HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1950-58

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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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S N? 97
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1950 - 58
CIA/RR ER 60-1
January 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1950-58
CIA/RR ER 60-i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
To support its ex-
panding economy, China has relied heavily on highway transport for short
hauls and feeder service to the railroad and waterway systems. Highway
transport also has been used to extend political and military control
in the western provinces and border regions. A more detailed examina-
tion of this system is necessary to determine accurately its signifi-
cance in relation to the total transportation system of China, to
assess the gains in performance during 1950-58, and to examine how
these gains were made.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary 1
I. Introduction 2
II. Truck Transport 3
A. Highway Network 3
1. Growth and Development
2. Investment
B. Organizational Structure
C. Performance
3
6
7
7
1. Tons Originated
7
2. Ton-Kilometers and Average Length of Haul . . .
8
3. Commodity Composition
12
4. Contribution of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA)
13
D.
Equipment and Facilities
13
1. Civilian Truck Park
13
2. Facilities
15
E.
Operating Efficiency
16
1. Utilization of Trucks
16
2. Overloading
17
3. Use of Trailers
18
4. Double Driver Shifts
18
5. Gasoline Consumption and Requirements
19
III.
Native Land Transport
20
A.
Performance
20
B.
Equipment
22
C.
Prospects
22
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Statistical Tables 23
Appendix B. Methodology
27
Tables
1. Communist China: Announced Length of the Highway
Network and Additions, 1949-58 5
2. Communist China: Tons Originated by Truck Transport,
9
1950-58
3. Communist China: Ton-Kilometer Performance of Truck
Transport, 1950-58 10
4. Communist China: Estimated Average Length of Haul of
Truck Transport, 1950-58 11
5. Communist China: Estimated Commodity Composition of
Traffic Carried by Truck Transport, 1958 12
6. Communist China: Estimated Civilian Truck Park and
Additions, 1950-58 14
7. Communist China: Estimated Performance of Native Land
Transport, 1955-58 21
8. Communist China: Highway Classification Selection, by
Functional Use, 1958 24
9. Communist China: Highway Specifications, 1958 25
10. Communist China: Highway Classification Selection, by
Density of Traffic, 1958 26
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11. Communist China: Truck Performance with Which Highway
Specifications Should Comply, 1958
12. Communist China: Estimated Total Civilian Truck Park,
Additions, and Performance, 1950-58
13. Communist China: Comparison of Performance of Native
Land Transport and Truck Transport, 1958
Communist China: Selected Highways
Map
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26
28
33
Inside
Back Cover
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HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
1950-58
Summary
, Modern highway transport** in Communist China is essentially local
in character except in the west, where other types of transportation
are undeveloped. In other regions, trucks are used primarily for
short-haul and feeder services to the railroads and waterways. Since
1949 these operations have made progressively more effective use of
available equipment and facilities, but highway transport still is
hampered by poor roads, shortages of trucks, and an inadequate supply
of fuel.
During 1949-58, Communist China expanded a badly damaged highway
network of 75,000 kilometers (km) of motorable roads to an improved
network of 400,000 km.*** This network, however, still is charac-
terized by little surfacing, poor drainage, timber bridges of low ca-
pacity, and numerous ferry crossings. Expansion of the network has
been accomplished primarily by renovation in the east and by new con-
struction in the west and has been financed by investment funds pro-
vided by several levels of government. This expansion, besides con-
siderably improving the roads throughout the country, has strengthened
political control and increased military capability, especially in the
border regions and the coastal area of Fukien.
During 1950-58 the civilian truck park of Communist China was in-
creased through imports and domestic production from 40,000 to 96,000
trucks, characteristically with capacities of 3 metric tons.****
About half of these trucks are owned by transport agencies of the
government and about half by functional government agencies. The
military services own and operate a truck park comparable to the total
civilian park. Rising domestic production of trucks may soon meet
effective demand, but the Chinese Communists will continue to import
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 November 1959.
** The term modern highway transport in this report refers to trans-
portation by motor truck. The performance figures include haulage of
freight by truck, trailer, or bus. The term native highway transport
refers to all highway transport except motorized transport, including
animal-drawn and man-drawn carts, porters, and the like.
*** See the map, inside back cover.
**** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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trucks of special types and export limited numbers of trucks, primarily
to build up political prestige.
During 1950-58 the tons originated by trucks in Communist China
increased from 7.45 million to 176.3 million, or about 23 times,
and of the total tons originated by modern transport the share con-
tributed by trucks rose from 6.6 percent to 27.9 percent. During the
same period the ton-kilometers performed by trucks increased from
373 million to 5.29 billion, or about 13 times, and the share of the
total ton-kilometer performance of modern transport contributed by
trucks increased from 0.9 percent to 2.3 percent. The performance
of truck transport has increased slightly faster than the performance
of total modern transport, a trend which may continue until 1962 or
1963. These increases reflect the restoration and expansion of the
highway system, additions to the truck park, intensive utilization of
equipment, and expansion of all types of transportation. The inten-
sive utilization of equipment will impair the condition of trucks and
may negate much of the gain that China could realize through expanding
domestic production and retiring its old trucks.
Native land transport in Communist China has an inventory of about
24 million carts of all kinds and a full-time labor force of about 4
million persons. During 1955-58 the tons originated by native land
transport increased from 300 million to 529 million, or about 76 per-
cent, and ton-kilometer performance increased from 1.9 billion to 3.3
billion, or about 74 percent, during the same period. Because of ex-
cessive labor costs, at least 10 times as high as in truck transport,
no sharp expansion of this sector seems likely, but native land trans-
port will continue to provide a flexible means by which highway trans-
port may be expanded quickly with small capital outlays. Native land
transport will continue to form an integral part of the economy of
China for some time to come.
I. Introduction
The Chinese did not place great emphasis on highway transport be-
fore the Communist seizure of power in 1949 but relied heavily on rail-
roads and waterways for long-haul freight movements and on traditional
native carts for short hauls. During the period when motor transport
was developing rapidly in other nations, China was engaged in civil
and international wars.
The Chinese Communists acquired an underdeveloped, badly damaged
highway system when they seized power in 1949. Starting from a small
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base, the Chinese made impressive gains in highway transport during
1950-58 by utilizing native types of transportation and technological
advancements in the modern sector. An assessment of these gains with-
out consideration of the unique conditions of this period, however,
would distort the facts.
II. Truck Transport
A. Highway Network
1. Growth and Development
The Chinese Communists in 1949 acquired a badly damaged
highway network concentrated mainly in the densely populated eastern
coastal regions. Sparsely populated western China was isolated from
central and eastern China with only the Lan-chou - Sinkiang road in
the north and the Burma road in the south providing motorable links
to the western borders of the country. In spite of the existence of
this northern route, the highway network of Sinkiang was oriented
toward the USSR. The Burma road provided no east-west connection with
China's western provinces. In the northeast, some highway routes ran
parallel to the rail lines providing supplementary service, but most
of the roads were intended to provide short-haul connections with the
railroad and water networks. Few good roads existed in the north
between Peking and the Yellow River, but the highway network became
more dense to the south. Possibly the best developed portions of the
highway network were centered in the area of the middle and lower
Yangtze River. Most of these roads were narrow and of poor quality,
and their usefulness was limited by timber bridges of low capacity
and by ferries. Surfacing, where it existed, consisted of a layer
of gravel, crushed rock, or packed earth, with some small sections of
pavement in and adjacent to the major urban centers. Low standards
of construction resulted in frequent closing or damage to roads during
periods of inclement weather.
