Official Designation
Variants and Former Names
245.
246.
247.
248.
USt'-Kamenogorak Gas Analyais
Instrument Plant
UW-Kamenogorsk Instrument Making
Plant
Viltnyus Computing Machine Plant
Vil'nyus Electric Meter Plant
(V2NS)
249.
Viltnyus Electrical Instrument
Vil'nyus Electronic Instru-
Plant,
ment Factory
50X1
250.
Vitebsk Electrical Measuring
Instrument Plant
251.
Vitebsk Timepiece Parts Plant
252.
Vladimir Avtopribor Plant
253.
Vora Gas Analyzer Plant
254.
Yerevan Elektrotochpribor Plant
Yerevan Precision Instru-
ment Plant
Yerevan Electrical Preci-
sion Instrument Plant
Yerevan Measuring Instru-
ment Plant
255.
Yerevan Instrument Making Plant
256.
Yerevan Timepiece Plant
257.
Yerevan Wristwatch Plant
Yerevan Artistic Timepiece
Plant
258.
Yoshkar-Ola Electroautomatics
Plant
259.
Zagorsk Optical Plant
50X1
260.
Zhdanov Vesotochmash Plant
261.
Zhitomir Electrical Measuring
Instrument Plant
262.
Zhitomir Electric Panel Instrument
Plant
263.
Zlatoust Timepiece Plant
- it2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A00220008000-1-7
. .
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
MAJOR PLANTS FRCOUCING INSTRUMENTS IN THE USSR IN 1961
Location Plant Chief Products Bamerks
Dnepropetrovsk
Prwase
Baku Instrument Making Plant Instruments iced matamatic devices for the
petroleue industry
Doepropetrovek Mine Automation
Plant
Frunze Physical Instrument Plant
This plant is believed to be. major producer of instalments and
automation equirment for the extraction and refining of petro-
leum. 1E/
Various inetruments and equipment, particu- Among the instruments produced in this plant are detonating instru-
ments 111/03/50, impw1/3O,.limm-1/59, met AVVIK-1/20 (prototype);
detonating tester IVTe-l; lov relays based on radineettireilsotopee;
and instruments for automating the control of the level of coal and
ore in hoppers and the locating of railroad cars. In 1960 the plant
was to produce its first 100 radioactive control instrumantefor the
coal industry. 0/
?
Electrical and electronic instruments for Although this plant vent into production *any in 1958, ite construe-
automatic control of production processes tion was not to have been completed until 1960. Supposedly it is or
in various branches of industry and for use will be one of the biggest Instrument-mmddngplants in the USSR.
in research in medicine, biology, and phys- Its first products were centrifuges for medical laboratories. Other
iology output includes a complex electrorboresis apparatus forAnialysing
complex albumin compounds and an electronic level indicator. During
the Seven Year Plan, output of the plant will be qui$4.44.112/
larly for coal sines
Oori Tnatrument./Saking Plant Industrial instruments
Ulnae Pyrometric Instrument Process control instruments
Plant
50X1
50X1
50X1
Construetion.of this plant repdrtedly began in 1959 ax.Obs to have
been coe0Leted in October of that year. It was late reported that
a second building mould be added to the plant in 1960.Atress output 50X1
was to have roadbed 0,6 Aillion rubles by the end of 1.95,41n8 8.5
million rubles annually by 1965. In August 1959 the plant was produc-
ing differential relays and also in 1959 was to produce 2i000 instru-
ments for determining the fat Content of milk. /t also was eclamluled
to begin production of instruments to determine the ion concentra-
tion in hydrogen. 111/
This plant is believed to be a key producer of such items as instru-
ments for autcamting complex processes in ebonies' and metallurgical
enterprises. It also produces gauges, densitometers and indicators
using isotopic .materials. Mese instruments are toed in petroleima
refineries, food-processing industries, and chemical plants. lly
- 1.3 -
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S-E-C-R-E-T
'Location
Kazan'
Kiev
Kiev
Kishinev
Plant
Chief Products Remarks
Kazan' Teplokontrol' Plant Process control instruments
Kiev Arsenal Optical Machinery
Plant imeni V.I. Lenin
This plant is believed to be an important producer of industrial
instrumentation. Late in 1959 the plant was severely criticized in
the press for production of obsolete instruments, for inadequate
quality control, and for failure to inaugurate production of new and
improved types of instruments. 111/
Theodolites, leveling instruments, alidades, This plant was formerly known as Arsenal and Optical Plant
compasses, fire control equipment, and Very little up-to-date infOrzation is available on this
cameras plant, but it is believed to be a major producer of optical instru-
ments. Although the plant existed before World Wer II, it was
evacuated to Novosibirsk in 1941 as the German Army approached Kiev.
Late in 1946 it was reactivated and reequipped with machinery from
the Carl Zeiss Plant in Jena, now Kest Germany, Which the um had
dismantled and shipped to Kiev together with a large number of
German specialists.
Kiev Tochelektropribor Plant Electrical measuring instruments
Kishinev Elektrotochprfbor Plant
Ultrasonic instruments and electromagnetic
flaw detectors for nondestructive testing
of metals
S-E-C-R-E-T
This plant is one of the chief producers of laboratory-type electri-
cal measuring instruments in the USSR. These instrumental:Measure
current, frequency, voltage, and inductance capacitance and are
produced with an accuracy of 0.1, 0.2, or 0.5 percent. About 120
different types of instruments are produced in a production process
that is completely integrated -- that is, all parts are mode at the
plant. The plant employs about 4,000 workers is being eSpanded,
and in 1905 is to be producing a volume of Instruments 2-1/2 times
that of 1958. Although the primary interest is in electrical
measuring instruments the plant does produce several types of
electric razors. 1151,
This plant is new and was to have begun series production of nine
designs of flaw detectors at the beginning of 1960. Evidently the
first Moldavian-made ultrasonic flaw detector was shipped from the
plant at the end of November 1959. The plant was organized on the
base of an automotive and tire repair workshop. 11.6./
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(Iv
E50X1
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B-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Krasnodar
ICrasnogorsk
Leninakan
Plant
Krasnodar Electrical Measuring
Instrument Plant
Krasnogorsk Optical Machinery
Plant
Leninakan Instrument Making Plant
Chief Products
Ammeters, voltmeters, wattmeters, frequency
meters, phasometers, synehronoscopes, and
many other types of electrical measuring
instruments
Lead sulfide photocells and other inflsommi
components and possibly military tanners&
systems for guidance, fire control, and
night viewing; 8146 camerae, 15 categories
of microscopes ourVeying inStruile204, and
theodolites, binoculars, gauges, and mico..
meters of several types; and numerous labora-
tory, industrial, and scientific optical
instruments
Viscosimeters and other general-purpose
industrial instruments
Remarks
This plant, which also is known as the Krasnodar ZIP Plant, the
Krasnodar Measuring Instrument Plant, and thq Krasnodar ZIP Electri-
cal Engineering Plant, is believed to be one of the most important
plants of its type in the USSR. In 1959 it was producing more than
100 types of products.
This plant was formerly known as Optical Plant I It was
engaged in production of optical equipment before World Van /I but
was dismantled and noved to BOvosibirsk during the var. After the
war it VW rebuilt largely from machinery and equipment frdm the
Carl Zeiss Plant in Jena, now ESA Germany, under the guise of
reparations, and staffed in part by key specialist personnel from
the German firm. The plant is believed to be one of the two largest
optical plants in the USSR. It employs 11,850 persons and probably
is a key research, development, and production facility for infrared
detectors and infrared optical Materials and components. The Plant
is suspected of being similarly engaged in the field of military
infrared systems for guidance, fire control, and night viewing both
for ground and air (especially guided missiles) application and is
believed to be producing a number of types of cameras. The plant is
believed to have produced in 1958 more than 30,000 microscopes; more
than 60,000 binoculars; 17,000 industrial gauges, micrometers, cali-
pers, and other related test devices; 3,000 theodolites and leveling
instruments; about 6,000 refractometers and polarimeters; end several
thousand units of miscellaneous optical instruments. In 1958 the
plant also was producing more than 1,000 cameras per day. lly
This plant is believed to be typical of the never fast-growing instru-
ment producers.: It was created in 1957 from the former Plehhpat
Metalworking Aria].. In December 1958 a new building was put into 50X1
operation, and in 1960 more than 1.8 Million rubles was to be spent
for the construction of new Whops and for new equipment. By the
end of the Seven Year Plan the number of employees at the plant
would be 15 times the number employed in 1959. la9/
50X1
50X1
50X1
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Location
Leningrad
Plant
Leningrad Electrical Machinery
Plant (LZ)
Leningrad Gosmetr Scales Plant
Leningrad Kinap Plant
Chief Products
Electric meters
Laboratory scales and electronic microscales
Mbtion picture studio equipment, film-
copying equipment, amplifiers for sound
projectors, electrostatic microphones,
loudspeakers, magnetic tape recorders,
closed circuit television, optical pound
recorders, film rejuvenator equipment,
and motion picture camera lenses
Remarks
This plant, a few milea southwest of Leningrad, produces watt-hour
meters. Before World War II it made typewriting machines. The
plant suffered large-scale destruction during the War and was largely
rebuilt afterward. After 1953 the plant began making electric single-
phase watt-hour meters for home and industry. Its output in 1960