Major emphasis has been placed on the extension of the
highway network of Communist China to the border areas of the country,
where only primitive means of communication formerly existed. Con-
struction of roads in these areas has furthered the economic and cul-
tural development of districts having racial minorities and has tied
these districts more closely to the central government. Roads provide
the only means of direct surface transportation between China and Tibet
and between China and the neighboring countries of Laos, Burma, and
India as well as the Soviet Central Asian republics. Because of the
intense Chinese interest in Tibet and the Chinese policy of strengthen-
ing border positions, truck transport has been considerably expanded
in these areas. A further stimulus to truck transport has resulted
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from the increased tempo of construction in areas not serviced by rail --
for example, the western oilfields. 50X1
a. Types of Highways
The Chinese Communists have been busily constructing
and repairing roads throughout the country, but precise information on
these activities is unavailable. Although the Chinese place motorable
roads in six classes for administrative purposes, they rarely refer to
these definitions in their announcements and do not even consistently
distinguish between new construction and the repair of existing roads.**
b. Length
Statistics released by the Chinese Communists concern-
ing the total length of their highway network are contradictory and
often confused. Table 1*** gives the total length of all highways as
officially announced. Additions to the highway network in Communist
China have been erratic, the largest being made in 1956 and 1958. Of
the total 120,400 km added during the First Five Year Plan (1953-57),
it appears that the central government added only about 12,000 km, or
10 percent.**** The large addition made in 1956 may have been the re-
sult of a number of earlier projects having been rushed to completion
when congestion and the upsurge throughout the economy began to affect
highway transport. The largest increments coincide with the years
when highway transport experienced serious congestion, and it is be-
lieved that most of the addition announced in 1958 represents roads
of dubious quality which were not counted earlier in the national
total.t It seems conceivable that the authorities, faced with serious
operational difficulties, added these roads statistically to compen-
sate partly for other shortcomings.
The most recent Chinese Communist announcement stated
that 40,000 km of highways were rebuilt during 1958; that 20,000 km of
native roads were improved to make them passable in rainy seasons;
that 10,000 km with tight curves, narrow stretches, and steep gradients
were improved; and that 25,000 km were surfaced with 'waste" materials.
Fifty percent of the existing highways, however, were not "completely"
passable during rainy seasons. 2/
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lk-A- bee Appendix A, Tables b, 9, 10, and 11, pp. 24, 25, 26, and
26, respectively, below.
*** Table 1 follows on p. 5.
**** Roads built by the central government are generally of much bet-
ter quality than those built with local funds.
t The addition could be the result of a reclassification of "simple"
highways as Class VI-B highways (for methodology, see Table 9, Appen-
dix A, p. 25, below).
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Table 1
Communist China: Announced Length of the Highway Network
and Additions
1949-58
Thousand Kilometers
Year
Length
Yearly Additions e./
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
75.0 12/
102.8 c/
107.4 E/
129.6 1/
138.6 El/
142.5 1/
162.5 Ey
227.2 I/
250.0 sl/
400.0 sy
N.A.
27.8
4.6
22.2
9.0
3.9
20.0
64.7
22.8
150.0
a. Derived from the first column.
b. .41/
c.
d. 2/
The quality of the highway network of Communist China,
although steadily improving, remains low by Western standards. Most
of the roads are of packed earth or of crushed rock, gravel, or sand.
Numerous streams, especially in the south and west, are forded or
crossed by ferry. Bridges are of poor construction, which limits the
number of vehicles and loads that can cross. Generally, roads are
better near large urban centers in the eastern provinces. It must be
remembered, however, that because the bulk of highway freight is trans-
ported by primitive means and because all highway transport in China
is essentially local in character, China does not require a modern
highway network of the Western type.
c. Maintenance
Communist China relies to a great extent on hand labor
to maintain its highway network because "the entire country now has
only 1,000 comparatively major road construction machines." _Y Workers
are assigned to a specific section of road and are held responsible
for its care, cadres of workers are organized by local authorities,
and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) maintains and constructs roads in
remote regions. All peasants have the duty of repairing roads. 2/
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The Chinese Communists have stated that generally each
maintenance worker should take care of 2 to 4 km of high-grade road
or 1 to 4 km of ordinary-grade road. 8/ A more recent announcement
states that each kilometer of road requires one or two persons for
constant maintenance. This statement indicates that the more than
400,000 km of highways in China require "several hundred thousand or
even a million persons for road maintenance, constituting a serious
problem when the 'leap forward' had caused a labor shortage." 2/ Al-
though this system is labor consuming, the existing facilities and
roads are kept in fair repair and are gradually improved. It is
assumed that the money cost of maintenance is low in Communist China
because of the large amounts of corvee labor used.*
2. Investment
The Chinese Communists have placed considerable emphasis
on road rehabilitation and new construction, the First Five Year Plan
having allocated 581.8 million yuan** for highway construction from
the central government, 12/ or about 7 percent of total planned in-
vestment in transport and communications. By far the greater part of
total road building, mostly on secondary roads, is done by the local
governments, capital investment by local governments having been
planned to be 297.8 million yuan during the First Five Year Plan. 11/
Actual total investment in highways during the First Five Year Plan
was 1.12 billion yuan, of which 704 million yuan were spent by the
central government and 414 million yuan by provincial and local
authorities. An application of these figures to the total kilometrage
added*** gives an average cost per kilometer of about 58,000 yuan for
projects financed by the central government and about 3,700 yuan for
roads built by provincial authorities The proportion of
total investment in roads by the central government probably varies
widely by region. In the western provinces, the border regions, and
the Fukien coastal area, investment probably is made primarily by
the central government, because these highways affect national defense
and welfare. In Tibet, almost the entire investment would come from
the central government.
* In addition to corvde labor, it is probable that convict and
slave labor is used for road *maintenance and construction.
** Except where otherwise indicated, yuan values in this report
are expressed in current yuan and may be converted to US dollars at
the rate of 2.46 yuan to US $1. This rate of exchange is based on
the yuan-sterling rate for telegraphic transfers, which is arbitrarily
established and bears no relationship to domestic price levels.
*** Assuming that 12,135 km were added by the central government and
112,598 km by local authorities. 12/
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It thus appears that substantial investments have been made
in the highway network by both the national and the local governments
in Communist China. Even these amounts may not reflect the true propor-
tion of total investment, because investments by "trade departments,"*
hsiens (counties), and commune governments probably are excluded from
the total. The heaviest investments by the central government have
been in the western provinces, the border regions, and the Fukien
coastal area. Local governments have invested heavily in all areas,
although the pattern of investment has been uneven, and estimates
of actual investment are complicated by the Chinese Communist practice
of including highway investment under "investments in communications
and transportation" in their announcements.
B. Organizational Structure
Highway transport in Communist China functions under the Min-
istry of Communications. The Ministry operates under the general
direction of the Industry and Communications Staff Office of the
State Council.112/ Wang Shou-tao assumed the duties of Minister of
Communications in mid-1957 when the incumbent was purged as a rightist.
At the ministerial level the coordination of different communications
facilities and the establishment of standards are the principal re-
sponsibilities. The Ministry of Communications also exercises direct
operational control over highway transport in some areas (for example,
the Tibet-Tsinghai Highway Bureau).
It seems likely that a large measure of day-to-day control
over highway transport lies with the provincial governments, which in
turn are responsible to the State Council. Plans are formulated at
the national level, are coordinated with the provinces, and are exe-
cuted by provincial authorities. The typical province in Communist
China probably has 5 to 10 transport groups, each with a repair facil-
ity and appropriate functional sections. The entire organization,
through the means available to a Communist state, is a closely con-
trolled, efficiently operated economic tool employed to further the
economic (and hence the political) and strategic interests of the cen-
tral government.
C. Performance
1. Tons Originated
Truck transport in Communist China showed a marked increase
in tons originated during 1950-58. Total tons originated increased
* Probably a part of the central government.
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from 7.45 million tons in 1950 to 176.3 million tons in 1958, or about
23 times, as shown in Table 2.* In the same period the share of
trucks in total tons originated by modern transport rose from 6.6 per-
cent to 27.9 percent. These figures reflect the renovation and expan-
sion of the highway network and increases in the size and utilization
of the truck park in addition to a general increase in performance by
all types of transportation.