was approximately as follows: 1,200,000 meters for private dwelling',
175,000 meters for industry, and 1,500 meters for locomotives. About
2,000 workers are employed, by the plant. New items produced by the
plant are designed by it. Of the labor force of the plant, eighty
percent are women, mostly girls just out of high adhool. Although
the plant is considered a medium-size producer in comparison with
the other two plants engaged in production of electric meters, the
value of its output in 1960 was expected to be 10 million rubles. 122/
This plant is the only known producer of electronic micro:males in
the USSR. (These scales, Which are used by the Chemical industry,
can measure the weight of chemical substances while reaction is
taking place and are especially useful in measuring radinettiws
and explosive substances, density of gases diffusion phenomenai
and the like). The plant also produces analytic microscales for
weighing precious metals. The plant reportedly has developed elec-
tronic remote-controlled, scales that measure with an accuracy of
within 1 millionth of a gram. In 1957 the plant was producing 30
different types of scales ranging from microscales up to large scales
with a 1,000-kilogram capacity. In that year the plant employed
1,220 persons and the value of its output amounted to 2 4 million
rubles annually. lay
This plant appears to be the largest producer of motion picture studio
equipment in the U. Amesder of a US automatic control delegation,
who visited this plant in the SUMMer of 1958, considered the quality
of its production equal to that of comparable UEFA:dant.. The plant,
established in 1932, has clean well-equipped shops, employs about
3,000 people and produces about 35 main item. and About 65 accesaory
items. The ;lent Imes mess production techniques to a much greater
extent than would a plant of comparable size in the US. Output of
the plant reportedly has increased 15 to 20 percent annually in recent
years. 122/
?
Lm. a a
A
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Location
Leningrad
(Continued)
Plant
Leningrad Lenneftekip Plant
Leningrad Lenteplapribor Plant
Leningrad State Optical Machinery
Plant imeni OGPU (GOMZY
Chief Products
Instruments for regulating and controlling
Industrial processes
Electronic potentiometers and automatic
measuring bridges and other high.preci-
Bien electronic instruments for smearing
and regulating Industrial processes '
Large astronomical equipment, spectroscopic
equipment, surveying equipment, microscopes,
and fire control equipment
Remarks
This plant is a major producer of instruments for automatic control
of industrial processes of Chemical, gas, and petroleum enter-
prises. ag
This plant is a leading producer of industrial instrumentstion. It
also is an important supplier ofOluch equipmeht lathe Mloulaii. under-
developed countries of the *rid. It tepOrtedltsangled
instromanta for practicellyell of the atetrapillOcel- ' ? oria
electric power station* under constutStion in WM in 2958 The :
plant apparently specialized in outpmt ce.insteuments far smearing -
industrial thermal processes inmetelluirgical,"-Mesical, powar
engineering, and other industries. The,plest warCsulabled,CPribein
1957 for production of an instrumnt that Cheeks, automatically'
records, and-regulates the ratios of acid and alkali solutiona.
Formerly known as the Leningrad State Optical and Mechanical Works
(oMHZ), this plant probably is one of the two largest
optical plants in the U. It existed bereft World War // and
like many other major plants was evacuated to the area'eset of the ,1
Urals early in the var. After the war it was reconstructed, largely
from equipment of the dismantled Carl Zeiss Plank in Jena, now Best
Germany, and staffed in part by former Zeiss personnel. In 1959 it
produced a reflector telescope with a 2.6-meter mirror. Its princi-
pal products include cameras optical instruments for interplanetary
flight, movie projectors, infrared epectrommes, lead-screw standard-
izing equipment, optical micrometers, an-purpose meesUring-micro-
scopes, grating spectrograph., quartz opectrogreptS, eteelscopes,
direct-reading speahrogrepbsi transit., surwefteg imatoraktir 'OA
photoelectric Ramarripectrophotometers. In 1060 the plant reportedly'
had approximate/7 12,000 esplwees.'182/
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Location
Leningrad
(Continued)
L'vov
Moscow
Plant
Leningrad Vibrator Plant
L'vov Teplokontrol' Plant
(Thermal Control Instrument
Plant)
Moscow Computer and Analytical
Machine Plant
Chief Products
Multichannel oscilloscopes, galvanometers,
AC and DC amplifiers, switchboards, exposure
meters, visual aids for schools, high-voltage
and high-frequency AC laboratory equipment,
and parts for other plants; and oscillographs,
thermometers, and potentiometers
Industrial instruments, including potenti-
ometers and portable instrument-testing
apparatus
Digital and analog computers, computer
components, oscillographs, and measuring
and recording devices for use with elec-
tronic computers
S-E-C-R-E-T
Remarks
This facility is one of the oldest and most important instrument 50X1
plants in the USSR. Although first established as a research labora-
tory, Vibrator became an instrument-manviecturing plant in 1928.