The increases in tons originated during 1951 and 1952
probably reflect the restoration of the highway network after the
Chinese civil war and the resulting increases in performance by all
types of transportation as the economy of Communist China began to
expand. The large increases in 1956 and 1958 reflect the increases
in over-all transportation performance as well as in truck transport.
Except in 1955 and 1957, tons originated by trucks have increased
steadily both in absolute terms and in the percentage of total tons
originated each year during 1950-58. Truck transport performance in
terms of tons originated has expanded at a faster rate than total
modern transport, a trend which probably will continue at least until
1962 or 1963.
The Chinese Communist state-owned transport agencies
achieved these increases in performance partly by intensive utiliza-
tion of trucks, which was accomplished by the following measures:
(a) firmer administrative control, (b) liberal support to the civilian
sector by the PLA, (c) part-time use of trucks belonging to functional
government agencies not primarily concerned with transportation,
(d) double driver shifts, (e) overloading, (f) use of trailers, and
(g) better utilization of available loading space. The use of double
driver shifts and the support received from the PLA have been realized
by a diversion of resources (fuel and personnel) from other sectors of
the economy. Apparently the Chinese considered the demand for trans-
portation to be of sufficient priority during 1958 to divert these re-
sources. It appears that high performance from existing facilities
was realized during 1958. Reports of early 1959 indicate that the
Chinese plan to increase performance by increased utilization more than
by expansion of the sector during 1959.
2. Ton-Kilometers and Average Length of Haul
Truck transport performance in Communist China in terms of
ton-kilometers is shown in Table 3.**
* Table 2 follows on p. 9.
** Table 3 follows on p. 10.
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Table 2
Communist China: Tons Originated by Truck Transport
1950-58
Year
Million Metric Tons
Percent
Tons Originated
Increase Above
Previous Year 2/
Increase Above
Previous Year a/
Share of
Total Modern
Transport 1,/
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
7.45 c
12.6 c L/
20.7 C./ 1/
30.4 -C./ sl/
43.5 1/
50.1 E/ 1/
49.8 g/
79.1 g/
101.212/
176.3 i/
N.A.
5.15
8.1
9.7
13.1
6.6
29.3
22.1
75.1
N.A.
69
64
47
43
15
59
28
74
6.6
9.4
12.3
14.3
16.3
17.9
21.3
23.6
27.9
a. Derived from the first column.
c. Tariff tons. The term tariff tons is a term used in Chinese Com-
munist cost accounting. The exact meaning of the term is unknown, but
there is very little difference between a tariff ton and a physical
(metric) ton.
d.
e.
f?
g. 124/
h. Es2/
i. El/. In March 1959 the Chinese Communists announced that tons
originated by truck transport had reached 280 million in 1958. 22/
This figure was tentatively accepted by this Office as the upper Unlit
of performance attainable with the available truck park and a consider-
able increase in operating efficiency. A hint that the figure of 280
million tons might be revised downward came in a speech by Chou En-lai
on 28 August 1959 El/ at a time when other revisions of 1958 data were
taking place. A month later the Minister of Communications, without
mentioning the figure of 280 million tons or indicating that any re-
vision was taking place, stated that motor trucks had carried 176.3
million tons in 1958. gl/ The revised figure is much more consistent
with past performance and with the announced goal for 1959 and there-
fore has been accepted as the current estimate of 1958 performance.
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Table 3
Communist China: Ton-Kilometer Performance of Truck Transport
1950-58
Year
Billion Ton-Kilometers
Percent
Performance
Increase Above
Previous Year a/
Increase Above
Previous Year 2/
Share of
Total Modern
Transport./
1950
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
0.373 pi d/
0.503 2/ 2/
0.678 E/ 1/
1.181 c/ d
1.87 27 d
2.52 c/ 1/
2.51 7g./
3.49 gi
379W
5.29J
N.A.
0.130
0.175
0.503
0.69
0.65
0.98
0.30
1.50
N.A.
35
35
74
58
35
39
9
4o
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.3
1.7
2.1
2.4
2.3
2.3
a. Derived from the first column.
c. Tariff tons. The term tariff tons is a term used in Chinese Com-
munist cost accounting. The exact meaning of the term is unknown,
but there is very little difference between a tariff ton and a physical
(metric) ton.
d. 26/
e. Interpolated between 1950 and 1952 by assuming geometric progres-
sion.
f. 2;/
h. 22/
i. Estimated.
The largest absolute gains took place in 1956 and 1958,
which were years of expansion in all sectors of the economy. The "leap
forward" campaign in 1958 resulted in an absolute increase larger than
in any previous year, reflecting significant additions to the truck
park and intensive utilization. The small gain in 1957 may reflect a
leveling off after the large increase made in 1956 and a reduction in
imports of trucks, suggesting that 1959 may also show a slight drop in
the rate of increase while the Chinese digest the gains made in 1958.
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he authorities expect an even 50X1
larger absolute increase in performance in 1959.
When considered in connection with total modern transport
performance, truck ton-kilometer performance does not bulk large in
the economy of Communist China but is nevertheless quite important.
Truck transport performance includes short-haul feeder service to rail
and water transport, which could not be handled by the native sector of
highway transport without excessive labor costs, and also the long-haul
service of truck transport in western China, which cannot be supplemented
by native transport. The average length of haul of truck transport is
shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Communist China: Estimated Average Length of Haul
of Truck Transport
1950-58
Kilometers
Year
Average Length
of Haul
Change from
Previous Year
1950
1951
50 2/
40 12/
N.A.
-10
1952
33 2/
-7
1953
39 a/
+6
1954
43
1955
50 2/
+7
1956
44 a/
-6
1957
37 7
-7
1958
30 b/
-7
a. Calculated by dividing ton-kilometers (see Table 3,
p. 10, above) by tons originated (see Table 2, p. 9, above).
b. Estimated.
The average length of haul of truck transport in Communist
China in the next few years may level out near 30 km. As the rail-
road network expands, the longer truck hauls will be eliminated, and
trucks will continue to be used on short-haul feeder operations. Be-
cause of the poor quality of the road network and continued problems
with liquid fuel, no long-haul operations of the common carrier type
such as those in the US will be possible for some time. An increase
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in the use of native transport for short hauls in 1958 could have in-
creased the average length of haul for motor trucks. The decrease
during 1958, however, suggests that the Chinese may have employed
motor vehicles on high-priority short hauls in support of industrial
production. This use might also account in part for the rapid rise
in tons originated during 1958.
3. Commodity Composition
Tentative conclusions regarding the commodity composition
of truck transport in Communist China are shown in Table 5. More
varieties of goods probably were transported by truck than by other
types of modern transportation, but 90 percent of jhe 176.3 million
tons moved by truck were in the specific commodity categories listed
in Table 5.
Table 5
Communist China: Estimated Commodity Composition
of Traffic Carried by Truck Transport a/
1958
Commodity
Tons Originated
Metric Tons)
Percent
of Total
Truck Transport
Coal
78
44
Mineral construction materials
38
21
Agricultural goods
26
15
Of which:
Grain
23
13
Cotton
2.5
1
Ferrous raw materials and
products.
8.9
5
Of which:
Steel
3.1
2
Timber
5
3
POL
3?
2
Other
17.4
10
Total 176.3 100
a. For methodology, see Appendix B.
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4. Contribution of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
With a truck park comparable to that of the civilian
authorities, the Peoples Liberation Army (FLA) of Communist China
makes a small but significant contribution to civilian transport.
During 1950-58 the PLA is estimated to have accounted for about 10
percent of total ton-kilometers in truck transport. Much of this
support was rendered in the western provinces, where the transport
organizations of the PLA function almost as civilian units. A large
number of trucks in Sinkiang, Tibet, and Szechwan are under military
control, and the rest probably are controlled by agencies directly
responsible to the central government.
In addition to furnishing trucks regularly used for
civilian transport in Communist China, the PLA has given liberal
support to the civilian authorities for specific transportation
tasks. In October 1958 it was announced that the PLA had mustered
more than 10,000 trucks for use on the "steel-making front." 30/
During 1958, according to a more recent announcement, the PLA turned
over "surplus" trucks to civilian authorities, and about 13,000 PLA
trucks also were used in support of the civilian authorities. 31/
No data are available concerning the precise contribution made by
these vehicles, but the actual number used is equivalent to about
14 percent of the estimated civilian park at the end of 1958. In
addition to supplying trucks, the PLA has been integrated to an ex-
tent with civilian transport. Unified traffic commands have been
set up in certain areas, repair facilities of the PLA have been partly
coordinated with those of the civilian authorities, and the PLA pro-
vides the civilian transportation authorities with trained personnel.
D. Equipment and Facilities
1. Civilian Truck Park
Estimates of the Chinese Communist civilian truck park*
are shown in Table 6.**
The civilian truck park in Communist China is composed of
many different makes and models from at least 10 different countries,
a situation which seriously complicates maintenance and the obtaining
of spare parts. During 1949-56, additions to the park came mainly from
the USSR and the European Satellites, especially Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. The Chinese curtailed imports in 1957, apparently because of
optimism concerning domestic production, a general policy of cutting
imports, and a low supply of fuel. Imports increased in 1958, when
* For methodology, see Appendix B.
** Table 6 follows on p. 14.
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Table 6
Communist China: Estimated Civilian Truck Park
and Additions
1950-58
Thousand Trucks
Yearly
Year b/ Park Additions
1950
4o
N.A.
1951
14.14.
4
1952
49
5
1953
514.
5
1954
59
5
1955
65
6
1956
72
7
1957
80
8
1958
96
16
a. See Table 12, Appendix B, p. 28, below.
b. As of the end of each year.
production did not meet effective demand and the "leap forward" cam-
paign created problems in highway transport. It appears that the
Chinese imported more than 20,000 trucks in 1958, the largest number
coming from the USSR. 32/
Communist China began limited exports of trucks to South-
east Asia and the Middle East late in 1957, primarily for propaganda
and political prestige. The propaganda aspects of such exports are
obvious and possibly were reflected in a shipment of 10 trucks to
Cambodia via Hong Kong. 12/ The total effect of Chinese exports of
trucks probably has been a net gain in political prestige, but the
economic effects have been small. Domestic production is rising
rapidly, but domestic needs should preclude any large exports in the
near future.
In 1956, domestic production of modified ZIS-150 4-ton
trucks began at the newly opened First Automobile Plant at Ch'ang-ch'un.
Production amounted to 1,654 trucks in that year and was expanded to
7,500 in 1957 and 15,000 in 1958. It is doubtful if the original stated
capacity of the Ch'ang-ch'un plant of 30,000 trucks per year will be
reached in 1959. The Chinese have stated that the capacity will be
raised to 150,000 in 1959, ],11/ but production probably will be far short
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of this figure. The Chinese also have automobile manufacturing plants
at Nanking and Shanghai in addition to a number of new plants under
construction. "Leap forward" production of trucks at numerous auto-
mobile repair shops in 1958 did not add any significant number to the
park. Already lacking adequate repair facilities, the repair shops
apparently went too far in trial production during 1958 and were sub-
sequently instructed to "trial produce" only after repair of trucks
and other vehicles and manufacture of parts had been accomplished. 3.2/
No figures are available concerning the rate of retirement
of trucks in Communist China, but at the end of 1958 it remained low.*
Retirement of the 37,000 pre-1942 trucks (39 percent of the civilian
park) will depend on a number of factors. If production rises rapidly,
the Chinese no doubt will retire the older trucks or possibly relegate
them to other uses -- for example, distribution among the communes.
This policy could result in a 1963 park with a lower average age than
at present, but the condition of the trucks will be adversely affected
by intensive utilization.
The Chinese Communists have the productive capability to
triple the existing truck park by 1963. By that time the park will
contain few trucks above 13 years of age, and there may be a larger
percentage of the total park under 5 years of age. China will con-
tinue to import trucks of special types -- for example, heavy-duty
semitrailer and tank trucks -- but rising domestic production should
cause reductions in imports of standard trucks. Production and allo-
cation of petroleum will determine the number of nongasoline vehicles
employed by the Chinese in the future, and the ratio of civilian to
military vehicles may change.
2. Facilities
Although little information is available concerning motor
truck facilities in Communist China, they are assumed to be scarce but
adequate. In most cases, highway freight feeds into the transportation
network at railheads or river ports, and terminal facilities probably
are provided by the rail or water transportation networks. Maintenance
and repair facilities for motor vehicles are relatively scarce in China,
but the existing shops are capable of performing extensive repairs.
Minor repair and maintenance ard done by the local transportation au-
thorities, and major repairs and overhauls are done at the "automobile
repair shops." Because of the mixed nature of the park, these shops
are equipped with foundries and machine tools to manufacture parts not
* A recent release stating that the 1957 "road department park" was
38,580 and that 12,000 trucks were added during 1958 for a park of
49,000 at the end of the year indicates a retirement rate of 4 percent
for 1958. 162/
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readily available. Information concerning the location of these shops
is fragmentary. Kwangtung Province, with five repair garages late in
1957, E/ probably is better provided with such facilities than most
provinces. In contrast, Tibet had no repair facilities until a garage
was constructed at Lhasa in 1957, vehicles being towed 2,000 km to
Lan-chou in Kansu Province or to Urumchi in Sinkiang Province for re-
pair before 1957. 38/ Even in the more densely populated eastern prov-
inces, much time is lost in hauling vehicles to the repair shops and in
repairing the vehicles. In 1956 the Chinese Communists complained that
on the average 25 percent of the trucks were under repair, some of them
in the shops for as long as 1 or 2 months. 22/ Recently the authorities
stated that the "leap forward" had caused a serious shortage of parts.
Of the 19,000 motor vehicles in Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan Prov-
inces, nearly 6.000 were out of ser ice because they could not be re-
paired./EV continued intensive utilization
during 1959, and the cumulative effect of this policy may cause even
more difficulties for the repair shops.
Expansion of the existing truck facilities in Communist
China entails considerable investment because of the mixed nature of
the park and the resulting need for extensive facilities and skilled
labor. To provide facilities for the expected tripling of the exist-
ing park and to compensate for intensive utilization, China will have
to invest heavily in repair shops. The expanding production of "Lib-
eration" trucks should result in more widespread standardization of
parts and thus should partly alleviate the supply problem.
E. Operating Efficiency
1. Utilization of Trucks
Along with a drive to bring all trucks under government
ownership, the Chinese Communists have attempted to utilize the idle
capacity of government-owned trucks. During 1956 it was found that
the trucks belonging to state-owned transport agencies attained a
utilization rate of 75 percent, whereas those of the functional
government agencies had utilization rates of only 43 percent.