The plant now makes about 500,000 electrical instruments annually,
representing a value of about 20 million rubles. Production of the
plant is believed to have doubled about every 3 years in recent years
and to have increased 46 times in 1946-59.
50X1'
in the future it might be able to compete seriously 50X1
with the best West German firms. The plant is believed to be a
producer of fire-control equipment and aiming devices for the armed
forces and reportedly is specializing in production of the following
Items: DC laboratory instruments, high-voltage and high-frequency
AC instruments, multichannel oscillographs,galvamometers, ampli-
fiers, switchboard instruments (both AC and DC), photoelectric
exposure meters, fluxmeters, and small parte. Visual aid instru-
ments used in teaching also are made at the plant. Although the
plant is not arranged for mass production and very little automatic
equipment is used, there is some automatic production in assembly
work with automatic control of the separate operations. In May 1960
the plant was being expanded and currently has 400,000 square feet
of floorspace and 3,500 employees (64 percent of Whom are women).
The plant will have about 530,000 square feet of floorspace and
4,500 employees when expansion is completed. 12?/
This plant was built in 1946. In the summer of 1957 the plant had
about 700 employees and in that year produced potentiometer FP-56.
During the Seven Year Man it is scheduled to triple its output,
Which includes instruments for regulating manufacturing processes
In chemical, metallurgical, and other industries and electrical
measuring instruments.
This plant is the largest known production facility for electronic
computers in the USSR. It is one of the older plants in the indus-
try, having been built in 1918, 12g/ and presently has a labor force
of 6,000.
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Location Plant
Moscow
(Continued)
Moscow Energopribor Plant
Moscow Fizpribor Plant
Moscow Manometer Plant
Chief Products
Industrial instruments
Scientific research instruments and indus-
trial instrumentation
Remarks
This plant, Which is about 15 years old, specializes in production of
complex electronic instruments and apparatus, mainly for the automa-
tion and mechanization of electric power stations and systems. In
1959 it began producing the MARS-200 control computer, which simul-
taneously controls temperature, flow, vacuum, and other indexes of a
production process at 200 points.. In spite of its assigned speciali-
zation and the need for industrial instrumentation there were com-
plaints in 1959 that the sovnarkhoz had directed the pleat to produce
simple products such as vending machine coin boxes, strain gauges,
and strain gauge diaphragms. 122/
This plant produces beta spectrometers, Wilson cloud chambers, Cosmic
ray measuring eqUipment, and industrial instrumentation utilizing
radioactive isotopes (a radioactive liquid densitometer designed for
continuous remote measurement and megistration Of the density of
various liquids, level gauges, and vacuum meters) and electropheu-
natio Principles of operation. The plant has a design bureau where
highly complex research and development of new instruments is carried
out. Apparently the plant also produces still another category of
instruments, as there have been several press announcements of prep-
arations for output of electrical air fresheners of the ozone
type. 142/
Electronic regulating, measuring, and Although this plant is considered to be only a medium-size plant, it
control instruments for industrial is one of the most important producers of instruments for industry.
processes The plant dates from 1803, but it produced steel castings until
1935, When it began to produce manometers (pressure gauges). In
1954 it began to produce electronic equipment, including electronic
remote control devices, gauging equipment, remote gauging equipment,
pickups, and converters. Basically this plant builds equipment for
flow, level, and pressure sensing and, in addition, such secondary
equipment as bridges and potentiometers. The high-pressure gauges
are in the 10,000 to 15,000 atmosphere range and have an accuracy
to 1 percent, which satisfies the demands of the Chemical Research
Institute. The plant also produces electronic amplifiers for use
in recording instruments and complete recorders. Vacuum tubes are
used in the amplifiers, and 15 percent of output was to be transis-
torized beginning in 1959. The actual output of the plant in the
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Location Plant Chief Products Remarks
Mbscow Moscow Manometer Plant summer of 1958 was as follows: electronic measuring and control
(Continued) instruments, 2,500 per month; various mechanical pressure gauges
and manometer indicators 1,0,000 per month; and differential
pressure transducers, 806 per month. In 1958 the plant had in
operation an automatic production line for recorders and control,
lers. Three thousand people are employed by the plant, loo percent
of Whom are women. The plant has its own development laboratories
in Which designs are made exclusively for its own production and
a large part of this development work is directed toward a gradual
Improvement of apparatus already in production. In 1959 the plant
was making more than 4,000 type-sizes of instruments, including
more than 570 manometric instruments and more than 2,000 elec-
tronic types. Unlike a plant of comparable size in the US, which
uses bench-type production, this plant employs a continuous produc-
tion line. 121/
Moscow Timepiece Plant Timekeeping devices
imeni Kirov
Moscow Timepiece Plant
Wristwatches and clocks
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Founded in 1930, this plant produces 10 different kinds of watches
and specializes insert's wristwatches. Since 1956, output has been
in excess of 2 million annually. In addition, the plant produces
automobile clocks, marine vetches, alarm clocks, and stopwatches.
The plant employs 6,500 workers, of eh= approximately 4,000 are
women. 123/
This plant employs 7,500 workers, 80 percent of wham are sown.
Annual production of the plant is 2.5 million men's and women's
watches and 1 million clocks of various kinds. The Seven Year
Plan calla for doubling the ruble value of output and specializing
in women's watches, both by 1965. Built abbot 1932, the plant pro-
duces about 10 percent of the nation's output of men's and women's
matches. During 1960 the plant was to begin mess production of
electric watches running on batteries. It also is believed to be
producing machine tools for instrument production and possibly to be
engaged in production of guided missile =moments. In mid-1560 it
was announced that the plant henceforth would specialize in produc-
tion of high quality wristwatches for women. 122/
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Location
Penza
Plant
Penza Computer and Analytical
Machine Plant
Penza Timepiece Plant
Riga Gidivaetpribor Plant
Stalin? Experimental Works for
Controlling and Measuring
Instruments
Chief Products
Digital computers, analog computers, elec-
tronic test equipment, card peaches, card
reading devices, and office calculating
equipment
Ladies wristwatches
Hydramiteorological and aerological
initrumenti
Gauges
Remarks
This plant, with a labor force of approximately 4,000, is the second
largest. producer of computers after the Mbscow plant of the same
name. lab/
This facility reportedly is the largest of its type in the world and
is being expanded for increased output. In 1959 it vas producing
70,000 watches (with 16-jewel end 17-jewel lever movements) weekly
and employed 7,800 workers. In 1960 its output was to have esen
100,000 watches per week (5 million per year), and it Vis to employ
10,000 workers. 122/
This plant is a major producer of scientific instrumeartaw 'In 1959
it was producing more than 70 differecd,types of instruments, and
in 1957 it had the fellorIng monthly output: barographs, 200 to
220 units; thermographs, 200 to 220 units- rain gauges 240 to 265
units. altimeters, 100 to 120 units. instruments for measuring the
thickness of ice, shout 100 units- Instruments for measuring the
water level of rivers about 40 units; an instrument for measuring
sea level, about 120 rivers,
water meters about 100 units; wind
velocity meters about 100 units; soil termomrters about 1,000
units; radiosondes, about 10,000 units; and taximeters, 250 to 300
units. In addition it was producing about 30 complete seismo-
graphs per year, en artillery correction tables and other miscella-
neous instalments also were in production on an irregular basis.
In 1957 the plant employed 1,000 workers. During the Seven Year
Plan its output of instruments is scheduled to increase 2.4 times.
Products of this plant are used in high-altitude research, in the
program of the International Geophysical Year, and for general
domestic service in warehouses production abOpe, and elsewhere
when humidity, temperature, and atmospheric pressure require con-
trol and regulation. lly
This plant is an important producer bf radioactive isotopic gauges
for UBO in determining the thickness of rolled metal. 121/
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Location Plant Chief Products Remarks
Tallinn
Vil'nyus
Yerevan
Tallinn Control and Measuring Isotopic instruments for regulation and con-
Instrument Plant (KIP) trol of industrial processes
Vil'nyusElectrical Instrument
Plant, Post Box 6 possibly other instruments
Oscillographs, nuclear instruments, and
Vil'nyus Electric Meter Plant
(WES)
Electric meters
Yerevan Elektrotochpribor Plant Electrical measuring instruments
Yerevan Instrument Making Plant
Millivoltmeters, ratiometers, and micro-
amperemeters, marine instruments, and
thermal instruments for use on diesel
locomotives
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Twelve instruments utilizing radioactive isotopes are produced by
this plant for the automation of various processes in the metallur-
gical, chemical, mining, and food industries. The plant probably
began production of instruments in 1951. In 1960 the plant employed
approximately 350 personnel and was to have produced equipment worth
1.5 million rubles, with a planned output for 1961 of 1.9 million
rubles. By 1965 the plant is to be producing annually instruments
worth 2.5 million rubles. 12/
This nlant was formerly known as the Electronic Instruments Factory
In mid-1958 it employed approximately 3,500 workers and
was producing about 300 oscillographs. 1.42/
This facility is one of the most important electrical instrument
plants in the USSR. In 1950 it produced 20,000 watt-hour meters
and in 1959 was to have made more than 1.9 million. During the
Seven Year Plan the plant is to be converted into an experimental
pilot plant. In 1960 it was to have had automatic lines installed
for machining, assedbling, and adjusting the components of meters.