The importance attached to this discrepancy in utilization
was emphasized by a directive issued early in May 1957 by the State
Council of Communist China concerning the use of trucks belonging to
functional government agencies. According to this directive, it was
necessary to exploit fully the potential of existing trucks. The
number of trucks owned and used by functional government agencies,
organs, and enterprises was said to be nearly equal to the total num-
ber engaged in public transportation under the management of state-
owned transport agencies. Each government unit having trucks was
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instructed to send balance sheets to the proper transport agency, show-
ing the capacity of its trucks and the legitimate requirements for
transportation and thus indicate the extent to which these vehicles
could be employed by the transportation agency. In this way the avail-
able transport capacity would be placed at the disposition of the of-
ficial transport agency. Ili/
It is not possible to state just how this shift of control
was to be effected. It may be assumed, however, that a number of
trucks belonging to Chinese Communist government organs are used on a
part-time basis by transport agencies. The directive of May 1957 stated
that the production targets should not be set too high nor the controls
made too stringent. IT/ Enterprises owning trucks were asked to
"strengthen their concept of socialist entity aid overcome narrow and
self-interested departmentalism ideology." 43/
Such measures no doubt have made contributions to the rise
in rates of utilization of trucks in Communist China. The Communists
claimed that by September 1958 about 20,000 trucks had been "pulled
out" of various organs and industries to assist the transportation
authorities. 1.-_& Although the work of each government agency or organi-
zation was to take priority over its obligation to loan trucks to other
agencies and some were specifically excluded from this directive (for
example, oil storage and refrigeration cars as well as vehicles belong-
ing to industrial and mining enterprises and surveying teams), 45/ there
seems to be little doubt that the transport agencies have received in-
creased support from the functional government agencies. Because the
functional igovernment agencies have a park roughly equal to that of
the transport agencies, even part-time support could improve materially
the over-all performance of truck transport.
2. Overloading
Another method used to increase the utilization of the
truck park in Communist China has been the overloading of available
vehicles. In view of the way in which the Chinese Communists solved
this problem with railroad cars (by merely raising the capacity), it
is reasonable to assume that overloading also has been increased in
truck transport. Late in 1956 the Ministry of Communications stated
that trucks were overloaded an average of from one-half to 1 ton per
vehicle and that all trucks should be thus overloaded. 46/
Most of the truck park in Communist China consists of
vehicles with load capacities of between 3 and 4 tons. Several cir-
cumstances assist the authorities in obtaining high load factors with
these vehicles. First, much of the freight carried by trucks in China,
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such as coal, construction materials, grain, ferrous metals, and tim-
ber, is of high load density. Second, because of the scarcity of
motor trucks, freight pickup stations probably are established along
the routes over which conimon-carrier vehicles are operated. The
freight is assembled at these points, and truck transport takes what
it can, the rest being transported by native means. Such procedures
could virtually eliminate truck operations with less than full loads.
3. Use of Trailers
The use of trailers, pulled behind conventional trucks,
made a significant contribution to increased highway transport perform-
ance in Communist China, especially during late 1958. China had only
4,700 trailers in June 1958, but the Chinese have announced that by late
1958 this number had increased to more than 32,000, which in terms of
load capacity was equivalent to adding about ?4,000 trucks. 47/ The
Chinese claim that by the addition of trailers they have increased
the ton-kilometer performance of individual trucks as much as 60 per-
cent and have reduced fuel consumption per ton-kilometer as much as
17 percent. 48/ Although these figures probably represent the upper
limits of the gains realized, the over-all average also must be im-
pressive. The Chinese cited numerous examples of trailer usage during
1958, including such extravagant claims as 46 trailers with 140 tons
of material being hauled by 1 truck. 145/ Although many such accounts
are obviously propaganda, there is little doubt that the use of trailers
has contributed a good deal to the increase in truck transport perform-
ance, particularly during the latter months of 1958, when truck transport
faced serious problems. The use of trailers, if properly developed, also
could do much to solve the problem of a high fuel-to-cargo ratio in
western China, where trucks at times must carry enough fuel to travel
thousands of kilometers.
Most of the trailers used by the Chinese Communists are
produced domestically by semihandicraft methods, although it seems
probable that a number of heavy-duty trailers and trailers of special
types have been imported from other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Even though of doubtful quality, locally produced trailers have had a
marked effect on truck transport in China by introducing a flexibility
that importation and manufacture have failed to achieve up to the
present time. The use of trailers may be a major and relatively cheap
means of partly solving the shortage of truck transport and to some ex-
tent the shortage of liquid fuel in China.
4. Double Driver Shifts
Another important means of increasing utilization has been
the contribution of double-driver shifts to the rise in truck transport
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performance in Communist China. This use of double drivers, previously
restricted by fuel shortages and lack of trained personnel, became more
widespread late in 1956, when transportation tasks increased. Some
reports give 60 to 70 percent as the rate of increase in transportation
capacity through the use of two shifts. By early March 1957 the Chinese
Communists claimed that about 4,000 trucks were operating on two
shifts 29.1./ and by. the end of 1958 they claimed that 26 percent of the
trucks "in operation throughout the country" were working on double
shifts. It is not clear whether the Chinese meant 26 percent of the
96,000 trucks in the civilian park -- that is, 25,000 trucks -- or
26 percent of the 49,000 trucks operated by the state-owned transport
agencies -- that is, 13,000 trucks. 21/ Late in 1958, as transporta-
tion tasks became heavier, the Chinese recruited skilled workers in
Hong Kong, "among whom a considerable number" were "motor car drivers." 2/
A substantial amount of the increase in performance is attributable to
this change in operations, but the increase has been restricted by
shortages of fuel and trained drivers. Some of the same liabilities
applying to other means of increased utilization apply to this measure.
The effect on the condition of trucks, on repair and maintenance, and
on requirements for fuel and personnel is obvious.
5. Gasoline Consumption and Requirements
It is estimated that in 1957 civilian trucks in Communist
China consumed about 400,000 tons* of the 610,000 tons of gasoline
available. By the end of 1958 the total amount of gasoline available
increased to 726,000 tons, or by 19 percent. During the same period,
ton-kilometer performance of truck transport increased from 3.79 billion
to 5.29 billion, or by about 40 percent. Viewed thus, the 1958 per-
formance figure appears improbable, but there may have been a reduc-
tion in the percentage of total gasoline allocated to the military
services, and part of the total performance may have been accomplished
by trucks that did not burn gasoline. It is likely that the 1958
performance was near the limit possible with the available fuel, thus
pointing once more to a serious fuel problem. The effect of petroleum
shortages on expansion and performance will depend on a policy decision
by the authorities. If necessary, however, China can provide the petro-
leum necessary to operate a park of 288,000 trucks by 1963.
In 1952 the Chinese Communists announced that the rise in
road standards had increased performance per truck from 8.05 km (5.0
miles) per US gallon of fuel to 13.156 km (8.2 miles) per gallon. 53/
* The estimated total amount of gasoline available (610,000 tons)
less the estimated military consumption (157,500 tons) gives 452,500
tons. A portion of this amount, however, would be consumed by buses,
automobiles, and other nonmilitary consumers.
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Fuel consumption in some areas, particularly western China, is con-
siderably greater than is indicated in the Communist announcements. 54/
In Sinkiang, 60 percent of the vehicles could not keep within the fuel
quota during the second quarter of 1957. 22/ tend 50X1
to discredit the Chinese claims of average fuel consumption.
The improvements in road standards as well as drivers and
equipment no doubt have been accompanied by. savings in fuel. No
official announcements have been made regarding the actual average
consumption of fuel except the stated goal of 19 liters per 100 km.*
This amount is considered to be beyond the capabilities of Chinese
Communist truck transport. An estimate of 10 to 12 km (6.2 to 7.5
miles) per gallon of fuel seems reasonable.
III. Native Land Transport
A. Performance
Data concerning the performance of native land transport in
Communist China are scattered, and it is not possible to project per-
formance beyond 1958. Performance during 1955-58 is shown in Table 7.**
The importance of native land transport to the Chinese Commu-
nist economy has often been underestimated, not only by foreign ob-
servers but also by the Chinese leaders. One of the major causes of
the transportation difficulties in 1956 was the shrinkage of native
transport resulting from the rapid collectivization of agriculture
in late 1955 and early 1956. The Chinese leaders began to awaken to
the importance of native transport in mid-1956, and since that time
there has been a steady flow of directives urging fuller utilization
of this great reservoir of transport capacity. In addition, the
planners have been taking steps to increase the efficiency of native
transport and in 1958 claimed that the shoulder pole was "virtually
eliminated." 2_61 The carters and porters also have been organized
into cooperatives; operations have been "rationalized" to get the most
service out of available equipment; extensive drives have been staged
to equip all carts with ball bearings; and, in 1958, administrative
control was extended.
Congestion in 1956 in rail and water transport, which also
affected the highway system, probably was partly a result of the
* At 3.785 liters per US gallon the rate of consumption would be
20 km (12.4 miles) per gallon.
** Table 7 follows on p. 21.
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Table 7
Communist China: Estimated Performance
of Native Land Transport
1955-58
Year
Ton-Kilometers
(Billion
Metric Tons)
Tons Originated
(Million
Metric Tons)
1955
1.90 12/
300 E/
1956
1.80 I/
298 2/
1957
2.45 f/
366 L/
1958
3.33 LI/
529 1/
Average Length
of Haul 2/
(Kilometers)
6.3
6.0
6.7
6.3 c/
a. Unless otherwise indicated, ton-kilometers divided by tons
originated.
b. Announced to be 43 percent of total highway ton-kilometers
combined). 21/
(truck and native
c. Estimated.
d. Announced to
e. Announced to
f. 60
g? _1/
h. Tons originated times average length of haul.
be 3)+ percent of total highway ton-kilometers.
be 79 percent of total highway tons originated. 59/
shrinkage of native land transport performance from 1.9 billion ton-
kilometers in 1955 to 1.8 billion in 1956 and of the decline in the
average length of haul from 6.3 km in 1955 to 6.0 km in 1956. The
Chinese Communist attempts to prevent any further recurrence of the
problems of 1956 are reflected in the increases in performance by
native transport from 1956 to 1958. Heavily dependent on native land
transport to support the 1958 "leap forward" campaign, the authorities
paid close attention to this sector of transportation.
The rise in performance of native land transport in Communist
China that occurred during 1958 may begin to level off as the modern
transport sector expands. The increase in native performance probably
was partly a reflection of increased statistical data made available
because of firmer administrative control over this sector of transpor-
tation in 1958. A number of exhortations to increase native transport
capability during 1959, together with statements that expansion of the
modern transport sector cannot compensate for the increased demands on
all transportation, indicate that the authorities will again use mil-
lions of people to make up the deficiency in transportation that the
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modern sector cannot handle. Apparently, transportation is considered
to be of sufficient importance to divert human resources from other
sectors of the economy.
Native land transport is more flexible than other sectors of
transportation. Extensive terminal facilities are not required, and
with very small capital investment the inventory of carts and the
network on which the carts operate can be expanded rapidly. The
principal controlling factor in expansion of native land transport
is labor. It is estimated that native land transport is at least 10
times as labor intensive as truck transport in Communist China.*
B. Equipment
Statistics concerning the inventory of animal-drawn and man-
drawn carts, pack animals, and porters in Communist China are few and
conflicting, but it is agreed that the numbers are large. According
to a Chinese statement, in 1958 there were more than 1.07 million
animal-drawn and man-drawn carts in the country. 63/ Incomplete sta-
tistics also indicated that 737,000 animals were used exclusively for
transportation work._6.11/ A more recent statement claimed that there
were 584,000 carts engaged exclusively in transportation (140,000
animal-drawn carts and 444,000 man-drawn carts) in addition to 23.8 mil-
lion engaged in part-time transport (5.8 million animal-drawn carts
and 18 million man-drawn carts). An estimate of bullock carts in
India, a country comparable to China, placed the number at nearly 10 mil-
lion in 1957. 66/ An estimate of more than 24 million carts of all
kinds seems reasonable.
C. Prospects
Native transport forms an integral part of the Chinese Com-
munist economy and will continue to do so for some time. The Chinese
appear to have a clear understanding of its importance, and they plan
to add 20 million wheelbarrows and animal-drawn transport vehicles in
1959. This appears to be more a modernization than an expansion of
native transport. China relies heavily on its native transport for
short-haul, low-priority freight and will continue to do so.
* For methodology, see Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 8
Communist China: Highway Classification Selection
by Functional Use
1958
Functional Description
Important international highways; highways that connect
with important political, economic, and cultural centers;
important interprovincial highways; and highways that
connect with important mines and industrial and/or trans-
portation centers.
Highways of secondary importance that connect with locali-
ties of the categories mentioned above as well as those
connecting with large farms and ranches, important har-
bors and riverports, railroad stations, and airfields.
Highways that connect with the seats of government of
special districts, hsiens (counties) and municipalities,
mines, enterprises, farms, and transportation centers of
medium importance.
Highways of general serviceability that provide communi-
cations between hsiens, between hsiens and communes, be-
tween communes, and within communes.
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Class of Highway
I, II, and III
II, III, and IV
IV, V, and VI
V and VI
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Table 9
Communist China: Highway Specifications a/
1958
Class of Highway
12/
Specification
Unit
I
II
III
IV
V
VI-A
VI-B
Designed speeds
Miles per hour
75
62
50
37
25
16
16
Number of lanes
Each
4
2
2
2
2
2
1
Width of each
lane 1/
Feet
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
Width of road
surface f/
Feet
46
23
23
23
23
20
10 to 15
Width of roadbed li
Feet
75
39
36
33
30
26
15 to 21
Minimum radius of
curvature g/ '
Feet
1,968
1,312
820
410
164
66
49 1)/
Unobstructed vision
Stopping
Feet
492
410
328
246
164
115
82 h/
Passing
Feet
N.A.
820
656
492
328
230
N.A.
Maximum grade i/
Level land
Percent
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
Mountainous
Percent
N.A.
N.A.
5
6
7
8
9
a. 67/. The figures given are those prescribed for roads in level areas and moun-
tainous areas only. For other types of terrain, modifications of the above specifica-
tions may be used.
b. See Table 8, p. 24, above.
c. The speeds given are the speed limits for light cars. The speeds of truck-trailer
trains are to be somewhat lower.
d. The width of each lane is considerably greater than that formerly regarded as
sufficient, in order to provide more space for truck-trailer trains.
e. On Class V highways with only light traffic, the width of the road surface may be
reduced to 21 feet. Where a road is about to cross a ford, the cross-section slope
of the road surface should not exceed 3 percent.
f. Under certain conditions the width of the roadbed may be less than the above
specifications by about 3 feet. On single-lane highways the road surface should be
somewhat widened at intervals of 656 to 1,640 feet to facilitate vehicles passing each
other. On roads where there is much native cart traffic, it is advisable to widen the
roadbed and to strengthen the shoulders or even to build a separate road or an addi-
tional lane.
g. No change has been made in the radius of curvature of hairpin bends, but the road
surfaces should be widened at those points. The minimum distance between adjacent
hairpin bends should be 66 feet. Where a curved road also dips downward to cross a
valley or ravine, the minimum radius of the curvature should be 656 feet.
h. In the case of Class VI-B (simple highways), where traffic is light and construc-
tion difficult, if money-saving specifications are followed with reference to radius
of curvature and length of unobstructed vision, the speed should be reduced, even
though the highways may be used by truck-trailer trains.
i. At individual points on Class III and Class IV highways that cross mountain
ranges involving engineering difficulties, the grade may be increased by 1 percent.
Grades of 5 percent in level areas or 8 percent in mountains should not be more than
984 feet long. Continuous grades of greater than 6 percent in mountainous areas
should not be longer than 2,625 feet. Where animal-drawn traffic is heavy, grades
should not be longer than 1,640 feet. If the upgrade is very long, it should be inter-
spersed with stretches not less than 262 feet long with grades not more than 3 percent.
These grades should be suitably reduced for curved roads and for roads on elevated
plateaus.
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Table 10
Communist China: Highway Classification Selection
by Density of Traffic a/
1958
Traffic
(Vehicles per 24 Hours)
More than 5,000
3,001 to 5,000
1,501 to 3,000
801 to 1,500
301 to 800
300 or less
Class of Highway
Level Terrain
Mountainous Terrain
a. 68/. See Table 8, p. 24, above.