During the Seven Year Plan, output of the plant will reach 5 million
units annually, and the plant will become the only Soviet enterprise
producing single-phase meters'. 1A2/
Built in 1943, this facility was the first instrument plant in Armenia.
The plant reportedly is the basic supplier of current finders and
high-voltage indicators. 141/
This facility is the new Armenian plant built in 1957. 18/
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APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY USED INHEST/MATING THE VALUE OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
IN PRE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
DURING THE SEVEN YEAR PLAN;(1959',45)
Information on investment in the instrument industry of the USSR is
sparse and inadequate. The USSR has not published a figure for invest-
ment in the industry during the Seven Year Plan (1959-65), and it has
not indicated how many new plants are to be built or how many existing
plants will be expanded.
Some information on this subject, however, is available for the:
abandoned Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60). A Japanese publication indi-
cates that 300 million rubles were to have been allocated during 1956-60
to construct 39 new plants and to expand 17 others,-:ail'of which appar-
ently were to produce "meaturing instruments for industrial use and
automation tools." 2..W:
?
From analysis of plant information it is estimated that the USSR'
is building 30 to 40 new -plants for production of instruments during
the Seven Year Plan and Is expanding a large number of existing plants
as well as converting some plants to production of instruments.
A rough calculation of the cost of this prograIncan be made by
using the investment data for the Sixth Five Year, Ran. Assuming that
the cost of expanding an existing plant is one4talf the cost of erecting
a new plant, then the cost of One new plant would be 64,3 million rubles.
(with x representing the coat of a new plant, 39x 4.-11/2(17x) evais 300
million rubles x therefore equals 6.3 million:rubles.) The cost of
building 30 new plants would. therefore be 189 million rubles, and 40
new plants would cost 252 Million rubles. '
Determination of the investment allocation for expanding existingi
plants is more difficult, more than 50X1
75 percent of all capital investment in the machine building sector
during the Seven Year Plan is to be used for reconstruction, expansion,
and replacement of equipMent of existing enterprises. ly2/ Applying
this ratio to the instrument industry, the total investment in the
industry would be four timesthe cost of 30 to 40'new plants, or from
756 million to 1 billion rubles.
A second method of estimating the probable level of Soviet capital
investment in the Instrument industry during the Oeven Year Plan involves
the use of a capital-output ratio. A ratio of lt0,2 obtains for the
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3
Soviet machine building industry. Thus 1 rale of capital investment
is required to produce 2 rubles of output. ?AY For the Soviet cutting
and measuring tool industry a ratio of 1 to 1.67 obtains'. This ratio
is believed to be a better One for the instrument industry than the
ratio for machine building as a whole because there is considerable
similarity between tool and instrument plants. This same ratio appar-
ently was used in the instrument industry in the Sixth Five Year Plan,
for the Flan provided for an investment of 300 million rubles to produce
an increment in production of 501 million rubles during 1956-60. The
actual increment during this period was 912 million rubles, but this .
figure cannot be used, because actual investment in the industry during
1956-60 is not known.
The Seven Year Flan calls for production of instruments in 1965
valued at 1.85 billion to 1.92 billion rubles compared with production
In 1958 valued at 740 million rubles, an absolute increment during
1959-65 of 1.11 billion to 1.18 billion rubles. Using the ratio of 1
to 1.67, an investment of 665 million to 707 million rubles would be
required to reach the level of production scheduled for 1965. It has
been estimated in this report, however, that the USSR will reach a
level of production of 2.4 billion to 2.5 billion rubles in 1965. A
level of production of 2.5 billion rubles would mean an absolute incre-
ment in production during 1959-65 of 1.76 billion rubles, which would
require an investment of about 1.1 billion rubles.
The use of this method gives a range of investment in the instrument
industry of from 665 million to 1.1 billion rubles. The higher figure
implies that both the 1965 target and the 1965 investment allocations
have been increased since the adoption of the Seven Year Flan early in
1959. This increase is believed to have occurred, although there is no
evidence on this point. On the other hand, the capital-output ratio may
be too low. There is evidence that in other sectors of industry there is
a considerably better capital-output ratio for expansion of existing plants
than for construction of new plants. Because 75 percent of the investment
in the instrument industry has been estimated to be allocated to expansion
of existing plants, a lover capital-output ratio would reduce considerably
the figure for total investment.