Table 11
Communist China: Truck Performance
with Which Highway Specifications Should Comply 2/
1958
Type
Terrain of Truck
Load
(Tons) Average Speed
(Kilometers
Gross Net per Hour)
Level Liberation 30
IFA 116 12/ 45
Mountainous Liberation 20
IFA 116 b?/ 30
20 More than 25
30 More than 25
12 15 to 20
20 5 to 10
Trailer Capability
(Units)
4-Ton Equivalent
Trailers Alternative
4 5 (3-ton)
6 4 (6-ton)
2 3 (3-ton)
3 2 (6-ton)
a. 69/. Tonnages are given in metric tons in this table.
b. East German-made, 4 x 2 drive, 6.5-ton, 120-horsepower diesel truck.
(The expression 4 x 2 indicates that the truck has four wheels, two of
which are driven.)
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
1. Truck Park
The estimates in this report on the truck park in Communist China
are for freight trucks only and exclude all other vehicles (for ex-
ample, three-wheeled vehicles, buses, and automobiles). The term
combined park is used to designate the total truck park, including both
civilian and military trucks. The term civilian park refers to the sum
of two distinct truck parks, both of which are state owned, the first
of which is operated by state-owned transport agencies and the second
of which is owned and operated by functional government agencies and/or
industries. The military park does not have a similar division and is
referred to by the term military park.
The method used to estimate the civilian park is essentially his-
torical. If complete data were available concerning retirement, im-
ports, and the allocation of additions to the civilian and military
parks, this method alone would yield reliable estimates. Unfortunately,
information on retirement rates is almost nonexistent, data on imports
are incomplete, and little is known about allocations. To compensate
for this lack of material, a deductive method of weighing estimates of
the civilian park against performance figures has been used. The esti-
mates of the park have given a residual figure representing the addi-
tions to the park. This residual figure represents imports plus
domestic production less retirement.
Estimates of the civilian park are based on reported data (which
are assumed to be firm) for 1950 and 1956. The difference between
these two figures indicates an average annual rate of growth of 10.3
percent. This average rate of growth was used to obtain estimates of
the park for 1951-55. The results then were compared with import re-
quirements, with an assumed retirement rate, and with performance
figures. The results appear to substantiate the estimates of the park
that are shown in Table 12.*
The Chinese Communist civilian truck park is estimated to have been
40,000 units in 1950. 70/ The 1956 estimate of 72,000 trucks is based
on an official statement that the "number of trucks owned by government
organizations and enterprises totals more than 35,000, a figure com-
parable to the total number of trucks 6wned by highway motor organizations
* Table 12 follows on p. 28.
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Table 12
Communist China: Estimated Total Civilian Truck Park, a/ Additions, and Performance
1950-58
Performance
Year
Thousand Trucks
Billion
Ton-Kilometers 1/
Average
Ton-Kilometers
per Truck e/
(Thousand?
Metric Tons)
Park 12/
Additions
Production
Import
Requirements 9./
1950
40 f/
N.A.
0
N.A.
0.373
9
1951
44 ?
4
o
4.8
0.503
12
1952
49g/
5
o
5.9
0.678
15
1953
54
5
o
6.0
1.18
23
1954
59
5
o
6.1
1.87
33
1955
65
6
o
7.2
2.51
4o
1956
72 h/
7
1.65
8.1 i/
3.49
51
1957
80 g/
8
7.50
6.4 T/
3.79
50
1958
96
16
15.0
11.7 73/
5.29
58 1/
a. Truck park of state-owned transport agencies plus truck park of functional government agencies (see p. 27, above).
b. As of the end of each year.
c. Unless otherwise indicated, annual additions plus park retirements at the rate of 2 percent of the previous year's park.
d. See Table 3, p. 10, above.
e. Unless otherwise indicated, total performance divided by midyear civilian park.
f. 71/
g. 1'more than 20,000" vehicles for "before 1953" and "more than 44,000" vehicles for 1957. /2/ The
state-owned transport agency park of 38,580 trucks plus 5,600 buses for 1957 gives a total transport agency vehicle park of
44,180. Thus it is believed that k?efers to the state-owned transport agency vehicle park only, excluding
the functional government agency park.
h. 73/
i. Additions to the park plus retirements at the rate of 3 percent per year based on the previous year's park less one-
half domestic production (see also p. 29, below). The assumption is made that available additions would be equally divided
between the military and civilian parks. The mechanics of distribution -- for example, new vehicles allocated to the mili-
tary park which in turn might transfer older vehicles to the civilian park -- do not affect this assumption.
j. Additions to the park plus retirements at the rate of 4 percent per year based on the previous year's park less one-
half domestic production (see also p. 29, below).
k. Average civilian park of 88,000 trucks plus 3,250 to adjust for the 13,000 military trucks used during the fourth quarter
of 1958 to give an average estimated midyear civilian truck park of 91,250. Total ton-kilometer performance for 1958 (5.29
billion divided by 91,250) gives an average vehicle performance of 58,000 ton-kilometers for 1958.
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throughout the country."* 74/ These estimates are confirmed by the
statement in 1956 that "the number of passenger cars and lorries in the
country is 4o percent more than in 1952 ... ."** The authorities
in a statement concerning older trucks, also stated that their older
trucks were responsible "for the same transport quota (calculated at
50,000 ton-kilometers a year) ... ." 76/ An application of this quota
to the 1956 performance figure gives an average park requirement of
69,800 trucks.*** Because of road conditions, shortages of fuel, and
other inhibiting factors, this method of estimating the civilian park
would not be applicable before 1956.
Early in 1959 the Chinese Communists announced that the number of
trucks "under road departments" was 38,580 in 1957 and 49,000 in 1958. 77/
An announced addition of 12,000 trucks**** in 1958 78/ indicates a re-
tirement rate of 4 percent for 1958. In computing the import require-
ments, this figure has been used for 1958, a 3-percent retirement rate
for 1956-57, and a 2-percent rate for the years before 1956. The state-
ment that 37,000 trucks are more than 17 years of age 79/ indicates that
4 percent may be too high a rate for the period before 1958. The figures
of 2 and 3 percent have been chosen and assigned arbitrarily. These
older trucks, representing 39 percent of the 1958 civilian park, should
prevent the retirement rate from dropping below 4 percent in the future.
In September 1958 the Chinese Communists also announced that there
were "... more than 47,000 trucks belonging to government organs and
enterprises ... ." 182/ On the assumption that because of urgent trans-
portation requirements no additional trucks were allocated to the
functional government agency park, the civilian park at the end of 1958
* "More than 35,000" is construed to mean about 36,000. A "compar-
able" number owned by highway transport organizations also is construed
to be about 36,000.
** This statement, made in October 1956, probably would refer to an
end-of-1955 or mid-1956 park. On the assumption that the growth of
passenger cars would have only a slight effect on the total percentage
increase, the statement would indicate a truck park of 68,600. Based
on Table 12, p. 28, above, the mid-1956 park would be 68,500.
*** Performance of 3.49 billion ton-kilometers divided by 50,000
ton-kilometers per truck. Because the statement refers to average
performance, the 69,800 represents the average (or near midyear)
park. The same procedure applied to the 1957 performance indicates
an average (or near midyear) park of 75,800 trucks. Based on Table 12,
the mid-1957 park would be 76,000 trucks.
**** This announcement refers to the addition to the transport agency
park. The addition to the functional government agency park was
4,000 trucks.
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was not less than 96,000 trucks.* This procedure gives estimates of
36,000,** 38,580,*** and 49,000*** for the state-owned transport
agency parks for 1956, 1957, and 1958, respectively. The functional
government agency park would be 36,000** in 1956 and 47,000 in 1958.