Even if the correct capital-output ratio were known, the estimate
of investment would be subject to some error because the rale figure
for production of instruments does not include the value of output of
watches and clocks. An unknown amount should therefore be added to
cover investment in the timepieces industry. The production figure
for instruments presumably includes some instruments manufactured
in plants that are not part of the instrument industry, and thus
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an unknown amount should berOdbtratted becadWOU#0,0 those instru-
ments would be the result otinVistment allocations to other sectors
of machine building.
There is sufficient congruence in the results Obtained from both
methods of estimating ievestment to suggest that investment in. the
Soviet instrument industry during the Seven Year Plan is in the range
of approximately 700 million to 1 billion rubles.
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APPENDIX D
METHODOLOGY USED IN COMPUTING THE LABOR FORCE
IN' THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
No information has been-released by the USSR on the size of the
labor force in the instrument industry. Of the 263 plants believed
to be serving the industry, there are fairly reliable employment
statistics available for 1956-61 for 30 of the plants, or slightly
more than 11 percent of the total.
varies as follows:
Number of Plants
The employment of these 30 plants
Persons Employed
per Plant
1
12,000
1
11,850
1
7,800
1
7,500
2
4,000
2
3,500
4
3,000
1
2,000
1
1,500
1
1,200
1
1,000
1
800
1
700
1
65o
2
600
1
45o
3
400
2
350
1
300
1
250
1
200
Total 30 781300
The average (arithmetic mean) size of the labor force of these 30
plants is about 2,610 employees per plant, yielding an industry total
of about 686,400 employees.., Such an average, however, is not likely
to be typical for the industry. In the first place, many of the
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employment figures have come from the reports of the exchange delega-
tions Who have visited the plants. Because these delegations visited
only the principal plants or the Showplace plants, it is likely that
these plants are far above the industry average in number of employees
per plant. A second reason for regarding the average of the 30 plants
as being far above the industry average is that about lo of the plants
Which are counted in the industry total are newly in production or in
some cases are not yet in production.
There is such a vide variation in employment in these 30 plants that
no good distribution is apparent.. Selection of the median employment of
1,100, however, yields a total employment for the industry of 289,300,
which is believed to be a more reasonable figure than that obtained by
averaging the employment of the 30 plants.
As a check on the above figure, another method has. been utilized to
estimate employment in the industry. The known labor force and the level
of output of four representative plants* are used to compute the annual
ruble-value output per worker. This figure is then divided into the
estimated total ruble-value figure for annual production during the year
concerned, as follows:
Leningrad Gosmetr Scales Plant
In 1957 this plant had 1,220 employees and produced analysis and
commercial scales worth 2.4 million rubles for an average annual output
per employee of 1,970 rubles.
Leningrad Electrical Machinery Plant (LZ)
In 1959 this plant employed about 2,000 people and produced watt-hour
meters worth 10.0 million rubles for an average output per employee of
5,000 rubles.
Tallinn Control and Measuring Instrument Plant (KIP)
In 1960 this plant had approximately 350 employees and was to have
produced radioactive isotopic instruments worth 1.5 million rubles for
an average output per employee of 4,290 rubles.
Leningrad Vibrator Plant
In 1960 this plant employed 3,500 workers and was to have produced
electrical measuring instruments and gauges, photoelectric exposure
* The representative plants include one plant with a large volume of
production, another with a small volume of production, and two plants
In between.
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meters, and electrical :components worth a total of 20.0 million rubles
for an average output per employee Of 5,710 rubles.
4 The average annual output per employee at these four plants there-
fore is 4,240 rubles. Because it is believed that the output figures
for these plants are gross output (valovaya produktsiya) or goods out-
put (tovarnaya produktsiya), these figures are not strictly comparable
with the total value of output of instruments for the USSR. The plant
output figures would include some repair work and services performed
for other plants. The national figures are believed to represent the
quantity of instruments produced multiplied by price. An arbitrary
reduction of 10 percent in the average output per employee has therefore
been made in an attempt to, Achieve greater comparability, or an average
annual output per employee of 3,820 rdbles. If the value of Soviet
output of instruments for 1959* (942 million rubles) is divided by
3,820 rubles, the result is an estimated labor force for the industry
of 247,000. Because the value of output of cameras, clocks and
watches is not included in the value figure for output of instruments,
it is necessary to add employment at the 20 to 30 plants producing
these items, an employment estimated to be 35,000. This figure gives
an estimate of employment for the entire instrument industry of 282,000
persons.
Using the above figure and the estimate derived from taking the
median of the 30 plants, a range of 280,000 to 290,000 is used in this
report as the estimated labor force of the Soviet instrument industry
in 1959.
* The year 1959 has been chosen because it is midway between the 1957
and 1960 data of these plants.
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APPENDIX E
RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE
TO THE INSTRUMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
AS OF 1961*
Designation
NIIMTOPriborov (NauChno-Issledovatelt-
skiy I Eksperimental'nyy Institut
AytomObiltnogp Elektrodborudovaniya,
Karbyuratorov I Priborov -- Scientific
Research and Experimental Institute- of
Automobile Electrical Equipment, Car-
buretors, and Instruments)
VNIIEP (Vsesoyuznyy-Baudhno-Issledova-
tel'skiy Institut Elektroizmeritel'-
nykh Priborov -- All-Union Scientific
Research Institute of Electrical
Measuring Instruments)
N1KIMP (Nauchno-Issledovateliskiy i
Konstruktorskiy Institut Ispytatel!-
nykh Mashin, Priborov i Sredstv
Izmereniya Mass -- Scientific Research
and Design institute of Testing
Machines, Instruments, and Devices for
the Measurement of Volume)
NIIChASPROM (Naudhno.4stledoTate1'-
skiy Institut Chasovoy_PrOMythlen-
nosti -- Scientific Research Institute
of the Watch Industry)
NIITeplopribor (NauChno.Issledovatelt-
skiy Institut Teploenergeticheskogo
Priborostroyeniya Scientific
Research Institute of Thermal Power
Engineering Instrument Making)
KB "Termopribor" (Konstratorskoye
Byuro po Proyektirovaniyu Priborov
dIya Izmereniya Temperatury -- Design
Office for the Planning of Instruments
for the Measurement of Temperature)
*1
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Area of Responsibility
Instruments and electrical
equipment for automobiles
and tractors
Electrical measuring Instru-
ments
Testing machines and devices
for the measurement of
volume
Watches, watch movements,
jewels for watches, And
technical instruments
Instruments for the thermal
control and measurement of
the levels and amounts of
liquids and gases
Thermocouples, resistance
thermometers, and. pyrometers
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Designation
TsNIIKA (Tsentral'nyy Nauchno-Issledo-
vatel'skiy Institut Kompleksnoy AY-
tamatizatsii -- Central Scientific
Research Institute of Over-All Auto-
mation)
SKBAP (Spetsiallnoye Konstruktorskoye
Etturo Analitidheskogo PriborostrOye-
niya -- Special Design Office for
Analytical Instrument Making)
GOI (Gosudarstvennyy Opticheskiy
Institut linen! 3.1. Vavilova -- State
Optical Institute in the Name of
S.I. Vavilov)
N1KFI (Vsesoyuznyy Nauchno-Issledo-
vatel'skiy Kinofoto Institut -- All-
Union Scientific Research Institute
of Motion Picture Photography)
SKIMP (Samostoyatel'noye Konstruk-
torsko-Tekhnologicheskoye Blur? po
Proyektirovaniyu Priborov i Apparatov
iz Stekla -- Independent Design and
Technological Bureau for Planning
Glass Instruments and Apparatus)
NIIGMP (Nauchno-Issledovateliskiy
Institut Gidrameteorologicheskogo
Priborostroyeniya -- Scientific
Research Institute of Hydrometeoro-
logical Instrument Making)
NIISChETMASh (Nauchno-Issledovatel'-
skiy Mashinostroyeniya Scientific
Research Institute of Computer
Machine Building)
IAT AN SSSR (Institut Avtomatiki
i Telemekhaniki Akademii Nauk
SSSR -- Institute of Automatics
and Telanechanics of the Academy of
Sciences, USSR)
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Area of Responsibility
Standardization of means of
automation and parts and
-units used in general in-
strument manufacture
Analytical instruments
Optical and optical-
mechanical instruments,
cameras, and lenses
Movie apparatus and supplies
Instruments and apparatus
made of glass
Hydrometeorologiaal instru-
ments and apparatus
Computers
Automation techniques
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APPENDIX F
ESTIMATED VALUE OF OUTPUT OF DETRIMENTS IN NIE- US IN 1958*
The heterogeneity of instruments and the fact that they are produced
by many different industries in the US make computation of the value
of output difficult. Although the following categories of instruments
may include items of equipment that in the USSR would not be included
in the value figures for production of instruments, such exceptions
are believed to be or minor importance.
Industry
Code
Instrument Industry
Value of Output
in 1958
(Million UB $)
3831 Optical instruments and lenses
industries 109
3821 Mechanical measuring instru-
ments industry 1,061
3613 Electrical measuring instru-
ments industry 643
36162 Electrical control apparatus
industry 426
3811 Scientific instruments indus-
try 946
3571 Office, computing, and account-
ing machinery industry (not
3576
? *w
including typewriters and
duplicating machines)
1,096
Scales and balances industry
82
Total
4,363
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