.Choosing the midpoint between these two figures gives a government
agency park for 1957 of 41,500 trucks. The latter figure added to the
figure of 38,580 for the state-owned transport park for 1957 gives a
civilian park for 1957 of 80,000 trucks. The relative ratio of growth
in the civilian parks for 1957 and 1958 is thus 1 to 2, or 8,000 trucks
added in 1957 to 16,000 added in 1958. This estimate appears to be
correct in view of the production ratio of 1 to 2 for 1957-58 and press
announcements concerning increased imports during 1958.
Based on estimates in Table 12,**** total import requirements for
1951-55 (until domestic production began) were 30,500, or an average
of about 6,100 trucks per year.. In late 1957 the Chinese Communists
stated that "heavy motor trucks with a total capacity of more than
40,000 tons" had been imported "during the past few years." 82/ On
the assumption of an average truck capacity of 3 to 4 tons, biased
toward the lower figure, the number of trucks would be 10,000 to
13,333. Although the 13,333 trucks represent a total slightly less
than in any period of more than 1 year immediately before 1957, the
statement does not detract from the validity of the estimates shown
in Table 12.
These
for error
appear to
amined in
Communist
transport
estimates and the procedure by which they were derived allow
at almost every juncture. The scattered bits of information
substantiate the estimates, however, and the analysis, ex-
its entirety) shows increases consistent with official Chinese
announcements regarding the growth and performance of truck
in China.
2. Commodity Composition of Truck Transport
The main source for deriving the estimates shown for truck trans-
port in Table 5t is a Chinese Communist press statement that the
transportation of steel, coal, grain, and cotton generally accounts
for approximately 60 percent of the total volume of highway transport
in the country. .11.3i The estimated amount of steel (crude, finished,
and imported) transported is shown in Table 5 to be 3.1 million tons,
or about 2 percent of the total tons originated by truck transport.
* A state-owned transport agency park of 49,000 trucks plus a
functional government agency park of 47,000 trucks.
** See the first footnote on D. 29, above.
50X1
**** P. 28, above.
t P. 12, above.
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Because of the considerable degree of integration in the Chinese steel
industry, only a little of the modern production of crude and finished
steel had to be moved for the next stage of processing. The estimate
of 3.1 million tons consists of 1 million ton of crude steel, most of
which was native production; 1.6 million tons of finished steel, most
of which moved from modern steel plants to machine-building plants;
and about 0.5 million ton of steel imports distributed by truck.
Cotton moved by truck probably was more than equal to the total govern-
ment procurement of ginned cotton (about 2 million tons) because it
possibly would be moved to ginning plants by truck and probably would
be moved by truck from the plants to railroads or waterways and again
by truck to spinning and weaving factories. This movement is there-
fore assumed to be about 2.5 million tons, or about 1 percent of the
figure for total highway transport.
Grain, according to a Chinese Communist periodical published in
1957, accounted for 13 percent of the volume of highway transport. !!').1./
Without more recent information, this percentage was applied to 1958,
giving a figure of 23 million tons of grain originated by truck
transport. The figure for coal, then, is the difference between the
sum of the percentages for steel, cotton, and grain and the quoted
60 percent, or about 44 percent of the total. Although 44 percent
appears to be a large proportion of tlie total to devote to the move-
ment of coal, the absolute amount, 78 million tons, is small when con-
sidered in connection with the amount of coal to be hauled. Production
of coal in 1958 was about 280 million tons, of which about 208 million
tons were produced in modern mines. Of the 208 million tons of modern
mine production, it is estimated that 10 percent were consumed at the
mines, leaving nearly 190 million tons to be moved from the mines.
The railroads transported about 150 million tons, according to the
Minister of Railroads, and inland waterways are estimated to have
transported a little less than 20 million tons. Therefore, trucks
must have been used to transport the other 20 million tons from the
modern mines. Even though some of the modern mines are served mainly
by inland waterways or railroads, trucks are used to haul coal from the
mines to the railroads or waterways. Again, in the distribution of
some of the coal to the consuming factories, trucks have to be used.
The limitation of this traffic to a total of 78 million tons origi-
nated by motor vehicles must have been difficult and probably was
done only because of the lack of truck trandport capacity.
The estimates of truck movements of timber and POL in Communist
China were derived, taking into consideration the geographic location
of the areas of production, consumption, or processing; the availa-
bility of modern transport; and the degree of modernization of the
industries. Although truck transport of these two commodities is
exceedingly important to the industrial sector of the economy, timber
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accounts for only about 3 percent and POL for only 2 percent of the
tons originated by truck.
The total of ferrous minerals and metals moved by truck is shown
on Table 5* to be 8.9 million tons, or about 5 percent of the highway
tons originated. Besides the 3.1 million tons of steel discussed
above, about 1 million tons of pig iron, most of which was native
production, probably moved by truck to steel plants. The amount of
agricultural goods moved by truck, other than government-procured
grain and cotton, is believed to have been mall, less than 1 million
tons. Although some vegetable oils, sweet potatoes, leafy vegetables,
and the like probably moved on commune trucks, these are goods which
could easily have been moved by native transport while the trucks
were diverted to the iron and steel drive and to the establishment
of commune industry and commune construction.
The total percentage devoted to the categories discussed above
(agricultural goods, 15 percent; coal, 44 percent; ferrous materials,
5 percent; timber, 3 percent; and POL, 2 percent) amount to 69 percent.
The only important category of highway transport not yet discussed is
that of mineral construction materials. It is estimated that, of the
31 percent remaining, at least 10 percent would be occupied by other
miscellaneous items carried by truck, leaving 21 percent for mineral
construction materials.
3. Labor Costs in Native Land Transport
The Chinese Communists have recently announced that at the end of
1958 there were about 24.4 million carts throughout the country en-
gaged exclusively or part time in transportation. L3.2/ The Minister of
Communications also announced in September 1959 that there were about
7.9 million persons, 3.58 million vehicles of various sorts, and
100,000 boats engaged in short-distance transportation./ On the
assumption of 1 person per cart, the figures indicate 3.58 million
to 24 million persons engaged in native land transport at some time
during the year. An application of the lower range (that is, 3.58
million persons) to the estimated labor force of 400,000 in truck
transport in 1958 indicates that native land transport is about 9
times as labor intensive, but this figure does not take into account
persons engaged part time in transportation. The performance of
various types of native land transport, derived from scattered
Chinese statements, is shown in Table 13.**
* P. 12, above.
** Table 13 follows on p. 33.
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Table 13
Communist China: Comparison of Performance
of Native Land Transport and Truck Transport
1958
Type of
Transportation
Percent of
Average
Ton-Kilometers Performance
Per Year per Truck a/
Labor Required
to Replace
One Truck b/
(Persons)
Porter
490 c/
0.8
118
Three-wheeled
hand cart
3,780 d/
6.5
15
Animal-drawn cart
9,000 -J/
15.5
6
a. Percent of estimated average performance
per truck in 1958.
b. Truck performance of 58,000 ton-kilometers
performance.
c. Derived annual performance. 87/
d. Derived annual performance. 77/
e. Estimated annual performance, on the assumption
carried 30 kilometers per day.
of 58,000 ton-kilometers
divided by native
of a 1-ton load
Because the most efficient type of native land transport -- that is,
animal-drawn carts -- requires six persons to replace one truck and be-
cause the available animal-drawn carts represent only 24 percent of the
total number of carts available,* it is estimated that native land trans-
port is at least 10 times as labor intensive as truck transport. Based
on this assumption, the labor force of 40o,000 in truck transport** for
1958 has been multiplied by 10 to yield an estimate of 4 million persons
engaged in native land transport during 1958. This figure is an approxi-
mation and is intended only to indicate the magnitude of labor supply
necessary to native land transport.
* See p. 32, above.
** This figure represents only operating personnel. Workers engaged
in road construction and maintenance would serve both sectors of high-
way transport.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
SELECTED HIGHWAYS
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SECRET
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